ISSUE 144 June 2012 Beyond the Principal Warfare Office – a respectful retort Positioning the RAN for Future Maritime Warfare The Republic of Singapore Navy Engaging Former JI Detainees in Countering Extremism: Can it Work? A ‘close run thing?’ Evaluating the capabilities of the Argentine Military in the Falklands Conflict The Yawning Capability Gap: the ADF and ‘Brown Water’ Warfare Assessing the 2009 White Paper Submarines, ASW and the South China Sea. A cause for concern CN SPEECH – Australian Navy Foundation Day JOURNAL OF THE QinetiQ Maritime Oceans of Experience QinetiQ is a leading international provider of independent technology based services and solutions to Defence, Aerospace and Security Markets. Our clients benefit from 300 specialist staff based in Australia and the ability to draw upon the expertise, experience and knowledge of over 10,000 QinetiQ employees from across the globe. 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For more information contact our Maritime team: Tel: 1800 038 081 www.QinetiQ.com.au Issue 144 3 ERRATUM Contents Vernon Parker Oration, Australian Naval Institute – 4 August 2011 Beyond the Principal Warfare Officer Apologies to author, RADM James Goldrick, RAN – a respectful retort 4 (Errata page 6, Headmark 143) Positioning the RAN for Future However, although substantial generally produce very high quality Maritime Warfare 8 efforts were made to create an work), many governments funded indigenous naval shipbuilding and naval shipbuilding at levels so low repair industry, the way in which the that they caused building schedules to The Republic of Singapore Navy 14 new Service was grown also meant that become unduly protracted and their many of the inherent risks were not products even more expensive than fully understood by the government, they should have been. This was true Engaging Former JI Detainees in by the electorate or by industry. In for the cruiser HMAS Adelaide, known Countering Extremism: Can it Work? 19 particular, Australia had little or no as HMAS ‘Long Delayed’ in the early exposure to just how difficult it is to 1920s and true for the destroyer and identify the right technologies and frigate programs in the 1950s. Here we A ‘close run thing?’ Evaluating the get them into service. The British did can see a direct relationship between capabilities of the Argentine Military in the job and carried the risks and all the size of the fleet unit that the nation the Falklands Conflict 21 Australia had to do was acquire and was willing to support and the ability adapt in very limited ways to meet our for that unit to be generated efficiently F ront page photograph: needs. and at reasonable cost within Australia. HMAS Choules (L100), The Yawning Capability Gap: the ADF There was also the question of There were other, more subtle Navy’s newest addition and ‘Brown Water’ Warfare 33 resources. A sustained in-country problems. The new Service was to the fleet, and HMAS shipbuilding effort was just possible, sometimes viewed by outsiders Labuan (L128) off but only if money was consistently as uncritically reflecting British Cowley Beach for Assessing the 2009 White Paper and committed. Unfortunately, although views when in fact its people were Exercise Sea Lion 2012. its Outline of Force 2030 as a Maritime matters got off to a reasonable, albeit demonstrating a naval outlook, The ships are part Strategy in the Light of Corbett’s of a simulated Non- expensive start in 1911, post-war particularly an outlook that appreciated ‘England In The Seven Years War’ 43 economies would soon slow and that national security was more Combatant Evacuation then halt new warship construction, than the simple defence of national Operation. Note the 2 initiating a series of stops and starts territory. This should not have been degree incline of HMAS Submarines, ASW and the South China Choules due to the that punctuated the remainder of the surprising, particularly as some in the Sea. A cause for concern 49 century. It would always be a dilemma RAN failed to make the distinction flooding of her well dock for governments to make the choice between the United Kingdom and the which allows landing between expensive and protracted navy themselves and were occasionally craft to drive inside the CN SPEECH – Australian Navy hull whilst the ship is local construction, with the significant ‘captured’ by the ethos of Britain to a Foundation Day, Creswell Oration 65 set-up costs involved but with real degree that made it difficult for them to at sea ( photo courtesy benefits for national development or operate comfortably in the Australian of RAN, Credit: Darren 1 Hilder) purchasing off others’ building lines national environment , but it also Book Reviews 72 and enjoying the economies of scale tended to make it very hard for them and reduced risks. to argue a naval case amongst