ISSUE 144

June 2012 Beyond the Principal Warfare Office – a respectful retort Positioning the RAN for Future Maritime Warfare The Republic of Navy Engaging Former JI Detainees in Countering Extremism: Can it Work? A ‘close run thing?’ Evaluating the capabilities of the Argentine Military in the Falklands Conflict The Yawning Capability Gap: the ADF and ‘Brown Water’ Warfare Assessing the 2009 White Paper Submarines, ASW and the South China Sea. A cause for concern CN SPEECH – Australian Navy Foundation Day

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For more information contact our Maritime team: Tel: 1800 038 081 www.QinetiQ.com.au Issue 144 3 ERRATUM Contents Vernon Parker Oration, Australian Naval Institute – 4 August 2011 Beyond the Principal Warfare Officer Apologies to author, RADM , RAN – a respectful retort 4 (Errata page 6, Headmark 143) Positioning the RAN for Future However, although substantial generally produce very high quality Maritime Warfare 8 efforts were made to create an work), many governments funded indigenous naval shipbuilding and naval shipbuilding at levels so low repair industry, the way in which the that they caused building schedules to The Republic of Singapore Navy 14 new Service was grown also meant that become unduly protracted and their many of the inherent risks were not products even more expensive than fully understood by the government, they should have been. This was true Engaging Former JI Detainees in by the electorate or by industry. In for the cruiser HMAS Adelaide, known Countering Extremism: Can it Work? 19 particular, Australia had little or no as HMAS ‘Long Delayed’ in the early exposure to just how difficult it is to 1920s and true for the and identify the right technologies and programs in the 1950s. Here we A ‘close run thing?’ Evaluating the get them into service. The British did can see a direct relationship between capabilities of the Argentine Military in the job and carried the risks and all the size of the fleet unit that the nation the Falklands Conflict 21 Australia had to do was acquire and was willing to support and the ability adapt in very limited ways to meet our for that unit to be generated efficiently F ront page photograph: needs. and at reasonable cost within Australia. HMAS Choules (L100), The Yawning Capability Gap: the ADF There was also the question of There were other, more subtle Navy’s newest addition and ‘Brown Water’ Warfare 33 resources. A sustained in-country problems. The new Service was to the fleet, and HMAS shipbuilding effort was just possible, sometimes viewed by outsiders Labuan (L128) off but only if money was consistently as uncritically reflecting British Cowley Beach for Assessing the 2009 White Paper and committed. Unfortunately, although views when in fact its people were Exercise Sea Lion 2012. its Outline of Force 2030 as a Maritime matters got off to a reasonable, albeit demonstrating a naval outlook, The ships are part Strategy in the Light of Corbett’s of a simulated Non- expensive start in 1911, post-war particularly an outlook that appreciated ‘England In The Seven Years War’ 43 economies would soon slow and that national security was more Combatant Evacuation then halt new warship construction, than the simple defence of national Operation. Note the 2 initiating a series of stops and starts territory. This should not have been degree incline of HMAS Submarines, ASW and the South China Choules due to the that punctuated the remainder of the surprising, particularly as some in the Sea. A cause for concern 49 century. It would always be a dilemma RAN failed to make the distinction flooding of her well dock for governments to make the choice between the and the which allows landing between expensive and protracted navy themselves and were occasionally craft to drive inside the CN SPEECH – Australian Navy hull whilst the ship is local construction, with the significant ‘captured’ by the ethos of Britain to a Foundation Day, Creswell Oration 65 set-up costs involved but with real degree that made it difficult for them to at sea ( photo courtesy benefits for national development or operate comfortably in the Australian of RAN, Credit: Darren 1 Hilder) purchasing off others’ building lines national environment , but it also Book Reviews 72 and enjoying the economies of scale tended to make it very hard for them and reduced risks. to argue a naval case amongst national However, notwithstanding the high defence policy makers. Visions from the Vault 79 cost of Australian workers (who did The focus on professional training… Issue Number 144

Printed by Style Notes for Headmark 81 Everbest Printing SPONSORS: Company - RAYTHEON - BOOZ & COMPANY - AUSTAL ISSN 1833-6531 - THALES NAVAL GROUP - DMS MARITME - QINETIQ - ATI - SAAB ANI Membership Application Form 82 + Design & DTP by - AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE CREDIT UNION - LOPAC - BLOHM VOSS NAVAL Diane Bricknell [email protected] Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 4 Beyond the Principal Warfare Officer – a respectful retort By Edmondson

n reading Rear the focus of training the future PWO debate to ask how the RAN intends Goldrick’s article Beyond the should be on the set up and operation to develop warfare officers capable of OPrincipal Warfare Officer1 in the of the systems which they will utilise operating at Task Group/Force level. June 2011 edition of Headmark, I felt to fight their ships. This is a move The Defence White Paper of compelled to take up his challenge away from the current practise of rote 20093 brings a distinctly maritime and join in the debate. Although a learning of pre-planned reactions to emphasis to the question of Australia’s recent lateral transfer from the Royal respond to a threat. In responding I security needs, and this strategy is Navy, I am acutely aware of Admiral argue that whilst system knowledge is a clearly brought into focus by the Goldrick’s reputation as a Naval Officer key enabler to the professional warfare procurement programme for the RAN with significant operational experience officer, the implications of future as part of Force 2030; in particular the and additionally, as a world-renowned maritime warfare will demand more Air Warfare (AWD) and historian and masterly author. than system knowledge and software Docked Landing Vessels (LHD). The However, before committing myself expertise. white paper is the blueprint that is to the discourse I take courage from It is my intention to put forward shaping the Navy for what Professor Professor Geoffrey Till’s adage that a a case for a more generalist, broadly Till describes as the modernist Navy where ideas are freely distributed, educated PWO who relies upon approach, where weapons and sensor discussed and challenged, irrespective warfare directors at the Senior mixes emphasise defence against such of their origin, performs better.2 This Sailor level to oversee the automated capabilities that can only be held by paper proffers a different perspective response of the weapon systems whilst other states.4 on the future of the Principal Warfare he or she looks outward from the Ship. Three years on from the publication Officer (PWO), their education and Congruous to the strategic direction in of the Defence White Paper the work training. which COMWAR intends to develop to develop the Navy from a single The key tenet of the article was that the surface forces I also expand the frigate ‘boarding’ Navy to a force

H ow best to fight the ship? German Navy Sachsen-class air defence frigate FGS Hamburg (Photo by Michael Nitz) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 5

centred on fighting a Task Group his thesis for from the high seas into the littoral is future conflict being taken forward with gusto by the around the warfare community. This was clearly persuasive ‘hybrid evident to the author at the Fleet war’ argument of Warfare Forum held at HMAS Watson Frank Hoffman7 in December 2011. At this event it ‘that blend the was both energising and interesting lethality of state to hear about the work being done conflict with at the various projects to achieve the the fanatical ambitious but deadly serious goal of and protracted having a ‘modern’ navy within such a fervour of challenging time scale. irregular warfare’. ineffectiveness to exert the soft power PWO command extends to more than one ship In the context of these major Obviously it is inordinately difficult to of influence with any great effect. - the flotilla concepts warship procurement projects for predict the exact nature of warfare in What are the implications for the demanded of new the RAN, Admiral Goldrick’s article the future, but the ‘hybrid war’ model PWO in this world? Without doubt battlegroups will be chimes with many. The leap in seems as valid as many other schools of they will be operating in an increasingly high. Graphic of LHD capabilities from the FFG to the AWD, thought. complex and confusing environment, alongside and for the ASMD upgrade for the FFH This not so distant future features with more technology at their control will require a step change in systems the increasingly likely scenario of state than ever before. The PWO will knowledge and exploitation. PWO on state conflict, superimposed onto need to be equipped to deal with the training must move with the times and a world influenced by international decisions he/she has to make beyond it needs to evolve from the 1960’s RN non-state actors. All this will be set the confines of the Operations Room model; in this I am in full agreement. within the globalised system where and its sensors. Without exception the My concern, however, is what will be the competition for resources and the sensors and system must be configured the product of a PWO whose training devastating effects of natural disasters correctly for the necessary information takes him or her deep into the world will be played out in increasingly to arrive at his console/command desk, of 0s and 1s; to develop expertise in populated littoral areas. The sliding but this is the job of the engineers ‘understanding the software and of its scale of future conflict and interaction embedded within the Operations room permutations of the data flows and will be conducted amongst people; and its annexes. the factors acting on their rate and reported on not only by the ubiquitous It is the job of the PWO job to lead consistency.’5 Operational knowledge media but also before the citizen and manage his/her team in order to of these new systems is axiomatic, journalists armed with smart phones arrange the facts within the context however, the world in which these and instant connectivity to the internet. of the operational environment and ships will be utilised will demand other This ‘war amongst the people’ as present the case to the Commanding vital skills sets from the PWO. coined by Rupert Smith8 will not be Officer who will ultimately make the I have already touched upon limited to just land forces. Emphasis decision that will most probably have the Defence White Paper’s on soft power versus hard power will to be defended at some point to a acknowledgement of the importance be the key to mission success. In a higher authority. I question whether a of the maritime environment to recent9 book, two British military PWO whose training has focused on Australia’s place in the world. It is officers, Andrew Mackay and Steve systems and software exploitation will undisputable that the global world Tatham, analyse recent conflicts in be best placed to achieve this role. in which we live is dependent upon which they have both been personally There is a precedent regarding trade and technology, and that involved over the previous 30 years, focusing on the technology in the the importance of the sea is a key with particular focus on Iraq and training for war fighting. Navies have component to the system. But what of Afghanistan. They come to the always faced a problem of keeping the nature of warfare and conflict in the conclusion that the common weakness abreast of advancing technologies, and future? to all western militaries has been the a useful example is the revolution in In his prize-winning6 essay, inability to identify the character and naval affairs facing the industrialised Lieutenant Commander Pitcher builds nature of the opponent and thereby the nations at the end of the 19th century. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 6 Beyond the Principal Warfare Officer– a respectful retort

The pre-eminent navy of the day was the PWO to the , and in a 2002 Naval take a step Review article10 Professor Dickenson back, and with argues the case for naval education appropriate drawing upon the experience of the delegation of RN during this period. He makes the ‘command point that despite the challenge of by veto’, he or the technological advances and the she is able to undisputed evidence that warfare was defend the ship changing rapidly ‘the value of ships using control as fighting instruments tended to be orders. The studied from an exclusively technical senior sailor, viewpoint’. There was little time within having spent the training spectrum ‘to thinking considerably about matters such as who the enemy more time on Seamless integration might be or where and how a future the operation of the Ship’s command is running within TA-MW. In of all sorts of battle might be fought’. system, will be more proficient at this researching this paper the author spoke platforms are Dickenson goes on to describe that task than the PWO. with a number USN SWO colleagues demanded from at the outbreak of World War I the Weapon engineers are primarily who had attended this course. The PWOs of the future. Service had generally high standards of selected for the branch based on their overriding message was that although Royal Norwegian Navy Oksoy-class seamanship and navigation, yet there ability for technical reasoning. Their an excellent course, aimed at bringing minehunter, HNoMs was little in the way of imagination training is arduous and extremely prospective Department Heads up Maloy (Photo by and tactical awareness. The naval detailed, enabling them to understand to speed on the system in order to Michael Nitz) community awaited with a misplaced how a weapon system is set up, utilise it tactically, it by no means made confidence a second Trafalgar and maintained and fixed when defective. them subject matter experts – that ‘wondered in what manner the new If correctly utilised, managed and led, takes years of education and on the Nelson might appear’. What followed the WE department should work in job training and is what the technical at the battle of Jutland has been well synergy with the operations team. senior sailors do. studied and is not for further analysis The PWO needs to have an So with the senior warfare sailor here, but what I wish to emphasize understanding of the equipment operating as the director of the system from this broad lesson is that this is not available to him or her, however, the and the WE department providing a new position we find ourselves in, and days of having a combat system such optimum set up and operation of the the consequences for getting it wrong as the main armament to fine tune equipment, how do we get a PWO are not comforting. If it is agreed that are over. Today’s PWO is fighting a who is capable of providing the level of PWO training must move beyond battle for information; literacy and tactical expertise to fight the ship on the 1960’s RN paradigm, what then knowledge of the vocabulary associated behalf of the ? are the alternatives to Rear Admiral with the technology is required, but First principles of warfare and Goldbrick’s proposed deep system and not the ability to re-write computer basic theory need to be ingrained with software knowledge model? programmes. the PWO early and this can be done RAN warfare senior sailors and The systems knowledge of the remotely via the DSN, something weapon engineers respectively need PWO in the RAN (and RN for that that is currently being progressed by to be utilised to control the automated matter) is not adequate. With the a working group at the PWO Faculty defensive reactions and set up the arrival of the AEGIS platforms and at HMAS Watson. This is a simple sensors of the ship under the tactical hopefully the use of the USN training philosophy, but similar to an innovative direction of the PWO. The warfare programme associated with this idea being pioneered in the US by a senior sailor is utilised as a director equipment the system knowledge will non-for profit organisation called the (EW Director, ASW Director and the improve. PWOs heading to the AWD Khan Academy.11 A recent newspaper Missile Director) by the Royal Navy, will probably attend the nine week article12 reports of exceptional results and it is the experience of the author Combat System Officer (CSO) course being achieved by students being able that this works extremely well. It allows in the USA until a similar programme to study, take tests and have their Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 7

progress monitored and mentored This education into all the effects envelope. It is hoped that this article online all before they reach the of maritime power taught on PWO will play a small part in furthering classroom. course and then put into practise debate around the optimisation of Once they reach the classroom during their tours at sea as PWOs will future warfare officer training. t the concepts learnt on line are put equip them to move into the next level into practice utilising the teachers in of their warfare careers and provide person. This translates neatly in the the continuum to man and lead the PWO students arriving having studied ‘modern’ navy. the basics before they arrive on course; In concluding, this paper’s classroom and simulator time can then intention was to counter Rear Admiral be best utilised with the instructors in Goldrick’s proposition that the explaining/demonstrating/practising training of PWO needs to shift away what they have learnt on APWO. from the 1960’s era of pre-planned This remote learning will free up responses moving towards a training instructional time which is where the focused on optimising the operational PWO students will begin to build the effectiveness of the weapon, command skill sets required to deal with the and information management systems. future of hybrid warfare. Knowledge This paper has argued for a swing exploitation, influence activities, towards educating the PWO on a Lieutenant Commander James psychology, behavioural studies, much broader level, taking into account Edmondson, RAN, is serving as a PWO regional studies into patterns of life, the likely future nature of warfare and cyber warfare, need to be studied consisting of a hybrid of state-on-state in HMAS Newcastle. He spent 14 years alongside the more conventional conflict and trans-national violence as a warfare officer in theR oyal Navy issues such as tactics, threats, the within an increasingly busy area of before emigrating to Australia in physical environment, command and operations. September 2011. weapon systems. It could be argued It is assessed that this future will that this would become more of a staff involve much more interaction with the (Endnotes) course than warfare course, but it is peoples on the sea and in the littoral, 1 Rear Admiral James Goldrick, Royal recommended that the PWO of the and thus non-kinetic measures and soft Australian Navy, ‘Beyond the Principal future needs an introduction into these power will have an equally important Warfare Officer’ (Headmark, Issue 140, p13 – 15) subjects early and the PWO course is place to the decision makers. Historical 2 Professor Geoffrey Till, Seapower the optimum place to start. precedence has been drawn with – A guide for the Twenty-First Century. A divergence from the focus on comparison to the state of the RN at (Routledge, 2009), p 139 systems exploitation and equipment the end of the 19th Century with regard 3 Defence White Paper 2009, ‘Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force knowledge is going to equip the to training and education in technology 2030.’ PWOs in the AWDs, LHDs, FFHs and the subsequent consequences 4 Till, ‘Seapower’, p 15 and other future surface combatants seen at the battle of Jutland. The 5 Goldrick, ‘Beyond the PWO’ 6 Lieutenant Command Paul Pitcher to fight successfully and intelligently suggested format to achieve the RN, ‘The Maritime Implications of Future in the complex future maritime more broadly educated PWO is Warfare’(JSCSC Shrivenham, 2009) warfare environment. It will also be the innovative use of information 7 Hoffman, ‘Conflict in the 21st Century’ (as cited by Paul Pitcher) the beginning of developing a broad technology to reduce instructional 8 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force – The and thorough professional warfare time on the basic principals of warfare Art of War in the Modern World. (Penguin knowledge required at the next level and tactics, and introducing subjects books 2005) by officers who will be required to more recognizable to staff course into 9 Mackay and Tatham, ‘Behavioural Conflict’ (Military Studies Press, 2011) man the battle staff of the Australian the PWO curriculum. This paper has 10 Professor H.W.Dickinson, ‘Athens in Amphibious Task Group. These also suggested that the RN concept Sparta: Making the case for Naval Education’ (The Naval Review, Vol 90, No 3, July 2002) officers working at border between of utilizing warfare senior sailors as 11 www.khanacademy.org tactical and operational level will warfare directors is considered to 12 Amanda Bower, ‘Substitute teacher’ (The need to know what influence the allow the PWO to take a step back and Australian Business Magazine, Vol 4/No forces under their control will wield. focus outside of the weapon systems 11,December 2011) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 8 Positioning the RAN for Future Maritime Warfare Bay C pt in PJ Leavy, RAN

ear Admiral James Goldrick focus on the systems, hardware and advanced weapons and sensors recently published a piece networks that will see the ADF evolve entering the international market. Rin Headmark on the future of the into a seamless force under a unified, Most countries can now buy highly Principle Warfare Officer (PWO) joint command. However, the key to capable weapons. They do not have to in the RAN.1 This article seeks to any Network Centric Warfare (NCW) spend years developing their own or contribute to that debate by exploring initiative is the human factor: people be a “technologically advanced” nation the human dimension of the future fight, not computers. Navy must to own them. Indeed technological networked develop the right people, with the advantage is becoming less relevant at (ADF) articulated in Force 2030.2 It right skills, to successfully operate in the individual ship system and platform recommends an expanded role for the future, networked environment. level and is increasingly a function of technical personnel in the Operations Personnel will be required with the how well the platforms and systems Room, greater systems knowledge for technical skills to keep the networks integrate and share information warfare personnel and more specialised and systems optimised together with across the entire battlespace: the core warfare sailors, allowing PWOs to the educated, agile and informed concept of NCW.4 Additionally, the move away from the mechanics of decision makers able to interpret what Information Technology (IT) that will conducting weapon engagements and they see and to react appropriately. drive the future of any networked force focus on decision making. To prepare the future workforce is not a field within which any military New challenges for Australia. Spain’s The Department of Defence has a Navy must understand the maintains an advantage. Commercial Alvaro de Bazan Air range of documents aimed at shaping environment within which they applications now drive IT innovation. Warfare destroyer the ADF’s future capabilities to ensure will operate. Maritime warfare is Militaries have become the users of shown on her visit to success in combat operations.3 They becoming more complex with an ever- well-understood and widespread Australia-photo by generally, although not exclusively, increasing array of technologically commercial technologies, rather than Chris Sattler

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 9

developers of unique technology. on HF/UHF radios, but now include defence situations will see everything The key to future warfare will be web-based applications. Electrical automated except firing. That is, the in deciding if and when to engage a Technical (ET) sailors maintained the system will make threat assessments contact and not the actual mechanics “combat system”, weapons, sensors and and provide recommendations but of undertaking the engagement, which communications equipment, while will require an operator to accept the will be increasingly automated. The CSO and Communications sailors recommendation before a weapon is speed and strategic impact of the operated them. released. modern media and internet mean that Email, persistent chat, secure web Given that computers and the the decision not to engage can be just browsing, Voice Over Internet Protocol seamless movement of electronic data as important as the decision to engage. (VOIP), video teleconferencing and are already fundamental to maritime Using a kinetic weapon will be only high data-rate tactical (and strategic) warfare - and becoming increasingly so one option available to meet a specific links are all now used for planning and - future systems will require dedicated aim. The Navy must have warfare C2 functions at sea. While many of systems managers to monitor, teams able to respond appropriately to these functions are currently hosted configure and optimize the various a wide range of situations in the face of on stand-alone systems, the future will systems and networks. This will be a incomplete, inconsistent or even wrong see such capabilities integrated into the new and different role to the ‘users’ of information. combat system as core components. the system as it is currently understood The future ADF will require all The interfaces between platforms (ie CSO, FC operators). Indeed, many nodes (in Navy’s case the ships, (sea, land and air) will be as seamless, of the functions currently focused submarines, aircraft and headquarters), permanent and at least as important, on by “operators” are becoming to be “connected” electronically so as those within the platform. These automated. Future systems will not that a wide range of information, data interfaces will all rely on high speed need operators to manually work their and orders can be moved around the digital data communications between way through an engagement sequence various sensor, weapons and command software intensive systems utilising the to fire a missile – once the decision is and control (C2) networks. While same commercial technology that will taken to shoot, the mechanics will be this concept is clearly aspirational, and ultimately power the envisaged sensor, computer controlled. there are some significant legal and weapon and C2 nets across the entire While firing weapons will be practical issues to overcome before it force. automated, people will still be required matures, it is the direction in which Modern technology is also to monitor the automated systems that the ADF, along with most comparable increasing the speed of engagements. control the process. Consequently militaries around the world, are The introduction of the AEGIS WEE personnel will be required to proceeding. combat system in the Air Warfare take an ongoing and active role in Advances in IT and computing Destroyers (AWD) will bring an order the Operations Room as the data power have already fundamentally of magnitude increase in Air Warfare communications specialists to monitor changed the way militaries operate. capability of the RAN; a timely increase and optimise computer performance Computer based systems are now used given the range of threats now faced. (akin to the tech support people at throughout most navies, leading to a The speed and lethality of modern your Internet Service Provider – you change in how the “combat system” in missiles will mean that computers don’t see them and they aren’t using the a ship is defined. Historically a ship’s will increasingly be central to decision applications, but their ‘back room’ work combat system (for example, NCDS5) making and execution. Since the is vital to an efficient service.) was a stand alone computer system mid 1990s the ANZAC Class has had In the 1990s the former branches that managed the ship’s sensors and the ability to automatically detect an of Radar Plot (RP), Electronic Warfare weapons to present the Command air contact, assess it as a threat and (EW) and Underwater Control a tactical picture. Information from engage with missiles until the target is (UC) were amalgamated to form the the combat system was passed to destroyed or is no longer a threat – all Combat System Operator (CSO) separate weapon control systems to without any human input other than category. As a result, the sailors conduct engagements with organic the original system setup. While it operating RAN combat systems are weapons. Communications were via will be a brave Captain who allows a not as deeply specialized as they once stand-alone systems, originally limited computer to do everything including were, particularly in EW and Sonar to formal message traffic and voice firing a missile, the norm in most self where true proficiency only comes Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 10 Positioning the RAN for Future Maritime Warfare

with practical experience. While Courses (such as those previously so necessary to move off their “P warfare has certainly benefited from conducted at CDSC for the DDG and Plates”. As a result warfare serials are technological advances, the conduct FFGs) have either been removed or often quite scripted with the PWO of maritime operations is more art restructured to focus on operating the managing a sequence of events, rather than a hard science –although it is system rather than imparting a deep than standing back and applying the an art based on a sound technical technical understanding of how the tactical and strategic appreciations to understanding of the systems in system works. This has, at least in an unfolding situation. In short, the use. One must always be careful part, contributed to an often unhealthy RAN has been through a phase – from to guard against the assumption acceptance of believing “the system” which it is now emerging - where it was that technology will provide the without an understanding of how the ‘training to train’ rather than ‘training “answers” and inadvertently make the system got to that point. to fight’. operator subordinate to the system. The current PWO Course aims This is certainly no criticism of A knowledgeable operator, who to develop the skills to manage an the individuals involved. Indeed, it understands their system (radar, sonar, Operations Room (and external assets), has been impressive to see warfare EW etc) and can correctly interpret the maintain situational awareness and capabilities rise over a relatively information presented, is vital to the develop a range of response options for short period when dedicated training overall capability. This only comes with the PWO to draw upon. The course time and the right opportunities and knowledge combined with experience. trains officers by teaching the relevant assets are available. This indicates Navy has already identified this issue threats and the theory of each warfare that the individual CSO and PWO and there are a number of initiatives discipline, and providing practical core skills are sound but personnel underway to specialise CSO sailors training in managing the reaction require more exposure to realistic in the sonar and EW areas. It will, to threats as they emerge. It must, training opportunities to build a sound however, take time to re-gain those by necessity, be quite scripted with experience base. This was not such an deep specialist skills throughout the students essentially running through issue when weapons were only capable organisation. a checklist of actions appropriate of unit self defence due to their range Coupled with the Navy’s reduction to the situation with which they are relative to the threat. In Air Warfare in deep warfare expertise, over the last faced. While this training is essential exercises for example, aircraft have decade there have been less training for building the individual foundation usually been tasked to pass almost on opportunities in core warfare skills (ie skills, successful completion of the top of ships in order to practice missile reduced training with submarines, high course is only one part of generating a engagements and to get the maximum speed jets, sophisticated EW training capable PWO. training benefit for all weapon systems. aircraft) plus a focus on boarding and The real skill for a PWO is to put This means warfare team are acting in constabulary operations for operational the right mix of responses together self-defence in all but high level serials deployments. This is understandable when faced with a real situation. The which reduces any requirement for given the contemporary threats the ability to apply the right set of tools strategic level appreciation or tactical Navy has been tasked to address, but to each unique situation can only thought beyond anticipating when a means that there are now more junior come from practical experience and strike may occur. Even this aspect is and less experienced personnel in key positive mentoring plus a thorough removed in a serialised program. positions around the Operations Room understanding of how the combat While procedural training is when it comes to traditional warfare system works. Gone are the days when important for building the basic skills.6 a newly graduated PWO would join a operator skills and practicing pre- As a result of the above factors, ship having undertaking a dedicated planned responses, it must be over the last decade PWOs have Combat System Course and join three recognised that this is only one aspect moved away from their core role as other PWOs, two of whom were of modern air warfare. Self defence high level decision-makers, becoming second or third job LCDRs. Newly measures are reactionary in nature more hands-on operators and even graduated PWOs now often join their and therefore following a series of pre- at times helping to compile the ships without a deep understanding planned responses works. However, the tactical picture. Additionally the of their combat system and without future of maritime warfare will be very system’s knowledge of AIO personnel appropriate mentors, making it difficult different. New long range weapons has reduced as dedicated Systems to learn the lessons of experience and systems (SM2 is already here, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 11

AEGIS is coming), coupled with the and equally important, aspects of weapons, sensors and associated ADF’s planned networked capabilities maintaining a Common Operating networks that allow data and (incorporating Link 16, AEWC, JSF Picture. No longer can the system information to seamlessly move around etc), will provide much greater scope be ‘used’ by CSOs until a problem the Force. There will be a merging for discretionary engagements where develops, at which time an ET sailor of the current ‘combat systems’ and making the right decision becomes the ‘fixes’ the problem and hands it back ‘communications systems’ as digital key factor. to the operators. ET sailors must be data transfer, both within and between PWO training (not just the constantly monitoring and optimising units, becomes the norm. PWO Course) must evolve beyond the flow of electronic information This technology will require reactionary, tactical warfare into and system performance, regardless dedicated specialists to maintain, strategic decision making and of whether the system is a radar, a monitor and optimise system deliberate engagements. The same missile system, a threat evaluator or a performance, in addition to the CSOs technology that allows the ADF to be communications path back to higher who actually use the information. The networked also allows images and news headquarters. All are equally as last two decades have seen an increased to be flashed around the world as the important and all will be based on the reliance on technology to provide events unfold so, as mentioned earlier, same commercial technology. contact detections, assessments and the decision not to engage may be just This is not revolutionary: the RAN recommendations, particularly in the as important as the decision to engage. has been on this path for some time. In EW and sonar areas. This has resulted PWOs also need to appreciate and the 1980s Fire Control sailors from the in less operator ‘value adding’ and an incorporate ROE (both ADF and allied Seaman branch were replaced by WEE increase in simply reporting ‘what the - much more difficult when it is not a sailors who assumed responsibility system says’. Coupled with changes to self defence issue), National Intent and for controlling major weapons. This training and branch structures over the second and third order effects of an concept must continue to evolve as the same period, the RAN’s general action. This is the direction in which computer based systems become experience levels in core warfare RAN PWOs must head: to be primarily integrated and ubiquitous. Perhaps disciplines has reduced in recent decision makers. Their core task will two “Operations Room Supervisors” years and PWOs have become more be to determine who to engage and are needed: an “ORS Operations” ‘hands-on operators’ at the expense when - not to execute the mechanics (based on the current POCSS model) of being ‘stand-back decision makers’. of firing a weapon. Indeed, modern focused on the content on the system The introduction of long range weapons mean that conducting Anti and an “ORS Systems” (a WEE sailor) weapons and sensors, such as SM2 and Ship Missile Defence (ASMD) will focused on the performance of the dipping sonar equipped helicopters, require reactions so fast that responses system. The ORS Systems would will provide much greater scope for will need to be computer controlled - manage a team who are constantly discretionary engagements in addition providing the computers are optimised, monitoring and maintaining system to reactionary self defence measures which reinforces the importance of performance to ensure the means and this will require organisational, having the right people monitoring to pass information is available and structural and training changes to system performance and the PWO optimised. This information may be ensure that the future PWOs are understanding how the system will data from a gyro to a missile or from equipped to execute the full range of react and why. a threat evaluator to a console for contemporary maritime warfare tasks. To ensure that the right information display, Link information passing from The following recommendations is available to decision makers, the one ship to another or a chat circuit are designed as a basis for discussion. manning and operation of the Action back to Australia –all will require the They are initial thoughts on how to Information Organisation (AIO) must same technical skills to monitor and move our warfare training, manning, also be reviewed. The Navy of the maintain. skills and mindset in the right direction future will require sailors who both In conclusion, the future ADF and are offered as a starting point for ‘operate’ (CSOs – manage the picture) will be networked under a joint, discussion: and ‘monitor’ (ETs – manage the unified command. High speed data The current CIS and ET(C) system) the combat system. Both the communications will be the core, categories amalgamate, under the CSO and ET personnel will need to enabling technology empowering WEEO, and become responsible report directly to the PWO as integral, the Navy’s future combat systems, for all data communications within Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 12 Positioning the RAN for Future Maritime Warfare

and external to the ship. Over time dedicated training effort introduced to deep systems and technological knowledge plus the requisite this role will become the core WEE rebuild and maximise the experience experience base to make decisions in both the traditional responsibility as data communications base of these specialised groups. warfare disciplines and the emerging technologies that will technology becomes ubiquitous. PWO course be structured to (indeed, already are) be fundamental to maritime warfare. t The WEE community position to provide a stronger foundation upon assume responsibility for the set-up which our PWOs can develop their and constant monitoring of system skills in maintaining situational performance rather than as “on-call” awareness, fighting the ‘fog of war’, maintainers to fix problems. This will understanding ROE, National Intent, be vital in the AWD, but is required strategic guidance, strategic impacts even now in managing stand alone of decisions (media coverage etc), systems. (This is essentially a mindset in addition to the basic, ship borne shift for the current ‘operators’ and warfare skills that they have always ‘maintainers’ who, rather than work in received. The new PWO training ‘series’ as previously, will need to work continuum commencing in 2013 will in ‘parallel’ in the future) be a major step in the right direction The concept of an “ORS Systems” The RAN develop, and PWO course (ideally a WEE sailor) be trialled with teach, tactics and procedures to best a view to developing an understanding employ the longer range weapons being Captain Leavy is currently the Director of the Sea Power of the specific requirements (and introduced (most noticeably SM2, but Centre - Australia in Canberra. He is a Principle Warfare more importantly, the future skillsets) also AEWC, F-18, JSF etc) that will Officer with service in DE, DDG, FFG and ANZAC Class ships, of the job. This concept was started allow for action well beyond the firing including his most recent tour as CO HMAS Stuart where a in HMAS during 2011 unit. In time, this must expand to cope when a dedicated Leading Seaman with weapons being ordered from one large part of the inspiration for this article evolved. (CSO) position was used to monitor unit, controlled by a second and fired the Combat System setup and from a third as the NCW concept performance. matures across the ADF. The current warfare community Sea Training Group be enhanced allow the WEE Department to have and assume much of the responsibility a more active role in the Operations for managing the at-sea training for (Endnotes) Room. The current CSOs will the more advanced training activities, 1 Goldrick, J., Beyond the Principle Warfare Officer, Headmark – retain responsibility for the tactical including the tasking of assets. This Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, Issue 140, January 2011. information that goes into the system, will ensure ships are not pre-warned 2 Defence White Paper 2009 – Defending Australia in the Asia- Pacific Century: Force 2030, Department of Defence, May 2009. but managing the technology will be of what is coming and is the only 3 These documents include: Defence White Paper 2009 – a full time job in itself and the WEE way of developing the PWO skill of Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030, Department is best placed to undertake appreciating an unfolding situation in Department of Defence, May 2009; Force 2020, Department of this role. the face of uncertainty. Defence, June 2002 (CDF’s Future Force Vision); Joint Operations for the 21st Century, ADDP D.3, Department of Defence, June 2007; A review of the current PWO and None of this should be construed Future Maritime Operational Concept 2025, Department of Defence, CSO training schedules be undertaken to imply that Navy’s people are not 2009; NCW Roadmap 2009, Department of Defence, 1 Oct 09; Defence Information and Communications Technology Strategy 2009, to ensure that the right ‘education’ performing nor that the RAN has not Department of Defence, 2009. (in addition to training) is provided met its mission. Indeed, the calibre 4 While Australia can expect to retain a certain technological edge in some areas it won’t be as great as it has been, nor as enduring. to enable a full understanding what of RAN officers and sailors today is 5 NCDS – Naval Combat Data System which was installed is going on behind the HMI in order the best it has ever been and the skills in the Perth Class DDGs and Adelaide Class FFGs prior to their to optimise the system, interpret the and missions the Navy has trained upgrade. While NCDS had Link 11 and was therefore able to share information between ships, it was essentially a stand-alone system information presented and value-add. for have been what the government when compared to the future networked environment envisaged for The re-introduction of detailed Systems has called upon the organisation the ADF. Courses is a major step in the right to deliver. However the emerging 6 Rebuilding these skills is the focus of Commodore Warfare’s (COMWAR) Project Pelorus which, coupled with a move back direction. threats, technological advances and towards more specialisation in our warfare sailors, should see Navy’s The training continuum of the the warfighting concepts behind Force high end warfare skills mature. PWO and CSOs be enhanced with a 2030 mean the RAN must now build Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

