DOCSLIB.ORG

Russian Outlook Plex, Often Painful, and Always Fateful Choices National Patriots and to Reap a Political Windfall Made by the First Post-Communist Regime

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Russian Outlook Plex, Often Painful, and Always Fateful Choices National Patriots and to Reap a Political Windfall Made by the First Post-Communist Regime Spring 1998 Russia’s New Foreign Policy By Leon Aron Few propositions about today’s world can be stated “national patriotic” plurality in the Duma (the with greater certainty: never in the four and a half lower house of the Russian Parliament), which centuries of the modern Russian state has there early in 1996 “annulled” the 1991 Belavezhskie been a Russia less imperialist, less militarized, less agreements formalizing the dissolution of the threatening to its neighbors and the world, and Soviet Union. This deafening chorus is led daily more susceptible to the Western ideals and prac- by the flagships of Communist and nationalist tices than the Russia we see today. media—Pravda, Sovetskaya Rossia and Zavtra, with a combined daily press run of more than Although obvious even to a person with only a half a million—and by the nearly 300 local pro- cursory acquaintance with Russian history, this Communist newspapers. state of affairs results from a long series of com- Yet even when the chance to propitiate the Russian Outlook plex, often painful, and always fateful choices national patriots and to reap a political windfall made by the first post-Communist regime. Some by adopting a rigid and hostile stance was handed of the most critical decisions were made between to President Boris Yeltsin on a silver platter, the 1991 and 1996, when Russia was reeling from Kremlin passed—as in the case of the North economic depression, hyperinflation, pain of Atlantic Treaty Organization expansion. After market reforms, and postimperial trauma. Many much blustering, Yeltsin chose to sign the NATO- a nation, even in incomparably milder circum- Russia Founding Act and to accommodate the stances, succumbed to the temptation of making United States and its partners rather than to repeat nationalism the linchpin of national unity and (even if rhetorically) the cold war. “It already hap- cohesion at the time of dislocation and disarray. pened more than once that we, the East and the From Argentina to China, Malaysia, and Indone- West, failed to find a chance to reconcile,” Yeltsin sia, in various degrees of crudeness and militancy, said in February 1997, when the final negotiations countries have recently resorted to the palliative with NATO began. “This chance must not be of nationalism to dull the pain of market reforms missed.” The leader of the national-patriotic oppo- or reversals of economic fortune. sition and the chairman of the Communist Party of In Russia, too, retrenchment and truculence the Russian Federation, Gennady Zyuganov called were urged by leftist nationalists inside and out- the founding act “unconditional surrender” and a side the Supreme Soviet and, since 1995, by the “betrayal of Russia’s interests.” Leon Aron is a resident scholar at the American A Historic Disarmament Enterprise Institute. Another version of this essay was published in the April 20 Weekly Standard. For more information on the subject, see Leon Aron, This instance was emblematic of a broader strat- “The Foreign Policy Doctrine of Post-Communist egy of post-Communist Russia. Between 1992 Russia and Its Domestic Context,” in Michael Man- delbaum, ed., The New Russian Foreign Policy, Coun- and 1995, Moscow implemented all Gorbachev’s cil on Foreign Relations, May 1998. commitments and completed contraction of the 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 202.862.5800 www.aei.org - 2 - empire inherited from the Soviet Union—a contrac- reduction of the armed forces by 500,000 men, to 1.2 mil- tion remarkable for being undertaken in peacetime and lion. A week later, the minister of defense, General Igor voluntarily. On September 1, 1994, when the last Russ- Rodionov, referred to himself as the “minister of a disinte- ian units left Germany, most troops had already been grating army and a dying fleet.” removed from Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Repub- At the same time, Yeltsin promised what surely will be lic. In four years, Russia repatriated (frequently without the coup de grâce of Russian militarism: the ending of the homes for officers or jobs for their spouses) 800,000 draft and the institution of an all-volunteer armed force of troops, 400,000 civilian personnel, and 500,000 family 600,000 by the year 2000. Even though this plan almost members. certainly will take longer than three years to implement, a Even as Moscow publicly and loudly linked its retreat mere talk by the Russian leader about ending almost two from Estonia to the granting of full civil and political centuries of conscription epitomized the distance that the rights to the ethnic Russians there, it quietly continued new country put between herself and the traditional Russ- to withdraw. In two years, between the end of 1991 and ian (let alone Soviet) militarized state. In the meantime, the last months of 1993, the number of Russian troops in following the Supreme Court’s October 1995 decision Estonia diminished from 35,000—50,000 to 3,000. The that allowed