Special Feature the Typhoon Haiyan Response

Home , Typhoon Haiyan, Typhoon Ruby (1988)

HPN Humanitarian Practice Network Managed by Humanitarian Humanitarian Policy Group Exchange

Commissioned and published by the Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI Number 63 January 2015 Special feature The Typhoon Haiyan response HPN Humanitarian Humanitarian Practice Network Managed by Humanitarian Policy Group Exchange Number 63 January 2015 Contents Editorial

The Typhoon Haiyan response 3 Coordinating the response to Typhoon Haiyan 5 Typhoon Haiyan: pushing the limits of DRR? 8 Assessing early warning efforts for Typhoon Haiyan in Leyte 11 Typhoon Haiyan: lessons from the response and how to prepare for the future 13 Constructing a culture of accountability: lessons from the Philippines 16 Pamati Kita: ‘Let’s Listen Together’ 19 Coordination around communicating with disaster-affected communities: insights from Typhoon Haiyan 23 Engaging with clusters: empowering and learning from local organisations 25 Humanitarian partnerships: reality lags behind the rhetoric 27 ‘Recently noticed’ aid actors: MSF’s interaction with a changing humanitarian landscape 29 Are cash transfers the ‘new normal’ in the Philippines? Challenges and opportunities from Typhoon Haiyan 34 The private sector: stepping up 36 Urban shelter and settlement recovery: a ‘menu of options’ for households 39 Supporting shelter self-recovery: field experience following Typhoon Haiyan This edition of Humanitarian Exchange focuses on lessons from the humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan, the worst disaster ever to hit the Philippines. Making landfall on 8 November 2013, the typhoon killed About HPN more than 6,000 people and affected more than 14 million. It also triggered The Humanitarian Practice Network at the Overseas a swift, large-scale national and international (Level 3) response. In the lead Development Institute is an independent forum article, David Carden and Ashley Jonathan Clements highlight the important where field workers, managers and policymakers coordination role of the Philippines government in the response, while Katie in the humanitarian sector share information, analysis and experience. The views and opinions Peters and Mirianna Budimir analyse why such heavy losses were sustained expressed in HPN’s publications do not necessarily despite significant government investment in Disaster Risk Reduction state or reflect those of the Humanitarian Policy (DRR). Julie Hall analyses the World Health Organisation (WHO)’s long Group or the Overseas Development Institute. experience of responding to disasters in the Philippines, emphasising that government structures need to be able to handle multiple waves of health Cover photo: Residents walk past debris in East Samar, needs for months or even years after an event. Articles by Barb Wigley and which Oxfam staff visited during an assessment in the Alex Jacobs reflect on the attitudes and tools needed to build a culture of aftermath of the Typhoon © Jire Carreon/Oxfam accountability to affected populations, and Caroline Austin and Nicki Bailey Editorial photo: Military helicopter delivers relief supplies in discuss lessons learned from a review of support to enhance two-way Guiuan after Typhoon Haiyan communications with communities. © US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Peter Burghart Articles by John Tipper, Anne Street and Michiel Hofman and Sandrine Tiller focus on the need to improve the quality of partnerships and engagement with local actors by clusters and individual agencies. Alesh Brown reflects on the collective cash response in the Philippines, one of the largest humanitarian cash-based interventions ever mounted, while Serena Brown Britain’s leading independent think-tank on international points out the extensive and growing role of the private sector in the Haiyan development and humanitarian issues response. The issue ends with articles by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Overseas Development Institute 203 Blackfriars Road, London SE1 8NJ Philippines and Victoria Maynard and Phil Barritt discussing key aspects of United Kingdom. the shelter response. Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300, Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399 HPN e-mail: [email protected] As always, we welcome any comments or feedback, which can be sent to HPN website: http://www.odihpn.org [email protected] or to The Coordinator, 203 Blackfriars Road, London SE1 8NJ.

HUMANITARIAN 2 exchange THE TYPHOON HAIYAN RESPONSE Coordinating the response to Typhoon Haiyan David Carden and Ashley Jonathan Clements

Typhoon Haiyan made landfall on 8 November 2013, priorities. The Haiyan response saw advisors from a cementing the position of the Philippines as one of range of areas being deployed in support of the response, the countries most at risk from natural hazards. Within including gender, private sector engagement and the days of the disaster the Emergency Relief Coordinator environment. OCHA established its largest sustained formally activated a system-wide level 3 (L3) response – a civil–military coordination operation to date, leading designation marking the highest level of humanitarian crisis. engagement with 22 militaries and the Armed Forces In responding to the needs of 14 million affected people, of the Philippines. As well as being the largest single the Haiyan response became the first large-scale relief donor under the SRP (accounting for 26%), the private effort for a sudden-onset disaster since the Inter-Agency sector also responded directly from the very earliest Standing Committee protocols under the Transformative stages. Significant efforts were made to engage the Agenda were adopted, setting the parameters for improved private sector at the local, national and international collective action in humanitarian emergencies. level, including briefing companies on how best to assist affected communities and partnering with businesses in Scaling up the provision of cash-based assistance. Accompanying the L3 declaration was a massive inter- agency surge that saw over 450 international staff deployed At least 45 international humanitarian agencies used within the first three weeks. There was a particular cash transfers, reaching 1.4m disaster-affected people. In emphasis on information management necessitated by the addition to emergency employment and livelihoods, cash scale and geographic impact of Haiyan, and recurring high- assistance was used extensively in support of food security impact disasters that had affected in-country capacities in and shelter, constituting around a fifth of the response the lead-up to the typhoon. The L3 declaration also made in each of these sectors. Due to the number of actors available $25 million through the UN Central Emergency involved, the scale of cash interventions, and differing Response Fund, and the Strategic Response Plan (SRP) approaches within the sector, cash transfers were difficult

brought in $468m of the requested $776m, including to monitor and coordinate, particularly as many took HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE projects from over 50 UN agencies and NGOs. An additional place outside the established humanitarian coordination $375m-worth of funding was recorded for projects outside architecture. Preparedness work that encompasses the SRP, with a far larger amount not registered on the planning around cash – in particular the role of financial Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)’s service providers within the Philippines – is underway Financial Tracking System. to ensure a more systematic and efficient approach to cash in future responses. More thinking is also needed at This unprecedented scaling up of response structures the global level to better define the role of cash during a and personnel was set against the backdrop of a middle- response (and beyond), and the coordination structures income country with strong national capacities and a well- needed to maximise its effectiveness. developed disaster management system. Long-standing relationships meant that coordination with the government Preparedness work by both national and international was strong from the outset. Government-led humanitarian humanitarian actors ensured that effective systems clusters – enshrined in national law in 2007 – led and and structures were in place prior to Typhoon Haiyan, oversaw coordination for the response, with the support of even though the impact of the storm proved to be international actors. Despite being heavily affected itself, beyond what could be accommodated without external the government provided an enabling environment for support. The Haiyan response has highlighted how international responders, with visas being waived during critical adequate investment in emergency preparedness the first months, and some Local Government Units (LGUs) is, a point reinforced yet again following Typhoon Ruby in hosted humanitarian agencies throughout the response. December 2014, where the government’s preparedness Even so, interoperability between the international efforts have been widely praised. humanitarian system and the national Philippines response framework was a challenge, particularly around Engaging communities strategic planning and how long humanitarian action The Philippines became a priority country for global should be pursued before giving way to recovery. initiatives around Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) and Communications with Communities (CwC). New ways of working Whilst AAP has its origins in civil society concepts of The social, political and economic environment in the accountability and the importance of adapting interventions Philippines was highly conducive to new initiatives, to the priorities of communities themselves, CwC focuses which humanitarian agencies were quick to embrace. on meeting the information and communications needs of Some were driven by field imperatives, others by global people affected by crisis.

Number 63 • January 2015 3 © M. Cochrane / OCHA / Cochrane M. ©

Supplies being unloaded from a helicopter in Tanauan

At the outset of the Haiyan response these two areas were down from an initial caseload of 4m people displaced seen to have limited overlap. As the sectors matured, immediately after the storm. With estimates that over however, they became more closely integrated, culminating 200,000 families (up to 1m individuals) continue to live in in a jointly-managed inter-agency community feedback areas deemed ‘unsafe’ across Haiyan-affected regions, the mechanism. In several field locations the AAP and CwC solution is likely to unfold over many years, and will form working groups merged. The flow of information from a critical component of the recovery. Identifying sufficient affected communities was channelled through these land to house these communities has proved difficult, and mechanisms directly to relevant clusters and the inter- requires significant investment to ensure that adequate cluster forum, with the aim of increasing the quality of services are in place. programming and to better inform decision-making. The transition to recovery Despite serving as a model to better integrate AAP and The immediate response was generally seen as timely CwC activities, closing the feedback loop and keeping and effective. Life-saving assistance was delivered communities fully informed remains a challenge for the at scale, reinforced by the L3 declaration and the sector, as does monitoring the impact of these systems. subsequent system-wide support that was mobilised. Given the magnitude of the disaster – which would have In search of durable solutions overwhelmed the capacity of any country – the inter- In the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, the Philippines national community complemented national capacities government announced that it would take steps to by repositioning in-country personnel to affected areas enforce a national policy restricting the building of private and quickly ramping up operations with international dwellings in high-risk areas. Humanitarian assistance surge deployments. Government leadership was at times was restricted within these zones to activities that did overshadowed, particularly at the local level where not encourage permanent settlement in an attempt to national capacities were particularly stretched. discourage housing. Yet many of the most vulnerable families – and those most affected by Haiyan – have Despite the magnitude of the disaster and pre-existing few alternatives, and so continue to reside within these levels of poverty, the response to Typhoon Haiyan took restricted zones. This presents a dilemma between the place in an environment of significant resilience and rapid imperative to meet short-term humanitarian needs and the self-recovery among affected communities. Displaced longer-term objective of encouraging vulnerable families families were quick to rebuild where possible – albeit to relocate. LGUs in affected areas continue to pursue often to a lower standard than they had enjoyed before durable solutions for those displaced by Haiyan. One year the typhoon – and the resumption of livelihoods rapidly on from the typhoon, around 5,000 families were still living became a key focus. Humanitarian actors on the ground

THE TYPHOON HAIYAN THE RESPONSE TYPHOON HAIYAN in bunkhouses, tent settlements and evacuation centres, proved sufficiently nimble to keep pace with these shifting

HUMANITARIAN 4 exchange priorities as initial food and water distributions gave way to The road ahead longer-term food security and water, sanitation and health At the one-year mark of the response a physical and programming. strategic realignment had taken place to ensure that international actors were working in support of government Field hubs were established in centres of high humanitarian recovery efforts, both at the national and local level. This need and where large numbers of actors were present, and transition is now broadly on track despite initial delays, but usually where local government capacity was good, but a transition framework could have helped build momentum not necessarily where provincial authorities were located. and increased coherence earlier. This model proved effective for the initial phase of the response – which tended to be channelled through LGUs. Reinforcing the successes achieved during the humani- But as recovery activities picked up pace, primarily through tarian phase of the Haiyan response hinges on this transition provincial actors, and the focus of the national authorities process, and more specifically on the effective management moved away from humanitarian interventions, a physical and coordination of recovery and development activities. The disconnect became apparent between international challenges faced by actors in the Philippines in overseeing actors and provincial or regional structures. This posed this handover have highlighted the systemic disconnect a significant challenge for recovery coordination and a between humanitarian and development approaches – a smooth transition to development. disconnect made all the more apparent during a rapid- onset emergency with early opportunities for recovery. More With up to a million people still living in ‘unsafe’ zones, thinking and greater resources at the global level could and many of the buildings used as evacuation centres ease this burden in future responses – particularly for a during Haiyan now damaged, the ability of communities to rapid-onset disaster like Typhoon Haiyan, in which national cope with future disasters has been significantly reduced. capacities and local resilience ensured a rapid move towards In Eastern Samar, for example, only 8% of evacuation recovery. Investment in and planning for transition must centres were still usable after the typhoon. Despite the begin at the earliest possible stage of the response. speed with which recovery activities became possible, the lasting impact of the response will be determined largely David Carden is Head of OCHA Philippines. Ashley Jonathan by the extent to which these remaining vulnerabilities are Clements is the former Head of Sub-Office Ormoc, OCHA addressed. Philippines. THE TYPHOON HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE Typhoon Haiyan: pushing the limits of DRR? Katie Peters and Mirianna Budimir

Compared to other countries in the region, the Philippines island of Leyte received rainfall totals greater than 500mm, is well prepared in terms of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). with a peak of over 685mm in the south-east corner of DRR is embedded in local through to national policies. the island. The wall of water caused by the typhoon was Over the past 40 years, the government has steadily particularly devastating for many low-lying islands; Tacloban evolved national policy, from disaster response to disaster City is located in a particularly vulnerable position at the management to disaster risk management and finally risk head of San Pedro Bay, with the majority of the city only five reduction. DRR is mainstreamed in development planning, meters above sea level. Haiyan was, in short, an enormous with different government departments addressing each event. Officials admitted that government systems were not aspect of Disaster Risk Reduction and Management adequately prepared for a disaster of this magnitude, in part (DRRM). The Office for Civil Defense implements and moni- because preparing for such adverse conditions is beyond the tors the overall scope of DRRM. Government spending on country’s means, despite substantial international support DRR is close to $800 million per year. totalling $8 billion in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) loans between 2001 and 2011. Despite these achievements, Typhoon Haiyan still resulted in massive destruction: almost 15m people were affected, In addition to the scale of the typhoon, one of the clearest 4m displaced and approximately 6,000 killed; losses were explanations for the Philippines’ lack of preparedness may, estimated at $830m. Why was this? The answer lies in two sadly, also be one of the most difficult to address: its poverty.1 parts: the sheer scale of the typhoon, and the country’s The Philippines is ranked 165th in the world in terms of GDP underlying vulnerability and poverty. The scale of the per capita, and almost two million people live on less than destruction also raises an important question: are there $2 per day. In order to better cope with disasters, these high limits to DRR? levels of poverty and vulnerability must be addressed.

Haiyan was possibly the strongest typhoon to make landfall 1 Catholic Agency for Overseas Development, ActionAid, Tearfund, on record globally in terms of windspeed, with 253km per Christian Aid and Oxfam, Missed Again: Making Space for Partnership hour winds and a storm surge that may have reached 7.5 in the Typhoon Haiyan Response, http://www.christianaid.org.uk/ meters high. Between 2 and 12 November 2013 most of the Images/Missed-Again-Typhoon-Haiyan-September-2014.pdf.

Number 63 • January 2015 5 The scale of the typhoon also raises challenging questions about the level of acceptable risk and the limits to DRR and preparedness measures. Typhoon Haiyan stretched national and international response capacities to their limits; if a hazard on a similar scale faced the country again, what can we change now to ensure that its impact is less severe and the response more effective? A large part of what is needed to improve humanitarian MindaNews Mordeno, C. Marcos Horacio © response actually has nothing to do with humanitarians. While nationally the Philippines invests heavily (polit- ically and financially) in DRR, more can and should be done by the international community:

• we need to get better at providing support for preparedness before a disaster and during A disaster risk reduction workshop with government, NGOs, academics recovery; and indigenous communities in the Philippines • we need to change the narrative: investing in DRR makes good economic sense; and could provide a good test case for trialling innovative • we need to get tougher on making ODA investments financing arrangements. risk-informed. DRR makes good economic sense Preparedness and recovery In addition to sufficient funding, preparedness can also be Evidence from the Philippines shows that there are funda- improved by changing the narrative, discourse and language mental gaps in financing for DRR, especially locally. typically used to encourage investment in DRR. Philippine The international community is notoriously poor at efforts to mainstream DRRM are commendable, and the providing support for preparedness and recovery and international community must reinforce and support this reconstruction. Investing in one component of prepared- ambition by ensuring that mainstream development actors ness – early warning systems, for instance – is fruitless fully embrace sustainable development that takes risk into without investment in other components as well, such account in decision-making. as evacuation plans. More investment is also needed in recovery. In the Philippines, less than half of the $788m Investments come in many forms; here we focus on ODA. required for recovery had been received by February 2014; In an era where value for money (VfM) and cost efficiency six months after the typhoon, two million people were still dominate donor rhetoric, the argument for investment in living without adequate shelter or housing. and uptake of DRR needs to be reframed. Currently, the economic case for DRR focuses on the measurement of Greater support is also needed to enable national capac- costs and benefits: for every dollar invested in DRR, a certain ity to take over recovery in the aftermath of disaster. amount is saved in terms of reduced losses and/or reduced International agencies working in the Haiyan response expenditure on the response.2 This argument has failed to struggled to hand over leadership and coordination of the have impact at the scale required, for a variety of reasons: recovery to the government and were unwilling to entrust it does not compare like for like choices between DRR and a greater share of the response to national organisations, disaster response; the ‘market’ for responding to disasters in turn leading to a further influx of internationals to is much larger than the ‘market’ for risk reduction;3 cost– build national capacity in key institutions. Addressing benefit approaches focus on losses, as directly compared this requires more concerted attention on the part to potential gains, which tends to ignore the wider macro- of the international community – as well as political economic or foreign direct investment dimensions that can will within the national government. It took a full year be associated with strong performance in disaster resilience; following the disaster for President Benigno Aquino to and the practitioners engaged in undertaking cost–benefit approve a $3.6bn reconstruction plan for affected areas. exercises are largely separate from those making large-scale DRRM plans need to include processes to effectively economic decisions, and fail to communicate findings in transfer responsibility for post-disaster initiatives ways that seem relevant to decision-makers. between different international and national actors. At present we lack examples of good practice for the 2 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ effective coordination of national and international post- attachment_data/file/67330/Econ-Ear-Rec-Res-Full-Report_20.pdf. disaster finance; as the Philippines is one of the more 3 See the discussion on incentives in the 2014 World Development

THE TYPHOON HAIYAN THE RESPONSE TYPHOON HAIYAN advanced countries in thinking and acting on DRR, it Report.