14 The Republic of Singapore Navy By Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe

hen Singapore attained entirely on importing from overseas a forum for defence and security independence from its food, water and energy to survive. cooperation, particularly in training. Win 1965, its navy had only three In fact, for decades Singapore has Furthermore, Singapore’s political and ships and a small force complement obtained much of its fresh water from military leadership has continually numbering several hundred personnel Malaysia, and, since 2001 has also strived to keep abreast with the latest and capable of only rudimentary imported its supply of natural gas from developments in military hardware coastal and inshore operations. Indonesia through a 656km pipeline and capabilities and emphasized the However, today much has changed that connects both countries. necessity for a high state of defence and the modern Republic of Singapore However, Singapore’s dependence readiness. Navy (RSN) has since expanded, on both Malaysia and Indonesia By developing a modern well diversified and transformed into a has not come without problems, as equipped and trained military, the world-class naval outfit at the cutting seen on occasions during the 1990s (SAF) have edge of technological development. when bilateral tensions led Malaysia developed not only the ability to act as to abruptly refuse the Republic of a credible deterrent against a would- Defence Policy Singapore Air Force (RSAF) and be aggressor, but also the capabilities Evolution RSN access to Malaysia’s air and sea required to project force hundreds space. Indeed, such tensions have of kilometers outside its sovereign As a small island-country neighbouring continuously served as a pressing territory by air, sea and land. In this both Malaysia and Indonesia, and with reminder of Singapore’s strategic context the role and capabilities of the a population of just over 4.5 million deficiencies. RSN has been particularly important in people, Singapore’s strategic location Given the nature of Singapore’s ensuring Singapore’s capacity to secure astride the world’s busiest shipping strategic challenges it has actively control over its maritime domain. lanes has provided unique and complex sought to maintain its security by security challenges. cultivating relations as a reliable Formation, Economically, Singapore’s very partner of the Western Alliance, as Development and prosperity is dependent on the seen by its enthusiasm to be apart of continued flow of maritime trade the Five Power Defence Arrangement, Expansion through its world-class port facilities. involving Australia, Malaysia, New The now formidable RSN of today Having no natural resources of its own, Zealand, Singapore and the United can trace back its origins to the era Singapore has no choice but to rely Kingdom. This has since provided of British colonialism when in 1934

A full moon rises above the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Boutwell at anchor at Changi Naval Base, Singapore Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 15

the Straits Settlements Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve was raised to act as a trained manpower reserve for the defence of Singapore in times of emergency. Subsequently, its evolutionary linkages to the naval establishments of colonial and post-independence Malaysia include the Singapore Division of the Malayan Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve during World War II and thereafter to the Royal Malaysian Navy under the title “Singapore Volunteer Force.” After Singapore ceded from Malaysia in 1965 its name T he Republic of again changed to the Singapore Naval Group, Underwater Demolition Group built Endurance-class LSTs, namely Singapore Navy Volunteer Force. At its inception and Combat Diving Group. Under the Endurance, Resolution, Persistence RSS Stalwart the force consisted of 89 mobilized its purview the NDU commands all and Endeavour. The Endurance-class (72) and RSS Intrepid personnel and 278 reservists and combat diving operations, search and LSTs have a flight deck that can fit (69) and the tank landing ship RSS only three ships: the RSS Panglima, seizure operations at sea and explosive two medium-lift helicopters and the Endeavour (210) Singapura and RSS. Latterly, there were ordnance and mine disposal for the capacity to furnish four landing craft maneuver with USS several more name changes such as SAF. onboard simultaneously, which proved Harpers Ferry (LSD 49) the Sea Defence Command, Maritime Second, the expansion of the valuable for operations outside of and USS Chafee (DDG Command, and finally in 1975, to the RSNs naval capabilities began with Singapore in later years. Following the 90), and USS Chung- Hoon (93) during Republic of Singapore Navy. the procurement of six German- addition of LSTs the RSNs capabilities CARAT 2009. Starting with improvised facilities, designed Sea Wolf-class missile were given a further boost in 1990 (US Navy photo) the RSN made gradual progress in gunboats commissioned as RSS Sea and 1991 respectively when six obtaining new basing facilities, raising Wolf, Sea Lion, Sea Dragon, Sea Tiger, German-built Victory-class missile units and procuring ships. For example, Sea Hawk and Sea Scorpion. Third, corvettes were commissioned: Victory, in 1974 Singapore’s first naval base the RSN acquired two former-US Valour, Vigilance, Valiant, Vigour and was opened in Pulai Brani. Similarly, Navy Redwing-class mine sweepers, Vengeance. Again in 1997 the RSN also the year 1975 proved to be significant both of which were re-commissioned added twelve locally-built Fearless-class one for the RSN with the formation as Bluebird-class and renamed patrol vessels to its fleet to augment of the Naval Diving Unit (NDU), the RSS Mercury and Jupiter. After its coastal and inshore operations. The acquisition of six German-designed Sea both ships were either scrapped or patrol vessels commissioned include Wolf-class missile gunboats and two decommissioned in 1986 and 1993, it Fearless, Brave, Courageous, Gallant, Bluebird-class minesweepers. would not be until 1995 when the RSN Daring, Dauntless, Resilience, Unity, First, the reconstitution of the Royal replaced them with newer Swedish- Sovereignty, Justice, Freedom and Navy’s Far East Fleet Clearance Diving built Landsort-class vessels. These were Independence. Team a demonstrated by the creation re-commissioned as Bedok-class mine Meanwhile, the steady expansion of the NDU, was the initial step in the countermeasure vessels and renamed of the RSN fleet throughout the 1980s evolution of what is today a highly RSS Bedok, RSS Kallang, RSS Katong and 1990s there was a requirement specialized and elite unit. Initially, and RSS Punggol. for a more effective command the NDU engaged in basic diving Subsequently, in 1978 the RSN structure and base facility. As such, and operational tasks, which by the acquired a useful sealift capability with the RSN created three new commands 1980s also encompassed underwater the requisition of five decommissioned exemplified by Naval Logistics explosive ordnance disposal and harbor US Navy County-class LSTs that Command (NALCOM) in 1986, security. remained in service until 2000-01. responsible for logistics support to Today the NDU contains three Upon been decommissioned they were RSN ships and bases installations; groups, namely the Clearance Diving supplanted by four locally designed and Coastal Command (COSCOM) in Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 16 The Republic of Singapore Navy

1988, responsible for the security of such a vessel without getting the men the Singapore Strait maritime domain, Capabilities into too close contact with a suspicious and Training Command (TRACOM) boat, which may have undesirable in 1994, which oversaw the training at As such, the period from the year intentions,” stated a senior-official at the RSN Officers’ Cadet School, Naval 2000 onwards represented a new era the Singapore Ministry of Defence. Advanced Officers’ School and the in the development of the RSN. The Subsequently, in 2005 the platform Command and Staff College. decommissioning of older-model ships made its operational debut with the Latterly, this also included the RSN’s such as the RSNs County-class LSTs RSN. Prior to the operational debut of Institute of Maritime Warfare, Institute and Sea Wolf-class missile gunboats the Spartan USV, in 2004-05 the RSN of Maritime Operations and Systems, in 2000-01 and 2008 respectively was also used the 9m-long RHIB Israeli- Institute of Naval Technology and followed by a major capacity-boost built Protector USV for the first time Operations and the Institute of Marine in other areas. These included the in an operational setting, notably in Systems. In addition, the growing size acquisition of two models of advanced maritime interdiction in the Persian and capabilities of the RSN meant that Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) Gulf as part of the force complement a larger and modern basing facility systems, the RSNs participation for the of Combined Task Force 158. Indeed, was needed, especially in light of the first time in naval operations far from the capacity of the RSN to engage closure of the Brani naval base due its shores, opening of another brand in maritime operations well outside to space constraints and inadequate new base facility, the commissioning of Singapore waters was a direct result infrastructure. Hence, in 1994 the six brand new Formidable-class stealth of its investment in the Endurance- opening of the Tuas naval base in frigates with a naval air wing capability, class LSTs which in turn enabled the western Singapore became the new two refurbished and modern Archer- Protector USV operational-trials. At main fleet base for the RSN’s missile class submarines, a submarine rescue various stages throughout the mission corvettes, LSTs, mine countermeasure capability, and finally, the creation of from 2003 to 2006, the RSN deployed vessels and new patrol vessels. two new joint-operational coordinating all five of its Endurance-class LSTs In a major development for agencies. to safeguard Iraqi oil infrastructure, the RSN, taking place in 1997, the Starting in 2002 the RSN engaged conduct regular patrols and board introduction of a diesel-powered in joint-collaboration with the French and inspect ships passing through submarine capability represented and US Navies in developing the the area. The LSTs were also used in an unprecedented step on part Spartan Scout USV, a 7m-long Rigid basic seamanship and medical training of Singapore to develop offensive Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) that can be exercises and joint-operations with the maritime capabilities. The four used for intelligence, surveillance and Iraqi Navy. Singapore Navy retrofitted former Sjoormen-class reconnaissance, mine countermeasure Furthermore, in 2004 the Changi Formidable-class Swedish submarines, were accordingly and anti-submarine operations. naval base was made operational frigate, RSS Tenacious-photo by based at Changi naval base and “The USVs allow ships to deploy after construction first began in 1992. Michael Nitz re-commissioned as RSS Challenger, Conqueror, Centurion and Chieftain. While such major capability enhancements benefitted the RSN, since the year 2000 Singapore’s political and military leaders have continued to invest increasingly greater resources to strengthen and expand their RSN’s naval capabilities with new and more powerful platforms.

Ne w Era, Enhanced Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 17

Situated on Singapore’s eastern littoral readiness to balance the deployment Swordsman will enable the RSN to the facility has 6.2 km berthing space of ships and aircraft efficiently and better fulfill its mission of protecting and is sufficient to accommodate an effectively.” Singapore’s sea lines of communication . Currently, the Changi He added: “Every day is a tough as and territorial integrity,” he said. “Like base is home to the RSN fleet of LSTs, we have to be watchful 24/7 in a large RSS Archer, RSS Swordsman brings submarines and stealth frigates. and porous area…we are ensuring the with it technology that improves the Indeed, the RSN’s drive to develop safety of an area more than a thousand anti-surface warfare capabilities of the a credible surface warfare capability times the size of Singapore.” RSN, improving the RSN’s fleet and was realised with the acquisition of In addition to the frigates and in providing better options in the field,” he six Formidable-class stealth frigates another significant development, two explained. between 2007 and 2009, namely former Swedish-built Vastergotland- To further complement its undersea RSS Formidable, Intrepid, Steadfast, class submarines were bought and capabilities the RSN also acquired Tenacious, Stalwart and Supreme. are intended to act as replacements a submarine-rescue capability in Built in Singapore the ships can to the older RSN Challenger- 2009 with a 9.6m long submersible accommodate a crew of 71, including class submarines. Subsequently submarine rescue vehicle, named Deep another 19 aviation personnel and re-commissioned as Archer-class Search and Rescue Six (DSAR 6). To reach speeds in excess of 25 knots. submarines, the refurbished platforms accommodate DSAR 6 the RSN also In addition, the stealth frigates RSS Archer and Swordsman were acquired a specialized ship MV Swift possess advanced weapon systems, delivered in June 2009 and October Rescue which is equipped with onboard which include: Surface-to- 2010 respectively. The submarines modern medical facilities, monitoring Surface Missiles, 76mm OTO Melara are a marked improvement over the wards and hyperbaric facilities. SRGM, SAM, Whitehead older designs in engine performance, The acquisition ascends the RSN to A244S Torpedoes. The stealth equipment, weapons systems and an exclusive club of only 11 navies frigates have the added capacity stealth capability. worldwide that have the capability to to accommodate medium-class Commenting on the acquisition engage in submarine rescue operations. helicopters. In 2005 the RSN purchased Singapore’s Minister for Education and Alongside the RSNs marked six Sikorsky S-70B naval helicopters Second Minister for Defence, Dr Ng increase in naval assets and capabilities, equipped with anti-surface and anti- Eng Hen, said: “The RSN’s submarines the creation of two new joint-operation submarine combat systems, which was are part of an integrated warfighting coordinating agencies has made the considered “a major leap forward in system which includes our stealth RSNs role increasingly effective in the capabilities of the SAF,” according frigates, naval helicopters, missile maritime interdiction operations N ew technology to Teo Chee Hean, Singapore’s Deputy corvettes and mine countermeasure around Singapore. Commencing - Singapore RSS Prime Minister and Minister for vessels. Together with the Challenger- in January 2009 the SAF-raised the Formidable-photo by Defence. class submarines, RSS Archer and Maritime Security Task Force based Chris Sattler Not long after, in 2009 the RSN also deployed the Endurance and two RSAF Super Puma helicopters to the US- led Combined Task Force 151, which the RSN actually commanded for a period of three months in early 2010, to participate in anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Arabian Sea. “On a daily basis we have to…ensure that the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor is well covered,” said Rear Admiral Miranda, the senior RSN commander assigned to CTF 151. “We have to closely watch the work-rest cycles, replenishment-at-sea needs, port visits and individual ships’ Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 18 The Republic of Singapore Navy

at Changi Naval Base which acts as advanced naval capabilities by the capability far in excess of its numbers. a joint-command centre involving RSN has sent a clear message to the The RSN has adapted well to the the RSN, the Police Coast Guard region as aptly reflected in the website latest in technology as seen by the and Maritime and Port Authority of of the Singapore Ministry of Defence: state of the art USVs, stealth frigates Singapore. “In wartime should deterrence and with a dedicated naval air wing, and Again, in April 2009 this was diplomacy fail, the RSN aims to secure a modern submarine force which can followed by creation of the Information victory over any aggressor [author’s readily match the capabilities of larger Fusion Centre, also located at Changi emphasis] at sea. The Navy’s main regional navies. Such achievements Naval Base. The agency is designed wartime tasks include ensuring the in modernization is a testimony to to collate and share intelligence on integrity of Singapore’s territorial the RSN’s remarkable progress which maritime security, terrorism, drug waters, preventing interdiction of will continue to serve as a fascinating trafficking and human smuggling the vital SLOCs and destroying the example to navies around the world. t with local, regional and international aggressor’s maritime forces at sea.” agencies and navies. Cumulatively, Clearly, from rudimentary Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe is a both initiatives have made a significant beginnings in the 1960s the RSN has senior analyst with Perth-based contribution to the security and steadily evolved and modernized strategic think tank Future Directions H MAS Larrakia P84 stability of the Singapore Straits into a technologically proficient and International. conducts helicopter and the wider region. Fittingly, the world-class navy. Although the RSN operations training combination of these enhancements is numerically small in size it has Note: This article was first published in with the Navy’s new in role and in acquisition of new and developed a strong force projection Naval Forces (II 2011). Agusta 109

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 19 Engaging Former JI Detainees in Countering Extremism: Can it Work? By Kumar Ramakrishna Synopsis In this connection, Singaporeans world contradictions within JI ideology. Singapore’s counter-radicalisation can be proud that local Muslim Hence they are uniquely positioned programme has been effective in community leaders have since to craft authentic “inside scoop” rehabilitating many Jemaah Islamiyah 2002 devised and refined a highly narratives aimed at cautioning detainees as well as immunising sophisticated counter-ideological vulnerable people against falling for JI the wider community against programme targeted at Singapore JI ideological blandishments. In this way, detainees at first, but expanded since former radicals could complement violent extremism. Can there be an then to encompass their families moderate scholars in counter- enhanced role for specially selected and the wider public. As more than ideological work. former detainees to complement the two-thirds of all detainees since 2001 Such use of former radicals is overall counter-ideological efforts of have been successfully rehabilitated, nothing new. During the Malayan Singapore’s Muslim scholars? Singapore’s counter-ideological Emergency of the 1950s, disillusioned programme, spearheaded by the former communists were effectively all-volunteer Islamic scholars of the employed in what was known then as Commentary Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), counter-propaganda work. The former en years ago Singapore came has been internationally acclaimed to senior Communist Party of Malaya close to being struck by a major have been effective. leader Lam Swee, for instance, had Tterrorist attack – a mere three months In Singapore it has been rightly been well known amongst the ordinary after the September 11 attacks in the recognised that moderate-minded rural Chinese folk that made up the United States by Al Qaeda. To many scholars remain best placed to lead the mass base of CPM support. He had Singaporeans, the news that a cell overall counter-ideological effort. They played a major role in the resistance of the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jemaah are the most qualified to present widely during the Japanese Occupation and in Islamiyah lurked within their own accepted understandings of Islamic the post-war labour movement. Hence borders seemed too surreal to be true. theology and to challenge the glaring when he defected to the government But it was: the local JI cell - with flaws within JI and Al Qaeda ideology. side and wrote a short booklet called the direct support of Al Qaeda itself They are also strategically positioned to My Accusation – an expose of the - had plotted to mount truck bomb offer authoritative opinions on a wide contradictions and blatant power plays attacks against Western diplomatic spectrum of issues ranging from the within the CPM – it sent shock waves and commercial interests in Singapore. deeper meaning of the concept of jihad throughout the Malayan communist Had the plot succeeded, the physical, to how Muslims should conduct their movement. economic, social and psychological daily affairs in a secular, multi-cultural The panicked response of CPM repercussions for Singapore would polity like Singapore. ideologues in hastily publishing have been catastrophic. frenzied rebuttals of the points in My What more can be done? Accusation prompted the government Success of RRG Nevertheless, ten years on, it is worth psychological warfare expert C.C. Too Over the past decade, it has become asking if the overall potency of the to remark that the CPM themselves clear that dealing with the threat counter-ideological programme can be should be thanked for indirectly of transnational terrorism crucially further enhanced - via the engagement generating publicity for Lam Swee. requires the capacity to deal with the of rehabilitated former JI detainees Our own historical record suggests real-time, physical threat posed by in the counter-ideological effort as that former “insiders” have potentially terrorists and their access to explosive well. Supporters argue for a measured something to bring to the counter- materials and funding. However, it employment of carefully selected ideological table today. Engaging is equally important to address the ex-detainees as such individuals former detainees in counter ideological threat posed by the virulent ideology possess a certain “street cred” by work actually represents a form of driving JI, Al Qaeda and a continuously virtue of actually having been within continuous rehabilitation for them as evolving network of like-minded the movement. They have witnessed well. Employing former radicals may counterparts. at close range the problems and real- well represent a win-win proposition Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 20 Engaging Former JI Detainees in Countering Extremism: Can it Work? for the three main stakeholders in the their commitment to establishing the scholars must continue to exercise counter-ideological process: first, the Islamic State and settle for practising overall strategic control and direction former detainee; second, his audience their faith in Indonesia’s secular and of the counter-ideological programme, - be it other detained individuals, plural milieu. Even in Singapore, the the judicious use of carefully selected detainee families, or the wider remaining unrepentant detainees willing former detainees could community - and finally; the relevant – such as the former operational potentially further enhance the overall religious and secular authorities. leader of the Singapore JI cell Mas effectiveness of the programme. Selamat Kastari – represent hard core As Singapore enters the second Challenges elements that are likely to remain decade of the ongoing struggle against Employing former detainees in impervious to counter-ideological a resilient violent extremism, it is counter-ideological work is not without efforts. Again, this is not new: many imperative to ensure that it uses all its challenges. In Indonesia, it has hardcore Malayan communists refused available measures in this fight. been found that a number of released to recant their commitment to setting JI militants promptly rejoined their up a Communist Republic in Malaya Kumar Ramakrishna is an Associate comrades in plotting violence against and Singapore well after unsustainable Professor and Head of the Centre of the government and Western interests. losses through eliminations and Excellence for National Security at the The problem of recidivism lies in the surrenders had forced Secretary- S. Rajaratnam School of International sheer difficulty of actually changing the General Chin Peng to demobilise his mindset of Indonesian JI militants. fighting units at the end of 1958. Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological This has prompted observers to This however does not imply that University. call for the minimal aim of simple there is ergo no role for former JI detainee “disengagement” from detainees in counter-ideological work. This article was originally published as RSIS Commentary No. 003/2012 dated 4 January violence as opposed to more ambitious It does suggest that great care must be 2012. Reproduced by kind permission. ideological “de-radicalisation” – in exercised in selecting former detainees which detainees ultimately give up for such efforts. While moderate

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 21 A ‘close run thing?’ Evaluating the capabilities of the Argentine Military in the Falklands Conflict By Acting Sub-Lieutenant Richard Morris

Could the Argentine Military sophistication of Argentine strike downsized as a result of the 1981 have defeated the British aircraft and the weaknesses of the Defence review, would have been taskforce if it had altered its British air defences it is unachievable powerless to respond. If the Argentine strategy or tactics? when the training, maintenance, command had not invaded when it logistics and range limitations of the did, however, they may never have he Falklands conflict may have Argentine Air Force are considered. had another chance. An analysis of occurred some 30 years ago but Argentina also had a Navy, with an relative strengths necessarily leads to Tit remains one of the only relevant aircraft carrier and diesel submarines, the question of what factors gave the case studies of modern naval warfare which it could have used to attack British the decisive advantage in the in ‘the missile age.’ As the Royal the British task force. However, its conflict. The United States proved itself Australian Navy rises to meet the technological inferiority and lack of an invaluable ally in its willingness to complex security challenges of the anti-submarine capability meant that provide basing on Ascension Island, 21st century it must not ignore the the Argentine Navy was unlikely ever air to air missiles and intelligence facts made undeniable by combat in to have made a significant impact. If support, all of which were essential to the South Atlantic. For both historian the Argentines had expanded Stanley the British war effort. British nuclear and security analyst the Falklands Airfield to accommodate strike fighters, attack submarines were also critically war illustrated the complexities the strategic balance of the conflict important and their presence gave the of amphibious operations, the could have shifted in their favour. This Royal Navy the ability to neutralise importance of joint operations, the was no simple task, however, nor one the Argentine Navy and to isolate power of capable submarines and which Argentina could have completed the Argentine defenders from their finally the enduring relevance of in the time required, nor defended support on the mainland. Britain Corbettian strategy. with the forces it had deployed to the also had a far superior logistical and It has been said, echoing the Islands. economic capacity, which was essential words of Admiral “Sandy” Woodward, Finally, it can be argued that if the in maintaining operations so far from commander of the task force executing Argentines had waited 18 months home. Invincible, a Falklands ‘Operation Corporate,’ that the before invading, their air force would Finally, the greatest advantage that warrior, pictured war had been ‘a damned close run have been bolstered by more aircraft the British had was in the standard of serving in 2004 thing,’ one in which Britain had and weaponry while the Royal Navy, their fighting men, the quality of their (Headmark collection) narrowly escaped defeat against a well equipped and determined enemy. However, as an examination and evaluation of available military options reveals, Argentina never had the capability to defeat the British task force. To win the war, the Argentines needed to neutralise Britain’s mission-critical assets before it was able to project power ashore. The most effective way of achieving this would have been in a mass, saturation style air attack, effected at the conflict’s opening stages or during an amphibious landing. Although such an attack initially seems to have been possible given the number and Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 22 A ‘close run thing?’ Evaluating the capabilities of the Argentine Military in the Falklands Conflict and the ‘jointness’ and efficiency of their command structure.

The Saturation Attack Option If the Argentines had focused the bulk of their air force in one sustained attack on the British task force and destroyed or disabled its mission- critical units, they could conceivably have achieved decisive victory. The most effective weapon the Argentines had was, as Norman Freeman notes in Military Lessons from the Falklands, “their numbers [in aircraft], which may saturate the defence[...].”1Although the Argentine Air Force did penetrate the A rgentine soldiers air defences of the task force several would also have significant political aircraft, which had proven their air in the war (Courtesy times, they did this with no more than and social repercussions which may combat capabilities against MiGs in PressTV) half a dozen aircraft at a time and never have led to a British withdrawal. the 1972 Yom Kippur War.6 committed to an all out saturation On a superficial analysis the In the counterinsurgency and attack. As Woodward comments in Argentine Air Force seems to have land attack role, it had over 100 One Hundred Days, this meant that been large and capable enough to Pucara land attack aircraft, which “they never really came after the one effect and sustain such an attack on could operate from remote airstrips. target that would surely have given the British task force. The Argentine Argentina also had Mirage III’s, them victory.”2 Air Force in late 1981 was one of but a lack of refuelling capability Clausewitz is a useful tool for the most capable in the region, meant they were not deployed to the understanding this idea. Clausewitz boasting over 100 combat aircraft, conflict.7 It is important to note that notes that “the first task then, in airborne refuellers and pilots trained all of these aircraft were supersonic, planning for a war is to identify the by Western forces. The bulk of the highly manoeuvrable and had proven enemy’s centre of gravity, and if Argentines’ air strike capability themselves as both fighter and strike possible trace it back to a single one. consisted of American built A-4 platforms in conflicts internationally. The second task is to ensure that the Skyhawks, which, if launched from The Sea Harrier and RAF Harrier forces to be used against that point are Rio Grande, allowed the Argentines GR3, in contrast were small, concentrated for a main offensive.”3 to project air power over the subsonic, had shorter ranges and had In the South Atlantic, The British Falklands. These aircraft could also not been validated in combat. On task force’s ‘centre of gravity,’ was its ‘buddy refuel’ to further extend their paper then, and assuming an even aircraft carriers, Hermes and Invincible ranges.4 playing field of altitude, combat fuel and its amphibious landing ships, By August of 1981, the Argentines and weaponry, the Argentine jets particularly Canberra.1 If either of had also received five Super had the tactical advantage. Further, the aircraft carriers were destroyed Étendards, with five Exocet missiles.5 allowing for the Argentine numerical or disabled, the task force would have These aircraft, although limited by superiority in facing only two dozen been unprotected from air attack range, could be refuelled by KC-130 Harriers, the Argentines appear and the central node of its command tankers to bring them well in range to have had unarguable potential and control system would have been of the British task force. The Exocet superiority in the air. removed. If any of the amphibious provided a surface skimming “fire It is also important to note that ships were hit, the task force would and forget” missile which enabled the Argentines had available to have been limited in its ability to the firing aircraft to turn and escape, them the assets required to fix the project power ashore. Such a loss increasing mission survivability. position of an incoming task force.

