DOCSLIB.ORG

Lenin's Brain

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Lenin's Brain Chapter Nine Who Is the Prisoner Here? Background The Holocaust provided the classic image of the concentration camp guard: A cruel and sadistic SS o"cer impeccably dressed in black jack boots, indi!erently sorting incoming Jewish prisoners for the gas chamber or work brigades. The Nazi concentration camps were basi- cally extermination camps in which prisoners were either executed immediately or worked to death. The men and women who guarded these camps belonged to the fanatical SS- Totenkopfverbaende or were recruited (such as female guards) into associated organizations by racist appeals. In 1945, the Nazi concentration camps held around 700,000 inmates guarded by 55,000 guards. At the time of Stalin’s death in March of 1953, his concentration camps held 2.5 million prisoners. While the Nazis operated hundreds of camps, primarily in Eastern Europe, Stalin’s Gulag administration operated 3,274 labor camps and colonies, 52 prisons, 120 children’s work colonies, and 748 orphanages and hospitals spread throughout the vast territory of the Soviet Union. To run this empire, the Gulag administration employed 446,000 persons, of whom more than half (234,000) were in the militarized guard division.1 This chapter tells the story of the quarter- million guards who manned the sentry outposts, who escorted inmates to work, and who 90 hunted them down when they escaped. Few, if any, were there for ideological reasons. Their o"cers were sent to the Gulag as punish- ment duty, and the guards were a rag- tag collection of poorly edu- cated and poorly paid unfortunates, unlikely to have any a"liation with the party or with communist youth. The Gulag guard corps was at the bottom of the ladder of the interior ministry hierarchy. At the top were the Chekist operational workers who caught, imprisoned, and executed enemies of the Soviet state. Those who guarded them were at the bottom. The job of these guards and their o"cers was not to exterminate prisoners; summary executions at the time of sentencing did that job more e"ciently and saved transportation costs. Instead, their task was to maintain order and discipline in the camps, to prevent escapes, and to deliver and return prisoners to work in the industrial and mining enterprises associated with the camp. Why Not the Best and the Brightest? Nazi concentration camp guards tended to believe in Nazi racist ideol- ogy, worked in camps an easy train ride to Berlin, and, if not driven by ideology, had vast opportunities for corruption (through the theft of inmate belongings). Soviet Gulag guards lived thousands of miles from home in some of the world’s harshest climates. Although some camps and colonies were located in central regions, the most impor- tant were dispersed in forlorn corners of the vast Soviet Union. They were built close to the vast mineral and forestry resources of the Far North, Siberia, and Kazakhstan. Although prisons in other societies are not exactly located on prime real estate, they can scarcely compare in remoteness and hard- ship with the prisons of the Soviet Gulag. As a massive industrial and mining empire, the Gulag spun o! a huge demand for guards in a society that was perennially short of labor. The USSR, in 1953, had a prison population fi fteen times larger than the United States, a coun- try of comparable size. The Gulag administration faced a constant struggle of recruiting and retaining guards. In any penitentiary system, the task of guards is basically the same: All societies isolate violent and dangerous o!enders as a threat to the Who Is the Prisoner Here? 91 physical safety and property of their citizens. In the Soviet case, most inmates were condemned to the Gulag not as threats to public safety but because of actual or suspected opposition to the Soviet state. That guards perform their jobs well was extremely important to the leadership. If the guarding system broke down, civil society could be swamped with “socially dangerous” persons who could infect the rest of society with their anti- Soviet views. Yet, there was little reason to expect that Gulag guards would be the “best and the brightest.” Guards had to work in remote regions where free labor would not come on its own. Guarding is a cruel, brutal, and unrewarding busi- ness in its own right, let alone in an arctic climate. Unless the Gu- lag administration was to pay exceptional wages and benefi ts, there would also be no reason for qualifi ed persons to volunteer for guard positions. The o"cial statistics for the militarized guard division of the Gulag for 1945 show that only twelve percent belonged to the party, ninety percent had an elementary education or less, and almost eighty per- cent had been on the job less than a year.2 If one adjusts these fi gures to exclude o"cers (who accounted for about ten percent of the total), the characteristics of ordinary guards look even worse. Their o"cers were not much better. NKVD / MVD o"cers with un- compromised backgrounds and good training opted for careers in the central administration or in the glamorous operational administra- tions. The guard division was a dumping ground for compromised o"cers sent to Gulag camps under the motto: “You can take those whom we do not need.”3 “O"cer” positions in the Gulag even had to be fulfi lled by “free labor,” suggesting even a shortage of o"cers. In 1948, 26,254 of the 63,033 o"cer positions were fi lled by “free labor.”4 Given that most camps were o! limits to