DOCSLIB.ORG

China's Emergence As a Global Security Actor

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
China's Emergence As a Global Security Actor MERICS PAPERS ON CHINA CHINA’S EMERGENCE AS A GLOBAL SECURITY ACTOR Strategies for Europe Mikko Huotari | Jan Gaspers Thomas Eder | Helena Legarda | Sabine Mokry No 4 | July 2017 CHINA’S EMERGENCE AS A GLOBAL SECURITY ACTOR Strategies for Europe Mikko Huotari | Jan Gaspers Thomas Eder | Helena Legarda | Sabine Mokry Contents Acknowledgements .........................................................................................................................................7 Executive Summary ..........................................................................................................................................9 The challenge: China’s emergence as a global security actor aects core European interests .......................................................................................................................................................................9 A nuanced approach: China can be a partner, competitor or adversary for Europe ....................11 1. Introduction: Europe needs to brace itself for China’s emergence as a global security actor ............................................................................................................................................. 15 New realities: China and the EU have more direct security interactions ............................................16 The big picture: Europe needs a comprehensive forward-looking assessment ...........................17 Factors of uncertainty: Conflicting trends shape China’s global security profile ..........................17 Outline of the report: Europe meets China as a diplomat, soldier, trader and shaper ................18 2. Domestic factors propel a more outward-facing national security policy ........................... 19 Key findings ....................................................................................................................................................................................21 Beijing’s mission: Securing the international environment for China’s power-seeking national modernization agenda ......................................................................................................................................21 New environment: China’s national security strategy confronts new threats and vulnerabilities ................................................................................................................................................................................23 Re-orientation: Beijing’s outward-facing security policy aligns with broader foreign policy changes ..............................................................................................................................................................................27 In the making: China is adapting institutions and building up capacity for its global role ......29 3. Diplomat: China expands its soft security power in Asia and beyond ................................. 31 Key findings ...................................................................................................................................................................................33 Past profile: China lacks resources and confidence to eectively broker security abroad .....34 Drivers: Beijing acts on the need to build trust and foster greater strategic alignment with international counterparts ......................................................................................................................................34 Key trends: China Advances diplomatic security initiatives in Asia and along the “Belt and Road” routes ............................................................................................................................................................35 China as a diplomat in 2022: Beijing delivers a more mature ‘soft security’ performance ....41 4. Soldier: The PLA goes global ................................................................................................................ 47 Key findings ...................................................................................................................................................................................49 Past profile: PLA international operations are limited to military operations other than war ............................................................................................................................................................................................50 Drivers: Beijing seeks to protect China’s overseas interests and raise its international profile ..................................................................................................................................................................................................50 Key trends: The PLA projects its power in new theaters and domains ................................................53 China as a soldier in 2022: Beijing has a truly global military footprint ..............................................61 4 | MERICS | PAPERS ON CHINA No 4 5. Trader: Economic statecraft catalyzes China’s global security policy ................................... 67 Key findings ...................................................................................................................................................................................69 Past profile: China rarely uses its economic influence for security-related purposes ...............70 Drivers: China’s domestic economic transformation provides new sources for influencing security matters abroad .............................................................................................................................70 Key trends: China’s pursuit of security interests comes with economic sticks and carrots and an expanding global footprint of its defense industry ..........................................................................72 China as a trader in 2022: Beijing deploys sophisticated economic statecraft to command global support for its security priorities .............................................................................................82 6. Shaper: China determines the way other countries think about and approach security ......................................................................................................................................................... 87 Key findings ...................................................................................................................................................................................89 Past profile: China takes a back seat on prominent international security debates ...................89 Drivers: China seizes on Western weakness to externalize its security ideas and concepts ............................................................................................................................................................................................90 Key trends: Beijing uses the UN and flexible security alignments as an amplifier for its normative security agenda .........................................................................................................................................91 China as a shaper by 2022: Beijing makes its security concepts and alliances popular with the rest of the world ....................................................................................................................................................99 7. China’s global security profile in 2022 aects core European security interests ........ 