1 During the early stages of the Argentina also had taken recent The primary early warning came amphibious landing, Canberra held the delivery of Israeli-built Dagger from two mobile Westinghouse majority of the Task Forces ground forces. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 23

TPS-43 three-dimensional air systems. The type 42 utilised the defence radars, which had been Type 965 radar to identify targets and deployed to the Falklands near the Sea Dart missile to engage them. Stanley.8 This gave the Argentines Type 42s and 22s had only two air an early warning capability which defence channels. Only one channel the British did not have as their could be devoted to each incoming light carriers, initially, did not carry target.12 fixed wing AEW&C assets. There The way that a saturation attack was an AEW&C capability gap after would be defended against would the decommissioning of HMS Ark be by targeting aircraft sequentially, Royal (R 09) and her Fairey Gannets, with a heavy reliance on command in 1978, which was not fixed until and control. There were two Searchwater radars were fitted to variables upon which the reliability Westland Sea Kings in 1982. of this system depended; range and Additionally, the Argentine Navy backdrop. The greater the range had Grumman S-2 Tracker aircraft of first contact, the more time the and P2E Neptunes, which could be defenders had to engage the aircraft used to provide over the horizon before they themselves were attacked. radar identification.9 These were The backdrop was what was behind the primary methods of finding the the incoming aircraft once they had British task force. Secondary means been ‘painted’ by the air defence for early warning consisted of a 707 radar. If there were any terrain and Lear Jets, which were used to find behind the aircraft, Sea Dart could surface contacts via weather radar, become confused and ‘freeze,’ or as well as undertaking clandestine attempt to locate another target. The intelligence gathering with converted British were operating in a littoral fishing trawlers, such as ARA Narwal environment and therefore were and Alfrez Sobral, and the use of open often being attacked by aircraft which source and signals intelligence.10 ‘popped up’ over land. They were Saturation attack seems to have also being attacked by aircraft at a been particularly viable when the very low level, below their air search limitations of British air defence radar ceiling. This meant that air systems in the Falklands are contacts were often detected only at considered. The British task force short ranges. The Étendards required employed a fluid layered defensive a quick ‘pop up’ at around 30 miles system, where ‘picket’ defensive to get a radar fix for their Exocets, ships were placed to provide early which were usually released soon warning and the first line of defence, after.13 with others placed near to mission The Exocet travelled at 650 kts, critical units. It is important to which gave the British around two note that the Falklands conflict was minutes warning before impact, the first time a Western Navy had depending upon the firing range. encountered a mass air opposition in The A4s primary strike weaponry was three minutes. These limitations the jet and missile age, therefore, the was its ‘dumb-bombs,’ and thus it did meant that the British were very effectiveness of this system had not not have to ‘pop up’ until the final vulnerable to a mass air attack. The been completely validated.11 moments of its attack. In the attack fact that the Argentines had been the The principle unit for air defence against HMS Brilliant, for example, only foreign customer for the Type 42 was the Type 42 destroyer with the the A4’s were detected only 15 miles and had used the Sea Dart system type 22 ‘Broadsword’ class frigate away, which meant that the time meant that they could identify complementing its air defence between detection and bomb impact these limitations and could Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 24 A ‘close run thing?’ Evaluating the capabilities of the Argentine Military in the Falklands Conflict Bottom: HMS potentially capitalise on them. the difficulties the Argentines would as a deterrent to Chile, Argentina’s Conqueror returns The ideal time for this kind of have faced if they had attempted traditional rival. It is also important to to base in the attack would have been either as either of these two kinds of attacks. note that the reconnaissance elements Falklands War - the task force entered its area of As Freedman reveals in his Official of the Argentine air force were also her tremendous endurance due to operations or at the time of the History, the primary strike fighter extremely vulnerable if not protected. her nuclear power landings. Woodward, thinking about asset of the Argentine arsenal, the Its land based air defence radars could enabled her to stay Argentine strategy, thought the A-4 Skyhawk, had been plagued with be easily identified and engaged with on station almost right move would be to“[...]throw serviceability issues since the United ‘Shrike’ radiation missiles and its high indefinitely.N ote the everything at us once they have States enforced an arms embargo in altitude 707 and Lear jets were very Jolly Roger flag - an 16 important but to decided we are there for real, and 1977. As a result, aircraft had to be vulnerable to the fleet’s air defence 14 some controversial not just another deception.” The cannibalised to allow any operational systems. morale booster (RN geographic placings of the exclusion capability. Argentina’s newest French Equipment failures were archival) zones gave the Argentines the jets had only been partially delivered, significant. If the Argentine Air strategic advantage if they decided had not been cleared for carrier Force had configured their bombs to strike as the task force entered its operations and were only equipped correctly, for example, they could area of operations. The Argentine with five Exocets. The Argentine have caused considerably more exclusion zone overlapped that of pilots also had significant gaps in their damage to the British task force. the British and thus if the task force training. They were not trained to Some 13 bombs struck British ships were confronted by Argentine jets, operate at night or in bad weather and without detonating. These bombs outside of their own exclusion zone, did not have experience flying at the were fitted with a safety mechanism F alklands Sea Harrier they would not have had justification, low levels required for an anti shipping which prevented them from going bombing up (RN or cassius belli, to fire the first shots attack profile.17 off if they were accidentally released archival) of the war. One of the most important Additionally, such a show of force deficiencies of the Argentine air force at such an early stage would have however was its lack of electronic forced Whitehall to question further counter measures for its aircraft, which commitment to war. Attacking made them particularly vulnerable during an amphibious landing would to the new infra-red homing AIM-9 have also caught the British at their ‘Stinger’ missile which the Harriers most vulnerable. Their amphibious used.18 The Argentine air force was also ships would have been packed with deployed across several fronts, with troops and their escort destroyers’ the main military airbases in the North radars would have been limited by surrounding terrain. As the troops were landed, there would also have been a gap in available air defence, as the ground forces set up their ‘Rapier’ missile systems.15 With the bulk of air defence vessels closer to shore, ‘mission-critical’ assets would have been left relatively vulnerable in the rear. This would have been an ideal opportunity for an outflanking attack with the aim of hitting Hermes, or Invincible.

Problems with the Saturation At- tack Option Maintenance, training, equipment and deployment limitations reveal Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 25

on the ground. The Argentine jets to do this with attack profile was often so low that enough aircraft the bombs had not fallen a sufficient to overwhelm the distance to arm. This did not make task forces air the bomb harmless, it just prevented defence systems. it from immediately exploding. Attacking during Indeed HMS Antelope and Ardent the landing were still lost, despite the bombs however, would they received failing to explode. have been Lord Craig, then Marshall of the within range Royal Air Force, stated that “six but would make better fuses and we would have lost.19 the Argentine This, unfortunately, was incorrect jets extremely and it started the myth that it had vulnerable.21 At been ‘luck’ which had prevented the the limit of their British from being “blown away” in range, the A-4’s the Atlantic. The reality is that fitting had, at best, only Being able to find and engage a ‘priority HMS Invincible returns from the Falklands retarding devices, such as parachutes, five minutes of ‘combat fuel’ over the target’ in this environment was a War(Wiki images) to bombs on aircraft with a very low islands. This meant that they could luxury that the Argentine pilots simply attack profile was common practice.20 not confront the British air patrols did not have. Once the attack was Not fitting them to the weapons was in air to air combat. Climbing to completed and combat fuel exhausted, a tactical blunder and the Argentines confront the Harriers not only would the Argentines had no choice but to paid dearly for their mistake. Even have burnt valuable fuel, but it also make a quick escape but, in doing if all of the bombs which hit had would have exposed them to the air so, they exposed their tails to the exploded, none of the ‘mission- defence radars of the fleet. Being Stinger missiles of the Harriers, which critical’ units would have been hit, low, slow, without electronic counter were directed by the fleet, and which so it is doubtful that it would have measures, and committing to such a pounced upon them from 10,000 feet.23 caused a British defeat. manoeuvre would have been suicide. If the Argentines had risked a mass Range, however, was the biggest This was well demonstrated by the air attack, they may have lost the bulk obstacle which faced the Argentine first and only Argentine Air Combat of their air combat capability in the air force and it placed them at a sortie, on 1 May, which resulted in process. distinctive tactical disadvantage in two aircraft losses and one Mirage the air over the Falklands. The air having to make a forced landing, with Naval Options force could not have struck the task no fuel, at Stanley only to be shot Another idea often posited was that force as it entered its exclusion zone down by its own forces.22 if the Argentines had been able to as it was well beyond the operational Thus the Argentines had no choice coordinate a naval ‘pincer movement’ range of any of its jets if they were but to commit to a very low altitude whilst a saturation air attack was taking launched from Rio Grande. If such attack profile, at wave top height below place, they could have overwhelmed a strike were possible, it would air defence radars, hitting the task force and destroyed the British task force. have to have been launched from and making a quick escape. This profile As Woodward’s memoir reflects, a substantially upgraded Stanley was not easy for even the most skilled his biggest fear in the early days of airfield, or from the Argentine fighter pilot. Rounding Porpoise Point May was that the task force would carrier. Why they could not attack or popping up over the hills at 400kts, be attacked from all sides; Skyhawks from either of these locations will be the Argentine pilots had around 15 launched from the Veintecinco de Mayo explained later. seconds to find a target and line up battle group in the North, Exocets A ‘double refuel’ of Super for bomb delivery, all whilst under from the Belgrano and her two escorts Étendards and ‘buddy refuel’ sortie a barrage of flak, missile and small in the South, and air attacks from the with A-4’s would have brought them arms fire. The British may have called mainland in the west. Woodward within range, but the Argentines San Carlos ‘Bomb Alley’ but to the records on 3 May “unless we were did not have the logistical capability Argentine pilots, it was ‘Death Valley.’ extraordinarily lucky we could find Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 26 A ‘close run thing?’ Evaluating the capabilities of the Argentine Military in the Falklands Conflict ourselves in some serious trouble which meant it had very limited had abundant marine life, an ideal here.” 24 Indeed, at this time, both ability to project power. The environment for diesel hunter- Argentine battle groups, 79.3 biggest weakness of the British killer submarine operations. At and 79.4, had manoeuvred into fleet was its lack of mine hunting the time of the war, Salta was positions from which this attack capability yet the Argentine Navy not operational, yet San Luis was could have been launched.25 Yet did not have enough mines, nor deployed to the area and had the there was never any attack, as the enough vessels, to capitalise potential to disrupt a landing weather conditions prevented the on this weakness. The biggest severely. The crew of the San Luis Skyhawks from being launched. weakness of the Argentine Navy were later to report that they had Nonetheless the Argentine Navy was its lack of anti-submarine attacked British ships on several would have presented a credible capability. Its Tracker aircraft occasions in the approaches to threat to the British task force if it were obsolete in this regard, Falkland Sound. Yet the San Luis had stayed in the area. whilst its Alouette and Lynx had negligible impact on the It is doubtful, however, that helicopters had yet to be fully British task force.28 As LTCDR the further participation of the integrated into its surface fleet.27 Steven Harper, USN was to write Argentine Navy would have Additionally, the Argentine in an intelligence report following changed the outcome of the Navy had no experience hunting the Falklands War, the Argentines Falklands conflict. Firstly, the nuclear hunter-killer submarines. had not maintained their Argentine surface fleet was This weakness alone, combined torpedoes correctly. As a result, entirely outmatched by the with the British nuclear the polarity on the gyro system British. With the exception of submarine threat, meant that the of the torpedoes had accidentally its Type 42 destroyers and its Argentine Navy was outclassed in been reversed, causing the French A69 Avisos frigates, the South Atlantic, a fact which torpedoes to divert from their the bulk of its surface fleet the military Junta could not deny intended target. 29 It was errors was obsolete. Its flagship, the with the sinking of the Belgrano such as this which illustrated Belgrano, was 44 years old at the on 2 May. the limited capabilities of the time of the war and its boilers The Argentines also had their Argentine submarine force. were often unserviceable. The own conventionally powered Argentine’s sole aircraft carrier, diesel electric submarines Reinforcing Stanley Airfield the Veintecinco de Mayo, had but training and maintenance If the Argentines had reinforced and degraded air defence radars, deficiencies ensured that they expanded the airport at Stanley to maintenance difficulties and a never played a decisive role accommodate strike aircraft, it certainly vibrating propeller shaft at speeds in the conflict. There were would have made the conflict a lot greater than 16kts. The latter fault four diesel submarines in the harder for the British. British Naval made it easy prey for hunter-killer Argentine order of battle. Two intelligence estimated that placing submarines. of these were former United the mission critical units in excess of The Argentine Navy was also States Navy Guppy class boats 700nm from the Argentine Air base very vulnerable to air attack. from the Second World War. at Rio Grande would reduce the air The Sea Dart system, which was According to American Naval threat to a satisfactory standard. It is their main anti-aircraft weapon, Intelligence reports, both were therefore safe to assume that if Port was one which was extremely of questionable maintenance Stanley had been the base of operations complicated to install and and were only suitable in the for Argentine strike aircraft, the British operate and the Argentines often reconnaissance role. carriers would have had to be 700nm struggled to fit it to their ships. It The main capability came from to the east. This would have had several was well known, for example, that Argentina’s two German 209 type important consequences, strategically the Type 42 destroyer Santisma boats, ARA San Luis and ARA and tactically. Firstly, as previously Trinidad could not fire the Sea Salta, which were modern, quiet noted, it would have enabled a mass Dart in 1981.26 The Argentine and capable. The shallow waters air strike on the British task force as it navy also had only one tanker, of the Falkland Islands were often entered the Argentine exclusion zone. and no merchant logistic support, protected by harsh weather and Secondly, it would have allowed the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 27

Argentines to escort their strike aircraft and small arms.32 This signified a planned abandonment with fighters and to face the Harriers Having these weapons did not of a blue water naval capability and in a more even tactical scenario. The necessarily guarantee that they a focus on Eurocentric, NATO- aircraft could have also networked with would be effectively employed. One oriented deterrence. Waiting six to 12 the early warning radar to intercept Argentine conscript remembers months before invading would have incoming Vulcans and Harriers. using the Blowpipe missile “ I saw strengthened the Argentine air force. Argentina simply did not have NCO’s who, with all the goodwill At the time of the war, Argentina the logistical and military capability in the world, couldn’t use them, had received only five of its 14 Super however, to create and defend a and when they fired, the missile Étendards, and only five of its 30 base of this magnitude. Building an shot off in any direction, sometimes Exocets.36 Considering the impact of airbase for strike fighters not only crashing into the ground. You can’t only five Étendard-delivered Exocets requires a runway, it also requires start learning in the middle of the on the British task force, three times as stores for fuel, accommodation, w a r.” 33 These weapons were designed many could have been devastating. taxi strips, support personnel, to defeat a fast low flying threat, Even if the Argentines had received maintenance facilities and hangers. like the Harrier. Against the Avro their full complement of Exocet To be able to ferry this equipment to Vulcan however, a strategic bomber missiles and jets however, the British the Falklands would have required a designed to penetrate complex Soviet were willing to go to extreme lengths serious logistical transport capability. air defence systems, the airfield to eliminate them. In The Secret War Transport vessels would also require remained potentially very vulnerable. for the Falklands, Nigel West reveals escort ships and air cover. The mere The Vulcan’s Shrike missiles also the secret campaign to prevent Exocets possibility of the presence of British could have neutralised the Argentine from being delivered to Argentina. nuclear submarines in the area early warning capability. As the had agreed to halt shipments mitigated against Argentina even successful and decisive SAS raids on of weaponry to Argentina but the considering such an initiative. Pebble Island would later illustrate, risk still remained of missiles being Even if the Argentines had built the British could also use special smuggled in from its neighbours, all the base, they did not have the forces to neutralise such bases. As of which had Exocets. MI6 officers military means of protecting it.30 will be explained later, the Argentine were to pose as arms dealers and buy Stanley airfield would have been the ground forces, most of whom were off Exocets and secret agreements primary target for the British task conscripts, were not equipped or were made to ensure that the missiles force. In his memoir, Woodward trained to defeat an attack of this did not reach Argentina.37 One of the recollects that “As always, I was nature.34 more daring plans involved landing terribly aware of the acute danger a Hercules aircraft on the runway we faced if the Args ever managed The ‘Wait 18 Months’ Theory at Rio Grande, with B Sqn 22 SAS to repair that runway sufficiently If the Argentines had been able to wait members destroying the Étendards to get fighter/attack aircraft off the six months to a year before taking the and Exocets and killing the pilots.38 ground[...]”31 As for the possibility Falkland Isles, their air force would The soldiers would then exfiltrate and of a fully functional strike fighter air have been far more capable and escape to Chile. This mission, although base at Stanley, Woodward coolly Britain, due to its planned defence rehearsed, was never executed. comments that “we needed to make cuts, could have done, as Woodward No doubt the SAS recognised the sure that was an impossibility.” put it, “precisely nothing.” In 1982 the improbability of an ‘escape to Chile’ Protecting a base of that size and Thatcher government, in the context and rightly considered the operation importance against the British task of international recession, inflation to be a last option. Although never force would have required complex and an apparent Soviet military implemented, these kinds of plans air and ground defence systems. The build up, initiated large cuts in the illustrate the sacrifices that Britain was principal air defence weapons on the Department of Defence. The aircraft potentially willing to make to protect island were several Oerlikon 35mm carriers Hermes and Invincible as its fleet from Exocets. portable guns and one Roland surface well as the amphibious landing ships to air missile unit, with the secondary HMS Intrepid and Fearless were to be The Contextual Background armament being numerous shoulder scrapped or sold, with the frigate and The decision by the Argentines to launched blowpipe, SAM-7 missiles destroyer fleet reduced by one fifth.35 invade the Falklands when they Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 28 A ‘close run thing?’ Evaluating the capabilities of the Argentine Military in the Falklands Conflict did is understandable when the against Argentina would undermine had indeed insisted that the Islands context of the decision is taken into the Inter-American Treaty of be retaken in May so as to avoid the account. In early 1982, the Argentine Reciprocal Assistance, or ‘Rio Treaty,’ South Atlantic winter, which could put military rule was on the point of signed in 1947, with South American a serious strain on an already battle- collapse. In 1981 alone ‘under the nations.40 weary fleet.42 There was also a concern regime’s guidance, Argentine GDP Finally, a series of events which towards the end of the war that the had dropped from $85, 000 million were beyond the control of the current rate of ship losses could not be to $80, 000 million, the fall being Argentine leadership pressured them sustained by Britain and if the rate of accompanied by rising inflation and into invading. To invade the Falklands ship losses had continued for another high unemployment. This, combined successfully, the Argentineans had to month or so, the task force would with public hostility and unrest, had maintain the element of surprise. If the have had to withdraw. However, if the caused significant unease amongst British were forewarned of the risk, they British had reason to fear the South the Argentine military leadership. could secretly send nuclear hunter-killer Atlantic winter, the Argentineans The Malvinas had long been a part of submarines to the area. These could had justification to be terrified. The the Argentine identity. Taking them, provide a totally deniable over-watch Argentine land forces had not even it was believed, would rally the home of the Falklands area for months and, if been supplied with winter clothing. front and strengthen the legitimacy of necessary, perform a pre-emptive strike Daniel Kon, in Los Chicos de LA the regime. If the military leadership on any invading force. As previously Guerra, interviews one such conscript. had waited another year, it may described, the Argentinean Navy had The conscript remembers that “It was have been overthrown. Additionally, very little experience or equipment with summer clothing; it wasn’t right for the there was an understandable belief which to combat this kind of threat. mountains or snow... I didn’t feel too that Britain would not respond to As the military Junta were planning cold on my body but only because I was an invasion and that if they did, the the invasion, a group of Argentinean wearing two summer uniforms, one on United States would not support the marines posing as civilians, in an top of the other.”43 This ad hoc solution response. The Thatcher government’s impromptu display of nationalism, would not have sufficed in July. plan to ‘axe’ its blue water capability raised their national flag in the South As for the attrition rate argument, sent a signal to the world that Georgia and South Sandwich Islands. the Argentinean air losses were far Britain was financially overstretched This event was captured on camera less sustainable than the British and could not afford to protect its and broadcast internationally, suddenly loss of ships. The Royal Navy had international interests. Particularly placing the Junta’s ambitions in the anticipated ship losses and had kept important in the 1981 Defence White international spotlight. Several days up a constant flow of replacement Paper was the decision to scrap the later, Argentinean naval intelligence frigates and destroyers as the campaign ice ship HMS Endurance.39 Although elements notified their command that continued. The Argentine losses had probably relatively insignificant to two British nuclear submarines had been relatively high; one cruiser, one Whitehall, this ship represented been spotted sailing out of harbour in submarine, three transports and the the only British naval presence in .41 If they were sailing to the trawler Narwal were all destroyed. the South Atlantic. Its removal sent Falklands, and it had to be assumed Most importantly however, it had a clear message to the Argentine that they were, the military Junta had to lost 75 fixed wing aircraft, and 25 military junta that Britain had act before they arrived. This gave them helicopters. Of the 59 Argentinean lost interest in the Falklands. The a maximum period of two months in ground attack aircraft deployed to the military junta also had good reason which to complete the invasion. Islands, only two air force Chinooks for their belief that the United and one naval Aeromacci returned States would remain neutral in the The ‘Attrition’ Strategy to the mainland.44 The Argentineans conflict. Although it had enforced It could be argued that if the were losing around five strike aircraft a trade embargo on the Argentines, Argentineans had persisted for only a for every British ship put ‘out of action.’ the US’s strategic priority for South few more months in their war effort, For a larger power these losses may America was stability, which was the British task force would have been have been acceptable but for a middle- seen as essential in its fight against exhausted, or forced to operate in power such as Argentina, they were not communist insurgencies. For the US winter, which, it seems, was considered sustainable. to support visibly a British war effort unsustainable. The British command Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 29

Decisive British Advantages Submarines The United States Woodward’s lessons from the war was that it was“ perfectly clear to me that Another advantage the British had On the other hand there were several without those AIM 9L the Sea Harriers was their nuclear hunter-killer factors which gave the British the would not have been good enough.” He submarines. These units could deploy strategic and tactical upper hand and adds, on the subjects of Ascension and to the Falklands in advance of the without which, the war could not have the Sidewinder, that ‘Never mind the fleet and undertake surveillance and been won. The most important of other ways that help was provided. Lack security patrols without affecting the these was assistance from the United of these two alone would probably have progress of diplomatic negotiations. States. Although the US had publicly reversed the outcome.” 48 For the Argentine Navy, the British decided to remain “neutral” during the The Americans also provided submarine threat was, as William J. conflict, in reality the US sided heavily comprehensive intelligence and Ruhe Jr. asserts, one which could not with the British. Firstly, without the US satellite communications support to be measured nor opposed.51 By simply providing strategic nuclear deterrence the British, which gave them better visibly putting their submarines to in Europe, Britain would have been tactical situational awareness than sea, the British unwittingly forced the unable to commit such a large force to their Argentinean enemy. The US Argentines to commit to a conflict the South Atlantic. Access to Ascension gave priority access to its array of unprepared. When the submarines, Island as a logistical base and staging communications and intelligence Splendid, Spartan and Conqueror, point was absolutely essential to the satellites. Satellite communications began their sea denial mission in the operations of the British task force. were essential to the functioning of the Falklands they cut off the Argentine Without this, the British would have British chain of command. Without it, defenders from means of resupply, been unable to sustain a logistical the British taskforce would not have with the exception of the use of one supply line across the Atlantic or launch been able to quickly communicate with Guppy Class submarine, the San Lois. Vulcan strikes. The US even went so Whitehall. This communications link British submarines also provided vital far as to offer “an aircraft carrier or would prove essential in the sinking of tactical intelligence in the later stages two,” if the British were ever desperate. the Belgrano. Conqueror was presented of the war by observing Argentine Jet 45 Although it is difficult to see how with only a window of opportunity to launches off the coast of Rio Grande. these would have been manned or engage Belgrano before it entered the operated in such a short period of shallow waters of the Burdwood Bank. Economic Superiority time, it could have given the British last If Woodward had not been able to gain Another advantage that the British chance option to salvage the war effort authorisation for a change in the rules had was their economic and if Argentines had disabled Invincible or of engagement from Whitehall quickly, logistical superiority. The Falklands Hermes. the Belgrano could have escaped. High war was essentially one in which a The US had also supplied the British resolution imagery was also supplied barely middle power challenged the with the AIM-9L Sidewinder infrared from US KH-8 ‘keyhole’ satellites and authority of a traditionally robust air to air missile. This weapon, which was very useful in assessing Argentine ‘great power.’ Although Britain’s could engage at all aspects and was capabilities. Finally, access to ‘white power had diminished after World simple to operate, put the British at a cloud,’ the system of US satellites which War II, it could still commit a far distinct advantage within visual range tracked the movements of surface ships greater magnitude of resources to air warfare. General Milton states, “ It internationally provided the British a war. Despite being in recession, was the AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to air with far greater situational awareness.49 the British government spent three missile that caused the most envy. In If the Argentines had received equally times that of the Argentineans the opinion of the Argentines, almost comprehensive intelligence, they would on their war effort. Logistically any airplane becomes something to be have been able to target mission-critical speaking, the British military was taken seriously if it has the AIM-9L.”46 units when they were unprotected also far superior. Its C-130 fleet, for The Argentinean pilots demonstrated and vulnerable.50 This heavy contrast example, was able to carry out 40 admirable bravery in persisting with in available tactical and strategic supply drops successfully with only attacks despite heavy losses but, as H. intelligence and communications tools a 5% unserviceable rate. Britain’s Telford Jr. noted, “courage and valour gave Britain a decisive advantage in the vessels also are no match for superior weaponry conflict. proved a vital element.52 In the war, effectively employed.”47 One of it deployed 45 vessels, delivering Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 30 A ‘close run thing?’ Evaluating the capabilities of the Argentine Military in the Falklands Conflict

100,000 tonnes of freight, including The United States Military analysed submarine operations, himself a former 95 aircraft.53 Argentina in contrast, the Falklands conflict in great detail, Submarine commander. This would could barely sustain logistics within and in The Marine Corps Gazette Peter prove essential in the decision to sink the islands. One young Argentine M. Dunn perfectly captures Britain’s the Belgrano, which effectively defeated conscript remembers that he never superiority in quality of personnel. He the Argentine Navy. got to see a full ration pack while he states The British also managed to have was in the Malvinas, as they were “whatever the merits of the a far more resilient and efficient pilfered as they travelled to the front Falklands victory, no self respecting command structure, which allowed line. Ironically, he remarks, “ do you professional military officer a level of autonomous control to know how I finally got to see one of should confess to having learned smaller units. Obstacles within those boxes? An English soldier gave anything from it. To admit that this structure, such as the separate it to me when I was a prisoner in one discovered that superb fitness, command of the Submarine force, Puerto Argentino.”54 The Argentinean high morale, superior field-craft, or the bureaucratic red tape of conscripts would have to eat local capable and courageous political Whitehall, could be bypassed by livestock or steal food. Another and military leadership, a sound using alternate means, like satellite conscript admits “We were thieves logistics system, intelligence, a communications. The British also and the enemy was the other soldier sensible control of the news media, had demonstratively more effective who had orders not to let anyone in air and naval support, a sound cooperation between their sea and [to the supplies].”55 strategy, skilled improvisation and land elements, which was essential an intelligent use of technology[...] to the success of any amphibious Personnel were necessary for victory is to operation. Central to this was the The biggest advantage the British had admit that one is in the wrong close working relationship between was in the quality of their personnel. business.’ Colonel Richard and Admiral Clinton Berry states in Military lessons Woodward. One good example was of the Falklands, that: “ One of the The British benefited from more the use of a subject matter expert, immutable lessons of any war is that experienced senior officers and a far Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour in the quality of the individual fighting backgroundmore ‘joint’ and efficient the amphibious landings at San man is paramount.”56 The fact is that command structure. European and Carlos. The Argentine commanders, the average ‘fighting man’ of the British American military doctrine had heavily in contrast, did not display such armed services in the Falklands was far influenced the force structure and efficiency. Turner in Military lessons superior, in his training, morale and tactics of the Argentine Navy and Air of the Falklands maintains that “ available equipment. The Argentinean Force. As a result, it was relatively easy While some officers fought with forces were often equipped with similar for British command to understand dedication (with medals for bravery equipment but their lack of training Argentine strategy. They had extensive going to officers at the rank of major and experience proved disastrous. experience in defending against and below), many field commanders One example was the Argentinean air attack, anti submarine warfare, left their men for the safety of the observers at Jersey Point who, although sea denial and enforcing exclusion rear echelons. In many cases, it was equipped with state of the art night zones from many international war the heroism of new recruits, fighting vision equipment and entrenched in games against nations equipped alone, that held off the British as long an ideal observation position, failed to with similar technology. Woodward as possible.”58 hear the helicopters flying over their recalls one example of how these heads, or see the twelve thousand experiences allowed him to appreciate Why Was The Falklands tonne assault ship on their eye-line at the complexities of fleet defence. In Conflict Ever Considered A two miles positioning for landing. assessing the threat of a nearby trawler ‘Close Run Thing?’ The British military at the time was on 2 May, Woodward comments Given the outcome of the above one of the most powerful of the world that “six months ago I had crept up analysis the question becomes why and in the seas of the South Atlantic on the Americans in the Arabian the Falklands War was said to be such it faced an enemy which presented Gulf, in circumstances very nearly a ‘close run thing.’ By echoing these no surface or submarine threat and identical to these.”57 Most importantly, words, Woodward had connected the refused to attack from the air at night. Woodward had extensive experience in Falklands victory with the The Battle of Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 31

Waterloo. His words probably reflect had played in the conflict. Recently the rise in patriotism and the revival of there has been a revival in this idea, national identity which occurred after as the United States shows signs of the war, a phenomenon later known Imperial overstretch indicating that it as ‘The Falklands factor.’ The Falklands may not have the capability to assist in stood out in a half century dominated the Falklands if it was again contested.62 by British economic and military The Falklands conflict was one decline. After two oil crises and budget which was fought at significant cuts, Britain’s population was searching sacrifice to both combatant powers for a new identity. The Falklands involved, yet, it was never a ‘close run victory proved to many citizens that thing.’ Argentine forces distinguished Britain was and would remain a great themselves in their valour and power. Margaret Thatcher captures this heroism under exceptionally trying idea in her speech to the Conservative circumstances but they did not have Rally at Cheltenham “That is the the capability to defeat the British, A cting Sub-Lieutenant Richard Morris, Falklands Factor. We have proved who enjoyed a technological, financial, RAN, is an advanced student currently ourselves to ourselves. It is a lesson we strategic and tactical superiority from must not now forget.”59 the start. The war then concluded for in third year of studies at the Australian There is a tension however that Britain with euphoria and patriotism Defence Force Academy. Richard is exists amongst veterans about cost and in Argentina with political unrest undertaking a Bachelor of Arts (Chief of the attainment of this ‘national and revolt. of Defence Force program,) majoring pride.’60The Yet this may not have been the in history. The BA (CDF) is a degree had lost 225 men, six ships and 34 case if Britain had not several decisive aircraft. The psychological damage advantages. These were its nuclear stream which promotes high academic to veterans was significant, with submarines its economic power standards with research projects, which more committing suicide by 2010 and military and logistical support are undertaken under the supervision than were KIA. The financial cost from its ally the United States. The of leading academics. of the War had exceeded 1.5 billion greatest factor however was not one pounds.61The myth about a ‘close which could be measured exactly: Bibliography run victory’ then can be seen as it was the superiority of the British Anderson, Alexander Social Order and the one which aimed to commemorate personnel. This critical factor enabled General Theory of Strategy, Routledge and Kegan the fallen, in a similar way that the them to overcome other weaknesses Paul, London, 1981. ‘Gallipoli myth’ did for ANZACs. and display far greater resilience and Armitage, M. J., Mason, R. A., Air Power in the Nuclear Age, University of Illinois Press, Most likely however, the war was coordination, to eventually prevail in Chicago, 1983. portrayed as a ‘Close Run thing’ in the South Atlantic. t Baybrook, Roy, Battle for the Falklands: Air order to justify the force composition Forces, Osprey, Oxford, 1982. Brown, James, Snyder William Paul, The of the Royal Navy, in particular its Regionalization of Warfare: The Falklands/ aircraft carriers and . The Malvinas Islands, Lebanon and the Iran/Iraq Conflict,National Strategy Information Center, British military had faced two years New York, 1985. of heavy budget cuts, from which Burns, Jimmy, The Land that Lost its Heroes: the Royal Navy would have been How Argentina lost the Falklands War, Bloomsbury, London, 1987. reduced to a local anti-submarine Chant, Christopher Air War in the Falklands force. The recent commitment of 1982, Osprey, Oxford, 2001. Britain to two Queen Elizabeth Class Clapp, Michael, Southby- Tailyour, Ewen, Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle of San Aircraft Carriers by 2020 illustrates the Carlos Water, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, resonance of this message today. This 1996. ‘close run’ myth was perpetuated by Correll, John T, ‘ Verbatim,’ United States Air Force Magazine, Viewed 14 April 2011, . now ‘battle proven’ weapon systems Daly, James, ‘John Knott 1981 Defence Cuts Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 32 A ‘close run thing?’ Evaluating the capabilities of the Argentine Military in the Falklands Conflict