civilians, many of these “free” o"cers were either prisoners themselves or former prisoners. That the Gulag was not a particularly desirable place of employ- ment is refl ected in the fact that of the 337,484 authorized positions in the camp sector, 21 percent were unfi lled (in 1948). In the early 1930s, shortages were so severe that prisoners occupied managerial positions in camp administration. During the construction of the White Sea– Baltic Canal, most lower- level administrative and techni- cal positions were held by prisoners. Although the Gulag administra- tion sought to minimize the use of prisoners as guards for obvious 92 chapter nine reasons, the number of prisoner- guards was substantial. As of January 1939, of the 94,921 armed guards in camps and colonies, 25,023 were prisoners.5 The practice of using prisoner- guards continued through- out the history of the Gulag. The Gulag had other ways to force “free” persons into guard posi- tions. Many inmates became guards after their sentences were com- pleted because internal passport controls would not permit them to live elsewhere. After World War II, Red Army soldiers, POWs, dis- placed persons, and others who would have been in Germany or in other foreign countries were automatically processed in “fi ltration” camps. Many who escaped imprisonment were made into concentra- tion camp guards. Others had their papers taken away and had no choice but to remain as guards. At the beginning of 1946, the number of such guards numbered 31,000.6 The sorry conditions of the armed guards of the Gulag were sum- marized in a letter to the NKVD minister Beriia in August of 1945: At the current time, most of the armed guards are older persons and war invalids. Many have asked to be demobilized based on the state decree about demobilizing older persons. The Gulag administration gives a stan- dard answer to such requests that the personnel sta! is not subject to this decree. Such an answer is correct for the present but the basic question is the future insofar as most guards are older than forty, disqualifi ed from military service because of health, war invalids, or women. Our e!orts to recruit demobilized solders is not yielding results. There are other sub- stantive defi ciencies. For example in the armed guards, we have in the commanding sta! in o"cer ranks free workers recruited from collective farms and cities in the ordinary fashion.7 Although former Red Army soldiers understood weaponry, those recruited from the collective farms did not. Guards did not know how to clean their rifl es, and one female guard went on duty with a rag stu!ed in her rifl e.8 Work Conditions and Discipline Guards were poorly paid, equipped, and trained. An August 1945 re- port to Beriia contains the following description of Gulag guards: Who Is the Prisoner Here? 93 The armed guards of many camps do not wear uniforms. They wear ripped shoes and tattered clothing. In the summer, they wear winter hats, wadded trousers, and quilted jackets. Their appearance is worse than that of the prisoners although the disciplinary rules of the Red Army apply to them.9 The proposal to Beriia: Make the armed Gulag guards a part of the NKVD Special Forces. The proposal was rejected because of the high cost and problems of mobilizing armed guards for the Gulag.10 Gulag guards worked long hours under generally miserable condi- tions in harsh climates. A March 1950 report stated that: The work day of armed guards is excessively hard and, as a general rule, is 10 to 12 hours, and during the summer months longer. Their days o! are irregular; their vacations are withheld and are granted primarily in the winter.11 A January 20, 1950, report to the head of the Gulag administration showed that the living conditions of guards had not improved: “In many divisions, the sta! is miserly quartered, some in wagons, and some in heated huts.”12 Gulag guards had to stand guard under freezing conditions.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Politics of Memory in Russia
    Thomas Sherlock Confronting the Stalinist Past: The Politics of Memory in Russia Attempting to reverse the decline of the Russian state, economy, and society, President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have paid increasing attention over the past two years to the modernization of Russia’s socioeconomic system. Aware of the importance of cultural and ideological supports for reform, both leaders are developing a ‘‘useable’’ past that promotes anti-Stalinism, challenging the anti-liberal historical narratives of Putin’s presidency from 2000—2008. This important political development was abrupt and unexpected in Russia and the West. In mid—2009, a respected journal noted in its introduction to a special issue on Russian history and politics: ‘‘turning a blind eye to the crimes of the communist regime, Russia’s political leadership is restoring, if only in part, the legacy of Soviet totalitarianism....’’1 In December 2009, Time magazine ran a story entitled ‘‘Rehabilitating Joseph Stalin.’’2 Although the conflicting interests of the regime and the opposition of conservatives are powerful obstacles to a sustained examination of Russia’s controversial Soviet past, the Kremlin has now reined in its recent efforts to burnish the historical image of Josef Stalin, one of the most brutal dictators in history. For now, Medvedev and Putin are bringing the Kremlin more in line with dominant Western assessments of Stalinism. If this initiative continues, it could help liberalize Russia’s official political culture and perhaps its political system. Yet Thomas Sherlock is Professor of Political Science at the United States Military Academy at West Point and the author of Historical Narratives in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
