What You Should Know About Home Equity Lines of Credit
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Down Payment and Closing Cost Assistance
STATE HOUSING FINANCE AGENCIES Down Payment and Closing Cost Assistance OVERVIEW STRUCTURE For many low- and moderate-income people, the The structure of down payment assistance programs most significant barrier to homeownership is the down varies by state with some programs offering fully payment and closing costs associated with getting a amortizing, repayable second mortgages, while other mortgage loan. For that reason, most HFAs offer some programs offer deferred payment and/or forgivable form of down payment and closing cost assistance second mortgages, and still other programs offer grant (DPA) to eligible low- and moderate-income home- funds with no repayment requirement. buyers in their states. The vast majority of HFA down payment assistance programs must be used in combi DPA SECOND MORTGAGES (AMORTIZING) nation with a first-lien mortgage product offered by the A second mortgage loan is subordinate to the first HFA. A few states offer stand-alone down payment and mortgage and is used to cover down payment and closing cost assistance that borrowers can combine closing costs. It is repayable over a given term. The with any non-HFA eligible mortgage product. Some interest rates and terms of the loans vary by state. DPA programs are targeted toward specific popula In some programs, the interest rate on the second tions, such as first-time homebuyers, active military mortgage matches that of the first mortgage. Other personnel and veterans, or teachers. Others offer programs offer more deeply subsidized rates on their assistance for any homebuyer who meets the income second mortgage down payment assistance. Some and purchase price limitations of their programs. -
Expected Default Frequency
CREDIT RESEARCH & RISK MEASUREMENT EDF Overview FROM MOODY’S ANALYTICS MOODY’S ANALYTICS EDF™ (EXPECTED DEFAULT FREQUENCY) ASSET VOLATILITY CREDIT MEASURES A measure of the business risk of the firm; technically, the standard EDF stands for Expected Default Frequency and is a measure of the deviation of the annual percentage change in the market value of the probability that a firm will default over a specified period of time firm’s assets. The higher the asset volatility, the less certain investors (typically one year). “Default” is defined as failure to make scheduled are about the market value of the firm, and the more likely the firm’s principal or interest payments. value will fall below its default point. According to the Moody’s EDF model, a firm defaults when the market value of its assets (the value of the ongoing business) falls DEFAULT POINT below its liabilities payable (the default point). The level of the market value of a company’s assets, below which the firm would fail to make scheduled debt payments. The default point THE COMPONENTS OF EDF is firm specific and is a function of the firm’s liability structure. It is There are three key values that determine a firm’s EDF credit measure: estimated based on extensive empirical research by Moody’s Analyt- » The current market value of the firm (market value of assets) ics, which has looked at thousands of defaulting firms, observing each firm’s default point in relation to the market value of its assets » The level of the firm’s obligations (default point) at the time of default. -
Money Market Fund Glossary
MONEY MARKET FUND GLOSSARY 1-day SEC yield: The calculation is similar to the 7-day Yield, only covering a one day time frame. To calculate the 1-day yield, take the net interest income earned by the fund over the prior day and subtract the daily management fee, then divide that amount by the average size of the fund's investments over the prior day, and then multiply by 365. Many market participates can use the 30-day Yield to benchmark money market fund performance over monthly time periods. 7-Day Net Yield: Based on the average net income per share for the seven days ended on the date of calculation, Daily Dividend Factor and the offering price on that date. Also known as the, “SEC Yield.” The 7-day Yield is an industry standard performance benchmark, measuring the performance of money market mutual funds regulated under the SEC’s Rule 2a-7. The calculation is performed as follows: take the net interest income earned by the fund over the last 7 days and subtract 7 days of management fees, then divide that amount by the average size of the fund's investments over the same 7 days, and then multiply by 365/7. Many market participates can use the 7-day Yield to calculate an approximation of interest likely to be earned in a money market fund—take the 7-day Yield, multiply by the amount invested, divide by the number of days in the year, and then multiply by the number of days in question. For example, if an investor has $1,000,000 invested for 30 days at a 7-day Yield of 2%, then: (0.02 x $1,000,000 ) / 365 = $54.79 per day. -
Venture Debt Determining When It’S the Right Path for Your Business