HUMANITARIAN 6 exchange THE TYPHOON HAIYAN RESPONSE 7 is an Mirianna Budimir Number Number 63 • January 2015 is a Research Fellow at the Overseas Typhoon Haiyan also raises more challenging 7 risk reduction and ensure that we get better at transitions out of disaster and into Obtaining recovery. national and existing reduce to action take to commitment international risk, avoid new risk and manage residual risk – through the post-2015 frameworks for Development Goals DRR, and climate the change agreement Sustainable – a clear, is practical way for the humanitarian community to development required, not is response a when that, ensure efforts are mitigating the disasters. risk and severity of questions – questions that future will be asked more frequently disasters of scale What toll. their take extremes climate as should we aim to prepared, for? undertakeAnd with climate change making DRR extremes measures, and the new norm, are there limits to DRR? be Katie Peters Development Institute (ODI). independent researcher. Moving Moving forward: post-2015 frameworks Although the Philippines invests for heavily disasters, Typhoon Haiyan in showed that preparing gaps remain and need to be addressed. The international community needs to get tougher on making investments existing ODA risk-informed; we can learn a lot approach to prioritising from and integrating DRR the in its policy, Philippines’ the However, frameworks. decision-making and budgetary underlying poverty and vulnerability of complicated the and worsened Philippines the effect of Haiyan, making the humanitarian response a much bigger reduce task. To the burden on humanitarian assistance in the immediate aftermath of a collaborating with their development colleagues to disaster, enact humanitarians DRR and preparedness should measures before an event occurs. be Here, the narrative used to encourage investment in DRR needs to change from one of costs and benefits to one of good economic sense. Finally, as Haiyan demonstrates, the process of transition out of disasters also be improved, in particular needs the transfer of responsibility to to and governments the coherence of funding streams. Building DRR into the post-2015 frameworks development is one way to ensure longevity in efforts to mainstream making: making: to consciously make decisions around when to take risks, when to spread them and when to minimise them. 7 http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications- opinion-files/8996.pdf.

4 Why Integration MakesWhy Integration

6 Such economic exposure 5 (London: ODI, 2014). (London: Good Economic Sense 4 http://cdkn.org/resource/highlights-south-asia-ar5/. 5 http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications- opinion-files/8633.pdf. Richards, and F. Venton C. Cabot 6 K. Peters, would be a significant step forward in decision ‘risk-informed’ at competent more this become must regard. We should be banging down the doors of their development counterparts to ensure that this appropriate international happens. policy framework in the Setting future an needs to catch up. we A must manage fundamental risk responsibly shift through mainstream is development required; interventions in burden on order humanitarian response. Humanitarian actors to reduce the In many respects the Philippines is government ahead of the aid game in terms of embedding risk in legislation, policies and practice. The international community estimates that 58% of its portfolio is at medium to high risk from climate change impacts. directly directly increases the level of risk for aid agencies across all development sectors with regard to their investment portfolio. The Asian Development Bank, for example, frequency frequency of hazards will accentuate existing disaster losses in trends the future, as well in as projected poverty rates for vulnerable people. that failing to take account of risk in ODA is short-sighted; is ODA in risk of account take to failing that with an increase in the number exposure to of disasters is disasters, increasing faster than economic per capita GDP. The effect of climate change on the severity and be reduced if mainstream systematically development sought to manage interventions disaster risk. Projected climate and disaster risks in the Philippines make clear It must become a duty and an obligation for risk-informed. ODA to Transitions be in and out underlying of poverty and disasters, vulnerability to and disasters, would to manage risk. risk-informed ODA Tougher, will accrue from investment even if a disaster strike, does including not a more attractive job investment creation, climate, sustainable economic communities local enabling of benefits the and livelihoods growth, improved framed framed only as preparation for come: people are less likely to a spend money on a ‘might’. disaster that ‘might’ Instead, DRR needs framing in terms of the benefits that of VfM and the post-2015 agenda, growth, based on economic sustainable benefits development, for other areas. Investing investment in DRR should not be and A new narrative is needed that draws on the language Assessing early warning efforts for Typhoon Haiyan in Leyte Gemma Ocon and Olaf Neussner

Typhoon Haiyan was the deadliest natural disaster ever surge hazard map on hand prior to Haiyan, generated recorded in the Philippines. It left a massive trail of death by PAGASA, indicated possible flooding across a much and destruction, leaving thousands dead and millions more smaller area than was in fact affected (interestingly, affected. Many families were left homeless; power lines the Philippines Institute for Volcanology and Seismology were destroyed and communications and water facilities (PHIVOLCS) produced a tsunami hazard map showing damaged. Fishing boats were wrecked and coconut groves an inundation area closer to that produced by Haiyan). crushed, leaving many families without a livelihood. Total Nine out of 29 respondents said that they did not know damage and economic losses were estimated at $2 billion. that their houses were located in a potential storm surge area, or assumed that they were not. Almost all of the The Philippines has a well-designed and robust disaster risk local government officials interviewed by GIZ claimed management system, with a specialised institution for risk that they used the hazard maps to identify who would be reduction and management through the National Disaster evacuated and which evacuation centres were safe. Most Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC)/Office evacuation centres were located outside the potentially of Civil Defense (OCD), and the country is accustomed to flooded area shown on the PAGASA map, but since a fearsome storms, floods and other hazards. Even so, it much larger area was affected many were still flooded. was not fully prepared for a disaster of the magnitude of For some rivers in Leyte detailed and verified computer Typhoon Haiyan. This article outlines the key findings of an flood models exist, but the PAGASA hazard map has yet assessment of early warning efforts prior to the typhoon, to receive such verification. Rain-induced landslide areas conducted by Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Internationale are also displayed on a hazard map, but as approximately Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in December 2013.1 Publicly available two-thirds of Leyte are marked as landslide-prone many documents and interviews with 41 survivors were analysed local residents regard the map, which does not appear under three aspects of early warning: risk knowledge, event to be based on a detailed study of individual sites, as detection and communication. exaggerating the extent of the risk.

Risk knowledge Several of the evacuation centres were single-storey Hazard maps contribute to risk knowledge by identifying buildings, typically schools, and were not strong enough which homes have to be evacuated and where safe places to withstand the force of violent waves, so did not protect are located. In the context of tropical cyclones, storms, evacuees from the storm surges caused by the typhoon. floods, landslides and storm surges, hazard maps are The Office of Civil Defense was tasked with checking on critical tools for preparedness planning. The Philippines the safety of the evacuation centres, though the fact that weather agency PAGASA has yet to publish a wind/storm many of the people who took refuge in them died suggests hazard map for the provinces that were affected by Haiyan, that these safety checks were not properly done or not although such information is available. The only storm done at all. Essentially, the centres became deathtraps.

Figure 1: Storm surge and tsunami hazard maps for Tacloban

THE TYPHOON HAIYAN THE RESPONSE TYPHOON HAIYAN 1 See http://www.preventionweb.net/files/36860_36860gizassessmentofearlywarningyol.pdf.

HUMANITARIAN 8 exchange Figure 2: Information dissemination flow enough time to prepare for the typhoon and evacuate to safe PAGASA areas before it made landfall. Weather information However, in the eyes of the public neither PAGASA nor the NDRRMC conveyed the seriousness of the Office of storm surge, instead issuing a NDRRMC/OCD National media the President PAGASA rain warning. Many residents and Regional Centers political decision-makers openly admitted that they were not familiar with the term ‘storm surge’; DRRMCs Local PAGASA Local Local media Government Units Stations one interviewee said that, while he did not understand what ‘storm surge’ meant, had the authorities used the terms ‘tsunami’ or ‘tidal General public wave’ people would have evacuated. Media coverage of the

National Regional Local PAGASA NDRRMC President’s Office Source: PAGASA tsunamis in the Indian Ocean in 2004 and in Japan in 2011 had raised public awareness of the dangers of tsunamis but not storm surges, although the effects of both hazards are very similar, even if their causes are not.

Although the authorities issued clear orders to evacuate to residents of Tacloban, some did not understand the nature of a storm surge and its dangers. Others stayed in their homes due to fear © Eleanor Farmer/OxfamEleanor © of looting, underestimated the HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE height and force of the water or simply laughed off the evacuation order. Forced evacuation was carried out in very few areas. According to interviewees, in Families from Guiuan, Eastern Samar, set up camp at a local evacuation centre. many places only half of resi- Oxfam is working on WATSAN in two evacuation centres dents left their homes. Govern- ment warnings, including those issued by the OCD and the local Event detection government, were not sufficient to persuade people to PAGASA and other national and international agencies move to safer areas. noted the emergence of a powerful tropical cyclone several days before Haiyan made landfall in the Philippines, and The death rate (i.e. the number of deaths in relation to its path was predicted quite well. PAGASA also forecast population) in Guiuan in Eastern Samar, where Haiyan heavy rains leading to floods and landslides, as well as a made its first landfall, was lower than in Leyte. This could storm surge. be because settlements in Guiuan were protected from the full force of the winds by a chain of hills, and because Communication of warnings the winds affecting the populated parts of Guiuan were The NDRRMC/OCD is responsible for the coordination offshore, reducing the danger of a storm surge. No such of early warning to the public based on information hills protected settlements in Leyte. From Tolosa to Tacloban from PAGASA. There are several ways for warnings to be the wind was onshore, producing a substantial storm surge communicated to the public. in a densely populated area. The highest death tolls in Leyte were in the coastal barangays hit by the full force of PAGASA declared the highest alert level for provinces the storm surge. Inland areas (Dagami, Jaro, Tabon-tabon, along the path of the typhoon. These warnings were Alang-alang, Santa Fe and Pastrana) experienced the same published in the daily bulletins of the NDRRMC and were wind speeds as coastal areas, but there was no storm widely disseminated by the media. President Benigno surge and the average death rate was much lower (nine Aquino appeared on television on 7 November 2013 to deaths per 10,000 residents, compared to 180 per 10,000 in highlight the warnings and emphasise the dangers of the Tanauan, Palo and Tacloban). The difference is most likely typhoon. From interviews GIZ concluded that there was due to the absence of a storm surge.

Number 63 • January 2015 9 Figure 3: The path of Typhoon Haiyan

Lessons coverage are essential if warning messages are to lead 1. Modify the storm hazard map for land use planning to sound decision-making, successful evacuation and and disaster and emergency management other preparatory measures. The capacities of PAGASA, The official storm hazard map should be modified in the NDRRMC/OCD and the local government to improve light of the experience of Typhoon Haiyan. This modified the accuracy of information and the dissemination and map will constitute a critical technical input into communication of early warnings should be enhanced. assessments of the risks to life and property, and should The OCD and the Philippines Department of Science and be incorporated into land use planning and disaster Technology (DOST) should include storm surges in the and emergency management. The modified map will official warning system, as they do with tsunamis. enable the NDRRMC/OCD, local government and other agencies to provide more accurate information to the 3. Proper location and appropriate design of evacuation public and media on areas prone to storm surge hazards. centres Local authorities should identify and strictly enforce Many evacuation centres were located in storm surge no-build zones in high-risk areas, as well as ensuring that areas. New centres should be located outside danger stipulations in conditional-build zones, such as special zones, and the hazards they are designed for clearly reinforcements and building exclusively for business use, indicated. Evacuation routes, shelter locations and not residential, are observed. emergency services (hospitals, fire stations) should be designated and publicised, and evacuation routes and 2. Strengthen dissemination and communication of centres clearly signposted. Evacuation centres should early warnings consider the needs of children, women, the elderly and The lack of effective dissemination and communication of the disabled. In high-risk areas forced evacuation should early warnings was a notable weakness in the run-up to the be considered. While some of the reasons why people typhoon. Critical information was not clearly communicated may be reluctant to heed evacuation warnings are beyond to those who needed it, and people were unaware of the the government’s control – fear of looting, for instance severity of the hazard, or did not use the information – that does not mean that efforts to increase people’s appropriately. People simply did not understand that understanding of the hazards they may face, and what their lives were at significant risk. If the scale of the they should do in response, should not be made. impending danger had been communicated properly, and coastal residents had been evacuated to safer ground, Gemma Ocon and Olaf Neussner worked with GIZ in the fewer lives would have been lost. Timeliness, clarity and Philippines at the time of Typhoon Haiyan. THE TYPHOON HAIYAN THE RESPONSE TYPHOON HAIYAN

HUMANITARIAN 10 exchange Typhoon Haiyan: lessons from the response and how to prepare for the future Julie Hall

Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as Yolanda) made landfall service. The Philippines also has the highest fertility rate in the Philippines on 8 November 2013. Just over a year on, in Asia: for some military medical teams accustomed this article reflects on what the World Health Organisation to treating injuries it was a surprise to find they had to (WHO) – the co-lead for the health cluster alongside the dust off their skills at delivering babies too. Some teams Philippines Department of Health (DoH) – has learnt, how needed additional drug supplies from WHO Philippines to these lessons have influenced the response over time and treat chronic heart disease and hypertension. what this means for responses to health emergencies in the future. The article is based on internal information For efficient use of the medical personnel, facilities and medi- from WHO’s own work, though it is hoped that the main cation brought in by foreign medical teams, it is essential findings will also be useful to other agencies. to systematise the procedure for their deployment. WHO Philippines instigated a registration and briefing system to Responding to multiple disasters make sure foreign teams were prepared before they were The first lesson is that national agencies and the deployed to areas needing support. WHO helped the DoH international community need to be ready to respond to to coordinate over 150 foreign medical teams during the multiple natural disasters each year in the Philippines. response. They held over 193,000 consultations, performed The country is one of the world’s most disaster-prone. over 5,000 surgeries and assisted in over 1,200 deliveries. Typhoon Haiyan was the third crisis to hit the country in two months, following conflict in Zamboanga and an Anticipate likely needs earthquake in Bohol, which combined displaced 750,000 A third lesson concerns anticipating what the needs will people. This meant that response services including be during different phases of the response. In the first national and international agencies and the Philippine wave, the initial days and weeks are focused on treating army were already stretched. the injured, providing equipment to newly disabled people and attending to pregnant women. A second wave of WHO Philippines has been working with the DoH to set activity involves the prevention of disease outbreaks up Emergency Operations Centres in vulnerable areas of through the restarting of surveillance activities to track

the country, and to establish a gold, silver and bronze any potential outbreaks and an immunisation campaign HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE command system1 to direct disaster responses. The agency across the whole affected area to protect children against has also been restocking and pre-positioning medical measles, rubella and polio. This is coordinated by the supplies and equipment in anticipation of more natural national government, but UN agencies and foreign medical disasters, and is developing toolkits with the DoH for teams provide important support on disease surveillance emergency preparedness. These toolkits will provide and often participate in the delivery of immunisation guidance on procedures and practices to ensure a quick campaigns. Measles is circulating constantly in the response in the aftermath of an emergency. Both national Philippines, and after a disaster children living in crowded and local governments are working to ensure that health conditions are particularly vulnerable to developing structures are disaster resilient. complications and even dying of the disease. In addition to poor living conditions, there can be large-scale migrations Be prepared in the aftermath of a major disaster, which are likely to A second lesson is that, in any emergency response, have an impact on immunisation needs. In the first wave aid agencies need to be prepared for the situation on of immunisations conducted in the typhoon-affected area, the ground. Foreign medical teams need to bring enough almost 110,000 children were vaccinated against measles, food, water, shelter, fuel and communications equipment and an expanded catch-up campaign in the National to be self-sufficient, particularly in areas that are physi- Capital Region in January–February 2014 saw an additional cally cut off and where communications are poor or 1.7 million children immunised. In addition, there is an non-existent. They also need to factor into their pre-arrival urgent need to get those living with TB and multi-drug planning sufficient health supplies and capacity to deal resistant TB (MDR-TB) back on treatment to prevent the with the health priorities and ground realities in the spread of the disease and increased drug resistance. The Philippines. Some teams came ready to treat the injured typhoon-affected area had an estimated 26,249 TB cases but had not considered the immediate demand for with 356 cases of MDR-TB. By mid-December almost all services for pregnant mothers or the need to replace daily TB patients were back in treatment services. There is also medications. The country has a triple burden of disease: a need to prevent other communicable diseases such as communicable and non-communicable diseases plus the dengue, which spreads quickly where mosquitos are able impact of natural disasters on an already stretched health to breed among debris.

