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State and Civil Society After the 2019 Elections

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State and Civil Society After the 2019 Elections EU PROJECT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT IN UKRAINE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY AFTER THE 2019 ELECTIONS Orysia Lutsevych, Consultant Context: This analysis aims to contribute ideas to the improvement of state and civil society cooperation in Ukraine after the electoral cycle of 2019. Two watershed elections – the presidential elections in April 2019 and the parliamentary elections in July 2019 – led to a complete overhaul of the political system in Ukraine. There are some important new factors that will determine the new leadership’s interaction with civil society: President Zelenskyy has the first ever single-party control across the legislative and executive branches in the history of independent Ukraine. He has an opportunity to demonstrate political leadership and ownership of reforms. With 254 MPs out of 450, Zelenskyy has formed a majority government without a coalition partner. At this stage, the parliament is not a strong player: as most laws are drafted and proposed by the office of the president. For the first time, the institution of the president has a much higher level of public trust than civil society organisations (CSOs). This creates a new dynamic in the relationship. After 100 days in office Zelenskyy was fully or mostly trusted by almost 70 per cent of Ukrainians, and the majority trusted that the president would deliver1. Meanwhile, trust in CSOs for driving reforms dropped from 24 per cent in 2018 to 9 per cent in 20192. This is the first time in the history of independent Ukraine that a president has enjoyed such a high level of trust in his ability to deliver change. There is now a new generation in parliament. Thanks to two new political parties – the president’s party Sluga Narodu and Voice, the party of rock star Slava Vakarchuk – 80 per cent of MPs are newcomers. The average age of parliamentarians is now 41, seven years younger than that of the previous parliament. The intake is 20 per cent female, almost twice that of 2014. Holos has the largest number of MPs from civil society. The current government of Oleksiy Honcharuk is aiming to pursue a market-oriented reform agenda. The cabinet is preparing for a large-scale privatization of state-owned enterprises and an easing of access to extractive industries for foreign investors; it has already lifted the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land to Ukrainian citizens. Many CSOs support a similar agenda. A number of people who have a good understanding of civil society have now joined the new executive team (Taras Kachka, Svitlana Zalishchuk, Pavlo Kukhta, Oksana Nechyporenko). The aim is to make the state smaller and more efficient. The number of ministers has been cut and there are now only 15 ministries. There is a plan to digitalize more services for citizens and create a so-called ‘state in a smartphone’. 1 https://www.unian.ua/politics/10664874-pidtrimuyut-70-ukrajinciv-sociologi-rozpovili-pro-rekordno-visoku-doviru-do-zelenskogo-pislya- 100-dniv-prezidentstva.html 2 https://dif.org.ua/article/100-dniv-pislya-prezidentskikh-viboriv-otsinki-ta-ochikuvannya- gromadyan?fbclid=IwAR06Rx3isvimzSqSdnpC2SyFyEUbh0GBRyjXJfl_KKHg3bwDGDClJprdTxQ The Project is funded by the European Union and implemented by a consortium led by FCG Many CSOs, especially those based in Kyiv, are viewed by President Zelenskyy as having supported his opponent during the presidential race. This complicates relations; it impedes openness and gets in the way of outreach by the office of the president towards more established groups and some think tanks. The perception of CSOs as having political preferences antagonised many actors. This has resulted in conflict among groups who share a similar reform agenda. The key demand from the office of the president is that the changes happen quickly. Speed of change is prioritised over the quality of the decision-making process. The current leadership openly acknowledges its capacity to tolerate mistakes and ‘learn by doing’. Zelenskyy has confirmed that he is ready to listen to the people, learn from his mistakes and change for better.3 But, this time pressure means that many things are decided in the narrow circle of the office of the president. Almost all new laws submitted to the parliament are developed and submitted by the office of the president. Evolution of the cooperation In the period immediately after Euromaidan, during which active citizens and organized civil society played an important role in ousting the corrupt regime of Victor Yanukovych, there was relatively active cooperation between civil society and the new leadership of Poroshenko to drive the reform agenda. CSOs participated in the National Reform Council and were active at Reform Offices at attached to sectoral ministries. Overall, the importance of civil society for the previous administration lay in its capacity to endorse reforms in the eyes of the western donors. In what was known as a ‘reform sandwich’, the Reanimation Package for Reforms Coalition (RPR) delivered vocal pressure from below, while donors put pressure on the former administration from the top. Since 2017 and parliament’s introduction of e-declarations for anti-corruption NGOs, the rift between civil society and President’s office especially has deepened. In spite of strong criticism from the G7 ambassadors, the EU Commission and the Venice Commission, this regulation remains in place. To date there have been no reports on the authorities’ exerting of pressure on CSOs by means of this regulation. As things stand, there has been no new systemic interface of cooperation between civil society and the new leadership. The sporadic exchange and engagement that exists is based on personal contacts with people in the office of the president or the Cabinet of Ministers. At the level of the Cabinet, they are interested in sectoral cooperation to make reforms happen and aid delivery of the Government Programme. In particular, the focus is on justice, land reform, privatization and energy efficiency. The office of the president is looking more for support from CSOs in promoting reforms internationally. From the start of Zelenskyy’s presidency many well-established groups have been sending a strong message to president-elect about their commitment to hold power to account and ensure civic oversight on key policy areas. In May 2019, around 100 CSOs signed a declaration setting out red lines for the president4. Among them were many leading think tanks, human rights and media CSOs. 3 https://ua.interfax.com.ua/news/political/613014.html 4 http://uacrisis.org/ua/71966-joint-appeal-of-civil-society-representatives The Project is funded by the European Union and implemented by a consortium led by FCG This established a rather confrontational atmosphere for the relationship with the sector among key figures in the office of the president. Overall, the operating environment in Ukraine continues to be complex and turbulent. The military conflict in the east has spill-over effects throughout Ukraine, with millions of internally displaced people (IDPs), veterans of war, a difficult economic situation and increasing political tensions among groups with regard to how the conflict in Donbas should be resolved. The recent ‘No Capitulation’ movement is gathering around the political opposition and patriotic forces to prevent ‘peace at any price’. Social cohesion index as measured by the SCORE Index shows quite low average intergroup harmony in Ukraine (2.9 as compared to max 9-10), with the lowest numbers being in Western Ukraine and Zakarpattia.5 Civic fatigue due to conflict is equally high across Ukraine.6 Key facts about the quality of civil society in Ukraine7: 44% ready to donate to charitable causes, including supporting CSOs 25% regularly or sometimes attend community meetings. 7.5% declare active civic engagement8. 12.6% responded correctly about their rights and the type of government system. Civil society is an important expression of citizens’ voices in any democratic society. It is by its nature diverse, and it is precisely this diversity that contributes to its strength. By channelling the views of various societal groups, by vocalising those views and by acting collectively to protect and serve citizens’ interests, civil society contributes to making public policy inclusive, effective and, in some cases, efficient. Ukrainian civil society broadly serves five key functions in its relations to the government: Ensure checks and balances – provide civic oversight, especially in the case of anti-corruption organizations. They rarely ‘cooperate’ with the authorities, but their presence and their role are indispensable. Serve as a ‘public square’ by providing a platform and support for public consultations with varied stakeholders, and by aiding consensus-building on sometimes complex and divisive policies. Maintaining a non-partisan outlook is key to ensuring the credibility of such initiatives. Provide capacity-building and propose solutions by supplying expertise and training for the new cadre of government officials and members of parliament. In light of what the current leadership views as the partisan leaning of some think tanks and advocacy groups during the 2019 elections, it would be expedient for CSOs to engage western experts in capacity-building activities with new MPs. 5 https://www.scoreforpeace.org/en/ukraine/2018-General%20population%20Government%20Controlled%20Areas-0 6 https://www.scoreforpeace.org/en/ukraine/2018-General%20population%20Government%20Controlled%20Areas-118 7 https://dif.org.ua/article/gromadskiy-aktivizm-ta-stavlennya-do-reform-suspilna-dumka-v-ukraini_5 8 https://dif.org.ua/article/gromadyanske-suspilstvo-v-ukraini-poglyad-gromadyan The Project is funded by the European Union and implemented by a consortium led by FCG Act as a partner in service delivery both at the national and regional level. This is especially relevant for social services (assistance to vulnerable groups), veterans and youth. Build public awareness around pressing issues affecting society at large, such as inequality, discrimination, the environment, the quality of the information space, demographics and social protection.
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