Revisited,’ Daly History Blog, 12 Sep 2010, West, Nigel, The Secret War for the Falklands: 24 Woodward, One Hundred Days, p. 149. viewed 12 April 2011, . Woodward, Sandy, One Hundred Days: 26 Freedman, Official History, p. 74. Defence Management Journal, Britain ‘Could not The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group 27 Friedman, Official History, p. 73. defend Falklands,’ 13 June 2011, viewed 10 Oct Commander, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2011, Publishers, Westport,2000 p. 52. Dunstan, Simon, The Yom Kippur War: The Arab (Endnotes) 29 Steven Harper, Submarine Operations During the Falklands War, Israeli war of 1973, Osprey, Oxford, 2007. Naval War College, Newport,17 June 1994, viewed 18 April 2011,< http:// 1 Norman Friedman, ‘Surface Combatant Gamba,Virginia The Falklands/Malvinas war: Lessons,’ in Bruce Watson and Peter M. www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA279554&Location=U2&doc= a model for North-South crisis prevention, Allen Dunn(ed.), Military Lessons From the Falklands GetTRDoc.pdf>. and Unwin, London, 1987. War, West view Press, London, 1984, p. 25. 30 M. J. Armitage, R. A. Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age, University Gavshon, Arthur L. Desmond Rice, The Sinking 2 Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days: of Illinois Press, Chicago, 1983, p. 215. of the Belgrano, Secker and Warburg, London, The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group 31 Woodward, One Hundred Days, p. 138. 1984. Commander, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1992, p. xviii 32 Nicholas Van der Biji, Argentine Forces In the Falklands, Osprey, Freedman, Lawrence, The Official History of the Oxford, 1992, p. 24. 3 Alexander Anderson, Social Order and the Falklands Campaign, Routledge, London, 2005. General Theory of Strategy, Rutledge and Kegan 33 Daniel Kon, Los Chicos de LA Guerra: The Argentine conscripts’ own Freedman, Lawrence Britain and the Falklands Paul, London, 1981, p. 216. moving accounts of their Falklands war, New English Library, Kent, 1982, p War, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1988. 4 Rene De La Pedraja, ‘The Argentine Air 30. Friedman, Norman, The Naval Institute Guide Force versus Britain in the Falkland Islands, ‘ 34 Van der Biji, Aegentine Forces, p. 18 to Weapons systems, Naval Institute Press, in Robin D. Hingam, Steven John Harris(ed.), Why Air Forces Fail, the anatomy of Defeat, The 35 James Daly, ‘John Knott 1981 Defence Cuts Revisited,’ Daly History Annapolis, 2006. University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2006, p. Blog, 12 Sep 2010, viewed 12 April 2011, . the Falklands War, Naval War College, Newport, 5 Christopher Chant, Air War in the Falklands 36 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Solna, 2009, viewed 17 June 1994, viewed 18 April 2011,< http:// 1982, Osprey, Oxford, 2001, p. 92. 11 April 2011, . www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA279 6 Simon Dunstan, The Yom Kippur War: The 554&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf >. Arab Israeli war of 1973, Osprey, Oxford, 2007, 37 Nigel West, The Secret War for the Falklands: The SAS, MI6 and the War Whitehall Nearly Lost, Warner, London, 1998, p. 3. Glen P. Hastedt, Encyclopedia of American p. 138. Foreign Policy,Facts on File Books, New York, 7 Roy Baybrook, Battle for the Falklands: Air 38 Mike Ryan, Secret Operations of the SAS, Amber Books, St Paul, 2003, 2004. Forces, Osprey, Oxford, 1982, p. 28. p. 136. Hingam, Robin D., Harris, Steven John(ed.), 8 Norman Friedman, in Military Lessons From 39 Virginia Gamba, The Falklands/Malvinas war: a model for North-South the Falklands War, p. 23. crisis prevention, Allen and Unwin, London, 1987, p. 101. Why Air Forces Fail, the anatomy of Defeat, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2006. 9 Chant, Air War in the Falklands, p. 54. 40 Glen P. Hastedt, Encyclopaedia of American Foreign Policy,Facts on File Books, New York, 2004, p. 420 Kon, Daniel, Los Chicos de LA Guerra: The 10 Martin Middlebrook, The Fight for the Argentine conscripts’ own moving accounts of Malvinas’: The Argentine Forces in the Falklands 41 Deborah L. Norden military Rebellion in Argentina; Between coups and War, Viking, London, 1989, p. 42. Consolidation, University of Nebraska Press, London, 1996, p. 71 their Falklands war, Editorial Galerna, Buenos Aires, 1982. 11 Friedman, in Military Lessons From the 42 Woodward, One Hundred Days, p. 145. Falklands War, p. 21. Middlebrook, Martin, The Fight for the 43 Kon, Los Chicos de LA Guerra, New English Library, Kent, 1982, p.19. Malvina’s: The Argentine Forces in the Falklands 12 Norman Friedman, The Naval Institute 44 Chant, Air War in the Falklands 1982, p. 92. Guide to Weapons systems, Naval Institute Press, War, Viking, London, 1989. Annapolis, 2006, p. 589. 45 Norden, Military Rebellion in Argentina, p. 73. Milton, T.R, ‘Too many missing pieces,’ Air Force 13 Chant, Air War in the Falklands, p. 53. 46 General T.R. Milton, U.S. Air Force (Retired), ‘Too many missing Magazine, December 1982, p. 28. pieces,’ Air Force Magazine, December 1982,p. 28. 14 Woodward, One Hundred Days, p. 244. Norden, Deborah L., Military Rebellion in 47 H. Tilford Jr. in Military Lessons From the Falklands War, p. 46. Argentina; Between coups and Consolidation, 15 Michael Clapp, Ewen Southby- Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle of San 48 Woodward, One Hundred Days, p. xviii. University of Nebraska Press, London, 1996. Carlos Water, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 49 West, The Secret War for the Falklands, p. 89. Puddlefoot, Geoff, No Sea Too Rough: The Royal 1996, p. 147. Fleet Auxiliary in the Falklands War, Chatham 16 Lawrence Freedman, The Official History 50 F. Clinton Berry Jr. , Military Lessons From the Falklands War, p. x. publishing, London of the Falklands Campaign, Rutledge, London, 51 William J. Ruhe Jr. , Military Lessons From the Falklands War, p. ix.p. 11 2005, p. 261. Ryan, Mike, Secret Operations of the SAS, Amber 52 Geoff Puddlefoot, No Sea Too Rough: The Royal Fleet Auxiliary in the Books, St Paul, 2003. 17 Jimmy Burns, The Land that Lost its Falklands War, Chatham publishing, London, 2007. p. vi. Heroes: How Argentina lost the Falklands War, Stockholm International Peace Research Bloomsbury, London, 1987, p. 373. 53 Freedman, Official History, p. 726. Institute, Solna2009, viewed 11 April 2011, 18 James Brown, William Paul Snyder, The 54 Kon, Los Chicos, p. 26. . Malvinas Islands, Lebanon and the Iran/Iraq 56 F. Clinton Berry Jr. , Military Lessons From the Falklands War, p. ix. Thatcher, Margaret, Speech to conservative Rally Conflict,National Strategy Information Centre, New York, p. 49. at Cheltnham, viewed 10 April 2011, . 19 John T Correll, ‘ Verbatim,’ United States Air 58 Turner, quoted in Norden, Military Rebellion in Argentina, p. 76. Force Magazine, Viewed 14 April 2011, . Pages/2002/June%202002/0602verb.aspx>. Ward, Sharkey Sea Harrier over the Falklands: 60 Lawrence Freedman, Britain and the Falklands War, Basil Blackwell, 20 F, Watts, Janes Weapons Systems 1988-89, Oxford, 1988, p. 109. A Maverick at War, Naval Institute Press, Janes Information Group, London,1989 p. 755. Annapolis, 1992. 61 Lawrence Freedman, Britain and the Falklands War, Blackwell, London, 21 Woodward, One Hundred Days, p. 262. 1988, p. 37. Watts F, Janes Weapons Systems 1988-89, Janes Information Group, London, 1989. 22 Freedman, Official History, p. 281. 62 Margaret Thatcher, Speech to conservative Rally at Cheltnham, viewed 10 April 2011, . Watson, Bruce and Dunn Peter M.(ed.), Military 23 Sharkey Ward, Sea Harrier over the Falklands: A Maverick at War, Naval Institute Lessons From the Falklands War,West view Press, Annapolis, 1992, p. 210. Press, London, 1984. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 33 The Yawning Capability Gap: the ADF and ‘Brown Water’ Warfare Commander Iain Jarvie

...Nor must Uncle Sam’s web feet be forgotten. At the less predominant for the population. all the watery margins they have been present. Not Nations in the POE comprise many only on the deep sea, the broad bay and the rapid dozens, if not hundreds of islands and river, but also up the narrow muddy bayou and reefs. Depths are constrained. Local wherever the ground was a little damp, they have commerce uses small coastal and inter- island craft. The ratio of waterways to been and made their tracks. 1 US President Abraham Lincoln roads in PNG, for example, is 1500:1 with over 11,000 km of navigable incoln was praising ‘brown water’ of close coastal waters, estuaries, waterways. Fig. 1 illustrates these facts. sailors of the US Civil War. The rivers, inland waterways and even Of the worlds 17 largest cities, 14 LUnited States has had an on-again, large lakes and dams. But even this are on the coast and 11 of these are in off-again affair with the ill-defined distinction requires another dimension. Asia, with half the world’s population ‘riverine’ since Americans fought Littoral discussions usually centre on within 100km (60nm) of the sea and alongside the British in the amphibious distances offshore. Take a large lump the vast majority in the POE within assault (in a river) by Gen Wolfe and of ocean and butt it against a large 25km (15nm). The ‘green water’ gaps Admiral Saunders on Quebec in 1759, single lump of land. This construct between islands and the ‘brown water’ against the British for independence becomes less useful when we consider rivers and estuaries are therefore a and on the bays and rivers of the the Australian Primary Operating major part of the physical and tactical north east during the civil war, during Environment (POE). environment but the ADF does not war with Mexico, against insurgents The ADF’s POE is dominated by apparently see the POE in this way. across the Philippine archipelago in archipelagic waters, much more so Perhaps this is an extension of what the early 20th century, through to the than any other region of the globe. It is former CN, VADM Russ Crane and Mekong Delta of Vietnam, and in critical to understand that population others have reflected on as Australia’s 3 its most recent form in Iraq. The US centres are even closer to the water ‘sea blindness’? Marines taught Colombia’s military in the POE than elsewhere in the The ADF is directed to maintain a how to conduct Riverine Warfare as world, most notably Europe where Maritime Strategy which exploits the part of counter-narcotics operations most modern amphibious thought approaches to Australia in her defence 2 F ig. 1 - Characteristics in the late 1990s and then handed the evolved , and that road transport is far and in mutual defence of neighbours. of the POE. Riverine role to the US Navy. Despite this regularity of need, in nearly every conflict in which the USN has been involved, a ‘riverine’ capability has had to be developed ab-initio. The dictates of the ADF’s operating environment strongly suggest both a similar need and that it be an enduring one.

Environment & Threat The ‘littoral’ or ‘green water’ is mainly conceptual and is about the influence of the land on operations at sea and, in-turn, their influence on the land. The ‘brown water’ zone is a more enduring and direct interaction between land and water, best shown in the confines Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 34 The Yawning Capability Gap: the ADF and ‘Brown Water’ Warfare

But do we understand our environment Despite all this, the and what a Maritime Strategy means RAN has traditionally in our context? More specifically, what focussed on ‘blue- can the ADF do to exploit or control water’ operations our environment? and its history is most prominently What Maritime about the cruisers Strategy? and destroyers which fought alongside In describing an ‘Australian Way of British and American War’, Dr Michael Evans argues that forces. But the Australia has always seen itself as a Amphibious Warfare F ig. 2 US Navy Brown continent, not an island and this is which was often the Amphibious Concept which describes Water Fleet during best evidenced by our view of the ‘sea- cause and beneficiary of those ‘proper the purpose and range of employment Vietnam air gap’, a moat around the continent naval’ actions are lesser known. We of the Amphibious Warfare (AmW) which someone one must cross to all know about HMA Ships Sydney, capabilities being realised through attack us rather than a manoeuvre Canberra and Australia, but few know Joint Project 2048, largely Phases 4A/B space we can use in our defence much about Kanimbla, Manoora and 3 with the Amphibious Assault 4 and engagement of our region. The and Westralia as part of MacArthur’s Ships (LHD) and their organic LCM1E 7 Defence White Paper describes this Amphibious Navy, the 7th Amphibious landing craft. Littoral Manoeuvre , 6 allegedly ‘maritime strategy’ but makes Force . Just as the ADF struggles the use of the sea as an operational clear how poor our understanding of to come to terms with Amphibious manoeuvre space, has parentage in the maritime strategy is, by implying we Warfare generally, so too do we ignore United States Navy and Marine Corps’s also need a continental one: the geographic reality in which we are Operational Manouver from the Sea “While our approach requires directed to operate. (OMFTS), now called Expeditionary principally a maritime strategy, the Manouver Warfare (EMW) and in the nature of our strategic geography Exploiting the POE Royal Navy and Royal Marines’ Littoral is such that we will also have to use Manoeuvre Concept. From these, Ship- conventional land forces to control Our strategic approach is that we cross to-Objective Manoeuvre (STOM) has our approaches, to secure offshore a sea-air ‘gap’ in order to put a land evolved as a tactic and ‘Seabasing’ as territories and facilities, to defeat force ashore (apparently this is then an enabling concept. This is maritime any incursions onto Australian ‘continental’), rather than use the sea warfare in a truly joint, operational territory, to protect bases from and land as a seamless environment and tactical level sense, not simply an which our naval and air forces over which we achieve desired effects. enabler for the conduct of land warfare. operate, and potentially to deny the Once that force is ashore, it ceases Joint Land Combat (JLC). Outside adversary access to staging bases.” 5 to achieve strategic effect and risks of large-scale Amphibious Manoeuvre, irrelevance and isolation from the rest the regional environment implies Using land forces to control maritime of the land across the archipelago it that any land force, particularly an approaches, secure bases and so is a sits within. Forces ashore, ‘boots on enduring expeditionary one, should maritime strategy. This ‘gap’ or ‘moat’ the ground’ are vital to ‘war among continue to exploit the green and view of course also flies in the face of the people’ but we need to balance our brown water zones for manoeuvre our ‘expeditionary’ naval and military mass with mobility and be cognisant and sustainment. There are few history from Rabaul and Gallipoli of what a smaller, agile force using the locations in the POE where a land onwards, most notably during the sea can achieve relative to a larger force force will not have a seaward flank as closing years of World War 11. The ashore. This is not an either/ or debate a minimum and in a majority of cases, one time we have defended Australia but one of balance. be operating across multiple islands. against direct attack, we were part of Littoral Manoeuvre (LitM). LitM The ability to control and exploit these an archipelagic amphibious campaign entered the ADF lexicon in Australia’s waterborne, but arguably not ‘sea’, across most of what we now describe Maritime Doctrine, because it was lines of communication is critical. A as our POE. borrowed in order develop Australia’s reasonable hypothesis is that the vast Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 35

majority of populations reside on waterways and coastal fringes because these remain the most effective means of transportation and commerce. One way to avoid roadside IEDs on these few roads is to go cross-country. Now we need to realise that this includes the water.

Littoral Effects

“The goal of naval thinking today should be to build awareness from the blue water to the green water to the brown water, in an integrated battle space. The maritime environment is more complex now. You have to put riverine into this 8 F ig. 3 - ADAS bigger picture.” Case Study. The US military’s Littoral Penetration Range vs Littoral Rear Admiral Donald K. Bullard experience in Vietnam is an excellent Basic physics as applied to ship design Penetration (USN) Commander Naval case study as the environment has has meant that if you wanted to cross Expeditionary Combat Command certain similarities to the POE. In an ocean safely and effectively, you built April 6, 2006 Vietnam the physical and tactical large vessels. If you wanted to beach, The requirement then is to achieve environment generated five different you placed these larger vessels at great enduring effects in the littoral. This craft types. Boarding operations in relative risk and significantly reduced does not necessarily imply permanent the inshore zone were beyond the your choice of beaches. Maximising presence but the ability to penetrate the range of frigates and a specialist beach access meant having large ships littoral where and when desired and the craft was developed. This role is now carry smaller landing craft and in 1943 nature of that penetration is also varied. addressed by RHIBs but these are only the first well-dock was at sea. If you Being doctrinally correct is present with their parent major fleet wished to further exploit the shallow, challenging in this domain, particularly unit (MFU). Fire Support craft were unsurveyed, changeable and confined in the ADF where the lexicon is limited. developed from converted LCM 6. No brown water zone, small craft were Clearly a ‘manoeuvre’ effect, that is, such capability is currently available in needed. This tension between range to achieve tactical combative effects the ADF. Troop variants with ballistic and ‘littoral penetration’ both in depth on an adversary is needed. So too is protection were also required. and persistent presence or effect is an ‘mobility’, or the tactical movement of Troop movement today is largely enduring challenge. Figure 2 illustrates forces which then achieve the tactical in helicopters or in some form of the place and effects various vessel manoeuvre. ‘Sustainment’ of the protected mobility vehicle. There is types, specifically under Joint Project distributed force is then crucial and no waterborne equivalent in the ADF. 2048, the ‘Amphibious Deployment force protection is then required over Specialised craft to support SEAL and Sustainment (ADAS) System’ can assets conducting these mobility and operations were also developed. While achieve. The future phases indicated sustainment tasks. the SF ADRHIB may meet some by dotted lines are yet to be developed Various nations have approached this of these roles, the suitability in the and the impacts on solution implied by requirement from different directions riverine environment is unassessed; the degree of penetration desired are and with differing emphasis dictated by however the fact that the USN operates highlighted. their particular needs as well as, perhaps both the AD RHIB and the Special Riverine Warfare occurs where the parochially, along Service lines. The Operations Craft (Riverine) may be sea and inland waters are an enduring easiest way to summarise these sorts of germane. part of the tactical environment rather effects however is to examine the US than a place of transition. It has been Vietnam experience. variously defined but the following is Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 36 The Yawning Capability Gap: the ADF and ‘Brown Water’ Warfare

perhaps the most apposite. Operations conducted by forces organised to cope with and exploit the unique characteristics of a riverine area, to locate and destroy hostile forces, and/or to achieve or maintain control of the riverine area. Joint riverine operations combine land, naval, and air operations, as appropriate, and are suited to Required Effects the nature of the specific riverine area in which operations are to be In order to achieve domain awareness, 9 conducted. security and tactical effect in the ‘green For the purposes of this paper, the and brown water’ zone, three core same argument is applied to the narrow capabilities are required. and sometimes shallow stretches of archipelagic ‘green’ water between 1. Intra-theatre manoeuvre islands where major fleet units are and sustainment capability. F ig. 4 – Finnish constrained or cannot operate. Intra-theatre manoeuvre and smaller craft over the ramp. If a Uisko and sustainment is the primary task conventional Combat Team had Jurmo Classes Cut rrent Situa ion of LCH Replacement but this access to small craft this would project cannot address the full apply equally. Use of ships like Joint Project 2048 Phase 4 A/B environmental range, particularly HMAS Choules and larger landing delivering the Amphibious Assault the shallow rivers and estuaries and craft as a floating / mobile FOB Ships (LHDs) and Phase 3 providing up poorer beaches, unless it adopts a for small craft was well-developed to 12 LCM1E for ship to shore assault “system of systems” approach. With in Vietnam and is SOP for the craft roles are the only currently funded only six large vessels it is unlikely Royal Marines today. The logistic phases of the ADAS system delivering to meet the need for concurrent, task previously performed by amphibious capability. Whilst at the enduring operations as well as LCM8, before their means of leading edge of modern conventional support to contingencies and raise strategic transport into a theatre landing craft capability, these will only / train / sustain activities, especially (LPA/LSH) was removed, could be employed within the LHD system if also picking up former LCM8 continue with life-extended LCM8 and not available for independent roles. The LCH(R) will necessarily or a replacement but only if their operations conducted by the LCM8. be a large vessel in order to conduct transport was resolved. Originally Ph3 was to replace a range open ocean transits and will 3. Deployable Tactical Manoeuvre effects represented by LARC V, LCM8, therefore be of limited utility in (Riverine) Capability. Independent LCVP, lighterage and LCH but only the shallow rivers and estuaries. Tactical Manoeuvre craft are a LCH effect is currently being addressed 2. The potential solutions however new capability although arguably as JP2048 Phase 5. This implies may be able to ‘host’ smaller craft. Commando Watercraft, Special some scope challenges to the LCH This means that the LCH may Forces Air-Drop RHIB (SF Replacement as it is unclear whether be seen as comprising a systems ADRHIB) and the Zodiac F470 the capabilities deemed necessary solution which can operate as capability previously used by in the past are no longer so. Phase 5 either the LCH acting as only a Assault Pioneers possess some of “LCH Replacement” will perform intra- strategic deployment means into the lower-end qualities required. theatre limited amphibious operations theatre for small craft or operating The ability to insert and extract and administrative sealift with a greater with the LCH as a mother- light vehicle or foot patrols, to ocean-going capability. ship by using perhaps several provide direct fire support to LCH as a FOB for Cdo Coy Gp conventional and special forces, scale operations and launching to exploit and patrol the rivers, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 37

estuaries and reef-bound waters is a common aspiration among many amphibious forces. 4. The ietnamV example demonstrates that at a minimum, fire support, troop / patrol and logistic functions need to be addressed. Arguably a separate C2 function is needed. It is difficult to satisfy all with the one hullform with the principle discriminator being between small combatant craft and larger logistic craft when a vehicle is a required load. As soon as a vehicle larger than a quad bike is specified, the craft becomes F ig. 5 – larger and less likely to satisfy fire themselves. The base requirement as Regional Force Surveillance Units, Swedeship ‘Fast support and patrol scale roles. would include a high-speed, the ‘Swedeship’ design for the Abu Supply Vessel’ for Common to all however is the protected hull with sensors and Dhabi Navy is a larger scale capability Abu Dhabi Navy need to use speed and manoeuvre stabilised weapons able to detect, and therefore more challenging to as part of the self-protective track, identify and prosecute deploy but of greater capacity. effect, much like a helicopter. potential threats, particularly Scandinavian development of Some resistance to waterborne asymmetric. These would need hovercraft, largely to counter ice and riverine IEDs and ballistic to be coordinated with the wider constrictions but equally relevant protection against small arms is surface warfare and maritime force in the coral and mangroves of the certainly desirable but the same protection effort and deconflicted tropics are relevant in the POE. practical limits apply as they do to with the landing force ashore. Any While lightly armoured they provide a helicopter. synergy between the solution for unique flexibilities for getting stores 5. Force-Protection Capability. this and a Riverine capability is and personnel ashore dry and across Australia’s Amphibious Concept worth exploring. a vast range of beaches denied to (AAC) articulates the aspirational conventional craft. Unlike their larger tactic of Ship-to-Objective International USN cousin which uses gas turbines, Manoeuvre (STOM). STOM these are relatively simple and cheap aims to minimise the pause at Approaches craft. Fig. 6 shows a Finnish LCAC-M. a beachhead and to proceed to Scandinavia. With the end of the Cold United States. Former US Navy tactical objectives directly, to take War, several Scandinavian navies have Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral the beach ‘in-stride’ and to do so also shifted from a coastal defence Mullen put USN requirements from over or just under the visible posture to an expeditionary role but succinctly; horizon in order to maximise found that their experience in the close We need a fleet that can operate surprise and force protection littoral of their fjords and archipelagos at the other end of the spectrum… of the LHD and escorts. This is especially relevant. The Swedish We need a green water capability however implies long transits on CombatBoat 90 is in export globally and a brown water capability… the surface assault landing craft, in many variants. The Finnish Jurmo I want a balanced force in every through complex waters in both Class is a similar design. At Fig. 4 a sense of the word. I believe our navigational and threat terms. Uisko Class variant of Jurmo hosting Navy is missing a great opportunity 6. The bilitya to achieve local domain a stabilised twin 120mm mortar fire to influence events by not having a awareness and to interdict threats support variant and a Jurmo troop riverine force. We’re going to have to the landing craft implies variant are shown. one.10 capability beyond the escorts Perhaps more suited to logistic tasks The US has in recent years offshore and the landing craft and tactical mobility for elements such reinvigorated its ‘Riverine’ capability Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 38 The Yawning Capability Gap: the ADF and ‘Brown Water’ Warfare

largely dormant since Vietnam. The Considerations Small Unit Riverine Craft (SURC) is Major Systems. The fact operated by the USN’s 1st Riverine that there is a close link Group and has been effective in Iraqi between Amphibious dams and waterways and in counter- and Riverine Warfare drug operations in South American means that the JP2048 rivers. ADAS system could The USN has also recently logically be designated as acquired a variant of the CombatBoat the parenting program. F ig. 6 – Finnish Navy (CB)90 for the Riverine C2 role. It If ADAS is not considered holistically, Quantities required will also be LCAC is important to note that these two elements become disjointed and determined in part by any multi- craft types are usually employed as a interfaces not well understood or roling and concurrency requirements. battlespace system with Tactical UAV developed. An obvious example is in Personnel and Individual Training. and close air support linked to the acquiring small craft with no view as to There is a clear synergy between craft with their crew trained as JTAC their means of strategic transport. the tactical roles envisaged, the and able to coordinate joint fires in Each requirement has a common expertise being developed to operate support of their mission. need for deployability by sea and / or the LCM1E assault craft and the The USN is developing concepts air. These are largely determined by Boatswains Mate category’s current around the Joint Multi-mission the lift platform’s capacity in terms of competencies in high speed, water jet Expeditionary Craft (JMEC). The material handling, space and weight. RHIB operations, OTH navigation Northrop Grumman prototype at Beyond approximately 30 tonnes, and small arms expertise. Equally Fig. 8 demonstrates a concept for heavy cranage or specialised davits Army’s Water Transport trade has a common high speed aluminium become the norm. Ability to tow on a wealth of expertise in the logistic hullform with inherent ballistic trailers will be dictated by the selected and independent operations domain protection and available in troop, prime-mover. Any implied towing and tactical work through support to C2, fire support and utility /cargo requirement will add a liability to Special Forces watercraft. variants. Army’s Land 121 vehicle project. The As Nick Brown has recently 11 United Kingdom. The UK has SURC gives an indication of scale. noted, the rise in small boat recently acquired the Offshore In terms of strategic deployment, capabilities internationally has Raiding Craft (ORC) in troop and craft fitted with kick-stands or stilts as come from different needs, fire-support variants. These have seen in Fig. 11 below for Jurmo boats, but the complexity and level of been successfully employed in Iraq can be carried (sacrificing LCM1E) in professionalism required just at the and Africa. While also employed in a the LHD and LSD dock, or as vehicle basic levels of safe boat handling Force Protection role for the Landing or upper deck cargo (at the sacrifice of of small craft at sea has always Craft in amphibious operations there vehicles) if under 16 tonnes and moved challenged training standards, but are plans for a replacement to release by overhead gantry crane. to add the tactical employment, these to their core role. Basis of Provisioning. The range maintenance of situational awareness In addition, the need to operate of effects required will determine and management of onboard in areas of large tidal zones, mudflats whether one common hull like the surveillance, counter-IED and F ig. 7- Small Unit and shallow waterways have also seen JMEC or specialised Riverine Craft (SURC) the RM develop small and medium hulls with perhaps some air cushioned landing craft (LCAC-S systems commonality and LCAC-M). Fig.10 shows two are required. Obvious LCAC S on the beach in Iraq. In Fig. commonality 11 three LCAC (S) are embarked as opportunities include deck cargo in an LSD(A), a sister ship weapons stations, BMS to HMA Choules, ready to be craned and radio equipment, into the water. propulsion and auxiliary systems and sensors and navigation systems. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 39

electronic countermeasures and weapons systems raises the bar. Neither Navy nor Army should underestimate it just because, ‘we know boats.’ The operation of combatant craft in the complex, littoral maritime domain and the maintenance of situational awareness is a clear overlap between traditional naval roles and procedures and their extension ashore. The decision to place all roles under one organisation, to split them or handle them jointly has pro- and counter- arguments to consider. Individual training and the sustainability of trade and career structures will figure heavily. Facilities, Supply and Support. The decisions on commonality, organisational splits or consolidation and therefore basing and crewing will These are largely reliant on deployment Amphibious Warfare domain in the F ig. 8 Northrop Grumman JMEC influence the facilities and sustainment through LSDs (and commercial sealift US, NL and UK and collectively in views. The LCM1E will be maintained shipping which is prevalent in Europe) NATO. There is therefore ready access by the parent LHD SPO. Navy RHIBs but much less in our region and have a to extant and evolving doctrine and are provided and sustained under a degree of capacity to be self-sustaining, tactics. It would be logical to place commercial arrangement. LCM8 and then become an element within the these requirements under a similar LARC V are managed by Army Marine Bde Gp. Separately, the British Army’s joint governance model in the ADF, under another SPO. 17 Port and Maritime Regiment even if sub-systems might reside in Organisation. There is an operates some heavy landing craft and separate single services. opportunity to group the various lighterage for purely logistic tasks. Collective Training. The manoeuvre effects under a common organisation Command and Management. and logistic capabilities envisaged or allocate them closer to their There is growing interest in ‘brown are logical extensions of the current parent tactical and logistic functions water’ warfare resulting in tactical domains but will require new models and each has its merits. Perhaps the and doctrinal development and for training and certification, much as easiest example of an approach is these sit formally under the broader is the case for Amphibious Warfare the UK’s 1st Assault Group, Royal Marines (1AGRM). This organisation addresses the needs of the ‘L’ ships for organic landing craft by providing permanently embarked ‘Assault Squadrons’ comprising LCVP and LCU landing craft, an Amphibious Beach Unit and a C2 structure embedded within the ship. This has been adapted for Australia’s LHDs. Separately, 539 Assault Sqn, Royal Marines (539 ASRM) provides independent manoeuvre to the Comd of 3 Cdo Bde F ig. 9 – Royal Marines ORC with RM. A range of craft from rigid raiders LCVP. Troop and Fire to large LCU and including small Support variants hovercraft address a range of effects. shown Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 40 The Yawning Capability Gap: the ADF and ‘Brown Water’ Warfare