1 The colours signify different levels of control within a hierarchical Disasters such as Typhoon Haiyan magnify the threat from framework: gold for strategic, silver for tactical and bronze for non-communicable diseases (NCDs) because they disrupt operational. access to and delivery of essential interventions, including

Number 63 • January 2015 11 © F.© / WHO Guerrero

Patients in a temporary hospital. Over 600 health facilities were damaged or destroyed by Typhoon Haiyan

medicines. This constitutes a third wave of activity. NCDs the presence of bacteriological contamination in a third of are among the top killers in the Philippines, accounting the samples collected. There was a clear need for training for more than 70% of the deaths recorded in the country and skills enhancement of water safety engineers to annually. Within weeks of the typhoon there was a rise ensure safe water supplies. WHO has trained 340 sanitary in the number of patients requiring treatment for NCDs, inspectors on water quality management and distributed and as the months went on the risk of heart attacks and test kits to nine provinces and two cities. strokes grew significantly due to the stress of the situation combined with long-term health problems. In the first Mental health needs three months after the disaster, 14,000 consultations In the first few weeks after a disaster it is essential to were reported for hypertension alone. Another 1,770 provide psychosocial first aid, particularly to people who consultations were reported for diabetes. The need to have lost family, homes or livelihoods. However, mental address NCDs proactively before a natural disaster and to health impacts begin to really show after around six ensure sufficient care in the aftermath was a key lesson months, when the initial adrenalin rush dies away and from the response to Haiyan. WHO provided additional morale and energy dip. Responding to mental health supplies for NCD treatment to the foreign medical teams needs requires a fourth wave of activity. WHO estimates that came to assist in the response as many had not that, in humanitarian emergencies, the percentage of anticipated the level of demand. people suffering from depression or anxiety disorders can double from a baseline of 10% to about 20%, while the Within three to four months after a disaster there is percentage of people with severe mental disorders can a transition from an emergency response to an early increase by up to 50%. recovery phase. Emergency response activities such as supplementary feeding programmes close down and free A ‘baby boom’ health care dries up as foreign medical teams leave. Finally, there is typically a ‘baby boom’ following a disaster. This transition can lead to further health challenges that More women become pregnant than previously expected, have to be planned for and managed. For example, in leading to greater demand for prenatal care and for food many of the typhoon-affected areas malnutrition was and vaccines for children following their birth. This puts already a problem. The concern was that this would be additional pressure on health services just as many aid exacerbated when feeding programmes finished. WHO has agencies are pulling out. This fifth wave of health needs been promoting breastfeeding of newborns and infants requires a scaling up of services and a longer-term plan to as a way to improve child health, and has trained health serve the needs of a growing population. workers to treat severe acute malnutrition in particular. Meanwhile, as public water supply systems are restored, Strengthen long-term resilience they need to be tested for water quality. Results of water Given these multiple waves of health needs it is important

THE TYPHOON HAIYAN THE RESPONSE TYPHOON HAIYAN quality testing done in priority areas of region 8 revealed that health teams do not all rush in at once, but that

HUMANITARIAN 12 exchange assistance is staggered to make sure that people’s needs teams have reached them. Resilience also needs to be are met for months – not just weeks – after the disaster. built into the construction and management of health This is a question of coordination and requires the support facilities, and WHO has included building plans, design of donors and aid agency managers. WHO Philippines was parameters and guidelines for rebuilding health facilities particularly grateful to those teams that held back and in two photobooks published by the DoH, entitled Rising took over once the initial rush had subsided and others Anew: Health at the Heart of Healing. These health had pulled out. It is important to recognise the work that facilities require a predictable supply of clean water and was done after the TV cameras had gone. Considerable electricity – services that are sadly lacking even in areas health needs remain more than a year after the typhoon, not hit by the typhoon. To improve this situation, local with implications for the management and funding of the officials need to understand where these services are health aspects of the response given that most funding absent and take charge of rectifying this. WHO Philippines tends to finish within 12 months. Ultimately, there has to has worked hard with the DoH to map the status of be a sixth wave of activity: the transition from recovery health infrastructure and health services. This process is to development, with a multi-year plan in place to ensure ongoing and will guide recovery operations. the full restoration of health services to all those in the affected areas. This requires investment in health The Philippines faces multiple natural disasters each year, planning, information management and capacity-building and to respond to them we need to have the right emergency at all levels. services and systems in place. The structure created to deal with disasters has to be able to handle multiple waves of A final lesson therefore concerns how to strengthen health needs over months and, in the case of a disaster on resilience for the future, particularly given the frequency the scale of Haiyan, for years after the event. This requires and severity of natural disasters in the Philippines. We investment in health planning, information management and know that the health facilities that best withstood the capacity-building at all levels. WHO Philippines continues typhoon were often originally built and supported by to work with the national government and international the community. It is at the level of communities that this partners to ensure the full restoration of health services to resilience has to be forged. To build resilience at local level all those in typhoon-affected areas. requires improving the skills of community health workers. First aid training can help ensure that communities are Dr Julie Hall MBE is the WHO Representative to the able to assist the injured before national and international Philippines. THE TYPHOON HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE Constructing a culture of accountability: lessons from the Philippines Barb Wigley

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)’s Task Team 1. Accountability will not happen without the engagement on Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) aims and commitment of those in leadership positions at all to promote a system-wide ‘culture of accountability’ levels of the system. within humanitarian organisations. A systems approach 2. Retaining a clear focus on the core mission of this work to AAP – including Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and is critical. Abuse (PSEA) – should, in theory, increase the impact of 3. Joined-up thinking1 between cross-cutting issues makes individual agency efforts, offer resource efficiencies and each better. provide more coherent and accountable services to the people the system seeks to assist. Leadership Leadership is one of the most critical elements in keeping The declaration of a Level 3 emergency in the Philippines the agenda and mission on track. Tools and systems alone in late 2013 presented an opportunity to test this theory will not result in effective change without strong and visible in practice. Following the declaration, an AAP coordinator commitment from the highest levels. This is the only thing was deployed (the first such deployment to a humanitarian that keeps AAP, PSEA and CwC on the agenda, however response). The coordinator – a World Food Programme precariously, and the experience of agencies that appear (WFP) secondee – arrived just ten days after the typhoon to have been more successful than others in embedding made landfall. After the one-month deployment ended, a culture of accountability within their practices shows consultants were brought in to continue the work. Drawing that it is the commitment of their leaders to the cause, on this experience and learning from the application of AAP rather than the specific tools they chose to implement it, in other emergency responses, this article reflects on what that makes it stick. It was senior leaders in the sector that counts when trying to build a culture of accountability. The interrelated threads of these reflections can be 1 Thanks to Patricia Colbert, Senior Gender Advisor at WFP, for this summarised under three overarching conclusions: description.

Number 63 • January 2015 13 put AAP on the map in the Philippines, and it was faltering certain processes in place, ticking certain boxes and even leadership commitment and a lack of understanding of the mobilising certain technology. Without the foundational core mission that caused it to struggle from time to time. underpinning of a consistent dialogue regarding the needs, experience and input of each segment of communities The mission affected by conflict and disaster, these mechanisms can Numerous systems, standards, tools and processes have be ineffective, dislocated and even counterproductive. If been developed in recent years to improve the quality of we put ‘accountability mechanisms’ in place, but fail to humanitarian aid. It seems, however, that an attraction ensure that the most vulnerable and marginalised can to the functional and structured language of tools and access them, or if we speak only to those with political mechanisms has been accompanied by a drift away from and social power, we risk strengthening social exclusion the primary purpose of a culture of accountability that seeks and marginalisation. to make accountability to the people we seek to assist ‘the way we do things around here’. The tools and mechanisms In the Philippines, the small team of AAP and Communi- have increasingly become an end in themselves rather than cating with Communities (CwC) specialists agreed at a means through which the primary purpose of AAP can the outset to find out what typhoon-affected girls, be achieved. AAP is about using power responsibly and boys, women, men and the elderly had to say about the seeing the people we seek to assist as our equals.2 AAP response. As a start, with the support of the Philippine should reinforce the right of affected people to receive and Information Agency, we spent two days at evacuation have influence over assistance safely and with dignity and centres in Tacloban and Palo, where in small teams choice. Understanding why we are doing AAP should help we talked to typhoon survivors in groups and on their guide every decision as to what and how we do it, as should own, filtered by gender and age. The idea was not to be remembering that accountability to affected populations scientifically or statistically representative, but simply to has a rights agenda as well as a political and social one. The start a conversation and see what we could learn. business process and structured systems approaches used to implement AAP form just some of the means for change, We found that people were cut off from their usual and not the end game. information and communication sources (including television, radio and print media), and that only some Somewhere along the way in the struggle to get the people (mostly teenagers) had managed to save their humanitarian system on board with new ways of thinking mobile phones. Adult women and men especially found the and doing, the tools and the mechanisms have become lack of both general news and specific information about an ‘as if’ primary purpose, where the ultimate goal is the response a source of additional anguish and requested rewritten as if it is the regulation of organisations, having detailed information about their rights and entitlements © WFP/Marco Frattini © WFP/Marco

Survivors of Typhoon Haiyan in Capiz, Philippines

2 This definition comes from the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership. THE TYPHOON HAIYAN THE RESPONSE TYPHOON HAIYAN

HUMANITARIAN 14 exchange and agency plans that far exceeded the simple messages positive reception across the humanitarian community to the humanitarian community was inclined to transmit to the existence of the role and the information it provided, them. Women and men of all ages highlighted their need as did the ongoing demand for input and advice, including for telephones and radios, and the means to recharge from the UN, NGOs and government agencies. For the first them, so that they could receive information. time, projects that were either specifically oriented to AAP, CwC and PSEA, or which had strong elements of them, were Beyond the basic needs of food, water and temporary included in the revised appeal, including proposals for shelter, adults said that their highest-priority needs were interagency common service projects. Unfortunately, the financial assistance, housing, tools, building materials novelty of this approach meant that initially these projects and livelihoods; children and adolescents wanted more were not funded by donors, and further lobbying and food and to return to school. Adolescents and young negotiation were needed to get them off the ground. For adults were more likely than other groups to notice example, through the determination and persistence of Plan and be concerned by lack of fairness and corruption in International, with support from actors such as the IASC distributions, and were also more inclined to be disturbed Task Team, the community consultation project described by exposure to dead bodies. The elderly, both women and above was taken over and developed into the Pamati Kita men, were particularly distressed by a lack of appropriate project (see the following article by Alex Jacobs). undergarments and requested specific attention to their health needs related to ageing and pre-existing conditions. Joined-up thinking While NGOs in particular have been working on improving When asked how we could improve the response, the their accountability to the people they seek to assist, elderly and young people called for information to be a collective efforts in this area have been weak. A joint higher priority, for the specific needs of different groups mission conducted by the Food and Agriculture Organis- to be taken into account more in the delivery of aid, ation (FAO), WFP and the global Food Security Cluster to and for the most vulnerable to be more clearly targeted. investigate AAP in Pakistan in 2012 found that, even in a Adolescents and young adults also called for improved setting where more national and international agencies dignity, order and transparency in aid distributions. than anywhere else were openly implementing commitments on accountability, very little was happening collect- Simple exercises like these, alongside analysis of feedback ively aside from peer support and a few joint mechanisms. received through an Internews radio station, were written up in brief reports and issue papers and disseminated Added to this tendency for agencies to work alone on as widely and rapidly as possible as a common service accountability is the siloed nature of what are in fact cross-

to all agencies. This reinforced the point that the cutting issues. Worthy causes raising the importance HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE voices and opinions of ordinary people affected by the of gender, age, accountability, communication and emergency were as important and as instructive as input disability find themselves competing against each other from what are usually more privileged, better educated for resources and attention. Rather than joining forces and more powerful ‘key informants’. This approach also constructively and creatively, or being encouraged to do so demonstrated that, contrary to what an initial review by donors, the politics and competition between agencies suggested, it is possible, using a small team of AAP, CwC can prove counterproductive. As a result, programme and reports officers, to consult a broad range of people officers become overwhelmed by the requirement to of different ages, genders, abilities, backgrounds and consider each issue separately and to report on growing needs from the beginning of an emergency, and without numbers of disconnected and unrelated indicators. detracting from lifesaving interventions. In the Philippines, as in other settings, through the efforts Feedback on these initial reports was overwhelmingly of the OCHA CwC team and the CDAC Network, it has positive, and agencies and clusters reported making rapid been demonstrated that addressing the communication, adjustments to programming based on the information information and connectivity needs of communities is provided. Consultation findings influenced decisions and a clear first-line priority in any humanitarian response. protocols; UNFPA added radios to their NFI kits for women, The work done together as a team during the first month FAO incorporated recommendations in their distribution of the response also showed that the quality of this protocols, HelpAge International addressed the lack of approach is enhanced by an AAP lens that encourages underwear for elderly women and men and ActionAid community involvement at a deeper level, clear problem coordinated information and feedback in a way that was definition, consideration of cross-cutting issues according informed by the reports. These outcomes suggested that to gender, age, diversity and protection, and greater follow the provision of synthesised feedback from communities through and response to two-way communication. The two could prove a valid centralised way to keep such feedback together effectively combine technological expertise with flowing to all agencies throughout the response. social science.

Overall, the rapid deployment of the team meant that AAP, The AAP role allowed for more coherent advocacy around PSEA and CwC were on the agenda from the very early the different needs and experiences of the women, men, stages of the response, including at cluster level. The girls and boys affected by the disaster. By supporting and value of having dedicated expertise available to conduct linking up gender, GBV, protection, CwC and other cross- consultations was demonstrated through the extremely cutting issues, AAP coordination reduced the demands on

Number 63 • January 2015 15 the time of humanitarian responders, providing already we cannot claim to be working accountably. AAP is not analysed and processed information which could be only about tools, but also a framework for enhancing the immediately used and applied, and a clear framework way we provide humanitarian relief to the women, men, for the provision of quality services to all segments of girls and boys affected by conflict and disaster. It ensures affected communities through the application of existing their participation, establishes the means for two-way accountability guidance.3 communication with them and allows them to give us feedback and complain if our aid has brought unwelcome While this experience demonstrates how ‘joined-up’ think- consequences. It also provides a means to coherently ing and action can be achieved through leadership and advocate on the range of issues that confront the people collaboration at country level, building these links at a we seek to assist during an emergency, and ensure that global level will be much more challenging. Initiatives and they are our partners in the response, not just the objects thematic areas that have higher and more established of our actions. Ultimately, AAP has to bring together and visibility and funding may not be easily persuaded to share add value to what is already there, not compete with other their hard-won gains with others, despite the potential issues for attention and funding or contribute to ‘issues that a fresh approach might bring. fatigue’.

Conclusion In order to construct a culture of accountability, current The deployment of an AAP coordinator to the Philippines attitudes, which see people-related issues as non-essential typhoon response highlighted the importance of leader- and encourage competition between issues rather than ship, retaining focus on the mission rather than just the ‘joined-up’ thinking and action, need to change. While a lot tools, and ‘joined-up thinking’ and action around cross- of progress has been made in certain areas, infighting and cutting issues as things that count in constructing a culture competition have prevented a more meaningful outcome. of accountability in humanitarian relief. While addressing this may present a long-term challenge at the global level, experience from the Philippines suggests Simply put, if we are not thinking about issues such as that practical collaboration at the local level can produce gender, age, diversity, disability, information, two-way results. communication and protection as part of a cohesive whole, Barb Wigley was formerly Senior Humanitarian Advisor 3 Including the IASC’s Commitments on AAP and associated tools, the with WFP. She is currently in Iraq as Food Security Cluster HAP Standard and Sphere standards. Coordinator.

Pamati Kita: ‘Let’s Listen Together’ Alex Jacobs

The humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan demon- been fully realised. A number of obstacles restricted account- strated that the concept of accountability to affected people ability, notably the pressure within agencies to mount large- (AAP) is firmly established on the agenda of humanitarian scale responses in a short time. Other obstacles included agencies.1 It also showed that agencies could still benefit limited staff capacity, the effort that agencies had to invest from better practical ways to achieve it in practice. Within in developing contextually appropriate approaches and the first month of the response, a number of major initiatives tools, the fragmented nature of decision-making across had been launched, including establishing an IASC AAP the response and confusion between related sector-wide Coordinator position, building accountability activities initiatives, including Accountability to Affected Populations, into the work plan of the Humanitarian Coordinator and Preventing Sexual Exploitation & Abuse, Communicating with individual agencies deploying specialist staff and developing Communities and the HAP Standard. Drawing on previous accountability activities. experience, Plan International worked with the IASC task force on accountability to initiate a practical response to The operating context in the Philippines created genuine these issues. This became the Pamati Kita project. opportunities for enhancing accountability to affected people. This included factors such as the very high level The concept of mobile phone and social network usage, established The Pamati Kita project supports and encourages agencies and respected barangay structures and agencies’ previous to use contextually appropriate common tools and services experience of similar disaster responses, albeit on a smaller for accountability. A concept note produced in December scale. It is unclear whether these opportunities have 2013 identified three categories of common tools and services that humanitarian agencies could use to improve the quality and accountability of their work.2 1 The terminology in this field is disputed and confusing, with considerable overlap between ‘Accountability to Affected Populations’, ‘Communicating with Communities’ (CwC) and other concepts. For 2 ‘Revised Concept Note: The Pakikinig Initiative. Common Services simplicity’s sake, this article uses the term ‘Accountability to Affected for Humanitarian Agencies to Improve Accountability Together’, 20

THE TYPHOON HAIYAN THE RESPONSE TYPHOON HAIYAN Populations’. December 2013. This included drafts of the proposed common tools.

HUMANITARIAN 16 exchange and local media, in order to enhance transparency and accountability, as well as to support continual improvement and advocacy.

The initiative was designed to generate significant benefits for participating agencies, affected communities and other key actors. Agencies would benefit from cost- effective, best practice tools and services specifically designed to enable them to meet their existing commitments in ways that were © Vittorio Oppizzi / Plan International Plan / Oppizzi © Vittorio relevant to the operating context. This would reduce costs for each agency and for the response as a whole by reducing duplicative efforts to design appropriate tools. In addition, agencies would benefit from the ability to collaborate on implementing the tools (again, potentially A girl from Tacloban takes on household chores under reducing costs), and to aggregate makeshift housing their data, which could enable them to understand how their work fits into the bigger picture, and to 1. Common tools compare their data in ways that generate insights for • A common feedback tool designed to generate broad continual improvement. insights into local perceptions of agencies’ work. This would be based on a short set of standard questions to Affected communities would benefit from convenient, generate a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data consistent and simple ways of communicating with agencies. on recipients’ experience of aid, some of which could For instance, a joint hotline could provide community THE TYPHOON HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE be aggregated. members with a single point of contact for multiple • A common methodology for community consultations, agencies. Community members would no longer need to with a focus on dialogue, while also capturing some identify which specific agency to contact for any specific qualitative data using standard reporting formats. service and how to contact them, reducing confusion.

