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HOW to WIN the WAR of IDEAS Lessons from the Gramscian Right

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HOW to WIN the WAR of IDEAS Lessons from the Gramscian Right Susan George HOW TO WIN THE WAR OF IDEAS Lessons from the Gramscian Right In Greek the hegemon is the leader, and from ket-dominated, iniquitous world is neither there it’s just a linguistic hop, skip, and jump to natural nor inevitable, then it should be pos- the notion of rule, authority, and dominance ex- sible to build a counter-project for a different pressed by the word “hegemony.” Traditionally, kind of world. the term was reserved for states. In the 1920s and 1930s, the great Italian Marxist thinker An- Exclusion and Ideology tonio Gramsci took the concept further, using it to explain how one class could establish its lead- The late twentieth century could be dubbed the ership over others through ideological domi- Age of Exclusion. It’s now clear that the “free nance. Whereas orthodox Marxism explained market,” which increasingly determines politi- nearly everything by economic forces, Gramsci cal and social as well as economic priorities, added the crucial cultural dimension. He showed cannot embrace everyone. The market’s job is how, once ideological authority—or “cultural he- not to provide jobs, much less social cohesion. gemony”—is established, the use of violence to It has no place for the growing numbers of people impose change can become superfluous. who contribute little or nothing to production Today, few would deny that we live under or consumption. The market operates for the the virtually undisputed rule of the market-domi- benefit of a minority. nated, ultracompetitive, globalized society with The Age of Exclusion engenders myriad so- its cortège of manifold iniquities and everyday cial ills with which various humanitarian and violence. Have we got the hegemony we deserve? charitable agencies, established in an earlier era, I think we have, and by “we” I mean the pro- vainly attempt to cope. Vainly, because they have gressive movement, or what’s left of it. Obvi- failed to understand that their projects and pro- ously I don’t deny the impact of economic forces grams exist in an ideological context that sys- or of political events like the end of the cold tematically frustrates their aims. war in shaping our lives and our societies, but The now-dominant economic doctrine, of here I intend to concentrate on the war of ideas which widespread exclusion is a necessary ele- that has been tragically neglected by the “side ment, did not descend from heaven. It has, of the angels.” Many public and private institu- rather, been carefully nurtured over decades, tions that genuinely believe they are working through thought, action, and propaganda; for a more equitable world have contributed to bought and paid for by a closely knit fraternity the triumph of neoliberalism or have passively (they mostly are men) who stand to gain from allowed this triumph to occur. its rule. If this judgment sounds harsh, positive An earlier version of this doctrine was called conclusions may still be drawn from it. The “laissez-faire”; today Americans speak of Rule of the Right is the result of a concerted, neoconservatism, Europeans of neoliberalism, long-term ideological effort on the part of and the French of “la pensée unique” (the domi- identifiable actors. If we recognize that a mar- nant or single mindset). I shall use SUMMER • 1997 • 47 The War of Ideas “neoliberalism,” bearing in mind that the mod- Clearly, ideas have consequences—after all, ern version of the doctrine is far removed from Margaret Thatcher proudly proclaimed her al- that of such great “liberal” political economists legiance to the ideas of Hayek, and most eco- as Adam Smith or David Ricardo. Neoliberals nomics students who go on to occupy policy po- pretend to follow these illustrious predecessors, sitions have been trained in the neoliberal cur- but in fact betray their spirit and ignore their ricula. One conservative scholar sums up the moral and social teachings. doctrine thus: “Individual freedom is the ulti- mate social ideal; governmental power, while A Half Century of History necessary, must be limited and decentralized. Interventionism is baneful and dangerous. Eco- The victory of neoliberalism is the result of fifty nomic freedom, that is, capitalism, is an indis- years of intellectual work, now widely reflected pensable condition for political liberty.” in the media, politics, and the programs of in- Neoliberals reject the notion that individual ternational organizations. Reaganism, Thatch- freedom might depend on democracy and the erism, and the Fall of the Wall are often credit- rule of law, guaranteed by the state. For them, ed (or blamed) for this state of affairs and they such “guarantees” are nothing but chains. To have, indeed, made neoliberals more arrogant, be free is to be free from the state. The indi- but there is much more to the story than that. vidual is entirely responsible for his economic Fifty years ago, in the wake of World War and social fate; this implies that