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Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 731 F

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Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 731 F Case 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS Document 13355 Filed 09/04/14 Page 1 of 153 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater * Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, * MDL 2179 on April 20, 2010, * * * SECTION J This Document Applies To: * * No. 10-2771, In re: The Complaint and Petition * JUDGE BARBIER of Triton Asset Leasing GmbH, et al. * * and * MAG. JUDGE SHUSHAN * No. 10-4536, United States of America v. BP * Exploration & Production, Inc., et al. * ——————————————————————————————————————— FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PHASE ONE TRIAL Case 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS Document 13355 Filed 09/04/14 Page 2 of 153 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), the Court enters these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relative to the Phase One trial. If any finding is in truth a conclusion of law, or if any conclusion stated is in truth a finding of fact, it shall be deemed so. The Court has also issued simultaneously with these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law a separate order ruling on various motions pertaining to the Phase One trial. CONTENTS I. Introduction and Procedural History ................................................................................. 5 II. Parties to the Phase One Trial ............................................................................................ 9 A. Defendants ........................................................................................................................ 9 i. The BP Entities ................................................................................................................ 9 ii. The Transocean Entities ................................................................................................. 10 iii. Halliburton ..................................................................................................................... 10 iv. Cameron and M-I ........................................................................................................... 10 B. Plaintiffs ......................................................................................................................... 11 C. Non-Parties to Phase One Trial ...................................................................................... 11 III. Substantive Findings of Fact .............................................................................................. 11 A. The DEEPWATER HORIZON ..................................................................................... 11 B. MC252 and the Macondo Well ...................................................................................... 13 C. Drilling the Macondo Well ............................................................................................ 15 i. Some Offshore Drilling Concepts .................................................................................. 15 ii. Drilling Operations at Macondo .................................................................................... 17 iii. Post-Drilling Operations: Production Casing and Temporary Abandonment ............... 20 D. Production Casing .......................................................................................................... 21 i. Long String Casing vs. Liner With Tieback .................................................................. 21 ii. Running the Production Casing ..................................................................................... 24 E. Overview of Cement Issues............................................................................................ 25 F. Cement Placement ............................................................................................................. 26 i. The Weatherford M45AP Float Collar .......................................................................... 26 ii. The Attempted Conversion of the Float Collar.............................................................. 28 iii. The Float Collar Did Not Convert ................................................................................. 34 2 Case 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS Document 13355 Filed 09/04/14 Page 3 of 153 iv. The Shoe Track Breached During the Attempted Float Collar Conversion .................. 37 v. Cement Was Pumped Through the Breach in the Shoe Track and Placed Improperly; Hydrocarbons Later Entered the Well Casing Through the Breach in the Shoe Track ........ 40 vi. The Court Is Not Persuaded by BP’s Theories Regarding Float Collar Conversion, Cement Placement, and Flow Path ....................................................................................... 43 vii. Cement Bond Log .......................................................................................................... 46 viii. M57B Sand .................................................................................................................... 50 G. Cement Composition ...................................................................................................... 51 i. Cementing Responsibilities ........................................................................................... 51 ii. The Cement Design for the Macondo Well ................................................................... 51 iii. Parties’ Arguments Regarding Cement Composition .................................................... 53 iv. The Cement Was Unstable, but Instability Did Not Cause the Blowout ....................... 55 H. Pressure Integrity Testing............................................................................................... 59 i. The Positive Pressure Test ............................................................................................ 59 ii. The Negative Pressure Test ........................................................................................... 60 iii. Responsibility for Misinterpretation of the Negative Pressure Test .............................. 65 iv. The “Bladder Effect” ..................................................................................................... 73 v. LCM Spacer ................................................................................................................... 75 I. Well Control During Final Displacement and the Blowout .............................................. 77 i. Well Control Responsibilities ........................................................................................ 77 ii. 8:00 p.m.: Final Displacement Commences .................................................................. 78 iii. 9:01-9:08: First Anomaly ............................................................................................... 80 iv. 9:08-9:14: The Sheen Test and the Second Anomaly .................................................... 81 v. 9:17: Pressure Spike ....................................................................................................... 82 vi. 9:31-9:38: The Transocean Drill Crew Fails to Timely Shut In the Well ..................... 83 vii. Actions by the Transocean Drill Crew Between 9:31 and 9:49 p.m., when the First Explosion Occurred. ............................................................................................................. 85 viii. Diversion to the Mud-Gas Separator ............................................................................. 86 ix. Simultaneous Operations Hindered Well Monitoring ................................................... 89 J. The BOP’s Automatic Functions: AMF and Autoshear .................................................... 90 i. Configuration of the HORIZON’s BOP ........................................................................ 90 ii. AMF and Autoshear ....................................................................................................... 94 iii. Improper Maintenance Prevented AMF from Closing the BSRs on April 20, 2010. .... 95 iv. The BSRs Would Have Sealed the Well if AMF Had Functioned ................................ 97 v. Responsibility for BOP Maintenance ............................................................................ 98 3 Case 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS Document 13355 Filed 09/04/14 Page 4 of 153 vi. The BSRs Partially Closed, but Did Not Seal, on April 22, 2010, When the Autoshear Plunger Was Cut ................................................................................................................. 100 vii. The Configuration of the BOP Was Not Unreasonable or Not Causal ........................ 101 K. Actions by the Marine Crew ........................................................................................ 102 i. EDS and the Master’s Overriding Authority ............................................................... 102 ii. Other Actions by the HORIZON’s Crew Following the Explosions .......................... 107 L. Alarm Systems and Rig Maintenance .......................................................................... 110 i. General Alarm, Emergency Shut Down, and Other Alarms ........................................ 110 ii. Rig Maintenance .......................................................................................................... 110 M. Process Safety .............................................................................................................. 111 IV. Conclusions of Fact and Law .......................................................................................... 112 A. Jurisdiction ..................................................................................................................
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