United Nations Security Council
BACKGROUND GUIDE
Vancouver Model United Nations The Twentieth Annual Session | January 29–31, 2021
Dear Delegates, William Tsai Secretary-General Welcome to the United Nations Security Council! My name is Andrew Liu, and it is my pleasure to serve as your Director at VMUN 2021 alongside your Chair, Stephanie Hai. I am currently in my junior year at St. George’s School, and I have participated in Model UN since Grade 9 as both a delegate and a staff member. Reminiscing about my own Vivian Gu transformative experiences in the UNSC, I am excited to guide the fruitful debate to Director-General come.
Derek Wu Model UN has been an essential part of my high school life, and I am so grateful for the Chief of Staff amazing friendships and experiences that I have gained along the way. For me, Model UN is truly the best way to encapsulate the sophistication of debate, public speaking, and Tyler Rosenzweig international affairs. My own experiences with Model UN have helped me improve my Director of Logistics public speaking skills as well as my interpersonal skills of communication and negotiation. I can assure you that you too will undergo such an enlightening experience at VMUN 2021.
Joyce Chen This year, the two topics to be discussed concern that of UN Peacekeeping Malpractice USG General Assemblies and Stability in South Sudan. Our first topic concerns an internal issue that the Security Council has been grappling with, and our second topic focuses on a volatile situation in Ethan Jasny South Sudan that could change at any given moment. Certainly, both topics are critical USG Specialized Agencies issues that the Security Council has been carefully monitoring. I am eager to hear the creative solutions you will doubtlessly conceive. Vivian Liang USG Conference Bearing that in mind, I wish you all the best in your research. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me via email at [email protected]. I look forward to meeting all Jonah Ezekiel of you at the conference. USG Finance Sincerely, Laura Choi USG Communications Andrew Liu UNSC Director Armaan Jaffer USG Delegate Affairs
Mia Tsao USG Delegate Affairs
Position Paper Policy
What is a Position Paper?
A position paper is a brief overview of a country’s stance on the topics being discussed by a particular committee. Though there is no specific format the position paper must follow, it should include a description of your positions your country holds on the issues on the agenda, relevant actions that your country has taken, and potential solutions that your country would support.
At Vancouver Model United Nations, delegates should write a position paper for each of the committee’s topics. Each position paper should not exceed one page, and should all be combined into a single document per delegate.
For the United Nations Security Council, position papers are mandatory, especially for a delegate to be considered for an award.
Formatting
Position papers should:
— Include the name of the delegate, his/her country, and the committee
— Be in a standard font (e.g. Times New Roman) with a 12-point font size and 1-inch document margins
— Not include illustrations, diagrams, decorations, national symbols, watermarks, or page borders
— Include citations and a bibliography, in any format, giving due credit to the sources used in research (not included in the 1-page limit)
Due Dates and Submission Procedure
Position papers for this committee must be submitted by midnight on January 22nd, 2021. Once your position paper is complete, please save the file as your last name, your first name and send it as an attachment in an email, to your committee’s email address, with the subject heading as your last name, your first name — Position Paper. Please do not add any other attachments to the email or write anything else in the body.
Both your position papers should be combined into a single PDF or Word document file; position papers submitted in another format will not be accepted.
Each position paper will be manually reviewed and considered for the Best Position Paper award.
The email address for this committee is [email protected].
UN Peacekeeping Malpractice ...... 3 Overview ...... 3 Timeline ...... 4 Historical Analysis ...... 6 Past UN/International Involvement ...... 8
General Assembly Resolution 57/306 ...... 8
Security Council Resolution 2272 ...... 8
UN Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse ...... 8 Current Situation ...... 9
Case Study: Central African Republic ...... 12
Case Study: South Sudan ...... 12 Possible Solutions and Controversies ...... 12
Improving the Peacekeeper Training Program ...... 12
Overhauling the Disciplinary Process ...... 13
Improving Peacekeeper Mission Policy ...... 14 Bloc Positions...... 14
Western Liberal Democracies ...... 14
Russia and China ...... 14
Asia and Africa ...... 15 Discussion Questions ...... 15 Additional Resources ...... 15 Bibliography ...... 17 Stability in South Sudan ...... 20 Overview ...... 20 Timeline ...... 21 Historical Analysis ...... 23 Past UN/International Involvement ...... 26
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) ...... 26
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2206 ...... 26
Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan ...... 27
Rome Resolution on Monitoring and Verification of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement ...... 27 Current Situation ...... 27
Intercommunal Violence ...... 28
Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) ...... 28
South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA) ...... 29 Possible Solutions and Controversies ...... 29
Renewing Sanctions ...... 29
Suspending Sanctions ...... 30 Bolstering Peacekeeping Operations ...... 31 Bloc Positions...... 32
United States and Europe ...... 32 Russia and China ...... 32
Africa ...... 32 Discussion Questions ...... 33 Additional Resources ...... 33 Bibliography ...... 34
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 2 UN Peacekeeping Malpractice
Overview
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping began in 1948 when the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) deployed UN forces to the Middle East to monitor peace processes between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Since then, the UNSC has deployed numerous peace operations in more than 70 conflicts.1 By deploying neutral military forces to conflict zones, peacekeepers are able to protect civilians from being caught in the crossfire and serve as a neutral third party to oversee peace processes. Peacekeeping operations also operate under their own mandates issued by the Security Council, which differ from situation to situation, depending on the nature of the conflict. Generally, humanitarian support and protection of civilians are included in the mandates of all peacekeeping missions, but the specific objectives and jurisdiction given to each mission vary according to the situation.
Given its track record of resolving conflicts and aiding humanitarian efforts, UN peacekeeping has been, at least on paper, tremendously successful. However, in early 2014, a shadow was cast over peacekeeping when reports emerged that children and women were being sexually assaulted and raped by UN troops participating in the Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).2 This was not the first recorded case of sex crimes being committed by peacekeepers, but it brought the previously obscure issue into the limelight.
The UN defines Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) to be “any actual or attempted abuse of position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially, or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.”3 In this committee, the UNSC will engage with this topic by tackling SEA.
In spite of numerous attempts to protect civilians from abuse by multiple UN secretariats, more allegations of SEA by UN peacekeepers arise every year, most notably from African countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR). In a recent effort to make real progress, the Security Council passed a resolution on September 21, 2018 to toughen the response to peacekeeper misconduct and increase accountability.4 Yet, in early 2020, a report revealed a fresh wave of SEA cases among peacekeepers deployed to the CAR.5 As many experts have pointed out, the issue of peacekeeper misconduct is a major threat to the effectiveness of the UN and is a serious violation of human rights.6 Clearly, more extensive and decisive action is needed to resolve the problem.
1 Peacekeeping, “United Nations Peacekeeping,” United Nations, n.d., https://peacekeeping.un.org/en. 2 CRIN, “UN Peacekeepers Timeline,” Child Rights International Network, n.d., https://home.crin.org/un-peacekeepers-timeline. 3 UN Missions, “The United Nations has a Zero Tolerance Policy against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (SEA),” United Nations, n.d., https://unficyp.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sea_information_sheet_for_unficyp_ website_-_2018_1.pdf. 4 Skye Wheeler, “UN Peacekeeping Has a Sexual Abuse Problem,” Human Rights Watch, January 11, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/11/un-peacekeeping-has-sexual-abuse-problem. 5 Code Blue. “The UN’s Deal With a Dictator.” Code Blue Campaign, 2020, http://www.codebluecampaign.com/press- releases/burundi-report. 6 Wheeler, “UN Peacekeeping Has a Sexual Abuse Problem."
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 3 Historically, developing resolutions to solve the issue has been a difficult process. The limited reporting and data collection of abuse cases and the internal culture within UN forces of dismissing cases as less important than peacekeeping tasks have all represented obstacles. Such difficulties have not been resolved, and delegates must therefore find a way to mitigate these factors while following their respective countries’ stances in order to develop an effective solution. The scope of this topic ranges from peacekeeping policy to the peacekeeper training curriculum and as such, there are multiple angles from which to tackle the issue. Delegates must also evaluate the wealth of past UN policy decisions and recommendations regarding the topic and decide whether or not such policies should continue to be implemented, discarded, or improved—and how.
Timeline
May 22, 2003 — The United Nations General Assembly adopts Resolution 57/306, calling for an investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa.7
October 9, 2003 — Secretary-General Kofi Annan releases a report instituting several prevention measures against sexual abuse.8
May 2014 — An officer from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and a United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) staff member receive testimony from an 11-year-old boy claiming that a French soldier who was part of the UN peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) had promised him food in exchange for oral sex. The two staff members continue to interview multiple victims with similar experiences over the next months.9
July 15, 2014 — Anders Kompass, a field operations director at OHCHR, receives the MINUSCA reports from UN staff members. Kompass passes along the reports to French authorities, who open an investigation into the matter.10
June 22, 2015 — Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appoints an investigative panel to examine the UN response to allegations of sexual abuse in the Central African Republic.11
August 12, 2015 — The UN envoy to the Central African Republic, Babacar Gaye, is fired amid multiple allegations of sexual abuse by peacekeepers under his command.12
7 United Nations General Assembly, “Investigation into Sexual Exploitation of Refugees by Aid Workers in West Africa ,” United Nations, May 22, 2003, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SE%20ARES%2057%20306.pdf. 8 United Nations Secretary-General, “Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse,” United Nations, October 9, 2003, https://undocs.org/ST/SGB/2003/13. 9 CRIN, “UN Peacekeepers Timeline,” Child Rights International Network, n.d., https://home.crin.org/un-peacekeepers-timeline. 10 Ibid. 11 United Nations News, “Central African Republic: Ban Appoints Panel to Investigate UN Response to Sexual Abuse Allegations,” United Nations, June 22, 2015, https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/06/502312. 12 BBC News, “UN's CAR Envoy Gaye Sacked over Peacekeeper Abuse Claims,” British Broadcasting Corporation, August 12, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33890664.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 4 September 11, 2015 — The UN outlines the steps taken in response to Central African Republic abuse allegations.13 These steps include repatriating troops under investigation and suspending their pay.