105 Overall trajectory: China emerges as a more visible and powerful security actor ....................107 More tangible links: Europe starts to feel the heat of Chinese security activism .....................108 Red layer: Europe and China meet in largely non-confrontational security interactions with high impact on European security interests .............................................................................................109 Orange layer: Europe and China meet in competitive and adversarial security interactions with medium to high impact on European security interests ....................................112 White layer: Europe and China meet in less intensive security interactions with only limited direct impact on European security interests by 2022 ..............................................................115 Conclusion: Europe must prepare to meet China as a security partner, competitor, and adversary ...................................................................................................................................................... 119 Europe’s homework: Decision makers need to tackle a set of policy priorities ...........................121 Engaging China in largely cooperative soft security interactions with high impact on European security interests .............................................................................................................................................122 Engaging China in competitive and adversarial security interactions with medium to high impact on European security interests .........................................................................................................123 Engaging China in less intensive security interactions with only limited direct impact on European security interests by 2022 ................................................................................................................125 Endnotes ........................................................................................................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Information Current As of November 18, 2020
    Information Current as of November 18, 2020 Table of Contents SOURCEREE PERSPECTIVE ............................................................................................3 OVERVIEW .........................................................................................................................6 WEBSITES ...........................................................................................................................6 OWNERSHIP .......................................................................................................................6 OBJECTIVES ......................................................................................................................6 FINANCIAL INTENTIONS .................................................................................................7 THE EFFECT ON AMERICA .............................................................................................8 ECONOMIC CORRIDORS .................................................................................................9 FUNDING .......................................................................................................................... 11 APPENDIX A: PROGRAM LEADERSHIP ....................................................................... 16 APPENDIX B: ASSOCIATED ENTITIES ......................................................................... 18 APPENDIX C: PARTICIPATING NATIONS.................................................................... 21 APPENDIX D: PROJECTS ...............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Chinese Investment in the Port of Piraeus, Greece: the Relevance for the EU and the Netherlands
    Chinese Investment in the Port of Piraeus, Greece: The Relevance for the EU and the Netherlands Frans-Paul van der Putten Clingendael Report Chinese Investment in the Port of Piraeus, Greece: The Relevance for the EU and the Netherlands Frans-Paul van der Putten Senior Research Fellow [email protected] Clingendael Report 14 February 2014 © Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holders. Clingendael Institute P.O. Box 93080 2509 AB The Hague The Netherlands Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.clingendael.nl/ Contents Summary 7 Abbreviations used in this Report 9 Introduction 10 1. Cosco and Piraeus as an Emerging Regional Hub 11 Corporate Profile and Operations 11 The Potential for Expansion 15 The Pioneering Role of Hewlett-Packard’s Distribution Activities at Piraeus 18 2. China’s Interests in the Region 21 3. EU–China Relations 24 Economic Significance for the EU 25 4. Cosco as a State-Owned Enterprise 28 Possible Political Relevance 29 5. The Relevance for Dutch Economic Interests 32 Conclusions 34 Interviews 35 Summary This report aims to provide a preliminary insight into how Cosco’s activities in Piraeus are relevant for: a) EU–China relations; and b) Dutch economic interests. Regarding EU– China relations, the report focuses on implications for trade flows and the relevance of the fact that Cosco is a state-owned company.
    [Show full text]
  • Piraeus Port Authority S.A. Annual Financial Report
    PIRAEUS PORT AU THORITY S.A. ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2018 (IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE L. 3556/2007) WorldReginfo - 4aac7156-b0aa-428d-be03-ee017797d73b PIRAEUS PORT AUTHORITY S.A Annual Financial Report for the year ended December 31, 2018 (amounts in Euro unless stated otherwise) Index to the Annual Financial Report PAGE STATEMENTS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS ....................................................................................................... 3 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS .............................................................................................................................. 4 STATEMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ................................................................................................................................... 53 INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT ................................................................................................................................................. 61 STATEMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE INCOME FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2018 ................................................................. 67 STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION AS AT DECEMBER 31, 2018 .................................................................................................. 68 STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN EQUITY FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2018 ......................................................................... 69 CASH FLOW STATEMENT FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2018 ...........................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • LABORATORY for MARITIME TRANSPORT Annual Report 2008 Contents
    NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS SCHOOL OF NAVAL ARCHITECTURE AND MARINE ENGINEERING DIVISION OF SHIP DESIGN AND MARITIME TRANSPORT LABORATORY FOR MARITIME TRANSPORT ANNUAL REPORT 2008 http://www.martrans.org June 2009 Laboratory for Maritime Transport National Technical University of Athens 9, Iroon Polytechneiou str 15773 Zografou , Greece Website: www.martrans.org NTUA - LABORATORY FOR MARITIME TRANSPORT Annual Report 2008 Contents Table of Contents 1. Introduction ........................................................................................2 1.1 About LMT .......................................................................................................................... 2 1.2 About this report .................................................................................................................. 2 2. Year 2008 Highlights ..........................................................................3 2.1 LMT wins "Piraeus International Centre Award"................................................................ 3 2.2 LMT and IMO business .......................................................................................................4 2.3 LMT at OECD Round Table................................................................................................ 5 2.4 LMT at SNAME Greek Section........................................................................................... 5 2.5 LMT at WMU SAR Workshop in Malmö........................................................................... 5 2.6
    [Show full text]
  • Geo-Economics with Chinese Characteristics: How China’S Economic Might Is Reshaping World Politics
    Regional Agenda Geo-economics with Chinese Characteristics: How China’s economic might is reshaping world politics January 2016 Geo-economics with Chinese Characteristics: How China’s economic might is reshaping world politics 1. Introduction Mark Leonard 2. China’s geo-economic power Wu Xinbo 3. China’s medium-term outlook: 2016-2020 Bert Hofman 4. The Geo-economic implications of China’s changing growth strategy Douglas Rediker, Elizabeth Economy, and Michael Levi 5. China’s infrastructure alliances Parag Khanna 6. China in Eurasia Sergei Guriev 7. China’s geo-economic power and the USA Ian Bremmer 8. China’s geo-economic role in South Asia Hina Rabbani Khar 9. China’s geo-economic role in Latin America Evan Ellis 10. China’s geo-economic policy in the Middle East Mahmood Sariolghalam 11. China’s geo-economic Power: Africa’s case Linah Mohohlo 12. China’s geo-economics in Europe Mark Leonard, Angela Stanzel & Agatha Kratz 13. China’s role in Asia-Pacific Kishore Mahbubani The World Economic Forum’s Network of Global Agenda Councils is the foremost interdisciplinary knowledge network dedicated to promoting innovative thinking on critical global issues, regions and industries, and incubating projects, campaigns and events for the public good. The Network convenes the most relevant and knowledgeable thought leaders from academia, government, business and civil society to challenge conventional thinking, develop new insights and create innovative solutions for key global challenges. In a global environment marked by short-term orientation and siloed thinking, the Network fosters interdisciplinary and long-range thinking on the prevailing challenges on the global agenda.
    [Show full text]
  • Turkish-Chinese Cooperation on the Belt & Road Initiative
    EKONOMICKÉ ROZHĽADY – ECONOMIC REVIEW Ročník/Volume 50, 2/2021 161 TURKISH-CHINESE COOPERATION ON THE BELT & ROAD INITIATIVE BARBORA DRUŽBACKÁ1 Turecko-čínska spolupráca v rámci iniciatívy Jedno pásmo, jedna cesta Abstract: China’s ambition to get to the top of the largest economies is obvious. This is also the reason in 2013 China launched the largest initiative in modern history – the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) – to revive the ancient Silk Road using state-of-the-art technology and to connect the Eurasian continent. In this context, China has cooperated with many countries, including Turkey. China and Turkey have a history of complicated relations, but it turns out that it is the cooperation on the ongoing projects of the BRI that could improve relations. This article aims to highlight Turkey’s position in the BRI, describes relations between these countries, analyses mutual trade, Chinese investment in Turkish territory and focuses on major projects under the initiative. The results showed that countries in economic interest are deepening their mutual cooperation despite cultural and ethical problems, but there is a large imbalance in market reciprocity. The paper also points out the most important BRI projects, with the opening of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway being identified as the most significant project implemented. This railway opens an alternative land route so-called southern branch of the New Silk Road. Turkey is becoming an important country as a gateway to Europe. Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, BRI, Cooperation, Investment, China, Turkey JEL Classification: F20, F50, P45 1 Ing. Barbora Družbacká, University of Economics in Bratislava, Slovak Republic; e-mail: [email protected] EKONOMICKÉ ROZHĽADY – ECONOMIC REVIEW 162 Ročník/Volume 50, 2/2021 1 Introduction In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping presented a vision for reviving the Silk Road in the form of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
    [Show full text]
  • China in the Broader Black Sea Region
    CHINA IN THE BROADER BLACK SEA REGION www.globsec.org CHINA IN THE BROADER BLACK SEA REGION The broader Black Sea region is the scene of increasing tensions amid renewed great power competition and conflicting geopolitical and geo-economic interests. The rise of China and its solidifying regional footprint requires a better understanding of how this influence is capitalized at national and regional level, what type of challenges it creates for respective countries, and what choices decision-makers have at their disposal in this new complex and complicated geopolitical setting. A report coordinated by Alexandra Martin, Head of GLOBSEC Brussels Office March 2021 China in the Broader Black Sea Region PARTNERS: PARTNERS This is a joint publication of GLOBSEC, the Wilfried Martens GLOBSEC is a global think-tank based in Bratislava Centre for European Studies and the Black Sea Trust for committed to enhancing security, prosperity and Regional Cooperation. This publication receives funding sustainability in Europe and throughout the world. Its from the European Parliament. GLOBSEC, the Wilfried mission is to influence the future by generating new ideas Martens Centre for European Studies, the Black Sea Trust and solutions for a better and safer world. We believe for Regional Cooperation, and the European Parliament we can change the world by putting together the right assume no responsibility for facts or opinions expressed in stakeholders at the right time for a free exchange of this publication or any subsequent use of the information ideas. In an interconnected world, GLOBSEC stimulates contained therein. Sole responsibility lies on the authors public-private dialogue to shape agendas for the future.
