The Dangers of GPS/GNSS
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
RNI: DELENG/2005/15153 No: DL(E)-01/5079/08-10 Publication: 15th of every month Licensed to post without pre-payment U(E) 28/2008-10 Posting: 19th /20th of every month at NDPSO Rs.100 ISSN 0973-2136 Volume V, Issue 2, February 2009 THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE ON POSITIONING, NAVIGATION AND BEYOND The dangers of GPS/GNSS February 2009 | 1 2 | Coordinates February 2009 GPS BY ITSELF WOULD BE GREAT. IF THE WORLD WERE STILL FLAT. IMPROVEYOURGPS.COM Coordinates February 2009 | 3 COLOPHON AND CONTENTS In this issue Volume 5, Issue 2, February 2009 Articles The dangers of GPS/GNSS BÖRJE FORSSELL 6 Challenges before National Mapping Organisations VANESSA LAWRENCE CB, P NAG, LAM JOON KHOI 10 Quality evaluation of NRTK correction transmission LEI YANG, CHRIS HILL, XIAOLIN MENG AND JOSE APONTE 14 Accuracy performance of hand-held GPS ABDULLAH S ALSALMAN AND ABDULLAH E ALI 27 Geomatics in Pakistan A W MIR 30 Columns My Coordinates EDITORIAL 5 News REMOTE SENSING 32 GPS 34 GALILEO UPDATE 35 LBS 36 GIS 36 INDUSTRY 38 Mark your calendar FEBRUARY 2009 TO SEPTEMBER 2009 42 This issue has been made possible by the support and good wishes of the following individuals and companies Abdullah E Ali, Abdullah S Alsalman, A W Mir, Börje Forssell, Chris Hill, Jose Aponte, Lam Joon Khoi, Lei Yang, P Nag, Vanessa Lawrence CB, Xiaolin Meng and Antrix, Hemisphere GPS, Sanding, Magellan, Navcom, NovAtel, NRSA, Spirent, Javad, Leica, South; and many others Mailing Address Coordinates is an initiative of cGIT that aims to broaden the Editor Bal Krishna 11C Pocket A scope of positioning, navigation and related technologies. SFS Mayur Vihar Phase III cGIT does not neccesarily subscribe to the views expressed Owner Centre for Geoinformation Technologies Delhi 110 096, India. by the authors and advertisers in this magazine and may not Phones +91 11 22632607, 98102 33422, 98107 24567 be held liable for any losses caused directly or indirectly due Designed at Thomson Press India Ltd. Fax +91 11 22632607 to the information provided herein. © cGIT, 2009. Reprinting with permission is encouraged; contact the editor for details. Printer Thomson Press India Ltd., B 315, Okhla Phase I, Email New Delhi-110020, India [information][email protected] Annual subscription (12 issues) [India] Rs.1,200 [editorial][email protected] [Overseas] US$80 This issue of Coordinates is of 44 pages, including [advertising][email protected] cover [subscriptions][email protected] Printed and published by Sanjay Malaviya on behalf of Centre for Geoinformation Technologies at A221 Mangal 4 | February 2009 Web www.mycoordinates.org Apartments, Vasundhara Enclave, Delhi 110096, India. MYCOORDINATES Defining limits A group of Japanese professionals and lawyers have asked Google to stop providing the detailed street level images of Japanese cities. Their concern is that it violates privacy rights. The ‘owners of the technology’ tend to demonstrate the extent to which the technology can go and what it can do. The benefits of such efforts are convincing but the concerns being raised cannot and should not be ruled out. Banning’ or even ‘constraining’ such service providers is not an answer. It is neither appropriate nor practical. However, it is the time to be more sensitive towards the concerns being raised. Apparently, there is a conflict between ‘right to information’ and ‘right to privacy’. Bal Krishna, Editor [email protected] CHIEF ADVISOR Muneendra Kumar PhD, Chief Geodesist (Retired), US National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, USA ADVISORS Naser El-Sheimy PEng, CRC Professor, Department of Geomatics Engineering, The University of Calgary Canada, George Cho Professor in GIS and the Law, University of Canberra, Australia, Dr Abbas Rajabifard Director, Centre for SDI and Land Administration, University of Mel- bourne, Australia, Luiz Paulo Souto Fortes PhD Associate Director of Geosciences, Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics -IBGE, Brazil, John Hannah Professor, School of Surveying, University of Otago, New Zealand February 2009 | GNSS The dangers of GPS/GNSS The problem is that nothing works 100 %. GPS is very close, but for some users under some circumstances, “very close” is not good enough Professor Börje Forssell NSS (Global Navigation Satellite discussion. In not too distant a future, Norwegian University of GSystems) is a common acronym even better numbers can be expected. Science and Technology, encompassing all existing and planned Dept. of Electronics and satellite-based navigation systems. So far, PDOP Availability: Requirement Telecommunications, the US-built GPS dominates the scene - PDOP of 6 or less, 98% of the Trondheim, Norway completely, but the Russian GLONASS time or better; Actual - 99.98%. [email protected] is approaching around-the-clock global operational status, and other systems are Horizontal Service Availability: being developed (the European Galileo, the Requirement - 95% threshold of Chinese Compass/Beidou and the Indian 36 metres, 99% of the time or IRNSS). There are also augmentation better; Actual – 3.7 metres. systems of more or less operational status (the US WAAS, the European Vertical Service Availability: Requirement EGNOS, the Japanese MSAS and the - 95% threshold of 77 metres, 99% of Indian GAGAN). Satellite navigation the time or better; Actual – 5.3 metres. is becoming part of everyday life, user equipments are becoming cheaper, smaller, User Range Error: Requirement easier to handle and with increasingly - 6 metres or less; Constellation improved performance. This development Average Actual - 1.2 metres. is expected to continue for the foreseeable future with receivers in mobile phones and cars as dominating markets (Figs. 1-3). What’s the problem? The following discussion for obvious The problem is that nothing works reasons mostly refers to GPS, but the 100 %. GPS is very close, but for arguments are generally valid for all some users under some circumstances, global navigation satellite-based systems. “very close” is not good enough. The situation in general is as follows: Actual performance • Most GPS users know nothing about GPS vulnerability. Today’s average performance of GPS • Most users don’t care. is used as a starting point for our • Most GPS users can stand some Fig. 1. GPS users in 2006 interruptions or performance reduction. Manufacturing • Most politicians and representatives of 7% authorities in the fi eld of navigation don’t know of GPS vulnerability. Tracking • Back-up systems are being 10% closed down (e.g. LORAN-C), and Aviation there is little or no contact between Vessel voyage 4% Hand held 2% 26% different countries about these matters. Military affairs GPS (and all satellite navigation systems, 1% more or less) are vulnerable because of GIS Survey • Very low signal power received; 8% 7% • A few frequencies (in the GPS case today, only one for general use) and a Car navigation 35% known signal structure; 6 | Coordinates February 2009 • Spectrum competition; • All GPS/GNSS receivers in critical • Unintentional interference: • Worldwide military applications drive applications must provide a timely a GPS disruption industry; warning when the signals are • Radio-frequency interference • Jamming techniques are degraded or lost; (RFI) from external sources well known, devices are available, • Development of certifi able, (spectrum congestion, or can be built easily (fi g. 4). integrated (multipurpose) receivers harmonics, high-power should be encouraged; signals saturating receiver front In 2001 (just before the infamous 9/11), the • A comprehensive analysis of GPS/ ends); U.S. Department of Transportation’s Volpe GNSS back-up navigation and • Testing at system level; National Transportation Systems Center precise timing options (e.g. LORAN, • Ionospheric infl uence published results from an investigation VOR/DME, ILS, INS) and operating (solar maxima, magnetic storms, into the vulnerability of the transportation procedures should be conducted. scintillations); infrastructure relying on GPS. Conclusions • Multipath. to be drawn from that investigation are: Causes of trouble • Intentional interference: • Awareness should be created in the navigation and timing communities There are many possible reasons for • Jamming; of the need for back-up systems or degraded performance or service • Spoofi ng (false signals into the operational procedures; interruption for users of GNSS: receiver); • All transportation modes should be • Meaconing (interception and encouraged to pay attention to • Satellite or control- re-broadcast of navigation autonomous integrity monitoring of segment malfunctions. signals). GPS/GNSS signals; • Human factors: • User equipment and satellite design errors; • Over-reliance; • Lack of knowledge and/or training. The main technical explanation of GNSS receiver vulnerabilities to external interference can be summarised as very low power received from the satellites. Fig. 2. Experienced and expected use of GPS/GNSS in cars The minimum power level is usually between -150 and -160 dBW. Looking at the details for GPS, we see that • acquisition requires 6 – 10 dB higher signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) than tracking, • loss-of-lock sometimes occurs for interference-to-signal ratios (I/S) below 30 dB, • receiver detection of loss-of-lock is delayed because of narrowband Fig. 3. Experienced and expected use of GPS/GNSS in mobile phones code-tracking loops, • some lines in the GPS C/A-code spectrum are more vulnerable than others because of higher power levels (Gold code spectra do not