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-J Bloody Beaches: The Marines at Peleliu by Brigadier General Gordon D. Gayle, USMC (Ret)

n D-Day 15 September 1944, five infantry bat- talions of the 1st Ma- rine Division's 1st, 5th, and 7th Marines, in amphibian tractors (LVTs) lumbered across 600-800 yards of coral reef fringingsmoking,reportedly smashed Peleliu in the Palau Island group and toward five selected land- ing beaches. That westward anchor of the 1,000-mile-long Caroline ar- chipelago was viewed by some U.S. planners as obstacles, or threats, to continued advances against Japan's Pacific empire. The Marines in the LVTs had been told that their commanding general, Major General William H. Rupertus, believed that the operation would be tough, but quick, in large part be- cause of the devastating quantityand quality of naval gunfire and dive bombing scheduled to precede their assault landing. On some minds were the grim images of their sister 2d Ma- rine Division's bloody assault across the reefs at Tarawa, many months earlier. But 1st Division Marines, peering over the gunwales of their landing craft saw an awesome scene of blasting and churning earth along the shore. Smoke, dust, and the geys- ers caused by exploding bombsand large-caliber naval shells gave op-timists some hope that the defenderssurviving strongpoints or weapons would become casualties from suchwhich appeared at the beach as the On the Cover: "Down from Bloodypreparatoryfires;at worst,theyfollowing troops landed. And just Ridge Too Late. He's Finished —Washedwould be too stunned to respondahead of the armored tractors, as the Up—Gone As we passed sick bay, stillquickly and effectivelytothenaval gunfire lifted toward deeper in the shell hole, it was crowded with hundreds of on-rushing Marinestargets, flew a line of U.S. Navy wounded, and somehow hushed in theabout to land in their midst. fighter aircraft, strafing north and evening light. I noticed a tattered Marine Just ahead of the first wave ofsouth along the length of the beach standing quietly by a corpsman, staringtroops carrying LVTs was a wave ofdefenses,paralleltotheassault stiffly at nothing. His mind had crum- armored amphibian tractors (LVTAs)waves,tryingto keepall beach bled in battle, his jaw hung, and his eyes defenders subdued and intimidated were like two black empty holes inhis mounting 75mm howitzers. They head." Caption by the artist, Tom Lea.were tasked to take under fire anyas the Marines closed thedefenses.

1 The Divisions and their Commanders

he Peleliu operation was to be conducted by two divisions, one Marine and one Army. In the Pacific area since mid-1942, the 1st Marine Division was a veteran, combat-tested organization which launched the first offensive landing in the Pacific War when it attacked Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942. After a period in Austra- lia of rest, recuperation, and training of newly joined Ma- rines, the division made its second amphibious assault on 26 December 1943 at Cape Gloucester on New Britain Is- land. When the division landed on Peleliu, its regiments (1st, 5th, and 7th Marines, all infantry, and 11th Marines, artillery) contained officers and enlisted Marine veterans of both landings as well as new troops. Before World War II ended, the 1st Division was to participate in one last bat- tle, the landing on Okinawa. Major General William H. Rupertus, the 1st Division commander, had been with the division since early 1942. As a brigadier general, he was the assistant division com- mander to Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift during the Guadalcanal campaign. He took command of the divi- sion for the Cape Gloucester operation. General Rupertus was commissioned in 1913 and served as commander of a Marine ship's detachment in World War I. During subse- quent years, he was assigned duty in Haiti and China. Fol- lowing the Peleliu campaign, he was named Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico. General Ruper- tus died of a heart attack on 25 March 1945, while still on active duty. MajGen William H. Rupertus