2. Common services Local media, government and donors would benefit from a • A public information campaign, promoting short, single source of credible reports of community members’ simple summaries of agencies’ major commitments to views about the response. Collectively, this would provide local communities, along with agencies’ contact details important data on the quality of the response, disaggregated and actions that members of the public can take if by implementing agency. This could inform their decision- agencies fall short of those commitments. making and improve their ability to hold agencies to account, • A joint hotline to allow members of the public to ask helping to improve quality across the entire response. questions, lodge complaints and get answers. This would provide a single means for people to address The concept note was developed with considerable input concerns to all participating agencies, through a single from international agencies and specialists in the field. phone number and online contact methods. The tools and services were aligned with key international • Common analysis of feedback data. This would allow standards, including the Sphere Core Standards and the each agency to benefit from all the data generated by HAP Standard. This aimed to enhance the tools’ credibility participating agencies. Agencies would be able to build and relevance, and their use for internal management up a collective picture of the response as a whole, and and external accountability processes. The tools were also compare their feedback to other agencies’. built on established and emerging good practice from leading initiatives across the sector, and were designed 3. Regular reports to provide accessible, cost-effective and high-quality • Based on the combined data of participating agencies, ways for agencies to meet their existing commitments.3 the original concept was that the initiative would publish The approach was designed to enable collaboration, a regular summary report, about every two months, of accommodating increasing numbers of agencies during the what local people were saying about agencies’ work, along with responses from the agencies involved. 3 This includes Keystone’s ‘Constituent Voice: Technical Note’, This was intended to be promoted to a variety of September 2014, and a wealth of material brought together by HAP, as important actors, including the government, donors well as specific agencies’ experience of hotlines.

Number 63 • January 2015 17 project’s lifetime rather than relying on resource-intensive be developed to implement international standards, and and potentially exclusive coordination mechanisms. It that these approaches can be used by multiple agencies, was designed to appeal initially to major international reducing costs, enhancing collaboration, improving agencies, as a pragmatic way of adding value to the quality and strengthening accountability. The concept response at scale, and also to be relevant and open to has attracted a high degree of interest. If successful, it national agencies and smaller agencies. may establish practical ways to enhance the quality and accountability of humanitarian response at a sector level. It Initial progress provides a practical alternative to other approaches, such The concept note developed into a formal partnership as certification. It resonates with other wider initiatives in between Plan International, World Vision International the sector, suggesting that perhaps these are ideas whose and the International Organisation for Migration on an time has come. innovative project funded by the UK’s Department for International Development. The project’s name is Pamati With the engagement of major agencies and donors, there Kita, ‘Let’s Listen Together’. is potential to develop the approach for implementation in major responses. It could even potentially be extended The initial concept was developed further in order to build to other areas, such as Sphere’s technical standards, if on relevant work undertaken by the partners and to suitable leadership for the process of contextualisation can respond to changes in the operating context. The work has be established. The project is consistent with the emerging been coordinated with the UN Office for the Coordination Core Humanitarian Standard.5 It could offer a realistic way of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and its Working Groups of implementing key aspects of the standard and assessing on AAP/CwC. These Working Groups have delivered some performance in relation to it. of the functions originally envisaged for Pamati Kita. For instance, the Community Feedback Forms have consolidated The project has also faced practical challenges. Foremost feedback from humanitarian agencies and fed it into the has been the difficulty of focusing management attention cluster system. Many agencies moved quickly to set up their on it during a major humanitarian response, and the own hotlines, complemented by independent initiatives familiar issue of staff turnover. There has been some such as Radyo Abante, a ‘humanitarian radio station’ that confusion about how the project fits with the established broadcasts programmes on the humanitarian response and priorities of different actors and initiatives, at cluster level, invites listeners to phone in and discuss their concerns with among donors and among implementing agencies. It has agency staff. proved harder to retro-fit common approaches across agencies during the response than it would have been The project is currently taking on the leadership of the Working to develop them in advance, as part of the preparation Groups on AAP/CwC in Tacloban, Ormoc and Roxas, as OCHA for the response. Looking ahead, it appears likely that withdraws. It is promoting a variety of accountability tools advance preparation will be crucial in taking the approach and communication materials using media including radio further. This would include developing key relationships and comics. A training element has been added, to build and intentions, as well as practical tools. It would also capacity within humanitarian agencies on accountability include clarifying leadership and complementarity across and preventing sexual exploitation and abuse. It also aims the various initiatives of AAP, CwC and other overlapping to build on the IOM’s Community Response Map,4 an online initiatives. data platform to track and respond to community feedback. Alongside this, a learning component has been established Plan, World Vision and the IOM will publish our experiences to document the experience, locate it in the wider context of the project by May 2015. We are excited about continuing of related efforts in the sector and identify lessons and the pilot and learning from it, and hope that it can contribute recommendations for the future. to broader efforts to strengthen quality and accountability in the sector. Commentary This project is based on the concept that, in the early stages Alex Jacobs is Director of Programme Quality, Plan of a response, contextually appropriate approaches should International.

4 See http://communityresponsemap.org/haiyan. 5 See http://www.corehumanitarianstandard.org. THE TYPHOON HAIYAN THE RESPONSE TYPHOON HAIYAN

HUMANITARIAN 18 exchange Coordination around communicating with disaster-affected communities: insights from Typhoon Haiyan

Caroline Austin and Nicki Bailey

Sudden-onset emergencies are typically chaotic, making CwC coordination effective communication between communities, humani- Following Typhoon Haiyan, information and communi- tarian responders and governments, whether local or cation access was severely impeded for weeks, with very international, challenging. little access to communication channels. Most people were unable to contact their families to tell them they Building on experience from the response to Typhoon were alive. Government and humanitarian responders Bopha in Mindanao in 2012, the United Nations Office also faced significant challenges in sharing lifesaving for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) information with communities. In the immediate after- supported the coordination of communication with math of the typhoon, two emergency humanitarian radio disaster-affected communities following Typhoon Haiyan stations were set up by CDAC Network members in with the deployment of an interagency Communications Tacloban City and Guiuan, and the government and with Communities (CwC) Coordinator and other CwC telecommunications companies set up telephone charg- field staff. CwC cross-sectoral working groups were set ing stations and internet points. For the first time, the up in the typhoon-affected area, convening local and Emergency Telecommunications Cluster, in partnership international NGOs, UN agencies, the Red Cross/Red with Ericsson Response, the Vodafone Foundation Crescent Movement, media development actors, local Instant Network and GSMA, provided mobile connectivity media, mobile operators and local government, with the to affected communities, rather than just humanitarian aim of coordinating two-way communication across the responders. humanitarian response. As part of the response, OCHA deployed CwC staff to This article provides a summary of findings from the coordinate communications with communities in affected Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities areas. CwC focal points from CDAC Network members (CDAC) Network Learning Review on the Typhoon Haiyan and other international and national agencies began response.1 coordinating as the typhoon approached landfall, sharing THE TYPHOON HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE

Figure 1: CwC and AAP Technical Working Groups across operational hubs

REGION VIII EASTERN VISAYAS REGION VI Roxas City WESTERN Tacloban VISAYAS Guiuan Ormoc

Iloilo

Cebu

REGION VII AAP Technical working group CENTRAL VISAYAS

AAP/CWC Technical working group

1 CDAC Network, Typhoon Haiyan Learning Review, November 2014, http://www.cdacnetwork.org/tools-and-resources/i/20141124131123-z7io0.

Number 63 • January 2015 19 existing data on the communication preferences of build a ‘history’ between their members, particularly Filipinos, contact information, project plans and hardware media actors which may not have previously participated through the CDAC Network’s Field Coordination Community in such forums. Interaction and communication built of Practice (CoP). relationships over time, and gave context to members of the Technical Working Groups on organisational At field level, OCHA deployed surge staff to support CwC mandates and programming around CwC. In some cases, coordination. CwC Technical Working Groups were estab- this led to collaboration over CwC initiatives. Some lished in all five operational coordination hubs to provide respondents commented that Technical Working Groups technical advice to the clusters, and to give agencies a were a ‘seeding ground’ for initiatives now underway in space within which to coordinate on CwC approaches. the Iraq response. These groups, co-chaired by the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), OCHA and World Vision International, Respondents in part attributed the success of coordination operated as part of the humanitarian cluster system and to strong brokerage skills by experienced coordinators at worked with the clusters to integrate communication the beginning of the response, but also noted that the and information within response and recovery planning. more remote operational hubs would have benefited They brought together representatives from international from more direct engagement and technical support organisations, local government, local NGOs, church organ- from CwC/AAP Coordinators during the initial phase of isations, media development organisations, local media the response. and telecommunications companies. The knowledge and experience brought to this forum by national partners Obstacles to CwC coordination contributed to the effectiveness of the coordinated Obstacles excluding or reducing the participation of communications response, providing cultural context and agencies in coordination included lack of resourcing for connections within communities on which to build. CwC coordination activities (attendance at meetings was cited as a main obstacle for stakeholders outside the Factors enabling CwC coordination coordination hubs) and lack of management understanding Respondents involved in the Learning Review noted the of the importance of CwC, which led to a focus on agency benefits of coordination, such as avoiding duplication mandates over collaborative initiatives. Some respondents and conflicting information reaching communities, also noted that the size of the CwC Technical Working collaboratively addressing community information gaps Group in some hubs meant that outcomes were slower and ensuring that community feedback was acted on. to produce, and coordination of joint communication Respondents felt that sharing project and technical and information needs assessments and monitoring of information and open and transparent leadership within communication initiatives during the response was not as the Technical Working Groups created an environment that efficient as it might have been. supported coordination. Many smaller agencies did not have the staff to attend Although understanding between local media actors sometimes weekly or fortnightly coordination meetings. and international humanitarian responders took time to Flexible alternative techniques were established, including develop, a collaboration between First Response Radio, coordination and communication via email and phone for local journalism network PECOJON International, World agencies located outside humanitarian hubs. Vision International and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), to keep the humanitarian radio station Radyo Abante The future of CwC coordination on the air in Tacloban, was noted as an example of a When asked what CwC coordination should look like in collective commitment to accountability on behalf of the future responses, respondents had a variety of answers. humanitarian response. Radio also played an important Responses were commonly situated on a continuum role in psychosocial support and improving connectivity between ‘CwC coordination as a minimal activity’ (i.e. between community members. Radyo Bakdaw (set up by preventing duplication though coordinated information Internews with local journalists) broadcast distribution provision) and ‘CwC coordination as an integrated activity’ schedules from organisations operating in the area, as part of an overarching and collaborative strategy for including the ICRC and the Philippines Red Cross, so communication with communities, with less focus on communities knew what relief goods to expect and organisational or agency objectives. Suggested models when, as well as gathering feedback from recipients and and functions of CwC coordination included access to forwarding this to humanitarian organisations. funding to incentivise coordination, particularly in the early stage of response, to reduce competition for funds The development of a ‘Community Feedback Form’ (CFF) and to lead to more common CwC projects. in an attempt to systematically consolidate community feedback being collected by different agencies was praised The disbursement of funds directly to actors at field as a shared project goal within the technical working groups. level could address some of the challenges associated with obtaining funding through traditional mechanisms, Regular interaction and strong and transparent leadership such as the Central Emergency Response Fund in the CwC Technical Working Groups addressed and (CERF). Important caveats on how this funding might moderated issues of power between agencies. The CwC be administered were noted, including the brokering

THE TYPHOON HAIYAN THE RESPONSE TYPHOON HAIYAN and AAP Technical Working Groups provided a forum to of funding democratically, with a focus on long-term

HUMANITARIAN 20 exchange Figure 2: The community feedback process THE TYPHOON HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE

Priority points taken to Tacloban Intercluster Coordination Meeting (ICCM)

Number 63 • January 2015 21 partnerships. Access to funding could also be improved plaints, response and feedback mechanisms and ‘closing by modelling the costs of CwC response options, so the feedback loop’ of follow-up, action and response. agencies know how much to budget for effective CwC. This costing is underway within the CDAC Network. Costing of • Common advocacy initiatives. Common advocacy initi- CwC response options, mapping of flexible programme atives could include developing a common language funds within existing networks and establishing funding around CwC, common templates for advocacy strategies at field level for coordinators would ensure that funding and preparedness agreements and developing capa- is available for collaborative or common service projects, city to generate evidence-based advocacy in CwC and incentivise CwC coordination. coordination.

There was a call for an exploration of common service Donors also have a role to play in supporting implementing initiatives in the CwC field by some agencies. Many agencies to prioritise effective communication with respondents were critical of the lack of collaboration over communities in their agency and cluster-specific planning CwC initiatives that could serve the whole sector, while and broader accountability efforts. recognising that their own organisational environments and donor requirements often prevented this collaboration. Finally, the majority of respondents felt preparedness activities that built on relationships developed through Future common service initiatives that could be explored the AAP/CwC Technical Working Groups were crucial. include: Media agencies in particular emphasised the need to improve understanding between humanitarian agencies • Common service logistics for CwC hardware. Attempts and the local media, focusing on each other’s roles in to coordinate the distribution of radio sets were disaster response. Building CwC into the overall National unsuccessful, with duplication in some areas and gaps Preparedness Strategy led by OCHA, and integrating it into in others. Radio sets should become a standard part of multi-sector preparedness activities, such as minimum distribution kits where a need for them is identified. preparedness training and emergency simulation exercises, will hopefully ensure that effective communication is seen • Common service CwC printing services. Agencies as an essential part of future emergency response in reported problems in access to printed materials such the Philippines. Preparedness and advocacy will require as maps or posters. Printing critical CwC materials and closer partnerships with government, clusters, programme disseminating these for all to use was a useful initiative. staff and communities to ensure that communication interventions are tailored and streamlined to take advantage • Common service database or technology for information of the limited CwC funding currently available. management. Information management between humanitarian actors will improve information flows Ultimately, effective coordination and engagement outwards to communities. between communities, humanitarian responders and governments, whether local or international, is critical. This • Common resource mobilisation efforts for funds for will not happen without commitment and the provision system-wide responses such as hotlines or databases of sufficient resources for effective and consistent to manage feedback. Respondents mentioned barriers communication with, and meaningful engagement of, associated with privacy and confidentiality, as well crisis-affected people in their own response and recovery. as concerns that feedback would not be effectively Links must also be made between humanitarian work referred or addressed. The ongoing common service pro- and development and preparedness efforts to achieve ject between Plan, the International Organisation for sustainable solutions. Realisation of effective coordination Migration (IOM) and World Vision aims to address is dependent on a proactive approach to these issues. these concerns by increasing accountability to people affected by Typhoon Haiyan through the use of common Caroline Austin is an independent consultant. Nicki Bailey approaches to participation, information provision, com- is the CDAC Network Research and Learning Officer. THE TYPHOON HAIYAN THE RESPONSE TYPHOON HAIYAN

HUMANITARIAN 22 exchange Engaging with clusters: empowering and learning from local organisations

John Tipper

Shortly after Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines in November 2013, I was employed as an advisor by a long-standing national NGO based in Cebu city, which in turn worked with a number of community-based organisations in Cebu Island, Bohol Island and the wider Tacloban region. The NGO, which went on to receive close to $1 million in funding for relief activities, wanted professional guidance to ensure that it was applying good principles in its work in the food, non-food, shelter and health sectors. This article is based on observations of the experiences of these local

organisations as they attempted to Tipper/MercyJohn © engage with various clusters.

A number of positives can be taken from the NGO’s experience of interacting with the cluster system. Organising staff transport onto a Malaysian military aircraft Initial online submissions of data to cluster coordinators received THE TYPHOON HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE prompt and helpful responses, with good guidance for three distributions were made to the same village by further submissions. The UN flight system UNHAS was different agencies. Furthermore, the church’s resources, used by the NGO and its partners on over 40 occasions, including trucks, drivers and interpreters, could have been greatly increasing the time available on the ground to made available to newly-arrived international NGOs as the work on projects. In the weeks and months following church’s distributions were scaled down. Haiyan the Shelter cluster in particular has been a source of very useful and relevant information as the NGO In addition to engaging with the Food Security and works on reconstructing over 500 homes. These positive Shelter clusters and the Child Protection working group, experiences notwithstanding, however, the cluster system I advised the local NGO I was working with to attend in the Philippines largely failed to involve local civil society. Logistics cluster meetings. In later discussions, the Filipina This article highlights the multiple problems caused by director of the NGO admitted to being intimidated by the this failure, and suggests a number of solutions. meeting environment. As an experienced manager with years of international exposure, she was not daunted Failure to engage with local actors by foreign styles of meeting. What was offputting was One of my first tasks as an advisor was to register the national the overwhelming number of international workers (only NGO with relevant clusters. However, it was only thanks to one other Filipino in a room of approximately 30 people), my knowledge of the cluster system that engagement was the jargon and acronyms being used and the brusque possible – the NGO itself was unaware of this system of ‘you’re assumed to know what we’re referring to’ style of aid coordination, and there was scant evidence of clusters interaction between the meeting participants. While the proactively engaging non-cluster actors. In one example, director and her colleagues arguably possessed much in the immediate aftermath of Haiyan a local businessman greater knowledge of the operating environment in the in Cebu city donated large quantities of foodstuffs to a Philippines than almost every newly arrived foreigner sizeable inner-city church, for distribution in villages in in the room, they ended up feeling like ‘poor relations’ Northern Cebu. The congregation included a number of (their description). They did not have the agency T-shirts truck owners and this, combined with voluntary labour, and caps, the VHF radios, the satellite phones and the allowed for the distribution of over 17,000 food packs. other trappings of international NGO responders – at Church members were unaware of the existence of the that point they did not even have agency ID cards. The Food Security cluster; had they known about it, their relief overall impression they received from the Logistics cluster efforts would probably not have been duplicated in the meeting – no doubt unintentionally – was that their days following their distributions. In fact, two or sometimes knowledge was of limited value.

