HUSSERL, HENRY and BEYOND Max Schaefer Ph.D. Thesis
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THE CREATIVITY OF LIFE: HUSSERL, HENRY AND BEYOND Max Schaefer Ph.D. Thesis Philosophy Mary Immaculate College University of Limerick Supervisors: Dr Cyril McDonnell (National University of Ireland, Maynooth) Dr Catherine Kavanagh (Mary Immaculate College, University of Limerick) Prof. Michael Breen (Mary Immaculate College, University of Limerick) Submitted to Mary Immaculate College: December, 2020 ABSTRACT This work investigates the nature of transcendental subjectivity, and whether and how the subject can endeavour to know and attest to its absolute foundation with its essential structures. Towards this end, I take up the respective transcendental projects of Edmund Husserl and Michel Henry. I argue that while Henry’s identification of transcendental subjectivity with the bodily life of the subject helps further our understanding of these matters as initially laid out in Husserl, his position requires revision, as it points toward, but fails to sufficiently develop, the finite (intentional) and destructive character of the phenomenological life of the living individual. Accordingly, I contend that transcenden- tal subjectivity can be understood neither as an absolute consciousness (Husserl), nor as a divine, a-cosmic flesh (Henry), but must be acknowledged as nothing other than the finite, embodied person in her ineluctable bond with the world, one which harbours both life and death drives. In light of this finding, I suggest that the living subject can most fully come to know and attest to the foundation of her being not only through the prac- tice of phenomenology, but through other forms of culture such as art, ethics and sci- ence as well. ii DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY Declaration: I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my own original research and does not contain the work of any other individual. All sources that have been con- sulted have been identified and acknowledged in the appropriate way. Signature of Candidate: ___________________________________ Max Schaefer Signature of Supervisor: ___________________________________ Date: December 30, 2020 iii ACKNOLWEDGEMENTS My doctoral studies began under the supervision of Dr Niall Keane. I thoroughly en- joyed working with Niall, and I remember our conversations, and his passion for think- ing, with fondness. My thanks go out to Niall for this time. However, as can happen in this punctuated life, this time ultimately came to an end of sorts with Niall’s leave of absence, which required that my work find another home. This was found in Cyril Mc- Donnell. In his patient and precise manner, Cyril helped see this dissertation through to its end. His encouragement and breadth of knowledge have been much appreciated, and this thesis is undoubtedly the better for it. In truth, though, there have always been a bevy of voices brimming in the fore- ground and background. Catherine Kavanagh and Michael Breen have been there to provide assistance when needed, and I thank them for it. It has been my pleasure to en- gage with Felix Ó Murchadha over the years. A genuine thinker, I have learnt much from Felix. I thank him for his kindness and for his example. Similarly, I have benefit- ted from exchanges with Jeremy Smith and James Mensch, and my thanks to both for our stimulating and edifying discussions concerning Husserl and Henry. Sean McGrath, under whose guidance I completed my Master’s degree at Memorial University of New- foundland, has been a continuous support for me. During my days at Memorial, Sean was a source of inspiration, and he proved pivotal in nurturing my interest in contempo- rary French phenomenology. At Memorial, I also crossed paths with Antoinette (Toni) Stafford. Toni’s passion and early belief in my work continues to mean a great deal. During this time, Sean, Toni, and the late James Bradley, helped sustain the Jockey Club, a weekly gathering among staff, students and locals with an ear for philosophy. The spirit of those weekly gatherings remains for me an example of what thinking can iv and should be. Allow me to thank Sean, Toni, James, and all those at Memorial for this inspiration, which continues on in me to this day. Finally, thanks to my family and friends for their support and encouragement. A special thanks to my mother for her gracious and loving manner. v TABLE OF CONTENTS page Introduction 1 Chapter 1 Learning How to See: Husserl’s Methodology 15 1.1 Husserl’s Breakthrough: The A Priori Correlation of Acts 16 and Their Intentional Objects 1.2 The Concept of Evidence 24 1.3 The First Moment of the Phenomenological Reduction: 33 The Epoche 1.4 The Second Moment of the Phenomenological Reduction: 41 The Reduction Proper Chapter 2 Husserl’s Analytic of Constitution 