MERICS PAPERS ON CHINA CHINA’S EMERGENCE AS A GLOBAL SECURITY ACTOR Strategies for Europe Mikko Huotari | Jan Gaspers Thomas Eder | Helena Legarda | Sabine Mokry No 4 | July 2017 CHINA’S EMERGENCE AS A GLOBAL SECURITY ACTOR Strategies for Europe Mikko Huotari | Jan Gaspers Thomas Eder | Helena Legarda | Sabine Mokry Contents Acknowledgements .........................................................................................................................................7 Executive Summary ..........................................................................................................................................9 The challenge: China’s emergence as a global security actor aects core European interests .......................................................................................................................................................................9 A nuanced approach: China can be a partner, competitor or adversary for Europe ....................11 1. Introduction: Europe needs to brace itself for China’s emergence as a global security actor ............................................................................................................................................. 15 New realities: China and the EU have more direct security interactions ............................................16 The big picture: Europe needs a comprehensive forward-looking assessment ...........................17 Factors of uncertainty: Conflicting trends shape China’s global security profile ..........................17 Outline of the report: Europe meets China as a diplomat, soldier, trader and shaper ................18 2. Domestic factors propel a more outward-facing national security policy ........................... 19 Key findings ....................................................................................................................................................................................21 Beijing’s mission: Securing the international environment for China’s power-seeking national modernization agenda ......................................................................................................................................21 New environment: China’s national security strategy confronts new threats and vulnerabilities ................................................................................................................................................................................23 Re-orientation: Beijing’s outward-facing security policy aligns with broader foreign policy changes ..............................................................................................................................................................................27 In the making: China is adapting institutions and building up capacity for its global role ......29 3. Diplomat: China expands its soft security power in Asia and beyond ................................. 31 Key findings ...................................................................................................................................................................................33 Past profile: China lacks resources and confidence to eectively broker security abroad .....34 Drivers: Beijing acts on the need to build trust and foster greater strategic alignment with international counterparts ......................................................................................................................................34 Key trends: China Advances diplomatic security initiatives in Asia and along the “Belt and Road” routes ............................................................................................................................................................35 China as a diplomat in 2022: Beijing delivers a more mature ‘soft security’ performance ....41 4. Soldier: The PLA goes global ................................................................................................................ 47 Key findings ...................................................................................................................................................................................49 Past profile: PLA international operations are limited to military operations other than war ............................................................................................................................................................................................50 Drivers: Beijing seeks to protect China’s overseas interests and raise its international profile ..................................................................................................................................................................................................50 Key trends: The PLA projects its power in new theaters and domains ................................................53 China as a soldier in 2022: Beijing has a truly global military footprint ..............................................61 4 | MERICS | PAPERS ON CHINA No 4 5. Trader: Economic statecraft catalyzes China’s global security policy ................................... 67 Key findings ...................................................................................................................................................................................69 Past profile: China rarely uses its economic influence for security-related purposes ...............70 Drivers: China’s domestic economic transformation provides new sources for influencing security matters abroad .............................................................................................................................70 Key trends: China’s pursuit of security interests comes with economic sticks and carrots and an expanding global footprint of its defense industry ..........................................................................72 China as a trader in 2022: Beijing deploys sophisticated economic statecraft to command global support for its security priorities .............................................................................................82 6. Shaper: China determines the way other countries think about and approach security ......................................................................................................................................................... 87 Key findings ...................................................................................................................................................................................89 Past profile: China takes a back seat on prominent international security debates ...................89 Drivers: China seizes on Western weakness to externalize its security ideas and concepts ............................................................................................................................................................................................90 Key trends: Beijing uses the UN and flexible security alignments as an amplifier for its normative security agenda .........................................................................................................................................91 China as a shaper by 2022: Beijing makes its security concepts and alliances popular with the rest of the world ....................................................................................................................................................99 7. China’s global security profile in 2022 aects core European security interests ........ 105 Overall trajectory: China emerges as a more visible and powerful security actor ....................107 More tangible links: Europe starts to feel the heat of Chinese security activism .....................108 Red layer: Europe and China meet in largely non-confrontational security interactions with high impact on European security interests .............................................................................................109 Orange layer: Europe and China meet in competitive and adversarial security interactions with medium to high impact on European security interests ....................................112 White layer: Europe and China meet in less intensive security interactions with only limited direct impact on European security interests by 2022 ..............................................................115 Conclusion: Europe must prepare to meet China as a security partner, competitor, and adversary ...................................................................................................................................................... 119 Europe’s homework: Decision makers need to tackle a set of policy priorities ...........................121 Engaging China in largely cooperative soft security interactions with high impact on European security interests .............................................................................................................................................122 Engaging China in competitive and adversarial security interactions with medium to high impact on European security interests .........................................................................................................123 Engaging China in less intensive security interactions with only limited direct impact on European security interests by 2022 ................................................................................................................125 Endnotes ........................................................................................................................................................