Number 63 • January 2015 23 24 THE TYPHOON HAIYAN RESPONSE provided transport between Ormoc and Tacloban; the deputy military commander in Ormoc, a schoolfriend of a volunteer, senior The resources. key to access of level considerable a enjoyed NGO local the Leyte on operations subsequent In uh dsse. usqety fr ah ra identified, area each for Subsequently, disaster. of a outcome such likely one be would multi-agency response a occur, international that to indicates likely capacity most local is where disaster and a where world areas the the identifying of with beginning taken, be steps to of need number A preparedness. is here issue key The process. cluster the in organisations community-based and NGOs local nowof inclusion the for advocate to agencies; need they UN with footing level more a onto NGOs The partners. cluster system has made equally-contributing progress in bringing international as actors local which approach sees cluster the within a inclusivity develop to of be culture must process this in goal significant A to interaction with inter-agency coordination mechanisms. accountability structures – of structures which are well-suited are which of many significant size and have well-developed management and for actors, allow local of to involvement required the are the adaptations from system benefit cluster more even derive to However, international NGOs. and and agencies UN coordination among inter-agency sharing resource undoubtedly in clusters useful the very Haiyan proved of aftermath the In forward way The had. they information the sharing for mechanisms the Again, however, these local organisations were unaware of Initial Rapid Multi-Agency Assessment (MIRA) and initial to subsequent the assessments. to both could contributed and have organisations community Tacloban some by infrastructure and insecurity, but this information was held poor by exacerbated contacts, local of absence the given expected be to only was This them. lack about knowledge to of due unserved went from yet Tacloban, in distant hub aid geographically the not were areas neglected these of Several islands. affected the of parts remoter the of knowledge little had generally NGOs newly-arrived that given understandable is roads.This main of the followed aid majority the that been has Haiyan to response the at levelled criticisms main with the of One members help. to resources the those to disseminated been have could information this informed, been cluster appropriate this the received, been not had information was not being transmitted to the clusters. Had aid where areas remote of lack about information accurate the providing were organisations of community-based local aspects although that, disturbing was coordination most the of One them. involving for mechanisms the known had they if counterparts international to relationships local local NGO would have The gladly extended the benefits of these stretched. was capacity UNHAS when time a at Cebu airport Tacloban and Tacloban at between flights Hercules to services access arranged emergency Filipino the to chaplain local the and community; from wider the reports and staff on his based Tacloban in needs of description in-depth an provided friend, college a Tacloban, of mayor HUMANITARIAN exchange following a disaster must be a greatly improved information acti-vation cluster future any of component critical Another coordination. of role the of aware areorganisations local skilled cluster liaison personnel in advance and ensure that suitably identify to be would consultation twin a such of The goals approach. cluster the of CBOs informing and NGOs conducted local be information simultaneously an can individuals, campaign suitable find to consulting of process the In local with. contact the in are and they organisations NGOs international and UN the between consultations through undertaken be could process This emergency.an in working groups cluster individual by reference of terms in incorporated and level global a at clusters of guidelines operating the into built be could organisations The local include region. and identify to their need in ground of the wealth on the agencies local with other touch regular in be should they all, Above essential. be would language local the in fluency area, affected the of natives be not need clusters the to second they that personnel the While level. managerial a at experience considerable with staff humanitarian possess and system the with local familiar Those be role. should liaison organisations cluster local a play could organisations that local suggested of list a forward put they that requesting area, the in working NGOs international and agencies UN the of made be should assessment an naturally seek to work exclusively with counterparts counterparts with exclusively may work many to as seek funding, naturally government local significant of receive amounts that organisations or groups based faith- for importance particular of Conduct. is of This Code Crescent Cross/Red Red the and principles humanitarian on education including them, with effectively engage to provide training on issues they that affect a local group’sand ability awareness benefits raise can the NGOs response, a and to bring clusters can the of existence the groups local of advising to addition the In catastrophe. enhance major to a following advance effectively work to in groups local of do capacities can area disaster an in to NGOs prone international that much also is There groups. morelocal to accessible locations to hotels expensive and camps UN from away meetings cluster of focus the shift would This halls. can be held and local accommodation, such as community meetings cluster where offices including strikes, before crisis infrastructurea important of identification allow the also for could groups local of engagement early The sources. of range wider much a from data on premium a places that approach ground-up a towards sources limited very from data on based maps shift required, moving away from a top-down approach with culture the of example an lies Herein diminished. greatly is value their then groups active locally from input of lack to a response, but if the data which they contain is limited due rolemajor a in areplay maps and Such useful distributions. the example, for as, priority creation equal of good-quality maps showing the locations of of food being as seen be should presence This area. their in the meetings cluster of purpose of and organisations local notifying campaign that share their own religious or political viewpoint. such as vehicles, local accommodation and translators Also of importance would be training local groups on being made available to international NGOs quickly and at issues including civil–military coordination, do no harm much less cost. This in turn would have greatly increased principles, Sphere standards and the value of timely coverage and improved the efficiency and effectiveness information collection and dissemination. of the response. It is hoped that the proposals outlined above will generate discussion on ways to ensure greater Conclusion involvement of knowledgeable local groups in future Including local groups in the clusters in the initial days emergencies. following Typhoon Haiyan would have resulted in information about existing needs and completed distributions by local John Tipper is Co-Director, Disaster Preparedness & groups being submitted earlier, and locally available assets Response, for the Swedish NGO Operation Mercy.

Humanitarian partnerships: reality lags behind the rhetoric Anne Street

Just over a year after Typhoon Haiyan devastated parts of the Philippines important lessons need to be learnt about how international actors partner and work with national organisations. The Philippines has consid- erably more local and national capacity to manage disaster response than many countries in the region. It also has a great deal of experience in dealing with disasters. Despite this, the scale and nature of the typhoon, and the storm surge it triggered, was CAFOD Cholewiak/ Lucasz ©

initially overwhelming. In the weeks HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE that followed, however, local and national humanitarian actors were also undermined by the international response. Despite being some of the earliest to respond to the emergency, Beneficiaries of projects run by CAFOD and partners many Filipino organisations faced huge challenges in delivering assistance. One national NGO, ECOWEB, noted: ‘We were able support from the UN and government but it was not to mobilize some funding but it was not enough. We easy and caused much delay to our distribution. approached some big INGOs but they chose not to fund us. It took some time before we were able to raise enough Nanette was speaking at an event to launch Missed Again: funds to cover the transport of goods. However, nobody Making Space for Partnership in the Typhoon Haiyan would fund us for the community organising and the Response,1 a study commissioned by a group of five NGOs, cost of distribution that would ensure participation and CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam, Action Aid and Tearfund, to reach to isolated communities’. Speaking at an ECOSOC assess the extent of partnership working in the aftermath Humanitarian Affairs Segment Side Event meeting in New of the typhoon. The research followed an earlier desk- York in June 2014, Nannette Antequisa, the Director of based study, Missed Opportunities,2 which focused on ECOWEB, neatly summed up some of the challenges that the effectiveness of humanitarian partnerships in the local organisations faced in delivering humanitarian aid Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Horn of Africa, after Typhoon Haiyan: Haiti and Pakistan. The Missed Again study sought to answer two questions: first, how has partnership increased Our long term partner, CREST Malaysia, and a new partner, Foodbank Singapore, were among those 1 Andy Featherstone and Carino Antequisa, Missed Again: Making who immediately responded. However, although we Space for Partnership in the Typhoon Haiyan Response, CAFOD, had the relief goods, our first problem was where to Christian Aid, Oxfam, Tearfund and Action Aid, September 2014, store the goods. Fortunately we had connections in http://www.cafod.org.uk/Policy/Emergencies-and-conflict. Cebu and a local businessman offered his warehouse 2 Ben Ramalingham, Bill Gray and Georgia Cerruti, Missed Opportunities: The Case for Strengthening National and Local at much reduced cost. Our next problem was how to Partnership Based Approaches to Humanitarian Action, CAFOD, distribute the goods so they could reach communities Christian Aid, Oxfam, Tearfund and Action Aid, October 2013, http:// in the islands affected. We tapped the logistics www.cafod.org.uk/Policy/Emergencies-and-conflict.

Number 63 • January 2015 25 26 THE TYPHOON HAIYAN RESPONSE fetd ra Atog bt ntok rle t a large a to relied networks both Although area. affected the in programme response a initiate rapidly to able was which (CARRAT), partners humanitarian and development and work both across to capacity response and preparedness disaster back get nationwide supported to Aid Christian services. re-establish staff enable to resources Water Metropolitan Leyte District asapartner, andwere abletoputinthenecessary the identified agencies the sector, water Philippines the of knowledge ASDW’s and resources financial and experience logistical Oxfam’s on Tacloban the Drawing response. a started had in later days four and area, assessment needs joint (ASDW), a Water the of undertaking Drop of Single one A with members, up consortium linked immediately Oxfam struck, Philippines. the Haiyan groupsin When island threemajor all across operations strategic and specialisms to mentary prior years of comple- number with NGOs national five together brought Haiyan, a formed Consortium, onse joint initiate to approaches. bySupported Oxfam, the Humanitarian Resp- organisations member enabling in role important an played networks humanitarian Pre-existing infrastructure. and assets hard members, family staff, losing hit, were upwards, level village barangay government from as capacity well as areas, affected the in operational NGOs Filipino Many them. fund that donors the humanitarian to Movement Crescent Cross/Red Red the and NGOs agencies, national and international of the system, from UN parts all in actors humanitarian of capacities response the challenged Haiyan by caused destruction the of scale The partnerships. up scale to difficult it made which NGOs national of capacity the in limitations revealed also deliver can connected offer can can partnerships partnership humanitarian contextual the that strengthen found study coverage,the and relevance, effectiveness of connectedness, criteria efficiency, evaluation OECD-DAC the Using international the in involved Philippines? the in response humanitarian been NGOs) (government national actors and national have and ways response?; what in humanitarian second, the of effectiveness the Source: performance system to contribute can partnerships How Figure1: Connectedness HUMANITARIAN System performancePotential contributionofpartnerships Missed Opportunities Missed exchange Coverage epne ofrn getr utiaiiy and sustainability, greater offering response, effective Relevance/Appropriateness assistance. Against this, the findings the this, Against assistance. , p. 23. p. , efficiencies relevance n eal a more a enable and f sitne that assistance, of Efficiency Effectiveness

that one of the key reasons for limited national capacity national limited for reasons key the of one considered that interviewed NGOs In national aid. several giving just Visayas, than more about is and time over up built is relationship a that signifying us’), with journey (‘to namo’ ‘muiban as described were organisations national but NGOs, international of support word the describe the to ‘help’ used They ones. national inter- than to NGOs differently national related Cebu and Leyte in munities The chain. aid the down trickle to funding for wait to had or could, they howeverfundraise NGOs either had to draw on their own limited resources and Filipino of number large A NGOs. international by delivered directly assistance to compared modest was partnerships through delivered assistance and response, the of months initial the in particularly partnerships, de-prioritised NGOs led, internationally international cases many In implemented. largely and coordinated was response the result a As logistics capacity, enabling them to work at significant scale. NGOs, international which to generally had far greater access to funding and better compared played role they minor out relatively rolled a response the as typhoon, the to Although national NGOs were among the earliest responders relationship.sub-contracting a than rather partnership, a as arrangement the approached they Haiyan, Typhoon to prior work their for funding NGO international on extent Anne Street Anne capable a and society anywhere? happen it can government– civil strong a with country middle- a income – Philippines the in led nationally and locally be cannot response emergency If organisations. national and people affected to resources and power cede to aspirations its real the make must like system the contexts where places see as Philippines to is 2016 in Summit Humanitarian humanitarian the to run-up World the in system humanitarian international of the for challenge centre The go. to way the long a has still at it response actors national place to aspiration its meet to is system international the If disasters. about questions the ability to of respondpartnerships at scale to mega- important raises research the normal’, to ‘new the expected disasters of called has Aquino frequency Benigno Presidentglobally, what increase and scale the With to scale. greater at respond to non-government,them enable and government national both to organisations, directly available are funds timely that ensure to need They respond. to Philippines the in society civil and coordination national mechanisms and strengthen the capacity of local government support and development capacity national for directfunding increasetheir to need also Donors emergencies. future for preparedness increase and capacity their build to NGOs Filipino support to needed is investment Greater more. lot a do to need sector humanitarian wider the and NGOs international that clear is it overall partnerships, Whilst the research identified some positive examples of good November2013. to prior response for to little partnerships strengthen or development capacity done support had organisations international that was isd Again Missed is Head of Humanitarian Policy at CAFOD. CAFOD. at Policy Humanitarian of Head is eerh on ta afce com- affected that found research

THE TYPHOON HAIYAN RESPONSE 27 Number Number 63 • January 2015 development development to emergency response, and others had to renegotiate partnerships with local actors. The private sector in the Philippines was heavily involved, raising money and sending Others activities combined and infrastructure. relief repair teams to carry out with business for continuity, example by relief restocking small shopkeepers with key items such as fridges and shelving, and livelihoods. The Philippines government has extensive extensive has government Philippines The livelihoods. and experience in responding to disasters enabling environment and for created international an assistance, with proactive government departments and a very easy entry airports Manila and Cebu at – One-Stop-Shop the – system which registration formalities covered in one step. The UN categorised the typhoon as a emergency, 3’ ‘Level and injected huge numbers of staff and response. goods into However, the the aid effort too was few staff in operational roles and too top-heavy, many in Manila. with The UN Cluster system worked in some ways in with parallel – and possibly overwhelmed – national coordination mechanisms and was not very effective. Logistics was key experienced most the only operation; the of success the to humanitarian operators were active in the first weeks of played countries 29 from assets military and response, the a crucial role. Although many actors responded, the majority were too small or arrived too unprepared late. or Many with ‘new inexperienced actors’ agencies teams. arrived from the Many traditional system large were very mount slow operations to despite already being present country, and in despite the having raised large sums of money earmarked for the disaster. Some took time to shift from same Red Crescent Society in a refugee camp. Relations with local Malian organisations were erratic: with some groups a close collaboration was established, whilst with be to perceived was MSF as strained were relations others dominated by patronising staff who did not understand local sensibilities. According to Malian a civil representative society of platform, a ‘MSF interviewed is not in very open Bamako: to locals … culture. The Americans, This British and is Dutch do a not operate very French the same way, they work in partnership. The French are very paternalistic. This attitude must be abandoned’. As a result, delivery of medical assistance was uneven. MSF had little impact on secondary care in Timbuktu, Gao, where whereas in good relations provide were to able was MSF crisis, the before long actors local established with good support to the hospital. The Philippines Typhoon Haiyan tore through the central islands Philippines of the on 8 November destruction 2013, and causing leaving 6,201 widespread shelter were people disaster the following needs dead main The injured. and 28,000 policy because of rumours about its political allegiance; meanwhile 100 miles down the road in Niger another MSF team had developed a close working relationship with the Relations Relations between MSF and these ‘new’ aid actors were MSF teams in mixed. Gao, the Crescent biggest where Red Society was based, decided to adopt a ‘no contact’ for decades. Some local organisations were response to the crisis; others predated it. created in Another factor was the UN regarded as inefficient cluster and unnecessarily substituting system, for which was the existing state-run and local coordination mechanisms that have linked local organisations with each other part a reflection of the longstanding Bamako and tensions the north, between with the United Nations seen as representing the interests of the central government. local actors took a prominent role in providing health care. care. health providing in role prominent a took actors local Many chose to operate outside the aid system of because a deep mistrust of the United Nations. This was in the agendas of their governments. With international organisations absent on the ground, NGOs willing to work in the country. Some Red Crescent Societies were quick mistrusted to by local people and also by the respond traditional aid in to linked was presence their that suspected which system, Gao, but were engaging in Mali for the first time, whilst ‘non-traditional’ donors such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the African Union offered funding to Islamic The security context forced traditional aid actors to limit the presence of mainly Western (white) expatriates. This gap was partially filled by regional Red Crescent societies years, years, events in 2012 completely transformed the nature and landscape of assistance. aided by African troops to tackle armed opposition groups groups opposition armed tackle to troops African by aided in northern Mali. In a country where aid actors had been engaged in development work for most of the past 40 Following Following the resumption of a rebellion military coup in in Bamako, 2012 Mali has and been beset a by one of the worst crises in its In history. January 2013 the former colonial power, France, launched a military intervention private private sector organisations. Mali Asia, non-European Red Cross and Red Crescent societies working internationally, diaspora organisations, governmental agencies, groups, local NGOs regional and response response in 2013 were Philippines. selected: Actors Mali, encountered Syria during and included these the international studies NGOs from the Middle East and Médecins Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) conducted three studies to see how MSF actors, and field how decisions on these relations teams were made. interact with Three ‘new’ countries where aid MSF was involved in emergency Michiel Hofman and Sandrine Tiller landscape, aid new the understand better to attempt an In humanitarian landscape humanitarian ‘Recently noticed’ aid actors: MSF’s interaction with a changing a changing with ‘Recently interaction MSF’s aid actors: noticed’ © Flickr/ SIM Central and South East Asia East South and Central SIM Flickr/ ©

Pastor Fernand, of the Marabut Christian Community Church, unloads supplies in Leyte.

