Far Right Gets Shut out in French Polls
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Russia's 2012 Presidential Election
Russia’s 2012 Presidential Election: Yet Another Term for Putin? By Paweł Piotr Styrna l February 27, 2012 The next presidential election in post-Soviet Russia is scheduled for March 4, 2012. The roster of candidates Russian voters can choose from is rather limited, both in terms of the number of candidates and their backgrounds. The upcoming contest pits five candidates against each other: the Sovietonostalgic chekist, Vladimir Putin; the unreconstructed and unrepentant communist, Gennady Zyuganov; the socialist - and long-time Chairman of the Federation Council (Russia’s upper house) - Sergey Mironov, the nominee of the “Just Russia” Party; the infamous, rabid chauvinist, Vladimir Zhirinovsky; and the “independent” oligarch, Mikhail Prokhorov. Not surprisingly, all these men embody different, yet often overlapping, facets of post-communism. One will notice the conspicuous and telling absence of a conservative, Christian, anti-communist alternative of the Alexander Solzhenitsyn variety. This seems to correspond with what some have argued to constitute one of the essential features of post-communism (particularly in the former USSR), i.e. an ostensible political pluralism serving as a façade, disguising an establishment jealously guarding the post-communist status quo, and attempting to marginalize threats to it. Thus, the faux pluralism appears designed to cater to multiple ideological persuasions in society without jeopardizing the main continuities between communism-proper and post-communism, not to mention the privileges, perks, and golden parachutes retained or acquired by the post-communist oligarchy. This is not to claim that the post-bolshevik establishment is a monolith or that no spheres of freedom exist, but that these are significantly limited. -
Why Gennady Zyuganov's Communist Party Finished First 187
Why Gennady Zyuganov 's Communist Party Finished First ALEXANDER S. TSIPKO t must be said that the recent Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) victory in the Duma elections was not a surprise. All Russian Isociologists predicted Gennady Zyuganov's victory four months before the elections on 17 December 1995. The KPRF, competing against forty-two other parties and movements, was expected to receive slightly more than 20 percent of the votes (it received 21.7 percent) and more than fifty deputy seats according to single-mandate districts (it received fifty-eight). Before the elections, there were obvious signals that the vote would go to the KPRF. It was expected that the older generation would vote for the KPRF. The pensioners, who suffered the most damage from shock therapy, would most certainly vote for members representing the ancién regime (for social guarantees, work, and security; things the former social system gave them). Even before the elections, the image of the KPRF as a real party had been formed. In my opinion, the victory of the KPRF in the elections is a critical event in Russia's post-Soviet history, which demands both more attention and clearer comprehension. The simplistic reason often given for the KPRF victory was the sudden introduction of the monetarist method of reform, which resulted in an inevitable leftward shift in the mood of society and a restoration of neo-communism. The heart of the problem is not so simple and orderly-it is found in Russian affairs and in Russian nature. First of all, it is evident that the Duma election victory of KPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov has a completely different moral and political meaning than the victory of the neo-communist party of Aleksander Kwasniewski in the November 1995 Polish presidential elections. -
Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Putin's
