4 February 2010

The Sri Lankan Election and Tamil Politics after the LTTE

- Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe

Summary

The defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009 has given vital democratic space for previously suppressed and sidelined Tamil political parties to meaningfully engage in the democratic process. As such, the political landscape for Tamils has changed dramatically over the last six months in particular, which has seen a new energy and optimism emerge among Tamil leaders in , eager to make headway in restoring normality and rebuilding their society. The presidential election of 26 January 2010 represented an important step in that process, not least because the two leading candidates, incumbent President Mahinda Rajapakse and former Chief of the Sri Lankan Army, General Sarath Fonseksa, were the driving forces of the successful campaign against the LTTE.

End of the LTTE-Era

Arguably, the defeat of the LTTE has ended the darkest and bloodiest era in Sri Lanka’s post- independence history, but in its wake a void has been left in Tamil politics. The intolerance of the LTTE to the democratic process and of dissident Tamil opinion saw it spearhead a sustained campaign to eliminate rival Tamil alternatives within the political spectrum. In fact, from 1975 to 2008, at least 56 Tamil leaders are believed to have been killed. According to SC Chandrahasan, the son of revered Tamil leader, the late SJV Chelvanayakam (who founded the Federal Party and remained a dedicated practitioner of non-violent politics):

‘Killing persons articulating voices opposed to the LTTE was one of the greatest wrongs the LTTE did. It not only eliminated many experienced and talented leaders, it also prevented many up and coming people from contributing to the cause of the Tamil-speaking people of . This is one of the reasons which prevented the LTTE from becoming a popular movement. The struggle for Tamil rights should be seen separately.’

Estimates vary markedly as to how many rival Tamils the LTTE eliminated throughout the conflict. According to Thirunavakkarasu Sritharan, leader of the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front-Naba (EPRLF-Naba), the figure is estimated at between 13,000-18,000. However, Dharmalingam Siddharthan, the leader of the Peoples Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) claims the figure is closer to 10,000, whereas the University Teachers

for Human Rights- (UTHR-J) refers to over 8,000 Tamils killed by the LTTE up to December 2008.

Tamil Politics since May 2009

Among Sri Lanka’s main Tamil parties, there were contrasting opinions with regard to the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009. Certainly, the four Tamil constituents within the coalition government led by President Mahinda Rajapakse, the United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA), maintained their solidarity. The Tamil parties allied to the UPFA included the Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC), Up-Country Peoples Front (UPF), Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) and Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP). In addition, the Democratic (DTNA), which is an influential conglomeration of three anti-LTTE parties (consisting of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front-Naba (EPRLF-Naba) and People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE)), endorsed the outcome. In fact, the EPRLF-Naba Secretary Thirunavakkarasu Sritharan asserted: ‘President Rajapaksa will go down in Sri Lanka’s political history as the leader who ended the fascist violent culture in the country.’ The leader of PLOTE, Dharmalingam Siddharthan, affirmed that:

‘We welcome a new era, the reintroduction of democracy and pluralism to the northeast. The LTTE is finally defeated. Democracy and pluralism were long denied to the Tamil community. They [the LTTE] failed to understand the political reality that a separatist state for Tamils was unattainable.’

On the other hand, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), a loose confederation of four influential pro-LTTE parties formed in 2001 through LTTE endorsement and consisting of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), Federal Party and Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front-Suresh (EPRLF-Suresh), largely denounced the government’s victory and rejected conciliatory overtures to meet with President Rajapakse, although some TNA MPs met on an individual basis.

Ordinary Tamil civilians, many of whom were accustomed to the balance of power wielded by the LTTE, received the defeat of the LTTE with a sense of contradiction. For most, there was a palpable sense of relief that the insurgency was over, but uncertainty for the future dominated their concerns, especially in how the Sri Lankan Government would potentially use its new found strength. This sentiment was perhaps best encapsulated by N Suntharesan, President of the Batticaloa District Chamber of Commerce and Industry, who stated to newspaper:

‘In one way we are really happy that the LTTE is finished. All these days, the successive governments accused the LTTE for being a stumbling block to any development or even power sharing. But now, with the LTTE no more in existence, we are waiting to see what is going to happen. The Tamil people feel that the victory has given the Government and especially the Armed Forces the upper hand, and they fear that this could be used against the Tamils, like in the 60s, 1977 and 1983 ethnic riots. They are worried that if the government military becomes more and more powerful, they do not have anybody with military power to counteract. I think with a proper development plan and a meaningful political package, this fear from the minds of the Tamils could be allayed soon.’

