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The Sri Lankan Election and Tamil Politics After the LTTE

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The Sri Lankan Election and Tamil Politics After the LTTE 4 February 2010 The Sri Lankan Election and Tamil Politics after the LTTE - Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe Summary The defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009 has given vital democratic space for previously suppressed and sidelined Tamil political parties to meaningfully engage in the democratic process. As such, the political landscape for Tamils has changed dramatically over the last six months in particular, which has seen a new energy and optimism emerge among Tamil leaders in Sri Lanka, eager to make headway in restoring normality and rebuilding their society. The presidential election of 26 January 2010 represented an important step in that process, not least because the two leading candidates, incumbent President Mahinda Rajapakse and former Chief of the Sri Lankan Army, General Sarath Fonseksa, were the driving forces of the successful campaign against the LTTE. End of the LTTE-Era Arguably, the defeat of the LTTE has ended the darkest and bloodiest era in Sri Lanka’s post- independence history, but in its wake a void has been left in Tamil politics. The intolerance of the LTTE to the democratic process and of dissident Tamil opinion saw it spearhead a sustained campaign to eliminate rival Tamil alternatives within the political spectrum. In fact, from 1975 to 2008, at least 56 Tamil leaders are believed to have been killed. According to SC Chandrahasan, the son of revered Tamil leader, the late SJV Chelvanayakam (who founded the Federal Party and remained a dedicated practitioner of non-violent politics): ‘Killing persons articulating voices opposed to the LTTE was one of the greatest wrongs the LTTE did. It not only eliminated many experienced and talented leaders, it also prevented many up and coming people from contributing to the cause of the Tamil-speaking people of the island. This is one of the reasons which prevented the LTTE from becoming a popular movement. The struggle for Tamil rights should be seen separately.’ Estimates vary markedly as to how many rival Tamils the LTTE eliminated throughout the conflict. According to Thirunavakkarasu Sritharan, leader of the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front-Naba (EPRLF-Naba), the figure is estimated at between 13,000-18,000. However, Dharmalingam Siddharthan, the leader of the Peoples Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) claims the figure is closer to 10,000, whereas the University Teachers for Human Rights-Jaffna (UTHR-J) refers to over 8,000 Tamils killed by the LTTE up to December 2008. Tamil Politics since May 2009 Among Sri Lanka’s main Tamil parties, there were contrasting opinions with regard to the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009. Certainly, the four Tamil constituents within the coalition government led by President Mahinda Rajapakse, the United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA), maintained their solidarity. The Tamil parties allied to the UPFA included the Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC), Up-Country Peoples Front (UPF), Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) and Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP). In addition, the Democratic Tamil National Alliance (DTNA), which is an influential conglomeration of three anti-LTTE parties (consisting of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front-Naba (EPRLF-Naba) and People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE)), endorsed the outcome. In fact, the EPRLF-Naba Secretary Thirunavakkarasu Sritharan asserted: ‘President Rajapaksa will go down in Sri Lanka’s political history as the leader who ended the fascist violent culture in the country.’ The leader of PLOTE, Dharmalingam Siddharthan, affirmed that: ‘We welcome a new era, the reintroduction of democracy and pluralism to the northeast. The LTTE is finally defeated. Democracy and pluralism were long denied to the Tamil community. They [the LTTE] failed to understand the political reality that a separatist state for Tamils was unattainable.’ On the other hand, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), a loose confederation of four influential pro-LTTE parties formed in 2001 through LTTE endorsement and consisting of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), Federal Party and Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front-Suresh (EPRLF-Suresh), largely denounced the government’s victory and rejected conciliatory overtures to meet with President Rajapakse, although some TNA MPs met on an individual basis. Ordinary Tamil civilians, many of whom were accustomed to the balance of power wielded by the LTTE, received the defeat of the LTTE with a sense of contradiction. For most, there was a palpable sense of relief that the insurgency was over, but uncertainty for the future dominated their concerns, especially in how the Sri Lankan Government would potentially use its new found strength. This sentiment was perhaps best encapsulated by N Suntharesan, President of the Batticaloa District Chamber of Commerce and Industry, who stated to The Nation newspaper: ‘In one way we are really happy that the LTTE is finished. All these days, the successive governments accused the LTTE for being a stumbling block to any development or even power sharing. But now, with the LTTE no more in existence, we are waiting to see what is going to happen. The Tamil people feel that the victory has given the Government and especially the Armed Forces the upper hand, and they fear that this could be used against the Tamils, like in the 60s, 1977 and 1983 ethnic riots. They are worried that if the government military becomes more and more powerful, they do not have anybody with military power to counteract. I think with a proper development plan and a meaningful political package, this fear from the minds of the Tamils could be allayed soon.’ Page 2 of 6 These views were likely to have been spawned by the general uncertainty surrounding the fate of nearly 300,000 Tamil refugees who required urgent humanitarian attention. Legitimate concerns over the length of time for screening and resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) roused suspicion about the government’s actual motives, however, these fears appear to have been placated when the majority of IDPs were allowed freedom of movement from October 2009 onwards. The general uncertainty and visible lack of improvement for the future may have influenced the results of the Northern Province’s first local government elections. In the Vavuniya Urban Council, a stronghold of the Democratic Peoples Liberation Front, an affiliate party of the PLOTE, lost to the TNA, which unexpectedly won by a narrow margin of 140 votes. In the Jaffna Municipal Council election, which was the first in 11 years, the EPDP allied to the UPFA won 13 seats and secured control of the Jaffna Municipal Council. Although the Sri Lankan Government remained overly cautious after the defeat of the LTTE, it steadily relaxed its security posture, which was first demonstrated in May 2009, when it launched a major recruitment drive to recruit 2,000 Tamil speaking police constables in the Eastern Province. On 17 June 2009, The Island reported in the Batticaloa District that the police had 74 checkpoints, and in the Trincomalee District, along the Trincomalee-Habarana Road, checkpoints were reduced from 11 to two. However, by September the situation in the Eastern Province had markedly changed, as demonstrated by The Sunday Leader journalist R. Wijewardene: ‘To travel to Batticaloa through the emptiness beyond … the once fraught towns of Valaichchenai, Kiran and Eravur in the darkness – without fear or checkpoints is to experience, in a journey, the magnitude of the changes that have gripped this country over the past few months. A night time journey to Batticaloa has been impossible for almost three decades. Daylight reveals the full extent of the changes that have taken place in the town and the surrounding area … there is a relaxed, unthreatening air on the streets of Batticaloa that speaks volumes about its progress. The hair trigger tension of what has for decades been the least stable major town in the country outside of the peninsula is gone. The armed presence has diminished. Checkpoints are virtually non-existent – newly recruited Tamil officers now patrol the streets and people move freely at all times. Once forlorn bars, restaurants and hotels are crowded extraordinarily not with foreign visitors or NGO workers but with Sinhala businessmen and tourists. Scenes that have been unimaginable for years; scores of Sinhala day trippers from Polonnaruwa and Dambulla bathing in the placid waters at Passekuda – are now almost routine.’ Similarly, in the Northern Province the Sri Lankan Government took several months to restructure its security priorities. As such, in August 2009, the Sri Lanka Army appointed Major-General LBR Mark, an ethnic Tamil, to oversee Security Forces, Jaffna. In October 2009, the Sri Lanka Police began a major recruitment drive for the first time since 1979 to enlist 500 Tamil police constables from the Jaffna Peninsula to serve in the Northern Province. In November and December 2009, the Government announced that travelling outside Jaffna Peninsula and up-country regions no longer required security clearances. In November the Jaffna High Security Zone perimeter was reduced to enable unhindered civilian access. On 6 January 2010, the strategic A9 highway which links Jaffna to the south of Sri Lanka was finally opened to 24 hour unregulated civilian access. On 31 December 2009, the night time curfew in Jaffna was finally lifted. The demilitarisation of the Northern Page 3 of 6 Province has enabled its reintegration into the island’s economy and society, as noted by the Bishop of Jaffna, Rev. Dr. Thomas Sundranayagam: ‘Jaffna is returning to normal. The A-9 road has been re-opened and civilians can now use the road. Lorries are daily bringing goods to Jaffna and also agricultural and fishing products are being sent to Colombo and other parts of the country.
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