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Democratic Party of Moldova Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 02/22/2019 11:35:12 AM Subject: Moldova Election Update Date: Friday, February 22, 2019 at 8:21:23 AM Eastern Standard Time From: Democratic Party of Moldova DEMOCRATIC PARTY &4 OF MOLDOVA PDM ELECTION UPDATE, FEBRUARY 2019 Dear Friend of Moldova, With this weekend's consequential parliamentary elections, we wanted to share with you this "non-paper" from our team on the electoral climate here in Moldova. The paper addresses a series of topics, starting with our campaign team's observations on the current political context. Moreover, the paper provides an analysis of the most recent polls and addresses some concerns expressed by election observation missions. Finally, the paper approaches the issue of campaign incidents, on which we have tried to provide regular updates, and ends with the Democratic Party of Moldova's commitment toward free and fair elections as the basis for future Euro-Atlantic integration. The PDM Team This material is distributed by Cogent Strategies on behalf of the Democratic Party of Moldova. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Unsubscribe Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 02/22/2019 11:35:12 AM Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 02/22/2019 11:35:12 AM ELECTORAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA THE COMMITMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY TOWARDS THE COUNTRY’S EURO- ATLANTIC FUTURE OBSERVATIONS ON THE POLITICAL CONTEXT: ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN IN FULL SWING As parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova are scheduled for February 24, all political parties are fully engaged in an electoral campaign that is set to be decisive for the country’s future development path. The upcoming parliamentary elections will be organized under a mixed voting system, which involves the election of 50 representatives on the national constituency, through party-list proportional representation, and 51 representatives on single-member constituencies, which also include three constituencies abroad. On the day of parliamentary elections, a referendum will also be organized, consulting Moldovan voters over the initiative of the previous ruling majority to reduce the number of Members of the Parliament from 101 to 61 and to introduce a mechanism allowing citizens to democratically revoke their representatives in Parliament. Following previous recommendations of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, the Electoral Code of the Republic of Moldova was amended to include specific provisions on the official start of the electoral campaign, which was established on January 25, 2019. So far, the electoral campaign has been marked by heated debates and political tensions but has also provided the opportunity to 15 political parties and 320 candidates on single-member constituencies to present their political platforms and to engage directly with Moldovan citizens. While political stakeholders remain divided on either political or geo-political grounds, the future of the Moldovan democracy is at stake. The continuity of Western-leaning coalitions, which have contributed greatly to the country’s modernization in the past decade, is challenged by increasingly vocal populist groups, mainly relying on a promised shift towards Russia. The appeal of populism during the electoral campaign is high, shaping Moldova’s narrative abroad and casting doubts on some of the most sensitive policy areas, despite legitimate efforts of the pro-European Government led by the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) to tackle corruption and lack of transparency, to ensure free and fair elections, to pursue justice independence or to create a stable and predictable framework for the freedom of media. In response, PDM has introduced a “Pro Moldova” campaign, as a commitment to close the void opposition between ‘pro-Europeans’ and ‘pro-Russians’, in order to encourage greater focus on the country’s real needs and challenges. PDM is currently running on the “Pro Moldova” platform, which is firmly anchored in the party’s strong commitment towards Moldova’s Euro Atlantic integration, as the only undisputable path towards reform and progress. To this end, the electoral strategy of PDM relies on the goal of continued stability and modernization efforts, through the implementation of reforms driven by the country’s partnerships with the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. While in Government, since January 2016, PDM has proven unparalleled performance as regards the country’s economic recovery, stabilization and reintegration perspectives. As the country’s economy has recovered from recession in 2015, registering GDP growths of around 4% in 2017 and 2018, Prime Minister Pavel Filip has recently concluded, in his last mandate review, that the average salary in Moldova has grown from 