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Yemen 2020 OSAC Crime & Safety Report

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Yemen 2020 OSAC Crime & Safety Report This is an annual report produced in conjunction with the Regional Security Office of U.S. Embassy Sana’a, provisionally based at U.S. Embassy Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and known as the Yemen Affairs Unit (YAU). OSAC encourages travelers to use this report to gain baseline knowledge of security conditions in Yemen. For more in-depth information, review OSAC’s Yemen country page for original OSAC reporting, consular messages, and contact information, some of which may be available only to private-sector representatives with an OSAC password. Travel Advisory The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses Yemen at Level 4, indicating travelers should not travel to the country due to terrorism, civil unrest, health risks, kidnapping, armed conflict, and landmines. Review OSAC’s report, Understanding the Consular Travel Advisory System. Overall Crime and Safety Situation Now in its fifth year, Yemen’s civil conflict has exacerbated the world’s worst food security emergency and cholera epidemic, and engendered a war economy that further disadvantages the most vulnerable. The protracted war has drawn in neighboring states; it has led to collapsed state institutions, local power vacuums and ungoverned spaces that militias and terrorists are exploiting to threaten close regional allies. The war has complicated ongoing counterterrorism efforts and has provided Iran a space to pursue its own ambitions in Yemen, further threatening regional stability. Crime Threats The U.S. Department of State has assessed Yemen as being a CRITICAL-threat location for crime directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests. Due to the ongoing civil unrest throughout the country, travelers should not rely on assistance from local authorities. The current conflict has caused the deterioration and dislocation of Yemen’s security sector. The Houthis remain in control of much of Yemen’s traditional military infrastructure and weapons caches in the north. The Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) armed forces continue to reconstitute themselves, even as they fight the Houthis and an expanded AQAP presence, in partnership with the Saudi-led Coalition (SLC). The Fragile State Index ranks Yemen as the world’s most fragile state due to the ongoing conflict, resulting in an increased crime rate and a decrease in law enforcement. The instability created by Yemen’s security, economic, and social conditions has created a fertile environment for crime and corruption both in the areas controlled by the Houthis and the internationally recognized government. Despite the prevalence of checkpoints throughout the country, criminal activities such as kidnapping, petty theft, carjacking, scams, abuses, sexual harassment, assault, murder, violence, looting and robbery are increasing at an alarming rate. Although the law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, both continue to occur because most Yemenis working in law enforcement have not received salaries for several years or are paid very low salaries, fostering an environment ripe for corruption. Those in Houthi-controlled areas have accused U.S. citizens of being spies for the U.S. Government, subjecting them to strict surveillance and arbitrary detention. Detainees face torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment. Prison conditions are mostly harsh and life threatening, and do not meet international standards. Yemen 2020 OSAC Crime & Safety Report Burglaries and home invasions are becoming more and more common, especially in the areas of direct conflict. SLC airstrikes, Houthi mortar strikes, and direct confrontations among armed groups in engagement zones cause civilian deaths. In 2015, the SLC initiated an air campaign in support of the internationally recognized Yemeni government. A nationwide cessation of hostilities ended in 2016, and high levels of violence, to include armed conflict, artillery shelling, and air strikes, persist in areas throughout the country. Instability and ongoing threats in Yemen are at a severe level. Transportation-Safety Situation Travel by road in Yemen is risky. Although there are traffic officers everywhere, driving around Sana’a and all other Yemeni cities is extremely hazardous. Authorities do not enforce standard driving and traffic rules, and drivers mostly ignore the instructions and existence of traffic officers. It is common to see a person driving on the wrong side of the road or at high rates of speed. Vehicles mostly do not meet U.S. safety standards. Many vehicles lack proper lighting or mirrors and are unlicensed. If they exist, traffic lights may not be in working condition, and streetlights are often non-functioning due to a lack of electricity. Streets are crowded with motorcycles, which mostly are unlicensed and used as taxis; motorcyclists are often involved in accidents since they do not have dedicated lanes and drivers do not obey the traffic rules. It is common to find security checkpoints every 300 meters, which causes crowding on the streets. It is common to see underage drivers or heavy trucks moving in the main streets during the day. Street hazards include large potholes, which are widespread due to a lack of maintenance and unmarked speed bumps. Traveling on the roads between cities can be very dangerous due to carjacking and kidnapping, which mostly target foreigners; perpetrators often kill victims of carjacking and kidnapping. Traffic accidents are common due to a lack of obedience with basic traffic rules and poor vehicle maintenance. Drivers of all types of vehicles may drive under the influence of qat, considered a Schedule 1 narcotic in the U.S. Saudi Arabia has reinforced its concrete-filled security barrier along sections of the fully demarcated border with Yemen to stem illegal cross-border activities. Review OSAC’s reports, Road Safety Abroad, Driving Overseas: Best Practices, and Evasive Driving Techniques; and read the State Department’s webpage on driving and road safety abroad. Aviation Security The United States is concerned about the risk to civil aviation operating in specified areas of the Sana’a Flight Information Region (FIR) due to the ongoing military operations, political instability, and violence from competing armed groups involved in combat operations and other military-related activity. The FAA has prohibited U.S. civil aviation from flying in specific areas within the FIR. For more information, please review OSAC’s Report, Security in Transit: Airplanes, Public Transport, and Overnights. Yemen 2020 OSAC Crime & Safety Report Maritime Security Mariners planning travel to Yemen should check for U.S. maritime advisories and alerts on the MARAD website, the U.S. Coast Guard homeport website, and the NGA broadcast warnings website. Vessels in the region of the Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden, including near the island of Socotra, should operate under a heightened state of alert as increasing tensions in the region increase the potential for direct or collateral damage to vessels transiting the area. These threats may come from a variety of different sources such as missiles, projectiles, or waterborne improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Piracy in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean remains a security threat to maritime activities in the region. The United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) advises that elevated regional tensions have increased the risk of maritime attacks by extremists to vessels operating in the Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Bab el Mandeb regions. MARAD recommends vessels at anchor, operating in restricted maneuvering environments, or at slow speeds should be especially vigilant and report suspicious activity. U.S. flag vessels that observe suspicious activity in the area should report such suspicious activity or any hostile or potentially hostile action to the COMUSNAVCENT Battlewatch Captain at +973-1785-3879. Report all suspicious activities and events to the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center at 1-800-424-8802, 1-202-267-2675, or TDD 1-202-267- 4477. Review the Department of State’s International Maritime Piracy Fact Sheet and the MARAD advisory on vessels transiting high risk waters. Terrorism Threat The U.S. Department of State has assessed Yemen as being a CRITICAL-threat location for terrorism directed at or affecting official U.S. government interests. The threat posed by violent extremist groups in Yemen remains high. Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has expanded its influence in Yemen since the beginning of the conflict. Because of the instability and violence in Yemen, the internationally recognized government cannot effectively enforce counterterrorism measures and a large security vacuum persists. AQAP has benefitted from the conflict by significantly expanding its presence in the southern and eastern governorates. ISIS also has established a presence in Yemen, and has claimed responsibility for several deadly attacks throughout Yemen since 2016. Methods include suicide bombings, vehicle borne IEDs (VBIEDs), ambushes, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations. The U.S. government remains extremely concerned about possible attacks on U.S. citizens (whether visiting or residing in Yemen), U.S. private-sector facilities, and perceived U.S. and Western interests. Political, Economic, Religious, and Ethnic Violence The U.S. Department of State has assessed Yemen as being a CRITICAL-threat location for political violence
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