This View of Morality: Can an Evolutionary Perspective Reveal a Universal Morality? 1
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Reflections on the Evolution of Morality Christine M. Korsgaard
Reflections on the Evolution of Morality Christine M. Korsgaard Harvard University1 All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward – this is what I call the internalization of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his “soul.” The entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquiring depth, breadth, and height, in the same measure as outward discharge was inhibited. - Nietzsche 1. Introduction In recent years there has been a fair amount of speculation about the evolution of morality, among scientists and philosophers alike. From both points of view, the question how our moral nature might have evolved is interesting because morality is one of the traditional candidates for a distinctively human attribute, something that makes us different from the other animals. From a scientific point of view, it matters whether there are any such attributes because of the special burden they seem to place on the theory of evolution. Beginning with Darwin’s own efforts in The Descent of Man, defenders of the theory of evolution have tried to show either that there are no genuinely distinctive human attributes – that is, that any differences between human beings and the other animals are a matter of degree – or that apparently distinctive human attributes can be explained in terms of the 1 Notes on this version are incomplete. Recommended supplemental reading: “The Activity of Reason,” APA Proceedings November 09, pp. 30-38. In a way, these papers are companion pieces, or at least their final sections are. -
Evolution and Ethics 2
It is still disputed, however, why moral behavior extends beyond a close circle of kin and reciprocal relationships: e.g., most people think stealing from anyone is wrong, not just stealing from family and friends. For moral behavior to evolve as we understand it today, there likely had to be selective pressures that pushed people to disregard their own 1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/10/11/evolution- interests in favor of their group’s interest.[3] Exactly and-ethics/ how morality extended beyond this close circle is debated, with many theories under consideration.[4] Evolution and Ethics 2. What Should We Do? Author: Michael Klenk Suppose our ability to understand and apply moral Category: Ethics, Philosophy of Science rules, as typically understood, can be explained by Word Count: 999 natural selection. Does evolution explain which rules We often follow what are considered basic moral we should follow?[5] rules: don’t steal, don’t lie, help others when we can. Some answer, “yes!” “Greed captures the essence of But why do we follow these rules, or any rules the evolutionary spirit,” says the fictional character understood as “moral rules”? Does evolution explain Gordon Gekko in the 1987 film Wall Street: “Greed why? If so, does evolution have implications for … is good. Greed is right.”[6] which rules we should follow, and whether we genuinely know this? Gekko’s claims about what is good and right and what we ought to be comes from what he thinks we This essay explores the relations between evolution naturally are: we are greedy, so we ought to be and morality, including evolution’s potential greedy. -
Redalyc.The New Science of Moral Cognition: the State of The
Anales de Psicología ISSN: 0212-9728 [email protected] Universidad de Murcia España Olivera-La Rosa, Antonio; Rosselló, Jaume The new science of moral cognition: the state of the art Anales de Psicología, vol. 30, núm. 3, septiembre-diciembre, 2014, pp. 1122-1128 Universidad de Murcia Murcia, España Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=16731690011 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative anales de psicología, 2014, vol. 30, nº 3 (octubre), 1122-1128 © Copyright 2014: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Murcia. Murcia (España) http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/analesps.30.3.166551 ISSN edición impresa: 0212-9728. ISSN edición web (http://revistas.um.es/analesps): 1695-2294 The new science of moral cognition: the state of the art Antonio Olivera-La Rosa1,2* y Jaume Rosselló1,3 1 Human Evolution and Cognition Group (IFISC-CSIC), University of the Balearic Islands, 07122 Palma de Mallorca (Spain) 2 Faculty of Psychology and Social Sciences. Fundación Universitaria Luis Amigó, Medellín (Colombia) 3 Department of Psychology, University of the Balearic Islands, 07122 Palma de Mallorca (Spain) Título: La nueva ciencia de la cognición moral: estado de la cuestión. Abstract: The need for multidisciplinary approaches to the scientific study Resumen: La necesidad de realizar aproximaciones multidisciplinares al of human nature is a widely supported academic claim. This assumption estudio de la naturaleza humana es ampliamente aceptada. -
Disgust: Evolved Function and Structure