LEGISLATURES, COOPTATION, AND SOCIAL PROTEST IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA An NCEEER Working Paper by Ora John Reuter Graeme B. Robertson National Council for Eurasian and East European Research University of Washington Box 353650 Seattle, WA 98195 [email protected] http://www.nceeer.org/ TITLE VIII PROGRAM Project Information* Principal Investigator: Ora John Reuter NCEEER Contract Number: 827-10g Date: October 10, 2013 Copyright Information Individual researchers retain the copyright on their work products derived from research funded through a contract or grant from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER). However, the NCEEER and the United States Government have the right to duplicate and disseminate, in written and electronic form, reports submitted to NCEEER to fulfill Contract or Grant Agreements either (a) for NCEEER’s own internal use, or (b) for use by the United States Government, and as follows: (1) for further dissemination to domestic, international, and foreign governments, entities and/or individuals to serve official United States Government purposes or (2) for dissemination in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act or other law or policy of the United States Government granting the public access to documents held by the United States Government. Neither NCEEER nor the United States Government nor any recipient of this Report may use it for commercial sale. * The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract or grant funds provided by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, funds which were made available by the U.S. Department of State under Title VIII (The Soviet-East European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended). -
Interview De Renaud Muselier
Interview de focus Renaud Muselier IL EST, AUPRÈS DE DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN, LE JEUNE SECRÉTAIRE D’ETAT AUX AFFAIRES ETRANGÈRES. Dossier RENAUD MUSELIER REÇOIT TANYA SAADÉ DANS SON GRAND BUREAU DU QUAI D’ORSAY : BRAS DE CHEMISE ET CRAVATE BLANCHE, PASDUTOUTL’IMAGE DU DIPLOMATE CLASSIQUE. LE REGARD EST DIRECT, COMME LE LANGAGE, COLORÉ D’UNE POINTE D’ACCENT. CAR RENAUD MUSELIER EST MARSEILLAIS, ET FIER DE L’ÊTRE. COMME IL EST FIER DE SON PARCOURS, CELUI D’UN VÉRITABLE GAGNEUR. CE MÉDECIN QUI A RÉUSSI APPLIQUE SES QUALITÉS À LA POLITIQUE. ENGAGÉ TRÈS JEUNE DANS LE MILITANTISME ÉTUDIANT, IL S’EST DONNÉ TOUT ENTIER À L’ACTION. PREMIER ADJOINT AU MAIRE DE MARSEILLE, JEAN CLAUDE GAUDIN, IL PRÉSIDE, AUX CÔTÉS DE CELUI-CI, AUX DESTINÉES D’EUROMED, L’ÉTABLISSEMENT PUBLIC QUI A CONTRIBUÉ À RÉGÉNÉRER LA CITÉ PHOCÉENNE ET SA RÉGION. Tanya Saadé : Vous avez dit un jour : démultiplier la voix de la France dans le «Villlepin fait tout, moi, je fais le monde. J’y parviens grâce à l’excellence reste ». Que vouliez-vous dire ? des relations que j’ai avec Dominique diplomatie, sans jamais me prendre Renaud Muselier : C’était deux mois de Villepin, qui apprécie, je crois, mon pour un diplomate. Je reste un après mon arrivée au ministère. Tous les bon sens et ma liberté d’expression. politique. Mais un Chef d’État parle à ambassadeurs de France étaient réunis, des politiques, pas à des diplomates. et il fallait que je leur explique ma De quoi êtes-vous le plus fier depuis Et j’ai vu 48 Chefs d’État en 18 mois. -
9143 Reg Baro Odoxa
NOTICE RELATIVE AU BAROMETRE POLITIQUE RÉALISÉ PAR ODOXA POUR DENTSU CONSULTING, FRANCE INTER ET LA PRESSE REGIONALE Première publication sur le site www.odoxa.fr – Mardi 25 mai, à 05h Article 2 : ✓ Organisme ayant réalisé le sondage : Odoxa ✓ Commanditaire(s) : DENTSU CONSULTING, FRANCE INTER ET LA PRESSE REGIONALE ✓ Nombre de personnes interrogées : Echantillon de 1 005 Français représentatif de la population française âgée de 18 ans et plus ✓ Dates de réalisation : du 20 au 21 mai 2021 Article 3 : ✓ Le pourcentage de personnes n’ayant pas répondu à chacune des questions est indiqué sur le rapport de l’enquête disponible sur le site www.odoxa.fr ✓ Gratification : Gratification sous la forme de points cumulables et dont la valeur s’élève à 0,675 € pour un questionnaire complété. ✓ Redressement : une pondération a été effectuée selon les critères socio- démographiques (sexe, âge, profession de l’interviewé, région et catégorie d’agglomération) et le vote aux 1er et 2nd tours de l’élection présidentielle 2017. Structure détaillée ci-dessous. Questions posées Q1. Diriez-vous qu’Emmanuel Macron est un bon président de la République ? - Oui - Non Q2. Diriez-vous que Jean Castex est un bon Premier ministre ? - Oui - Non Q3. Pour chacune des personnalités politiques suivantes, dites-nous si vous la soutenez, si vous éprouvez de la sympathie pour elle, si vous ressentez de l’indifférence à son égard ou si vous la rejetez. 1) Jean-Luc Mélenchon 2) Audrey Pulvar 3) Christiane Taubira 4) Anne Hidalgo 5) Julien Bayou 6) Yannick Jadot 7) Jean-Yves Le Drian 8) Edouard Philippe 9) Roselyne Bachelot 10) Éric Dupont-Moretti 11) Marlène Schiappa 12) Olivier Véran 13) Bruno Le Maire 14) Jean-Michel Blanquer 15) Gérald Darmanin 16) Nicolas Sarkozy 17) Xavier Bertrand 18) Valérie Pécresse 19) Renaud Muselier 20) Laurent Wauquiez 21) Jordan Bardella 22) Marine Le Pen 23) Thierry Mariani • Vous la soutenez • Vous éprouvez de la sympathie pour elle • Vous ressentez de l’indifférence à son égard • Vous la rejetez Q4. -