and local mobile phone companies re-established con- more strategic approach that looks beyond the traditional nectivity. Many religious organisations also responded to sector may pay off in the long term as national capacity the crisis, predominantly Christian, but also some Muslim grows stronger in countries like the Philippines. and Buddhist groups. These organisations carried out a wide range of activities, from medical care to agricultural Syria support. They played an important role in the distribution The way in which the war in Syria has been fought – and of relief items to the most vulnerable, and provided the regional geopolitical dynamics that frame it – has pastoral care to distressed or bereaved families. By resulted in a polarised aid environment: either aid is and large these organisations worked through their own provided officially through Damascus, and subject to a coordination mechanisms organised by the churches, in series of administrative and bureaucratic procedures, or part because of distrust of local and national government. it is provided directly into opposition-controlled areas Only the larger international religious NGOs participated without the consent of the Syrian government. The two in the cluster system. modes of delivery are entirely dependent on one or the other party to the conflict and are incorporated into their MSF ran a massive operation, spending €17.6 million military tactics and strategies. Although some ‘official’ aid within about seven weeks, and deploying 171 expatriates crossed frontlines from Damascus (half of the World Food providing medical care, shelter and water and sanitation Programme (WFP)’s food convoys in 2013, for example), services. Although a wide range of actors were involved in areas controlled by the opposition or under siege aid in the response, MSF’s interaction with them was entirely is provided through armed opposition groups, informal pragmatic and based on operational need. MSF invested in networks of activists, regional organisations, solidarity relations with national government departments through networks and newly formed foundations. a dedicated position in Manila. This paid significant dividends, both practically in terms of facilitating the Many of the estimated 1,000 armed opposition groups response, but also in terms of MSF’s longer-term relations include service delivery as part of their activities. In some with the Philippines government. With local actors, MSF’s cases this comes with the responsibility for controlling an interaction was entirely practical – loan of a digger by a area, and in others there is a clear programme to build local company, assessments with the local municipality, administrative structures and engage in state-building. joint health messaging – and effective. There was virtually The aid environment in opposition-held areas is plagued no structured interaction with the private sector or with by the same tensions at work in Syria as a whole: church-led groups, which meant that MSF may have factionalism, sectarianism and a deep divide between missed important opportunities to improve community internal and external actors. The traditional aid community

THE TYPHOON HAIYAN THE RESPONSE TYPHOON HAIYAN relations and deepen understanding of the wider context. A has relied on old models of accountability and contractual

HUMANITARIAN 28 exchange arrangements that are not suitable and are potentially and its capacity to innovate and work outside the usual aid compromising. The result has been a growing gap between modalities. the provision of funds and the delivery of services, with multiple layers of bureaucracy either slowing down or Conclusion obstructing any adequate response. These case studies show that MSF is interacting with a variety of ‘new’ aid actors, and in some cases, such as MSF began negotiating for an official presence in Damascus Syria, is dependent on them. This choice is pragmatic and soon after the uprising began, but when this failed the practical. Some of these groups may have political links, agency established support programmes from across the but this has not prevented MSF from engaging with them Lebanese and Turkish borders. Operational alliances were as long as operational alliances are based on clear criteria created with independent relief activists who supported and are responding to needs. However, MSF is inconsistent MSF in smuggling medical supplies into areas under the in its dealings with ‘new’ actors and can be perceived as control of the opposition, under siege or in government arrogant. The agency has a natural bias towards familiar, hands. Initially, teams took a cautious approach, focusing traditional aid actors and little understanding of who on one network, but then realised that this group had these ‘new’ actors are or how to work with them. This has exploited MSF’s support for political purposes. This was led to very contradictory levels of collaboration regionally later addressed through a more extensive networking or even locally, leaving the ‘new’ aid actors very confused process and more diversified contacts. Medical support was about MSF’s identity. MSF would benefit from investing provided to local medical staff with whom a relationship of in a better understanding of, and a more open attitude trust had been established through consistent delivery towards, these ‘new’ actors, many of which have been and discretion around their identities. around for years, but have only recently been noticed by MSF and others as access has become more difficult for Many of the organisations interviewed saw MSF as arrogant the traditional aid system. and reliant on expatriates, and regarded its medical standards and protocols as below the quality expected Michiel Hofman is senior humanitarian specialist for MSF by both patients and local health professionals. However, in Brussels. Sandrine Tiller is humanitarian advisor for they also acknowledged MSF’s flexibility in other areas MSF in London.

Are cash transfers the ‘new normal’ in the Philippines? Challenges THE TYPHOON HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE and opportunities from Typhoon Haiyan Alesh Brown

As Typhoon Haiyan made landfall on 8 November 2013, aid remainder was given as uncon-ditional transfers, without agencies and donors alike realised that, if ever there were requirements. About 60% of the conditional cash transfers an environment where cash transfers would be appropriate, were to support livelihood rehabilitation, primarily through it was the Philippines. Some 16 million people were cash for work. Table 1 describes some of the cash transfer affected; 1.1m houses were damaged or destroyed, 4.1m modalities deployed in the Philippines. people were displaced and around 6,200 lost their lives. In response, at least 45 international humanitarian agencies Targeting implemented cash transfer programmes in one of the most As in most emergencies, targeting was an issue in the sophisticated humanitarian cash interventions to date. This absence of more in-depth assessments and better article reflects on the author’s experience of delivering cash baseline data. Although efforts were made to standardise in the Philippines and draws out some key observations, targeting criteria, agencies often used different conditions challenges and opportunities for moving forward. – e.g. female-headed households, having partially or fully damaged houses and being registered with the government The cash response 4P’s social safety net.2 At an estimated $338m, equivalent to roughly 40% of the response, the cash transfers following Haiyan constitute one While publishing inclusion/exclusion criteria on public of the world’s largest humanitarian cash-based interventions.1 billboards helped to improve transparency, some commun- According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian ities argued that using standardised indicators failed to Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking System, three-quarters of reflect the nuances of debt and vulnerability. For example, transfers were conditional, restricting expenditure to a set one community member noted that she was not selected range of items or asking recipients to participate in training because she had used credit to buy fish cages before the or some other specified activity (e.g. cash for work). The emergency, and as such was seen as less ‘vulnerable’ than her neighbour who did not have the same assets. During the emergency she lost her boat, could no longer fish 1 This figure does not include the substantial cash contribution made by remittances, the private sector and government and civil society organisations. 2 The Pantawid Pamilya Pilipino conditional cash transfer programme.

Number 63 • January 2015 29 Table 1: Types of humanitarian cash transfer Modality Description Primary objective Secondary objective Unconditional cash grant Providing people with cash • To help restore purchasing • To support market recovery without conditions power of affected communities and enable them to prioritise their own needs at the household level Cash for work Employing/paying people in • Early onset: To provide • To support market/labour exchange for their participation immediate income and force recovery, community in works of public, private and/ restore purchasing power cohesion or individual utility. Payment is • Early recovery: To help usually pegged to local daily recover lost livelihoods/ wage rates. assets or put affected people on the path to attaining alternative livelihoods/new assets or income-generating activities Conditional grant Providing cash with conditions, • To meet immediate • To support market recovery such as participating in hygiene consumption needs of • To incentivise participation training, school enrolment affected families in activities designed to • To meet programme achieve/promote programme objectives objective(s) of the grant- giving agency Cash or commodity voucher Restricting expenditure to one • To meet immediate needs for • To support market recovery or more goods or services in specific products/services order to meet a specified need/ (e.g. shelter tools, CGI sheets outcome and other materials, or services) • To improve the quality of humanitarian assistance to crisis-affected people by ensuring cash/voucher links them to durable goods/ services (set by SPHERE standards) Hybrid: grant + loan A grant mixed with a loan which To meet immediate • To support market recovery (microfinance) needs to be repaid. The grant consumption needs • To promote responsibility and component can be conditional ownership over expenditure/ or unconditional payback • Promote savings • Increase coverage (the number of people targeted) Community grant/loan Providing cash to more than Restore production, income Build cohesion via shared one person. This can be and/or employment ownership over activities and/ deployed in both conditional or loan or unconditional format, as a grant, loan or combination

and was incurring increasing debts, raising questions ment Programme (UNDP) piloting more sophisticated about how to include debt in targeting frameworks. To e-payment systems some four to 12 months into the overcome this, some agencies implemented blanket cash response.3 While remittance companies were fast, had good for work programmes, offering everyone the opportunity coverage and were flexible in terms of ‘know your customer’ to participate. While this helped in overcoming targeting ID requirements to verify the identity of their clients, their errors, some businesses complained that they lost ability to scale up was restricted by each office’s processing employees and were no longer able to source labour capacity and cash-out liquidity (the ability of customers due to the impact of the programme on a small island to access physical cash or buy goods using an electronic economy. payment) – both of which were put under pressure as multiple agencies used the same provider. Similarly, Payment although electronic payments (e.g. mobile payments) The Philippines probably has one of the most developed offered real-time reporting and reconciliation, a lack of and efficient mobile cash transfer systems in the world. Yet hand-to-hand payments, either directly by 3 UNDP provided beneficiaries with a mobile phone, a SIM card with aid agencies or through remittance companies, were PhP30 airtime load and a Landbank ATM cash card, the idea being often the first choice, with organisations such as the that people could cash out using both the mobile phone and pre-paid

THE TYPHOON HAIYAN THE RESPONSE TYPHOON HAIYAN World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN Develop- ATM card.

HUMANITARIAN 30 exchange © Lesley Wright/UNDP Philippines Lesley© Wright/UNDP

A payout in a Leyte for cash-for-work programme under-standing about available services, patchy cellular conditions of employment, namely accident and health coverage and questions over cash-out liquidity slowed insurance, tetanus vaccinations and a contribution to the uptake. As such, cash in hand, either directly or through a Social Security Service (SSS). Although on paper these carried third party, was often the most popular mechanism, with logical benefits, some questioned whether households would

more sophisticated electronic systems introduced as the pay their SSS contributions given that they only receive HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE infrastructure became more reliable and better understood. SSS benefits after one year’s payments have been made. Similarly, when added up, the cost of insurance, vaccinations Cash for work policies and SSS contributions could account for between 20% and Filipino legislation requires any public work programme, 40% of the value of the transfer, depending on the wage rate including cash for work, to follow laws on labour rights and and number of days employed. As a result, the Inter-Cluster

Table 2: Cash for work guidance Type Duration Wage rate Work activity Mandatory Optional requirements requirements Cash for asset Minimum 5 100% of Light debris clearance Provision of protective Tetanus vaccinations recovery days minimum wage and reconstruction of gear Accident insurance personal property Safety training Communication with Monitoring of work nearest health clinics conditions Emergency Minimum 100% of Light and heavy work All the above plus: Provision of health employment 15 days minimum wage to restore public Tetanus vaccinations insurance through cash for infrastructure and Enrolment in the work spaces, creating Social Security immediate income and System (SSS) if social protection engaged for 6 months or more Accident insurance Health workers on site

Number 63 • January 2015 31 Coordination Group worked with the government to update work programmes should be used to re-employ people policies, dividing optional and mandatory requirements in their previous employment, leveraging the capital by work type (see Table 2). While this helped to install injection to meet consumption needs and improve minimum conditions of employment in terms of protection wage rates and job security for the target population. and insurance, further research is needed to understand the costs and benefits of transferring money directly versus 3. Develop shared contingency plans with financial service through the government social security service. providers. Digital delivery systems are one of the most transparent ways of making financial transfers and help Wage distortion root out leakage and corruption. Similarly, working in From the outset, the government set cash for work rates at consortia offers opportunities to negotiate lower fees, 100% of the minimum wage, rather than below it, in order develop common standards and streamline coordination to encourage self-targeting. As noted, some government through the use of common payment lists. and private sector employees participated in cash for work projects, rather than resuming their normal jobs, either 4. Pilot new payment models. Where appropriate, try out because their employer paid below the minimum wage or new models for transferring cash. For example, www. the work was seen as easier than their current job. Similarly, worldremit.com is what is known as a ‘Wholesale FSP’, skilled labourers such as carpenters undertaking boat which can deliver cash to multiple countries through repair complained that aid agencies were inflating costs for its various partners. Such organisations often have labour and goods, and unskilled cash for work employees more nuanced knowledge of issues such as regulation, were being paid the same or sometimes more than skilled compliance and coverage, and could help agencies labour. While some communities argued that the cash to understand the risks and opportunities associated injection helped, others suggested that the increase in with different payment mechanisms. Similarly, working income was cancelled out by inflated prices for goods and through one provider could reduce transfer costs and services – especially for people not participating in the improve coordination by using common payment lists. programme, who were asking how long it would take prices to settle back to their pre-emergency levels. 5. Develop an online marketplace (website) to compare and coordinate payments. Delivering cash can be Conclusion complex because there are multiple types of modality, Cash is both a product and a driver of change, pushing the financing and channels of delivery. As a result, many sector to envisage a system that is radically different. Rather aid workers commented on the usefulness of a report than delivering physical goods, aid agencies are engaging documenting the locations, services and requirements with local economies, banks and mobile companies to associated with different payment mechanisms in deliver cash. They are trying to pay households the same the Philippines. Such a model could be expanded by amount, follow common targeting criteria and in some developing a website (online marketplace) where aid cases help link recipients to longer-term development workers can compare different payment options. Such a projects – all in the midst of an emergency response. As platform could be extended into a shared payment and such, the move to cash and market-based programming monitoring system using digital payments and shared signifies a significant shift in the way aid works by uniting service models to coordinate and reduce transfer costs. multiple actors to meet multiple objectives. 6. Cash coordination. Fitting cash into the current UN Recommendations coordination system is a complex task. Because cash 1. Implement a SWOT analysis to understand the strengths can be given for one purpose but spent on something and weaknesses of using the 4Ps Social Safety Net else project managers find it difficult to create indicators to deliver and coordinate cash transfers in the next as they often do not know what the cash is spent on. emergency. Covering 3.93m households, the safety net Figure 1 presents a modification to the current cluster aims to provide a modest but stable source of income model, the main difference being the creation of a shared for the poorest families. Until now, there has been very needs and market assessment unit that works across little experience of or experimentation with using social clusters to calculate needs, and convert this into the protection programmes in the Philippines for emergency local monetary equivalent. Distributions can then be response. Further research is needed to understand tracked through a shared payment system/database or the costs and benefits of delivering cash directly through an online coordination system, allowing users to versus using the government’s protection system. register the location, modalities and amounts of cash or 2. Identify opportunities to expand cash for work assets being transferred, providing a composite picture programmes to restore and improve pre-emergency of the distribution of resources. employment. To date, the majority of cash for work programmes have focused on debris removal, managed Alesh Brown Cash, Markets and Technology Specialist at by individual aid agencies. Where possible, cash for www.apt-info.org. THE TYPHOON HAIYAN THE RESPONSE TYPHOON HAIYAN

HUMANITARIAN 32 exchange Figure 1: Proposed cash coordination model4

Donors put cash into a common pool for a shared humanitarian safety net

Humanitarian Coordinator

Inter-Cluster Coordinator

Demand analysis Supply analysis Multi-Sectorial Needs Assessment and Multi-Sectoral Market Assessment Unit Registration Unit

Food Early Shelter Health Education Protection WASH security recovery plus NFI

Cash Cash Cash Cash Cash Cash Cash Champion Champion Champion Champion Champion Champion Champion THE TYPHOON HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE

Cash transfers packages designed to meet multi-sectoral consumption needs, then restore production, income and employment

NGO NGO NGO NGO NGO Area A Area B Area C Area D Area E

Shared registration, Payment, Tracking and Coordination System

Affected population

4 Figure 1 has been developed from http://www.urd.org/Review-of-coordination-mechanisms.

Number 63 • January 2015 33 The private sector: stepping up Serena Brown, KPMG International

The private sector response to Typhoon Haiyan was more for Public Affairs and Communications at Coca-Cola: sophisticated than for any preceding natural disaster. It ‘One of our core tenets is that sustainability is part responded at scale, with a wide array of resources and of everything we do so we are moving away from a expertise, mainly in close collaboration with the government philanthropic model … We don’t see a conflict that our and traditional humanitarian actors (civil society, the Red support for Sari-Sari stores helps our business and also Cross and the United Nations). Most companies responded has a humanitarian purpose’. out of a sense of shared humanity: Filipinos often expressed this as the spirit of ‘Bayanihan’ (mutual cooperation for the The private sector also made substantial contributions to common good). Although most large companies had limited recovery and reconstruction in the form of financial dona- direct economic exposure to affected low-income island tions from companies, corporate foundations and employee communities, companies present in the Philippines know giving campaigns, and donations of products and expertise. that their employees, customers and the government expect These resources have been channelled into repairing and them to assist in the event of a major natural disaster. For constructing houses, schools, healthcare facilities and foreign investor companies ‘It shows how we feel about the other infrastructure, as well as helping people to recover country we want to invest in; that we respect it. You cannot and diversify their livelihoods. drive investment where you only have commercial benefits; you need to employ people and gain support from local Companies also provided financing for relief and recovery authorities’.1 through payment of insured losses. Given low insurance penetration in the Philippines (ranked 65 out of 88 This article draws on interviews with over 30 represen- countries by Swiss Re in 2013), insured losses were tatives from the private sector, civil society, the UN, estimated at $1.5 billion, including losses from public the IFRC/Philippines Red Cross and the government of infrastructure insurance, compared to estimated total the Philippines. The interviews probed private sector losses of around $13bn. Insurance thus comprised a small, alignment with the OCHA-WEF ‘Guiding Principles for though important, proportion of disaster loss financing. Public-Private Collaboration for Humanitarian Action’ and Some microinsurers were able to settle claims promptly, contributions to the five pillars of the ‘Hyogo Framework starting within three days of the typhoon, by using their for Action on Disaster Risk Reduction’.2 grassroots networks, easing documentation requirements and, for the first time, using satellite imagery and crisis Quicker, bigger and better maps for damage assessments. However, in most cases The private sector made the humanitarian response quicker, claims payments took longer than normal because staff bigger and more effective. Companies with local presence and infrastructure had been affected by the typhoon. were often the first responders, leveraging their networks, It also proved difficult to locate displaced people and people, assets and products. They donated relief items (for identify the missing. example water, food, tarpaulins, water filters, solar torches, blankets, clothes, pharmaceuticals, medical equipment and In addition, companies used their networks and customer hygiene items), logistics (vehicles, air and sea freight, ware- base to increase giving from third parties. In the UK, for houses), services (including communications, passenger example, the airline easyJet asked passengers to donate on flights, port services), expertise (such as project manage- flights; mobile network providers EE, Orange and T-Mobile ment, financial and logistics surge capacity) and volunteers texted customers to ask them to donate £5 to UNICEF; and for packing, distribution and rapid assessments. UK retail store H&M asked people visiting its 200 stores to donate spare change into buckets at tills. Technology After the early relief phase, one of the primary contributions also proved to be a key enabler. Facebook’s News Feed of the private sector was to revive distribution chains for and Twitter’s home timeline (together accessed by 1.5 essential items, reduce predatory pricing (many prices billion users every month) launched a banner campaign increased between four and ten times their pre-typhoon encouraging people to click and donate. The Yahoo-owned levels) and rebuild livelihoods.3 For example, Coca-Cola Tumblr and Apple’s iTunes ran similar campaigns. BT’s provided 15,000 Sari Sari store (small convenience store) MyDonate technology platform powered and securely owners with temporary structures, and together with processed donations raised through the UK’s Disasters Procter & Gamble it partnered with USAID to rebuild Emergency Committee (DEC), and BskyB’s interactive (with permanent structures, sometimes including a small giving facility enabled viewers to use the interactive ‘red’ dwelling), and to restock 1,000 Sari Sari stores and train button to donate. their owners. According to Adel Tamano, Vice President Locally led, rehearsed and coordinated 1 Interview with Vanessa Hans, Head of Business Support, France- Three critical success factors stand out. First, as a Philippines United Action, 27 June 2014. middle-income country with an active private sector, 2 See http://www.un.org/partnerships/Docs/Principles%20for%20 Public-Private%20Collaboration%20for%20Humanitarian%20Action. Filipino companies – together with the Philippines arms pdf and http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa. of international businesses – led the private sector 3 Interview with Rene Fortune, Director, PBSP, 28 July 2014. response. These companies understand the local context, THE TYPHOON HAIYAN THE RESPONSE TYPHOON HAIYAN

HUMANITARIAN 34 exchange back better approach under the Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP), working with OPARR, the local governments and other private sector donors and partners in that area’.5

The power of platforms The Philippines has several well developed private sector platforms/ consortia. These platforms galvan- ise private sector resources for disaster management, improve the quality of preparedness and response, cluster activities for greater

© Karen Lapitan / ILO 2014 ILO / KarenLapitan © impact, and coordinate with the government and other humanitarian actors. A few examples are particularly noteworthy, although the range of their activities is far wider than can be discussed here. The Philippines Disaster Recovery Foun- Conference with business owners, vendors and entrepreneurs dation funded relief and rehabili- in Tacloban, May 2014 tation activities, and acted as the main national coordinator of private they have established relationships with local govern- sector efforts and link to the government. The Philippines ment and civil society and they were able to quickly Business for Social Progress (PBSP) foundation, which deploy local resources. For example, 90% of the pro bono is supported by 250 private companies, identified personnel deployed by the Logistics Emergency Teams north-ern Cebu as a priority; under its Project ‘New Dawn’, were Filipino. it designed five major social investment programmes including health and school infrastructure, disaster risk

Second, the frequency of natural disasters in the Philip- reduction training and mangrove protection. The Corpor- HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE pines has given the local private sector plenty of practice ate Network for Disaster Reduction has a flagship project, in responding. There is a conducive legal framework, and Noah’s Ark, which develops government capacity through over recent years companies have refined their approach a series of seminars and workshops including risk assess- to disaster risk management, complemented by other ments, emergency procedures and evacuation drills. actors improving the ways in which they leverage private sector support. This created the foundation for a strong Several Chambers of Commerce also secured and coordi- and proficient private sector response when Typhoon nated private sector support. For example, the Cebu Haiyan struck. Companies activated tried and tested Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which has a permanent protocols, collaborating with NGOs that had already disaster committee in its External Affairs Division, led local earned their trust. private–public coordination of relief efforts and (amongst other things) provided logistical support to the development Third, the private sector response was generally well of Cebu Mactan Airport as an international hub for relief coordinated with the government and other humani- flights. The French Chamber of Commerce and Industry tarian actors. Coordination mechanisms included bilateral in the Philippines established ‘France–Philippines United relationships between companies and government minis- Action’ as a taskforce to coordinate and cluster the activities tries at national, provincial and local levels; private sector of French businesses; it evaluated and selected projects to platforms; and the humanitarian cluster system (Typhoon support, led engagement with other stakeholders and Haiyan was the first disaster where OCHA and the UN developed collective communications. The Philippines Global Compact deployed private sector focal points to Chamber of Commerce and Industry launched the Eastern help inform and coordinate the private sector response).4 Visayas Business Recovery Center, in partnership with To help coordinate private sector rehabilitation efforts, the Department of the Interior and Local Government, to the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation increase the viability of businesses affected by the typhoon. and Recovery (OPARR) is taking the novel approach of The potential of global industry associations was clearly securing a private sector sponsor for each of 24 Areas demonstrated by the GSMA (which represents the interests of Intervention and Development: ‘The sponsor adopts of 800 mobile operators around the world) and the Global an area and becomes an overall shepherd to make sure VSAT Forum (which represents the interests of SatCom rehabilitation in that area is in accordance with the building companies around the world). Both have established a

4 https://www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutthegc/TheTenprinciples/ 5 Interview with Atty. Karen Jimeno, Director for Communications, index.html. OPARR, 18 August 2014.

Number 63 • January 2015 35 Disaster Response Programme and are Observer Members Collaboration between the private sector, the government of the UN Emergency Telecommunications Cluster. GSMA and civil society is on the right trajectory. Even so, Typhoon supported Filipino mobile operators with preparedness in Haiyan was a wake-up call to accelerate these positive advance of Typhoon Haiyan, and was well positioned to changes: from disaster management towards resilient deploy a representative to act as a link for mobile operators development; from response towards risk reduction, in the typhoon’s aftermath, collating, synthesising and mitigation and preparedness; from projects towards an sharing information on network availability and other integrated system view; and from donations towards skills services (e.g. mobile money) with humanitarian actors, and sharing. In September 2013 the Bank of the Philippines aggregating and coordinating NGO, UN and government had sponsored a workshop in Tacloban to assess the city’s requests for support. preparedness for future client scenarios including a super typhoon in 2021; just a few weeks later Typhoon Haiyan Opportunity knocking? struck allowing insufficient time to translate workshop Many leading companies now integrate social and recommendations into action. Typhoon Hagupit is yet environmental considerations into their core business, another reminder that we need to seize the opportunities rather than viewing them as the preserve of a Corporate we have available today. Social Responsibility department. Increasingly, companies are catching on to the ‘shared value’ opportunity: i.e. Next year heads of state will adopt the Sustainable they are seeking to create economic value by creating Development Goals and the successor to the Hyogo societal value. However, when it comes to natural Framework for Action. The private sector has been a disasters the large majority of companies are still thinking significant voice throughout the global consultation only in terms of philanthropy (i.e. donations of funds, processes, and 2015 will shine a spotlight on the goods and services) and business continuity. The next centrality of the private sector to resilient, sustainable opportunity is to re-imagine products and markets for a development. With its well-developed private sector world characterised by escalating disaster risk. As Butch platforms, the Philippines can further enhance its global Meily, President of the Philippines Disaster Recovery reputation by becoming a beacon of good practice for Foundation, commented: ‘CSR budgets are finite; we need public–private collaboration which accelerates resilient to unleash the commercial muscle of the private sector’. development. The Philippines, as a highly disaster-prone middle-income country, is an obvious market in which to ‘hot house’ game Serena Brown, Global Development Initiative, KPMG changing solutions. International.

Urban shelter and settlement recovery: a ‘menu of options’ for households

Catholic Relief Services Philippines

Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines on 8 November ensuring participation, freedom of choice, and access to 2013, killing 6,300 people and injuring another 29,000. basic services to ensure a life of dignity’. An estimated four million people were displaced from their homes. This article reflects on Catholic Relief Service Within this context, CRS, with funding from the US Agency (CRS)’s urban shelter and settlement recovery programme for International Development – Office of US Foreign in Tacloban City. The programme, which offers a ‘menu Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA), has taken an integrated of options’ to households, works closely with affected approach in its urban shelter and settlements recovery communities to find shelter solutions by putting decision- programme, which has placed neighbourhoods at the centre making power in the hands of households themselves. of the project. The Typhoon Haiyan Recovery Program aims to complement the Tacloban City government’s relocation The USAID/OFDA and CRS urban shelter and project, which has focused on one main site approximately settlements recovery programme 15 kilometres north of the centre, in a largely undeveloped The Humanitarian Communities’ Strategic Response Plan area called New Kawayan. Other smaller-scale relocation for Typhoon Haiyan, approved by the national government, projects include permanent shelters for approximately states that families with destroyed or damaged homes, 14,000 households in coastal barangays. However, the including displaced people, should attain appropriate sites selected are considered too far away by the majority and sustainable shelter solutions. Likewise, the Shelter of affected households, and many are finding it difficult Cluster’s Recovery Guidelines highlight the need for shelter to create new livelihoods or maintain their previous assistance programmes to ensure that families have livelihoods in the proposed relocation sites. ‘adequate appropriate and safe shelter supporting them to transition along the pathway to permanent durable CRS’ approach offers alternative shelter options to

THE TYPHOON HAIYAN THE RESPONSE TYPHOON HAIYAN housing, prioritizing the needs of the most vulnerable, typhoon-affected households. Working at community and

A shelter in Tacloban City household level, the programme has focused on helping Table 1: Vulnerabilities according to land tenure and households to find their own shelter and settlement zoning classification solutions close to their original homes, livelihoods Post-Haiyan Land Zoning and social structures. CRS is targeting 3,000 affected No Dwell Zone Dwell Zone

households in 17 of the 31 high-risk coastal barangays in HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE Sharer Most vulnerable Tacloban City. hardest to assist Whether households can legally return and rebuild on the Renter land they occupied before the typhoon has been a central Owner Least vulnerable question in planning shelter and settlement assistance. In easiest to assist the early days after the typhoon, the national government announced a blanket 40-meter buffer zone along the Housing and land tenure coastline, which it designated a ‘No Dwell Zone’ (NDZ). This blanket ban was later lifted, and it has been left to ‘Menu of Options’ for households in the local governments to set the parameters of these zones Dwell Zone according to hazard assessments. Twelve months on, DZ households are offered on-site assistance to repair or information from the assessments for Tacloban City is rebuild their houses calibrated according to the level of still not widely available; the local government has yet to damage. Following assessment by CRS engineers, cash make a decision about zoning, and is unlikely to do so in payments and materials are provided in conditional tranches the near future. The widespread lack of secure land tenure to assist with rebuilding or construction of transitional adds a further layer of uncertainty. shelters and latrines. A team of engineers and foremen oversees and monitors construction or repairs and ensures The lack of clarity around zoning and tenure issues has led that ‘Build Back Safer’ techniques are incorporated into the CRS to develop a twin-track approach, in consultation with design and construction. These activities in the DZ allow neighbourhood residents and the local government. This displaced households to return to their place of origin and provides a menu of options for assistance which caters to provide households with a safe, secure and durable home. households in both the ill-defined ‘Dwell Zone’ (DZ) and An estimated 41% of the 3,000 households assisted by CRS the NDZ. For the purposes of this project CRS has come to in this project fall into this category. an understanding with the City to use a main costal road to define the boundary. Households that are in the DZ One CRS beneficiary household that sought emergency and which own land are relatively easy to assist through shelter in a nearby church in the face of the storm lost on-site shelter and latrine reconstruction and repair. The most of their possessions, but their house was found to most vulnerable households – those in the NDZ which be sound. Under the project they received PHP 20,000 share a house or do not own land – are much more difficult (approximately $500) and corrugated iron sheets to repair to assist. the roof. With the cash the household bought lumber and

Number 63 • January 2015 37 other materials and hired carpenters to build their new roof. community members identified the owner of a plot within the The beneficiary said: ‘my family and I can sleep comfortable barangay and negotiated to ‘infill’ his plot to accommodate and secure without worrying about the rain’. Other families 75 shelters, through a community-driven selection process, that have received support have prioritised the building of for the most vulnerable households in the NDZ. strong second floors, in case of another storm surge. Facilitating permanent solutions ‘Menu of Options’ for households in the No CRS, through cash and material support, is facilitating a Dwell Zone permanent solution for those households in the DZ who The NDZ is considered a high-risk area and the local can repair and rebuild in their original location. In addition, government will not permit humanitarian organisations the organisation is providing transitional solutions for the to provide onsite assistance beyond emergency shelter majority of households in the NDZ through the Menu of distributions (plastic sheets and non-food items). The Options, to facilitate relocation to safer areas nearby. absence of humanitarian assistance in these areas meant Experience in Haiti, elsewhere in the Philippines and in other that unsupported reconstruction was being undertaken countries indicates that these transitional solutions are without adequate materials or expertise. Many households likely to evolve into permanent shelter solutions. However, took out high-interest personal loans from local lenders to concerns remain about what will happen at the end of purchase materials or hire labour, only to begin building the project. Many households were unwilling to leave the inadequate and inappropriate shelters. relative security of their communities within the NDZ, especially with so much uncertainty about long-term plans. CRS worked with the neighbourhoods to develop a ‘Menu Households were concerned about maintaining their current of Options’ for households in the NDZ to enable them to livelihoods, the additional cost of transport to schools and relocate to safer areas within Tacloban, while staying as close their long-term ability to pay for alternative shelter options as possible to their place of origin in order to limit disruption as humanitarian support declines. Many households initially to livelihoods and education, and to maintain households’ opted to remain in the danger areas, investing their limited familial and community support systems. After substantial resources in rebuilding in situ in the hope of a place in debate, assessments and consultations, CRS finalised four the government’s permanent relocation site. The confusion two-year options that households could choose from: around the possibility of eviction, and initial calculations by many households that housing would be ready and available 1. ‘Rent to own’ land subsidy: financial support to move in a permanent relocation site, led many to delay thinking to a safe location where families can potentially own about their immediate future. land, together with a full shelter and latrine package. 2. Land rental subsidy: financial support to rent a plot of To support informed decision-making, CRS facilitated site land in a safe location, together with a full shelter and visits for over 1,100 households to the land in the govern- latrine package. ment’s permanent relocation site to see the permanent 3. Apartment rental subsidy: financial support to rent an shelters that households might receive. CRS invited apartment or house in a safe location. government officials to discuss the plans for permanent 4. Host family subsidy: Financial support to live with a relocation and the selection criteria that they would use family member or friend in a safe location. to determine who would be eligible. CRS also discussed the ‘Menu of Options’ and encouraged households to find After working directly with the Mayor’s Office and local transitional shelter solutions to facilitate work towards a landowners without much success, CRS found that it was permanent solution, which could be in their current site, in more effective to place the responsibility on each household New Kawayan or elsewhere. Once households understood to find a piece of land, apartment or host family to which they the full picture and timeline of government and CRS support, would be happy to relocate. Once decision-making power was they became more enthusiastic about finding transitional shifted to households, solutions started to emerge. In one shelter solutions. In the weeks after the visit, the number of case, 38 households living in the San Fernando evacuation transitional shelter solutions that households presented to centre identified a plot of land in a safe, inland barangay two CRS for assessment increased significantly. kilometres from the project neighbourhood, and negotiated the monthly rental payment. CRS then determined whether CRS and the Tacloban City government are offering the land was suitable and began construction of individual complementary shelter and settlement solutions to affected shelters, latrines, communal septic tanks, water taps, hand people in Tacloban. There are real challenges in ensuring pumps and electrical connections. Families have been an inclusive process, particularly in meeting the needs of able to determine their own future, providing continuity of the most vulnerable, but the CRS shelter and settlement social connections between households within the original programme is finding solutions by putting decision-making barangays and fostering a sense of community (what is power in the hands of households themselves. known locally as ‘Bayanihan’) in the relocation areas. This article was developed collaboratively by Holly Fuller CRS has also enabled households to find solutions (Program Manager – CRS Philippines), Seki Hirano (Senior through the use of aerial photography and participatory Technical Advisor, Shelter and Settlements – CRS), Vera community mapping exercises to find potential areas for Kreuwels (Technical Advisor, Shelter and Settlements – CRS), urban densification. In one barangay with a large number of Joshua Kyller (Emergency Coordinator – CRS) and Jane

THE TYPHOON HAIYAN THE RESPONSE TYPHOON HAIYAN households located in the NDZ, the barangay captain and Strangways (Masters candidate – Oxford Brookes University).