INSIGHTS | Legal Affairs Venture debt Determining when it’s the right path for your business INTERVIEWED BY SUE OSTROWSKI or startup companies lacking the Michael E. Fink cash flow or liquid assets to obtain a Attorney traditional bank loan, venture debt Babst Calland Fcould be the answer to help elevate them 412.394.6477 FOLLOW UP: To learn about venture debt or other to the next level. [email protected] financing alternatives, contact attorneys in our “Startups often lack many of the Emerging Technologies Group. characteristics that would give traditional lenders comfort that a regular INSIGHTS Legal Affairs is brought to you by Babst Calland commercial loan would be a good deal for them,” says Michael Fink, attorney the lender may receive a warrant to HOW CAN A BUSINESS DETERMINE at Babst Calland. “Venture debt can be purchase either common equity or the IF VENTURE DEBT IS THE RIGHT an alternative to help bridge the gap to a preferred equity to be issued in the next PATH? company’s next valuation.” fundraising round, typically at a discount. Just because you can go out and get Smart Business spoke with Michael money doesn’t mean you should. There about how taking on venture debt can WHEN SHOULD A COMPANY should be a solid reason for taking on keep a business moving forward without CONSIDER PURSUING VENTURE venture debt or any other investment. decreasing its valuation. DEBT? It’s really dependent on the Venture debt typically isn’t available circumstances of the business. As with WHAT IS VENTURE DEBT, AND HOW until a company has had a priced equity any financing deal, venture debt can IS IT STRUCTURED? fundraising round that includes a get complicated very quickly, and an At its core, venture debt looks similar to valuation for the lender to work from. -
New Credit Do You Know How to Play Your Cards Right?
New credit Do you know how to play your cards right? In most card games, someone invites you to join in, and you are dealt a hand. What you do with those cards is up to you. Play them wisely, and you may win. Make bad decisions, and you could lose. The credit game is much the same, with one very important difference: You are the only person in the game. If you manage your credit well, you can’t lose. Getting in on the credit game The most important rule is to pay your bills on time. Playing the credit game well gives you the added flexibility If you observe that one simple rule, you will succeed and security of credit at your disposal. You can improve at the credit game. your lifestyle through purchases that are possible only with credit and utilize services that are easily available only The playing cards of credit if you have a credit card — renting a car, for example. You In a deck of cards, there are four suits: hearts, diamonds, have the resources to pay for unexpected emergencies. clubs and spades. Credit can be similarly divided. Here are the kinds of credit you can use: But there are risks. Poorly managed credit can drive Revolving credit: Most credit cards are a form of revolving you deep into debt. Getting back in the game isn’t easy, credit. This simply means you are given a maximum credit but with time and self-control, you can regain control and limit, and you can make charges against that limit, carrying get a fresh start. -
The Student Loan Default Trap Why Borrowers Default and What Can Be Done
THE STUDENT LOAN DEFAULT TraP WHY BORROWERS DEFAULT AND WHAT CAN BE DONE NCLC® NATIONAL CONSUMER July 2012 LAW CENTER® © Copyright 2012, National Consumer Law Center, Inc. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Deanne Loonin is a staff attorney at the National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) and the Director of NCLC’s Student Loan Borrower Assistance Project. She was formerly a legal services attorney in Los Angeles. She is the author of numerous publications and reports, including NCLC publications Student Loan Law and Surviving Debt. Contributing Author Jillian McLaughlin is a research assistant at NCLC. She graduated from Kala mazoo College with a degree in political science. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report is a release of the National Consumer Law Center’s Student Loan Borrower Assistance Project (www.studentloanborrowerassistance.org). The authors thank NCLC colleagues Carolyn Carter, Jan Kruse, and Persis Yu for valuable comments and assistance. We also thank Emily Green Caplan for research assistance as well as NCLC colleagues Svetlana Ladan and Beverlie Sopiep for their assistance. We also thank the amazing advocates who helped out by surveying their clients, including Herman De Jesus and Liz Fusco with Neighborhood Economic Development Advo cacy Project and Meg Quiat, volunteer attorney at Boulder County Legal Services. This report is grounded in and inspired by the author’s work with lowincome clients. The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the author alone. NCLC’s Student Loan Borrower Assistance Project provides informa tion about student loan rights and responsibilities for borrowers and advocates. We also seek to increase public understanding of student lending issues and to identify policy solutions to promote access to education, lessen student debt burdens, and make loan repayment more manageable. -
And More Lenders Are Offering Home Equity Lines of Credit. by Using The