Berezovsky-Judgment.Pdf
Neutral Citation Number: [2012] EWHC 2463 (Comm) Royal Courts of Justice Rolls Building, 7 Rolls Buildings, London EC4A 1NL Date: 31st August 2012 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE Case No: 2007 Folio 942 QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION COMMERCIAL COURT IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE Claim Nos: HC08C03549; HC09C00494; CHANCERY DIVISION HC09C00711 Before: MRS JUSTICE GLOSTER, DBE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Between: Boris Abramovich Berezovsky Claimant - and - Roman Arkadievich Abramovich Defendant Boris Abramovich Berezovsky Claimant - and - Hine & Others Defendants - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Laurence Rabinowitz Esq, QC, Richard Gillis Esq, QC, Roger Masefield Esq, Simon Colton Esq, Henry Forbes-Smith Esq, Sebastian Isaac Esq, Alexander Milner Esq, and Ms. Nehali Shah (instructed by Addleshaw Goddard LLP) for the Claimant Jonathan Sumption Esq, QC, Miss Helen Davies QC, Daniel Jowell Esq, QC, Andrew Henshaw Esq, Richard Eschwege Esq, Edward Harrison Esq and Craig Morrison Esq (instructed by Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP) for the Defendant Ali Malek Esq, QC, Ms. Sonia Tolaney QC, and Ms. Anne Jeavons (instructed by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP) appeared for the Anisimov Defendants to the Chancery Actions David Mumford Esq (instructed by Macfarlanes LLP) appeared for the Salford Defendants to the Chancery Actions Jonathan Adkin Esq and Watson Pringle Esq (instructed by Signature Litigation LLP) appeared for the Family Defendants to the Chancery Actions Hearing dates: 3rd – 7th October 2011; 10th – 13th October 2011; 17th – 19th October 2011; 24th & 28th October 2011; 31st October – 4th November 2011; 7th – 10th November 2011; 14th - 18th November 2011; 21st – 23 November 2011; 28th November – 2nd December 2011; 5th December 2011; 19th & 20th December 2011; 17th – 19th January 2012. -
Russia: Political Parties in a 'Managed Democracy'
At a glance December 2014 Russia: political parties in a 'managed democracy' From the October 1917 Bolshevik Revolution until 1989, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the country's only legal party. Since then, the number has grown, with a record 69 parties participating in the September 2014 regional elections. However, this apparent diversity does not mean that Russian voters have a real choice, as Vladimir Putin's grip on power is increasingly unchallenged, gradually reversing the gains made in the post-1989 democratisation process. United Russia – the 'party of power' (UR) In an inversion of the usual democratic procedure whereby political parties choose their leaders, the party was set up in 1999 to mobilise support for Vladimir Putin, at the time serving as prime minister under Boris Yeltsin. (Initially it went by the name of Unity, but was renamed United Russia after a merger in 2001). Thanks to the popularity of Putin's strong action on Chechnya, UR quickly became the dominant party in both national and most regional parliaments. It has held onto its majority in the lower house of the national parliament (State Duma) ever since 2003, despite a large drop in its share of the vote in 2011 (from 64% to 49%). Regional elections held in September 2014, in which UR-nominated candidates won in 28 out of 30 provinces, suggest that UR's grip on power is likely to remain as firm as ever for the foreseeable future. Ideology: in its manifestos, UR advocates centrist policies which will appeal to the largest possible number of voters while remaining consistent with the government's general approach – economic liberalism but with state regulation and social protection, alongside an emphasis on conservative values and patriotism. -