The Army's 81st Infantry Division—theWildcats —wasIt saw action in France at the Meuse-Argonne in World War formed in August 1917 at Camp Jackson, South Carolina.I, and was deactivated following the end of the war. The division was reactivated in June 1942. It went to several MajGen Paul I. Mueller USA Pacific training bases before its first combat assignment, the landing on Angaur. After securing Angaur, it relieved units of the 1st Marine Division on Peleliu. When Peleliu was secured, the Wildcats began training for Operation Olympic—the assault on Japan proper. The Japanese sur- rendered unconditionally after suffering two atomic bomb attacks. As a result, instead of invading Japan, the 81st oc- cupied it. On 10 January, the 81st Infantry Division was once more deactivated. Major General Paul J. Mueller, USA, the commander of the 81st Division, was a graduate of the famous West Point Class of 1915. He commanded an infantry battalion in France in World War I, and during the interwar period he had a succession of assignments to infantry commands, staff billets, and schools. In August 1941 he assumedcom- mand of the 81st Infantry Division at Fort Rucker, Alaba- ma, and moved his division during its training period successively from Florida to Tennessee to California before its commitment to the battle for Angaur and Peleliu. Gener- al Mueller served on active duty until 1954, when here- - tired.He died in 1964.

2 cave and tunneldefenses. The at — Japanese had made the most of what this terrain provided during their ex- tensive period of occupation and defensive preparations. The second imponderable facing the Marines was the plan developed by Colonel Kunio Nakagawa, the officer who was to command the force on Peleliu, and his superior, Lieutenant General Sadae Inoue, back on Koror. Their concept of defense had changed considerably from that which was experienced by Captions by the artist, Tom Lea General Rupertus at Guadalcanal and "Going In—First Wave For an hour we plowed toward the beach, the sun aboveCape Gloucester, and, in fact, negat- us coming down through the overcast like a silver burning ball Over theed his concept of a tough, but quick gunwale of a craft abreast of us I saw a Marine, his face painted for the jungle, campaign. his eyes set for the beach, his mouth set for murder, his big hands quiet now in Instead of relying upon a pre- the last moments before the tough tendons drew up to kill." sumed moral superiority to defeat the Meanwhile, to blind enemy observa-As seen from the air on D-Day, 15 September 1944, Beaches White 1 and 2, on tion and limit Japanese fire upon thewhich the 1st and 3d Battalions, 1st Marines, landed. Capt George P Hunt's landing waves, naval gunfire wasCompany K, 3/1, was on the extreme left flank of the 1st Marine Division. shifted to the hill massif northeast of Department of Defense Photo (USN) 253745 the landing beaches.

That "massif," later to be called the •1 Umurbrogol Pocket, was the first of two deadly imponderables, as yet unknown to the division commander and his planners. Although General Rupertus had been on temporary It. duty in Washington during most of his division's planning for the Peleliu landing, he had been well briefed for the operation. The first imponderable involved the real character of Umurbrogol, which aerial photos indicated as a rather gently rounded north-south hill,commanding the landing beaches some 2,000-4,000 yards dis- tant. Viewed in these early photos, the elevated terrain appeared clothed in jungle scrub, which was almost en- tirely removed by the preparatory bombardment and then subsequent heavy artillery fire directed at it. In- stead of a gently rounded hill, the Umurbrogol area was in fact a com- plex system of sharply uplifted coral ridges, knobs, valleys, and sinkholes. It rose above the level remainder of the island from 50 to 300 feet, and provided excellent emplacements for