taking a percentage (say, 75 percent) of the home's appraised value and subtracting from that the balance What should you look for when shopping for a plan? owed on the existing mortgage. For example, If you decide to apply for a home equity line of credit, look for the plan that best meets your particular needs. Read the credit agreement carefully, and examine the terms and conditions of various plans, including the annual percentage rate (APR) and the costs of establishing the plan. The APR for a home equity line is based on the interest rate alone and will not reflect the closing costs and other fees and charges, so you'll need to compare these costs, as well as the APRs, among lenders. Interest rate charges and related plan features Home equity lines of credit typically involve variable rather than fixed interest rates. The variable rate must be based on a publicly available index (such as the prime rate published in some major daily newspapers or a U.S. Treasury bill rate); the interest rate for borrowing under the home equity line changes, mirroring fluctuations in More and more lenders are offering home equity lines of [D] the value of the index. Most lenders cite the interest rate credit. By using the equity in your home, you may qualify In determining your actual credit limit, the lender will also you will pay as the value of the index at a particular time for a sizable amount of credit, available for use when and consider your ability to repay, by looking at your income, plus a "margin," such as 2 percentage points. -
Default Option Exercise Over the Financial Crisis and Beyond*
Review of Finance, 2021, 153–187 doi: 10.1093/rof/rfaa022 Advance Access Publication Date: 17 August 2020 Default Option Exercise over the Financial Crisis and beyond* Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/rof/article/25/1/153/5893492 by guest on 19 February 2021 Xudong An1, Yongheng Deng2, and Stuart A. Gabriel3 1Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2University of Wisconsin – Madison, and 3University of California, Los Angeles Anderson School of Management Abstract We document changes in borrowers’ sensitivity to negative equity and show height- ened borrower default propensity as a fundamental driver of crisis period mortgage defaults. Estimates of a time-varying coefficient competing risk hazard model reveal a marked run-up in the default option beta from 0.2 during 2003–06 to about 1.5 dur- ing 2012–13. Simulation of 2006 vintage loan performance shows that the marked upturn in the default option beta resulted in a doubling of mortgage default inci- dence. Panel data analysis indicates that much of the variation in default option ex- ercise is associated with the local business cycle and consumer distress. Results also indicate elevated default propensities in sand states and among borrowers seeking a crisis-period Home Affordable Modification Program loan modification. JEL classification: G21, G12, C13, G18 Keywords: Mortgage default, Option exercise, Default option beta, Time-varying coefficient hazard model Received August 19, 2017; accepted October 23, 2019 by Editor Amiyatosh Purnanandam. * We thank Sumit Agarwal, Yacine Ait-Sahalia, -
Rules and Regulations Federal Register Vol
35003 Rules and Regulations Federal Register Vol. 84, No. 140 Monday, July 22, 2019 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER Division, STOP 0784, Room 2250, provisions of Title II of the UMRA) for contains regulatory documents having general USDA Rural Development, South State, local, and tribal governments or applicability and legal effect, most of which Agriculture Building, 1400 the private sector. Therefore, this rule is are keyed to and codified in the Code of Independence Avenue SW, Washington, not subject to the requirements of Federal Regulations, which is published under DC 20250–0784, telephone: (503) 894– sections 202 and 205 of the UMRA. 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510. 2382, email is [email protected]. Environmental Impact Statement The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: the Superintendent of Documents. This document has been reviewed in Executive Order 12866, Classification accordance with 7 CFR part 1970, This rule has been determined to be subpart A, ‘‘Environmental Programs.’’ DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE non-significant and therefore was not It is the determination of the Agency reviewed by the Office of Management that this action does not constitute a Rural Housing Service and Budget (OMB) under Executive major Federal action significantly Order 12866. affecting the quality of the human 7 CFR Part 3555 environment, and, in accordance with Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice RIN 0575–AD10 the National Environmental Policy Act Reform of 1969, Public Law 91–190, neither an Single Family Housing Guaranteed This final rule has been reviewed Environmental Assessment nor an Loan Program under Executive Order 12988, Civil Environmental Impact Statement is Justice Reform. -
Why Do Borrowers Default on Mortgages? a New Method for Causal Attribution Peter Ganong and Pascal J