Not Free 5.5
Russia | Freedom House Page 1 of 4 About Us DONATE Blog Contact Us Reports Programs Initiatives News Experts Events Donate FREEDOM IN THE WORLD - View another year - Russia Russia Freedom in the World 2012 - Select year - OVERVIEW: 2012 SCORES President Dmitry Medvedev announced in September 2011 that he would not seek reelection in 2012 so STATUS that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin could return to the presidency. Putin had changed titles in 2008 to avoid violating the constitutional ban on serving more than two consecutive terms as president. Heavy Not Free manipulation of State Duma elections in early December barely preserved United Russia’s majority in the lower house of parliament, as voters apparently sought to punish the ruling party by casting ballots for FREEDOM RATING three Kremlin-approved opposition groups. In the weeks following the vote, tens of thousands of antigovernment demonstrators turned out to protest electoral fraud and official corruption in an 5.5 unprecedented Putin-era display of peaceful dissent. Also during the year, insurgent and other violence originating in the North Caucasus continued, with a high-profile attack on Moscow’s Domodedovo airport CIVIL LIBERTIES in January. 5 With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Russian Federation emerged as an independent POLITICAL RIGHTS state under the leadership of President Boris Yeltsin. In 1993, Yeltsin used force to thwart an attempted coup by parliamentary opponents of radical reform, after which voters approved a new constitution establishing a powerful 6 presidency and a bicameral national legislature, the Federal Assembly. The 1995 parliamentary elections featured strong support for the Communist Party and ultranationalist forces. -
Hier, Le Conseil Régional De Provence-Alpes-Côte D'azur A
1 octobre 2021 | Hier, le Conseil régional de Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur a désigné son président. Sans surprise, c’est Renaud Muselier qui a été reconduit dans ses fonctions à la tête de la Région Sud. En dépit de l’heure encore matinale, les dames – élues ou fonctionnaires – à l’aise dans une vêture soignée semblaient s’être préparées pour une agréable ‘Garden party’ estivale. La cérémonie d’investiture de Renaud Muselier s’avançait avec un beau brin d’élégance ‘républicaine’ et de nouveauté au moment de célébrer le verdict des urnes en assemblée plénière du Conseil régional Provence-Alpes- Côte d’Azur. « 90% des 18-25 ans ne se sont pas allés voter » Car « la démocratie a parlé », comme le reconnaissait Thierry Mariani lors de son intervention face à la tribune. « Elle le fait désormais à voix basse et, cette fois-ci, elle a murmuré » a commenté le chef de file du Rassemblement national entouré de 38 élus. « C’est un record d’abstention pour des élections régionales » confirme Renaud Muselier, « 90% des 18-25 ans ne se sont pas allés voter ». Les deux seuls groupes qui s’affronteront au cours de ce mandat de près de 7 ans sont d’accord : la toile de fond de l’action politique s’amorce maintenant sur le sujet de la considération et de l’intérêt des citoyens pour une institution qui a toujours autant de mal à faire partie du paysage, 40 ans après les premières lois de décentralisation. C’est un tournant. Refondation démocratique Pas question pour autant de s’entendre. -
On December 31, 1999,Yeltsin's Russia Became Putin's Russia
PROLOGUE n December 31, 1999,Yeltsin’s Russia became Putin’s Russia. Boris Yeltsin—a political maverick who until the end tried to Oplay the mutually exclusive roles of democrat and tsar, who made revolutionary frenzy and turmoil his way of survival—unexpect- edly left the Kremlin and handed over power, like a New Year’s gift, to Vladimir Putin, an unknown former intelligence officer who had hardly ever dreamed of becoming a Russian leader. Yeltsin—tired and sick, disoriented and having lost his stamina— apparently understood that he could no longer keep power in his fist. It was a painful and dramatic decision for a politician for whom nonstop struggle for power and domination was the substance of life and his main ambition. His failing health and numerous heart attacks, however, were not