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“Let Us All Give a Promise ...” 2 201 09 newsletter newsletter Special Edition focused on the political situation in Greece, in cooperation with Nicos Poulantzas Institute (NPI) After The Greek Elections: “Let Us All Give A Promise ...” By Stavros Panagiotidis, NPI The night of the Greek elections of 17 2011)), with the collaboration of Kon- only electoral platform of the New De- June punctuated the map of Modern stantinos Karamanlis and the US- mocracy (endorsed by the rest of the Greek history. For the first time, parties Embassy had founded his party, the parties and all major media, co- left of the Social democracy receive Center Union, designed to absorb and ordinating political propaganda against such as a large percentage (SYRIZA, weaken the radical social power. SYRIZA). Thus it became the first party Democratic Left and KKE together that wins the elections throughout the 37.5%), and assume the position of the The Election Result: New Democracy post-dictatorial period, not on a political major opposition. The only time some- – A Winner Without Power project and an optimistic promise, but on thing similar has happened in the whole the basis of threat and fear. It also be- Back again in 2012, SYRIZA received of Greek political history was in 1956 came the first party that wins the elec- 27% (71 seats), while in the previous when the political alliance of EDA tion with so little acceptance of its ideas. elections in May received 17% and (United Democratic Left) won 25% of As a former communications specialist 4.6% (13 seats) in the 2009 elections. the vote and second place. This was just wrote: “Most of those who voted for Despite this high percentage it failed to seven years after the Greek Civil War ND, they did so by wrinkling their noses achieve the goal to form the first left and the defeat of the communists, prov- in disgust!” government. The New Democracy ing that the Left continues to live in the (Conservatives) won the election with After the elections of May and the rise country and is a political force with very 29.66% share, over the course of of SYRIZA, all parties had talked about strong social ties. In the next elections in 18.85% of the elections in May, but still the need to revise the Memorandum, and 1961, the percentage of EDA decreased, smaller than that of the 2009 elections to develop a plan of conflict with the mainly for two reasons. First, because (34%), which was considered as an Troika. Similarly, the ND, the Prime the then Prime Minister, Konstantinos electoral defeat. It is telling that despite Minister Antonis Samaras, who in his Karamanlis, uncle of the later Prime the unacceptable electoral law, which first statement did not speak at all about Minister Costas Karamanlis (2004- gives a bonus of 50 parliamentary seats the renegotiation of the Memorandum. It 2009), organised a plan of extensive to the first party, regardless its percent- is worth mentioning that the percentage intimidation of left, mostly rural voters age (!), the ND was not able to reach of ND as a result of increased anti- and rigging election results, in conjunc- parliamentary majority, winning only SYRIZA-campaign, managed to rally tion with agents of the army, some of 129 out of 300 seats. As the readers of not only voters of other right-wing par- whom were the protagonists of the coup this newsletter already know, the main ties, but even voters who had supported that took place six years later. The sec- weapon of ND was terrorizing citizens the PASOK in order not to allow ond reason was that George Papandreou, by threatening that a government with SYRIZA becoming first. (the father of later Prime Minister An- the Left will cancel the Memorandum, dreas Papandreou (1981-1989, 1993- the country will exit the Euro and the 1996) and grandfather – also Prime economy will be destroyed. This was the Minister! – George Papandreou (2009- Elections’ Polarization: Pro- age of it dissipated due to the dynamic lead the country out from the Eurozone Memorandum and Anti- that developed SYRIZA and the pros- and they will lose their – already low – Memorandum pect of a left government which pensions, having apparently come to charmed the traditional left-wing voters. terms with the idea of living in poverty, PASOK (Social Democrats) lost The CP has paid the consequences of with only the absolutely necessary res- nearly one percent since the elections of sectarian policies and the refusal of any sources. Also, SYRIZA comes first May, decreasing to 12.28% (33 seats) cooperation with other left forces, the among graduates of higher and secon- from 44% in 2009 due to the enormous features of which are captured in the dary education, as well as in the age damage caused by its governance and phrase of its Secretary: “We are not groups of 18-34 (33%) and 35-54 the signing of the Memorandum, losing leftists, we’re communists!” Thus they (34%), but second, with half the per- thus the majority of its voters to refused to cooperate with SYRIZA, centage of ND (20%), in 55+ age