G8/G20 Reference Manual for Commitment and Compliance Coding

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G8/G20 Reference Manual for Commitment and Compliance Coding G8/G20 Reference Manual for Commitment and Compliance Coding By John Kirton, Director, Ella Kokotsis, PhD, Director of External Affairs, Jenilee Guebert, Director of Research, and Caroline Bracht, Researcher G8 Research Group G20 Research Group Munk School of Global Affairs at Trinity College University of Toronto September 22, 2011 G8 Research Group G20 Research Group Contents G8/G20 Reference Manual for Commitment and Compliance Coding .......................................... 0 Preface .............................................................................................................................................. 2 Introduction: Why Study Compliance? ............................................................................................ 3 Why Study G8 Compliance? ........................................................................................................ 3 Why Study G20 Compliance? ...................................................................................................... 3 What are G8 and G20 Summit Commitments? ................................................................................ 4 How to Define and Identify Commitments from the G7/8 and G20 Communiqué ..................... 4 How to Measure the Overall Significance of a Commitment ...................................................... 7 What are Compliance Catalysts? ................................................................................................. 8 List of Compliance Catalysts ....................................................................................................... 8 Notes .......................................................................................................................................... 10 What are Priority Commitments? ................................................................................................... 11 How to Choose Priority Commitments ...................................................................................... 11 What Constitutes Summit Compliance? ........................................................................................ 13 First Order Compliance .............................................................................................................. 13 Measuring Compliance .................................................................................................................. 15 What Is the Compliance Time Frame? ....................................................................................... 15 Translated G8 and G20 Research Group Scores into a Percentage ........................................... 16 General Interpretive Guidelines for Compliance Measurement .................................................... 17 Multiyear Financial Commitments ............................................................................................ 17 Multiyear “Other” Commitments ............................................................................................... 18 Double Counting ........................................................................................................................ 18 Burden Sharing ........................................................................................................................... 19 Definitions ...................................................................................................................................... 21 Specific Interpretive Guidelines ..................................................................................................... 25 Anatomy of a Typical Interpretive Guideline ............................................................................ 26 Writing the Interpretive Guidelines ........................................................................................... 26 Interim vs. Final Compliance Reports ........................................................................................... 30 How to Write a Compliance Report ............................................................................................... 31 Special Considerations ................................................................................................................... 33 Appendix A: Compliance Report Template .................................................................................. 35 Appendix B: Where to Find G8 and G20 Compliance Information Online .................................. 36 Appendix C: G8 Compliance Bibliographical References ........................................................... 45 Appendix D: G20 Compliance Bibliographical References .......................................................... 49 Appendix E: G8/G20 Summit Performance Indicators by Function ............................................. 51 Appendix F: Causal Models of Summit Performance .................................................................. 52 Appendix G: Indicators of Major Causal Variables ...................................................................... 54 Appendix H: Summary of Variables, Methods and Sources ........................................................ 55 G8/G20 Reference Manual 1 September 22, 2011 G8 Research Group G20 Research Group Preface Each year since 1996, the University of Toronto G8 Research Group has produced compliance reports on the progress made by G8 members in meeting the commitments reached at their annual G8 Summits. Since 2002, the G8 Research Group has published an interim compliance report, timed to assess progress at the transition point between one country hosting and the next in the hosting rotation. Building on the interim compliance report, a final compliance report is issued just prior to the annual Summit meeting. These reports monitor and assess each country’s compliance on a carefully chosen selection of priority commitments. They are offered to the general public, policy makers, scholars, researchers, civil society, the media, interested citizens and other stakeholders around the world in an effort to make the work of the G8 more transparent and accessible. They are also conducted to provide systemic data to enable meaningful social science analysis of this unique informal institution. Compliance reports are available on the G8 Information Centre web site at www.g8.utoronto.ca. Since 2010, the University of Toronto G20 Research Group has produced compliance reports on the progress made by G20 members in meeting the commitments reached at their annual G20 Summits. These reports monitor and assess each country’s compliance on a carefully chosen selection of priority commitments. They are offered to the general public, policy makers, scholars, researchers, civil society, the media, interested citizens and other stakeholders around the world in an effort to make the work of the G20 more transparent and accessible. They are also conducted to provide systemic data to enable meaningful social science analysis of this unique informal institution. Compliance reports are available on the G20 Information Centre website at www.g20.utoronto.ca. The G8 and G20 Information Centres (www.g8.utoronto.ca and www.g20.utoronto.ca) contain the world’s most comprehensive and authoritative online collection of information and analyses on the G7/G8, G20 and related institutions. The Centres assemble, verify and post documents from the meetings, leading up to and at each summit. They make available official documentation of all past summits and ministerial meetings (in several G8 and G20 languages), scholarly writings and policy analyses, research studies, data sets, fact sheets, scholarship, information and links to related websites. The G8 Research Group and G20 Research Group are global networks of scholars, students and professionals in the academic, research, media, business, government and NGO communities, which follow the work of the G8, G20 and its related institutions. Founded in 1987 and 2008, the G8 Research Group and G20 Research Group are coordinated from the University of Toronto through the International Relations Program, the Centre for International Studies and the John Graham Library based at the Munk School of Global Affairs in Trinity College. The G8 Research Group and G20 Research Group have satellites in London, Paris, Tokyo, Moscow, Shanghai, Mexico City, Seoul and Montreal. Professor John Kirton, Ella Kokotsis, Jenilee Guebert and Caroline Bracht Toronto, September 9, 2010 G8/G20 Reference Manual 2 September 22, 2011 G8 Research Group G20 Research Group Introduction: Why Study Compliance? Why Study G8 Compliance? Every year since the Lyon Summit in 1996, the University of Toronto’s G8 Research Group has conducted compliance studies as an important part of the analysis it produces. Why do we embark on this task every year? What is it we and the world derive from our efforts? The G8 Summit annually produces a series of written, public communiqués or declarations used at the summit that bind the leaders in many cases to hard commitments. Can the impact of these commitments be measured once the Summit is over, the media have dispersed and the leaders have returned home? Are there limits to how much or how often the G8 can comply with their Summit commitments, particularly given that they are autonomous, sovereign states whose leaders are driven by differing domestic and international demands? It makes little sense for G8 leaders to invest their time and resources, while potentially risking their political and personal reputations, to generate
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