March 2016 — Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon creates the Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, which supports UN organizations and NGOs that provide victim assistance and support services.14
March 11, 2016 — The Security Council adopts Resolution 2272, which authorizes the Secretary-General to enforce accountability measures regarding sexual abuse.15 These measures include repatriating peacekeeping units with evidence of sexual abuse by troops in that unit and assessing if the home country of the repatriated units has held the personnel in question accountable.
July 22, 2016 — The UN launches a mandatory online program for all personnel to strengthen adherence to the UN Standards of Conduct, with a special focus on sexual exploitation and abuse.16 The UN Standards of Conduct outline the behavioural standards of integrity and professionalism that UN personnel are expected to abide by.
February 28, 2017 — Secretary-General António Guterres publishes a report outlining his strategy for preventing and responding to sexual exploitation and abuse.17
March 10, 2017 — The General Assembly adopts Resolution 71/L.59, which implements a zero-tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse.18
September 21, 2018 — The UNSC unanimously votes to adopt Resolution 2436, which is aimed at “enhancing the performance of peacekeeping personnel at all levels, both at Headquarters and in the field.”19
September 25, 2018 — Secretary-General António Guterres convenes a meeting on his Action for Peacekeeping Initiative to renew commitments to UN peacekeeping operations. The meeting reaffirms the importance of peacekeeping approaches that focus on protecting women and children and implements a victim-centred approach to handling sex abuse cases.20
13 United Nations News, “Senior UN Official Outlines Steps Taken in Response to Central African Republic Abuse Allegations,” United Nations, September 11, 2015, https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/09/508622. 14 CRIN, “UN Peacekeepers Timeline,” Child Rights International Network, n.d., https://home.crin.org/un-peacekeepers-timeline. 15 United Nations Security Council, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,” United Nations, March 11, 2016, https://undocs.org/S/RES/2272(2016). 16 United Nations News, “UN Launches e-Learning Training to Tackle Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,” United Nations, July 22, 2016, https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/07/535182-un-launches-e-learning-training-tackle-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse. 17 CRIN, “UN Peacekeepers Timeline,” Child Rights International Network, n.d., https://home.crin.org/un-peacekeepers-timeline. 18 United Nations General Assembly, “United Nations Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,” United Nations, March 10, 2017, https://undocs.org/A/RES/71/278. 19 United Nations Security Council, “United Nations Peacekeeping Performance,” United Nations, September 21, 2018, https://undocs.org/S/RES/2436(2018). 20 CRIN, “UN Peacekeepers Timeline.”
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 5 February 19, 2019 — Secretary-General António Guterres establishes the Civil Society Advisory Board on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, which aims to draw on the advice of external experts and organizations to better combat SEA.21
Historical Analysis
With conflict comes chaos and destruction—and with that comes poverty, starvation, and desperation. According to Human Rights Watch, all of these factors make women and children much more vulnerable to exploitation from troops in positions of authority.22 This vulnerable situation makes it easier for predators to prey on individuals who may be willing to trade sexual favours in exchange for resources they desperately require—as was the case for numerous SEA cases involving peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and CAR. Furthermore, the combination of a toxic culture within troop contingents and peacekeepers unable to relieve their physical needs for prolonged periods of time during deployment all contribute to the growing problem.23
The roots of UN peacekeeping misconduct perhaps began at the conception of the initiative itself. When the UN first began operating peace missions during the Cold War, the UN gave peacekeepers immunity from prosecution by the host state for any alleged crimes committed during the operation. Instead, peacekeepers could only be held accountable by the government of their country of origin. At the time, this legal protection was considered necessary to prevent states from attempting to undermine peace operations by prosecuting mission personnel. Now, the grave consequences of continuing to uphold that immunity are becoming clear: peacekeepers do not need to fear any consequences for their actions. As a result, some participate in SEA given the absence of deterrence. The statistics are clear on the severity of the issue, as Figure 1 shows that the number of SEA allegations every year remains high even after many attempts to combat it.
Toxic culture is another factor contributing to peacekeeping malpractice, with history influencing much of the race and gender discrimination involved. Marsha Henry, Deputy Director of the Centre for Women, Peace and Security at the London School of Economics notes that “the fact that many of the most severely affected places are former French colonies speaks to the way in which a colonial past has influenced contemporary forms of sexual violence.” Many countries with the largest prevalence of SEA in peacekeeping operations, like the DRC, the CAR, Haiti, Liberia, South Sudan, and Côte d'Ivoire, were historically colonies, and the colonial attitudes of certain races being inferior to others instilled during the colonial age linger to this day. One French peacekeeper from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) explains that “over there, the colonial spirit persists. The white man gets what he wants.” 24 Unfortunately, these colonial attitudes are something that predators can exploit, often in the form of SEA.
21 United Nations News, “Civil Society Advisory Board on Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,” United Nations, February 19, 2019, https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/civil-society-advisory-board-prevention-sexual- exploitation-and-abuse. 22 Wheeler, “UN Peacekeeping Has a Sexual Abuse Problem." 23 Azad Essa, “Why Do Some Peacekeepers Rape? The Full Report,” Al Jazeera, August 10, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/08/peacekeepers-rape-full-report-170804134221292.html. 24 International Affairs, “Sexual exploitation and abuse in peace operations: trends, policy responses and future directions,” International Affairs, March 1, 2017, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/93/2/365/2982811.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 6 Furthermore, when several organizations raised concerns over the behaviour of UN peacekeepers in Cambodia in the 1990s, including the hiring of underage prostitutes, the response from the head of the mission Yasushi Akashi was simply that "boys will be boys."25
Figure 1: Data - Allegations (UN Missions).26
With the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2272 in 2016, many provisions designed to combat SEA were implemented—namely, that military contingents with allegations made against them could be repatriated. This meant that such contingents would be sent back to their home countries to face prosecution. However, there was one glaring flaw in the resolution: the regulations and policies only applied to uniformed UN troops and not civilian personnel. Currently, more than 14,000 civilian personnel serve in peacekeeping operations, often as translators, drivers, logistics personnel, and in other support capacities. 27 Given that less than half of SEA allegations are against actual uniformed units, this distinction is an enormous flaw within current regulations.28
25 Ibid. 26 United Nations Missions, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,” United Nations, n.d., https://conduct.unmissions.org/sea-overview. 27 United Nations Peacekeeping, “Civilians,” United Nations, n.d., https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/civilians. 28 Dr Sarah Smith et al., “Resolution 2272: Holding UN Peacekeepers Accountable,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, July 10, 2017, http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/resolution-2272-holding-un-peacekeepers-accountable/.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 7 Past UN/International Involvement
General Assembly Resolution 57/306
General Assembly Resolution 57/306 was passed in May 2003. The resolution called for an “investigation into the sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa,” as well as requested the Secretary-General to release a bulletin on sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel and to maintain data on all action being taken on the topic.29 A few months later, in October 2003, Secretary-General Kofi Annan released a report outlining the scope of what constituted SEA as well as the protocols that would need to be taken to report and address SEA cases. These protocols operated under a “zero tolerance” mandate with respect to SEA, obliging UN staff to report all incidents of abuse; however, the report did not instate a unified, comprehensive procedure to tackle instances of SEA, leaving many discretionary choices to officials along the chain of command. Since then, the Secretary-General has reported every year to the General Assembly on the number of allegations of sexual abuse for each mission in the previous year and on the progress of the investigations into those allegations. Unfortunately, it is not clear that measures instituted by the bulletin have increased accountability or reduced SEA by UN troops, primarily because of the bulletin's vague wording and failure to set out any mechanisms to hold offenders accountable. For instance, the report only called for Heads of Departments to “take appropriate measures” when dealing with SEA cases—with no further explanation.
Security Council Resolution 2272
Adopted in March 2016, Security Council Resolution 2272 reaffirmed the zero-tolerance mandate of SEA prevention measures as instituted by the Secretary-General’s May 2003 bulletin. Crucially, Resolution 2272 also authorized the Secretary-General to repatriate entire military contingents that contained individuals who had allegations made against them. These measures meant that such contingents would be sent back to their home countries to face prosecution. Furthermore, the Secretary-General was given the authority to replace repatriated units with another from a contributing country that maintained a good peacekeeping track record. This mechanism was a new means of reducing SEA that depended on the commitment of member states to hold perpetrators from their own country accountable. However, the accountability measures that this resolution includes only applies to uniformed peacekeeping units, which only make up a portion of personnel who have allegedly committed abuse. Additionally, the resolution provides no way to ensure that troop-contributing countries actually prosecute their repatriated troops.