    [Show full text]
  • The Belt and Road Initiative: an Inclusive and Symbiotic Approach to Shared Global Prosperity
    The Belt and Road Initiative: An Inclusive and Symbiotic Approach to Shared Global Prosperity Yvonne Zhou, Alex Xie, Feng Lu, and Kevin Zhang March 2018 Contents 1. Analysis of the BRI’s Strategic Significance and Investment Models 1 1.1 Fundamental Evolution of the BRI: from a Foreign and Economic Policy Program Focusing on Infrastructure Projects, to a China-initiated Inclusive Global Platform for Economic Cooperation 1 1.2 Achievements and Status: Extensive Coverage, Inclusiveness and Symbiotic Development 2 1.3 An Inclusive and Symbiotic Model 3 1.4 Analysis of Chinese Enterprises’ Investments in BRI Countries: Models and Experience 5 2. Challenges Faced by the BRI and Suggestions for Its Development 12 2.1 Improve the Government’s Complementary Strategic Measures 12 2.2 Conquer Uncertainties in the Investment Environment of BRI Countries 13 2.3 Upgrade Models of Corporate Operations and Management 13 2.4 Suggestions for the Government 14 2.5 Suggestions for Enterprises Expanding Globally 15 The Belt and Road Initiative: An Inclusive and Symbiotic Approach to Shared Global Prosperity 1. Analysis of the BRI’s Strategic Significance and Investment Models 1.1 Fundamental Evolution of the BRI: from a Foreign and Economic Policy Program Focusing on Infrastructure Projects, to a China-initiated Inclusive Global Platform for Economic Cooperation During his state visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013 and to Indonesia a month later, President Xi Jinping proposed jointly building a “Silk Road Economic Belt” and a “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, now officially known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since then, the BRI has become a key component of China’s economic and diplomatic efforts.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Expanding Overseas Coal Power Industry
    Department of War Studies strategy paper 11 paper strategy China’s Expanding Overseas Coal Power Industry: New Strategic Opportunities, Commercial Risks, Climate Challenges and Geopolitical Implications Dr Frank Umbach & Dr Ka-ho Yu 2 China’s Expanding Overseas Coal Power Industry EUCERS Advisory Board Marco Arcelli Executive Vice President, Upstream Gas, Frederick Kempe President and CEO, Atlantic Council, Enel, Rome Washington, D.C., USA Professor Dr Hüseyin Bagci Department Chair of International Ilya Kochevrin Executive Director of Gazprom Export Ltd. Relations, Middle East Technical University Inonu Bulvari, Thierry de Montbrial Founder and President of the Institute Ankara Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Paris Andrew Bartlett Managing Director, Bartlett Energy Advisers Chris Mottershead Vice Principal, King’s College London Volker Beckers Chairman, Spenceram Limited Dr Pierre Noël Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Senior Fellow for Professor Dr Marc Oliver Bettzüge Chair of Energy Economics, Economic and Energy Security, IISS Asia Department of Economics and Director of the Institute of Dr Ligia Noronha Director Resources, Regulation and Global Energy Economics (EWI), University of Cologne Security, TERI, New Delhi Professor Dr Iulian Chifu Advisor to the Romanian President Janusz Reiter Center for International Relations, Warsaw for Strategic Affairs, Security and Foreign Policy and President of the Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Professor Dr Karl Rose Senior Fellow Scenarios, World Warning, Bucharest Energy Council, Vienna/Londo Dr John Chipman Director International Institute for Professor Dr Burkhard Schwenker Chairman of the Strategic Studies (IISS), London Supervisory Board, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants GmbH, Hamburg Professor Dr Dieter Helm University of Oxford Professor Dr Karl Kaiser Director of the Program on Transatlantic Relations of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, USA Media Partners Impressum Design © 2016 EUCERS.