    [Show full text]
  • The Crime of Genocide Committed Against the Poles by the USSR Before and During World War II: an International Legal Study, 45 Case W
    Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Volume 45 | Issue 3 2012 The rC ime of Genocide Committed against the Poles by the USSR before and during World War II: An International Legal Study Karol Karski Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Karol Karski, The Crime of Genocide Committed against the Poles by the USSR before and during World War II: An International Legal Study, 45 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 703 (2013) Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol45/iss3/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Volume 45 Spring 2013 Issue 3 The Crime of Genocide Committed Against the Poles by the USSR Before and During WWII: An International Legal Study Karol Karski Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2013 The Crime of Genocide Committed Against the Poles The Crime of Genocide Committed Against the Poles by the USSR Before and During World War II: An International Legal Study Karol Karski* The USSR’s genocidal activity against the Polish nation started before World War II. For instance, during the NKVD’s “Polish operation” of 1937 and 1938, the Communist regime exterminated about 85,000 Poles living at that time on the pre- war territory of the USSR.
    [Show full text]
  • ABSTRACT BITCHES and THIEVES: GULAG GUARDS, ADMINISTRATORS, and PROFESSIONAL CRIMINALS in the BITCHES' WAR by Adam Richard
    ABSTRACT BITCHES AND THIEVES: GULAG GUARDS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND PROFESSIONAL CRIMINALS IN THE BITCHES’ WAR by Adam Richard Rodger Amongst the professional criminals imprisoned in the Soviet Gulag, a split developed between those who kept to the Thieves’ Law and those who broke the Law and collaborated with the State. This violent schism, the Bitches’ War, raged across the entire Gulag system, becoming most heated between 1948 and 1953, and implicated the camps’ guards and administrators as much as the prisoners themselves. This research examines primary and secondary sources, heavily incorporating Gulag survivor memoirs, to investigate the culture of the Thieves-in-Law, these professional criminals, and also to uncover the involvement, intentions, and guilt of the camp administration. This study argues that the Bitches’ War sheds light on the real purpose and function of the Gulag; that it was not primarily about ideological re-education, nor was it primarily about economics and production, but that the Gulag served as a model for social control through use of power, persuasion, and violence. BITCHES AND THIEVES: GULAG GUARDS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND PROFESSIONAL CRIMINALS IN THE BITCHES’ WAR Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Miami University in partial fulfillment of Master’s Degree by Adam Richard Rodger Miami University Oxford, Ohio 2017 Advisor: Dr. Stephen Norris Reader: Dr. Dan Prior Reader: Dr. Scott Kenworthy ©2017 Adam Richard Rodger This thesis titled BITCHES AND THIEVES GULAG GUARDS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND PROFESSIONAL CRIMINALS IN THE BITCHES’ WAR by Adam Richard Rodger has been approved for publication by The College of Arts and Sciences and The Department of History ____________________________________________________ Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Certainty, Probability, and Stalin's Great Party Purge
    McNair Scholars Journal Volume 8 | Issue 1 Article 3 2004 Certainty, Probability, and Stalin’s Great Party Purge Brett omkH es Grand Valley State University Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/mcnair Recommended Citation Homkes, Brett (2004) C" ertainty, Probability, and Stalin’s Great Party Purge," McNair Scholars Journal: Vol. 8: Iss. 1, Article 3. Available at: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/mcnair/vol8/iss1/3 Copyright © 2004 by the authors. McNair Scholars Journal is reproduced electronically by ScholarWorks@GVSU. http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/ mcnair?utm_source=scholarworks.gvsu.edu%2Fmcnair%2Fvol8%2Fiss1%2F3&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages Certainty, Probability, and Stalin’s Great Party Purge ABSTRACT In 1936, Josef Stalin, General Secretary In 1935, Stalin decided to purge his own of the Communist Party of the Soviet party to consolidate power in the Soviet Union [CPSU], initiated a Party Purge, government. Since the inception of historical the extent of which, measured by the research about this event, a debate has numbers of deaths and arrests of Party developed regarding the number of arrests members and their affiliates, has proved and deaths of Soviets ordered by Stalin. This to be highly controversial. A long- study will examine the figures calculated simmering historical debate about this by Western historians to determine where issue surprisingly deepened after the fall correlation and discrepancy exist. The of the Soviet Union brought about the importance of this research is to assess partial opening of government archives the reasons why such dramatic statistical that many thought would answer all differences exist among various historians.