UN Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
On February 13, 2015, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon submitted a report to the 69th session of the General Assembly, entitled “Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse” (A/69/779). In his report, Ban outlined a number of steps he intended to take in order to better support victims of abuse. One of the measures that the Secretary-General recommended was the formation of a trust fund to support the victims. A year later, in March 2016, the Secretary-General established the Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. The aim of the Fund was to “support United Nations and non-United Nations entities
29 United Nations General Assembly, “Investigation into Sexual Exploitation of Refugees by Aid Workers in West Africa.”
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 8 and organizations that provide victim assistance and support services.”30 Since then, the Fund has received over 21 voluntary contributions from member states, totalling over USD 2.5 million.31 The Trust Fund is designed to support victims in SEA in four areas:
1. Specialized services in the form of medical, legal, and psychosocial aid;
2. Community outreach;
3. Gaps in the distribution of assistance for SEA victims;
4. Specialized support for children born as a result of SEA.32
To achieve these goals, the Trust Fund gives monetary support to a variety of UN and non-UN organizations, including but not limited to: the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), and Siku ya Mazingira (SYAM)—an NGO based in the DRC. In 2017 and 2018 alone, the Fund contributed a total of USD 264,703 to three major projects:
1. Programme of Assistance for Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the Central African Republic;
2. Adult Literacy Programme in Eight Communities in Liberia;
3. Victim Assistance and Support to Community-Based Complaint Networks in the Communities of Bujovu/Munigi, Kavumu and Sake in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.33
Current Situation
While efforts to investigate and reduce SEA have drastically increased over the past year alone, the number of allegations has increased as well, possibly as a result of those efforts. That is to say, because the UN has increased accessibility to communication channels for victims to report SEA, more individuals may be stepping up to report cases. According to the 2019 report by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, MINUSCA had the highest number of cases of SEA that it investigated that year, followed by the peacekeeping operations in Mali, Congo, Western Sahara, and South Sudan.34 Overall, over 70 cases were investigated—a 40 percent increase from 2018.35 The total number of cases per year has not decreased by a substantial amount since 2007, and the numbers fluctuate wildly year by year.
30 United Nations Missions, “Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,” United Nations, June 29, 2020, https://conduct.unmissions.org/remedial-trust-fund. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services, “Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services,” United Nations, 2020, https://undocs.org/en/A/74/305(PartII). 35 Ibid.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 9 Figure 2: Data - Investigations (UN Missions).36
As of 2020, the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic has severely hampered efforts to reduce SEA. Measures to enforce social distancing, including lockdowns and quarantines, have affected access to reporting channels and reduced victims’ access to aid from NGOs and the UN. Furthermore, investigations into allegations have also been negatively impacted by the pandemic. Many countries and peacekeeping missions have implemented strict social distancing measures, which hamper investigators’ ability to interact with persons of interest in their investigations.
In recent years, all UN peacekeeping missions have adopted a Community-Based Complaint Mechanism (CBCM) in order to improve reporting channels and to better support victims. The system has been developed, refined, and put into practice by the coordinated efforts of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the Save the Children Fund. According to the UN Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary- General, “CBCM is a reporting mechanism that integrates the role of formal and informal community-based structures in revealing SEA concerns faced by community members.” In practice, a CBCM is simply a way of building a community SEA reporting mechanism that adapts to local cultures and circumstances. For example, a CBCM program in a village in the DRC found that many victims of SEA would simply settle cases with the offender themselves through traditional avenues, like negotiations of livestock or monetary settlement instead of following the recommended UN procedures. Problematically, these types of settlements leave predators free
36 United Nations Missions, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,” United Nations, n.d., https://conduct.unmissions.org/sea- investigations.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 10 to continue living in society with little to no consequences. As such, the CBCM adjusted their approach and reached out to the Save the Children Fund. Together, 84 community education sessions on the dangers of SEA were conducted over the following year. After just one year of the program, 79 percent of local residents surveyed reported feeling safer and better protected from potential SEA.37
The current situation with peacekeeper training is also in dire need of improvement. For decades, the UN has tried to control the behaviour of its troops through training. Values and morals are meant to be instilled during the training phase, and the UN Standards of Conduct are supposed to always be reflected while deployed. Despite troop-contributing countries all agreeing to the importance of training, issues have arisen from the fact that not all training is equal among different countries. Certain countries may have better funded or more streamlined pre-deployment training programs, and some nations may simply have certain values that they view as more or less important. For example, the cultural value of obedience to authority varies across cultures, and as a result, certain countries may produce troops that adhere to UN guidelines more stringently. The outcome is that the behaviour of troops is not consistently disciplined across military contingents from different countries.
While the UN does provide the curriculum for peacekeepers-in-training, the implementation of the curriculum is entirely the responsibility of the member state contributing the troops. Recently, the UN has tried to mitigate this potential flaw by implementing a mandatory online training program meant to instill ethics within troops. However, the fact remains that training is not equal across different countries and therefore, may not always be up to par.
Current Secretary-General António Guterres’ strategy to combat SEA focuses on four main areas: putting victims first, ending impunity, engaging civil society and external partners, and improving strategic communications for education and transparency. 38 This strategy prioritizes victims throughout the response to SEA and has produced a number of new initiatives. For instance, in 2018, a system called “Clear Check” was launched. The purpose of the system was to prevent UN staff dismissed or repatriated as a result of substantiated SEA allegations from being re-employed. Furthermore, the Secretary-General has since made it mandatory for all UN staff to complete an online training program on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, which focuses on ethics and the UN Standards of Conduct.
The Secretary-General’s strategy is not limited to mechanisms dealing with the perpetrators themselves as has been the case in the past. For instance, a DNA collection protocol has been developed to allow peacekeeping operations to assist in the collection of the DNA of mothers in cases of children being born as a result of SEA. This system, coupled with the UN Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, is meant to provide adequate support and care to victims.
37 IASC, “Inter-Agency Community-Based Complaint Mechanisms,” Inter-Agency Standing Committee, April 2016, https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/2020- 09/Best%20Practice%20Guide%20Inter%20Agency%20Community%20Based%20Complaint%20Mechanisms.pdf. 38 United Nations News, “New Efforts Launched to Prevent Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,” United Nations, May 5, 2017, https://www.un.int/news/new-efforts-launched-prevent-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 11 Case Study: Central African Republic
MINUSCA—the peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic—has been at the forefront of SEA allegations and is largely responsible for bringing the issue of UN peacekeeping misconduct into the spotlight in the past few years. In late 2019, MINUSCA implemented a CBCM system and has since launched multiple projects, including an early warning system for neighbourhoods to report SEA. This early warning system consisted of a toll-free number operated by MINUSCA that anyone could call to report suspicious activity even if cases of SEA had not yet occurred. In December 2019, MINUSCA launched its “Educational Talks” campaign on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, with an audience of over 500 children. The campaign, which ran until June of 2020, aimed at “raising awareness among the population, including young school children, about issues related to sexual exploitation and abuse.”39
Case Study: South Sudan
In South Sudan, investigations into SEA cases continue, including one into a substantiated allegation that a member of a military contingent sexually harassed a female colleague.40 Such cases involving victims who are UN personnel highlight the need for better UN policies with respect to SEA, as community-based systems like CBCMs are not as effective with victims who are not part of local communities in the first place.
Possible Solutions and Controversies
When developing possible solutions, it is critical that delegates are aware of the Security Council’s mandate, which grants the committee the ability to alter every aspect of peacekeeping operations. The following solutions have been at the forefront of policy recommendations pushed by countries and experts alike and may be implemented in conjunction with each other.
Improving the Peacekeeper Training Program
Currently, new peacekeeping troops must complete pre-deployment training (PDT), which prepares troops to meet the challenges of the battlefield and perform their functions effectively, while also requiring trainees to demonstrate the UN’s core values. However, while these objectives and the curriculum have been clearly laid out by the UN, it is the responsibility of individual member states to train their own troops. As a result, troops from different countries may not be trained to the same standard. Furthermore, the third objective of PDT— demonstrating UN core values—is vague and difficult to evaluate. While mission preparedness and technical skills can be objectively measured, the level to which trainees uphold UN values is difficult to standardize. The UN has also recently created a mandatory online course that teaches personnel about the UN’s ethics and morals.
39 United Nations News, “Nation-Wide Educational Campaign to Tackle Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,” United Nations, December 3, 2019, https://minusca.unmissions.org/en/nation-wide-educational-campaign-tackle-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse. 40 United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services, “Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services,” United Nations, 2020, https://undocs.org/en/A/74/305(PartII).
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 12 The new system is certainly an improvement from the situation prior to the course’s implementation, but the short, online nature of the course offers its own set of difficulties, including decreased student focus.
The glaring flaws within the current system indicate that a more rigorous training program that puts more emphasis on core values and the Peacekeeper Code of Conduct will be beneficial. In reforming the training program, delegates could emphasize the types and consequences of peacekeeper misconduct, the responsibility of peacekeepers to report misconduct, how to report misconduct, and the functioning of disciplinary procedures. In addition, the Security Council can set new requirements for mission-specific training for peacekeepers before they can be deployed, and the vetting process for new troop personnel can be tightened even further.
Overhauling the Disciplinary Process
The UN’s antiquated disciplinary process represents one of the most significant obstacles in the way of achieving justice for victims of SEA. As such, overhauling the system is a promising potential solution. This solution consists of two parts: streamlining the reporting process and increasing penalties for misconduct. The UN itself cannot convict or punish peacekeepers; the responsibility falls to individual contributing countries. As a result, reporting misconduct is often a complicated process that is lost under layers of bureaucracy. Improving communications with local communities and police will make it easier to report perpetrators, and investigations will consequently be processed and carried out in a more efficient manner. In addition, the UNSC can also immediately relieve wrongdoers of their posts without pay and request that the contributing country of the peacekeepers in question take appropriate disciplinary action. If the UNSC creates a binding resolution that outlines and streamlines this process, misconduct can be much more effectively punished. However, such an aggressive approach will likely face substantial opposition in the committee, especially from countries who have contributed a significant number of troops. Historically, countries with large peacekeeping contributions tend to oppose reforming accountability processes in favor of training or mission policy changes, presumably in an effort to protect their own troops from any possibility of unjust prosecution.41
Passed in 2016, Security Council Resolution 2272 implemented a plethora of new accountability measures that would remove the previous immunity that peacekeepers had. However, the main criticism of the resolution was that its measures only applied to uniformed troops, leaving out a large portion of UN mission personnel, including all civilian staff. Delegates may want to consider expanding those measures to include all mission personnel.