HUMANITARIAN 38 exchange THE TYPHOON HAIYAN RESPONSE 39 , no. , no. Humanitarian Exchange 83,403 106,893 Other Shelter Cluster agencies 0 no data 28,125 46,007 70,234 Number Number 63 • January 2015 10,753 12,830 CARE 0 0 240 1,262 4,194 5% of the target overall for humanitarian shelter agencies for the first year of the response – provided with ‘support to self-recovery of shelter’ monitoring at completed that by point. both Programme that organisations this assistance had enabled many families indicated to quickly begin repairing their houses and move on recovery. to livelihood Challenges and solutions Funding Existing partnerships meant received that rapid in-kind both and financial organisations support from humanitarian major donors in the immediate aftermath of the Following Following the distribution of (tarpaulins, fixings emergency and shelter tools), Habitat kits construction began providing materials to families two in weeks after the Cebu typhoon, including and plywood, timber, Samar corrugated iron sheets, nails and tools. CARE accelerated its planned shift from emergency support to support for self-recovery at the end of December as its assessments highlighted that many families had to immediately repair or begun rebuild their homes themselves. CARE’s self- supportrecovery included the distribution of construction materials, cash transfers through local cooperatives and support. technical CAREBoth household-level Habitat and also offered community-level technical briefings on safe construction techniques. Six months after the typhoon both agencies had assisted around 13,000 families to begin repairing their or rebuilding homes through their According self-recovery to the programmes. Shelter Cluster these were largest such programmes implemented within two the first six of the – households of 20% around with response, the of months 4 J. Kennedy et al., ‘Post-tsunami Transitional Settlement and Shelter: Transitional et al., ‘Post-tsunami 4 J. Kennedy Aceh and Sri Lanka’, Field Experience from 37, 2007, www.odihpn.org. 5 See https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/SRP_2013-2014_ Philippines_Typhoon_Haiyan.pdf.

5 process- 3 12,844 13,277 Habitat 0 1,614 6,635 7,731 11,572

4 (Oxford: Oxford Polytechnic Press, 1978). Press, Polytechnic Oxford (Oxford: Freedom To Build: Dweller Control of the Control Build: Dweller To Freedom (New York: Macmillan, 1972). York: (New (Colchester: ITDG Publishing, 1995). (Colchester: ITDG Publishing, Housing without Houses: Participation, Flexibility, Housing without Houses: Participation, Flexibility, Over 30 years after Ian Davis described shelter Shelter after Disaster 2 They have also advocated for ‘supporting’ rather 1 8 April 2014 8 May 2014 8 January 2014 8 February 2014 8 March 2014 8 2013 November 8 December 2013 Date 2 N. Hamdi, Enablement 3 I. Davis, 1 J. Turner and R. Fichter, Fichter, and R. Turner 1 J. Housing Process Sources: Sources: Internal monitoring data (CARE and Habitat); Shelter Cluster data; Reliefweb. Table 1: Number of Table households provided with support for self-recovery of shelter within the first six months following the typhoon policy into practice was far from easy. strategic strategic objective of humanitarian Yet shelter despite agencies. longstanding backing recovery for following disasters, and support the appropriateness to of self- this approach to the context in the Philippines, translating million families to repair or rebuild their homes through a participatory process and the provision of construction materials, tools, cash and technical assistance was a from from building more permanent structures, while were others informal settlers in hazardous areas sea. In close response to to the Typhoon Haiyan, supporting half a weight weight timber buildings which they had either built them- families Many construct. to carpenters local paid or selves, had agreements with landowners which prevented them the first six months Haiyan. after the Typhoon Prior to the typhoon most affected families lived in light- From policy to From practice This article partners local their and Humanity for Habitat International, documents the in experiences implementing self-recovery shelter programmes during of CARE oriented approaches to post-disaster rarely implemented on the housing ground. are still skills and labour rather than the provision of completed houses. after disaster as ‘a process, not as an object’, than ‘providing’ approaches: than enabling ‘providing’ families to upgrade their own housing situation through improved access to and management of land, finance, services, materials, Affordable housing Affordable experts that long housing argued have is ‘both the stock of process by which dwelling that stock is created units and maintained (a (a noun) verb)’. and the Victoria Victoria Maynard and Philip Barritt Typhoon Haiyan Typhoon Supporting shelter self-recovery: field experience following 40 THE TYPHOON HAIYAN RESPONSE the response. the in later programmes ‘top-up’ inform to undertaken assessments were detailed more while assistance, shelter of provision the in delay possible minimum the ensured also of processes and criteria likelihood selection of simplicity the The conflict. reduced and community whole the of approach recovery This the supported response. involvement, community the ensured of months few first the in provided and which assistance relatively low levels of identify shelter support to receive almost all families to should communities households with closely worked not organisations are both challenge and this overcome To are selected. who families between tensions cause can and time-consuming, and complex be can assistance receive should families which identifying of process the need overwhelming and resources limited of context a In selection Beneficiary household. per costs higher the meet to efforts werefundraising own CARE’s from provided funds additional CARE’s while programmes, of self-recovery Some to emergency from 1). funds of Figure transfer the allowed see donors – relief committed emergency already funding to reallocate to unable was it (although programmes shelter self-recovery to ramming prog- emergency its from funding some reallocate to able was CARE contrast, the In provided. assistance on the of impact limitations significant imposed This assistance. its align to shelter emergency providing agencies of those order with costs of in amount provided) the materials reducing construction (through household per provided assistance of cost the donor reduce one to response Habitat the required of days few first tarp- the In distributing aulins. programmes shelter emergency household than per cost higher a had materials construction distributing programmes self-recovery However, disaster. Care Habitatand by assistance shelter with provided households of Number Figure1: HUMANITARIAN 10,000 12,000 14,000

2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 exchange Nov 2013 0 Dec 2013 Habitat: emergency self-recovery CARE: emergency CARE: Habitat: self-rec0very Jan 2014 Feb 2014

n omn ih rvos iatr epne operations response disaster previous with common policy In zone’ ‘No-build rm upir i Cb, hc ws eaiey unscathed, relatively was which Cebu, in suppliers from supply to materials disruption construction purchased initially and Habitat chains. damage virtually to was due disaster the impossible of in aftermath materials immediate construction the of purchase local However, grants. cash of provision the either or purchasing direct through materials, construction of sourcing local through recovery economic support to aimed organisations Both procurement Material nearby.land of plots safe the identify to community whole with worked and assistance shelter with household the provided CARE instances these In rebuild. to want not riveras wheresuch did banks, sites they high-risk in living were families some areas these in even but underserved, were areas these that municipalities highlighted inland assessments initial in as work to chose CARE donors. general flexible In more from support with and disasters) with agreements reaching previousin done Localhad each Governmentthey (as Unit after zones no-build within living families to assistance was self-recovery provide to Habitat able generally, More zones. no-build living the families within fewer had which municipality different a in work to Habitat the forced eventually outside and zones and no-build inside living families between conflict urgent need for shelter assistance. This created significant their despite zones no-build the within living families to support self-recovery provide to organisation the permit not would donors Habitat’s of One them. assist to trying areas these (many within of whom living were informal families settlers) and for for organisations confusion caused This coast. the of metres 40 within houses rebuilding or repairing from families prohibiting policy zone’ ‘no-build a announced quickly government the Philippines, the in Mar 2014 Apr 2014 May 2014 then identified local suppliers within the disaster- combination of procurement delays on particular items, affected region as the construction industry recovered transportation challenges and a lack of secure warehousing and expanded in response to demand. In Cebu demand meant that, in some instances, in the first three months from international agencies far exceeded supply in the after the typhoon Habitat chose to distribute partial first few months of the response. Suppliers were not rather than full packages of materials to affected families able to fulfil orders on time or substituted inferior-quality (returning later with the outstanding items). While this was materials, requiring Habitat to instigate higher levels of a compassionate response to the needs of affected families quality control. CARE purchased large volumes of items in the immediate aftermath of the disaster it significantly such as corrugated iron sheets in Cebu and Manila as increased the complexity of the programme and the number these were not available in local markets in sufficient of distributions required. In later stages of the response both volume or quality to meet demand. CARE was able to agencies distributed directly from trucks carrying complete rapidly procure due to early funding, initially avoiding packages to reduce the need for warehousing in the field. problems, but experienced similar difficulties with later Despite CARE having made the decision to move from procurement rounds. Recognising that levels of damage, emergency to self-recovery support in the first few weeks needs and capacities varied between households, CARE of the response the organisation (and its local partners) also provided conditional cash grants to be spent on was already committed to delivering its emergency shelter house repair or reconstruction, allowing households to programme. This, combined with shipping delays caused purchase materials or hire skilled labour, depending on by tropical storms in January, delayed significant scale-up their specific needs. This approach meant that families of the organisation’s self-recovery programme until three could prioritise how they spent the cash, and encouraged months after the typhoon (see Figure 1). local processing of fallen coconut timber.6 Different needs, different solutions Logistics Both CARE and Habitat initially provided the same package As with other agencies, both CARE and Habitat experienced of assistance to all selected families. However, the success transportation challenges in the first few weeks and months of self-recovery programmes is dependent on the level of of the response. The transportation and distribution of damage and the capacity of each household to use the construction materials was also more difficult than tents assistance provided. CARE’s partners brought valuable or tarpaulins due to their greater weight and volume. A expertise in mobilising communities to help the most THE TYPHOON HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE © IOM 2014 IOM ©

Distribution of shelter kits to typhoon survivors in Eastern Samar

6 Over 33 million coconut trees were destroyed in the storm and affected undamaged trees was a crucial task. See http://www.fao.org/ processing the fallen timber before it started to rot and pest infestation news/story/en/item/212957/icode.

Number 63 • January 2015 41 42 THE TYPHOON HAIYAN RESPONSE ihn uaiain raiain i ky o h efficient the to key is organisations factors humanitarian within common Typhoon of set following a that Habitat suggest however, Haiyan, and CARE The of challenges. experiences unique poses response disaster Every theory Fromto practice widened and kits. buildings the of beneficiaries direct the beyond uptake the of robustness the increased further have could partners local support of capacity-building technical and increased that however, found, also It buildings. safer to leading techniques, construction basic safer of implementation and knowledge of levels high in the communication of safer construction messages resulted and monitoring evaluation indicates that ProgrammeCARE’s comprehensive strategy for staff. technical partners’ its and CARE’s by monitoring frequent with period, two-month from a carpenters for advice technical two ongoing provide to and community each mobiliser community one of consisting teams’ ‘roving paid also CARE briefing technical the Tosupplement dance. and song including media other communities, and emphasised by staff printing on both T-shirts for and through standards minimum easy-to-remember provide to – roofing’ connections, bracing, ‘foundations, – provided by the whole Shelter Cluster into a four-point catchphrase the to guidance technical briefingssimplified community.CARE addition, In technical provided Habitat CARE and organisations, other Like safer techniques. of construction adoption and understanding communities both encourage with to working to approaches adopted organisations participatory both challenge this overcome To risks. other reducing money or time spending to compared the resilience of their houses to future disasters as a priority families – who may disaster-affectedor may not view investment in with increasing but not organisation lies assisting safer the with back building for responsibility the where is particularly difficult in self-recovery programmes, however, back safer’ and reduce vulnerability to future disasters. This ‘build to disaster a by created opportunity’ of ‘window the using advocate practitioners and policymakers Academics, construction Safer phase. earlier the from donor same the of support the with households, cash ‘top-up’ additional an vulnerable particularly 4,300 to grantsupport technical and provided also CARE Panay. into Leyte from programme its expanded organisation the when materials ratherthan cash in assistance of proportion construction for materials following markets were being re-established CARE provided that purchased a greater Recognising or typhoon. agencies, the other or Habitat by donated materials additional with home pre-disaster their to from materials families salvaged combining enabled by rebuilding continue This household. each to labour and materials ‘top-up’of a package bespoke providingprojecta develop to donor flexible small, a with worked Habitat need of damage and lack of local capacity to recover. To meet this levels high extremely the to due construction to with continue order in support realised additional needed Habitat families many Guiuan, that In recovery. shelter achieve to families for sufficient not was support their cases, some in that, found organisations both nonetheless but vulnerable, HUMANITARIAN exchange also experienced in working with communities, community- community- communities, with working in experienced also were organisations Both required. scale and speed the at adopt and to implement organisation a mixed the material/cash-based enabled approach cooperatives and NGOs familiar local with of partnerships existing package CARE’s materials. appropriate construction an identified organisation rapidly the that meant housing Philippines the post-disaster in and processes pre- of knowledge Habitat’s knowledge Local families. affected to assistance technical provide and responses organisations appropriate identify both to enabled which levels, operational and strategic both at expertise construction and shelter financial as management, quality control and logistics. It also included such capabilities, humanitarian standard included self-recoveryprogrammes.deliverThis rapidly to capacity technical of levels high that had organisations meant both commitment Institutional post- shelter. to disaster approaches owner-driven support wherever to try possible organisations Both disaster operations. its response support to sectors, team emergency technical core dedicated a four with CARE’s of one is shelter capacity while settlements, and and housing on solely works Habitat commitment Sectoral context. the irrespectiveof self-recovery,shelter to support of provision effective and Reconstruction Advisor, seconded to CARE Philippines. Advisor,CARE Reconstruction to seconded Barritt Philip Humanity.for Habitat with partnership in London College Victoria Maynard policymakers donors. and organisations, implementing for practice and policy research,future of focus such the be should barriers Tackling conceptual. than rather institutional, are process recovery shelter own families’ affected support which approaches of adoption greater to barriers the that clear is it Haiyan, Typhoon following months six first the during Habitat and CARE of experience field the on Based zones. no-build in families to assistance ‘top-up’providingimplementing and programmesfunding), recovery additional or support on-going avoiding in made emergency than household be would savings that recognising and programmes shelter per costs up-front higher reallocating self-recovery to programmes(accepting funding emergency in donors their of responsive support this the take was to approach Habitat and the CARE to both of Critical ability needs. remaining pro- to ‘top-up’ respond to develop grammes to monitoring organisations ongoing both response prompted the in Later assistance. self-recovery assessment to emergency from initial switch the accelerating by its of findings the to responded CARE Flexibility issues. tenure and land to solutions local the negotiate and manage process distribution assistance, for to eligible government households local identify and organisations faith-based and a CR Itrainls hle and Shelter International’s CARE was is completing PhD research at University

Counter-terrorism laws and regulations: what aid agencies need to know Jessica Burniske, with Naz Modirzadeh and Dustin Lewis Network Paper 79 November 2014

Over the past two decades, states and inter-governmental bodies have adopted increasingly robust counter-terrorism laws and policies. At the same time, humanitarian crises in countries like Somalia, Mali and Syria have reaffirmed the continued importance of principled humanitarian action. Counter-terrorism laws and humanitarian action share several goals, including the prevention of attacks against civilians and of diversion of aid to armed actors. Yet tensions between these two

areas of law and policy have emerged in recent years, resulting in challenges for governments and HAIYANTYPHOON RESPONSE THE humanitarian actors alike.

States and members of the humanitarian community have increasingly engaged in dialogue on these issues, and efforts to address the many challenges posed by counter-terrorism law are under way. Despite this progress, and despite the significant need for humanitarian assistance among the civilian populations concerned, the threat of harm or criminal liability has caused many humanitarian actors to curb or halt some of their work in certain regions. Some of these challenges may become more complicated as crises become more pressing. Already, there is evidence of this complexity in the Gaza Strip, Somalia, Mali and Syria. These conflicts raise considerable challenges for humanitarian actors, especially those seeking to operate in areas controlled by listed armed groups. Humanitarian actors should be aware of the challenges that may arise when counter- terrorism law intersects with humanitarian action in these quickly evolving environments.

This Network Paper provides a brief primer on counter-terrorism measures and an overview of some of the most salient questions that humanitarian actors are grappling with in planning effective, principled and lawful operations in high-risk environments. It outlines the legal bases for both counter-terrorism law and humanitarian action, discusses the challenges and possible consequences of legislation for humanitarian actors, discusses some of the key challenges anti- terrorism laws and regulations pose to humanitarian action, and sets out some questions and approaches humanitarian actors may wish to consider when facing these challenges.

Number 63 • January 2015 43 Humanitarian Practice Network

The Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) is an independent forum where field workers, managers and policymakers in the humanitarian sector share information, analysis and experience. HPN’s aim is to improve the performance of humanitarian action by contributing to individual and institutional learning. HPN’s activities include: • A series of specialist publications: Humanitarian Exchange magazine, Network Papers and Good Practice Reviews. • A resource website at www.odihpn.org. • Occasional seminars and workshops bringing together practitioners, policymakers and analysts. HPN’s members and audience comprise individuals and organisations engaged in humanitarian action. They are in 80 countries worldwide, working in northern and southern NGOs, the UN and other multilateral agencies, governments and donors, academic institutions and consultancies. HPN’s publications are written by a similarly wide range of contributors. HPN’s institutional location is the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), an independent think tank on humanitarian and development policy. HPN’s publications are researched and written by a wide range of individuals and organisations, and are published by HPN in order to encourage and facilitate knowledge-sharing within the sector. The views and opinions expressed in HPN’s publications do not necessarily state or reflect those of the Humanitarian Policy Group or the Overseas Development Institute. Funding support is provided through the HPG Integrated Programme by the Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the British Red Cross, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD), the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Denmark, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Netherlands, Oxfam GB, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), World Vision International, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) (USAID), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Norway, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) UK and Irish Aid. This edition of Humanitarian Exchange was edited by Wendy Fenton and Matthew Foley. Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) Overseas Development Institute 203 Blackfriars Road London, SE1 8NJ United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0)20 7922 0300 Fax: +44 (0)20 7922 0399 HPN e-mail: [email protected] HPN website: http://www.odihpn.org Typesetting Design To Print Solutions Limited Printed and bound in the UK by Charlesworth. ISSN: 1472-4847 © Overseas Development Institute, London, 2015.