    [Show full text]
  • Stalin's Terror and the Long-Term Political
    Stalin’s Terror and the Long-Term Political Effects of Mass Repression Yuri M. Zhukov and Roya Talibova Department of Political Science University of Michigan November 29, 2016 Abstract Can the effect of repression endure for multiple generations and erode trust in future political institutions? Yes. We examine the impact of Stalin’s Great Terror on political participation in contemporary Rus- sia. Using millions of arrest records from archival documents, we con- struct local measures of repression and match them to precinct-level data on voting in national elections between 2003-2012. To identify the effect of repression on voting, we use an instrumental variable de- sign, exploiting exogenous variation in Soviet repression due to the structure of mid-century Soviet railroads, and travel distances from each locality to Gulag camps. We find that communities more heavily repressed under Stalin are significantly less likely to vote in Russian elections today. These results challenge emerging findings that expo- sure to violence has positive effects on political participation. 1 Reflecting on his years in correctional labor camps, Soviet writer and dis- sident Varlam Shalamov said, “He who has been there will never forget” (Hosking, 1991). Between 1929 and 1953, the Soviet secret police sent an estimated 15 million citizens to prison camps (Conquest, 1997). The num- ber of inmates increased from 400,000 in 1929 (Ivanova, 2000) to 2.5 million in the early 1950s (Gregory and Lazarev, 2013). The Gulag – an acronym for “Main Directorate of Corrective Labor Camps and Labor Settlements” – was among the defining institutions of the USSR (Adler, 2005).
    [Show full text]
  • The Gulag As a Reinvention of Serfdom in Soviet Russia
    READING COPY ONLY NOT FOR CITATION The Gulag as a Reinvention of Serfdom in Soviet Russia By David J. Nordlander Intractable for centuries, forced labor has proven to be an enduring legacy of Russian history. What began as a gradual restriction of peasant movement in earlier times became institutionalized within a state that ultimately relied upon coercion as a chief lever of economic policy in both the tsarist and Soviet periods. The most notable measure of unfree labor, the institution of serfdom, constituted the base of a pyramid that upheld the tsarist polity. But the endemic problems of a cash-poor economy and imbalanced labor supply did not end with the Bolshevik Revolution, and thus helped shape the outlines of the Soviet era. The idealism of October quickly gave way to a harshening of labor policy, culminating in the extreme response of Stalinism that essentially led to a reenserfment of the peasantry and a pernicious expansion of the most repressive aspects of tsarism. The Gulag in particular encapsulated these trends and became the embodiment of Soviet coercion in the twentieth century. The continuities between the tsarist and Soviet epochs were both obvious and subtle. Imprisonment, exile, and restriction of movement were to be found in both eras, albeit in an even more harsh form under Stalin. While trumpeting an idealistic and 2 liberationist rhetoric, the Soviet experiment in reality soon revived and expanded upon the economic and political coercion of its tsarist predecessor. Just as significantly, social and cultural parallels also were noteworthy. In spite of their progressive cant, Soviet bosses essentially formed a new ruling elite that contentedly reshaped the privileges of power and formed a revived aristocracy.