local judges to rule on constitutional matters, departure of the last Russian soldier from the Paldiski Russian judges have thrown out dozens of cases brought submarine training base in Estonia in September 1995 by the army against the “deserters” who exercised their marked the end of Russian presence in East-Central constitutional right to alternative civil service. Europe. The lands acquired and held during two and a The extent of the rout of the formerly invincible half centuries of Russian and Soviet imperial conquests defense sector became evident in the twelve months were restored to the former captive nations. Russia following the 1996 presidential election. An often sick returned to its seventeenth-century borders. president fired two defense ministers, the head of the Unfolding in parallel was demilitarization, historically general staff, and the commanders of the paratroop and unprecedented in speed and scope. Reduction is a ridicu- space forces, and he ordered the retirement of 500 gen- lous euphemism for the methodical starvation, depreda- erals from the immensely bloated Russian field officers tion, and strangulation to which Yeltsin has subjected the corps. Soviet armed forces and the military-industrial complex. No other Russian or Soviet leader, not even Stalin, In a few years, the Russian defense sector—the country’s attempted to remove at the same time as many pillars of omnipotent overlord, the source of national pride, the the national defense establishment for the fear of desta- master of the country’s choicest resources and of the liveli- bilizing the regime (to say nothing of risking one’s hoods of one-third of the Russian population—was neck). With the 40 million votes that he received on reduced to a neglected and humiliated beggar. July 3, 1996, Yeltsin apparently felt no fear. Dictator- Begun with an 80 percent decrease in defense procure- ships and autocracies depend on the army’s good graces; ment ordered by Yegor Gaidar in 1992, the decline in the democracies (even young and imperfect) can afford to share of the Russian gross domestic product spent on the be far less solicitous. military continued from at least 20 percent to 5 percent— 7 percent today. Yeltsin promised to reduce it to 3 percent The Rationale of Disarmament by the year 2000. According to Sergei Rogov, a leading Russian expert and the director of the USA and Canada Russia’s historic disarmament results from political and Institute, the 1996 expenditures for organization and economic democratization, not from a weak economy, as maintenance of Russian armed forces were at least 2.5 often suggested—as if national priorities are determined times lower than in 1990, for procurement and military by economists and as if, throughout human history, eco- construction 9 times, and for research and development nomic rationale has not been invariably and completely 10 times. When, in May 1997, the government imple- overridden by fear, hatred, wounded national honor, mented an across-the-board spending cut (“sequestering”), messianic fervor, or a dictator’s will. In our own century, defense was again hit the hardest: its already delayed where was a “strong economy” and excess wealth in the funding was reduced by another 20 percent. Soviet Union in the 1930s and after World War II; in Along the way, the Russian army shrank from around 4 Vietnam between the 1950s and the 1980s; in Cuba million in January 1992 to about 1.7 million by late 1996. since the 1960s; in Ethiopia under Comrade Mengistu; In July 1997, Yeltsin signed several decrees mandating a in an Armenia fighting for Nagorny-Karabakh; in a - 3 - Pakistan developing a nuclear arsenal; or in an Iraq expect any time soon a reversal in the enormous Chi- starving its people to produce the mother of all weapons? nese military buildup and modernization, helped by a No, the shrinking of the Russian military is due to the burgeoning economy and fueled by resurgent national- weakening of the Russian state’s grip on the economy and ism, with which China, unlike Russia, chose to anchor to the constraints imposed on imperialism, aggressiveness, and unite the nation during its dizzying economic and brutality by public opinion, the free mass media, and transformation. competitive politics, which have forced the Kremlin to Historically, the key feature of a transition from a end the war in Chechnya. Tardy in bestowing on Russia traditional to a modern society and from a village- to its other blessings, Russian democracy has already made an urban-based economy was the “disposal” of surplus high defense expenditures and violent imperial projects peasantry. Everywhere this process was attended with quite difficult to sustain. enormous societal convulsions, revolutions, violence, Most fundamentally, Russian demilitarization is a con- and cruelty (England showing the way.) For Russia, the sequence of rearranged national priorities, of a change in problem was “resolved” by the terror of Stalin’s collec- the criteria of greatness, and of society’s gradual liberation tivization and industrialization.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Russia's 2012 Presidential Election