disparities will II, neoliberalism had no place in the mainstream necessarily exist. But this is good. As Thatcher political debate. Its few champions preached to put it, “It is our job to glory in inequality and each other or in the desert—everyone else was see that talents and abilities are given vent and a Keynesian, a social/Christian democrat or expression for the benefit of us all.” some shade of Marxist. Overturning that con- text required intellectual tenacity and political planning—but it also took the passivity of a self- In the early days of the neoliberal renaissance, satisfied majority. If there are three kinds of such ideas may have seemed utopian, since they people—those who make things happen, those were antagonistic to the spirit of the New Deal who watch things happen, and those who never and the welfare state. Neoliberals understood, knew what hit them—neoliberals belong to the however, that to transform the economic, po- first category and most progressives to the lat- litical, and social landscape they first had to ter two. The left remained complacent until, sud- change the intellectual and psychological one. denly, it was too late. For ideas to become part of the daily life of The American founding fathers of people and society, they must be propagated neoliberalism thus held few cards at the outset, through books, magazines, journals, confer- but they believed in a crucial principle: Ideas ences, professional associations, and so on. If Have Consequences—the title of a 1948 book some ideas are to become more fashionable than by Richard Weaver that was to have a long and others, they must be financed: it takes money to fruitful career. build intellectual infrastructures and to promote Weaver’s conservative writings were pub- a worldview. lished by the University of Chicago Press, as were When these foundations have been carefully the works of exiled Austrian philosopher-econo- laid and built upon, views that once seemed mist Friedrich von Hayek and the brilliant young minoritarian, elitist, even morally repugnant will economist Milton Friedman. Today the “Chicago gradually become predominant, especially School” is famous: its economic, social, and po- among decision makers. Press, radio, and tele- litical views have spread throughout the world. vision can be guided to follow the lead of the In General Pinochet’s Chile, Chicago-trained more specialized or erudite media. Impercepti- economists were the first to apply el tratamiento bly, nearly everyone will come to feel that cer- de chock (shock treatment) based on freedom for tain ideas are normal, natural, part of the air we business but repression for labor. breathe. 48 • DISSENT The War of Ideas Manufacturing Ideology Heritage’s success has inspired the creation of thirty-seven mini-Heritages across the United The neoliberals thus conceived their strategy, States, creating synergy, an illusion of diversity, recruiting and rewarding thinkers and writers, and the impression that experts quoted actually raising funds to found and to sustain a broad represent a broad spectrum of views. range of institutions at the forefront of the “con- • Smaller think tanks include the venerable servative revolution.” This revolution began in Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and the United States but, like the rest of American Peace, founded at Stanford University in Cali- culture, has spread across the world. The doc- fornia in 1919 to study communism. In 1960, it trines of the International Monetary Fund, the added an economic program to its cold war vo- World Bank, and the World Trade Organization cation. The Cato Institute in Washington is lib- are indistinguishable from those of the neoliberal ertarian, advocating minimalist government and credo. Here are some capsule profiles of some specializing in studies on privatization; the Man- of the most influential intellectual institutions hattan Institute for Policy Research, founded in or think tanks. 1978 by William Casey, who later became di- • The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) was rector of the Central Intelligence Agency, spe- founded in 1943 by a group of anti-New Deal cializes in the critique of government income- businessmen. It pioneered intellectual public re- redistribution programs. lations in the 1950s and 1960s, working directly A revolving door between government and with members of Congress, the federal bureau- conservative think tanks allowed former Nixon cracy, and the media. In the 1980s, AEI’s aver- or Reagan/Bush staffers to find homes outside age budget was $14 million; it employed some of government during the Carter and Clinton 150 people. One of its most successful fund-rais- presidencies (although one wonders why they ing campaigns was launched by the Secretary of needed to move: Clinton’s position on welfare Defense in the Pentagon dining room. In the is virtually indistinguishable from that of the 1990s, the annual budget has dropped to around neoliberal think tanks, constituting another vic- $8 to $10 million, but AEI still produces a steady tory for them).
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