    [Show full text]
  • The Potential for Growth Through Chinese Infrastructure Investments in Central and South-Eastern Europe Along
    The views expressed in this report are those of the author only and not the EBRD. The potential for growth through Chinese infrastructure investments in Central and South-Eastern Europe along the “Balkan Silk Road” Report1 prepared by Dr Jens Bastian for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (with funding from the Central European Initiative) Athens / London July 2017 1 The author would like to thank the Central European Initiative for generous funding of the study. He is also indebted to Daniel Berg and Peter Tabak as well as Ian Brown from the EBRD offices in Belgrade and Sarajevo, respectively for the time and expertise provided. Peter Sanfey and Anna Engstrom from the EBRD head office in London have engaged with the author in a spirit of cooperation and inspiration. Finally, he would like to thank the participants attending the presentation of the report at EBRD headquarters on July 18th, 2017, in particular Dr Mattia Romani, XinXing Li and Libor Krkoska. Executive Summary President XI Jinping’s “One Belt, One Road” or “Belt and Road” initiative, launched in 2013, is a Eurasian grand strategy that seeks to expand and secure maritime routes and road infrastructure networks for China from Asia across Africa to the Middle East and Europe. The blueprint includes a mosaic of trade deals, energy cooperation and financing agreements taking China westwards. With deep government pockets, growing technical sophistication and a comprehensive investment plan, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims to establish the country’s political economy on a global scale. In various sectors, it is already achieving dominant status in terms of production, consumption and distribution.
    [Show full text]
  • Hellenic Institute of Transport
    Informal document WP.5/GE.2 (2015) No. 5 Distr.: General 28 May 2015 English only Economic Commission for Europe Inland Transport Committee Working Party on Transport Trends and Economics Group of Experts on Euro-Asian Transport Links Thirteenth session Dushanbe, 9–10 June 2015 Item 5 of the provisional agenda Information from participants on recent developments in transport infrastructure priority projects on EATL routes Information from participants on recent developments in transport infrastructure priority projects on EATL routes Submitted by the Hellenic Institute of Transport GE. Informal document WP.5/GE.2 (2015) No. 5 Contribution Paper Submitted to: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Inland Transport Committee Working Party on Transport Trends and Economics Group of Experts on Euro-Asian Transport Links Based on: NEAR2 Project “Network of European-Asian Rail Research Capacities” SEVENTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME THEME 7 Transport including Aeronautics Submitted by: Dr. Maria Boile, Research Director, NEAR2 Project Coordinator Ms. Annie Kortsari, Research Associate Centre for Research and Technology Hellas Hellenic Institute of Transport Athens, May 2015 Contribution Paper to the EATL Project 2 Informal document WP.5/GE.2 (2015) No. 5 1. Introduction From the antiquity until today the Trans-Eurasian land bridge networks have contributed to the exchange of goods and ideas, and to the economic growth of Europe and Asia. Today, Asia is one of the world’s largest geo-economic hubs and Europe places particular emphasis on trade relationships with it. The New Silk Road, as the Eurasian land bridge is often called, provides a land-based option for moving freight between the Pacific ports of Russian Far East and China, countries of Central Asia like Kazakhstan and European industrial centres.
    [Show full text]
  • Silk Road 2.0: US Strategy Toward China’S Belt and Road Initiative
    Silk Road 2.0: US Strategy toward China’s Belt and Road Initiative Gal Luft Foreword by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. REVIVING THE SILK ROAD Announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, the Silk Road in infrastructure projects including railways and power grids in central, initiative, also known as China’s Belt and Road Initiative, aims to invest west, and southern Asia, as well as Africa and Europe. Silk Road 2.0 A US Strategy toward China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative Atlantic Council Strategy Paper No. 11 © 2017 The Atlantic Council of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Atlantic Council, except in the case of brief quotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. Please direct inquiries to: Atlantic Council 1030 15th Street, NW, 12th Floor Washington, DC 20005 ISBN: 978-1-61977-406-3 Cover art credit: Marco Polo’s caravan, from the Catalan Atlas, ca. 1375 This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council, its partners, and funders do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s particular conclusions. October 2017 Atlantic Council Strategy Papers Editorial Board Executive Editors Mr. Frederick Kempe Dr. Alexander V. Mirtchev Editor-in-Chief Mr. Barry Pavel Managing Editor Dr. Mathew Burrows Table of
    [Show full text]