the main reasons behind his unexpected resignation. The moment came when Yeltsin could not control the situation much longer and—more important—he did not know how to deal with the new challenges Russia was facing. He had been accustomed to making breakthroughs, to defeating his enemies, to overcoming obstacles. He was not prepared for state building, for the effort of everyday governance, for consensus making, for knitting a new national unity. By nature he was a terminator, not a transformational leader. It was time for him to gra- ciously bow out and hand over power to his successor. And Russia had to live through a time of real suspense while the Kremlin was preparing the transfer of power. The new Russian leader Vladimir Putin has become a symbol of a staggering mix of continuity and change. -
Why Invest in the Sud 8 Sectors of Excellence
8 SECTORS OF EXCELLENCE Welcome to the Sud region, where you have every reason to invest with us! Quality AND A WIDE POOL OF LOCAL & GLOBAL TALENT of life, accessibility, cutting-edge skills, the capacity to innovate, sectors of excellence WHY INVEST IN THE SUD such as Industries of the Future, Smart Tech, Natural Living or Energies of Tomorrow… And don’t forget our unwavering commitment PROVENCE-ALPES-CÔTE D’AZUR REGION? THEY’VE CHOSEN to your project. Because, especially in the THE SUD REGION post-health crisis era, we want to build a sustainable economy with our ‘One Step ST • Airbus Helicopters BECOMING THE 1 REGION IN EUROPE • CMA CGM Ahead’ climate plan. Calanques – Marseille TO MEET THE COP 21 AGREEMENTS • L’Occitane M O BILIZE Renaud MUSELIER • Thales 1 BILLION EUROS THE “ONE STEP AHEAD” CLIMATE PROGRAM President of the • Dassault O F IN VESTM ENT Provence Alpes-Côte d’Azur Region CMA CGM Tower – Marseille Zero plastic by 2030 • Naval Group CREATE President of the Regions of France • Saint-Gobain 50 000 JOBS Carbon neutral by 2050 • Amadeus ATTRACT Renewable energies: major Smart grid, hydropower • Malongo ARM 500 and solar energy infrastructure (#1 French region in • Symphony N EW COM PANIES terms of sunny days). Also, significant investments • Infosys to develop the hydrogen chain for green energy • Expedia projects. • Voyage Privé • Haribo • STMicroelectronics Sophia Antipolis – Nice • ArcelorMittal… THE SUD REGION: HOST OF ITER SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT A HUB FOR PEOPLE, MAJOR GLOBAL SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROJECT OPPORTUNITIES -
The Nature of Mass Communist Beliefs in Postcommunist Russian
CSD Center for the Study of Democracy An Organized Research Unit University of California, Irvine www.democ.uci.edu Mass Politics in Postcommunist Russia: An Introduction The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Communist Party political rule in 1991 has led to dramatic change for political regimes across the former Soviet region. 1 In an area once distinguished for its uniformity of single-party politics, regimes varying from robust democracies to reconstituted dictatorships have taken root. While scholars have made extensive contributions to our understanding of the institutional factors that influenced these outcomes, as well as the impact of particular institutional legacies on postcommunist reform, less attention has been paid to the impact of communist legacies on the mass political mind. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a democratizing regime in Russia during the 1990s raise several questions about the contours of Russian political space: Do Russians have structured beliefs that motivate political behavior? Is there any ideology guiding Russian mass political beliefs? How has seventy years of Communist Party rule affected Russian political attitudes? Although Russia’s postcommunist political history has not been characterized by a smooth transition to democracy,2 it would be misguided to assume that the mass political mind in Russia shares a uniform taste in favor of authoritarian political and economic relations—despite popular rhetoric to this end. In fact, there is little empirical basis to assume much of anything about the underlying contours of the political predispositions of the Russian public and the impact of Communist Party rule on shaping Russian opinions towards political, economic, and social organization.