Psychological Review © 2012 American Psychological Association 2013, Vol. 120, No. 1, 65–84 0033-295X/13/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0030778 Disgust: Evolved Function and Structure Joshua M. Tybur Debra Lieberman VU University Amsterdam University of Miami Robert Kurzban Peter DeScioli University of Pennsylvania Brandeis University Interest in and research on disgust has surged over the past few decades. The field, however, still lacks a coherent theoretical framework for understanding the evolved function or functions of disgust. Here we present such a framework, emphasizing 2 levels of analysis: that of evolved function and that of information processing. Although there is widespread agreement that disgust evolved to motivate the avoidance of contact with disease-causing organisms, there is no consensus about the functions disgust serves when evoked by acts unrelated to pathogen avoidance. Here we suggest that in addition to motivating pathogen avoidance, disgust evolved to regulate decisions in the domains of mate choice and morality. For each proposed evolved function, we posit distinct information processing systems that integrate function-relevant information and account for the trade-offs required of each disgust system. By refocusing the discussion of disgust on computational mechanisms, we recast prior theorizing on disgust into a framework that can generate new lines of empirical and theoretical inquiry. Keywords: disgust, adaptation, evolutionary psychology, emotion, cognition Research concerning disgust has expanded in recent years (Ola- selection pressure driving the evolution of the disgust system, but tunji & Sawchuk, 2005; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2009), and there has been less precision in identifying the selection pressures contemporary disgust researchers generally agree that an evolu- driving the evolution of disgust systems unrelated to pathogen tionary perspective is necessary for a comprehensive understand- avoidance (e.g., behavior in the sexual and moral domains). -
Past and Present Environments
Journal of Evolutionary Psychology, 2011, 275-278 DOI: 10.1556/JEP.9.2011.3.5 PAST AND PRESENT ENVIRONMENTS A review of Decision Making: Towards an Evolutionary Psychology of Rationality, by Mauro Maldonato. Sussex Academic Press (2010), 121 pages, $32.50. ISBN: 978-1-84519-421-5 (paperback) 1 2 CHELSEA ROSS AND ANDREAS WILKE Department of Psychology, Clarkson University In his book, Maldonato provides a thoughtful look at how early scholars viewed de- cision-making and rationality. He takes the reader on an illustrative journey through the historic passages of decision-making all the way to modern notions of a more limited rationality and how humans can make choices under risk and uncertainty. He discusses Kahneman and Tversky’s seminal work on heuristics and biases— “short cuts” that rely on little information and modest cognitive resources that sometimes lead to persistent failures, but usually allow the decision-maker to make fast and fairly reliable choices. Herbert Simon and Gerd Gigerenzer’s work on bounded rationality is discussed, with respect to its influence on decision-making research in economics and psychology. For Maldonato, the principle of bounded ra- tionality—that organisms have limited resources, such as time, information, and cognitive capacity with which to find solutions to the problems they face—is a key insight to understanding the evolution of decision-making. Maldonato proposes that evolutionary pressures urged the human mind to adopt a primitive decision-making process. For the purpose of survival, the majority of human choices had to be made by means of simple and fast decision strategies, because the decision-making system developed under general human cognitive limitations and from environmental pressures that selected for decision strategies suited for the harsh ancestral living environments as well as the resources at hand. -
The Evolution of Animal Play, Emotions, and Social Morality: on Science, Theology, Spirituality, Personhood, and Love
WellBeing International WBI Studies Repository 12-2001 The Evolution of Animal Play, Emotions, and Social Morality: On Science, Theology, Spirituality, Personhood, and Love Marc Bekoff University of Colorado Follow this and additional works at: https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/acwp_sata Part of the Animal Studies Commons, Behavior and Ethology Commons, and the Comparative Psychology Commons Recommended Citation Bekoff, M. (2001). The evolution of animal play, emotions, and social morality: on science, theology, spirituality, personhood, and love. Zygon®, 36(4), 615-655. This material is brought to you for free and open access by WellBeing International. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of the WBI Studies Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Evolution of Animal Play, Emotions, and Social Morality: On Science, Theology, Spirituality, Personhood, and Love Marc Bekoff University of Colorado KEYWORDS animal emotions, animal play, biocentric anthropomorphism, critical anthropomorphism, personhood, social morality, spirituality ABSTRACT My essay first takes me into the arena in which science, spirituality, and theology meet. I comment on the enterprise of science and how scientists could well benefit from reciprocal interactions with theologians and religious leaders. Next, I discuss the evolution of social morality and the ways in which various aspects of social play behavior relate to the notion of “behaving fairly.” The contributions of spiritual and religious perspectives are important in our coming to a fuller understanding of the evolution of morality. I go on to discuss animal emotions, the concept of personhood, and how our special relationships with other animals, especially the companions with whom we share our homes, help us to define our place in nature, our humanness. -
Information Systems Theorizing Based on Evolutionary Psychology: an Interdisciplinary Review and Theory Integration Framework1