3 fire capability. More disturbingly, as theleading waves nearedthe beaches, the LVTs were hit by heavy enfilading artillery and antiboat gun fire coming from concealed bunkers on north and south flanking points. The defenses on the left (north) flank of Beach White 1, assaulted by the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines (Lieu- tenant Colonel Stephen V. Sabol), were especially deadly and effective. They disrupted the critical regimen- tal and division left flank. Especial- iy costly to the larger landing plan, these guns shortly thereafter knocked out tractors carrying important ele- ments of the battalion's and the regi- ment's command and control personnel and equipment. The bat- talion and then the regimental com- mander both found themselves ashore in a brutally vicious beach fight, without the means of commu- nication necessary to comprehend their situations fully, or to take the needed remedial measures. The critical mission to seize the "The Point" dominating the division left flank had gone to one of the 1st Regiment's most experienced compa- fly commanders: Captain George P. Hunt, a veteran of Guadalcanal and attackers at the beach, and then tofronting the landing beaches (WhiteNew Britain, (who, after the war, be- use bushido spirit and banzai tactics1 and 2, Orange 1, 2, and 3), the trac-came a long-serving managing edi- to throw any survivors back into thetors passed several hundred "mines,"tor of Life magazine). Hunt had sea, Peleliu's defenders would delayintended to destroy any craft whichdeveloped plans involving specific as- the attacking Marines as long as theyapproached or ran over them. Thesesignments for each element of his could, attempting to bleed them as"mines" were aerial bombs, set to becompany. These had been rehearsed heavily as possible. Rather than de-detonated by wire control from ob-until every individual knew his role pending upon spiritual superiority,servation points onshore. However,and how it fit into the company plan. they would combine the devilish ter-the preliminary bombardment hadEach understood his mission's criti- rain with the stubborn, disciplined,so disrupted the wire controls, andcality. Japanese soldiers to relinquish Peleliuso blinded the observers, that the D-Day and H-Hour brought heav- at the highest cost to the invaders.defensive mining did little to slow orier than expected casualties. One of This unpleasant surprise for the Ma-destroy the assaulting tractors. the company's platoons was pinned rines marked a new and important As the tractors neared the beaches,down all day in the fighting at the adjustment to the Japanese tacticsthey came under indirect fire frombeach. The survivors of the rest of which were employed earlier in themortars and artillery. Indirect firethe company wheeledleft,as war. against moving targets generatesplanned, onto the flanking point. Little or nothing during the tripmore apprehension than damage,Moving grimly ahead, they pressed into the beaches and the touchdownand only a few vehicles were lost toassaults upon the many defensive revealed the character of the revisedthat phase of Japanese defense. Suchemplacements. Embrasures in the Japanese tactical plan to the five Ma-fire did, however, demonstrate thatpiliboxes and casements were rine assault battalions. Bouncingthe preliminary bombardment hadblanketed with small-fire arms and across almost half a mile of coralnot disposed of all the enemy's heavysmoke, then attacked with demoli-

4 . 1 'V

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 94913 The skies over the landing beaches of Peleliu are blackened bined naval and aerial prelanding bombardment, as amphib- with smoke rising from the ground as the result of the corn- ian tractors rush shoreward carrying the assault waves. tions and rifle grenades. A climaxclothing on fire and ammunition ex-munications got through to bring in came at the principal casement, fromploding in their belts. That flight hadsupportingfiresand desperately which the largest and most effectivebeen anticipated, and some of Hunt'sneeded re-supply. One LVT got into artillery fire had been hitting LVTs onMarines were in position to cut themthe beach just before dark, with theflanksof following landingdown. grenades, mortar shells, and water. waves. A rifle grenade hit the gun At dusk, Hunt's Company K heldIt evacuated casualties as it depart- muzzle itself, and ricocheted into thethe Point, but by then the Marinesed. The ammunition made the differ- casement, setting off explosions andhad been reducedtoplatoonence in that night's furious struggle flames. Japanese defenders ran outstrength, with no adjacent units inagainst Japanese determined to recap- the rear of the blockhouse, theircontact. Only the sketchy radio com-ture the Point. The Changing Nature of Japanese Tactics apan launcheditsDecember 1941surprisethe lessons of defeat by modern infantry weapons in the attacks inthe expectation thatitsforces couldhands of the determined Allies. quickly seize a forward line of Pacific and Asian em- To Americans, these Japanese misconceptions were Jpire. Thereafter, it expected to defend these territories stub- alarming, but cost-effective: It was easier, and less costly, bornly enough to tire and bleed the Allies and then to to mow down banzai attacks than to digstubborndefenders negotiate a recognition of Japanese hegemony. out of fortified positions. By spring of 1944, the lessons had permeated to the This strategic concept was synchronized with the fanat-highest levels of Japan's army command. When General ic Japanese spirit of bushido. Faith in their army's moral Hideki Tojo instructed General Inoue to defend the Palaus superiority over lesser races led the Japanese to expect 19th- deliberately and conservatively, he was bringing Japanese century banzai tactics to lead invariably to success. Expec- tactics into support of Japanese strategy. Henceforth, tations and experience meshed until their 1942 encounters Japanese soldiers would dig in and hunker down, to make with the Allies, particularly with Americans in the Solo-their final defenses as costly as possible to the attacking mons. Thereafter, it took several campaigns to internalizeAmericans.