    [Show full text]
  • Accusations Against Stalin Regarding the Great Purge and the Establishment of the Gulags
    International Court of Justice Accusations against Stalin regarding the Great Purge and the establishment of the Gulags Director: Alvaro Ricós Moderator: Carlos Colchero INTRODUCTION The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations (UN). It was founded in 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations and began work in 1946. The Court’s duty is to advise on legal questions referred to it by other UN organs or agencies (The Court ICG, n.d.). The Court is composed of 15 judges who are elected by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. The Court is located in the Netherlands, and is therefore the only UN organ that is not located in New York. There are two types of cases involving the ICJ, either legal disputes called Contentious Cases, or advisory opinions on legal questions, which is the case in the upcoming trial. Other UN organs request trials to discuss and determine the legality of specific situations, so the most suitable states are chosen in order to provide the most informed verdict as possible. Furthermore, written and oral proceedings usually take place in order to inform the court of the case and then withdraw a public advisory decision. (The Court ICG, n.d.). First off, once the proceedings begin, the member States are required to file and exchange pleadings signaling their position and a detailed statement of laws or facts leading them to such position during what’s known as the written phase. After that, the State representatives are required to do oral proceedings addressing the court and thus looking forward to reaching a verdict.
    [Show full text]
  • What Was Distinctive About Katyn: the Massacres in Context, 44 Case W
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Volume 44 | Issue 3 2012 What Was Distinctive about Katyn: The aM ssacres in Context Mark Kramer Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Mark Kramer, What Was Distinctive about Katyn: The Massacres in Context, 44 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 569 (2012) Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol44/iss3/21 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. File: Kramer 2 Created on: 8/8/2012 3:23:00 PM Last Printed: 9/1/2012 4:27:00 PM WHAT WAS DISTINCTIVE ABOUT KATYN?: THE MASSACRES IN CONTEXT Mark Kramer I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 569 II. UNTANGLING THE COVER-UP .............................................................. 572 III. THE IMPORTANCE OF HISTORICAL JUSTICE ......................................... 574 I. INTRODUCTION The Katyn massacres must be understood in their proper historical context: the context not only of Soviet domestic politics, but also of Soviet occupation policy in
    [Show full text]
  • Western Influence in the Cover-Up of the Holodomor
    City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works School of Arts & Sciences Theses Hunter College Fall 1-3-2020 Western Influence in the Cover-up of the Holodomor Michael Galka-Giaquinto CUNY Hunter College How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/hc_sas_etds/555 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] Western Influence in the Cover-up of the Holodomor by Michael Galka-Giaquinto Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History, Hunter College The City University of New York Fall 2019 01/03/2020 Prof. Elidor Mëhilli Date Thesis Sponsor 01/03/2020 Prof. Benjamin Hett Date Second Reader Western Influence in the Cover-up of the Holodomor | Michael Galka-Giaquinto Table of Contents Abstract: p. 2 Preface: p. 2 Introduction: pp. 3-6 Chapter 1 - A Coveted Land: pp. 6-8 Chapter 2 - Bolshevik Extremism in Ukraine: pp. 8-15 Chapter 3 - Walter Duranty: pp. 15-17 Chapter 4 - Elitism, NEP, and Misinformation: pp. 17-23 Chapter 5 - The Foreign Press and the Cover-up of the Holodomor: pp. 23-34 Chapter 6 - The British Foreign Office, Diplomacy, and the Famine: pp. 34-47 Conclusion: pp. 48-50 Bibliography: pp. 51-56 1 Western Influence in the Cover-up of the Holodomor | Michael Galka-Giaquinto Abstract This paper discusses how the Holodomor (Ukrainian Genocide of 1932-1933) was effectively covered up by Stalin with the help of compliant actors in the West.