50 2.1 The Privilege of Perception 51 2.2 Flesh and Body 58 2.3 Passive Synthesis 63 2.4 The Depths of Time 66 2.5 Absolute Time-Constituting Consciousness 72 2.6 The Mystery of Inner Time-Consciousness 81 Chapter 3 The Productive Force of Life: 90 Henry’s Immanent Critique of Husserl 3.1 Henry, Husserl and Descartes 91 3.2 The Immanent Appearing of the Cogito 94 3.3 The Primal Sensing of Thought 98 3.4 The Embodied Cogito 100 3.5 The Generative Movement of Life 104 3.6 The Arch-Presence of Life 112 3.7 Primal Selfhood 116 3.8 The Question of Divine Genesis 118 3.9 A Turn to Christianity 121 3.10 The World of Life 127 3.11 Orders of Constitution 131 vi 3.12 The Absolute Priority of Affectivity 134 Chapter 4 Putting Life to the Test: Culture and Barbarism 142 4.1 Self-Growth as The Foundation of Culture 143 4.2 The Artistic Form of Culture 146 4.3 A Theory of Form and Colour 151 4.4 Art as Normative Culture 156 4.5 The Ramifications of Normative Life 163 4.6 Barbarism and Modernity 166 4.7 The Modern Marriage of Science, Technology and 171 Economics 4.8 The Malaise of Life 175 4.9 Second Birth 181 4.10 Rethinking the Unity of Affectivity and Intentionality 189 Chapter 5 Returning Life to the World 197 5.1 Re-conceiving Transcendental Phenomenology 197 5.2 The Hidden Art of the Soul 203 5.3 Background Feelings 209 5.4 Affectively Driven Consciousness 215 5.5 The Drive for Destruction 219 5.6 Towards the Full Presence of Things 224 5.7 Trust, World and Others 228 5.8 Layers of Intersubjectivity 235 Chapter 6 Becoming Fully Alive 246 6.1 Life’s Unity of Motivation and the Natural Attitude 247 6.2 Wonder and the Problematisation of the World’s 249 Obviousness 6.3 Art 253 6.4 Love 259 6.5 Ethics 262 vii 6.6 The Dark Side of Feeling 267 6.7 A Chorus of Voices 276 Conclusion 284 Bibliography 294 viii INTRODUCTION This study investigates the nature of transcendental subjectivity, and whether and how the subject can come to know and attest to its absolute foundation with its essential structures. It will do this by taking up the respective transcendental projects of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Michel Henry (1922-2002). Both of these figures stand out in the history of phenomenology for their radical claim that the ultimate foundation of transcendental subjectivity can, in some way, be given absolutely, and that it is therefore possible to establish an absolute knowledge of all experience. Husserl contends that it is principally the phenomenological method that unlocks the transcendental dimension, and which allows the subject to attest to the innermost nature of the transcendental ego (i.e. who or what it is and how it functions). In his view, the history of philosophy has thus far failed to attain true and lasting knowledge of the absolute origin and beginning of all givenness and knowledge owing to its hidden assumptions and prejudices, in particular the unquestioned assumption contained in what Husserl called ‘the general thesis of the natural attitude’.1 In this attitude, in per- ception I take the world of things to be ‘simply there’ (vorhanden), whether my atten- tion is directed towards them or not. Thus, in this natural attitude, the transcendental source of the intelligibility of our experiences in human consciousness is overlooked. If phenomenology is to obtain systematic absoluteness — i.e. clarity concerning the essen- tial features or essence of the world as presented to our actual experiences — then it needs to free itself from such naïve realism and its supporting suppositions and biases, which have remained unquestioned since the evolution of philosophy itself down 1 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General introduction to pure phenomenology, trans. by Fred Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), p. 51. Henceforth, abbreviated as Ideas I. 1 through the millennia. In order to attain true knowledge of this source, therefore, Husserl believes that phenomenology must first attain a certain historical absoluteness;2 that is to say, it must free itself from these wayward philosophical traditions, their im- plicit assumptions and prejudices, and establish itself as a radically new philosophy of human consciousness itself with a new method. According to Husserl, it is the transcendental reduction that clears the way for this radically new form of philosophy, and the eidetic reduction that renders philosophy as a rigorous science. In brief, by performing both reductions, it is said that the phe- nomenologist attains an unbiased, presuppositionless position from which she can re- flectively elucidate the essential, universal structures of the world. In doing so, Husserl is led back to transcendental subjectivity, which he equates with absolute consciousness, as the a priori foundation of the meaningfulness of all life and being (i.e.