Some experts have recommended an even more drastic approach to reforming the disciplinary process. For instance, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security suggests using an external body to verify and assist in conducting evaluations and investigations into allegations. The Institute recommends requesting “assistance from law firms or renowned NGOs, or a UNSC mandate given to an independent team of experts.”42
41 Maria Gambale, “Striking a Better Balance in the Newest UN Peacekeeping Reforms,” PassBlue, October 11, 2018, https://www.passblue.com/2018/10/04/a-better-balance-has-been-won-in- the-newest-un-peacekeeping-reforms/. 42 Anjali Dayal and Sophie Huvé, “Reducing Sexual Abuse and Exploitation in UN Peacekeeping Missions,” Georgetown Institute of Women Peace and Security, 2018, https://giwps.georgetown.edu/resource/reducing-sexual-abuse-and-exploitation-in-un- peacekeeping-missions/.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 13 Improving Peacekeeper Mission Policy
Although the UN has passed numerous resolutions over the years to address SEA, many of the resolutions containing substantive measures are fairly vague, hindering their effectiveness. Various organizations including the UN itself have recommended a variety of specific policies, including banning unofficial fraternization of peacekeepers with local communities, enforcing a nighttime curfew on personnel to ensure that they stay on base during off hours, prohibiting casual dress to ensure that personnel are easily identifiable, introducing a small internal military police on-base to monitor mission personnel activity, and others.43 In particular, recent research from the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security reveals that “peacekeeping missions with civilian protection mandates account for over 95 percent of reported allegations, while missions without such mandates account for under 5 percent.”44 Thus, delegates may want to consider implementing policies that will limit the amount of contact that mission personnel have with civilians as much as possible.
Bloc Positions
Western Liberal Democracies
These countries generally have a history of supporting strong action to combat SEA. The United States and France, for example, have long advocated for increased accountability among peacekeeping forces.45 A zero tolerance approach to any kind of SEA among peacekeeping troops is the unyielding stance of this bloc. Notably, most countries in this bloc are not significant troop contributors and as such, do not have as large of a stake in the issue as other countries that contribute many troops. Thus, their priority is focused more on the human rights aspect, unlike countries that contribute many troops and may be concerned about how stricter regulations will affect their own forces. While essentially all countries on the Security Council wish to do more to combat SEA, countries in this bloc are likely to push for harsher punitive measures.
Russia and China
Historically speaking, both Russia and China have offered slight criticism mostly aimed at Western nations when dealing with SEA. Though Russia does not outright oppose accountability and disciplinary measures for peacekeepers, the country continues to maintain that such mechanisms are not necessary for international security. For both Resolution 2272 (2016) and 2436 (2018), Russia supported the stance of Egypt: increased disciplinary measures would result in “arbitrary and unobjective decisions amounting to collective punishment against hundreds of peacekeeping personnel.”46,47 Similarly, China stresses that the mistakes of a comparatively
43 Michael Fleshman, “Tough UN Line on Peacekeeper Abuses | Africa Renewal,” United Nations, n.d., https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2005/tough-un-line-peacekeeper-abuses. 44 Dayal and Huvé, “Reducing Sexual Abuse and Exploitation in UN Peacekeeping Missions.” 45 United Nations News, “Security Council Asks Secretary-General to Replace Contingents from Countries Failing to Hold Sexual Predators Accountable,” United Nations, March 11, 2016, https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12277.doc.htm. 46 United Nations Security Council, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,” United Nations, March 11, 2016, https://undocs.org/S/RES/2272(2016). 47 United Nations Security Council, “United Nations Peacekeeping Performance,” United Nations, September 21, 2018, https://undocs.org/S/RES/2436(2018).
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 14 small number of troops should not tarnish the reputation of the effectiveness of the entire force. During the drafting of Resolution 2272, Egypt proposed an amendment to the text that would require specific conditions to be met before a military contingent could be replaced. Both China and Russia spoke in favour of the amendment, citing that such conditions would prevent unnecessary damage to troop morale and reputation that would undoubtedly occur if a military contingent was repatriated. In addition, with many countries supporting the Western bloc regarding this issue, Russia is concerned about the partiality of investigations and punishment if disciplinary measures were strengthened.
Asia and Africa
While India has shown strong commitment to combating SEA, the country is also a large troop contributor; hence, the security and safety of its peacekeepers is India's priority. As a country contributing many troops, any increased accountability or disciplinary measures will impact India more than other countries that do not contribute as many. Similarly, African nations on the Security Council—Kenya, Niger, and Tunisia—also maintain this stance, as the majority of peacekeeping troops originate from African countries. In the same vein, Vietnam will likely mirror India’s view. These countries are greatly concerned about SEA among peacekeepers but are less willing to advocate for any policies that will drastically affect their own troops. Instead, this bloc would prefer to focus on non-disciplinary solutions relating to education, training, mission policy, and awareness.
Discussion Questions
1. What is your country’s stance on dealing with sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers?
2. How many troops does your country contribute to peacekeeping forces? How large of a stake does your country have in peacekeeper policy?
3. Based on past policy implementations, what approach has been the most effective? Have any approaches been effective?
4. Through what means can the UNSC tackle the toxic culture among peacekeeping forces?
5. What type of action is needed most to help victims?
6. What are the advantages of increasing the severity of consequences for SEA? What are the disadvantages?
7. How can reporting channels be made accessible? Through what means can the UN allow more people to be aware of these channels?
8. How can the UNSC ensure that member states hold perpetrators from their country accountable?
Additional Resources
Child Rights International Network:
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 15 https://home.crin.org/issues/sexual-violence/un-peacekeepers.
UN Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Hub: https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/.
Code Blue Campaign: http://www.codebluecampaign.com/.
UN Peacekeeping: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 16 Bibliography
BBC News. “UN's CAR Envoy Gaye Sacked over Peacekeeper Abuse Claims.” British Broadcasting Corporation, August 12, 2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33890664.
Code Blue. “The UN’s Deal With a Dictator.” Code Blue Campaign, 2020.
CRIN. “UN Peacekeepers Timeline.” Child Rights International Network, n.d. https://home.crin.org/un- peacekeepers-timeline.
Dayal, Anjali, and Sophie Huvé. “Reducing Sexual Abuse and Exploitation in UN Peacekeeping Missions.” Georgetown Institute of Women Peace and Security, 2018. https://giwps.georgetown.edu/resource/reducing- sexual-abuse-and-exploitation-in-un-peacekeeping-missions/.
Essa, Azad. “Why Do Some Peacekeepers Rape? The Full Report.” Al Jazeera, August 10, 2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/08/peacekeepers-rape-full-report- 170804134221292.html.
Fleshman, Michael. “Tough UN Line on Peacekeeper Abuses.” United Nations, n.d. https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2005/tough-un-line-peacekeeper-abuses.
Gambale, Maria. “Striking a Better Balance in the Newest UN Peacekeeping Reforms.” PassBlue, October 11, 2018. https://www.passblue.com/2018/10/04/a-better-balance-has-been-won-in-the-newest-un- peacekeeping-reforms/.
IASC. “Inter-Agency Community-Based Complaint Mechanisms.” Inter-Agency Standing Committee, April 2016. https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/2020- 09/Best%20Practice%20Guide%20Inter%20Agency%20Community%20Based%20Complaint%20Mechanis ms.pdf.
Katie, Felix Francis. “Women in Yambio Speak out against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.” United Nations, December 13, 2019. https://unmiss.unmissions.org/women-yambio-speak-out-against-sexual-exploitation- and-abuse.
Oussou, Laurent Sam. “MONUSCO Explains Its Policy against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse to Civil Society Organizations in Kananga.” United Nations, April 8, 2020. https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/rdc- monusco-explains-its-policy-against-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-civil-society-organizations.
Peacekeeping. “United Nations Peacekeeping.” United Nations, n.d. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en.
Ryan, Kate. “U.N. Discloses Rise in Sex Abuse Cases, Ascribes It to Better Reporting.” Reuters, March 18, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-sexualviolence/un-discloses-rise-in-sex-abuse-cases-ascribes-it-to- better-reporting-idUSKCN1QZ2KV.
Smith, Dr Sarah, Jonathan Crowe and Anna John, Professor Rawiri Taonui, and Dr Elsina Wainwright AM. “Resolution 2272: Holding UN Peacekeepers Accountable.” Australian Institute of International Affairs, July 10, 2017. http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/resolution-2272-holding-un- peacekeepers-accountable/.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 17 United Nations General Assembly. “Investigation into Sexual Exploitation of Refugees by Aid Workers in West Africa.” United Nations, May 22, 2003. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27- 4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SE%20ARES%2057%20306.pdf.
United Nations General Assembly. “United Nations Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.” United Nations, March 10, 2017. https://undocs.org/A/RES/71/278.
United Nations Missions. “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.” United Nations, n.d. https://conduct.unmissions.org/sea-overview.
United Nations Missions. “Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.” United Nations, June 29, 2020. https://conduct.unmissions.org/remedial-trust-fund.
United Nations News. “Central African Republic: Ban Appoints Panel to Investigate UN Response to Sexual Abuse Allegations.” United Nations, June 22, 2015. https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/06/502312.
United Nations News. “Civil Society Advisory Board on Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.” United Nations, February 19, 2019. https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/civil- society-advisory-board-prevention-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse.
United Nations News. “Nation-Wide Educational Campaign to Tackle Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.” United Nations, December 3, 2019. https://minusca.unmissions.org/en/nation-wide-educational-campaign-tackle- sexual-exploitation-and-abuse.
