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Institutionalizing Ethnicity in the Western Balkans www.ssoar.info Institutionalizing ethnicity in the Western Balkans: managing change in deeply divided societies Bieber, Florian Arbeitspapier / working paper Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Bieber, F. (2004). Institutionalizing ethnicity in the Western Balkans: managing change in deeply divided societies. (ECMI Working Paper, 19). Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI). https://nbn-resolving.org/ urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-63152 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non- Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses This document is solely intended for your personal, non- Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. all copyright information and other information regarding legal Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie document in public. dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder conditions of use. anderweitig nutzen. Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an. Institutionalizing Ethnicity in the Western Balkans Managing Change in Deeply Divided Societies FLORIAN BIEBER ECMI Working Paper # 19 February 2004 EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MINORITY ISSUES (ECMI) Schiffbruecke 12 (Kompagnietor Building) D-24939 Flensburg Germany phone: +49-(0)461-14 14 9-0 fax: +49-(0)461-14 14 9-19 e-mail: [email protected] internet: http://www.ecmi.de ECMI Working Paper # 19 European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) Director: Marc Weller © European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) 2004. ISSN 1435-9812 The European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) is a non- partisan institution founded in 1996 by the Governments of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the German State of Schleswig-Holstein. ECMI was established in Flensburg, at the heart of the Danish-German border region, in order to draw from the encouraging example of peaceful coexistence between minorities and majorities achieved here. ECMI’s aim is to promote interdisciplinary research on issues related to minorities and majorities in a European perspective and to contribute to the improvement of interethnic relations in those parts of Western and Eastern Europe where ethnopolitical tension and conflict prevail. ECMI Working Papers are written either by the staff of ECMI or by outside authors commissioned by the Centre. As ECMI does not propagate opinions of its own, the views expressed in any of its publications are the sole responsibility of the author concerned. ECMI Working Paper # 19 European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) © ECMI 2004 CONTENTS Executive Summary...................................................................................................1 1. Introduction............................................................................................................1 2. The Legacy and Features of Institutionalized Ethnicity...........................................4 a) Historical Legacies.............................................................................................4 b) Features of Instiutionalized Ethnicity.................................................................5 3. Alternatives and Challenges to the Status Quo........................................................8 a) Conceptual and Procedural Critique....................................................................9 b) The Institutional Alternatives...........................................................................10 4. Mechanisms for Change.......................................................................................14 a) Facing Change..................................................................................................14 b) Local Ownership of the Negotiation Process....................................................16 c) Building Popular Support.................................................................................16 5. Institutional Reforms............................................................................................19 a) Rigid vs. Flexible Institutional Design..............................................................19 b) Avoiding Destructive Veto Rights....................................................................20 c) Representation cannot Replace Minority Rights...............................................22 d) Bringing in the Local Level..............................................................................23 6. Conclusions..........................................................................................................24 7. Bibliography........................................................................................................25 Annex: Group-Based Representation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia............................................................................................28 Institutionalizing Ethnicity in the Western Balkans Managing Change in Deeply Divided Societies Florian BIEBER* Executive Summary Ethnic politics continue to dominate political discourse and institutions in the post-conflict regions of former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia). This has rendered these regions dependent on external intervention and blocked or delayed political and economic development, including the process of integration into European and Euroatlantic structures. Some of the post-conflict arrangements have rightfully come under criticism—both from within and outside the region—as obstacles in the normalization of ethnic relations. While the status quo needs revision and a different approach to institutional design is required, this paper argues against abandoning group- based institutions altogether. Instead, it argues for a more dynamic and process- oriented approach to accommodate ever-changing interethnic relations. 1. Introduction More than a decade has passed since the wars in former Yugoslavia began. Nearly from the first day of the conflict, international mediators began proposing peace plans seeking to end the war and establish a post-conflict system of government, which would prevent the reoccurrence of the conflict. There has since been considerable experience with the post-conflict arrangements. The key focus of these arrangements has been the areas most affected by the wars and conflicts. The Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia-Herzegovina have been in place since early 1996, the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo1 and the Ohrid Framework Agreement for Macedonia since 2001. Beyond these three cases, Croatia concluded the temporary Erdut agreement in 1995 with Yugoslavia to allow for the re-integration of Eastern Slavonia, while Serbia and Montenegro have redefined their relations through the internationally brokered * This working paper contains the conclusions of the research conducted in the framework of the International Policy Fellowship of the Open Society Institute. I would like to thank the staff of the IPF program for its support. Earlier versions of this working paper was presented at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 15 October 2003; the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 8 October 2003, and Central European University, Budapest, 12 March 2003. I would like to thank Brendan O’Leary and Anna-Maria Biro for their comments. 1 The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 from 1999 provides for the international administration in post-war Kosovo, but does not spell out the details of governance in the region. 1 Belgrade Agreement of March 2002. In addition Croatia and Serbia have sought to improve their treatment of minorities since then end of the authoritarian Tudjman and Milošević regimes. Both the temporary measures of Croatia and the minority-related policies of Serbia and Croatia shall not be our prime focus of attention, as they lack one or several key features of the arrangements in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia: (a) substantial international involvement; (b) a medium- or long-term institutional arrangement, and (c) a post-conflict setting. The record of the post-conflict institutional (re-) design in Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina today is mixed at best. While peace is now the norm in former Yugoslavia, the countries and regions which emerged are marred by weak institutions which are often unable to undertaken the reforms necessary to bring the region closer to the European Union. Furthermore, ethnicity continues to be the primary political identity in most former conflict regions. Especially in the more diverse parts of former Yugoslavia, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina or Macedonia, ethnic affiliation often matters more than economic
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