Fig. 10 – generally. Separate and independent (Endnotes) LCAC(S) on roles may draw on common Fleet and 1 Navy Department, Riverine Warfare: Iraqi beach FORCOMD collective training and The US Navy’s Operations on Inland Waters, Washington: Naval History Division, 1969. certification agencies and processes but 2 While the South West Pacific campaign applied to their specific roles. of WW11 is important to Australians, the US Army dominance over the US Marine Corps in writing history and the scale of the Conclusions Normandy operations , (with an obvious British focus on this theatre) overshadowed the quite different lessons and tactics of The ADF exhibits a certain blindness the SW Pacific in post-war developments in Amphibious warfare. The current to the characteristics of its operating F ig. 11 – Command and Control and other doctrine Three RM environment and as such a significant is a descendant of the European models and LCAC(S) capability gap exists in the ‘brown procedures much more so than the Pacific experience. Yung, Christopher D., Gators of secured on water’ domain. The conduct of both Neptune, Naval Amphibious Planning for the an LSD(A) amphibious operations as well as Normandy Invasion, Annapolis, Maryland: deck United States Naval Institute, 2006. enduring expeditionary operations 3 Crane, Russ H. VADM, RAN Rtd, Chief in the POE and beyond requires the of Navy speech to Seapower 2010. ADF to maximise the range of effects 4 Evans, Dr. Michael, ‘Towards an Australian Way of War, Culture Politics and it can achieve. A clear gap exists at Strategy, 1901-2004’ in Australian Army the small-craft end of the spectrum Journal, Volume 11, Number 1, 2004, pg 177. in the extensive ‘brown water’ 5 Defence White Paper 2009, Section 7.6 6 Barbey, Daniel E. VADM, USN Rtd, areas of the POE. A range of linked MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy: Seventh capability options, with similarly linked Amphibious Force Operations, 1943–1945, Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval organisational aspects, are available Institute, 1969. to address these. Wider allied interest 7 ‘The use of the littoral as an operational and current efforts in development will manoeuvre space from which a sea-based Joint amphibious force can threaten, or assist the ADF in its own considerations apply and sustain, force ashore.’ Australian as well as offering materiel solution Maritime Doctrine 1, 2010 (AMD) p 198. options and is an opportunity to 8 Mills, “An Integrated Battle Space”. Rear Admiral Donald K. Bullard’s presentation address them together. t at the U.S. Naval Institute’s 2006 Applied Fig. 12 Naval History Conference. Riverine Warfare Conference Final Wrap-Up,” U.S. Small Unit Riverine Naval Institute, April 10, 2006. Craft 9 US Military Dictionary. The Oxford Commander Iain Jarvie, RAN, is Deputy Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military, (SURC), Berkeley: Oxford University Press, 2001. trailer and Director, Amphibious Warfare and Afloat 10 Chief of Naval Operations, Remarks prime- Support in Capability Development delivered to the Naval War College, mover Unclassified, 31 August 2005. (www.navy. / repair Group. Aside from 14 years at sea mil/navydata/cno/speeches/mullen05081. txt) quoted in; vehicle including HMAS Kanimbla (OPSO) and Benbow, R., Ensminger, F., Swartz, P.,Savitz, S., Stimpson, D. MAJ, Renewal of Navy’s CO HMAS Wollongong, his unofficial Riverine Capabilities: A Preliminary Amphibious Warfare career began in Examination of Past, Current and Future Capabilities, Alexandria, Virginia : Center Fig. 13 1998 at Army’s Command and Staff for Naval Analysis, March 2006, pg 5. – Jurmo 11 Brown, Nick. ‘Large parts for small Class in a College, then ADF Warfare Centre, actors: small boat operations at the human Dutch LPD attending USN/USMC Amphibious level’, in Jane’s International Defence Review, Volume 44, November 2011, p 48-50. Dock Warfare courses, as N5 (Plans) to COMAUSATG, as PWO DS Amphibious Additional Resources Warfare, and OIC of Joint Amphibious Cutler Thomas J, Brown Water, Black Berets Capability Implementation Team (JACIT). (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1988). Clark, Dean, ‘Australia’s Amphibious Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 41

Ambition’, in Australian Army Journal, LWD 3-0-0, Manoeuvre Operations in the Expeditionary Maneuver, July 1997 Canberra, 2011 Littoral Environment, 2004, p 1-1, para 1.1 United States Marine Corps Publication, The Dunnavant, R. Blake., Brown Water Warfare: United States Navy Fleet Forces Command, MAGTF in Sustained Operations Ashore The U.S. Navy in Riverine Warfare and the U.S. Navy Riverine Group Concept of United States Marine Corps Concept paper - Emergence of a Tactical Doctrine, 1775- Operations, Revision A. United States. Dept. Expeditionary Riverine Operations, 2009. 1970, Gainsville, Florida: University Press of of the Navy. Naval Expeditionary Combat Florida, 2003. Command, 2008. United States Marine Corps Publication, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, February Forbes John and Williams Robert, Riverine Stolzenburg, Michael A. Unified Vision 2002. Force: The Illustrated History of the Vietnam For The Future:Riverine Squadrons And War, Bearsville, New York: The Up and The Security Cooperation MAGTF, Thesis United States Marine Corps Publication, Coming Publishing Company, 1987. presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, July 1997, Fulton William B., Riverine Operations: Command and General Staff College, Fort United Nations Population Fund, “State of 1966-1969, Washington, D.C.: Department Leavenworth, Kansas, 2008. 14 October the World Population 2001,” http://www. of the Army, 1985. 2011. < http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/Get unfpa.org/swp/2001/english/ch02.html TRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc. Lindley-French Julian, Effect in the All Water pdf&AD=ADA482961> Battlespace Riverine Operations Draft Final Report, 24 February, 2009 United States Marine Corps Publication,

H MAS Ballarat departs Sydney Harbour to participate in Fleet Concentration Period 2009

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Issue 144 43 Assessing the 2009 White Paper and its Outline of Force 2030 as a Maritime Strategy in the Light of Corbett’s ‘England In The Seven Years War’ by Major Scott McPherson

he Defence White Paper 2009 Corbett’s key strategic findings that Australia’s Force 2030 (WP09) ‘Defending Australia in relate to the ‘functions of the fleet’ (ie. the Maritime Strategy Tthe Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030’ sea-borne or maritime force). Central to provides strategic direction to the ADF, this are three strategies (herein referred The ADF’s principal task of deterring and outlines the use of maritime strategy to as tenets), which include firstly being and defeating attacks on Australia entails to achieve national security and regional able to support or obstruct diplomatic a fundamentally maritime strategy, stability. Known as Force 2030, this effort; secondly, to protect or destroy for which Australia requires forces strategy is an ambitious approach, which commerce; and thirdly to further or that can operate with decisive effect aims to acquire and develop a potent hinder military operations ashore’.1 A throughout the northern maritime and force for the nation. fourth key aspect is the coordinated use littoral approaches to Australia, and the This essay will assess WP09 and of the entire maritime force to achieve ADF’s primary operational environment its outline of Force 2030 as a maritime strategic outcomes. more generally.2 Force 2030 -as the strategy in the light of Sir Julian Corbett’s Force 2030- as a maritime strategy- centrepiece of the government’s ‘England in the Seven Years War’. will be assessed against each of these maritime strategy- relies upon force Importantly, assessing WP09 against areas to highlight strengths and structures that permit operations from Corbett’s writings will demonstrate how weaknesses in the Australian approach, the sea in order to conduct war, deter key aspects of maritime strategy are and additional context will be provided conflict or help regional partners. This resident within Force 2030, and will draw by way of recent operational experiences force is built upon maritime forces, out the relative strengths and weaknesses (which have shaped Force 2030). land forces, air power, strategic strike, of the Australian strategy. Importantly, this essay will also highlight and Joint enablers (to name but a few), This essay will also outline examples future challenges in order to stimulate which provide the government with from the Seven Years War to highlight further debate on this topic. a range of military contingencies.3

R oyal Australian Navy boarding officer,L ieutenant Bradley Morgan, shakes hands with East Timor Defence Force (F-FDTL) officer,L ieutenant David Santos, after boarding party practice onboard HMAS Albany, off the north coast of East Timor (Navy photo) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 44 Assessing the 2009 White Paper and its Outline of Force 2030 as a Maritime Strategy in the Light of Corbett’s ‘England In The Seven Years War’

Importantly, WP09 outlines that Force tenet. diplomacy is not highlighted in Corbett’s 2030 is not purely a warfighting force, The Force 2030 maritime strategy writings, it is nonetheless a natural but a force that is capable of achieving and its inherent capabilities will be very extension from his theory of supporting the government’s will through a range capable in supporting and/or obstructing or obstructing diplomacy, albeit within a of actions that achieve diplomatic and diplomatic efforts through coalitions peaceful environment. A recent example military endstates. and maritime forces. From a coalition- of this was the ADF’s response to the building perspective, one of WP09’s 2009 Sumatran earthquake, which Tenet One - Supporting Or themes centres on the employment of allowed the Australian government Obstructing Diplomatic the ADF within coalitions, either as a to utilise its expeditionary orientated Effort partner or as the lead nation.6 From force to provide rapid support to our a capability perspective, Force 2030 regional neighbour, thus enhancing Corbett illustrates ‘an obstruction of elements operating in the maritime regional diplomacy and strengthening diplomatic effort’ as an action by the domain are capable of command and international ties.9 Indeed Force English to position their naval and control of a large maritime force using 2030’s structure will enable greater military (ie. land) forces in an objective the new Canberra Class ships, which diplomatic efforts through additional area, while seeking to gain advantage include state of the art command and strategic lift aircraft (C-17) and the through working with a coalition. control systems. Therefore, the ability improved amphibious fleet, which is Importantly, these efforts attempted to for Force 2030 to operate effectively able to hold large amounts of disaster undermine the will of the enemy not within a coalition environment enhances relief stores, produce large amounts of through direct fighting, but through the likelihood of achieving diplomatic fresh water, and house a large amount advantageous positioning of a maritime support or obstruction, which further of construction equipment.10 The force. The English demonstrated this builds upon Corbett’s requirement to continuing increase in expeditionary when they formed an alliance with the effect diplomacy.7 forces under Force 2030 therefore Portuguese, and strategically placed Australia’s emerging amphibious supports diplomatic ties within the their maritime forces in key areas, thus capability also provides an excellent region, and expands upon Corbett’s dislocating the French battle fleet and means to obstruct diplomatic efforts basic tenet of supporting or obstructing preventing them from dominating the by acting as a deterrent to conflict. The diplomacy. Mediterranean Sea.4 While this may utility of a heavy maritime presence (ie. The combination of these diplomatic seem rather simplified in the modern an amphibious force) positioned off a effects under Corbett’s first tenet context, the root of its cause still holds coastline can achieve great diplomatic highlight the inherent strengths within true. A maritime force is an equally effect – indeed more effectively than the Force 2030 maritime strategy- effective tool of diplomacy in 2011 as it naval ships or aircraft alone. This was particularly as a force for implementing was in 1756. highlighted by General Colin Powell diplomacy. A recent Australian example of in 1991 when he surmised that ‘lying using a maritime force to support offshore, ready to act, the presence of Tenet Two – Protect Or diplomatic efforts occurred in East ships and Marines sometimes means Destroy Commerce Timor in May 2006. Otherwise known much more than just having air power as ‘gunboat diplomacy’, the presence or ship’s fire, when it comes to deterring Within the Seven Years War context, of a maritime force, operating as a a crisis. And the ships and Marines may Corbett recognised that undermining coalition of the willing off the coast not have to do anything but lie offshore’.8 the economies of England’s adversaries of Dili, demonstrated the Australian The ability of ADF expeditionary would weaken their will to fight, as their government’s resolve in supporting elements to stage off the coast and fighting power co-depended on their diplomatic efforts, while obstructing effect diplomatic change reinforces this resource base and ability to trade. In diplomatic efforts of adversary groups.5 argument, and supports Corbett’s first Corbett’s words, ‘trade and maritime This example highlights the how tenet in a modern sense. force depend on each other, and the judicious use of even a small maritime Force 2030’s maritime elements will riches which are the true resources of a force can shape diplomatic efforts and also be a powerful tool in enhancing country depend upon [its] commerce’.11 achieve a positive diplomatic effect, such diplomacy through defence agreements In this tenet, Corbett highlights the as coercing parties to the negotiation and bi-lateral arrangements with fundamental need to protect one’s own table, which reinforces Corbett’s first regional partners. While this style of commerce, and destroy an adversary’s Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 45

commerce. The tenet was practised examples are not as extreme as Corbett’s widely throughout the Seven Years War, descriptions (because they were not particularly in 1756 when Rear Admiral conducted under a declaration of war), Townshend established a form of ‘sea this style of operation still undermines control’ off the coast of North America, the adversary’s riches, and can be which protected English commerce described as a modern demonstration of (through providing safe passage), and Corbett’s second tenet. denied the line of passage between In a future setting, and particularly France and its colonies in the West in a time of war (as unlikely as that Indies. This approach undermined is), Force 2030 is well positioned as a French trade routes and facilitated the strategy to deal with protecting and destruction of many French commercial destroying (or denying) commerce in vessels.12 Another method of destroying Australia’s sea-air gap. The Future Joint commerce can be seen in the raid on Operating Concept outlines that the St Malo, where raiding forces attacked maritime elements operating under the ships, wharves and stockpiles at the port, Force 2030 guidance will establish Joint thus destroying a high number of trade sea control, air control, strategic strike, commodities and trade shipping for the and secure and maintain freedom of region.13 navigation through trade routes, thus Corbett’s second tenet can be found reinforcing Corbett’s second tenet.17 in the Force 2030 maritime strategy, Despite the need for sea which identifies sea control as the control doctrine (as a fundamental key component in Australia’s sea-air component of the second tenet), some gap denial. As outlined in WP09, ‘our commentators argue that achieving sea Operating from military strategy will be a proactive control is not viable. Hugh White argues clear strengths (and some weaknesses) the sea to the land one in which we seek to control the that the new Air Warfare Destroyers within the Australian maritime - Royal Australian dynamics of a conflict, principally by (AWDs) should only be use for sea strategy, the combined effects achieve Navy Doctor, Commander Peter way of sea control and air superiority, denial (ie. denying enemy use of an areas Corbett’s second tenet, and advances its Collins examines a and also by defeating hostile forces of sea), as sea control is far too complex applicability into the modern era. Micronesian man in their bases, in staging areas, or in and costly.18 However, this approach Tenet Three – Further Or Hinder (ADF photo) transit. We will use strategic strike would only allow Force 2030 to fulfil Military (LAND) Operations Ashore if we have to, and land operations in half of Corbett’s second tenet – destroy Corbett’s third maritime strategy our approaches’.14 While the WP09 enemy commerce. If Australia is to tenet is the need to further or hinder does not explicitly mention attacking maintain its trade routes (which are military operations ashore. Arguably commercial shipping, the establishment critical to its economic strength), then this is where Force 2030 faces its greatest of naval blockades and sea control sea control is required, thus justifying challenges, as it strives to convert a infers the denial of commercial shipping the high cost and complexity of this land-centric Army to an organisation where operationally required. Case task.19 The same argument can be made that thinks like a marine force.20 English in point for protection of commerce for other costly capabilities under the forces arguably faced similar challenges is the current anti-piracy operations Force 2030 acquisition plan. Without an during the Seven Years War, and the in the Gulf of Aden, where Australian appropriate suite of layered capabilities, judicious use of naval and military (ie. maritime elements conduct commercial Force 2030 will not be able to achieve sea land) elements within a coordinated shipping protection.15 Recent counter- control, and will not achieve the basic maritime strategy turned service commerce operations include ADF requirements under Corbett’s tenet of limitations into stunning victories. maritime elements operating within protecting and destroying commerce. The most notable of these victories the Multinational Interception Force Force 2030’s focus on sea control, was the successful English amphibious in 2002, which enforced economic and the range of advanced maritime campaign in which a string of coastal sanctions (including denying capabilities within the strategy clearly towns in southern France were seized commercial shipping where necessary) demonstrate the ability of Force 2030 through a series of amphibious attacks.21 in the Persian Gulf.16 While these to affect commerce. While there are Corbett identified the importance of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 46 Assessing the 2009 White Paper and its Outline of Force 2030 as a Maritime Strategy in the Light of Corbett’s ‘England In The Seven Years War’ fleet in supporting military operations the third tenet of supporting operations effects of maritime forces within ashore, and preferably only against ashore.25 the STOM and sea-basing concepts lightly fortified locations. A further Despite these capability underpin the ability for Force 2030 example of supporting military actions improvements, Frühling opines that to succeed in the littoral battle, hence ashore is the extensive use of rivers the Force 2030 amphibious force is reinforcing Corbett’s third tenet. and waterways during the Quebec ‘insufficient for decisive land operations, To ensure that Corbett’s third campaign of 1759. In this case, land and would need to be withdrawn before tenet can be met sufficiently, the 2014 force commanders utilised naval sloops the enemy mounted a counter attack to White Paper should ensure that all to conduct reconnaissance and patrol its landing’.26 However, this argument amphibious force enablers are acquired. the waterways around the area. This does not consider the subordinate As highlighted during the Quebec provided significant information to local doctrine under the Force 2030 maritime campaign, the maritime force must commanders, which supported both strategy, notably ship-to-objective make use of a range of watercraft that land and naval operations.22 While this manoeuvre (STOM), and sea-basing.27 permit it to prosecute its mission in all was conducted on inland waterways, Within STOM, the amphibious maritime and littoral environments- not this combined use of naval and military landing force is able to strike directly just into a ocean-facing beachhead.30 elements emphasises the importance at the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities, While WP09 states that the force of Corbett’s tenet as part of a maritime and will manoeuvre to avoid decisive projection capabilities of Force 2030 are strategy. engagement (which may include significant, it still lacks critical enablers. Force projection to support or recovering to the sea), until conditions Given that our region is archipelagic hinder military operations ashore is are suitable for decisive battle. Likewise, by nature and contains over 85,000 unequivocal in the Force 2030 maritime the sea-basing concept permits much kilometres of navigable waterways, strategy. WP09 states that ‘amphibious of the force to conduct prolonged independent landing craft and riverine T- imor Leste and sea-lift ships, strategic (inter-theatre) operations from an amphibious task craft are needed to provide sufficient Battle Group VI and operational (intra-theatre) air lift, group loitering off the coast, thereby mobility and reach to the maritime force. Commanding Officer, mounting bases and forward operating reducing the risk from remaining Additionally, given the relative paucity Lieutenant Colonel bases in northern Australia and our onshore. Importantly, Force 2030 also of suitable ports within the region, a David Smith talks with retired General maritime and littoral environment… exists in an era where contested landings requirement exists for an expanded 28 Peter Cosgrove at the provide us with the ability to project are not conducted. This philosophy portable wharf system, such as naval 10th Anniversary of 31 military power throughout our primary was also identified by Corbett, who lighterage equipment. By providing the Popular Consultation operational environment and, on espoused the importance of strong naval full range of amphibious enablers, Force awards ceremony occasions, beyond’.23 This statement forces and a weaker army, which were 2030 will be more capable of furthering held at the Presidential Palace in provides a bold example of the intent of capable of using superior manoeuvre to military operations ashore, thus building Dili.(ADF photo) Force 2030, which not only satisfies, but defeat their opponent.29 The combined upon Corbett’s third tenet. also builds upon Corbett’s third tenet. While Force 2030’s projection capabilities may look impressive, this development was borne out of earlier mistakes, particularly during the initial insertion into East Timor in 1999. According to Dupont, there were significant strategic and tactical lift limitations, which significantly delayed the deployment of Australian land forces.24 This lesson has helped shape the ADF’s current expeditionary mindset, including Force 2030, as demonstrated by the purchase of five C-17 heavy lift aircraft, and a three-fold increase in amphibious lift capability, thus providing the means to achieve Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 47

‘Coordinating The Functions’ And reflecting an advanced version of Modern Joint Operations Corbett’s theory of ‘coordinated fleet Corbett’s description of the ‘need functions’.35 to coordinate the functions of the As a maritime strategy, Force naval and military elements’ is a 1900s 2030 has inherent strengths that are description of joint operations. Corbett demonstrated against Corbett’s three highlights the use of coordinated tenets and his principle of coordination. functions during the Quebec campaign, The ability for Force 2030 capabilities to where naval and military forces regularly operate as a coalition leader or partner Major Scott McPherson is a pilot in the operated in concert- an example of this in the region, and the ability for the force Australian Army, serving in the plans being the use of naval gunfire support to provide a deterrent effect makes it a for an advancing land force. Further strong tool for supporting or obstructing branch of Army HQ. He has conducted examples of ‘joint’ operations occurred diplomacy. Similarly, the advanced operational tours to Bougainville during amphibious landings along technological nature of the force, and the Island, Bosnia-in-Herzegovina, the French coastline, in what Corbett force’s construct make it very well suited Christmas Island (during the Tampa described as the ability to control ‘the to providing sea control in support of crisis), East Timor, and Afghanistan; diverse functions of the fleet in full Australia’s economic interests. While or coordinated activity’ within the these efforts may be prove to be costly held command positions as a maritime strategy.32 and complex, Force 2030’s ability to troop commander and an Aviation The Force 2030 maritime strategy support or destroy commerce in the Reconnaissance Squadron commander, (and indeed the entire ADF’s joint maritime environment is substantial, and was lead author for a number of warfighting concept) reflects Corbett’s thus supporting national trade routes. Army’s aviation doctrine publications. joint approach; insofar that WP09 states While the ability for Force 2030 that ‘the ADF must be joint, integrated, to project ashore still presents some He was a major contributor to the [and] highly deployable’. While the ADF limitations in terms of smaller ADF’s Amphibious Aviation Concept of has come from a past where services watercraft capability, the overall Employment paper. often preferred operate independently, projection capability is second to none operational experiences since 1999 in the region. The planned Force 2030 have demonstrated the ever-increasing capabilities will allow the ADF to fundamental joint nature of the ADF. successfully support land operations Indeed, WP09 recognises that ‘for a ashore, as well as hinder enemy relatively small force like the ADF, joint operations. The force will further expand operations are the only way to deliver on Corbett’s third tenet when the ADF’s (Endnotes) decisive outcomes’.33 STOM and sea-basing concepts are 1 Notes Hendley applies this argument developed through the coming decade. Corbett, J. 1911, England in the Seven directly to the Force 2030 maritime These endeavours will be enabled Years War: A Study in Combined Strategy, strategy, stating that ‘archipelagic through effective joint integration of the Longmans Green & Co, London, p. 6. 2 Department of Defence. 2009, Defence warfare is a creature of its own, with maritime force, which will also further White Paper 2009 ‘Defending Australia an interdependence of maritime, land, the ADF’s inherent strength in joint war in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030’, air and littoral warfare of an order of fighting. Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p. 59. 3 ibid, pp. 61-62. magnitude more intimate than in any Highlighting WP09 (and its outline 4 Corbett, pp. 4-5. other type of theatre. Consequently, of Force 2030 as a maritime strategy) 5 The sudden arrival of HMAS ADELAIDE existing doctrines cannot be simply against Corbett’s principles not only in Dili Harbour at dawn on 25 May 06 had 34 an unprecedented effect on local political run in parallel and expected to work’. paints the strategy in a positive light, but and para-military groups operating in a The developing joint culture within the clearly demonstrates how the Australian near political vacuum (based on the author’s ADF will naturally transition into the maritime strategy builds upon the tenets experience during the commencement of Operation ASTUTE). Force 2030 maritime strategy, and the and principles that enabled English 6 Department of Defence, pp. 50-51. development of the force’s command victories during the Seven Years War. t 7 Joint Amphibious Capability Team. and control systems will takes the 2011, Australia’s Amphibious Concept, v5.2, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. joint approach one step further- thus 8-9. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 48 Assessing the 2009 White Paper and its Outline of Force 2030 as a Maritime Strategy in the Light of Corbett’s ‘England In The Seven Years War’ 8 Powell, C. 1991, in ‘How much might be 32 Corbett, p. 8. and the Implications for Navy’, in Naval done with in a hundred thousand such as 33 Department of Defence, p. 54. Forces, vol 31 Special issue, Monch Publishing, these?’ in Defence Viewpoints, http://www. Australia. defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/ 34 Hendley, P. 2004, ‘Archipelagic Manoeuvre Warfare for the ADF’ in Defender, Winter Powell, C. 1991, in ‘How much might be how-much-might-be-done-with-a-hundred- done with in a hundred thousand such as thousand-such-as-these, accessed 30 Oct 11. 2004, Australian Defence Association, Canberra, p. 32. these?’ in Defence Viewpoints, http://www. 9 Crane, R. 2011, The Royal Australian defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/ Navy’s Force 2030: An Asia Pacific Strategy, 35 Department of Defence, Future Joint how-much-might-be-done-with-a-hundred- in RUSI Journal, vol 156, issue 2, Routledge, Operating Concept, p. 4. thousand-such-as-these, accessed 30 Oct 11. London, p. 70. . 2009, Defence to 10 Joint Amphibious Capability Team, p. 8. Bibliography Contribute to Anti-Piracy Efforts, Royal 11 Corbett, p. 189. Australian Peacekeeper and Peace Makers Australian Navy website, 29 May 2009, http:// www.navy.gov.au/Defence_to_Contribute_to_ 12 Corbett, p. 357. Association. 2004, Op SLIPPER, http://www. peacekeepers.asn.au/operations/current_ops/ Anti-Piracy_Efforts, accessed 26 Oct 11. 13 Corbett, p. 277. Op%20Slipper.pdf, accessed 30 Oct 11. United States Marine Corps. 2010, Marine 14 Department of Defence, p. 59. Barrie, C. ‘The Defence White Paper 2009 and Corps Operating Concepts: Assuring Littoral 15 Royal Australian Navy. 2009, Defence Australia’s Maritime Capabilities’ in Security Access…Winning Small Wars, United States to Contribute to Anti-Piracy Efforts, Royal Challenges, Vol 5, no 2 (Winter 2009), Kokoda Marine Corps, Quantico, Virginia. Australian Navy website, 29 May 2009, http:// Foundation, Canberra, pp. 51-59. United States Marine Corps. 2010, MCDP www.navy.gov.au/Defence_to_Contribute_to_ Corbett, J. 1911, England in the Seven 1-0 Marine Corps Operations, United States Anti-Piracy_Efforts, accessed 26 Oct 11. Years War: A Study in Combined Strategy, Marine Corps, Quantico, Virginia. 16 Australian Peacekeeper and Peace Makers Longmans Green & Co, London. United States Marine Corps. 2004, Association. 2004, Op SLIPPER, http://www. Crane, R. 2011, The Royal Australian Navy’s Operational Maneuver from the Sea: A peacekeepers.asn.au/operations/current_ops/ Force 2030: An Asia Pacific Strategy, in RUSI Concept for the Projection of Naval Power Op%20Slipper.pdf, accessed 30 Oct 11 Journal, vol 156, issue 2, Routledge, London. Ashore, United States Marine Corps, Quantico, Virginia. 17 Department of Defence. 2011, Future Joint Department of Defence. 2007, ADDP Operating Concept 2030, Head Joint Capability 0.3 - Joint Operations for the 21st Century, Coordination, Commonwealth of Australia, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. Canberra, p. 2. Department of Defence. 2009, Defence White 18 White, H. 2011, ‘No defence to warship Paper 2009 ‘Defending Australia in the Asia blowout’ in The Age, 27 Sep 2011, p 11. Pacific Century: Force 2030’, Commonwealth 19 Naval Forces. 2009, ‘The Defence White of Australia, Canberra. Paper and the Implications for Navy’, in Naval Department of Defence. 2010, Australian Forces, vol 31 Special issue, Monch Publishing, Maritime Doctrine – RAN Doctrine 1, Australia, p.18. Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 20 McPherson, S. 2011, ‘Australia’s Department of Defence. 2011, Future Joint Amphibious Concept’ speech to the United Operating Concept 2030, Head Joint Capability States Marine Corps Command & Staff Coordination, Commonwealth of Australia, College, Quantico, Virginia, 20 Oct 11. Canberra. 21 Corbett, pp. 294-298. Dupont, A. 2002, Transformation or 22 Corbett, pp. 460-463. Stagnation? Rethinking Australia’s Defence, 23 Department of Defence, p. 69. Speech to the Australian Security in the 21st Century Seminar, Parliament House, 24 Dupont, A. 2002, Transformation or Canberra, 13 Nov 2002. Stagnation? Rethinking Australia’s Defence, Speech to the Australian Security in the Frühling, S. 2008, ‘Golden Window of 21st Century Seminar, Parliament House, Opportunity: A New Maritime Strategy and Canberra, 13 Nov 2002. Force Structure for the Australian Navy’, in Security Challenges, vol 4, no 2, Winter 2008, 25 McPherson, loc. cit. Kokoda Foundation, Canberra, pp. 81-104. 26 Frühling, S. 2008, ‘Golden Window of Greet, N. 2008, ADF Experience on Opportunity: A New Maritime Strategy and Humanitarian Operations: A New Idea?, in Force Structure for the Australian Navy’, in Security Challenges, vol 4, no 2 (Winter 2008), Security Challenges, vol 4, no 2, Winter 2008, Kokoda Foundation, Canberra, pp. 45-61. pp. 92-93. Hendley, P. 2004, ‘Archipelagic Manoeuvre 27 Joint Amphibious Capability Team, pp. Warfare for the ADF’ in Defender, Winter 11-12. 2004, Australian Defence Association, 28 Discussions during the recent visit to Canberra, pp. 32-34. United States Marine Corps Command & Joint Amphibious Capability Team. 2011, Staff College highlighted that like the ADF, Australia’s Amphibious Concept, v5.2, the USMC will actively avoid a contested Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. landing due to the risks involved. An example of this is the use of I MEF as a demonstration Lyon, R & Davies, A. 2009, ‘Assessing the during Gulf War 1, when they threatened Defence White Paper 2009’, in ASPI Policy the Occupied Kuwaiti coastline, but were Analysis, no 41, Australian Strategic Policy never planned to be used due to the extensive Institute, Sydney. defences on the beachhead. McPherson, S. 2011, ‘Australia’s Amphibious 29 Corbett, p. 8. Concept’ speech to the United States Marine Corps Command & Staff College, Quantico, 30 Corbett, p. 460. Virginia, 20 Oct 11. 31 McPherson, loc. cit. Naval Forces. 2009, ‘The Defence White Paper Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 49 Submarines, ASW and the South China Sea. A cause for concern By Professor Geoffrey Till†

t is hard to avoid the fact that these strategic concerns for the days naval development has become US as well as other powers Ia hot topic in the Asia Pacific region in the region. Although amongst the media and in academic sophisticated wake-homing circles. The notion that a naval arms torpedoes have been race is developing is bandied about developed (particularly and there is a lot of speculation about effective against vessels what it might mean for an already with large wakes – like complicated situation in the South aircraft carriers), Chinese China Sea and for stability in the submarines (such as the Asia-Pacific region generally.1 The Kilo with its Sizzlers) emphasis on building up their ASW Capable neighbours - a debate focuses particularly on the appear to be optimised for shooting capacity and take Chinese capabilities Song Class submarine of the Chinese Navy development of submarines in the ASCMs not least the new H-6K/M as a benchmark of what is required. region, especially around the South cruise missile which suggests a Hence the JSMDF now has 30 undersea China Sea. This raises a couple of developing capacity to reach as far as SOSUS-type arrays connected to 14 issues, firstly, the implications of the Guam, a possibility that might require shore stations, ideally deployed to steady build up of China’s submarine the hardening of military facilities monitor Chinese submarines transiting A ircraft Carrier USS 3 fleet in the area and of the United there. The Chinese Navy’s focus on from the East China Sea to the wider Theodore Roosevelt, States’ response in terms of strategic the procurement of submarines is Pacific Ocean.4 background, joins a ASW, and secondly what is behind the entirely consistent with a strategy of sea ’s plans are more problematic. multinational battle accumulation of submarines by the denial intended to defend the maritime It currently maintains 16 SSKs but has group formation including the People’s other smaller powers of the region, approaches to China against intruding an ambitious submarine programme and what this might mean for the naval forces bent on attacking the of modernising existing forces, while multi-role missile area’s strategic stability.2 In particular, mainland. It is also seen as evidence of developing new ones in order to serve destroyer Guangzhou is a destablising submarine race a desire to deter external intervention standard sea denial/control purposes. and the Pakistan Navy developing? in any future conflict with, and/or over, In 2007, the upgraded Mazagon dock frigate PNS Badr Taiwan. The Submarine The comparatively modest Chinese Build-up SSN programme, and the development First of all, there is no doubting that of an ambitious new nuclear submarine China and its neighbours are building base at Yulin on Hainan, suggests an up their submarine capacities, as part interest in operational speed and a of the substantial naval modernization capacity to range well beyond China’s programme taking place all around the immediate area. Even so, the bulk of Asia-Pacific. China’s submarine force is especially The Chinese submarine force now suited for operations within the stands at some 60-70 units including First Island Chain. China’s SSBN at least six nuclear powered SSNs programme has only made slow and over 50 diesel-powered SSKs; the progress. newer classes in both categories such Anxieties about China have as the 6000 ton Shang class SSN and recently led to a deceleration in Japan’s the Song and Yuan classes of SSKs submarine-replacement rate, which represent a significant up-grade of will eventually lead to an increased Chinese submarine capabilities and force of some 22-24 submarines. There has raised a number of operational and has even been talk of Japan’s acquiring an SSN on lease from the US. The † This paper was delivered to the ANI Goldrick Seminar 6 February 2012. Japanese are placing an increasing Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 50 Submarines, ASW and the South China Sea. A cause for concern

in Mumbai began the construction II SSN from Russia, despite delays in China’s preparations for a campaign of the first of six advanced French- repairs after the accident to the Nerpa of sea denial, a diesel-powered Song designed Scorpene SSKs and the navy in the Sea of Japan in November 2008, submarine surfaced within five miles has launched another project for six which killed 20 crew members.9 of the USS Kitty Hawk battlegroup locally produced submarines. Admiral Finally current planning in the US operating near Okinawa. Denying Mehta was particularly keen for Navy calls for 48 SSN, and centres on this was a deliberate part of their India to develop more of an all-round the successful Virginia programme, developing anti-access strategy indigenous submarine capability, which most unusually is ahead of against the United States, the Chinese but for the time being it will need schedule and below budget, 10 and claimed it to be nothing more than to rely heavily on foreign expertise.5 which currently confers a considerable an accidental encounter, and that the According to India’s Comptroller ASW advantage over China. The US submarine in question did not have the and Auditor General’s report, project Navy is exploring options for a later speed to trail the battlegroup. Perhaps delays, however, are likely to mean, that follow on class of much smaller nuclear in part because of their embarrassment given the need to de-commission its submarines nonetheless capable of at having been thus surprised [to older submarines, the Navy might have carrying a number of the smaller the extent they were], and partly in a to operate with less than half its current manned and unmanned platforms bid to prevent this incident turning active submarine fleet. To compensate now considered essential for littoral into a crisis, the response of US Fleet for this serious shortfall India is in the operations, and is in the early stages of Commander, Admiral Fallon was market for an additional six SSKs with renewing its SSBN force. quite muted. He pointed out that the air-independent propulsion under As far as the main four naval powers battlegroup had not been exercising Project-75 India, but that project has of the region are concerned, it is not its ASW capabilities at the time but also run into trouble.6 just a question of their developing if it had been ‘and if this Chinese Additionally, Indian SSN/SSBN their submarines, but of exhibiting submarine came in the middle of aspirations are expanding too. The an increasing tendency to use them this, then it could have escalated into country began its programme to robustly. A Han class submarine was something that could have been very develop an indigenous a nuclear detected in Japan’s territorial waters unforeseen.’ 12 ballistic missile submarine project, the in 2004, and five warships operated in Nonetheless, American concern Advanced Technology Vessel [ATV] in close proximity to Chinxiao gas field at these kind of developments has the 1970s but only in December 2007, in the East China Sea, an area disputed resulted in a significant shift in the I NS Arihant did Admiral Mehta, finally confirm with Japan, in September 2005. 11 deployment of its submarines to the is expected to the Navy’s intent to take the nuclear In November 2006, in an incident Pacific from elsewhere and to a more commission this year deterrent to sea.7 India was helped in which some construed as a part of public use of its SSGNs more recently. (Public domain) this programme by leasing 4,000 ton Russian ‘Charlie 1’ Type 670A SSN in 1988-1991, an arrangement which facilitated the design and build of its first SSN, INS Arihant which was launched at $2.9in billion in July 2009, a major step in the country’s naval and defence-industrial development; this submarine is expected to be the first of a class of five SSNs under this programme. 8 INS Arihant is scheduled to commission in early 2012, and to be equipped with four K-4 x 3,500 km nuclear-tipped missile or 12 x K-15 Sagarika 750 km missiles and more such submarines are expected to follow. India is also in the process of leasing a much larger 12,000 ton Akula Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 51