United Nations News. “New Efforts Launched to Prevent Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.” United Nations, May 5, 2017. https://www.un.int/news/new-efforts-launched-prevent-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse.
United Nations News. “Security Council Asks Secretary-General to Replace Contingents from Countries Failing to Hold Sexual Predators Accountable.” United Nations, March 11, 2016. https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12277.doc.htm.
United Nations News. “Senior UN Official Outlines Steps Taken in Response to Central African Republic Abuse Allegations.” United Nations, September 11, 2015. https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/09/508622.
United Nations News. “UN Launches e-Learning Training to Tackle Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.” United Nations, July 22, 2016. https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/07/535182-un-launches-e-learning-training- tackle-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse.
United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services. “Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services.” United Nations, 2020. https://undocs.org/en/A/74/305(PartII).
United Nations Secretary General. “Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse.” United Nations, October 9, 2003. https://undocs.org/ST/SGB/2003/13.
United Nations Security Council. “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.” United Nations, March 11, 2016. https://undocs.org/S/RES/2272(2016).
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 18 United Nations Security Council. “United Nations Peacekeeping Performance.” United Nations, September 21, 2018. https://undocs.org/S/RES/2436(2018).
Wheeler, Skye. “UN Peacekeeping Has a Sexual Abuse Problem.” Human Rights Watch, August 7, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/11/un-peacekeeping-has-sexual-abuse-problem.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 19 Stability in South Sudan
Overview
Located in an area of East-Central Africa containing rich oil deposits and a plethora of ethnic groups, South Sudan has been mired in conflict for the entirety of its existence.48 In December 2013—a mere two years after its independence from Sudan in 2011—South Sudan descended into civil war as President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar were embroiled in a power struggle. As of 2020, the South Sudanese Civil War has devastated the country, claiming nearly 400,000 lives and displacing almost four million people, becoming one of the deadliest conflicts in recent memory.49 Hope is on the horizon, however, as a power-sharing agreement between the warring factions came into effect in August 2018, and the factions formed a unity government in February 2020.
As a result of the civil war, South Sudan has become the epicentre of a humanitarian crisis, with nearly 2 million of the internally displaced people in the country living in overcrowded sites where they face unhealthy sanitary conditions and have limited access to health facilities.50 Additionally, a large proportion of the population relies on farms and livestock as a primary source of income, but agricultural areas have been ravaged by recent floods and locust swarms, contributing to drastically rising poverty levels.51 Together with the economic and social shocks of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, South Sudan is perched precariously on the edge of a political crisis, and some experts fear that the country may devolve into chaos yet again.52 Thus, the Security Council must be vigilant and careful when navigating this complex and volatile situation.
The new unity government faces problems as well. After years of brutal conflict, Kiir and Machar are consistently at odds with each other, and the peace is still delicate. South Sudan’s population of nearly 11 million people is ethnically diverse, comprising over 60 ethnic groups, increasing the likelihood of ethnic conflict.53 Regular inter- communal clashes and opposition from groups who reject the new unity government, many of which are ethnically divided, threaten the fragile stability of the nation.
48 BBC News, “South Sudan Profile - Overview,” British Broadcasting Corporation, April 27, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa- 14019208#:~:text=Formed%20from%20the%2010%20southernmost,the%20Dinka%2C%20Nuer%20and%20Shilluk. 49 CFR, “Civil War in South Sudan | Global Conflict Tracker,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/global- conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan. 50 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Warns of Looming Humanitarian Crisis in South Sudan, amidst Ongoing Fighting and Coronavirus Threat,” United Nations, April 30, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/4/5eaa991c4/unhcr-warns-looming-humanitarian-crisis-south-sudan-amidst-ongoing- fighting.html. 51 Ibid. 52 Justin Lynch and Robbie Gramer, “A Fragile Peace Deal Could Soon Collapse in South Sudan,” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/05/south-sudan-peace-deal-diplomats-fear-collapse/. 53 Jennifer Williams, “The Conflict in South Sudan, Explained,” Vox, January 9, 2017, https://www.vox.com/world/2016/12/8/13817072/south-sudan-crisis-explained-ethnic-cleansing-genocide.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 20 Despite the recent peace agreement, South Sudan’s fundamental government structure remains the same. As a constitutional republic, South Sudan’s executive power is vested in the President and Vice President, while legislative power is distributed in a bicameral legislature: the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), consisting of elected officials, and the Council of States, consisting of officials elected by the ten individual state legislatures. 54 The country also has local state governments led by state governors. The two levels of government—the national government comprising the executive and legislative branch, and the subnational government comprising the state governments—makes South Sudan somewhat federalist, although regional governments with significant power do not exist on a smaller scale than states.55 Many other countries with federal governments further divide administrative power into county and municipal governments.
Delegates in the UNSC must formulate a solution that is consistent with their respective countries’ stances but are expected to also compromise when necessary. In particular, delegates must consider past actions taken by the UNSC, including the deployment of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) forces and the imposition of sanctions, while also taking care not to undermine the efforts of regional actors, like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU).
Timeline
July 8, 2011 — In preparation for South Sudan’s independence from Sudan, the UNSC adopts Resolution 1996, establishing UNMISS in order to “consolidate peace and security and to help establish conditions for development.”56
July 9, 2011 — South Sudan formally declares independence from Sudan after 20 years of conflict and a six-year peace process.57
July 23, 2013 — South Sudanese President Salva Kiir dismisses his entire cabinet, including Vice President Riek Machar, in a power struggle within the ruling political party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).58
December 16, 2013 — South Sudan descends into civil war as Kiir accuses Machar of plotting a coup. Machar and his supporters split from the SPLM and form the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO).59
54 Mohy Sabr, “South Sudan: Government and Society,” Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d., https://www.britannica.com/place/South- Sudan/Government-and-society. 55 Lovise Aalen, “The Paradox of Federalism and Decentralisation in South Sudan: An Instrument and an Obstacle for Peace,” Chr. Michelsen Institute, January 2019, https://www.cmi.no/publications/6974-the-paradox-of- federalism-and-decentralisation-in-south-sudan. 56 United Nations Peacekeeping, “UNMISS Fact Sheet,” United Nations, 2011, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmiss. 57 Gregg Carlstrom, “South Sudan Declares ‘New Beginning,’” Al Jazeera, February 7, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/southsudanindependence/2011/07/201179161956305487.html. 58 Al Jazeera, “Timeline: South Sudan since Independence,” Al Jazeera, February 22, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/timeline-south-sudan-independence-200222173029619.html. 59 Ibid.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 21 March 3, 2015 — The Security Council votes to adopt Resolution 2206, which places a travel ban and assets freeze on individuals identified by an expert panel to be “responsible for or complicit in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of South Sudan.”60
August 26, 2015 — Under the threat of an arms embargo and sanctions from the UN, Kiir signs a peace deal with Machar and agrees to reinstate him as Vice President. The peace deal, known as the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), is driven by IGAD.61
April 26, 2016 — Machar returns to South Sudan’s capital, Juba, and is sworn in as Vice President, forming the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU).62
July 7, 2016 — Fighting between the two factions breaks out again due to a disagreement between soldiers at a security checkpoint; Machar returns to exile.63
June 12, 2017 — IGAD establishes the High Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) at its Extra-Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government on South Sudan with the aim of reviving ARCSS.64
February 2018 — Nine rebel groups merge to form the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA).
July 13, 2018 — The Security Council adopts Resolution 2428. The resolution imposes an arms embargo on South Sudan and extends the 2015 sanctions.65
September 12, 2018 — Mediated by IGAD, Kiir, Machar, and the Opposition Alliance sign a new peace deal: The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). Similar to the 2015 peace deal, the new power-sharing agreement provides a path for a transitional unity government to be installed.66
60 United Nations Meeting Coverage, “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2206 (2015), Lays Groundwork for Targeted Sanctions in South Sudan Should Peace Deal Fail,” United Nations, March 3, 2015, https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11805.doc.htm. 61 BBC News, “South Sudan President Salva Kiir Signs Peace Deal,” British Broadcasting Corporation, August 26, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34066511. 62 Al Jazeera, “Timeline: South Sudan since Independence.” 63 BBC News, “South Sudan: Clashes Erupt in Juba Hours after UN Plea,” British Broadcasting Corporation, July 11, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36762831. 64 IGAD, “IGAD - High Level Revitalization Forum for the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan Concluded with Signing of an Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities,” Intergovernmental Authority on Development, December 23, 2017, https://igad.int/programs/115-south-sudan-office/1731-high-level-revitalization-forum-agreement- on-cessation-of-hostilities-protection-of-civilians-and-humanitarian-access-republic-of-south-sudan. 65 United Nations Meetings Coverage, “Adopting Resolution 2428 (2018), Security Council Extends Sanctions on South Sudan,” United Nations, July 13, 2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13421.doc.htm#:~:text= By%20the%20terms%20of%20resolution,the%20Council%20expressed%20deep%20concern. 66 Clayton Hazvinei, “Reviving Peace in South Sudan through the Revitalised Peace Agreement – ACCORD,” African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, March 12, 2019, https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/reviving-peace-in-south- sudan-through-the-revitalised- peace-agreement/.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 22 February 22, 2020 — Machar is reinstated as Vice President, marking the reestablishment of the TGoNU, now named the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU).67
Historical Analysis
Like many other African countries, South Sudan is no stranger to conflict. The nation’s current state of unrest dates back to the colonial era, which laid the foundations for much of the current ethnic and religious tensions that exist in the region.