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These views were likely to have been spawned by the general uncertainty surrounding the fate of nearly 300,000 Tamil refugees who required urgent humanitarian attention. Legitimate concerns over the length of time for screening and resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) roused suspicion about the government’s actual motives, however, these fears appear to have been placated when the majority of IDPs were allowed freedom of movement from October 2009 onwards. The general uncertainty and visible lack of improvement for the future may have influenced the results of the Northern Province’s first local government elections. In the Urban Council, a stronghold of the Democratic Peoples Liberation Front, an affiliate party of the PLOTE, lost to the TNA, which unexpectedly won by a narrow margin of 140 votes. In the Jaffna Municipal Council election, which was the first in 11 years, the EPDP allied to the UPFA won 13 seats and secured control of the Jaffna Municipal Council.

Although the Sri Lankan Government remained overly cautious after the defeat of the LTTE, it steadily relaxed its security posture, which was first demonstrated in May 2009, when it launched a major recruitment drive to recruit 2,000 Tamil speaking police constables in the Eastern Province. On 17 June 2009, The Island reported in the Batticaloa District that the police had 74 checkpoints, and in the Trincomalee District, along the Trincomalee-Habarana Road, checkpoints were reduced from 11 to two. However, by September the situation in the Eastern Province had markedly changed, as demonstrated by journalist R. Wijewardene:

‘To travel to Batticaloa through the emptiness beyond … the once fraught towns of Valaichchenai, Kiran and Eravur in the darkness – without fear or checkpoints is to experience, in a journey, the magnitude of the changes that have gripped this country over the past few months. A night time journey to Batticaloa has been impossible for almost three decades. Daylight reveals the full extent of the changes that have taken place in the town and the surrounding area … there is a relaxed, unthreatening air on the streets of Batticaloa that speaks volumes about its progress. The hair trigger tension of what has for decades been the least stable major town in the country outside of the peninsula is gone. The armed presence has diminished. Checkpoints are virtually non-existent – newly recruited Tamil officers now patrol the streets and people move freely at all times. Once forlorn bars, restaurants and hotels are crowded extraordinarily not with foreign visitors or NGO workers but with Sinhala businessmen and tourists. Scenes that have been unimaginable for years; scores of Sinhala day trippers from Polonnaruwa and Dambulla bathing in the placid waters at Passekuda – are now almost routine.’

Similarly, in the Northern Province the Sri Lankan Government took several months to restructure its security priorities. As such, in August 2009, the Sri Lanka Army appointed Major-General LBR Mark, an ethnic Tamil, to oversee Security Forces, Jaffna. In October 2009, the Sri Lanka Police began a major recruitment drive for the first time since 1979 to enlist 500 Tamil police constables from the Jaffna Peninsula to serve in the Northern Province. In November and December 2009, the Government announced that travelling outside Jaffna Peninsula and up-country regions no longer required security clearances. In November the Jaffna High Security Zone perimeter was reduced to enable unhindered civilian access. On 6 January 2010, the strategic A9 highway which links Jaffna to the south of Sri Lanka was finally opened to 24 hour unregulated civilian access. On 31 December 2009, the night time curfew in Jaffna was finally lifted. The demilitarisation of the Northern

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Province has enabled its reintegration into the island’s economy and society, as noted by the Bishop of Jaffna, Rev. Dr. Thomas Sundranayagam:

‘Jaffna is returning to normal. The A-9 road has been re-opened and civilians can now use the road. Lorries are daily bringing goods to Jaffna and also agricultural and fishing products are being sent to Colombo and other parts of the country. Commercial activities are taking place and the civilians are also very happy. They can now easily visit Colombo and other areas. People from the South also come to Jaffna. During the Thaipongal and New Year they witnessed a lot of people from South, visiting Jaffna; some of them were visiting the area for the first time.’