Part of the reason for the strategic shift to the south-west announced by the Japanese 2010 Defence white paper has plainly been a concern for the consequences of a build-up in China’s submarine capacity in the area. The same kind of developments, though in more minor key can be seen in the developing submarine programmes of many other countries in the region. The ROK’s acquisition of modern, medium-sized KSS II and the more capable KSS III suggest a step-change in that country’s underwater capabilities, especially with 2009 Defence White Paper, Australia’s war and was characterised by an The now most- capable Collins-class the acquisition of Air Independent submarine fleet is to be doubled to 12 apparent competition between the two (Courtesy RAN) Propulsion systems13 [AIP] and the boats, equipped with cruise missile, countries to build the new all-big-gun fitting of cruise missiles; some have a similarly ambitious project given battleships and their even suggested that the ROKN explore its past and present difficulties with more lightly armoured faster consorts, the acquisition of nuclear propelled the now very capable Collins class.18 battlecruisers. The British started the submarines eventually to replace Submarine numbers in the Asia-Pacific process by constructing a brand new its nine Type 214 submarines. To are expected to increase markedly over style of ship HMS Dreadnought, to a supplement its upgraded Challenger the next couple of decades, not least revolutionary design in 1905 and then class submarines, Singapore has amongst the smaller and lesser naval ordering another 12 over the next 3 commissioned the first of two very powers where they are seen as a force years [at 4 per annum].22 The Germans modern Archer class Vastergotland equaliser.19 With this can be expected responded and the race was on. class submarines retro-fitted with AIP significant improvements in local Making use of this particular from Sweden.14 At the commissioning anti-submarine warfare capacities. example, analysts have identified ceremony, Defence minister Ng Eng Developments here will include the seven deadly characteristics of a Hen noted that other Southeast technological advances such as the naval arms race, which to a degree Asian navies were cranking up their future Red Shark 20 km range anti- distinguish it from ordinary processes submarine programmes and said that submarine torpedo being developed for of naval modernisation: Singapore would keep pace with these the ROKN, and tactical ones such as Firstly, naval arms development of developments. Indonesia, Malaysia the Australian ‘ASW Roadmap.’20 the sort associated with arms races is and Thailand are likewise developing driven mainly by perceptions of the or enhancing their submarine But is it a naval external security environment rather HMS Dreadnought capabilities.15 Thailand has agreed arms race, and than by domestic or technological (Tom Lewis collection) in principle to buy two second-hand if it is, would it Type 206A submarines from Germany matter? and in principle would like to acquire Perhaps we should attempt first to another four but parliamentary explore the term to see what it really approval for this programme has yet to means. The notion of an arms race is be won. 16 famously ambiguous and the literature Vietnam has ordered six Project dealing with it is voluminous.21 The 636 Varshavyanka (Kilo) submarines naval arms race between Britain and from Russia, part of an extensive Germany in the days before the First package intended to revive its navy and World War is usually cited as a classic coastal defence forces and to develop example of the genre. Its most intense sea-denial capabilities that are clearly period was 1909-1910, but it continued, aimed at China. 17 According to its more or less until the outbreak of Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 52 Submarines, ASW and the South China Sea. A cause for concern

imperatives.23 There were domestic was inconceivable (except as political and economic benefits but a convenient force structure they did not drive the process in planning device). This was quite Britain. The situation in Germany unlike the period before 1914, was more complex. There has been a when major war was generally long and frankly inconclusive debate thought likely sooner or later. amongst German historians about Fourthly, abnormal intensity extent to which the German drive in style is another potentially towards naval and military power rather vague characteristic was in fact driven by international of arms races but in this pressures (Aussenpolitik) rather than case we might try to gauge internal domestic ones (Innenpolitik) it by looking at: particularly that were more to do with the struggle high levels of defence effort between various groups for influence (Britain and Germany in general. The German surface fleet Slava (Russian within the country.24 But at the very devoted something like half of of the early part of the 20th century for “Glory”) a pre-dreadnought least the external environmental has government expenditure to defence); was clearly designed for operations battleship of the to be sufficiently competitive in nature or, in terms of the quality of what is in the North Sea, and so could hardly Imperial Russian for such domestic pressures to seem being produced, transformational have been aimed at anyone apart from Navy (Tom Lewis credible. technology which offers the prospect the British – and maybe the French, Collection) Secondly, an arms race involves of major competitive advantage (The their allies, a point of which the British conscious competition for political Dreadnought rendered every other were well aware and to which they or military superiority between two major warship obsolete almost over responded. rival hegemonic states, or coalitions. night). Another measure of intensity Sixthly, the protagonists sense that The resultant naval preparation is might be particularly large increases ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ the race could accordingly usually aimed against in number, that is the quantity of what well result in a decisive shift in the another specific state or coalition. is being produced, which may also be nature of the military balance and Germany and Britain had each other in a major source of strategic advantage. the consequent power relationship mind of course. France was concerned Finally the intensity of the competition between them. The status quo may in about Italy and Austria. Russia was might be increased by high levels of consequence be drastically changed determined to recover itself after its suspicion encouraged by conspicuous to the disadvantage of the loser rather catastrophic defeat by Japan and was lack of transparency. From ambiguous than simply maintained. This was concerned about Germany. All the evidence about the construction summed up by the Foreign Secretary same, the European situation ended up and accumulation of capital ships Lord Grey: as essentially bilateral. guns, engines and armour [and even If we, alone among the great Thirdly, bearing in mind that there some building starts before Reichstag powers, gave up the competition is inevitably a competitive element to authorisation] the British thought there and sank into a position of international relations, the high level of might be a secret shadow building inferiority, what good should we political tension often associated with programme intended to provide the do? None whatever…We should arms races might seems a bit vague. basis of a sudden, rapid acceleration cease to count for anything It suggests a level of competitiveness that would catch them out by 1920. amongst the nations of Europe, significantly greater than what you This characteristic was especially and we should be fortunate if our might normally expect. So how might dangerous because such ambiguities liberty was left, and we did not we measure it? Perhaps by the extent encourages ‘worst-case analysis’ of the become the conscript appendage of to which the use of lethal force between data and the intentions of the other some stronger power.26 the protagonists remains a policy side.25 Moreover, because Britain was a option ? Thus the naval relationship Fifthly, there will tend to be a maritime power, its stake in the of the US and the UK in the 1920s specific operational focus for the outcome was disproportionate. Secure and 1930s would be seen as a naval accumulation of naval arms. It is aimed sea lines of communication were competition not an arms race, because at a particular nation or coalition, critical to the strategic survival of military conflict between the two rather than the needs of naval defence Britain and its empire. For Germany, as Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 53

being spend on naval and military questions, the same seven issues need the First World War was to show, naval preparations…[which are], after to be considered: power was a matter merely of prestige all preparations to kill each other. and diplomatic influence and of being Surely…this expenditure…becomes 1: Submarine Development better able to protect their commerce, a satire …on civilisation…If it goes Internationally Driven? not a matter of life and death, on…sooner or later I believe it will Of course at the very least, the independence and integrity as it was submerge civilisation. international context provides the for Britain. As far as the British were But, on the other hand, there were major background and situates concerned, things had to be settled on a those who took a much more relaxed modernization policy but factors other basis of British maritime superiority view about the consequences of this than rivalry with other countries are Finally, perceptions and language seem kind of international behavior. Some at play too. The countries of Southeast to be important indicators of an arms pointed to the economic and social Asia in particular tend to stress the race. In the period before the war, few benefits of this kind of investment value of developing innovative high- doubted that Germany and Britain in technological modernization. tech industrial technologies through were in an expensive and potentially Others argued that maintaining your investing in defence generally and dangerous arms race. The analogy was military strength would deter risk- through submarine acquisition in often used by the statesmen of the time. taking behaviour by others and so particular. Technology transfer through In March 1912, Churchill, First Lord of could actually stabilize international partnership with foreign defence forms the Admiralty bluntly stated Britain’s relationships. Naval arms races, in is seen as providing a boost for local determination to defeat the German other words, had potentially beneficial industry, social advantage and in some challenge and promised to out-build consequences as well as bad ones. cases may also be designed to keep the whatever the Germans produced. The military happy and supportive. expense and potential dangers of this Submarines, ASW About half of the cost of the RMN’s inspired liberals in both countries to and the South Scorpene project for example was tied try at least to slow the process down. It China Sea; should to barter [through the sale of palm oil, was also the reason why Churchill and we worry? cocoa, rubber and electrical products] others suggested building ‘holidays’ in and offset deals, and such deals have the last three years before the war. And so, after this rather long become a standard expectation.28 This gets us to the issue of why naval introduction, to the heart of the matter. The deal was designed to fit in with Malaysian Scorpene- arms racing was and is considered Is there evidence of such a naval arms the New Economic Model plan to class submarine such a bad thing. The basic idea is race developing around the South turn Malaysia into a high income KD Tunku Abdul clear enough. The process may well China Sea region and if so should we society within a decade. This would Rakman-photo by feed the ‘security dilemma’ of all worry? To seek an answer to such be achieved through investing in new Chris Sattler countries in the region; one country’s defensive preparations may make its neighbours feel less secure, so sparking counter-reactions on their part. Domestic imperatives such as the influence over decision-makers of the ‘military-industrial complex’ can encourage an accumulation of arms in one nation that encourages others to respond in a vicious spiral that leads to ruinous levels of economic expenditure and greatly increased prospects of conflict.27 Thus Foreign Secretary, Lord Grey March 1909 in the House: The great countries of Europe are raising enormous revenues and something like half o them are Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 54 Submarines, ASW and the South China Sea. A cause for concern

technology, helping firms like Boustead (such as India’s endemic problem in of all the other actors in the area. The and developing places like Labuan its shipyards and acquisition systems) bilateral rivalry between Vietnam Shipyard into a general hub for marine may not perhaps drive policy, but it and China, for example is plainly industries.29 In December 2012, as can certainly determine outcomes. predicated on the assumption that another example, it was announced Throughout the region there is also while the two countries may have that South Korea’s Daewoo company a clear desire for independence of acute differences of view over the had won an order for three Type 209 strategic decision and for reduced South China Sea, the bulk of China’s derivative submarines for Indonesia. reliance on foreign defence suppliers, strategic preoccupations will be on the While the first two will be constructed whose record is distinctly spotty in US and the wider challenge this may in the ROK, sufficient technology terms of quality, cost and reliability. represent. In effect, and partly through transfer will take place for the third to Thus the Malaysian Defence Minister its submarine acquisitions, Vietnam is be built in Indonesia. Commodore Sudi Dr Ahmad Zahid Hamidi: developing its own Anti-Access/Area Haryono explained that, Much of the economies of Denial (A2/AD) system, one that is Our priority as a government Europe and America are generated specifically aimed against China but is to build a stronger local defence by the defence industry while we one that has to be seen in the wider industry. We understand that and other countries in this region context of the US/China relationship.36 we will have to look at buying are the end users…Rather than At the moment, though, the equipment from abroad if we allow the country to be a dumping prospects of this degenerating into a cannot make it ourselves but ground for near obsolete defence straight “The rest v China” bilateral our policy is to enter transfer of products and services, it’s time line-up still seem quite remote, given technology agreements if we have for us to produce our own using the numerous differences amongst ‘the to buy.’30 the latest technology and at more rest’, the importance of their economic Moreover being able to export competitive prices.33 relationships with China and their indigenous systems to other countries This he said would help Malaysia be domestic reluctance to be manoeuvred helps make submarine development ‘more self-reliant on the national level.’34 into a pseudo-coalition led by the by the original manufacturing country Varied though these domestic issues United States.37 Nor is there much potentially more affordable. This are as policy drivers, none of them evidence that such is Washington’s appears to have been another factor in seem to be principally aimed at other intention. the recent Korean/Daewoo submarine states. deal with Indonesia.31 Many of the 3: Submarine development same calculations appear to have been 2: Bilateral Rivalry? arising from High levels of made in the overall package between The situation before the First World Political Tension? Russia and Vietnam for the latter’s s War was more complex than is often Here we have identified a willingness acquisition of 6 Kilo submarines. made out. Some rivalries cut across to use force as an obvious indicator of These arrangements show the the straight relationship between uncomfortably high levels of political complexity of the dynamic between Britain and Germany, but over time tension. At first sight the outlook the external and domestic contexts. these complexities did resolve into doesn’t seem encouraging. The naval They illustrate the non-confrontational an essentially bilateral competition rivalry between North and South way in which one country’s submarine between two competing coalitions. Korea provides the currently most acquisitions can facilitate others. It So how does this compare with the deadly example of the genre, with also provides evidence of what some situation around the South China Sea? the submarine sinking of the ROK analysts consider supply-side ‘push’ President Obama’s much-discussed Corvette Cheonan and past submarine- rather than customer side ‘pull’; given pivot towards Asia, and the clear based raids on the South Korean coast. the decline of their domestic markets, indications given by Hillary Clinton Many of the ROK Navy’s acquisitions Russian and European defence and others about America’s heightened are clear reactions to the actions industries have every incentive to seek interest in the South China Sea have and capabilities of the North and out and exploit new markets in the all brought the potential bilateral seem often to stimulate asymmetric area, no doubt being occasionally guilty competition between China and the US responses from Pyongyang. China’s of over-persuasion in the process.32 in this area into much sharper relief. 35 rivalry with Vietnam over the South Corruption and inefficiencies, This relationship frames the policy China Sea has had lethal consequences Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 55

too, most notably with China’s seizure high levels of sensitivity about their development. Here the situation is of the Paracel islands in 1974 and sovereignty and so take a jaundiced generally much more encouraging, the battle of Fiery Cross reef in 1988. view of the possible ‘intrusion’ of since defence expenditure levels as a Abusive media rhetoric in disputing anonymous submarines into their proportion of GNP remain very low countries doesn’t help much either. EEZs, let alone their territorial seas. by the standards of the 20th Century, The extent to which the relationship Indonesia for example has, in the and in several cases are actually falling between the US and China may past, demonstrated its concerns about rather than rising. This is offset to degenerate into outright competition submarine passage through its waters.39 some degree of course by the increase is a hot topic at the moment and finds This level of general tension, in the size of the national budget distinctively maritime expression, though, is much mitigated by high made possible by economic growth; since seapower is at the heart of the levels of trade dependency between according to SIPRI the actual amount American position in the Asia-Pacific all the actors by the rhetorical and to a spent on defence in the region actually Region and of increasing importance to lesser extent practical demonstrations increased between 2000 and 2008.40 the Chinese. The US Navy still thinks of of naval togetherness and functional In this regard the Chinese example itself as navy under threat. It is not that cooperation in the region, in terms of is often used as a worrying trend, American believe themselves fraternal exercises and common efforts particularly as its results tend to set to be faced with the prospect of war against common threats such as that the standard by which other countries with China; rather it is a matter of a of piracy in the Straits of Malacca, and define their needs. As a percentage of declining ability to shape events in the emphasis given multinational naval GNP, Singapore’s spending at around 5 the Western Pacific in the way that cooperation in all their declaratory per cent is also high by local standards. Washington would prefer, particularly statements and doctrinal formulations. Most other countries, though, seem to in regard to the foreign policy choices All the states of Southeast Asia, Japan make much less effort. made by other Pacific nations.38 and India, the US particularly and Moreover, most countries of the Accordingly the US Navy is keen to China too with its discourse on the region, do face real domestic problems maintain its forward presence combat- ‘harmonious ocean’ consistently and in implementing their submarine ready naval forces as a precondition regularly employ the rhetoric of such acquisition programmes. The Thai for its capacity to project power and naval togetherness. For evidence Navy’s submarine acquisition plans for influence from the sea, to maintain of this in the submarine world, one instance are bedeviled by budgetary its web of political relationships in the might point to the growing interest parliamentary doubts, especially in the area, to reassure America’s friends in submarine rescue capabilities and wake of the country’s recent flooding and partners and to deter possible mutual help exercises. disaster. Moreover its experience adversaries. For its part China sees There was little evidence of this in of the carrier programme will warn this ‘forward presence’ and the the Europe of 1914, though it has to conscientious planners of the dangers US interpretation of international be said that the war between Britain of acquiring the kit without the support maritime law on the ‘freedom of and Germany broke out shortly packages to back it up.41 navigation’ as an illegitimate means of after a large scale high-level British The big issue with the quality of containing China’s growth and power fleet visit to Germany that everyone course is in the appearance in the and ultimately threatening its security. agreed was particularly ambitious and region of submarines, and especially Hence the USNS Impeccable incident successful. There are limits to what perhaps larger modern types with of March 2009, and the sometimes naval togetherness can achieve in some greater range, AIP and long-range sea rancorous relationship between the contexts. and land attack capabilities. Vessels like two countries over problems in the this are widely regarded as potentially East and South China seas. 4. Submarine Development: more de-stabilising. Properly operated The covert nature of submarines Abnormally Intense in they have demonstrated great utility and their possible presence in sea areas Style? in a variety of high-intensity tasks where the fact and nature of national The intensity of the naval competition ranging from covert surveillance, jurisdiction is disputed may well in the region can be measured in a through land attack to campaigns result in tactical situations that both number of ways. The most obvious of sea denial. Though major force illustrate and exacerbate such tensions. perhaps is the extent to which multipliers for such missions, they are Countries in the region do exhibit national budgets are devoted to naval of limited utility and cost-effectiveness Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 56 Submarines, ASW and the South China Sea. A cause for concern

for low-intensity tasks such as the point of view, and certainly far slower White Paper for example made no maintenance of maritime security. than the equivalent efforts of the US mention of the DF-21D, the J 20 or the They seem justified primarily by their or the Soviet Union during the Cold prospective launch of the country’s utility against peer competitors rather War.43 first aircraft carrier and so provided than against commonplace threats such Nor has pace of change in numerical a distinctly inadequate guide even to as pirates or drug smugglers, because terms been all that alarming despite China’s short term naval intentions. they provide comparatively very the breathlessness of media coverage. Other states in the region however limited means of exerting ‘soft power’. The submarine programmes of remain similarly opaque, in strong In both submarine operation and ASW Thailand and Indonesia, both countries contrast to the almost embarrassing operations, it is all too often a matter seeking to revive earlier submarine candor of the American system. Thus of ‘all or nothing.’ Even so, properly capabilities, have not proved very Admiral Abdul Aziz, at the arrival operated, their acquisition represents a rapid. The deal between Indonesia and of the second Scorpene, the KD Tun perhaps natural ambition for a growing the ROK recently announced for the Razak, complained that there was navy, not least because they are usually acquisition of three Type 209 derivative dangerous trend where information considered to offer major advantages submarines for commission in 2018 about a country’s strategic assets and in cost-effectiveness when compared to can be seen as the second phases of a sensitive information was made public the countervailing ASW efforts of the programme that started back in the via the internet. ’Information about ‘other side(s).’ 1970s. The same is even more true the submarines,’ he said, ‘had also been But they also come with a of Thailand’s equivalent aspirations. purposely manipulated by certain particularly challenging baggage of Finally, even when successful, such parties for their own selfish reasons.’45 operational challenge. The experience programmes have yielded very small His views on this are echoed by many of other navies shows just how numbers of submarines. Although of his naval colleagues around the difficult it is to operate and maintain fleet commanders no doubt hope to region. submarines, especially when a navy is do better than the 1 in 50 day patrol either developing such skills first time, rate achieved in Canada44, this will still 5: Operationally Specific or regenerating them after a period make a sustainable submarine patrol At first glance at least there are of relative neglect.42 If to this is added presence extremely difficult. unnerving similarities between the the difficult physical and jurisdictional Of course, this range of caveats can North Sea of 1914 and the South conditions of the South China Sea be applied with much less effect to China Sea today. In both cases and the huge problems in water-space the submarine programmes of China, malign geography more or less forces management, the possibility of accident the ROK, Japan and the US where all the actors to satisfy their own and/or inadvertent crisis as well as the observers have noted an aspiration competing security preoccupations expenditure of large amounts of money towards greater numbers (in the case of in the same stretch of water. Much without long-term benefit must seem Japan and the ROK), greater quality (in of the South China Sea is directly high. the case of all four) and in an apparent contended by Vietnam and China, and However the pace, in quality terms, willingness to use these submarines other countries in the region. These of transformational change does not quite robustly. The extent to which disputed waters and, for that matter, seem particularly high when compared the wider tensions are increasing the the Japanese island chain sits directly to that of the early Twentieth Century. strategic focus on the South China across China’s access to the open HMS Invincible the Royal Navy’s first Sea means that the tensions that may ocean, and strategic interests collide in battlecruiser was commissioned in result from this wider and more general consequence. The US and China are 1909 but obsolescent in 1916 when it development in submarines may be both preoccupied with the security was sunk in the battle of Jutland. By imported into the sub-region. of what the China calls the ‘near seas’ contrast, the appearance of AIP has Concern here is increased within the first island chain. Indeed, the not been rapid nor has the move into substantially by the Chinese budget’s most obvious and worrying example nuclear-propulsion, as exemplified perceived lack of transparency, a of a potentially dangerous operational by India’s very slow development of critical characteristic of the Anglo- specificity has to be the emerging this capability. China’s progress in German position before the First competition between Chinese concepts developing an SSBN force has been World War. Analysts have pointed of Anti-Access/Area Denial on the one steady, or glacial depending on one’s out that the 2010 Chinese Defence hand and American responses in the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 57

shape of the Air-Sea Battle on the other. such aspirations and the narrow-eyed concern. Both concepts only really make sense, policies of deterrence aimed at peer But, on the other hand, conflict is and justify their enormous budgets, competitors that was so characteristic seen as in no-one’s interest and all the when pitted against each other – just as of Europe before the First World War. actors have an absolute if sometimes did the German and British concepts of indirect stake in the safe passage of battlefleet operation of 1914.46 6: Submarine Development the 75,000 or so merchant ships that The build-up of the submarine - High Stakes? pass through the area every year. The components of China’s South Sea Fleet Since the area is so intensely maritime, stakes may in fact be nothing like as at Yulin, and the distinct possibility submarine superiority seems to matter high or the outcome so momentous as that China may base its emerging a lot. Submarine development may they appear at first glance. This case SSBN force there has increased the be seen as a symbol of the extent to is strengthened by reference to the US Navy’s interest in the area, and which the South China Sea has become growing economic inter-dependence is no doubt a factor in its military the locus of an incipient strategic of the countries of the region and the data gathering activities in what it competition between the US and harm to all that would result from regards as international waters and China about their relative power in the excessive levels of competition, which air space to the South-west of Hainan. new security architecture of the 21st most would argue makes continuing China does not see things the same Century which in turn makes the stake peace and prosperity the highest stake way and its objections to this were in the submarine relationship between of all. manifested by the Impeccable incident the two seem very high. Hence the of March 2009 and by a robust and US pivot towards Asia something 7: Language and continuing campaign of legal and measured in submarine terms by the Perceptions political objection ever since. Given fact that an increasing proportion – In 1912-1914, as we have seen, there the fundamental difference of view now something like 60 per cent – of US was a strong sense that Europe was between the two sides about what Navy submarines, including its latest engaged in an arms race at sea and is militarily permissible in the EEZ, classes are deployed to the Pacific, was standing into war. This was why and what actions can be legitimately something that will have been noted by Churchill and others pushed so hard engaged in to express those views, the China. for naval holidays and construction prospect of such potentially dangerous There is competition too between stretches.48 In contrast, while to quote incidents must remain high. some at least of the other players. Australia’s Minister for Defence, Joel Nonetheless, against all this, Rightly or wrongly, the future course of Fitzgibbon in May 2009: ‘ it would be submarine acquisitions need also to be events in the South China sea is seen as premature to judge that war among seen as just part of the developmental an indicator of China’s future role in the states, including the major powers, programmes of the region’s navies. area and its relationship with ASEAN. has been eliminated as a feature of Navies are for ‘general purposes of To these political considerations the international system.’49 Statesmen greatness’47 but they have many other must be added a series of economic in the region mostly think it highly less conflictual roles too. All the navies ones. The extent to which both China unlikely and their discourse in no of the area are trying to develop a and Vietnam have emphasized the way approximates the rhetoric and portfolio of general all-round naval importance of developing the maritime indeed the level of concern common capabilities rather than simply a set aspects of their economies in their in Europe before the First World War. narrowly aimed at another state. They latest five year plans, will certainly But it does perhaps suggest a need to have for example to develop capabilities increase the level of competition make positive efforts through various that will assure maritime security in between the two for the fish, oil and gas programmes of naval togetherness to their regions of interest against threats commonly supposed to be potentially keep things that way. Hence much of such as illegal fishing, drugs, arms available in the South China Sea, and the public rhetoric in the area is about and people smugglers and terrorism. if to a lesser extent this applies to the the need further to develop areas of They mostly want to display naval other players in the region too. The cooperation between the region’s major capacity (and this is arguably more stakes would seem quite high here too, and minor, navies, to avoid the dangers easily done through surface ships than and hence the prospect of submarines inherent in accidental encounters submarines). Resources being finite, operating in such troubled and difficult and the need to develop confidence- there is an element of tension between waters, must be a matter of some building measures.50 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 58 Submarines, ASW and the South China Sea. A cause for concern

Accordingly the need to extend But, to end this preliminary survey United States to respond to the military the discourse to the acquisition and on another perhaps mischievous preparations of Japan and Germany operation of submarines is slowly note, there is a legitimate argument and their preference instead for a beginning to be accepted. Singapore that even if it were concluded that strategy of relying on a policy described for example has hosted exercises and such a submarine arms race, or by Bernard Brodie as ‘faith, hope and discussions on submarine rescue and at least competition, were either parity’ 54 was much more to blame for ‘intends to use our submarines to build taking place or in prospect, that its precipitating war than was the Anglo- confidence with other militaries.’51 consequences would necessarily be German naval arms. Coming to a clear-cut conclusion as bad as its critics assert. After all, How might this apply to the South about the extent to which we should although the naval preparations of China Sea? Perhaps the clearest worry about the acquisition and Germany and Britain did certainly example might, paradoxically, be operation of submarines in the South cost a great deal of money that could the development of a Chinese SSBN China sea area is therefore not easy. profitably have been spent on other force at Yulin. The incentives for this, The evidence conflicts, but for all things (social welfare, submarines after all, are presumably for China the limits discussed above and the or the army according to taste) and to develop the kind of secure second region’s togetherness, we should at times poisoned the international strike capability for its nuclear forces not perhaps be too sanguine about atmosphere, they had precious little that the classic literature on the subject the prospects of a submarine race to do with the outbreak of war in in Cold War days suggests was a in the region. There remains the 1914, which was far more to do with stabilising rather than a de-stabilising possibility of future miscalculation and the foreign policies of the powers, the development. In the same way, there future deterioration, especially if the limitations of contemporary diplomatic might be something in the argument nationalistic impulses of the regions’ procedure and the constraining effect that the development of credible ‘netizens’ get involved in some future of army deployment plans. In Britain, naval forces, submarines included, submarine incident. There is as yet little many were convinced that British will discourage adventurism and risk- sign of a submarine equivalent of the determination to win was actually good taking behaviour. To the extent that ‘Dreadnought fever’ that beset Europe for stable Anglo-German relations. all this is true, then perhaps even if a before 1914, but we cannot entirely It showed that liberal Britain had not submarine race is beginning to develop rule it out. become effete and soft; it deserved in the region we shouldn’t worry too Anxiety must be increased by the respect and provided incentives for much about it anyway! On the other absence of the specific constraints on friendship. Despite, or perhaps because hand, some would argue that this same competitive naval development that of, the Dreadnought race Anglo- development might well tempt the US emerged for example during the Cold German relations in 1914 were better Navy into preparing for a campaign War, and before, in the shape of arms than they had been for years. of strategic ASW, which they would control or incidents at sea agreements. In like manner, Admiral Laksamana regard as escalatory and destabilizing For a variety of reasons, the US and Tan Sri Abdul Aziz Jaafar at the arrival as, arguably, it was in the Cold War55 Chinese navies have been unable of the Royal Malaysian Navy’s first – and so perhaps we – and perhaps to conclude any “Incidents at Sea Scorpene, especially Australia - should worry after agreement’ such as those negotiated The presence of the Scorpene all! t with the Soviet Union during the Cold submarine is a deterrent for would- War, for example. The likelihood of the be perpetrators. It is an insurance successful introduction of water-space factor in our defence system. It will management protocols in disputed be force to be reckoned with. It’s waters such as the South China Sea, not that we are unable to defend our for example in order to reduce the country without it but with it our prospect of accident and collision for enemies would think two or three example seems quite remote.52 Levels times before they act against us.53 of transparency about naval intentions And who’s to say he’s not right? After also remain low, and the prospects for all, there is something to be said worst case analysis correspondingly for the notion that in the 1930s the high. reluctance of Britain, France and the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 59