Between 1890 and 1953, Sudan was under colonial rule by the British, who partitioned the country into two parts along ethno-religious lines: the primarily Muslim-and Arab-dominated north, and the south—which adhered to more traditional East African customs and cultures of the area.68 In 1946, the British merged the two sections of Sudan and made Arabic the official administrative language of the country, pushing southern leaders out of government positions and increasing the already significant political and economic dominance that the mostly Arab north held.69 The disparity between northern and southern Sudanese leaders led to both resource disputes about the distribution of oil reserves and ethno-religious tensions between the north and south, fueling growing unrest that eventually sparked two consecutive civil wars: the first between 1955 to 1972 and the second between 1983 and 2005 .70
The borders that carved out southern Sudan during the colonial age were not drawn cleanly across ethnic lines and contributed heavily to the large amount of intercommunal conflict present in modern-day South Sudan. Whereas the northern section of Sudan was mostly unified under an Islamic religious identity and Arab ethnic identity, southern Sudan comprised numerous different ethnic and religious groups who oftentimes held animosity towards each other.71 The current nation of South Sudan retains those same borders and thus, the ethnic tensions as well.
Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union have also contributed to South Sudan’s current state. At the height of the First Sudanese Civil War during the 1960s, the Soviet Union supported the Sudanese government in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, while Israel and other U.S. allies supported rebel groups fighting for southern independence by sending arms through bordering Ethiopia. 72 The U.S. never directly involved themselves in the region militarily until 1974, when the pro-Western Ethiopian Empire was overthrown in a communist coup d'état, pushing Ethiopia towards the Soviet bloc.73 In an effort to balance increased Soviet
67 Al Jazeera, “Timeline: South Sudan since Independence.” 68 EISA, “Sudan: British Colonialism's Divide and Rule (1896-1939),” African Democracy Encyclopaedia Project, January 2020, https://www.eisa.org/wep/sudoverview3.htm. 69 SAIL, “What's Happening in Sudan?,” Sudanese Australian Integrated Learning (SAIL) Program, n.d., https://web.archive.org/web/20051227024857/http://home.vicnet.net.au/~sail/insudan.htm. 70 Ana Cascão, “Resource-Based Conflict in South Sudan and Gambella (Ethiopia): When Water, Land and Oil Mix with Politics,” Centro de Estudos Internacionais, January 1, 1970, https://books.openedition.org/cei/295. 71 EISA, “Sudan: British Colonialism's Divide and Rule (1896-1939),” African Democracy Encyclopaedia Project, January 2020, https://www.eisa.org/wep/sudoverview3.htm. 72 Dan Connell, “Sudan: Global Trade, Local Impact, Arms Transfers to All Sides in the Civil War in Sudan,” Human Rights Watch, August 1998, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/sudan/Sudarm988-03.htm. 73 Ibid.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 23 influence in the region, the U.S. began sending large amounts of military support to Sudan, which was matched by Soviet arms flows to Ethiopia.74 This enormous influx of American arms convinced the Sudanese government in Khartoum—largely controlled by northern politicians—that it wielded the power to finally bring the southern rebels to heel.75 With simmering frustration remaining from the first civil war, the U.S. arms flow to Sudan only served to exacerbate tensions, contributing to the start of the Second Sudanese Civil War in 1983, which was again fought between the Sudanese government and the southern rebels. Today, the millions of arms imported during the Cold War are still a source of tension and contribute to the scale of violence during conflict.76
On January 9, 2005, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), an alliance of southern rebels, and the Government of Sudan signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), ending the Second Sudanese Civil War. The accord granted autonomy for the southern region of Sudan and guaranteed a South Sudanese referendum on independence in six years. Six years later in 2011, the people of South Sudan voted overwhelmingly for secession, with nearly 99 percent of citizens in favour of independence.77 On July 9, 2011, South Sudan formally declared independence from Sudan. Simultaneously, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to help the country stabilize.
The actions of the new government resulted in terrible consequences for most South Sudanese citizens. In July 2013, President Salva Kiir accused Vice President Riek Machar of plotting to overthrow him. Kiir subsequently dismissed his entire cabinet, and he and Machar entered into a bitter power struggle. By December, the struggle had transformed into full-blown civil war, and Machar formed the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in- Opposition (SPLM/A-IO). Despite the political nature of the conflict, heavy ethnic tensions lay under the guise of political differences, with soldiers from the Dinka ethnic group aligning with Kiir, and those from the Nuer ethnic group aligning with Machar. Troops from both sides murdered civilians, committed rape, destroyed property, looted villages, and recruited child soldiers—provoking international condemnation.78
The rapidly escalating bloodshed caught international attention soon after the civil war broke out. Under the threat of sanctions from the Security Council, Kiir and Machar entered negotiations mediated by IGAD, eventually signing the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2015. The peace pact sought to end the two-year-long civil war and was ratified by the South Sudanese National Legislative Assembly on September 10, 2015. ARCSS subsequently resulted in the formation of a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) on April 26, 2016, when Machar returned to Juba, the South Sudanese capital, as Vice President. Unfortunately, a few months later, fighting broke out among the two groups again, breaking the peace and rendering ARCSS meaningless. Throughout 2017 and 2018,
74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Al Jazeera, “Timeline: South Sudan since Independence.” 78 United Nations News, “South Sudan: ‘Outraged’ UN Experts Say Ongoing Widespread Human Rights Violations May Amount to War Crimes,” United Nations, n.d., https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/ south-sudan-%E2%80%98outraged%E2%80%99-un-experts-say-ongoing-widespread-human-rights-violations-may-amount-war.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 24 multiple ceasefires were negotiated and subsequently violated between the two sides and other factions, sometimes mere hours after they began.79
Machar and his faction were not the only group that rebelled against Kiir’s government. Multiple other small rebel groups also revolted, with most of them advocating for a specific solution to the conflict. In February 2018, nine of these smaller rebel factions merged and formed the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA). The Opposition Alliance’s primary goal is to institute a strong, federalist government in South Sudan—a political system that combines a central government with subordinate regional or provincial governments, thus granting increased representation and power to small, regional ethnic groups. In addition, the SSOA criticized previous peace agreements for not implementing a complete government overhaul, believing that only a fundamental change in the political system will achieve long-lasting conflict resolution.
After the breakdown of the TGoNU, regional actors scrambled to try to save the peace deal. In June 2018, IGAD established the High Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF). For 15 months afterwards, the HLRF was able to facilitate talks between Kiir, Machar, and the newly formed Opposition Alliance. As a result of their efforts, the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) was signed on September 12, 2018, in Addis Ababa.
Despite the seemingly unanimous agreement between R-ARCSS signatories, not all parties were satisfied with the accord. As negotiations of R-ARCSS were drawing to a close, a group within the Opposition Alliance became dissatisfied with the agreement, even accusing neighbouring countries who were part of the agreement, such as Sudan and Uganda, of only looking out for their own national interests. Consequently, this group splintered from the Opposition Alliance and reformed itself as the South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA)—a coalition of rebel groups that did not sign R-ARCSS. Regarding R-ARCSS, SSOMA stated that the agreement “[did] not address the fundamental root causes of the conflict,” believing that the government should be more federal in nature. While South Sudan’s government already possessed federalist characteristics, such as state governments, local governments on the county and municipal level simply did not exist, and power at the subnational level was concentrated solely with state governors.80 Nonetheless, the implementation of R-ARCSS continued, and after months of delays, Kiir, Machar, and the Opposition Alliance signed a peace deal that established a new transitional government on February 22, 2020—the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU). This transitional unity government is designed to be in power for three years, until democratic elections can be held.
These colonial actions, historical conflicts, peace deals, and international efforts have culminated in the delicate political transition process that South Sudan finds itself in today.
79 Associated Press, “South Sudan Cease-Fire Violated Within Hours,” New York Times, June 30, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/30/world/africa/south-sudan-cease-fire-violated-within-hours.html. 80 ReliefWeb, “South Sudan SSOMA Says Committed to Rome Not IGAD Peace Process - South Sudan,” ReliefWeb, April 28, 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-ssoma-says-committed- rome-not-igad-peace-process.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 25 Past UN/International Involvement
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
UNMISS was established on July 8, 2011 by UNSC Resolution 1996 at the time of South Sudan’s independence from Sudan. Originally, the mission was formed to help the South Sudanese government govern effectively and develop the country economically.81 However, after South Sudan descended into civil war in December 2013, the mission’s objectives shifted. In order to keep up with the rapidly escalating violence and death toll, UNMISS was reinforced: the Security Council provided the mission with more resources and thousands of extra troops, shifting the mandate of UNMISS towards the protection of civilians and the dissemination of humanitarian aid. Since then, UNMISS has worked with other organizations like UNICEF and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) to provide aid and physical protection to over 200,000 displaced civilians.82
Currently, UNMISS is mandated to perform the following tasks: “[Protecting] civilians; creating the conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance; supporting the implementation of the revitalized agreement and the peace process; monitoring and investigating human rights.”83
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2206
On March 3, 2015, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2206, which imposed targeted sanctions on individuals and groups that were contributing to the conflict in South Sudan. Specifically, the sanctions included a global travel ban and assets freeze on the top leaders of all the major factions in an attempt to pressure parties of the conflict to end the bloodshed. On July 13, 2018, the Security Council expanded the extent of the sanctions measures imposed on South Sudan in response to unprecedented levels of violence. These measures included an arms embargo in order to limit the number of weapons in the country. Since then, the Security Council has renewed the sanctions measures every year through resolutions 2271, 2280, 2290 (2016), 2353 (2017), 2418, 2428 (2018), 2471 (2019), and 2521 (2020). Unfortunately, a 2020 UN report found that many of South Sudan’s neighbouring countries have ignored the sanctions by failing to conduct proper inspections and, in some cases, even delivered weapons to the country84 In recent years, these measures have been a controversial topic within the Security Council, and the committee is often split on the topic; most African nations on the Council, as well as China and Russia, have historically favoured giving the AU and IGAD complete autonomy over peace processes in South Sudan, believing that any interference from the Security Council would be counterproductive.