    [Show full text]
  • Unwritten: the Hidden History of the Holodomor
    Liberty University Unwritten: The Hidden History of the Holodomor A Thesis Submitted to the Department of History by Amy Whisman Vineland, New Jersey April 2018 Abstract Between 1930 and 1933, Joseph Stalin unleashed an assault on Ukraine that resulted in the starvation of 5 million people. Their story went untold for decades. The fact that Soviet propaganda was largely successful in suppressing the truth speaks less to its sophistication than to the gullibility and complicity of Westerners. Although there were truth-tellers from Great Britain, the United States, and even Europe who accurately reported on the Ukrainian famine, Stalin understood that such voices could be effectively neutralized. Because the story of the Holodomor remained essentially unwritten, the West did not recognize it as the legitimate offspring of Communist ideology. The oversight allowed space and time for Communist doctrine to proliferate outside the bounds of historical judgment. Western intellectuals espoused and promoted Soviet ideology, granting it a measure of acceptability that would have been precluded by the accurate historical account of Communism as a conveyer of immeasurable injustice and suffering. ii Statement of Purpose Philosophy was once considered the handmaiden of theology. Unfortunately, it reached a state of autonomy in the modern era and unleashed all manner of untenable thought systems that are inconsistent with man’s actual experience of the world. It is necessary, therefore, to drive these false ideologies to their logical conclusions by identifying the real-world consequences they have produced. In other words, by writing their history. Jesus said that wisdom is proved right by her children; it must be that history serves as the handmaiden to theology.
    [Show full text]
  • The Gulag Archipelago: Experiment in Literary Investigation V
    THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO: EXPERIMENT IN LITERARY INVESTIGATION V. 1 PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn | 660 pages | 01 Sep 2007 | HarperCollins Publishers Inc | 9780061253713 | English | New York, NY, United States The Gulag Archipelago: Experiment in Literary Investigation v. 1 PDF Book With his students and colleagues, he has published over a hundred scientific papers, and his book Maps of Meaning revolutionized the psychology of religion. But, as though stricken dumb on the islands of the Archipelago, they kept their silence. Bookhouse Philadelphia, PA, U. Every bit of information that had managed to survive needed to be accepted, and a way had to be found to determine the appropriate place for each episode. It may well leave the reader limping a bit, too, for the encounter with God found in these pages is stark and startling. For eighteen years, he and his family lived in Vermont. He wants the whole truth of official criminality and civic acquiescence openly acknowledged and condemned so that the nation can achieve spiritual and political renewal through "the great Russian tradition of penitence. The first in New York Times bestselling author Michael Grant's breathtaking dystopian sci-fi saga, Gone is a page-turning thriller that invokes the classic The Lord of the Flies along with the horror of Stephen King. Amateur P. Yet we also witness astounding moral courage, the incorruptibility with which the occasional individual or a few scattered groups, all defenseless, endured brutality and degradation. Both sides resorted to atrocities, a reciprocity common to civil wars elsewhere. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn died at his home in Moscow in There are more copies of this book View all search results for this book.
    [Show full text]
  • 6 the Economy of the Gulag
    6 THE ECONOMY OF THE GULAG Oleg Khlevnyuk After World War II a certain number of documents that the Hitlerites had taken from Soviet archives found their way to the United States. They included the plan for development of the USSR national economy for 1941 (without the secret appendixes). For a long time this document was the only archival source that allowed specialists to draw any conclu- sions about the economics of forced labor in the USSR.1 Nonethe- less, several specialized studies on forced labor were written in the West on the basis of various available materials. It is noteworthy that one of the first such works, the book by D. Dallin and B. Nicolaevsky, soon after its publication was translated into Rus- sian in the research department of the USSR MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and was typed up in four copies for the leader- ship of Soviet punitive bodies.2 Other than this publication of four copies, not a single work on the economy of the Gulag was issued in the USSR until Gorbachev’s perestroika. This was a completely forbidden topic for Soviet historians. As for specific facts, the most valuable part of the first publica- Translated by Steven Shabad. 1. N. Jasny, ‘‘Labour and Output in Soviet Concentration Camps,’’ Journal of Political Economy, October 1951. 2. D. J. Dallin and B. P. Nicolaevsky, Forced Labor in Soviet Russia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1947). See State Archive of the Russian Federa- tion (GARF), f. R-9414, op. 1, d. 1800. ................. 8732$$ $CH6 03-22-07 07:10:56 PS 112 Oleg Khlevnyuk tions both about the Gulag as a whole and about its economy was the testimony of former inmates of Stalin’s camps.3 But most of the other data (especially statistics) suffered from imprecision and, most important, could not be verified without access to the archives.
    [Show full text]