4600 MDL (approximately 270 USD) to almost 7000 MDL (approximately 410 USD), a 52% growth, in the past three years, whereas the pensions reform has led to a 30% growth for certain categories of beneficiaries and to a 50% overall growth of the average pension. Budgetary revenues have registered a growth of 15 billion MDL (approximately 879 million USD) in the past three years, allowing the Government to increase public sector wages, consolidate social support schemes and introduce national programs targeting infrastructure, health and youth development. Foreign and national investors have regained trust in This material is distributed by Cogent Strategies on behalf of the Democratic Party of Moldova. ^ Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Received by N SD/F ARA Registration Unit 02/22/2019 11:35:12 AM Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 02/22/2019 11:35:12 AM the Moldovan economy, which led to the creation of 170 000 new jobs since the beginning of 2016. Achievements of the PDM-led Government extend to all sectors of the Moldovan society, yet the underlining of few economic indicators serve the understanding of the party’s current political stance and commitment towards continuity. As a result, PDM’s electoral platform has been built on 9 key pillars that the review of existing policies or the introduction of new ones, in areas such as: the social security system, modern infrastructure and regional development, healthcare, education, economy and business, agriculture, rule of law and justice independence, political reform, Moldova’s European and global dimension. ELECTORAL PERSPECTIVES, AS REFLECTED BY MOST RECENT POLLS Recent surveys have shown that the Democratic Party of Moldova has registered a growth in electoral preferences of Moldovan voters, currently standing a second chance in electoral rankings. Six recent polls measuring general tendencies - thus excluding specific preferences which may occur in single­ member constituencies - confirm that at least three political parties will be represented in the next Moldovan Parliament, while smaller political parties may win some seats in electoral constituencies. The latest poll, presented by I MAS on February 18 and conducted in cooperation with the US company Lake Research Partners, reveals that voting intentions for the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) have reached 19.4% - the party ranking second at national level, after the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM). This is the first poll in the past few months that reveals a significant difference between PDM and the ACUM Electoral Bloc, in PDM’s favor. PDM has registered a 1 % growth in less than two weeks, whereas PSRM has dropped by 2.5% in the same timeframe. The ACUM Electoral Bloc has also dropped by 2.4%, according to IMAS. Elowever, a worrying tendency concerns the percentage of undecided voters, which has grown by 5.1% in less than two weeks, adding to the general lack of predictability of the February 24 elections. Moreover, the latest IMAS poll also credits the Sor Party with 7.5% in voters’ intentions, setting the ground for the accession of at least four political parties in the Moldovan Parliament after the February 24 elections. Lake Research IMAS Institute of International iData| ASD Partners & Public Policy Republican IMAS (IPP) Institute (IRI) February 18 February 7 February 7 February 5 January 30 January 29 Party of Socialists of 26% 28.5% 20% 39% 32% 49.2% the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) Democratic Party of 19.4% 18.4% 9% 14% 16.1% 19.3% Moldova (PDM) Action and Solidarity N/A N/A N/A 13% N/A N/A Party (PAS) Dignity and Truth N/A N/A N/A 9% N/A N/A Platform Party (PPDA) “ACUM” Sectoral Bloc 16.8% 19.2% 11.7% N/A 20% 19.1% (PAS & PPDA) Undecided Voters 19.8% 14.7% 34.5% 9% 14% 17.6% 2 Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 02/22/2019 11:35:12 AM Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 02/22/2019 11:35:12 AM Presented on February 7, the previous poll conducted by IMAS at the request of the Foundation for a Modern Democracy confirmed that the majority of Moldovan voters (28.5%) would have voted for the Socialist Party. PDM would have scored 18.4%, while the ACUM Electoral Bloc would have ranked second, with 19.2% of the votes. According to IMAS’ February 7 poll, the Sor Party would have scored 6.7% of the votes (past the electoral threshold), whereas the Communist Party would have come close to the electoral threshold, with a score of 5.8%. The poll presented on February 7 revealed 14.7% undecided voters - which was still a large percentage at that time. Both IMAS polls have been based on a 2.5% margin of error. Also presented on February 7, a poll conducted by the Institute of Public Policy (IPP), with a 3% error, showed that only 20% of respondents would have voted for the Socialists on February 24, while 11.7% would have voted for the ACUM bloc and 9% for PDM.
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