national However, notwithstanding the high defence policy makers. Visions from the Vault 79 cost of Australian workers (who did The focus on professional training… Issue Number 144 Printed by Style Notes for Headmark 81 Everbest Printing SPONSORS: Company - RAYTHEON - BOOZ & COMPANY - AUSTAL ISSN 1833-6531 - THALES NAVAL GROUP - DMS MARITME - QINETIQ - ATI - SAAB ANI Membership Application Form 82 + Design & DTP by - AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE CREDIT UNION - LOPAC - BLOHM VOSS NAVAL Diane Bricknell [email protected] Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 4 Beyond the Principal Warfare Officer – a respectful retort BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER EDMONDSON n reading Rear Admiral the focus of training the future PWO debate to ask how the RAN intends Goldrick’s article Beyond the should be on the set up and operation to develop warfare officers capable of OPrincipal Warfare Officer1 in the of the systems which they will utilise operating at Task Group/Force level. June 2011 edition of Headmark, I felt to fight their ships. This is a move The Defence White Paper of compelled to take up his challenge away from the current practise of rote 20093 brings a distinctly maritime and join in the debate. Although a learning of pre-planned reactions to emphasis to the question of Australia’s recent lateral transfer from the Royal respond to a threat. In responding I security needs, and this strategy is Navy, I am acutely aware of Admiral argue that whilst system knowledge is a clearly brought into focus by the Goldrick’s reputation as a Naval Officer key enabler to the professional warfare procurement programme for the RAN with significant operational experience officer, the implications of future as part of Force 2030; in particular the and additionally, as a world-renowned maritime warfare will demand more Air Warfare Destroyers (AWD) and historian and masterly author. than system knowledge and software Docked Landing Vessels (LHD). The However, before committing myself expertise. white paper is the blueprint that is to the discourse I take courage from It is my intention to put forward shaping the Navy for what Professor Professor Geoffrey Till’s adage that a a case for a more generalist, broadly Till describes as the modernist Navy where ideas are freely distributed, educated PWO who relies upon approach, where weapons and sensor discussed and challenged, irrespective warfare directors at the Senior mixes emphasise defence against such of their origin, performs better.2 This Sailor level to oversee the automated capabilities that can only be held by paper proffers a different perspective response of the weapon systems whilst other states.4 on the future of the Principal Warfare he or she looks outward from the Ship. Three years on from the publication Officer (PWO), their education and Congruous to the strategic direction in of the Defence White Paper the work training. which COMWAR intends to develop to develop the Navy from a single The key tenet of the article was that the surface forces I also expand the frigate ‘boarding’ Navy to a force H ow best to fight the ship? German Navy Sachsen-class air defence frigate FGS Hamburg (Photo by Michael Nitz) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 5 centred on fighting a Task Group his thesis for from the high seas into the littoral is future conflict being taken forward with gusto by the around the warfare community. This was clearly persuasive ‘hybrid evident to the author at the Fleet war’ argument of Warfare Forum held at HMAS Watson Frank Hoffman7 in December 2011. At this event it ‘that blend the was both energising and interesting lethality of state to hear about the work being done conflict with at the various projects to achieve the the fanatical ambitious but deadly serious goal of and protracted having a ‘modern’ navy within such a fervour of challenging time scale. irregular warfare’. ineffectiveness to exert the soft power PWO command extends to more than one ship In the context of these major Obviously it is inordinately difficult to of influence with any great effect. - the flotilla concepts warship procurement projects for predict the exact nature of warfare in What are the implications for the demanded of new the RAN, Admiral Goldrick’s article the future, but the ‘hybrid war’ model PWO in this world? Without doubt battlegroups will be chimes with many. The leap in seems as valid as many other schools of they will be operating in an increasingly high. Graphic of LHD capabilities from the FFG to the AWD, thought. complex and confusing environment, alongside and for the ASMD upgrade for the FFH This not so distant future features with more technology at their control will require a step change in systems the increasingly likely scenario of state than ever before.