Although the military has expanded its strength since the defeat of the LTTE, the evidence suggests that by and large there is in fact a process of ongoing demilitarisation taking place throughout Sri Lanka. Clearly, the UPFA was hopeful that the speedy restoration of normality would translate into Tamil votes in the upcoming presidential election.

2010 Presidential Election

As Sri Lanka concluded its sixth presidential election, Mahinda Rajapakse emerged victorious to lead Sri Lanka for a second term. Although Rajapakse was tipped as the favoured candidate, there were expectations that the election would be a close contest since the emergence of General Sarath Fonseka – who had led the Sri Lanka Army to victory against the LTTE – as the joint opposition candidate. However, this was not to be and Rajapakse’s comfortable win over Fonseka (both of whom claimed to be the architects of that victory) has clearly demonstrated that his popularity, particularly among the Sinhalese electorate, has expanded considerably since he was first elected in 2005.

Rajapakse obtained 57 per cent or 6,015,934 votes, while Fonseka received 40 per cent or 4,173,185 votes. Although Fonseka refused to accept the final result, claiming the election was rigged, his stance is at odds with the Elections Commissioner and all independent election observers, which despite some incidents and shortcomings, was endorsed by the Campaign for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE), the Peoples Action for Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL), and the Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV). Also, the preliminary post-election report compiled by a five-member Commonwealth team led by the former Jamaican Foreign Minister KD Knight confirmed: ‘ballots were properly counted’ and ‘overall voting and counting have proceeded reasonably well in most areas.’

In a historical perspective, the significance of Rajapakse’s victory lies in the fact that no other Sri Lankan president has achieved a majority of 1.8 million votes or gained 57 per cent of the vote in running for a second term. As a result, Rajapakse has secured a strong mandate to follow through on his pledge to push through reforms in governance and to broker a political settlement (including constitutional reform) with the island’s Tamil minority. However, the fact that the majority of Tamils and Muslims voted for Fonseka is a clear indication that, despite the restoration of normality and the success of Rajapakse’s infrastructure development projects, especially in the Eastern Province, there are fissures along ethnic lines that require priority attention. According to political commentator Dayan Jayatilleka, who was also Sri Lanka’s former UN Ambassador: ‘[Rajapakse] has not yet resolved the state’s crisis of legitimacy at its periphery. There is no political consensus which cross-cuts ethnicity and runs from North to South, East to West. Thus, the crisis continues.’ Hence, if Rajapakse in the early part of his second term fails to address ethnic minority grievances, then in the long-term Sri Lanka may indeed face the prospect of an escalation in ethnic

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tensions and politically motivated violence. Such an outcome would further polarise the country and jeopardise its hard-won stability.

Furthermore, with the separatist insurgency over, the issues of governance, accountability and transparency have moved to the forefront of public interest, as amply demonstrated by Fonseka’s election platform, which promised to herald a new era of transparency, accountability and good governance. There is an implicit expectation among the ethnic Sinhalese who voted for Rajapakse, that his second term will augur a new era for Sri Lanka; one that is both different to and which consolidates on the achievements of his previous term. Realising the significance of the challenges that lie ahead, especially in achieving national consensus in addressing ethnic minority grievances, Rajapakse will need to make headway in the lead up to the Parliamentary Elections in April to exploit his popularity and to also inflict further damage to an Opposition reeling in disarray. Sri Lanka’s main Opposition party, the (UNP) has lost every Presidential contest since 1994 - although it has won one Parliamentary Election.

If the recent trends are anything to go by, it is not hard to fathom why the majority of Sinhalese voters opted to vote for Rajapakse. Starting with Fonseka himself, there was a strong underlying sense that his main motivation was based on his anathema for the Rajapakse family. Indeed, this was also the case with his coalition supporters who were likewise driven by antipathy towards the Rajapakse family. In addition, Fonseka’s coalition was in itself a paradox made up of parties and personalities with strongly divergent and clashing interests. As such, it became increasingly apparent that the opposition lacked internal cohesion and if Fonseka, a political newcomer, did in fact succeed to become President, his disparate coalition government is likely to have encountered serious internal turmoil. For instance, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), an ultra-nationalist Sinhalese party, has consistently opposed concessions to the Tamils; while the ultra-nationalist pro- LTTE Tamil National Alliance, Sri Lanka’s largest Tamil party, has not renounced its endorsement of secessionism and even publically paid tribute to the LTTE in the lead up to the election.