5 and toward the edge of the clearing looking east over the airfield area. On thedivision'srightflank, Orange 3, Major Edward H. Hurst's 3/7 had to cross directly in front of a commanding defensive fortification flanking the beach as had Marines in the flanking position on the Point. - Fortunately, it was not as close as the

- — Point position, and did not inflict such heavy damage. Nevertheless, its enfilading fire, together with some natural obstructions on the beach caused Company K, 3/7, to land left of its planned landing beach, onto the right half of beach Orange 2, _,:' 3/5's beach. In addition to being out Marines and corpsmen scramble ashore and seek any cover they can to escape theof position, and out of contact with incoming murderous enemy mortar and artillery fire. Behind them, smoking andthe company to its right, Company abandoned, are amphibian tractors which were hit as they approached the beach. K, 3/7, became intermingled with The next afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond C. Davis' 1/1 fl? moved its Company B to establish contact with Hunt, to help hang onto thebitterlycontestedpositions. Hunt's company also regained the survivors of the platoon which had been pinned atthe beach fight throughout D-Day. Of equal' impor- tance, the company regained artillery and naval gunfire communications, which proved critical during the se- cond night. That night, the Japanese Caption and photograph by Phillip D. Orr organized another and heavier— two Situated in a cave overlooking the airfield is this heavy caliber Japanese antiboat companies —counterattackdirectedgun. It had a field of fire which included the invasion beaches and the airfield. at the Marines at the Point. It was narrowly defeated. By mid-morning,Damaged heavily in the D-Day bombardment, this Japanese pillbox survives on the southern promontory of White Beach. Now vacant, its gun lies on the beach. D plus 2, Hunt's survivors, together Caption and photograph by Phillip D. Orr with Company B, 1/1,ownedthe Point, and could look out upon some c. 500 Japanese who had died defend- ?- ing or trying to re-take it. To the right of Puller's struggling i_. .. 3d Battalion, his 2d Battalion, Lieu- tenant Colonel Russell E. Honsowetz commanding, met artillery and mor- tar opposition in landing, as well as machine-gun fire from still effective beach defenders. The same was true for 5th Marines' two assault battal- ions, Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Boyd's 1/5 and Lieutenant Colonel - I.- Austin C.Shofner's 3/5,which hi r -' - fought through the beach defenses

6 Naval Gunfire Support for Peleliu

n their earlier operations, especially at Guadalcanal, the primary experience of 1st Division Marines with naval gunfire was at the receiving end. On New Bri- tain, the character and disposition of Japanese defenses did not call for extensive pre-landing fire support, nor did sub- sequent operations ashore. The naval gunfire to which the Guadalcanal veterans were exposed frequently and heavi- ly damaged planes and installations ashore. Its effect upon dug-in Marines was frightening and sobering, but rarely destructive. During the planning for Peleliu, the division staff ini- tially had no trained naval gunfire (NGF) planner. When one arrived, he was hampered by the cumbersome com- munications link back to higher headquarters, Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith's Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), in Honolulu, which would provide the essen- tial targeting information for the division's NGF plan. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95115 FMFPac also would plan and allocate the available gunfire effect of inadequate NGF was that the flanking positions resources to the targets deemed important by the division north and south of the landing beaches were not taken out. staff's planners. The preoccupation of FMFPac with the on- The selection of naval gunfire targets could certainly have going Marianas campaigns, as well as illness on the staffbeen done with more careful attention. Colonel Lewis B. of Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, Commander, NavalPuller, the 1st Marines commander, had specifically asked Gunfire Support Group, further limited and constrained thefor the destruction of the positions dominating his land- preparations. Heavy ammunition expenditures in the Man-ing on the division left flanks. Failure to do so was paid anas reduced ammunition availability for Peleliu. for in blood, courage, and time during the critical battle Surprisingly, during the delivery of U.S. preparatoryfor the Point. fires, there was no Japanese response. This prompted 01- Subsequent to D-Day there were numerous instances of dendorf to report all known targets destroyed, and to can- well-called and -delivered naval gunfire support: night il- celpreparatoryfiresscheduled for D plus3.An lumination during the night of 15-16 September, the des- unintentional benefit of this uncoordinated change in naval truction of two major blockhouses earlier reported gunfire plan may have resulted in there being more shells "destroyed," and effective support of the Ngesebus landing available for post-landing NGF support. But the costliest toward the end of the battle.

Company K, 3/5, a condition fraughtGormley's unit was to tie into Hurst'sdeemed essential. with confusion and delay. Majorright flank, and re-orient southeast Following close behind Sabol's Hurst necessarily spent time regroup-and south as that area was unco-3/1, the 1st Marines' Colonel Puller ing his separated battalion, using asvered. He was thentoattacklanded his forward command group. a coordinating line a large anti-tanksoutheast and south, with his left onAs always, he was eager to be close ditch astride his line of advance. HisHurst's right, and his own right onto the battle, even if that location eastward advance then resumed,the beach. After Hurst's battaliondeprived him of some capacity to de- somewhat delayed by his efforts toreached the opposite shore, bothvelop full supporting fires. With regroup. were toattack south,defendinglimited communications, and now Any delay was anathema to the di-Scarlet 1 and Scarlet 2, the southernwith inadequate numbers of LVTs for vision commander, who visualizedlanding beaches. follow-on waves, he struggled to momentum as key to his success. The At the end of a bloody first hour,ascertain and improve his regiment's division scheme of maneuver on theall five battalions were ashore. Thesituation. His left unit (Company K, right called for the 7th Marinescloser each battalion was to Umur-3/1) had two of its platoons desper- (Colonel Herman H. Hanneken) tobrogol, the more tenuous was itsately struggling to gain dominance at land two battalions in column, bothhold on the shallow beachhead. Dur-the Point. Puller's plan to land Major over Beach Orange 3. As Hurst'sing the next two hours, three of theDavis' 1st Battalion behind Sabol's leading battalion advanced, it was todivision's four remaining battalions3/1, to reinforce the fight for the left be followed in trace by Lieutenantwould join the assault and press forflank, was thwarted by the H-hour Colonel JohnJ.Gormley's1/7. the momentum General Rupertuslosses in LVTs. Davis' companies had

7 the Marines' map, which had been reported destroyed by pre-landing naval gunfire. As a similar situation later met on Puller's inland advance, the blockhouse showed little evi- dence of ever having been visited by heavy fire. Preparations to attack and reduce this blockhouse further delayed the 7th Marines' advance, and the commanding general fretted further about loss of momentum.

On the enemy's side, Lieutenant General Sadae Inoue, a fifth genera- tion warrior of stout military repu- tation,commanding the14th Infantry Division, fresh from the Kwangtung Army in China, met in Tokyo in March 1944 with Japanese Premier Hideki Tojo, who was also Minister of War. Tojo had conclud- ed that Japan was no longer able to hold the Palaus against growing Al- lied naval dominance in the Western Pacific. Instead, he had decided to sell the Palaus to the United States at the highest possible cost to Americans in blood and time. He ordered Inoue to D— DAY After Rectifying 3/5) take his division to the Palaus, to take command ofallJapanese forces Front Lines Regimental Boundaries there, and to defend the Palau Islands Phase Lines as long as possible, denying its use Main Counterattack to the Americans—and killing as Secondary Counterattacks or Strong Pressure many as possible in the undertaking. As his division sailed to the Palaus, Inoue flew ahead, reconnoitered his to be landed singly and his battaliona few of his troops were driven left-new locale by air for two days, and committed piecemeal to the action.ward by the still enfilading fire fromconcluded that Peleliu (with satellite On the regiment's right, Honsowetz'the south flank of the beach, andair strips on Angaur and Ngesebus) 2/1 was hotly engaged, but makinglanded on Orange 2, in the 5th Ma-was the key to his defenses. Earlier progress toward capture of the westrines' zone of action. Gormley's bat-U.S. attention to Peleliu during the edges of the scrub which looked outtalion was brought fully togetherTask Force 58 March strikes seemed onto the airfield area. He was tied onbehind 3/7 however, and as Hurst'sto confirm that judgment. To defend his right into Boyd's 1/5, which wasleading 3/7 was able to advance east,Peleliu, Inoue immediately settled similarly engaged. Gormley's 1 / 7 attacked southeastupon a commander, a mission, and In the beachhead's southern sector,and south,against prepared po-a force level. Peleliu had for some the landing of Gormley's 1/7 wassitions. time been under occupation and ad- delayed somewhat by its earlier loss- Hanneken's battle against heavyministrative command of a rear ad- es in LVTs. That telling effect of ear-opposition from both east and southmiral, who had used hisforces' lyopposition would befeltdeveloped approximately as planned.construction resources and capabili- throughout the remainder of the day.Suddenly, in mid-afternoon, the op-ty to build blockhouses and many Most of Gormley's battalion landedposition grew much heavier. Hurst'sreinforced concrete structures above on the correct (Orange 3) beach, but3/7 ran into a blockhouse, long onground, while improving existing

8 I I a-

I "1 Caption by the artist, Tom Lea "The Beach.. . MyFirst View as I Came Around From thedrew into himself when he ran down that ramp, into that Ramp of our LVT We ground to a stop, after a thousand years, flame. Those Marines flattened in the sand on that beach were on the coarse coral. . . Andwe ran down the ramp and camedark and huddled like wet rats in death as I threw my body around the end of the LVL splashing ankle-deep up the surfdown to among them." the white beach. Suddenly I was completely alone. Each man caves and tunnels under Peleliu's richantiaircraft guns, and rudimentaryisland command and to maintain concealment of overlying jungle, rocket launchers for sending up large,"liaison" with Colonel Nakagawa. scrub, and vines. unguided naval shells. Most signifi-Murai was young, highly regarded, In these underground installations,cant,theregiment had Coloneland, as the personal representative of the admiral's personnel had well sur-Nakagawa and his battle-disciplinedLieutenant General Inoue, was con- vived the Task Force 58 March at-officersand noncommissionedsidered senior to the admiral. He left tacks. Above ground, planes andofficers. Nakagawa had already beenNakagawa's operationalmission installations were demolished. Asawarded nine medals for leadershipfirmly in Nakagawa's hands, as In- Task Force 58 departed, the Japaneseagainst the Chinese and was viewedoue intended. Throughout the cam- emerged, repaired what they could,as a "comer" within his officer corps.paign, Nakagawa exercised but continued to focus upon under- Immediatelyuponarrival,operational control, and was assist- ground installations. Together withNakagawareconnoiteredhised and counseled, but not command- a few Korean labor troops, theirprospective battle area from theed, by General Murai. numbers totaled about 7,000, mostground and from the air. He identi- Nakagawa had a sound apprecia- of them lacking training and leader-fied the western beaches, the Ma-tion of his mission, of the situation, ship for infantry action. rines' White and Orange Beaches, asand of American firepower. He Leadership arrived in the person of the most probable landing sites. Heturned his attention to the fullest use Colonel Nakagawa,withhisimmediately ordered his troops to digof his principal advantage, the ter- 6,500-man 2d Infantry Regimentin and construct beach defenses. Atrain. He so deployed and installed his (Rein forced). They had long battlethis time,a bureaucratic conflictforces to inflict all possible damage experience in China. They werearose. Vice Admiral Seiichi Itou, whoand casualties during the anticipat- armed with 24 75mm artillery pieces, was the senior officer and the seniored landing, and then to defend in some 13-15 light tanks, about 100naval officer on Peleliu, resented be-depth for as long as possible. On .50-cal. machine guns, 15 81mming subordinate to an Army officerPeleliu, that offered a vertical as well heavy mortars, and about 30 dual-much junior to him. as a horizontal dimension to the purpose antiaircraft guns. Already From Koror, Lieutenant Generaldefense. on the island were a large number ofInoue dispatched Major General He surveyed and registered ar- very heavy (141mm) mortars, navalKenjiro Murai to Peleliu, to assumetillery and mortar weapons over the