    Russia’s 2012 Presidential Election: Yet Another Term for Putin? By Paweł Piotr Styrna l February 27, 2012 The next presidential election in post-Soviet Russia is scheduled for March 4, 2012. The roster of candidates Russian voters can choose from is rather limited, both in terms of the number of candidates and their backgrounds. The upcoming contest pits five candidates against each other: the Sovietonostalgic chekist, Vladimir Putin; the unreconstructed and unrepentant communist, Gennady Zyuganov; the socialist - and long-time Chairman of the Federation Council (Russia’s upper house) - Sergey Mironov, the nominee of the “Just Russia” Party; the infamous, rabid chauvinist, Vladimir Zhirinovsky; and the “independent” oligarch, Mikhail Prokhorov. Not surprisingly, all these men embody different, yet often overlapping, facets of post-communism. One will notice the conspicuous and telling absence of a conservative, Christian, anti-communist alternative of the Alexander Solzhenitsyn variety. This seems to correspond with what some have argued to constitute one of the essential features of post-communism (particularly in the former USSR), i.e. an ostensible political pluralism serving as a façade, disguising an establishment jealously guarding the post-communist status quo, and attempting to marginalize threats to it. Thus, the faux pluralism appears designed to cater to multiple ideological persuasions in society without jeopardizing the main continuities between communism-proper and post-communism, not to mention the privileges, perks, and golden parachutes retained or acquired by the post-communist oligarchy. This is not to claim that the post-bolshevik establishment is a monolith or that no spheres of freedom exist, but that these are significantly limited.
    [Show full text]
  • Why Gennady Zyuganov's Communist Party Finished First 187
    Why Gennady Zyuganov 's Communist Party Finished First ALEXANDER S. TSIPKO t must be said that the recent Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) victory in the Duma elections was not a surprise. All Russian Isociologists predicted Gennady Zyuganov's victory four months before the elections on 17 December 1995. The KPRF, competing against forty-two other parties and movements, was expected to receive slightly more than 20 percent of the votes (it received 21.7 percent) and more than fifty deputy seats according to single-mandate districts (it received fifty-eight). Before the elections, there were obvious signals that the vote would go to the KPRF. It was expected that the older generation would vote for the KPRF. The pensioners, who suffered the most damage from shock therapy, would most certainly vote for members representing the ancién regime (for social guarantees, work, and security; things the former social system gave them). Even before the elections, the image of the KPRF as a real party had been formed. In my opinion, the victory of the KPRF in the elections is a critical event in Russia's post-Soviet history, which demands both more attention and clearer comprehension. The simplistic reason often given for the KPRF victory was the sudden introduction of the monetarist method of reform, which resulted in an inevitable leftward shift in the mood of society and a restoration of neo-communism. The heart of the problem is not so simple and orderly-it is found in Russian affairs and in Russian nature. First of all, it is evident that the Duma election victory of KPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov has a completely different moral and political meaning than the victory of the neo-communist party of Aleksander Kwasniewski in the November 1995 Polish presidential elections.
    [Show full text]
  • Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Putin's
    LEGISLATURES, COOPTATION, AND SOCIAL PROTEST IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA An NCEEER Working Paper by Ora John Reuter Graeme B. Robertson National Council for Eurasian and East European Research University of Washington Box 353650 Seattle, WA 98195 [email protected] http://www.nceeer.org/ TITLE VIII PROGRAM Project Information* Principal Investigator: Ora John Reuter NCEEER Contract Number: 827-10g Date: October 10, 2013 Copyright Information Individual researchers retain the copyright on their work products derived from research funded through a contract or grant from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER). However, the NCEEER and the United States Government have the right to duplicate and disseminate, in written and electronic form, reports submitted to NCEEER to fulfill Contract or Grant Agreements either (a) for NCEEER’s own internal use, or (b) for use by the United States Government, and as follows: (1) for further dissemination to domestic, international, and foreign governments, entities and/or individuals to serve official United States Government purposes or (2) for dissemination in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act or other law or policy of the United States Government granting the public access to documents held by the United States Government. Neither NCEEER nor the United States Government nor any recipient of this Report may use it for commercial sale. * The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract or grant funds provided by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, funds which were made available by the U.S. Department of State under Title VIII (The Soviet-East European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended).
    [Show full text]
  • Berezovsky-Judgment.Pdf
    Neutral Citation Number: [2012] EWHC 2463 (Comm) Royal Courts of Justice Rolls Building, 7 Rolls Buildings, London EC4A 1NL Date: 31st August 2012 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE Case No: 2007 Folio 942 QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION COMMERCIAL COURT IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE Claim Nos: HC08C03549; HC09C00494; CHANCERY DIVISION HC09C00711 Before: MRS JUSTICE GLOSTER, DBE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Between: Boris Abramovich Berezovsky Claimant - and - Roman Arkadievich Abramovich Defendant Boris Abramovich Berezovsky Claimant - and - Hine & Others Defendants - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Laurence Rabinowitz Esq, QC, Richard Gillis Esq, QC, Roger Masefield Esq, Simon Colton Esq, Henry Forbes-Smith Esq, Sebastian Isaac Esq, Alexander Milner Esq, and Ms. Nehali Shah (instructed by Addleshaw Goddard LLP) for the Claimant Jonathan Sumption Esq, QC, Miss Helen Davies QC, Daniel Jowell Esq, QC, Andrew Henshaw Esq, Richard Eschwege Esq, Edward Harrison Esq and Craig Morrison Esq (instructed by Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP) for the Defendant Ali Malek Esq, QC, Ms. Sonia Tolaney QC, and Ms. Anne Jeavons (instructed by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP) appeared for the Anisimov Defendants to the Chancery Actions David Mumford Esq (instructed by Macfarlanes LLP) appeared for the Salford Defendants to the Chancery Actions Jonathan Adkin Esq and Watson Pringle Esq (instructed by Signature Litigation LLP) appeared for the Family Defendants to the Chancery Actions Hearing dates: 3rd – 7th October 2011; 10th – 13th October 2011; 17th – 19th October 2011; 24th & 28th October 2011; 31st October – 4th November 2011; 7th – 10th November 2011; 14th - 18th November 2011; 21st – 23 November 2011; 28th November – 2nd December 2011; 5th December 2011; 19th & 20th December 2011; 17th – 19th January 2012.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia: Political Parties in a 'Managed Democracy'
    At a glance December 2014 Russia: political parties in a 'managed democracy' From the October 1917 Bolshevik Revolution until 1989, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the country's only legal party. Since then, the number has grown, with a record 69 parties participating in the September 2014 regional elections. However, this apparent diversity does not mean that Russian voters have a real choice, as Vladimir Putin's grip on power is increasingly unchallenged, gradually reversing the gains made in the post-1989 democratisation process. United Russia – the 'party of power' (UR) In an inversion of the usual democratic procedure whereby political parties choose their leaders, the party was set up in 1999 to mobilise support for Vladimir Putin, at the time serving as prime minister under Boris Yeltsin. (Initially it went by the name of Unity, but was renamed United Russia after a merger in 2001). Thanks to the popularity of Putin's strong action on Chechnya, UR quickly became the dominant party in both national and most regional parliaments. It has held onto its majority in the lower house of the national parliament (State Duma) ever since 2003, despite a large drop in its share of the vote in 2011 (from 64% to 49%). Regional elections held in September 2014, in which UR-nominated candidates won in 28 out of 30 provinces, suggest that UR's grip on power is likely to remain as firm as ever for the foreseeable future. Ideology: in its manifestos, UR advocates centrist policies which will appeal to the largest possible number of voters while remaining consistent with the government's general approach – economic liberalism but with state regulation and social protection, alongside an emphasis on conservative values and patriotism.
    [Show full text]
  • Not Free 5.5
    Russia | Freedom House Page 1 of 4 About Us DONATE Blog Contact Us Reports Programs Initiatives News Experts Events Donate FREEDOM IN THE WORLD - View another year - Russia Russia Freedom in the World 2012 - Select year - OVERVIEW: 2012 SCORES President Dmitry Medvedev announced in September 2011 that he would not seek reelection in 2012 so STATUS that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin could return to the presidency. Putin had changed titles in 2008 to avoid violating the constitutional ban on serving more than two consecutive terms as president. Heavy Not Free manipulation of State Duma elections in early December barely preserved United Russia’s majority in the lower house of parliament, as voters apparently sought to punish the ruling party by casting ballots for FREEDOM RATING three Kremlin-approved opposition groups. In the weeks following the vote, tens of thousands of antigovernment demonstrators turned out to protest electoral fraud and official corruption in an 5.5 unprecedented Putin-era display of peaceful dissent. Also during the year, insurgent and other violence originating in the North Caucasus continued, with a high-profile attack on Moscow’s Domodedovo airport CIVIL LIBERTIES in January. 5 With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Russian Federation emerged as an independent POLITICAL RIGHTS state under the leadership of President Boris Yeltsin. In 1993, Yeltsin used force to thwart an attempted coup by parliamentary opponents of radical reform, after which voters approved a new constitution establishing a powerful 6 presidency and a bicameral national legislature, the Federal Assembly. The 1995 parliamentary elections featured strong support for the Communist Party and ultranationalist forces.
    [Show full text]
  • On December 31, 1999,Yeltsin's Russia Became Putin's Russia
    PROLOGUE n December 31, 1999,Yeltsin’s Russia became Putin’s Russia. Boris Yeltsin—a political maverick who until the end tried to Oplay the mutually exclusive roles of democrat and tsar, who made revolutionary frenzy and turmoil his way of survival—unexpect- edly left the Kremlin and handed over power, like a New Year’s gift, to Vladimir Putin, an unknown former intelligence officer who had hardly ever dreamed of becoming a Russian leader. Yeltsin—tired and sick, disoriented and having lost his stamina— apparently understood that he could no longer keep power in his fist. It was a painful and dramatic decision for a politician for whom nonstop struggle for power and domination was the substance of life and his main ambition. His failing health and numerous heart attacks, however, were not the main reasons behind his unexpected resignation. The moment came when Yeltsin could not control the situation much longer and—more important—he did not know how to deal with the new challenges Russia was facing. He had been accustomed to making breakthroughs, to defeating his enemies, to overcoming obstacles. He was not prepared for state building, for the effort of everyday governance, for consensus making, for knitting a new national unity. By nature he was a terminator, not a transformational leader. It was time for him to gra- ciously bow out and hand over power to his successor. And Russia had to live through a time of real suspense while the Kremlin was preparing the transfer of power. The new Russian leader Vladimir Putin has become a symbol of a staggering mix of continuity and change.
    [Show full text]
  • The Nature of Mass Communist Beliefs in Postcommunist Russian
    CSD Center for the Study of Democracy An Organized Research Unit University of California, Irvine www.democ.uci.edu Mass Politics in Postcommunist Russia: An Introduction The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Communist Party political rule in 1991 has led to dramatic change for political regimes across the former Soviet region. 1 In an area once distinguished for its uniformity of single-party politics, regimes varying from robust democracies to reconstituted dictatorships have taken root. While scholars have made extensive contributions to our understanding of the institutional factors that influenced these outcomes, as well as the impact of particular institutional legacies on postcommunist reform, less attention has been paid to the impact of communist legacies on the mass political mind. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a democratizing regime in Russia during the 1990s raise several questions about the contours of Russian political space: Do Russians have structured beliefs that motivate political behavior? Is there any ideology guiding Russian mass political beliefs? How has seventy years of Communist Party rule affected Russian political attitudes? Although Russia’s postcommunist political history has not been characterized by a smooth transition to democracy,2 it would be misguided to assume that the mass political mind in Russia shares a uniform taste in favor of authoritarian political and economic relations—despite popular rhetoric to this end. In fact, there is little empirical basis to assume much of anything about the underlying contours of the political predispositions of the Russian public and the impact of Communist Party rule on shaping Russian opinions towards political, economic, and social organization.
    [Show full text]
  • Report on the Russian Presidential Elections March 26, 2000
    106th CONGRESS Printed for the use of the 2nd Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe REPORT ON THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS MARCH 26, 2000 A Report Prepared by the Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe WASHINGTON:2000 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 234 Ford House Office Building Washington, DC 20515-6460 (202) 225-1901 [email protected] http://www.house.gov/csce/ LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS HOUSE SENATE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado, Co-Chairman FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas MATT SALMON, Arizona SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas STENY H. HOYER, Maryland FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland BOB GRAHAM, Florida LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin MICHAEL P. FORBES, New York CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS HAROLD HONGJU KOH, Department of State EDWARD L. WARNER III, Department of Defense PATRICK A. MULLOY, Department of Commerce COMMISSION STAFF DOROTHY DOUGLAS TAFT, Chief of Staff RONALD J. MCNAMARA, Deputy Chief of Staff BEN ANDERSON, Communications Director OREST DEYCHAKIWSKY, Staff Advisor JOHN F. FINERTY, Staff Advisor CHADWICK R. GORE, Staff Advisor ROBERT HAND, Staff Advisor JANICE HELWIG, Staff Advisor MARLENE KAUFMANN, Counsel KAREN S. LORD, Counsel for Freedom of Religion MICHELE MADASZ, Office Administrator MICHAEL OCHS, Staff Advisor ERIKA B. SCHLAGER, Counsel for International Law MAUREEN WALSH, General Counsel ii ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION (OSCE) The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki process, traces its origin to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the leaders of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia Presidential Pre-Election Assessment Report March 20, 2000
    I R I Advancing Democracy Worldwide RUSSIA PRESIDENTIAL PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT REPORT MARCH 20, 2000 INTRODUCTION For the second time in just over three months, the Russian electorate will go to the polls in a national election. On March 26, 2000, Russia will hold its third democratic election for president and complete an election cycle that began with the State Duma election of December 19, 1999. This election is being held earlier than was initially scheduled (June 2000) due to the surprise resignation of then-President Boris Yeltsin on December 31, 1999. In preparation for the post-Yeltsin era, the Kremlin has undertaken a well-orchestrated campaign to ensure the transfer of power to its own hand-picked candidate. The State Duma election was used by the Kremlin as a means to remove all serious opponents for the presidential election. Prior to the start of the campaign for the State Duma in August 1999, presidential aspirants former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov were polling 22 percent and 9 percent respectively (polls by Public Opinion Foundation.) Considering both potential candidates were leaders of the broad-based Fatherland-All Russia alliance and had no intention of running against each other, either of their candidacies was considered extremely formidable. Now eight months later, neither Primakov nor Luzhkov is running and the Kremlin’s candidate of choice – acting President Vladimir Putin – sits atop the polls with an approval rating around 59 percent (VCIOM -- All Russia Center for Public Opinion.) If nothing else has been proven in this campaign cycle, it is that the Kremlin is still the most formidable campaign organization in Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia Insights from a Changing Country
    European European Union Union Institute for Institute for Security Studies Security Studies Russia Insights from a changing country Report N° 11 February 2012 Edited by Sabine Fischer Contributors: Nabi Abdullaev, Mikhail Krutikhin, Aleksandr Kynev, European Union Institute for Security Studies Lilia Ovcharova, Simon Saradzhyan, Andrei Zagorski, Natalia Zubarevich www.iss.europa.eu • [email protected] This EUISS Report features contributions from a group of Russian authors with out- standing expertise on important Russian domestic and foreign policy issues. They all contributed analytical papers to the Institute’s ‘Russia Insights’ series, which were published online during the weeks before the parliamentary and presidential elec- tions. Institute for Security Studies 100, avenue de Suffren 75015 Paris tel.: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 30 fax: +33 (0)1 56 89 19 31 [email protected] http://www.iss.europa.eu Director: Álvaro de Vasconcelos © EU Institute for Security Studies 2012. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the EU Institute for Security Studies. ISBN 978-92-9198-201-1 ISSN 1830-9747 QN-AF-12-011-EN-C doi:10.2815/28132 Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Condé-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur. Graphic design by Metropolis, Lisbon. CONTENTS Introduction 5 Sabine Fischer I. Elections and domestic politics in
    [Show full text]
  • Far Right Gets Shut out in French Polls
    CHINA DAILY | HONG KONG EDITION Tuesday, June 29, 2021 | 11 WORLD Xi salutes Cambodian party on landmark Far right gets By CAO DESHENG with their relations having long China will, as always, support 19 pandemic, which, he said, have [email protected] maintained high-level development. Cambodia in pursuing a develop- vividly demonstrated their On the occasion of the 70th anni- ment path that suits its national unbreakable and everlasting Xi Jinping, general secretary of the versary of the CPP’s founding, he conditions, Xi said. He expressed friendship with concrete actions. Communist Party of China Central would like to extend warm congrat- the confidence that under the lead- Saying the CPC highly values its shut out in Committee, congratulated the Cam- ulations to Hun Sen, the CPP and ership of Hun Sen, the CPP will con- friendly cooperation with the CPP, Xi bodian People’s Party, or CPP, on the Cambodian people on behalf of tinue to make new and greater pointed out that he is willing to work Monday on the 70th anniversary of the CPC, the Chinese people and in contributions to the prosperity of with Hun Sen to strengthen the politi- its founding, and called for advanc- his own name, Xi said. Cambodia and the well-being of the cal guidance for the relations between ing the building of the China-Cambo- He said that for a long time, the Cambodian people, as well as to the two countries and between the dia community with a shared future. CPP has been rallying and leading regional peace and development.
    [Show full text]