81 United Nations Peacekeeping, “Background,” United Nations, n.d., https://unmiss.unmissions.org/background. 82 Adam Day, “Impact of UN Mission in South Sudan Complicated by Dilemmas of Protection,” IPI Global Observatory, December 12, 2019, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2019/12/impact-un-mission-south- sudan-complicated-by-dilemmas-of- protection/#:~:text=UNMISS%20Saved%20Lives,numbers%20of%20women%20and%20children. 83 United Nations Peacekeeping, “Mandate,” United Nations, n.d., https://unmiss.unmissions.org/mandate. 84 Nyagoah Pur, “UN Security Council Should Renew South Sudan Arms Embargo,” Human Rights Watch, May 8, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/08/un-security-council-should-renew-south-sudan-arms-embargo.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 26 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)
Due to the efforts of IGAD, R-ARCSS was signed on September 12, 2018, in Addis Ababa by Kiir, Machar, and the Opposition Alliance. The new agreement was designed to be both the successor to the original ARCSS that had failed three years prior, as well as a comprehensive peace accord that included all the necessary provisions needed to end the conflict and foster South Sudan’s development. Hence, R-ARCSS absorbed and expanded on most of the provisions from ARCSS as well as other existing agreements.
As it covered and expanded on so many previous agreements, the scope of R-ARCSS is quite large. The agreement covers essentially everything that a new South Sudanese government would need to function smoothly, including ceasefire agreements, plans for humanitarian assistance, financial and economic management, and governance structures.85
R-ARCSS formed a new unity government that is mandated to rule for a three-year transition period, after which democratic elections will be held. Although the deadlines that the pact outlined have been pushed back multiple times, R-ARCSS has generally been successful; the recent formation of the new government and the gradually dwindling tensions between factions are all key markers of progress that no previous peace agreement in South Sudan has ever achieved. However, it remains to be seen whether the transition period and commitment to democratic elections can be upheld without hostilities reigniting again.
Rome Resolution on Monitoring and Verification of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA)
On January 13, 2020, SSOMA—the coalition of rebel groups that did not sign R-ARCSS—and the TGoNU signed CoHA in Rome, Italy. The Rome Resolution called for a ceasefire starting on January 15, and the signing was mediated by the Sant’Egidio Community, a lay Catholic association. Both parties of the pact agreed to continue political dialogue under the guidance of the international community in order to address the root causes of the civil war.86 Subsequently, the agreement has generally been adhered to by both parties, although a recent August 2020 ambush on Machar by what appears to be a subgroup of SSOMA has put that into question.
Current Situation
While R-ARCSS and the peace deal signed in February 2020 have calmed political tensions between the main belligerents of the civil war and provided new hope for the future, the vacuum created by the lack of governance under Kiir has reignited ethnic tensions and exacerbated intercommunal violence, leading to hundreds of deaths. Concerningly, there were 415 violent incidents in South Sudan during the first five months of 2020 alone.87 Although UN peacekeepers have been dispatched to calm hostilities, recent economic burdens brought on by COVID-19 and flash flooding, coupled with pre-existing ethnic tensions between ethnic groups, provide the
85 Ibid. 86 Radio Tamazuj, “Government, Rebel Group Sign Declaration of Peace,” Radio Tamazuj, January 13, 2020, https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/government-holdout-opposition-groups-sign-declaration-of-peace. 87 United Nations Peacekeeping, “Escalating Intercommunal Conflict Could Unravel the Peace Agreement,” United Nations, June 9, 2020, https://unmiss.unmissions.org/escalating-intercommunal-conflict-could-unravel-peace- agreement.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 27 embers for further violence. Additionally, an MSF staff member, as well as several other aid workers, were killed in a May 2020 skirmish, hampering humanitarian efforts.88 Suppressing the violence will be difficult, as the government is already stretched thin while attempting to cement its legitimacy and implement R-ARCSS. Recent events involving SSOMA have also inflamed tensions, putting South Sudan in an improving but still delicate situation.
Intercommunal Violence
While outright conflict between political factions has calmed in recent months, intercommunal violence between ethnic groups is on the rise, resulting in 658 deaths in the first quarter of 2020 alone.89 Despite the fact that South Sudan consists of more than 60 ethnic groups, three primary groups—the Dinka, the Lou Nuer, and Murle— make up the bulk of the country’s population and thus facilitate the vast majority of the intercommunal conflict.90 These ethnic groups are traditionally nomadic cattle herders; as such, most of the conflict between them are disputes over cattle and grazing land. 91 Critically, such disputes perpetuate a cycle of revenge and violence between ethnic groups, as one skirmish can set off a chain reaction of retaliation. In February 2020, for example, armed men from the Nuer raided cattle and abducted children from the Murle, which in turn provoked retaliation from the Murle in the form of a raid on a Nuer village in May that killed over 300 people.92 Similar cases occur on a monthly basis and have been growing in frequency, largely due to the economic hardships and humanitarian crisis caused by the South Sudanese Civil War—exacerbated by the global COVID-19 pandemic.93
Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU)
When R-ARCSS was drafted in 2018, the agreement was very clear on how ministers and deputy ministers would be assigned in order to include all parties in the new government. However, the agreement did not delineate any power-sharing agreements for the governors of South Sudan’s ten states. As a result, ever since the signing of the agreement that formed the new unity government in February 2020, the biggest threat to lasting peace in South Sudan has been the selection of governors, who are independent from the cabinet and are appointed by the factions within the government (i.e., Kiir, Machar, SPLM, Opposition Alliance). While Kiir and Machar did argue over the selection of governors for the country’s oil-producing states, they reached a deal in June 2020, further cementing the peace.
88 MSF, “South Sudan: MSF Staff Member Killed, Dozens Wounded during Renewed Violence in Pieri,” Doctors Without Borders, May 19, 2020, https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/news/south -sudan-msf-staff-member-killed-dozens-wounded-during-renewed. 89 United Nations News, “Victims of Intercommunal Violence in South Sudan Deserve 'Justice, Truth and Reparations': Bachelet,” United Nations, May 22, 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/05/1064792. 90 Lukong Stella Shulika and Nwabufo Okeke Uzodike, “Inter-Ethnic Conflict in South Sudan : a Challenge to Peace,” ResearchGate, January 2013, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282878836_Inter-ethnic_ conflict_in_South_Sudan_a_challenge_to_peace. 91 Ibid. 92 Al Jazeera, “Hundreds Killed in Inter-Communal Clashes in South Sudan,” Al Jazeera, May 20, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/5/20/hundreds-killed-in-inter-communal-clashes-in-south-sudan. 93 United Nations News, “Victims of Intercommunal Violence in South Sudan Deserve 'Justice, Truth and Reparations': Bachelet,” United Nations, May 22, 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/05/1064792.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 28 As part of their agreement, Kiir will nominate governors for six states, including the oil-producing states of Unity and Central Equatoria, which includes the capital, Juba. On the other hand, Machar will nominate governors for three states, including the Upper Nile state, which is the largest oil-producing state. The Opposition Alliance will nominate a governor for the tenth state, Jonglei.
In 2018, the Kiir government estimated that supporting the new RTGoNU would cost in excess of 17 billion South Sudanese pounds (SSP), or about USD 130 million.94 This heavy financial burden has made it difficult for the government to implement R-ARCSS while maintaining domestic security.
South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA)
In April 2020, SSOMA reaffirmed its rejection of R-ARCSS, stating that the group is only in support of the Rome Resolution. The group also agreed to UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ declaration of a global ceasefire in light of the pandemic.95 Moreover, SSOMA announced a partnership with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO) in order to facilitate easier access to humanitarian aid. Despite this firm declaration, on August 21, 2020, six of Machar’s bodyguards were killed in a road ambush by the National Salvation Front (NAS), a rebel group that is part of SSOMA. This incident was in clear violation of the Rome Resolution, which SSOMA had reaffirmed only a few months earlier in April. As a result, tensions rose again between SSOMA and the government, with South Sudan’s military later releasing a statement stating that “they are ready to retaliate against NAS in case of continued attacks on their positions and on civilians.”96
Possible Solutions and Controversies
Renewing Sanctions
The unique mandate of the UNSC allows the committee to impose sanctions on certain countries and groups, and since 2015, the Security Council has imposed targeted sanctions and an arms embargo on South Sudan. According to the latest data from UNMISS, there was an increase in the amount of intercommunal violence during the first half of 2020. Much of this violence is being facilitated by the consistent flow of arms from neighbouring nations into South Sudan, and as a result, hundreds of civilian lives are being lost each month.97 Additionally, the flow of weapons is enabling abuses, including killings, rape, and forced recruitment of child
94 Clayton Vhumbunu, “Reviving Peace in South Sudan through the Revitalised Peace Agreement – ACCORD,” African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, March 12, 2019, https://www.accord.org.za /conflict-trends/reviving-peace-in-south-sudan-through-the-revitalised- peace-agreement/. 95 NAS, “SSOMA’s Response to the of UN SG on COVID-19 Ceasefire Request - National Salvation Front,” National Salvation Front, April 11, 2020, https://www.nassouthsudan.com/. download/20200409-ssomas-response-to-the-of-un-sg-on-covid-19-ceasefire-request/. 96 Sudans Post, “SSPDF Threatens ‘Deadly Force’ against Cirilo’s Rebels,” Sudans Post, August 24, 2020, https://www.sudanspost.com/sspdf-threatens-deadly-force-against-cirilos-rebels/. 97 ICRC, “South Sudan: Millions Struggle to Recover from Unsparing War, as Violence Threatens Fragile Stability,” International Committee of the Red Cross, February 20, 2020, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/south-sudan-millions-struggle-recover- unsparing-war-violence- threatens-fragile-stability.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 29 soldiers.98 The purpose of the 2018 arms embargo was to minimize such abuse and was meant to restrict the scope of the conflict by limiting the belligerents’ access to weapons. Unfortunately, a steady stream of weapons was still able to flow into South Sudan due to the non-compliance of neighbouring countries, including Uganda and Sudan, who flouted the arms embargo.99 With the recent uptick in violence against civilians, some delegates may choose to continue with this approach by renewing the arms embargo—which is due to expire in May 2021—and strengthening the embargo's enforcement and monitoring. For example, the Security Council could form a committee of trained, UN sanction monitors to inspect cargo currently exempted from inspections— such as arms only meant for defensive use—and hold countries who violate the embargo accountable.100
The arms embargo is not the only measure that the Security Council has put in place. The targeted sanctions placed on individuals deemed to be obstacles to peace are meant to either pressure them to stop hindering peace processes or to remove them from the equation entirely by locking them out of resources. As of 2020, only eight individuals and no organizations are under targeted sanctions; thus, the Security Council may wish to consider placing more persons or entities under targeted sanctions or bolstering enforcement of existing sanctions.101
Suspending Sanctions
After five years under sanctions and two years under the arms embargo, significant results have yet to be seen. This outcome, coupled with the present circumstances, may make the removal of punitive measures a strategic move. Suspending the arms embargo will allow the government to freely rearm its military and police and—with the recent escalation of intercommunal violence—more law enforcement is desperately needed.