Times of India 11 July 2001; ‘Induction of Jane’s Navy International October 2010.. Scorpene submarines delayed by three years’, 20 ’South Korea fast-tracks cruise missile Hindustan Times, 23 Feb 2011; ‘India close and torpedo programmes’ Jane’s Defence to receiving Akula class submarine’ Jane’s Weekly 26 Aug 2009: Andrew Davies ‘The Defence Weekly 31 Aug 2011 Enemy Below: Anti-submarine warfare 7 ‘India poised to complete Russian in the ADF’ Australian Strategic Policy SSN leasing deal’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, Institute, 2007. 14 Nov 2007. ‘India to launch indigenous 21 Barry Buzan and Eric Herring’s The n-submarine by ’09: navy Chief’ The Indian Arms Dynamic in World Politics (Boulder, Express, 4 Dec 2007. Col and London: Lynne Rienner, 1998) pp 8 India set to launch nuclear submarine, 75-9. Colin Gray, however, (Book review of Financial Times, 9 July 2009; India’s nuclear- Grant T Hammond ‘Plowshares Into Swords’ powered submarine ready UPI New Delhi, in International Studies ,1996 22:3, pp 323- 27 July 2009.. 335) urges the abandonment of a concept so 9 India still wants sub, Defence Technology ambiguous as to confuse rather than clarify International, Dec 2008; Repairs of India- analysis. But see his Weapons Don’t Make bound Russian sub hit by lack of funds AFP 8 War (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, Geoffrey Till is Emeritus Professor of Oct 2009. 1993) pp 47-64. 22 Robert K Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Maritime Studies at King’s College 10 The Seawolf programme is reckoned to have cost about $7.3 billion in R&D and 14.2 Germany and the Coming of the Great War London, Director of the Corbett Centre billion in construction and outfitting in 2010 (London Jonathan Cape, 1991) pp 609-625. dollars. ‘USS Missouri leading way for new 23 For this see Buzan and Herring, pp 101- for Maritime Policy Studies, and Visiting wave of submarines’ Military News, 4 Aug 118; Gray op cit, pp 50-52. 2010. ‘New US Attack Subs Getting Their 24 Fisher, Richard D., China’s Military Senior Research Fellow at the Defence ‘Sea Legs.’ Defense News, 13 Sep 2010. Modernisation: Building for Regional and Studies Department at the UK Joint 11 Ronald O’Rourke, The Impact of Chinese Global Reach (Stanford,CA: Stanford Naval Modernization on the Future of the University Press, 2010) Ppix-x Services Command and Staff College. United States Navy’ (New York: Novitka 25 They were right about the data but Books, 2006) p 25 wrong about the intentions. German ship- Since 2009 he has also been a Visiting 12 ‘Chinese Sub Got Within Striking builders seemed merely to be smoothing Professor at the Rajaratnam School Range of US Ship’ Gulf Times 14 Nov out their production schedules in order 2006 Washington Times/Post 11 Jan 2007. to produce a stable building programme of International studies in Singapore. Accounts of this incident vary widely. See over time. To a limited extent this required O’Rourke, op cit, p 44. them to assume commercial risk in starting He has been Visiting Professor at the 13 Richard A Bitzinger Air-Independent programmes before the contracts were Armed Forces University, Taiwan. He powered Submarines in the Asia-pacific: finalized. Proliferation and repercussions Singapore: 26 Massie, p 617 is also a Member of the Council of the RSIS Commentary 62/2009. 27 Mary Kaldor, the Baroque Arsenal Royal United Services Institute. 14 ‘Singapore receives first Archer-class (London: Abdre Deutsch, 1982) pp 219-230. submarine’ JDW, 7 Sep 2011. ‘RSS Archer 28 Malaysia to present updated offset submarine now operational’ The Straits policy’ JDW 6 Oct 2010. Times 3 Dec 2011; 29 Notes from Realmild; Najob: No date 15 Kelvin Fong, ‘Asian Submarine forces on fixed to buy Cougars, New Stratits Times, 3 the Rise’ Australian Defence Journal, May Dec 2009. (Endnotes) 2009. Pp 23-27; Malaysia: Country Briefing, Jane’s Defence Weekly 7 April 2010. But 30 Indonesia unveils defence revitalization 1 ‘As Asian Sub Forces Grow, So Do see ‘Thailand Submarine plan torpedoed’ plan.Jane’s 12 Nov 2009. Concerns,’ DefenseNews 28 Feb 2011 Bangkok Post, 20 Sep 2011. 31 ‘Daewoo Wins Indonesian Submarine Christain Le Miere, ‘Waves of Concern’ deal’ UPI Newsletter, 23 Dec 2011. Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 2011. 16 ‘Defence in Thailand’ Asian Military Richard A Bitzinger, ‘A New Arms Race? Review’ Nov 2011. 32 ‘France,Germany,UK seek more defence Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military 17 Reports: Vietnam Orders 6 Russian ties with Southeast Asia’ Jane’s defence Acquisitions’ Contemporary Southeast Asia Subs, Defence News, 4 May 2009; Vietnam Weekly, 30 Nov 2011 Vol 32 No.1 (2010) pp 50-69. looks to expand coastal defence assets’ Jane’s 33 Quoted in ‘Local Firms Can Show their 2 defence weekly, 24 Aug 2011; ‘Vietnam eyes Power’ and ‘Getting into its Stride’ New naval boost against China’ The straits Times, Straits Times 3 Dec 2009. 3 ‘China Ramps Up Missile Threat with 14 Nov 2011. DF-16’ Defence News 21 Mar 2011. 34 Gen Dato’ Sri Rodzali, Malaysia Report, 18 Rear-Admiral Chew Men Long JDW 7 April 2010. This hasn’t however 4 Desmond Ball, in ‘Naval Acquisitions , interview, op cit.; “Australia’s Future prevented Malaysia from suggesting there in Northeast Asia: modernization or arms Submarine Capability’ Semaphore Issue 14, be established be established a more racing ?’ Unpublished notes for Seminar Oct 2009 ; Julian Kerr, ‘Australia tests the common arms market in ASEAN. Although on Enhancing Asia Maritime Security and water for procurement challenge’ Jane’s Navy this proposal would be something of a Confidence Building Measures, Singapore, International, Jan/Feb 2010.; Ross Babbage, confidence-building measure, it was turned 26 Jan 2010. ‘Why Australia Needs Nuclear Subs’ The down by Indonesia, on the nbasis that the 5 ‘India to acquire six more submarines: Diplomat 8 Nov 2011. two situations were too dissimilar. Naval Chief’ The Hindustan Times 9 May 19 Andrew Davies, ‘Up Periscope: the 35 ‘Smaller US Army, bigger Asia focus, 2008. expansion of submarine capabilities in the The Straits times, 6 Jan 2012; ‘US”fanning 6 ‘India approves additional payment for Asia-Pacific region’ , Journal of the RUSI, Oct out” across Asia-Pac to contain China‘s rise’ delayed subs’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, 17 Mar 2007 pp 64-69: ‘Launch of mystery Chinese The Straits Times, 11 Jan 2012 2010. India to Let Bids for Six Submarines’ SSK fuels submarine race in Asia’ and ‘First 36 Robert Karniol, ‘Vietnam prepares for Defense News 26 July 2010.’Biggest military Vietnamese submarine begins construction’ intruders in S.China Sea’ The Straits Times, deal: Six subs for Rs 50,000 crore’ The Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 60 Submarines, ASW and the South China Sea. A cause for concern

12 jan 2012 ‘W5 Investigates Canada’s floundering 49 The onH Joel Fitzgibbon MP A New 37 For Australia as an ally torn between submarine fleet’ W5 12 Nov 2011. Strategic Environment, Media release of 2 thinking of China as a strategic concern, but 43 Lewis, John Wilson and Xue Litai, May 2009 available at www.defence.gov.au/ a critical economic partner, see Malcolm China’s Strategic.Seapower [Stanford Ca: media. Turnbull, ‘A friend to two giants, The Stanford University Press, 1994] See also 50 ‘India seeks to prevent skirmishes with Guardian, 6 Oct 2011. ‘Japan’s balancing act Goldstein, Lyle J. [Ed] China’s Nuclear Force China on high seas.’ International News over ties with China, US,’ The Straits Times Modernization [Newport RI: Naval War Network, 18 Jan 2012. 23 Nov 2011. ‘India “unaware” of security College Press- Newport papers No 22, 2005] 51 ‘RSS Archer submarine now operational’ pact with US, Australia, The Straits Times, 44 ‘W5 Investigates Canada’s floundering The Straits Times, 3 Dec 2011. 2 Dec 2010; Evelyn Goh, ‘America faces submarine fleet’ W5 12 Nov 2011. familiar dilemmas in region’ The Straits 52 Sam Bateman, ‘The perils of the Deep’ Times, 3 Dec 2011. 45 Royal welcome for second sub’ The Star, op cit.; Kwa Chong Guan, ‘ASEAN’s Next Lumut, 3 July 2010. Challenge: Preventing Incidents at Sea’ RSIS 38 Ronald O’Rourke China Naval 46 The Chinese are said to be developing Commentary 76/2009, July 2009.; Mohd Modernization: Implications for US Navy Nizam Basiron, ‘Maritime Confidence Capabilities – Background and Issues for a plethora of weapons, most famously the DF-21D and other long-range missiles, Building measures (CBMs) in Southeast Asia Congress (Washington: Congressional revisited, MIMA Bulletin, Vol 17 (3) 2010. Research Service, June 2010) p 25. sophisticated submarines, land-based fighters and the capacity to disrupt the 53 Quoted in ‘Scorpene boost for the navy’, 39 Sam Bateman, ‘Perils of the Deep” op cit. electronic means by which binds the US fleet The Star, 18 Sep 2009. 40 SIPRI. ‘The SIPRI Milatary Expenditure together in order to deny US free access to 54 Cited, Gray, op cit p 56 database’ http://milexdata.sipri.org their ‘near seas.’ 55 Tom Stefanick, Strategic Antisubmarine 41 ‘Defence in Thailand’ Asian Military 47 Granville to Nicolson, 18 October 1912. Warfare and Naval Strategy, (Lexington, Review’ Nov 2011. Carnock MSS, Vol 11/12 B.D. IX, ii, 47. Cited Mass: D.C. Heath and Co., 1987) pp xix-xxii, 42 ‘Russian captain blames nuclear sub for in Richard Langhome, ‘The naval Question 1-8. accident: report’ AFP Staff Writers, 27 Sep in Anglo-German relations, 1912-1914’ 2011); ‘Russia submerges nuclear submarine Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol 2, 1971. to douse blaze’. Reuters, Wed, Dec 21 2011; 48 Maurer,op cit…

A n Army Landing Craft Medium 8 (LCM8) from Townsville based 35 WaterTransport Squadron approaches the ‘beach’ inside the well dock of Landing Ship Dock HMAS Choules during Exercise SQUADEX 2012 Credit ABIS James Whittle

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 61

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 62 Captain Norman Banks - 1958-2011 aptain Norman Stewart Banks, Norman’s early career followed the specialised in Gunnery and remained a most respected career naval established pattern of training in the in UK after the course to undertake Cofficer, passed away on 2 December Fleet to obtain his bridge watchkeeping an exchange posting as the gunnery 2011 after a long and courageous battle certificate and then service in small officer of the frigate HMS Avenger. with cancer. ships to consolidate his watchkeeping The ship had operational service in Norman Banks was born in the skills. In Norman’s case he served in the the Persian Gulf as part of the Armilla Orkney Islands in Scotland on 31 patrol boats Adroit and Assail based Patrol. Essentially the task of the frigate May 1958. His childhood was that of a out of Darwin. During that period was to ensure safe passage of merchant traditional islander of the period and these small vessels mainly conducted shipping in the face of the Iranian-Iraqi this included often wearing a kilt to fisheries protection and were a navy conflict. This period of his service school. Norman was the son of Stewart unto themselves. broadened Norman’s professional and Nancy Banks who had a long Following his patrol boat years, horizons and firmly established his tradition of farming and fishing. His Norman undertook the Assistant specialist credentials. family immigrated to Australia in the Principal Warfare Officers Course On return to Australia Norman earlier 1970s and settled in . at HMAS Watson in 1983. He then spent some time in the PWO Faculty Norman quickly embraced the served in the destroyer escort HMAS at HMAS Watson prior to joining Australian way of life and developed Parramatta both watchkeeping in the frigate HMAS Darwin. The ship an Australian accent that belied his the bridge and the operations room. attended Exercise RIMPAC 1990. The Scottish origins. During this period the ship conducted event was notable for two things; the In 1977 Norman Banks joined deployments to South East Asia. first was Darwin running aground off the Royal Australian Navy as a In 1984 he undertook the one-year Hawaii and requiring some weeks in Supplementary List officer at HMAS Principal Warfare Officer training Pearl Harbor effecting repairs. The Cerberus, south of Melbourne. With with the Royal Navy in UK. He and second was that Norman met his his longstanding family maritime roots three other RAN officers were on the future wife Maureen O’Malley at a it was unsurprising that Norman had a last course before this training was cocktail party. Maureen and some girl strong affinity for the sea and the Navy. repatriated to Australia. Norman friends were on a holiday from Clinton,

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 63 OBITUARY

Massachusetts and by chance received role and attended an invitation to attend the reception. staff training at Norman and Maureen married at the Australian HMAS Watson in 1992. Their union Defence College brought immense happiness to them before serving as both. the Chief of Staff Norman’s sea service included a to the Commander posting as Executive Officer of the of Australian Naval frigate Melbourne and then culminated Systems Command. in his command of the Adelaide. The The Command controversy of the 2001, ‘Children had diverse Overboard’ incident, was a much responsibilities unwanted distraction for Norman. He from naval training, was immensely proud of the efforts engineering, and heroics displayed by Adelaide’s naval bases and sailors in successfully rescuing the personnel. Norman men, women and children from the was a brilliant sinking vessel. His composure through chief of staff who this incident and subsequent inquiries possessed a sure became an inspiration for a generation sense of judgement, of naval officers. His command of a willingness to Adelaide subsequently included a address difficult successful operational deployment personnel matters to the Gulf to enforce UN Security and an exceptional Council Resolutions against Iraq. clarity of thought on In 1994 Captain Banks was posted paper. for two years Exchange service with the In 2009 Norman USN. He was appointed to the Staff of contracted stomach COMTHIRDFLT primarily as the lead cancer and the planner for exercise RIMPAC, and he battle for his life did exceedingly well in a very complex began. The early job. outlook was positive In 2002 Norman was sent to the but his strain of US Central Command Headquarters cancer was virulent. His fight against values and that of preserving life at sea in Tampa, Florida to act at the the disease was quite inspirational as in the face of the uncertain pressures of Australian Defence Liaison Officer. was the devotion and courage shown border protection. This was a critical time as the by Maureen. Norman was touched by Norman’s abiding passions were Central Command was immersed in the support the Navy and the broader his family, the Navy, and his native developing contingency plans for the Naval Family gave him during his sport of golf. His beloved Collingwood possible invasion of Iraq. By virtue of struggle. He was equally grateful to the Magpies could not go by without his experience with operating with wonderful support provided by the mention. He doggedly supported the US Navy over his career as well as medical staff at Canberra Hospital and the Magpies from his early years in his understanding of the US military the Duntroon Medical Centre. Melbourne and was known to spend culture, Norman was extremely Norman Banks had qualities that late nights overseas with an ear glued successful in that role. attracted great loyalty and affection to radio or the internet to follow games On leaving Adelaide Norman among his friends. They appreciated and hear results. travelled to Darwin undertaking the his native Scottish stubbornness, his Norman Banks is survived by his role of the Chief of Staff and Deputy deep integrity and good humour. He loving wife Maureen, his parents, Commander Northern Command. He came to unintentionally symbolise the Nancy and Stewart, and his younger was promoted to Captain from this Navy’s abiding desire to adhere to its sister, Grace. t Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 64 OBITUARY

The following message Monsignor Lyons was appointed being appointed as a Member of the was received from Navy as a Chaplain in the RANR in February Order of Australia, Vietnam Medal, Office on 6 September 1957 from St Columba’s Church, Australian Active Service Medal with 2011: Elwood and later transferred to the Clasp Vietnam, Australian Service RAN on the 23rd June 1958. He served Medal with Clasp FESR, Defence Force t is with regret to advise that for 21 years and retired from the RAN Service Medal and the National Medal. Monsignor “Tiger” Lyons passed as a Principal Chaplain (RC). When he retired from the RAN, he Iaway peacefully at St Joseph’s Home, Monsignor Lyons served in HMA always retained a great interest in the Northcote, Victoria yesterday, (just a ships Lonsdale, Albatross, Cerberus, Navy, its people and the wider Navy few weeks short of his 90th birthday). Penguin, Creswell,Kuttabul, Watson, family. Monsignor Lyons had a deep He had been in care for some years. Leeuwin, Melbourne, Sydney, Supply, devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary - His funeral Mass will be at St Patrick’s Stalwart, Derwent, and Queenborough as will be noted by the many fine gifts Cathedral, Melbourne on Thursday th8 as well as on the staffs of the Fleet he left as memorials to those who had September commencing at 1400. He Commander as the Fleet Chaplain and died during Service in the RAN which will be buried in the Priest’s Crypt at the Naval Support Commander as the include the Marian theme. He was the Melbourne General Cemetery after Command Chaplain. serving in Melbourne at the time of the the Mass concludes. His Honours and Awards included Melbourne/Voyager collision.

SMARTER AND SAFER UNDERWATER SOLUTIONS ...Since the beginning

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 65 CN SPEECH – Australian Navy Foundation Day, Creswell Oration – 01 Mar 2012

embers of the Creswell family, official reception in Canberra. I have In 1913 on members of the Australian discontinued the Chief of Navy’s this day the first MNavy Foundation Day Organising traditional Christmas reception and entrants of the Committee and of the Navy League, replaced it with tonight’s event which I Royal Australian ladies and gentlemen. It is my pleasure think is more fitting and helps reinforce Naval College to be invited to present the Creswell the importance of the day. commenced their Oration for 2012, to commemorate As always it is great to be here in training at Osborne Navy’s 111 years service to the Melbourne where so much of the story House in Geelong. Australian nation. I am particularly of our early Navy was played out. I This included honoured to be the first person to have don’t think I need to recount the entire distinguished the opportunity to deliver this address role of Victoria in those early years but graduates such twice. Five years ago as the Deputy I do think it is worthwhile to note the as a young John Fleet Commander, when paradoxically, richness of Victoria’s naval heritage Collins and Harold Sir William Rooke Creswell I probably had more freedom in what I from our first purpose built warship Farncomb, both of whom served said than I do today - I focused heavily of 1855 which proudly bore this state’s with distinction during World War on the period leading up to the key name. Victoria served in the Maori II and reached flag rank and whom decision to acquire our own fleet - I wars of 1860 and has the distinction of we honour today through the two think after five years I hope I can get earning Australia’s naval forces their submarines that proudly bear their away with reusing some of that speech! first battle honour: 1860- names. But before I start, though, I would like 1861. Victoria was also the first colony In the early hours of the morning to acknowledge the achievements of to regulate its naval activities, and, of on this day 70 years ago, Victorian John Wilkins and congratulate him course, remains the ‘cradle of the Navy’. born Captain Hector Waller led the on the public recognition he received Today I would like to talk to you crew of the cruiser HMAS Perth in with the award of a Medal of the about the way Navy is developing company with USS Houston in the face Order of Australia in the Australia Day as a result of the challenges of today of impossible odds against superior Honours List this year. It is fitting that but I will also draw on some historic Japanese naval forces during the Battle this recognition was for his work in the parallels. The reason I chose this of Sunda Strait. preservation of Australia’s naval history mix for discussion is because, like so 357 of Perth’s complement, H MAS Perth at speed(By - Well done John! many other speakers before me at this including Waller, were killed in action, B2:67 - HMAS) This time five years ago was the first event, I firmly believe that real attempt to publicly acknowledge Australia’s naval future Navy’s birthday; there was a quite cannot be understood, a media blitz, Cerberus, under the developed or articulated in tutelage of Dave Garnock, had a huge isolation from our history Navy birthday BBQ and our ships were and foundations. dressed for the first time to mark the If I could turn to this occasion. day in history - it marks I remarked during this speech more than the birth of five years ago that I thought Navy’s our nation’s Navy (and celebration of its birthday was here Army - we should not to stay. Well, so far so good! There is forget that, either). On maybe less media fanfare today, but this day in 1901, control I think we are seeing the importance of the States’ Defence of the day being embedded in our Forces was transferred to naval calendar. Indeed tonight I will the Commonwealth of be hosting the first Navy birthday Australia. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 66 CN SPEECH – Australian Navy Foundation Day, Creswell Oration – 01 Mar 2012 while those who survived suffered the Navy in our early years of development. considered a privations of three years of captivity as This tyranny of distance and lamentable lack of prisoners of war. Nearly 700 US sailors associated naval challenge was understanding by died that morning, including their acknowledged by Alfred Deakin and the British public Captain and Medal of Honour winner, Admiral Tyron amongst others at the of the sea and Harold Rooks. Today the concept of 1887 Colonial Conference held in the importance over a thousand people losing their London and indeed was the catalyst of their Navy. lives in action over the space of a for the Australasian Naval Defence Act We suffer from couple of hours would be very hard to passed that December which allowed it too. Curiously comprehend. for the provision of an auxiliary naval enough it was not On Tuesday, at the War Memorial squadron which was to be partially paid something that was in Canberra, I was privileged to meet for by the Australian colonies and New evident in the early seven of the twelve remaining Perth Zealand. years of federation. survivors from that action. Meeting our Of course, in addition to Victoria, With literally no naval veterans is always an honour; as several already had their own defensive other means of H ec Waller with a group they were truly inspirational. naval forces and these in time were to communication or transportation, the pipe (Tom Lewis Services like that on Tuesday remind become the basis of the future national country was very much focused on the collection) all of us in this uniform of what we navy. sea and what it meant for Australia’s may be asked to do as part of a combat Captain, later, Vice Admiral Sir prosperity. force. It also reminds us of the strength William Creswell, who commanded The strategic reality is that in 2012 it of the bonds that the term ‘shipmate’ first South Australia’s, then has not changed but the public’s grasp evokes and in this particular instance Queensland’s naval service – and, of the importance of the sea has waned it also underscores the depth of the briefly that of Victoria, was steadfast significantly. relationship that we have with the in his insistence that Australia needed It is confounding that many United States Navy. the ability to defend its vast coastline. Australians observe an array of So, whether we join together today Creswell however, was of the opinion merchant ships at anchor off Australian in celebration or commemoration, that this defence needed to be ports like Newcastle, but do not March the 1st is an important day indigenous to Australia. In an article instinctively make the connection for us to strengthen and honour printed by the Brisbane Newspaper to our national wealth. Of course, our Australian naval heritage. A day Company in 1901, Creswell wrote compounding this is that much of our to acknowledge the lives lost, the about a “guerre a commerce” and how high value merchant traffic operates sacrifices made and the selfless service a war on merchant shipping would off our sparsely populated north west given by tens of thousands of fellow adversely affect Australia in both the coast or other regional areas, largely Australians and to draw upon the trans-oceanic and coastal trading unseen by the public. valuable lessons their experiences and domains. Then, as now, Australia’s The truth is that most seaborne challenges provide us. future and its prosperity are bound activity is invisible to the average Australia as an island state with a to the maritime environment and the citizen and the relationship between long coastline is critically dependent on ability to use the sea for the conduct of the assured use of the oceans and seaborne trade and has vital interests in commerce. our national prosperity – indeed our the stability and security of the region, I recently had the privilege of national survival - is not something that whether in times of peace or conflict. speaking at the Sea Power Conference penetrates the consciousness of most. As stipulated in the White Paper of in Sydney, the theme of which was ‘The Perhaps running the ‘supermarket 2009, today, as at every stage of our naval contribution to prosperity and shelves’ test is the best way to make this nation’s development, our main aim National Security’, which reflects the point. Take everything off the shelf that is to defend against and deter armed continued importance of Australia’s has in some way been reliant on sea attacks against Australia. ability to use the sea. Whilst at this transport and see what is left. There are many significant parallels conference I discussed the unfortunate Partly this problem exists because that may be drawn between the phenomenon of ‘sea blindness’. This of the nature of maritime work. challenges we face today in the RAN phrase was coined in the UK a number Much of what maritime industries – and those that were presented to the of years ago to describe what was shipping, fishing and offshore resource Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 67

exploitation – as well as what the navies operations. that protect them occur out of sight of I am grateful that land and therefore out of mind. We as Mr Hope, who was a Navy, along with the broader naval quite rightly very tough, community need to talk more about forensic and probing what we do and the contribution that during his inquest, we and the rest of the maritime sector reached the conclusions make to the continued prosperity of about our people that he this country. did. From all my reading If you have been following my of the material and my recent speeches you will see this is a personal experience recurring theme, and if I am starting to of the operational sound like a broken record it is because environment up there, I believe that this is such a fundamental our people can stand tall message that we must get across. for how they responded I would like to touch briefly on the and acted, putting recent findings of Mr Alastair Hope themselves in harms way the WA Coroner into the tragic events to save others on that of 15 December 2010, when Suspected awful day. Irregular Entry Vessel 221 foundered Our commitment on the rocks at Christmas Island and to border protection up to 50 asylum seekers perished. I is our most significant have personally spent a number of operational task, it months operating there during the continues under close monsoon; they are perilous waters in public scrutiny and is those conditions. conducted every single I remain very proud of what the day by a dedicated and Assail Three crew and their small yet largely unrecognised Army Transit Security Element did on group of sailors. We that day. They were the most difficult should all be very proud More capabale and tragic of circumstances and our of what they achieve. I certainly am. the fitting of her superstructure and helicopters are on the people were simply magnificent. I think If I could turn to the Navy of integration of her communications way…an MH-60S what they did on that day, like their tomorrow. As most of you would and command and control equipment. Seahawk helicopter mates who dealt with the explosion know we are building Force 2030, the When you see her come in you will see of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 8 on SIEV 36 in April 2009, are the future force that was articulated by the the step up that we face after 30 years brings supplies to the truest indicator of the quality of our Government in the 2009 White Paper, of having a ‘frigate-navy’ outlook. We aircraft carrier USS people and of the intrinsic nature of a very capable Australian Defence are up to the challenge and frankly I John C. Stennis during a Australia’s Navy. It reinforces for me Force. It is a force that is starting to think it will bring a level of excitement vertical replenishment. that there remains an unbroken thread be delivered. In many ways there are and pride to the organisation that will (Courtesy US Navy) throughout the last 111 years that this similarities in the challenges we face be beneficial, but as I have been saying sort of behaviour has been consistently today just as Creswell faced as he set to the wider Navy, the worst thing we demonstrated in both peace and in about building the early RAN. The can do is to think that ‘we know boats’. war. There are some who still want to parallels are significant as we upskill In capability terms the LHD is a game criticise the response of our people on our people for new capabilities and changer and will shift the way we that day, criticism leveled by people equipment that we have had no prior conduct our amphibious training and who have never worked at sea, let alone experience in operating. We of course operations just as the arrival of the first commanded men and women in tough are not coming off a zero base but it is RAN fleet of ships in October 1913 circumstances or had to pick their way nonetheless a challenging time. shifted the thinking of those in the navy through the reality of the Clausewitzian This year marks the arrival of LHD at the time. fog which sometimes descends on Canberra here in Melbourne for For us however the LHD will not Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 68 CN SPEECH – Australian Navy Foundation Day, Creswell Oration – 01 Mar 2012 be just about shifting Navy and what battalion is an important lead indicator, the then Minister for Defence Materiel, it wants to achieve, it will be about as are the changes Navy will be making Minister Clare, into Afghanistan for my shifting the ADF and accommodating to tactical command and control second visit to that country. Navy have what it needs to achieve for the structures to better support the about a dozen officers and sailors in a capability as a whole. deployable joint force headquarters number of roles, from patrolling on the And there will be equivalent construct and provide a more robust front line with the MTF as Explosive challenges for the ADF with the Command and Control arrangement. Ordnance Disposal or Improvised introduction of the Air Warfare If we consider one of the very Explosive Device specialists, to some Destroyers. We are starting to get first combat experiences of the RAN, key HQ and support positions; they are back into the air warfare mission in a there was an emphasis from very doing a great job and are universally way that is also paralleled only by the beginning on a joint expeditionary well respected. We also have Navy capability jump that the 1913 Fleet capability. Australia and New Zealand people on operations in the Sinai, Unit represented. The AWD are key to had combined to create a Naval and Timor, the Solomons and in Southern that jump, but so are the new Airborne Military Expeditionary Force which Sudan. Early Warning and Control aircraft set out on August 19, 1914 just weeks We are now in our 22nd year of now entering Air Force service. after the proclamation of war to land major fleet unit operations in the Together, ship and aircraft – and in Rabaul and then take the wireless Middle East. HMAS Parramatta the other systems and units with which station at Bitapaka. is the current frigate in the Middle they will operate – represent a sum This operation was a maritime East Area of Operations (MEAO) very much greater than the component power projection mission enabled by doing a sterling job across counter parts. In the meantime, we have the the ability to exercise local sea control. piracy, counter terrorism and general long range SM-2 missile at sea in the In that case it utilised the versatility maritime security missions. Someone modernised guided missile frigates and utility of the battle cruiser HMAS who was no stranger to the dangers of H MAS Albany closes and the new phased array radar fit and Australia; the Sydney and counter piracy operations was Creswell in on the scene as combat system in the frigate Perth has the Australian destroyer and submarine himself who was shot in the hip during Royal Australian been immensely successful. When the forces. The initial landings were a skirmish with pirates off the Malay Navy RHIBs’ rescue survivors form program is complete, all the ANZAC conducted by naval infantry who were coast in 1873 whilst he was serving as a the water after an class will have an order of magnitude then subsequently supported by militia Sub-Lieutenant in the gunboat Midge. explosion aboard increase in their missile detection and forces landed from the transport ship. Of course both new and old Suspected Illegal engagement capabilities. Today of course we still serve in the capabilities bring with them significant Entry Vessel (SIEV) In 2014 we will see new combat joint environment ashore. maintenance challenges, a fact that the 36 north of Ashmore helicopters for Navy with a new In August last year I accompanied naval engineer, a man very much the Island. (Courtesy Navy) variant to the Seahawk helicopter. It re-introduces an important capability ­– the dipping sonar; which will allow us to conduct anti-submarine warfare in a way that we have not for some time. Then, of course, there is the future submarine, the offshore combatant vessel, and in the mid-2020s a new frigate to replace the ANZACs. In all, it is a very exciting time on the hardware front. I know the reality of a serious maritime power projection capability is coming into sharp focus within the Defence senior leadership group. The announcement regarding the 2nd battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment as a dedicated amphibious Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 69