group. SYRIZA. Shortly before the election, accusing it of not supporting an exit SYRIZA is first in most major urban the president of PASOK, Evangelos from the EMU (although this claim areas and in many regions of the prov- Venizelos announced that his party disagrees with the vast majority of ince, including the island of Crete where would launch a process of reinvention, Greek society) – and of being a party the political forces of the center (PA- removing all the organs of PASOK which agrees with the system and en- SOK and its predecessors) have had except himself, a decision which was dorses a new social democracy! It is traditionally been assembling their larg- accepted by members without reaction indicative that the interpretation of elec- est percentages since the first decades of due to the political decline of PASOK. tion results by the side of the CP is that the twentieth century. The Independent Greek’s (Antimni- “we told the truth to the people and we One of the most remarkable features is moniako, an emerging right-wing party, have paid!” the absolute class polarization that resulting from division of the New De- Last we left the case of neo-Nazi party emerged in the elections, especially in mocracy, with tough positions on for- Golden Dawn, whose rates remained the region of Attica, where 5.000.000 eign policy and immigration and sup- high at 7% (18 seats). Readers of the people live. SYRIZA came first in all porting the immediate cancellation of newsletter had the chance to read in the the areas populated with people of lower the Memorandum) vote has been pres- previous issue an analysis of this phe- incomes and belonging to proletarian sured by ND but the results have re- nomenon. The article vindicated that the strata, approaching 40% (ND got there mained high, going from 10.5% to 7.5% stabilizing influence of GD is based on percentages of 15%) and second or third (20 seats). very real trends in Greek society, which in all regions whose inhabitants belong The Democratic Left (coming from a have been even strengthened after the to middle class and higher strata. split of Synaspismos in 2010) main- attack of a member of GD on TV The conclusion is that the most dy- tained its rates at 6.26% (17 seats). The against women candidates of the Left. namic parts of Greek society, whose party throughout the election period put The election result has encouraged its lives and future prospects are strongly forward the slogan “Stay in the Euro at followers to engage in previous days in a affected by the policies of the Memo- all costs” and “renegotiation of the series of actions, indicative of their in- randum, supported SYRIZA. This Memorandum (as opposed to the pro- human ideology, such as knife attacks shows the huge success of SYRIZA and posed cancellation on the part of against immigrants and the destruction the vindication of its efforts to express SYRIZA) and gradual disengagement of SYRIZA stands. their interests, as well as the enormous by 2014”, but, anyway, in this year sup- class polarization existing in Greek posedly the Memorandum will expire! The Characteristics of Voting for society and the great potential that Finally, the Democratic Left presented SYRIZA SYRIZA has. itself as a responsible power of the Left The qualitative characteristics of (as opposed to the “irresponsible” SYRIZA voters are extremely interest- The Next Day SYRIZA, who refused to join the gov- ing. According to one survey, the alli- ernment after elections in May), which After the elections, SYRIZA an- ance comes first in the preferences of will guarantee the formation of a gov- nounced firmly that the party respects private employees (19%), civil servants ernment after the elections. However, the election results and will not partici- (22%), self-employed (18%), unem- surveys show that they’ve lost ¼ of the pate in any government formation proc- ployed (22%) and students (20%). It is voters of May to SYRIZA. ess, since there is a political chasm be- fourth power among farmers (9%) and tween it and the New Democracy. A The Communist Party suffered a huge third power among housewives (15%) government with the participation of crash, losing half of the votes of May and pensioners (11%). The latter not SYRIZA, who supports the immediate and dropped from 8.5% to 4.5% (12 changing easily their electoral behav- cancellation of the Memorandum, along seats). Like other small extra- iour, both because of their age and their with ND and PASOK, whose leaders parliamentary left alliances, the percent- fear that a government of the Left would have guaranteed to sign that they will page 2 transform! newsletter 092012 www.transform-network.net fulfil the terms of the Memorandum, sciousness of voters on the social divi- at the election night in the central pavil- may not have any luck and it would sion of labour, their own position within ion of SYRIZA in Athens, in front of mean a cancellation of SYRIZA’s po- it and the need for collective organisa- hundreds of members and friends of litical agenda.
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