Targeted sanctions, too, may be an obstacle to peace. Considering that the individuals that sanctions are placed on hold significant political and military power and are vital to securing lasting peace, suspending them can streamline the volatile political processes that are currently occurring; alienating such individuals through sanctions may achieve the opposite of the intended result. Some experts also believe that sanctions in South Sudan are counterproductive, as they are empowering sanctioned individuals to push their agendas harder than before, determined to prove their power in military terms.102 Consequently, political and military actors might be pushed to take more extreme actions than what they would have done in the absence of sanctions. Moreover, sanctions may aggravate the delicate power balance between the government and remaining rebel factions, with
98 Nyagoah Pur, “UN Security Council Should Renew South Sudan Arms Embargo,” Human Rights Watch, May 8, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/08/un-security-council-should-renew-south-sudan-arms-embargo. 99 Ibid. 100 United Nations Security Council, “Exemptions to the Arms Embargo,” United Nations, n.d., https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2206/exemptions/arms_embargo. 101 Dang Dinh Quy, “Fact Sheet On The 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee,” Security Council Report, January 1, 2020, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D /south-sudan-sanctions-fact-sheet.pdf. 102 Matthew LeRiche, “How the Use of Targeted Sanctions Can Undermine Peace in South Sudan – ACCORD,” African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, December 5, 2017, https://www.accord.org.za /conflict-trends/how-the-use-of-targeted-sanctions-can-undermine-peace-in-south-sudan/.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 30 a South Sudanese official even warning that “continuing sanctions would weaken the government and embolden holdout groups that refused to sign the revitalized peace deal.”103
Suspending the measures currently in place includes its own risks. Particularly, some experts warn that if Kiir rushes to re-arm his army with the suspension of the arms embargo, Kiir's rivals may be prompted to do the same, therefore risking an escalation of hostilities and a collapse of the peace deal.104
Within the sea of possible actions to take, a middle ground can be found between renewing punitive measures and suspending them. With the recent progress that South Sudan has made towards lasting peace, easing some of the targeted sanctions on individuals to relieve pressure on volatile political actors while maintaining the arms embargo to prevent any increases in violence may prove to be beneficial.
Bolstering Peacekeeping Operations
While taking measures to ensure that the peace process runs smoothly via the government is crucial for stability, there is another important facet to the situation: the protection of civilians. Particularly, violence between ethnic groups threatens the stability of South Sudan and the lives of innocent individuals. However, while UNMISS has the potential to help de-escalate those tensions, its current lack of resources hinders that goal.
Despite a USD 1 billion annual budget and over 17,000 mission personnel working to protect civilians as part of UNMISS, the rising civilian death toll demonstrates the need for an expansion of the mission to adapt to the changing circumstances.105 In 2019, a report from the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network found that while UNMISS has been effective in protecting civilians and delivering humanitarian aid, the protection is limited to only a handful of UN bases and consumes nearly 70 percent of the mission’s resources, which includes manpower, supplies, and funding.106 This leaves little funding for other operations, like long-range patrolling and facilitating peaceful dialogue between ethnic groups. In essence, UNMISS is stretched too thin; therefore, increasing UNMISS’ budget and resources would greatly alleviate its current resource constraints. Bolstering UNMISS forces in order to better stabilize South Sudan is especially prudent considering that the country is currently being ravaged by the COVID-19 pandemic and a devastated economy.
103 Dimo Aurelio, “South Sudan Reacts Angrily to Renewed UNSC Sanctions,” Voice of America News, May 31, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/archive/south-sudan-reacts-angrily-renewed-unsc-sanctions. 104 Comfort Ero, “Lifting Arms Embargo Could Be Catastrophic for South Sudan,” Crisis Group, May 27, 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/lifting-arms-embargo-could-be-catastrophic-south-sudan. 105 United Nations Peacekeeping, “About UNMISS,” United Nations, November 16, 2017, https://unmiss.unmissions .org/about-unmiss. 106 Adam Day, “Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS),” Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network, February 2019, https://effectivepeaceops.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/EPON- UNMISS-Report-LOWRES.pdf.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 31 Bloc Positions
United States and Europe
Ever since South Sudan devolved into civil war, the United States has been the primary sponsor for every resolution urging the Security Council to take action. Other Western powers take a similar stance. Recently, this bloc has acknowledged the progress made by regional actors like IGAD, but still strongly advocate for sanctions. Unlike many other nations on the Council, such as China or the African bloc, the West has little to no investment in South Sudan, with many countries in this bloc even banning domestic corporations from doing business with South Sudanese companies. Therefore, limiting the scope of violence and protecting civilians is this bloc's main priority.
Russia and China
Although both Russia and China voted in support of the 2015 sanctions, the two countries recently switched their stance to one supporting the suspension of all sanctions levied against South Sudan. Historically, Russia and China have shied away from supporting sanctions on other nations; the same holds true now, as both countries are in favour of taking a backseat approach to South Sudan. Specifically, they advocate for IGAD to be allowed to handle the peace process and insist that the Security Council refrain from taking more active measures, like sanctions. However, despite objecting to punitive measures, this bloc follows the rest of the Council in supporting expanding support for the UNMISS.
In contrast to the West’s lack of investment in South Sudan, both Russia and China have large stakes in the country. China in particular has significant investments in South Sudan’s oil sector; in fact, the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation is one of the country's largest investors.107 Russia has its own energy and infrastructure investments in the country, but also has an agreement to cooperate with the South Sudanese government to strengthen the country's security and military capabilities—a deal only set to take effect when the Security Council’s arms embargo is lifted.108
Africa
Many countries expressed shock and alarm when, in 2019, all African nations on the Security Council voted against extending the sanctions measures being imposed on South Sudan. The representative of South Africa stated, “Given the ongoing political process in South Sudan, sanctions are not helpful at this time,” encouraging the Council to support efforts being made by IGAD and the AU instead.109 African nations on the Council still hold this stance, citing both the inefficacy of sanctions to produce legitimate results and the progress that regional actors have made in recent months. Representing the views of many African nations, the AU Peace and Security
107 Kester Klomegah, “Russia's Interest in South Sudan,” Modern Diplomacy, February 2, 2020, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/01/30/russias-interest-in-south-sudan/. 108 Ibid. 109 United Nations Meetings Coverage, “Security Council Renews Sanctions against South Sudan, Adopting Resolution 2471 (2019) by 10 Votes in Favour, with 5 Abstentions | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases,” United Nations, May 30, 2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13827.doc.htm.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 32 Council also recently urged “the concerned members of the international community, who imposed sanctions and other forms of punitive measures on South Sudan, to immediately and unconditionally lift them.”110
Discussion Questions
1. What stake does your country have in South Sudan?
2. What is your nation’s stance on sanctions? Why does it hold this stance?
3. What are the advantages of imposing sanctions? What are the disadvantages? How successful have sanctions been historically?
4. What forces drive ethnic tensions in South Sudan? How can they be reduced?
5. What strategies have been most successful in ensuring the stability of power-sharing arrangements in transitional governments?
6. How can the Security Council help South Sudan rebuild and develop in both political, social, and economic senses?
7. Through what means can the UNMISS continue offering security and humanitarian aid to civilians, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic?
Additional Resources
United Nations Mission in South Sudan: https://unmiss.unmissions.org/
Intergovernmental Authority on Development: https://igad.int
Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS): https://igad.int/programs/115-south-sudan-office/1950-signed-revitalized-agreement-on-the-resolution-of- the-conflict-in-south-sudan
African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes—Analysis of R-ARCSS: https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/reviving-peace-in-south-sudan-through-the-revitalised-peace- agreement/
UNSC Sanctions on South Sudan: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2206
110 WIB, “Security Council Vote on South Sudan Sanctions: What’s In Blue,” What’s In Blue, May 28, 2020, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2020/05/security-council-vote-on-south-sudan-sanctions.php.
Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 33 Bibliography
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