‘second father’ of the Australian Navy, the broader capability management Navy to ensure that we can help be part Captain and later Vice Admiral Sir challenge and ensuring that all of our of the solution as they downsize. William Clarkson was well aware of as officers and senior sailors understand What began 111 years ago as the the senior technical officer of the naval their role in it. But a healthy development of an Australian Navy forces from 1901. engineering function which is viewed has grown and matured into a force With the outbreak of war there were as an enabler rather than an overhead which I am immensely proud of. We 28 vessels requisitioned for the purpose remains absolutely critical to a high are on watch around the world, ashore of transporting the first AIF contingent technology organisation. I believe we and at sea, on peacetime and active of 21,500 men and 8000 horses to lost sight of that critical difference over service getting on with the job we have the Middle East. As you can imagine, the last decade or so. It is interesting been given. In doing that I think we alterations of a drastic nature were to compare the technical content of owe a great deal to the early leadership required. In addition to configuration what our young officers today are of the Navy and how they shaped the changes Clarkson was ultimately being taught compared to Collins organisation here in Melbourne over responsible for the manufacture of and Farncomb and the 1913 entry. In a century ago. I said last time I gave all the equipment required to fit out general terms they had a much higher this address that Creswell’s real legacy and repair ships at Cockatoo Island level of technical content than today - was that he ensured that the Navy was dockyard. All of this was achieved perhaps there is a message there and it set up in such a way that it could be often in very tight timeframes. Perhaps is something that we are going to have sustained and grown as the strategic the most impressive of all technical a close look at. situation demanded. My time in this achievements of that time under In the current economic climate job has only reinforced that belief. Clarkson’s direction was the building the RAN has had lower separation This is the enduring task for the of warships up to light cruiser size rates than has historically been the organisation’s leadership; we are at Cockatoo Island, a process which case which is a significant turnaround stewards after all, stewards of this was enabled utilising an increasing from a few short years ago. They are great national institution. We must proportion of locally produced items as on the rise, however, and we still face not allow ourselves to be consumed suggested by Clarkson. a fierce battle for talent particularly for by the parochialism of the present. Speaking of technical integrity....last technical personnel as our own Navy- Stewardship demands due regard year the report resulting from the Rizzo trained personnel remain highly sought to the past, it demands that we Review into amphibious and support after and not just in the resource sector. understand the challenges of today, that ship maintenance was released. This In Navy we are trying a broad range we nurture what we have and also that review was undertaken with the of initiatives to demonstrate that we we have a very clear view of where the express purpose of ensuring that what have shifted from an ‘overhead’ view organisation needs to be positioned in led to the systemic failure in availability to an ‘enabling’ view of this critical the future. of our amphibious force never occurred workforce. We stand on the cusp of one of again. An important recommendation The drive to retain our trained talent the most significant periods of naval made by Paul Rizzo was to rebuild has included some very tightly targeted modernisation for many decades in VADM Ray Griggs and reorganise Navy engineering: a bonuses, industry outplacements, a this, the Asian Pacific century, this (Courtesy Navy) process that he recommended be led redesign of our Fleet Support Units inherently maritime by a two star Navy Admiral to give and broader professional development century. Guided the necessary weight to this critical programs which I think show that we by the example function. I promoted RADM Mick are serious. of Creswell and Uzzell and appointed him as Head of This will take time and there is Clarkson, we are Navy Engineering in September last no easy fix. In the meantime we are getting on with this year and he has been hard at work looking to augment our talent base challenge. t since that time. There is significant through the use of lateral transfers work underway to implement the from other navies. While Creswell recommendations of the review and would probably not have described it get us back to basics. as such, this is exactly what happened Of course the review was about in the early life of the RAN. We are more than engineering, it was about working very closely with the Royal Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 70 GERMAN CORVETTES

erman Navy type K130 corvette The missile is manufactured jointly approaching its target in very-low-level FGS Braunschweig (F260) has by German company Diehl BGT flight up to ranges of more than 200 km. Gbeen fitted with its brand new main Defence and the Swedish company At the moment the K130-class weapon system, the RBS15 MK3 missile Saab Bofors Dynamics. The RBS15 is corvettes are the only combat ships system. a heavyweight anti-ship missile which of the German Navy, armed with the Four missiles launchers have been can be employed to engage to large RBS15 missile system. fitted amidships. In total the German surface targets as well land targets Navy has procured thirty RBS15 Mk3 from the sea. It is a “fire and forget“ Michael Nitz missiles. weapon, equipped with a radar seeker,

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 71

H MAS Gascoyne under way inside Jervis Bay, NSW, Credit: Able Seaman Brenton Freind

HMA Ships Newcastle and Warramunga pull up to stations 1 and 2 for a replenishment at sea from HMAS Sirius, HMNZS Te Kaha takes up lifeguard station to the rear of the evolution

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 72 Book Reviews

intended limits somewhat unclear, navy – even more so than any aircraft deleting the subtitle in some of its carrier. There is, however, not much to descriptive materials and even on the be said on undersea mine warfare, an book’s spine. The cliché that you can’t area that the open literature is almost judge a book by its cover is accurate barren. The authors do point out that here. the South China Sea is an area where But what is inside the book naval mining can have a significant is valuable. It is an excellent and role, but they have no good estimate on straightforward supplement to such what the PLAN can actually do. Western-source official publications, For the more general reader, the such as the US Office of the Secretary final chapter – entitled “The PLAN of Defense’s annual Military Power Fleet in the Twenty-first Century” – is of the People’s Republic of China – of the most interest. It is there that the straightforward in that the authors, authors allow themselves some room unlike governmental officials, do not to speculate – in a most reasonable, have to worry about whether their considered manner – about future People’s Liberation language is perceived as alarmist developments at sea. The portrait Army Navy: Combat or codling. Their conclusions are they paint is one of a fleet developed definitely not alarmist; despite 60 very deliberately along the lines of Systems Technology, years of effort, over 80 percent of the Soviet Navy: a sea denial force 1949-2010 PRC naval technology is derived specifically designed to hazard the from foreign sources, with their most U.S. fleet and attrite its forces as far as By James C. Bussert and Bruce A. operationally-capable platforms being possible from contested areas, such Elleman Soviet/Russian-built. Even the PRC’s as Taiwan. As with the Soviet Navy, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 978-1- much-speculated-about Anti-Ship long-range anti-piracy operations or 59114-080-1, 256 pp., USD $36.95 Ballistic Missile (ASBM) program port visits are by-products. This is is largely derivative of what was a in keeping with the current general Reviewed by Sam J. Tangredi partially-pursued Soviet capability. assessment that the PRC is focused But characteristically (perhaps best on developing an overall “anti-access” For any specialist on Chinese described as rigorously) sticking to strategy. However, many of the military affairs or comparative their appointed limits, the authors do necessary systems for anti-access, such world naval capabilities, Bussert not discuss the PLA ASBM in much as for satellite reconnaissance and long- and Elleman’s compendium of the detail since it is a PLA Second Artillery range strike, are not under the exclusive PLAN’s combat systems and their program, not a PLAN weapon. For the control of the PLAN, so the authors historical development is a must-have capabilities they do review, the authors’ do not discuss the anti-access concept reference. It thoroughly details in a overall conclusions are down-scale: beyond pointing to Jiang Zemin’s 1997 single volume the existing unclassified “China’s much publicized modern direction to the PLAN to “build the knowledge of People’s Republic of imports cannot alter the fact that more nation’s maritime great wall,” and to the China naval technology from 1947- than three-quarters of the PLAN’s PRC’s January 2007 ASAT test. (p. 185) 2010, categorizing the information by: submarines, surface ships, and aircraft In admirably sticking to its ship type; the principal warfare areas are almost totally obsolete for today’s limits, the book raises an interesting of AAW, ASW and mine warfare and modern combat requirements.” (p. 178) analytical question: can navies or naval their related sensors and systems; The book is strongest on PLAN developments truly be independently and system integration, electrical and submarines and submarine weapons assessed, or do they require a joint training issues. It is not, however, an systems, reflecting co-author Bussert’s context in order to make sense of their integrated, narrative history of these particular area of professional impact? I would argue the latter, but developments or the PLAN overall; experience. Their conclusion is that that is admittedly an USN-centric view. nor do the authors intend it to be. the newest PLAN diesel-electric Although there is a brief discussion of Unfortunately, in packaging the book, submarines are their most valuable the on-again, off-again PLA Marine the Naval Institute Press makes the assets in any conflict with a foreign Corps and amphibious capabilities in Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 73

a chapter with coastal defense, Bussert space capabilities are influencing the well as space technologies. The book and Elleman’s volume is limited by military balance in the Asia-Pacific. contextualises the introduction of design to detailing systems for ‘war at It avoids hyperbole by presenting the China’s carrier fleet, the earliest phase sea’ rather than ‘war from the sea.’ It reality of Chinese military capabilities, of which was demonstrated when a does what it sets out to do – assemble experiences and perspectives. carrier, based around the ex-Russian the open information and chronology Chinese Aerospace Power is a Varyug, actually commenced sea trials of PLAN war-at-sea-systems collection of papers derived from in August 2011, well after this book developments in one place. The book, the US Naval War College’s China was published. The Chinese aerospace therefore, is a detailed and valuable Maritime Studies Institute’s fourth transformation continues but this book contribution, but – as intended – not annual conference, “Evolving Maritime will remain a valuable introduction in itself a full assessment of the PLAN Roles for Chinese Aerospace Power”, to Chinese aerospace power for some future potential. t held on 10-11 December 2008. The time to come. papers have been supplemented and Overall Chinese Aerospace Power brought up to date prior to publication, provides an excellent introduction and although many of the capabilities to China’s current aerospace discussed continue to evolve, the book transformation. It is a must-read for brings together the fundamentals that ADF members who contribute to underpin China’s developing strategy strategic and/or capability decision- and doctrine. making, irrespective of whether they China’s aerospace power is not are serving with Navy, Air Force or some great centrally controlled Army. It is also recommended for behemoth, rather it is a complex anyone who wishes to come to grips reflection of western aerospace power with the logic and grammar of modern “with Chinese characteristics”. The warfare in the Asia-Pacific region. t conference brought together USN and USAF experts to further what has since become known as the Air- Sea Battle – a concept that also has major implications for the defence of Australia and its interests in the Pacific. Chinese Aerospace Some aspects discussed within this Power: Evolving book will undoubtedly be known to Maritime Roles a few specialists but few Australian warfighters will have expertise in the E dited by Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle full depth and breadth covered. It is J. Goldstein, not a book for the faint-hearted, and Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD, while a few Australian commentators may try to support their opinions on 2011 international relations by bluff and/or Reviewed by Dr Gregory P. Gilbert; Air bluster, these papers are the epitome of Power Development Centre scholarly endeavour. They use detailed analysis to back-up their claims and Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving their judgements are supported by Maritime Roles, the fifth book in relevant sources. the “Studies in Chinese Maritime Chinese Aerospace Power provides Development” series, continues to set great insight into China’s recent the standard for our understanding advances in areas such as intelligence, of Chinese military affairs. This book surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), offers a thorough analysis of how air launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), China’s impressive advances in air and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), as Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 74 Book Reviews

of combat with the weapons that view of Australia’s forward turret and were now in service although several, bridge structure looking aft from the including Jellicoe, had been responsible bow. for their specification and introduction The 6-inch Mark XI* gun, the into service. Submarines, long-range type fitted to the cruisers Melbourne torpedoes and reconnaissance aircraft and Sydney is illustrated by one of had clearly made the time-honoured the latter’s guns on its PVI mounting strategy of close blockade untenable and in the . long-range guns and fire-control systems Unfortunately, it is missing its breech, were considerably more advanced than controls and telescopes but it has the those that had been used at the Battle merit of having made history in the of Tsushima but they needed time and action against Emden. constant practice to make them effective. The book is divided into sections In order to understand the way in which cover guns, torpedoes, mines Naval Weapons of which commanders deployed fleets, you and ASW weapons. Significantly the World War One have to understand their perception of section on guns fills 316 pages out of the new weapons they had available to this 405 page book and the section on Guns, Torpedoes, Mines and them and those that their adversaries British guns within it fills 104 out of the ASW Weapons of all Nations would deploy against them. The 316 pages. Similar ratios apply in the A n Illustrated Directory practical results of gunnery duels at other weapons’ sections showing the high speed and ranges far beyond those dominance of the Royal Navy during the By Norman Friedman that had been thought possible in pre- period in question. Seaforth Publishing, UK war exercises, once understood, had Throughout the book measurements to be assimilated quickly by admirals are given in the form provided by the ISBN 978-1-84832-100-7 in their fighting instructions to gain a sources to avoid ‘errors in translation’ 405 pages; profusely illustrated with tactical edge over a well-equipped and and the inevitable ‘rounding errors’, thus determined enemy fleet. British weapons appear in imperial units photographs and technical drawings; This book has been eagerly awaited and German ones in metric. This is a £45 recommended and fully lives up to that expectation; it good idea and it is not difficult to do Reviewed by Commander David would be difficult to imagine a better the conversion with a calculator if one Hobbs MBE RN (Ret’d) finished product. Every weapon wants to. Unlike his previous books, used by every navy is given a detailed the author has not footnoted the text World War I was fought by navies analysis with technical specifications, because he feels that it is impossible to equipped with new, technically complex, photographs, drawings and a summary provide a source for each piece of data in weapons, far in advance of those in of their conception, development and an encyclopaedia of this kind. Instead he service only a generation earlier which use. In the case of guns the different has provided an extensive list of sources had changed the nature of naval warfare shell designs with differing ‘calibre radius and their locations. without being realistically tested in heads’ are discussed and compared in For me the most fascinating action. terms of range, accuracy and effect. In elements of this book are the extensive Senior officers who had first gone to the section on the largest guns ever introductory pages in each section that sea in an era when the tactics used by fitted to an Australian warship, the 12- explain the origins of the weapons, wooden sailing ships with smooth bore, inch BL Mark X* in HMAS Australia their design, manufacture and tactical muzzle-loading cannon were still in use for example, we learn that the gun use. Here we find why guns and other had to understand the impact of the weighed 58 tons and fired a shell that weapons evolved in the way that they new weapons and devise tactics to use weighed 850lb, of which the burster in a did, whether they measured up to them effectively. Fast-firing heavy guns ‘common’ round weighed 83lb 4 oz. An expectations, the part they played in and primitive contact mines had been armour-piercing round could penetrate the evolution of conflict at sea and how used during the Russo-Japanese War of 12 inches of Krupp armour at 7,600 tactics evolved to make best use of them. 1904 but by 1914 it was fair to say that yards. The gun is well illustrated in the Many of the weapons described no fleet commander had experience frontispiece which shows an excellent were still in service in World War II Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 75

or can be considered as prototypes of had already donated to the Royal Aero later weapons, giving the book a wider Club but the Admiralty had to pay value in the study of twentieth century for the aircraft’s running expenses, conflict. The author explains how the maintenance and repair. It also paid development of one weapon led to the for the officers to be given courses modification or counter-development of technical instruction with Short of others; for instance the need for Brothers at their various facilities in the long-range gunnery in the Grand Fleet UK and for them to visit to the Gnome was initially seen as important to inflict aero-engine factory just outside damage on the enemy while remaining Paris. Flying instruction took place out of range of the torpedoes that under the auspices of the Royal Aero German battleships were believed to be Club, the only organisation within the capable of firing from the line-of-battle. British Empire at the time that could With his usual incisive analysis, Frank McClean: award certificates of qualification to Friedman notes how the use of new pilots who passed the internationally weapons affected the tactical thinking Godfather To British recognised flying test. Longmore was of commanders in action. For example Naval Aviation awarded certificate number 72 on 25 he notes that Jellicoe was the first to April 1911. understand that to control a large By Philip Jarrett It becomes clear, reading this book fleet of warships in action he needed a Seaforth Publishing that the Admiralty wanted its officers tactical plot but that, as with so many not just to become pilots but to become novel ideas, the concept was not tested ISBN 978-1-84832-109-0 instructors with knowledge across realistically before it was used in action. 175 pages plus Appendices a broad range of aviation subjects. Some weapons achieved greater effects They were then expected to teach the than imagined, others less so, and the Reviewed by CMDR David Hobbs MBE numbers of men that followed in the British fascination for underwater RN (Ret’d) rapid expansion of the Royal Navy’s weapons becomes apparent when one new air arm. learns that many of the fears expressed Little has been written about the rapid This was an era when every flight by Jellicoe in 1914 actually reflected development of naval aviation before was reported in the specialist press planned or current British thinking on the formation of the Royal Naval Air and modifications to the early designs tactics. Service in 1914 with the result that not were eagerly noted and discussed. This In summary this is much more than enough is known about a period of wealth of material provided much of a directory of weapons used between exciting and dynamic progress. Philip the information on which the author 1914 and 1918, it is an important work Jarrett’s book helps to fill this gap, based his work but he also had access that is fundamental to an understanding provides fascinating insight into period to McClean’s photographic archive of the war plans and tactics used by that deserves greater attention and puts which is now in the possession of the fighting powers during a period into context the way in which aviation the Fleet Air Arm Museum at RNAS of unprecedented naval warfare. It pioneer Frank McClean helped the Yeovilton and which helped to produce will appeal to anyone who wants to Admiralty to establish a ‘school’ for the book. understand how and why the conflict training aviators earlier than would In 1911 different manufacturers evolved the way it did and may change otherwise have been possible. used different methods of controlling the perceptions of those who had not Lieutenant Arthur Longmore, aircraft in flight and their relative fully appreciated the properties of an Australian serving in the Royal merits were the subject of lengthy contemporary weapons and their effects. Navy, was one of the first four officers debate. Even the individual aircraft had My review copy has been given an chosen from hundreds of volunteers personalities and the early machines important place in my library and I to undergo flying instruction at bought by the Admiralty were all recommend it highly. t Eastchurch in 1911. They did so in given nicknames by their pilots. There aircraft provided as a patriotic gesture were, for instance, the ‘field-kitchen’ at no initial cost to the Admiralty by which suffered from over-heating; Frank McClean, flying from a site he the ‘triple-twin’ in which two engines Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 76 Book Reviews

WALLER FARNCOMB RANKIN DECHAINEUX COLLINS SHEEAN drove three propellers and the ‘gnome- produced. This book has been given in sandwich’ in which the ‘filling’ was the manuscript form and in final format to pilot who sat between two engines and Australian Naval Heroes those making those recommendations.

NEW their propellers, one pushing and one NEWSOUTH Time will tell whether the nation will SOUTHWALES pulling the aircraft in flight. When the WALES use this process to remedy the injustice early pilots took off from the deck of done to the RAN heroes who are a warship or attempted to carry out among those under consideration. The

VICTORIA a visual search for a dived submarine VICTORIA fog of war and national amnesia with they were doing something for the first regard to its naval history caused their NEW SOUTH time and finding new limits the hard WALES deeds to be unrequited for generations. way. It is easy to forget how very few If the oversights of the past are put right TASMANIA flying hours they had by our modern TASMANIA then this book will have played its part standards. Jarrett brings this era to life in providing justice at last for these VICTORIA and puts the early pioneers into their Dr Tom Lewis men, their families and for the Navy and historical context with a style that is the nation. both informative and easy to read. The Submarine Six The Submarine Six comes with a

The Navies of the Commonwealth TASMANIA foreword by VADM Crane, written in share a common aviation heritage Australian Naval Heroes: June 2011, aligning the book with the that began with the enthusiastic steps Waller, Farncomb, Rankin, centenary of the RAN and pointing out described in this book. It gives an Dechaineux, Collins, Sheean that the Collins class are the only ships accurate picture of experiments that in the RAN which bear the names of took place before the Royal Naval Dr Tom Lewis individuals. Air Service or Royal Flying Corps ISBN 970987151919 This handsomely illustrated work were formed and there is much more tells the story of those six sailors including the development of balloon Avonmore Books in detail. Effectively, it is six short flight and McClean’s flying expedition www.avonmorebooks.com.au biographies, but it also covers a very up the Nile from Cairo to Khartoum. great deal of Australia’s naval history 201 pages For those interested in reading about from the early 1920’s until the end of the first days of fixed-wing naval flying Reviewed by LCDR Desmond Woods Collins’ naval career in 1955. This is a in the Commonwealth and their place considerable achievement. Naturally in a contemporary context, this is This new book by Dr Tom Lewis the main focus of the book is the 1939- an important book and I thoroughly has had a long gestation period. The 45 war which took four of its subjects’ recommend it. t author has been gathering information lives. Tom Lewis builds his account of and interviewing those who knew the careers of each of the five officers his subjects for the last decade. Some through the scores and remarks made of those he interviewed in his early on their personal reports, and through research period died before the book many interviews and written accounts. was published. Had this research not The four who died fighting, Waller, been done, much of the first hand Rankin, Dechaineux and Sheean, have information and insights recorded in now become, at least within the Navy the book would have been irretrievably and the naval retired community, men lost. Dr Lewis has done good service to garlanded with imperishable fame. But posterity by ensuring that elderly eye they are still largely unknown to the witnesses to the deeds and lives of these general Australian public. When the great Australian sailors have had their author was interviewed on radio while final say. promoting the book it was clear that the By the time this review is published interviewers had no prior knowledge the findings of the current investigation of these sailors’ achievements until into the recognition of unrecognised they had read the book and were acts of gallantry may have been somewhat bemused that they had never Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 77

heard of these Australian heroes. The no matter how often it is told. It was and half her ship’s company in Sunda bloodied digger in trench and jungle is told to an ANZAC Day audience in Strait was the tragic finale to a heroic understandably the prevailing image in the town of Armidale a few years ago. and full life, well lived on many levels. the public mind of Australians at war Many of them knew nothing of this Mike Carlton’s recent fine book Cruiser, and it appears to be all that is taught Tasmanian boy whose corvette bore published in 2010, reminded a new in Australian school textbooks. This the name of their town. The crowd was generation of the life and death of this book should be a set text in Australian visibly moved. great naval officer who combined being history classes nationwide. It should Harold Farncomb was the an extraordinary leader and a working also be mandated reading for all New consummate naval professional who seaman. In far fewer pages Tom Lewis Entry Officers at the RANC. Five of its never put a foot wrong while at sea in has distilled the essence of “Hard over subjects were graduates of the RANC. the most testing of command positions. Hec Waller” and illustrated his account The inspiring life stories are all here. He repeatedly distinguished himself with the anecdotes that round out this John Collins, was a brilliant ship in command of an RN carrier and kindly, wise sailor so beloved by his handler and victor over the Bartolomeo the RAN’s cruisers. He was a great men. Waller too is among those rightly Colleone. He commanded Shropshire Australian sailor who was tested in under consideration for retrospective and led Australia’s fight back in the battle and never found wanting. He honours. Pacific until he came as close as a man fought a successful battle in peacetime Of note is the fact that only two can to being killed in action and yet to recover from mental war wounds posthumous awards were available survive. He recovered from his wounds and went on to be a fine barrister. during the war: the VC or a Mention in and led the Navy into the post war Robert ‘Oscar’ Rankin, was the quiet Despatches. Why this should be so is world as an advocate for air power at methodical hydrographer who when not entirely clear, but the effect was that sea and prepared the service for the given command of an under-armed Waller and Shean were both awarded Korean war. ‘sloop of war’ Yarra demonstrated only an MID for the actions in which Emile Dechaineaux, the Tasmanian his fighting spirit and determination they died. Rankin did not even receive son of a French artist who distinguished to do all that he could to protect his that award presumably because there himself during the evacuation of embattled convoy, or die trying. Yarra’s were none of his men left who were Dunkirk, was the warm-hearted father last fight and the gallantry of Rankin’s senior enough to have the credibility to of his ships’ companies until he was men should be finally recognised by speak or write of his selfless courage. struck down on Australia’s bridge, her CO and his gunner LS ‘Buck’ Taylor This book is written to be read by standing next to Collins, by air attack both receiving posthumous Victoria those who know and understand the at Leyte Gulf. His death from internal Crosses. national significance of the men it pays wounds robbed the Navy of an officer Finally there is Hector Laws Waller, tribute to, and by the general public. who, had he lived, would have been a the finest Captain (D) and greatest For those for whom ‘navy ways’ are new very great leader at sea for the final year natural leader of RAN sailors in war information there is a wealth of detail of the war and in the post war period. that Australia has ever bred and the on the naval context in which these six ’s familiar story is well RANC trained. He took the near lives were lived. The book contains told. His selfless split-second decision obsolete and mechanically unreliable a glossary and an opening chapter to return to his Oerlikon gun and fire flotilla of elderly destroyers, that a containing a wide range of information in defence of his mates being strafed penurious Australian government on the Navy and its people. This is a in the water should be embedded gave him, and turned it into a sharp definitive work and will be consulted in the national consciousness as the weapon of war. He demonstrated to and enjoyed for decades to come, ultimate example of mateship and duty, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, C-in-C long after the Collins class have been combined in one young lost life. His Mediterrannean, the steely calibre of superseded by the future submarines decision to sink with Armidale, still Australian sailors in battle. His deeds now under discussion. The names of the fighting back, was an act of sublime commanding Stuart at Matapan, submarine six will be with us forever, courage and self-sacrifice in the highest attacking Italian heavy cruisers at point whether or not future ships carry them, traditions of the , which blank range, and illuminating them with and whether or not overdue recognition he so richly deserves. He brought great searchlights, are unsurpassed in our is now paid to the skill and courage of honour to himself and his little ship naval annals for cool courage and elan. these great Australians. Submarine Six and his story has the power to move His death in 1942 and the loss of Perth is highly recommended. t Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 78

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 79

Lingayen Operation bombardment – 8 January 1945

he battleship USS Mississippi sister, HMAS Australia, survived lucky to be one of the few Allied bombards Luzon in the no fewer than five hits by Japanese heavy ships to escape damage. t TPhilippines during the Lingayen kamikaze aircraft. The destroyer operation on 8 January 1945. She is HMAS Arunta was also damaged by followed by the battleship USS West air attack. Shropshire’s close-in air Virginia and the HMAS defences were likewise kept busy, Shropshire. It was during the invasion accounting for several of the enemy. of Lingayen that Shropshire’s near Despite some near misses, she was (Naval Historical Centre 80-G-301229)

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 80 ANI On-line: A guide to the new website.

O ur new website is now on-line! In addition to the features available on the Changing your details When your account is created, only your member ID and password are previous site, the new site also features a library of past journals, a discussion stored in the system for privacy reasons. However, you may provide forum, a news section and member list. This short guide is designed to help other details that are visible to other ANI members. In order to change you take full advantage of the new features. your details, login and click the “Change Your Details” menu item (figure 5). Then select the “change” link (figure 6) next to either your personal details or password. Change the text appropriately and click the “save” button (figure 7). F igure 1 The personal information that you provide will be visible to other Obtaining an account members of the ANI but will be hidden from members of the general In order to access the new features of the site you must have a user public. You may provide as much or as little detail as you wish but account for the website. If you have a current subscription to the ANI, none of the fields are compulsory. However, you may not change your navigate to the website www.navalinstitute.com.au using your web member ID as it is the link between the on-line database and our off- browser (figure 1), click the “Members Login” menu item (figure 2), line records. then click the link to download an application form. Fill in the form, then fax or post it to the ANI Business Manager. Once your account has been created, you will receive an email that outlines your member ID and password. Figure 8

Figure 7 Participating in the forum Figure 2 Figure 3 In order to post topics and replies in the discussion forum, first login and click the “Forum” menu item (figure 8). Then select a forum that Logging in to your account you would like to view by clicking its “View Topics” button (figure Once you have your account details, you are ready to login and access 9). Select a topic that you would like to read by clicking its “View this the new features of the site. In order to login, navigate to the website topic” link (figure 10). If you are not interested in any particular topic, (figure 1) and click the “Members Login” item (figure 2). Enter your you may add your own by clicking the “Add New Topic” button (figure member ID and password as they were provided to you, then click the 10). Similarly, once you are viewing a topic, you may post a reply by “Login” button. The case of the member ID and password are important: clicking “Add New Post”. Fill in the heading and body of your reply and i.e. “CaSe” and “case” are considered entirely different words by the click the “Submit” button to add your reply to the topic. If you change authentication system. Each letter of the password will appear as a single your mind while writing your reply, you may click the “Cancel” button “*” to prevent others from seeing your password as you type. and your reply will not be added to the topic. If you have entered your details correctly, you will be presented with the news page. The grey status bar at the top notifies you of the account you are using (figure 4). You are now able to access all of the new features of the site.

Figure 4 Figure 9 Logging out of your account In order to protect your identity and to prevent malicious use of your account by others, you must log out of the site when you are finished browsing. This is especially important on public computers. In order to log out, click the “Logout” link in the grey status bar (figure 4). Figure 10

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 144 81 Thinking of Making a Contribution? Style Notes for Headmark

In general, please present your work So: the end of the article, please supply full honours - Lieutenant with the minimum of formatting. Adkin, Mark. Goose Green. London: Commander Bill Crabbe, CSC, RAN - unless you would Paragraphs: Leo Cooper, 1992. prefer not to use them. Then please supply a paragraph Don’t indent, and leave left justified. Adler, Bill (Ed.) Letters from Vietnam. on yourself, to a maximum of 50 words, including any Separate paragraphs by one line. Single New York: EP Dutton and Co., 1967. qualifications you would like listed, and any interesting spacing only. Use one space only after Articles use quotation marks around biographical aspects. If possible please supply a colour or stops and colons. their title, which is not in italics. greyscale head and shoulders e-photo of yourself for use Conventions: If citing web sites please use the alongside the article title. Use numbers for 10 and above, words convention: Illustrations: below. Ship names use italics in title Australian Associated Press. “Army Do not embed graphs or figures in your text without case; prefixes such as HMAS in capitals admits mistakes in SAS investigation”. sending a separate file as well. If supplying photographs use and italics. Book and Journal titles use 17 February, 2004. Forwarding your article: Citations: So, web site name. Article title. Full Please send to the Editor on Endnotes rather than footnotes. Use date of accessing the site. Full URL. Editorial considerations: footnotes to explain any points you want Bylines: The Editor reserves the right to amend articles where the reader to notice immediately. Book Supply your everyday title for use at the necessary for the purposes of grammar correction, and to titles follow Author surname, first name, beginning of the title, so: Lieutenant delete tables or figures for space considerations. title if any. Title. Place of publication: Commander Bill Crabbe, or Jack publisher, year of that edition. Aubrey, or Reverend James Moodie. At

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 82 Australian Naval Institute

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Crew members of HMAS Choules use the 30 tonne Liebherr crane to prepare the mexeflote in preparation to conduct amphibious boat operations whilst on Exercise SQUADEX 2012