In this context, the stability and leadership that Rajapakse offered bolstered his advantage, especially since he has delivered on major infrastructure development and is also credited with the defeat of the LTTE. Clearly, this transpired in the official results tally when Fonseka was trounced, winning only six electoral districts. Hence, there is increasing doubt as to whether a unified coalition will indeed exist at the upcoming Parliamentary Elections, as there are indications that the UNP is now gearing up to go it alone without Fonseka – who is interested in contesting for a seat in Parliament. Rajapakse is at the height of his power and influence and is in an unprecedented position to herald much-needed change in good governance and bring about political and constitutional reform, which will arguably be the most crucial test of his leadership in a country which is now at a crossroads phase in its post- civil war history.

India’s Posture

In the aftermath of the defeat of the LTTE, India’s stance towards the TNA reveals that it is seeking a settlement to the problem in Sri Lanka with the full implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment to ensure stability on its strategically important southern periphery. Hence, the TNA position is increasingly at odds with India’s foreign policy interests towards Sri Lanka. Since the pro-LTTE parties were routed in India’s Lok Sabha parliamentary elections in April-May 2009, India has made subtle gestures to influence the Tamil vote and has voiced its disapproval of the TNA election platform.

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Initially, in July 2009 when Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi told the Tamil Nadu Assembly: ‘US President Barack Obama changed the compulsion that only a white-skinned person can rule US. And the day is not far off when a Tamil will rule Sri Lanka.’ He also cautioned Tamil Nadu politicians making provocative remarks: ‘This is not a conflict between the governments of Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka…If we end up saying something against the Sinhalese community, it will only affect the Tamils there.’ Similarly, BBC Sinhala reported that M Karunanidhi told the same Tamil Nadu State Assembly that Tamil Eelam or a ‘separate country [is] unrealistic’ and only by working with Rajapakse could a solution be fostered. He also rebuked calls for a war crimes investigation on the grounds that it would be counter-productive. Hence, by this statement M. Karunanidhi signalled that his party, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhigam, a key ally of Congress, was comfortable with Rajapakse and the Thirteenth Amendment was its preferred solution. In fact, as the Times of India reported, M. Karunanidhi categorically affirmed this position: ‘Only this is possible, not Tamil Eelam.’ This posture was reinforced in January 2010 by Dr. Subramaniam Swamy, the Janata Party leader in Tamil Nadu, who urged Tamils to vote for President Rajapakse if they wanted more Indian support. Certainly, India is taking a tougher line with the TNA as seen in December 2009 when access was denied to TNA MP and staunch pro-LTTE advocate MK Sivajilingam to visit Chennai (Madras), capital of Tamil Nadu state. According to the Sunday Times , an anonymous Indian diplomatic source mentioned that India would reconsider its view of the TNA ‘only if the alliance brings clarity to its political vision.’

Where Tamil opinion is concerned, the most important outcome of the election according to Dayan Jayatilleka is that:

‘Tamil has to demonstrably break from the LTTE and “Prabhakanism” and from the secessionist goal. The Sri Lankan state would naturally feel it is unsafe to consider as a peace partner and an ally in nation-building, a party or formation which failed to arrive at a consensus with it on these issues. Public opinion could be reluctant to fully devolve power to such an entity.’

Previously, the LTTE flourished in a markedly different geopolitical environment, which at the time was conducive to a separatist insurgency. Today, the situation is dramatically different and the competing regional interests of India, China and the West will almost certainly make the TNA federalist/separatist platform increasingly at odds with the region’s evolving political dynamics.

About the author: Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe is an analyst who has published widely on South Asian and Indian Ocean political and security issues.

This SAP is a revised and expanded version of the original which was first published as ‘The Road to Normalcy’ in The Diplomat, (January, 2010).

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