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CONFLICT TRENDS (NO. 31) REAL-TIME ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE, OCTOBER 2014 Welcome to the October issue of the Armed Con- flict Location & Event Data Project’s (ACLED) Con- flict Trends report. Each month, ACLED research- ers gather, analyse and publish data on political violence in Africa in realtime. Monthly updates to realtime conflict event data are published through our research partners at Climate Change and African Political Stability (CCAPS) and also on the ACLED website. This month’s issue focuses on protest dynamics in Egypt, and the wider North African region in com- parative perspective; the issue of service delivery protests in South Africa; cross-border violence by Boko Haram in Cameroon, the complex issue of ongoing unrest in South Sudan, and the changing nature of political violence and civilian targeting in Zimbabwe. A special focus feature explores the interrelationship of conflict and the spread of Ebola in West Africa. Elsewhere on the continent, violence levels are persistent in in Kenya and Somalia, overall levels dropped in the past month in Sudan, Central Afri- can Republic, and Democratic Republic of Congo. By contrast, violence escalated in Libya while the intensity of violent conflict increased in Nigeria. Conflict Trajectory, September 2014 Figure 1: Conflict Events and Reported Fatalities by Country, from 1st March - 27th September 2014 1 ACLED is a publicly available database of political violence, which focuses on conflict in African states. Data is geo-referenced and disaggregated by type of violence and a wide variety of actors. Further information and maps, data, trends and publications can be found at www.acleddata.com or by contacting [email protected]. Follow ACLED on Twitter for realtime updates, news and analysis: @ACLEDinfo CONFLICT TRENDS (NO. 31) REAL-TIME ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE, OCTOBER 2014 Cameroon Since the beginning of 2014, violent events in Cameroon But although the number of Boko Haram attacks has in- have steadily increased, peaking in August (see Figure 2). creased, the lower casualty figures resulting from these These events have largely been clustered in Cameroon's attacks show that the deployment of Cameroonian forces Far North region (see Figure 3) and have been dominated to the Far North (BBC News, May 27, 2014) has had a seri- by violence involving Boko Haram. But despite the rising ous impact on Boko Haram's operational effectiveness. number of violent events, fatality levels have been much A notable example of the impact of Cameroon's deploy- less stable, with a dramatic jumps in fatalities recorded in ment to the Far North includes their thwarting of numer- June and September. ous attempted incursions by Boko Haram fighters near However, these surges in fatalities can obscure the true Fotokol. Fotokol lies just across the border from Gamboru picture. In both cases, the totals are skewed by pairs of in Nigeria which was captured by Boko Haram fighters events in which more than 150 Boko Haram fighters were after a lengthy battle with Nigerian forces, leading to the killed by Cameroonian military forces with few reported widely publicized retreat of 500 Nigerian soldiers into casualties of their own. Cameroon in late August (Reuters, August 26, 2014). Clashes around the town of Fotokol were responsible for Rather than indicating increasing instability or failings by the Cameroonian military, the high fatality figures in both more than 90% of all casualties between August- June and September can be seen to represent the re- September (see Figure 4), although similar fighting also occurred further south in response to attempts by Boko sponse (in terms of casualties inflicted) of Cameroon's Haram fighters to take control of border villages. military to multiple Boko Haram incursions, which have worryingly increased since the first half of 2014 (see Fig- Another important aspect of the analysis of fatalities in ure 4). Cameroon is the division between battle deaths (occurring Figure 2: Conflict Events and Fatalities in Cameroon, from December 2011 -September 2014 2 CONFLICT TRENDS (NO. 31) REAL-TIME ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE, OCTOBER 2014 Cameroon mainly between the Cameroonian security forces and Boko Haram) and deaths of civilians. Civilian deaths have risen since June, with Boko Haram's attack on Kolofata in July (Camer.be, August 12, 2014) and a more recent attack in Tourou in September (Camer.be, September 24, 2014) being notable examples of violence against civilians. Nevertheless, reports indicate that the vast majority of reported battle deaths are those of Boko Haram fighters. This suggests the increasing capacity of the Cameroonian military responding to this threat. In addition to the impact of the Cameroonian military di- rectly, Boko Haram is also facing increased pressure from the Nigerian military in Borno State (which neighbours Cameroon's Far North) where gains have recently been made against Boko Haram following setbacks over the past few months (CNN World, September 