Kock/IS Theorizing Based on Evolutionary Psychology THEORY AND REVIEW INFORMATION SYSTEMS THEORIZING BASED ON EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEW AND THEORY INTEGRATION FRAMEWORK1 By: Ned Kock on one evolutionary information systems theory—media Division of International Business and Technology naturalness theory—previously developed as an alternative to Studies media richness theory, and one non-evolutionary information Texas A&M International University systems theory, channel expansion theory. 5201 University Boulevard Laredo, TX 78041 Keywords: Information systems, evolutionary psychology, U.S.A. theory development, media richness theory, media naturalness [email protected] theory, channel expansion theory Abstract Introduction Evolutionary psychology holds great promise as one of the possible pillars on which information systems theorizing can While information systems as a distinct area of research has take place. Arguably, evolutionary psychology can provide the potential to be a reference for other disciplines, it is the key to many counterintuitive predictions of behavior reasonable to argue that information systems theorizing can toward technology, because many of the evolved instincts that benefit from fresh new insights from other fields of inquiry, influence our behavior are below our level of conscious which may in turn enhance even more the reference potential awareness; often those instincts lead to behavioral responses of information systems (Baskerville and Myers 2002). After that are not self-evident. This paper provides a discussion of all, to be influential in other disciplines, information systems information systems theorizing based on evolutionary psych- research should address problems that are perceived as rele- ology, centered on key human evolution and evolutionary vant by scholars in those disciplines and in ways that are genetics concepts and notions. -
Morality Is for Choosing Sides
CHAPTER 18 Morality Is for Choosing Sides Peter DeScioli Robert Kurzban Why did moral judgment evolve? To help people choose sides when conflicts erupt within groups with complex coalitions and power hierarchies. Theories of inorality have largely tried to ex What, then, might be the benefits gained plain the brighter side of behavior, answer tl1rough moral judgn1e11ts? Consider a situ i11g questio11s about wl1y people behave ii1 atio11 in wl1ich a perso11 accuses so1neo11e of ways that are kind, generous, and good. Our witchcraft, such as in Arthur Miller's The proposal focuses not on explaining n1oral Crucible. Specifically, suppose tl1at a you11g, behavior but, rather, on explaining inoral low-status wo1na11 accuses an older, more judgn1ent. Co11sider son1eone readi11g a pron1i11ent wo111an of witchcraft. Other news story abot1t a rnan who pays a woman members of the commt1nity can respond in to have sex with him. Many people wot1ld a few different ways. judge-in an intuitive way (Haidt, 2012) One obviot1s move for a self-interested that both the man's and woman's actions are observer is to curry favor with the higher n1orally wrong. O t1r interest lies in the ex status wornan. Choosing sides based on sta planation for these and similar judgments. tus often occurs in very hierarchical groups Theories that atte1npt to explain moral such as tl1e inilitary (Fiske, 1992). It is also behavior often point to altruism or benefits observed i11 11onl1uma11 ani111als: For i11- (de Waal, 1996; Krebs, 2005; Ridley, 1996; stance, hyenas join fights and st1pport the Wright, 1994). The theory of reciprocal al higher-statt1s and more formidable fighter truism (Trivers, 1971), for instance, explains (Holekamp, Sakai, & Lt1ndriga11, 2007). -
How Morality Evolved Doug Mann
HANNAH WALLACE: CRISIS IN TURKISH EDUCATION CELEBRATING REASON AND HUMANITY February/March 2019 Vol. 39 No. 2 HOW MORALITY EVOLVED DOUG MANN LINDA KAY KLEIN Dissects the Christian Purity Movement F/M 17 $5.95 CDN $5.95 US $5.95 Tom Flynn | Faisal Saeed Al Mutar 03 Robert M. Price | S. T. Joshi Poetry by Max Jacob Published by the Center for Inquiry in association 0 74470 74957 8 with the Council for Secular Humanism For many, mere atheism (the absence of belief in gods and the supernatural) or agnosticism (the view that such questions cannot be answered) aren’t enough. It’s liberating to recognize that supernatural beings are human creations … that there’s no such thing as “spirit” or “transcendence”… that people are undesigned, unintended, and responsible for themselves. But what’s next? Atheism and agnosticism are silent on larger questions of values and meaning. If Meaning in life is not ordained from on high, what small-m meanings can we work out among ourselves? If eternal life is an illusion, how can we make the most of our only lives? As social beings sharing a godless world, how should we coexist? For the questions that remain unanswered after we’ve cleared our minds of gods and souls and spirits, many atheists, agnostics, skeptics, and freethinkers turn to secular humanism. Secular. “Pertaining to the world or things not spiritual or sacred.” Humanism. “Any system of thought or action concerned with the interests or ideals of people … the intellectual and cultural movement … characterized by an emphasis on human interests rather than … religion.” — Webster’s Dictionary Secular humanism is a comprehensive, nonreligious life stance incorporating: A naturalistic philosophy A cosmic outlook rooted in science, and A consequentialist ethical system in which acts are judged not by their conformance to preselected norms but by their consequences for men and women in the world. -
Are Supernatural Beliefs Commitment Devices for Intergroup Conflict?
