U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Planning And Managing Security For Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement | By Edward Connors ILJ Institute for Law and Justice Alexandria, Virginia www.ilj.org Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement March 2007 Prepared for the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. Prepared by Edward Connors Institute for Law and Justice Alexandria, Virginia This project was supported by Cooperative Agreement #2004-CK-WX-K004 awarded by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions contained herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific companies, products, or services should not be considered an endorsement by the author or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues. v Executive Summary Background The U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) was directed by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, to submit a report to Congress on “best practices” developed by law enforcement to secure special events of national or regional importance, such as sporting events, concerts, and cultural exhibitions. The report, “Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement,” was prepared after a nationwide study that included: • Consultations with representatives of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other agencies charged with providing high levels of security for major national events. • Interviews with private security experts regarding such events as National Football League and National Basketball Association games. • On-site observations of security planning and management for the Republican and Democratic National Conventions, Kentucky Derby, and other major events. • Extensive telephone interviews with more than 40 local law enforcement agencies concerning best practices for securing major events in their jurisdictions. • Reviews of relevant security plans, reports, articles, guidelines, and other documents produced by experts in event security planning and management. Purpose of the Guidelines Report The guidelines report provides a framework to assist local law enforcement in planning and managing security for events that attract large numbers of people. It includes examples of best practices employed by federal agencies with security responsibilities, as well as strategies that have been effective for local law enforcement and private security. The focus is on national and regional events, which often include a variety of VIPs and may be targets for terrorists, other criminals, and protestors. The variety of approaches discussed can be tailored to large or small local special events. Challenges and Principles In planning and managing major special events, law enforcement must: • Plan for worst-case scenarios—extraordinary crimes, violence by protestors, a possible terrorist attack, natural disasters—but also be thoroughly prepared to deal with ordinary crimes and incidents (fights, drunkenness, etc.). • Weigh the security measures that conceivably could be taken (e.g., street closures, searches, highly visible tactical units) against the jurisdiction’s desire to produce events that are enjoyable, well attended, and profitable. • Ensure that the event continues safely and at the same time respect Constitutional rights, including freedom of speech and assembly. • Establish new and effective—but temporary—organizational arrangements, management structures, and methods of communication. Executive Summary vi • Ensure that the rest of the jurisdiction receives essential law enforcement services, regardless of the size or importance of the event. • Ensure that appropriate federal officials, such as DHS State Homeland Security Advisors, are informed in advance about events with national or international significance to guarantee federal awareness and possible support. The guidelines report offers principles for major event planning and management that recognize these challenges. The most obvious principle—one that many in law enforcement said cannot be overstated—is that timely, effective planning, communication, and training are critical. Pre-Event Planning Pre-event planning should begin 12-18 months before the date of the event, if possible. At the federal level, pre-event planning may begin two to three years prior to a major special event. Often, major national and regional events involve multiple federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Additional key partners include fire, emergency medical services (EMS), transportation, public works, health, and other public agencies and the private sector—businesses affected by the event, as well as private security. Leadership Authority and Structure Governing bodies must define events that require the highest levels of law enforcement attention to security. For example, the Secretary of DHS, after consultation with the Homeland Security Counsel, is responsible for designating National Special Security Events (NSSEs). NSSEs are significant domestic or international events, which, by virtue of their profile or status, represent a significant target, and warrant additional preparation, planning and mitigation efforts. By definition, an NSSE is an Incident of National Significance as defined by the National Response Plan. By Presidential directive, the U.S. Secret Service is the lead agency for the design and implementation of the operational security plan for the NSSE. The FBI is the lead federal agency for crisis management, counterterrorism, hostage rescue, and intelligence, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead federal agency for consequence management (response and recovery operations). Many special events are held on private property, with leadership shared among the venue owner/ private security and the local police and fire departments. Even when one law enforcement agency clearly has the lead and provides most of the resources—a July 4th celebration in a city park, for example—assistance from other law enforcement agencies may be needed (e.g., sheriff’s office for prisoner transport, county police for standby tactical support). Inter-agency Agreement. In multiple agency situations, a simple, straightforward memorandum of understanding (MOU) or agreement (MOA) should be signed. It is critical to clarify the legal authority of assisting agencies to enforce the law in the lead agency’s jurisdiction. This may not be covered by existing mutual aid agreements. For example, the Boston Police Department needed to involve many other law enforcement agencies to assist with the 2004 Democratic National Convention, but its existing mutual aid pacts covered only “emergencies” strictly defined as natural disasters. It needed help from the county sheriff to deputize outside law enforcement officers, military personnel, National Guard members, and others. The MOU or MOA should also enumerate the commitment of assisting agencies in providing personnel and equipment; state when and where other agencies’ officers should arrive and the specifics of their assignments (duty posts, shifts, etc.); and clarify any compensation for labor costs, expenses, and equipment incurred by the assisting agencies. Executive Summary vii ExecutiveTeam and Subcommittee Model. Most major event planning begins with creation of an executive team headed by the overall event security director who represents the lead law enforcement agency. This team typically involves top command level personnel from all partners in securing the event. Key tasks: • Identify all functional areas that need to be planned, create subcommittees to handle those areas, and issue timelines—who will plan what by when. • Review subcommittee operational plans to ensure that they are comprehensive, consistent, and realistic, and that contingency plans are in place for each major function. • Determine any changes needed in routine policies, practices, or laws (e.g., does the union contract permit 12-hour shifts to cover a major special event?). Subcommittees vary depending on the event, but 20 or more responsibility areas may be identified, including personnel resources; legal issues; communications; intelligence; field operations/venue safety and security; transportation/traffic; tactical support; fire/EMS/hospital services; prisoner processing; credentialing; media relations; training; budget and logistics; and after-action evaluation. Additional areas (especially for NSSEs) include airspace security; critical infrastructure/utilities; hazardous materials/ weapons of mass destruction; consequence management; crisis management; and cyber-security. Threat and Risk Assessments The FBI, DHS, and International Association of Assembly Managers are among the organizations that offer criteria for classifying special events according to threat levels and corresponding security levels. The FBI uses eight factors to arrive at four Special Event Readiness Levels (SERLs). The SERLs relate to anticipated levels of FBI support, but the eight factors are relevant to local law enforcement: size of event; threat (including known threats to the specific event); historical, political, or symbolic significance;