25, 2014). While the group’s activities in Nigeria in the past few months have been heavily dominated by violence against civilians, September saw a marked reversal of this trend, with over half of all events attributed to Boko Haram in- volving engagement with the military (compared to just under one-third between January and August). Combined, Figure 3: Map of Reported Fatalities by Location in Far the two-fronted pressure on the group may have a signifi- North Cameroon, from January to September 2014 cant effect in coming weeks. Figure 4: Conflict Events Attributed to Boko Haram in Cameroon, January—September 2014 3 CONFLICT TRENDS (NO. 31) REAL-TIME ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE, OCTOBER 2014 Egypt After a spike in riots and protest events in Egypt in July tion since 2011 has entailed the mobilisation of coercive 2013, both the frequency and intensity has gradually de- force in battles (see Figure 6). clined over the succeeding year, and continued to fall last Although a 74% decrease in the overall number of riots/ month (see Figure 5). One explanation for this drop is the protests from Q3 of 2013 to Q3 of 2014 suggests that the increasing barriers to collective action and the organisa- introduction of key state policies may have had significant tion of social movements since the Muslim Brotherhood implications for the coordination or endurance of demon- was designated a ‘terrorist organisation’ by the Egyptian strations and social protest, they have not set in motion a government in December 2013. This has led to police forc- significant shift in tactics by actors. This could be because es conducting routine drag-net arrests and detain- of a lack of political cohesion and direction with which to ing Muslim Brotherhood members, while heavy prison channel more violent responses, or it may suggest that sentences have been given to political activists who have the government’s concessionary governance technique, violated its terms. This has applied pressure to the coordi- that allow for limited political participation, prevent fur- nation of collective action nationwide with a decline in the ther instability from escalating. frequency of demonstrations. An exception to this, however, is the dynamics of the Despite this decline in absolute incidence of riots and pro- Muslim Brotherhood. Peaceful protests involving the Mus- tests, they still comprised almost 60% of all political con- lim Brotherhood decreased from 2013 to 2014. Violent flict events in Egypt in Q3 of 2014, indicating that non- forms of Muslim Brotherhood collective action also initial- state actors continue to express grievances articulated ly fell from 2013 to 2014 but riots saw a slight resurgence through either peaceful or low-level social movements as in Q3 of 2014 (see Figure 7). This could indicate that group opposed to concerted armed efforts. This is in stark con- members felt less empowered with a lesser degree of trast to other regional players in North Africa, for example agency in affecting social change. The fact that there were in Libya, where the most common mode of collective ac- marginally more riots involving the Muslim Brotherhood Figure 5: Riots and Protest Events and Associated Reported Fatalities by in Egypt from 2011-September 2014 4 CONFLICT TRENDS (NO. 31) REAL-TIME ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE, OCTOBER 2014 Egypt Figure 6: Percentage of Conflict Events by Type, by Quarter in Egypt & Libya, from 2011-2014 compared to peaceful protest events in 2014 and that designating the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group in state force engagement remained relatively constant December 2013. An analysis of the data suggests that in would suggest that restrictions on demonstrations and 2013 there were fewer rioters than protesters affiliated assembly may also have catalysed greater violent action with the Muslim Brotherhood, and by reducing the scope by demonstrators themselves as a sign of growing frustra- of civic action groups, the Egyptian government may have tion at state control. This makes for an interesting case spurred more uncoordinated violent acts of civil disobedi- when assessing the actions of the Egyptian government in ence. Figure 7: Conflict Events by Rioters or Protesters, by Quarter, by Location, in Egypt, 2013-2014 5 CONFLICT TRENDS (NO. 31) REAL-TIME ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE, OCTOBER 2014 North Africa In 2014 to date, North Africa was the third most active has been rising since 2008, and is currently at significantly region for battle-related events and fatalities on the Afri- higher levels than during the tumultuous 2011 Arab Spring can continent accounting for 711 recorded battles and period (see Figure 10). roughly 2295 related casualties (see Figure 9). Battles in- This is largely due to the complex web of power-seeking creased across North Africa by 146% from 2012 to 2014, militias in Libya that have been able to emerge through with overall numbers of battles higher than in 2011 which porous national borders and the proliferation of weapons saw NATO intervention in Libya.