Are Supernatural Beliefs Commitment Devices For Intergroup Conflict? Robert Kurzban John Christner University of Pennsylvania Robert Kurzban Department of Psychology 3720 Walnut St. Philadelphia PA 19104 (215) 898‐4977 [email protected] Abstract. In a world of potentially fluid alliances in which group size is an important determinant of success in aggressive conflict, groups can be expected to compete for members. By the same token, individuals in such contexts can be expected to compete for membership in large, cohesive groups. In the context of this competition, the ability to signal that one cannot change groups can be a strategic advantage because members of groups would prefer to have loyal allies rather than confederates who might switch groups as conditions change. This idea might help to explain why members of certain kinds of groups, especially competitive ones, use marks, scars and other more or less permanent modifications of their bodies to signal their membership. To the extent that people with these marks have difficulty joining rival groups, these marks are effective in signaling one’s commitment. It is possible that the public endorsement of certain kinds of beliefs have the same effect as marks. In particular, there are certain beliefs which, when endorsed, might make membership difficult in all but one group. This idea is proposed as an explanation for supernatural beliefs. Are Supernatural Beliefs Commitment Devices? Arguably the most important political event of the albeit still young 21st century was a case of intergroup conflict in which supernatural beliefs played a pivotal role. The attack on the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington DC, and the foiled attack by the hijackers of United Airlines Flight 93 on September 11th, 2001, was motivated by intergroup conflict, but made possible in no small part because the perpetrators had beliefs about the afterlife. -
Evolutionary Genetics
Evolutionary Genetics Ruben C. Arslan & Lars Penke Institute of Psychology Georg August University Göttingen Forthcoming in D. M. Buss (Ed.), Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley. September 17, 2014 Corresponding author: Ruben C. Arslan Georg August University Göttingen Biological Personality Psychology and Psychological Assessment Georg Elias Müller Institute of Psychology Goßlerstr. 14 37073 Göttingen, Germany Tel.: +49 551 3920704 Email: [email protected] 1 Introduction When Charles Darwin developed the theory of evolution, he knew nothing about genetics. Hence, one of its biggest weaknesses was that Darwin had to base it on crude ideas of inheritance. Around the same time, Gregor Mendel discovered the laws of inheritance, but the scientific community initially failed to appreciate his work’s importance. It was only in the 1930’s that Dobzhansky, Fisher, Haldane, Wright, Mayr and others unified genetics and the theory of evolution in the ‘modern synthesis’. Still, the modern synthesis was built on a basic understanding of genetics, with genes merely being particulate inherited information. The basics of molecular genetics, like the structure of DNA, were not discovered until the 1950’s. When modern evolutionary psychology emerged from ethology and sociobiology in the late 1980’s, it had a strong emphasis on human universals, borne from both the assumption that complex adaptations are monomorphic (or sexually dimorphic) and have to go back to at least the last common ancestor of all humans, and the methodological proximity to experimental cognitive psychology, which tends to treat individual differences as statistical noise. As a consequence, genetic differences between people were marginalized in evolutionary psychology (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). -
The Weirdest People in the World?
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2010) 33, 61–135 doi:10.1017/S0140525X0999152X The weirdest people in the world? Joseph Henrich Department of Psychology and Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver V6T 1Z4, Canada [email protected] http://www.psych.ubc.ca/henrich/home.html Steven J. Heine Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver V6T 1Z4, Canada [email protected] Ara Norenzayan Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver V6T 1Z4, Canada [email protected] Abstract: Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world’s top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers – often implicitly – assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these “standard subjects” are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species – frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior – hence, there are no obvious a priori grounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation.