James City Cavalry Picket Lines

Special Edition, April 2016 – Williamsburg, Virginia – http://www.jamescitycavalry.org

st Camp #2095 1 Brigade Virginia Division Army of Northern Virginia

A patriotic honor society dedicated to service and preserving the true history of the War Between The States.

The Lt. Colonel James Harvey Allen Memorial Scholarship

$1000 Historical Essay – 2016

“The Hampton Roads Peace Conference of February 3, 1865”

Sponsored by:

The James City Cavalry Camp 2095 Sons of Confederate Veterans

Additional Sponsorship Funding by:

The Williamsburg Civil War Roundtable

The Williamsburg Chapter of the United Daughters of the Confederacy

The Hampton Roads Peace Conference of February 3, 1865 ‘One Common Country or Two Divided Nations’

By Kayla Coghlan Jamestown High School

While peace was not the outcome, nor were any treaties signed between the Union and the Confederacy, the Hampton Roads Peace Conference moved the adversaries one step closer to the end of the war. Two strong leaders, President Lincoln of the North and President Da- vis of the South, struggled to find a solution for obtaining peace. The key difference for achieving this goal was due to Davis’ belief that they were two separate nations, and Lin- coln’s belief that the North and South were two side of the same coin. The differences be- tween the two figureheads prolonged the end of the war, but due to the informal conference, each side’s arguments were heard.

The Union and Confederacy were both ready for an end to the war, but in order to negotiate peace, President Lincoln would have to acknowledge the South as an independent nation. To do so would mean violating the “non-negotiation policy. . . . outlined in his 1863 Procla- mation of Amnesty and Reconstruction.”1 Jefferson Davis’ situation, however, was quite different as “the loss of the war meant a loss of honor” for himself. In addition, Davis knew that as the main figurehead of the rebelling side, the consequences of defeat would be steep. 2

Francis Blair, who had been advising U. S. Presidents for decades, hoped to contribute to the peace effort, and in mid-December he received Lincoln’s permission to go persuade “Davis to treat for peace and thereby end the war.” The beloved advisor then wrote two let- ters to be sent to Jefferson Davis. The first contained an irrelevant inquiry about missing title papers, while the other, more important letter, asked for the chance for them to meet and discuss the current position of the country. When this meeting finally occurred, Davis had no expectations and did not anticipate accomplishing much during the exchange. In contrast, Blair believed he could convince his old friend to join forces with the North in or- der to force the French out of Mexico, which would temporarily pause the current war. 3

Jefferson Davis, in response to his discussion with Francis Blair, stated that he “was willing now, and always had been, to enter into negotiation for ending the war by this or any other honorable method.” 4 Davis firmly believed that the Confederacy was not a part of the United States, and with this news, Blair was sent back to Washington carrying a note ad- dressed to Lincoln. The note proposed “a meeting between commissioners of both sides” to work towards peace. The two Presidents were engaged in a complex game; both wanted to find an end to the war, but they still disagreed about the South’s position, making it difficult to engage in peace negotiations. Lincoln responded to Davis’ proposal with a skillfully crafted remark, retorting that he would agree to meet with the men Davis appointed, but on- ly “with the view to securing peace to the people of our one common country.” 5 Essentially, Lincoln was once again refusing to negotiate with the South to show they were not an independent country, but he was willing to talk to the Confederacy in re- gards to the war. To further this stance, Lincoln told Blair to deliver a message to Davis: “I have constantly been, and am now, and shall continue, ready to receive any agent whom he, or any other influential person now resisting the national authority, may infor- mally send to me with the view of securing peace to the people of our one common country.” President Lincoln blatantly disregards Davis’ words referring to ‘two different sides’ to establish the Union’s connection to the rebelling South. He was not fighting an enemy, but simply attempting to reunite two halves of a whole nation. 6 With each side sticking firmly to their beliefs, they finally agreed to meet.

On February 3rd President Lincoln, accompanied by Secretary of State William Seward, met with the three men appointed by President Davis: Vice President Alexander Ste- phens, President pro tem of the Senate R. M. T. Hunter and former U. S. Supreme Court Justice and current Assistant Secretary of War John Campbell. Davis chose his 3 key po- litical enemies as the commissioners knowing that if the conference failed they could not complain and rail against him since they were the negotiators. 7 The conference took place informally over a four hour duration on, General Grant’s steamboat, the River Queen. President Lincoln was pleased to see Alexander Stephens, his companion from the Whig Party before the war, among the commissioners. 8 Their small talk and stories created a comfortable atmosphere for the conference.

When the conference began, Lincoln was asked by Stephens if there was a solution to ending the war. Lincoln reiterated his ‘one common nation’ argument yet again, bluntly reminding them “that it could be done only if those resisting the Union ceased their re- sistance.” The heavy emphasis on resistance contradicted Davis’ opinions, on being sep- arate nations entirely. Then, when probed about Reconstruction, “Lincoln again tersely informed the commissioners that reunion could be achieved simply by the Southern states disbanding their armies and permitting federal authorities to resume their func- tions.” 9 In contrast to Lincoln’s one sided argument, Stephens proposed an alternate solution. He believed if the Union and Confederate sides were to unite against a com- mon enemy, in this case the French, which was previously suggested by Francis Blair, then the tension between the two sides of the war might temporarily be resolved. 10 Unfortunately, this short term solution never occurred.

The second crucial debate was over slavery, which had special importance since the thir- teenth amendment was well on its way to being ratified. Seward, who “had lobbied strongly for the amendment,” explicitly stated “that there would be no compromise on the slavery is- sue.” The South must accept the amendment. Since slavery was a pillar of the Southern economy and a major factor leading to our Civil War, this news was of particular interest. Seward wished to “entice” the Confederates, explaining that if they were to rejoin the Union, then they could possibly obtain enough votes to delay the ratification date of the amendment. 11 Lincoln noted that he favored compensation for the slaves but Congress would have to ap- prove monies for those payments. 12 During this meeting, however, no agreements were made and the issue remained unresolved.

Ultimately, since no documents were signed at the time, everything that was discussed dur- ing the Hampton Roads Peace Conference was merely that, a discussion. The war did not immediately end, nor did the two sides find peace through this event, but each side was able to calmly listen to the opposing side’s arguments. The viewpoints remained unchanged be- tween Lincoln and Davis, but peace would eventually be realized on April 9, 1865, with the first surrender of a major Confederate army, just two short months after the Hampton Roads Peace Conference.

Footnotes: 1. Harris, William C., “The Hampton Roads Peace Conference: A Final Test of Lincoln’s Presi- dential Leadership”, Michigan Publishing, 2000, Web. 2. Goodwin, Doris K., Team of Rivals, New York, 2006, p.694. 3. Foote, Shelby, The Civil War – A Narrative,New York, 1974, Vol. 3 p.779. 4. Foote, p.771. 5. Rafuse, E. S., Hampton Roads Conference, Encyclopedia Virginia, Virginia Foundation of Humanities, 29 March 2011, Web. 6. Foote, p.772. 7. Foote, p. 766-768, 772. 8. Rafuse, Web. 9. Harris, Web. 10. Goodwin, p. 693. 11. Lehrman, Lewis, “Hampton Roads Conference – Abraham Lincoln” The Lehrman Insti- tute, n.d. Web. 12. Foote, p. 777.