WORKING PAPER · NO. 2020-100 Why Do Borrowers Default on Mortgages? A New Method For Causal Attribution Peter Ganong and Pascal J. Noel JULY 2020 5757 S. University Ave. Chicago, IL 60637 Main: 773.702.5599 bfi.uchicago.edu Why Do Borrowers Default on Mortgages? A New Method For Causal Attribution Peter Ganong and Pascal J. Noel July 2020 JEL No. E20,G21,R21 ABSTRACT There are two prevailing theories of borrower default: strategic default—when debt is too high relative to the value of the house—and adverse life events—such that the monthly payment is too high relative to available resources. It has been challenging to test between these theories in part because adverse events are measured with error, possibly leading to attenuation bias. We develop a new method for addressing this measurement error using a comparison group of borrowers with no strategic default motive: borrowers with positive home equity. We implement the method using high-frequency administrative data linking income and mortgage default. Our central finding is that only 3 percent of defaults are caused exclusively by negative equity, much less than previously thought; in other words, adverse events are a necessary condition for 97 percent of mortgage defaults. Although this finding contrasts sharply with predictions from standard models, we show that it can be rationalized in models with a high private cost of mortgage default. Peter Ganong Harris School of Public Policy University of Chicago 1307 East 60th Street Chicago, IL 60637 and NBER [email protected] Pascal J. Noel University of Chicago Booth School of Business 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue Chicago, IL 60637 [email protected] 1 Introduction “To determine the appropriate public- and private-sector responses to the rise in mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures, we need to better understand the sources of this phenomenon. -
Blacklisted: the Unwarranted Divestment of Access to Bank Accounts
BLACKLISTED: THE UNWARRANTED DIVESTMENT OF ACCESS TO BANK ACCOUNTS JAMES MARVIN PItREZ* The ability to thrive in America's mainstream financial economy is interwined with the ability to maintain a bank account. Yet, recent studies show that millions of American families do not own a bank account. While studies have pointed to various reasons behind this phenomenon, relatively little attention has been given to the banking industry's own exclusionary policies regarding bank accounts. This Note critiques financial institutions' use of an obscure credit reporting agency called ChexSystems. A bank reports an account to ChexSystems if it deems the account to be a "problem." Each bank has discretion as to what constitutes a "problem" account. Research has shown that this discretion has permitted banks to report accounts to ChexSystems for very modest sums. Problematically, if an applicant appears in ChexSystems when attempting to open a new account, evi- dence has shown that most banks would deny that applicanta checking accountfor a five-year period, effectively blacklisting the applicant from mainstream financial institutions. In turn, these rejectionsforce many families to rely on expensive alter- natives to meet their day-to-day financial needs. In this Note, James Marvin Pgrez posits that we must seriously question the banking industry's use of ChexSystems. In light of historicalbanking practices, Mr. Pirez argues that ChexSystems may act as a pretext for discriminatory behavior among banks to exclude unwanted clien- tele. Additionally, Mr. Pdrez explains that ChexSystems disportionately punishes many consumers who have made only trivial mistakes. He offers additionalfactors for a bank to consider other than an applicant's ChexSystems report when evalu- ating that applicantfor an account. -
The New Face of Payday Lending in Ohio
The New Face of Payday Lending in Ohio JEFFREY D. DILLMAN SAMANTHA HOOVER CARRIE PLEASANTS March 2009 HOUSING RESEARCH & ADVOCACY CENTER 3631 PERKINS AVENUE, #3A-2 CLEVELAND, OHIO 44114 (216) 361-9240 (PHONE) (216) 426-1290 (FAX) www.thehousingcenter.org About the Authors JEFFREY D. DILLMAN is the Executive Director of the Housing Research & Advocacy Center (the “Housing Center”). He received his J.D. from Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, and has practiced civil rights, consumer, and immigration law for over 18 years. SAMANTHA HOOVER is the Housing Center’s Fair Housing Research Associate. She is a graduate of Kent State University’s Honors College, earning dual Bachelor of Arts degrees in English and sociology, a certificate in Nonprofit/Human Services Management, and a Writing minor. CARRIE PLEASANTS is the Associate Director of the Housing Center. She received her M.A. in Geography, with an emphasis on Urban Geography, from Kent State University and has conducted a number of research projects at the Housing Center related to lending discrimination and impediments to fair housing. Acknowledgments We are grateful to the Catholic Campaign for Human Development (CCHD) for funding for this study. Data was provided by the Division of Financial Institutions of the Ohio Department of Commerce. About the Housing Research & Advocacy Center The Housing Research & Advocacy Center (the “Housing Center”) is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization whose mission is to eliminate housing discrimination and assure choice in Northeast Ohio by providing those at risk with effective information, intervention, and advocacy. The Housing Center works to achieve its mission through work in three primary areas: research and mapping, education and outreach, and enforcement of fair housing laws through testing and litigation.