9 ally supporting defensive complexes, with interconnecting communication lines and trenches. Although believing the western beaches to be the most probable route of attack, he did not leave the southern (Scarlet) and eastern (Pur- ple) beaches undefended. He com- mitted one battalion to organize defenses in each area. The Purple Beaches were thoroughly organized, with contingent orderstothe defenders to move into central Peleliu if the battle developed from the west, as expected. But the battalion com- mitted to the south, Scarlet Beach, had orders to defend those stronger, more permanent emplacements to the end. Nakagawa assigned about 500 infantry and artillery to defend Ngesebus and about 1,000 naval per- sonnel to defend northern Peleliu. Not under his command were the 1,500 defenders of Angaur. The major part of his force and ef- fort was committed to the 500 caves, tunnels, and firing embrasures in the coral ridges of central Peleliu. The naval units' extensive earlier tunnel- ing into the limestone ridges rendered occupants largely immune to gener- t4. al bombardments. Only lucky hits into the mouths of caves, or point- blank direct fire could damage the Caption by the artist, Tom Lea hidden defenses and their troops. "The Price Lying there in terror looking longingly up the slope to better cover, IThe tunnels were designed for, or saw a wounded man near me, staggering in the direction of the LVTs. His face was half bloody pulp and the mangled shreds of what was left of an arm hung down adapted to, various purposes: bar- like a stick, as he bent over in his stumbling, shock-crazy walk. The half of his racks, command centers, hospitals, face that was still human had the most terrifying look of abject patience I havestorage and ammunition magazines, ever seen. He fell behind me, in a red puddle on the white sand." cooking areas complete with fresh width and depth of the reef off bothrails and logs, and ordered anti-tankwater springs and seepage basins, eastern and western beaches, withditches dug. He emplaced troops inand of course firing embrasures with planned heavy concentrations alongmachine gun and mortar pits along, elaborate concealment and protective the fringe of the western reef. In thisand inland from, the beaches, aug-devices, including a few sliding steel he anticipated the American need tomented by all the available barbeddoors. Colonel Nakagawa expected transfer follow-on waves from land-wire. On the north and south flanksvery heavy prelanding bombard- ing craft to the reef-crossing amphib-of the beach, he constructed concrete ments. He expected his troops to sur- ian vehicles. He registered weaponsemplacements to shelter and concealvive them, and then to carry out his on, and immediately inland from,antitank and anti-boat artillery sit-mission of delaying and bleeding the the water's edge, to subject landinged to enfilade the expected waves ofAmericans. troops to a hail of fire. Off-shore helanding craft. On Koror, Lieutenant General In- laid 500 wire-controlled "mines." Inland,he incorporatedtheoue was busy with the bulk of his Colonel Nakagawa directed con-already-built blockhouse and adja- forces, preparing for expected attacks struction of beach obstacles, usingcent reinforced buildings into mutu-againstBabeithuap. The Allied / V

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95253 Engaged in the bitter struggle to establish the Peleliu beach- LVT, while other Marines atop the amphibian tractor fire at head, Marine riflemen get only momentary shelter behind an enemy targets. The name of the LVT was more than prophetic "Stalemate" plan had indeed calledcure the eastern half of the island.moved directly east, through the for invasion of Babeithuap. As theShortly after the scheduled H plusdunes and scrub jungle, into and out anticipated invasion drew near, Inoueone schedule, the 2d Battalion, 5thof the antitank barrier, and to the issued a proclamation to his troops,Marines, Major Gordon D. Gaylewest edge of the clearing surround- clearly reflecting Tojo's instructionscommanding, landed over Beaching the airfield. Passing through the to delay and bleed. He pointed outOrange 2, in trace behind 3/5. Itlines of 3/5, Gayle's battalion at- the necessities to anticipate and en- Embrasures in this well-sited, heavily reinforced position, possibly in the Pocket, dure the naval bombardment and to indicate the location of Japanese weapons which devastated attacking Marines. use the terrain to inflict casualties on Department of Defense Photo (!JSMC) 107934 the attackers. Without actually or- dering troops to die, he included the words, "we are ready to die honora- bly:' He went on to say that dying, and losing the territory to the enemy, might contribute to the opening of a new phase of the war.

As the 1st Marines battled to se- cure the left flank, and as the 7th Ma- rines fought toisolate and then reduce the Japanese defenses in the southern end of Peleliu, the 5th Ma- rines, Colonel Harold D. Harris com- manding, was charged to drive across the airfield, cut the island in two, and then re-orient north and drive to se-

11 Sherman medium tanks, one-third of which had been left behind at the last moment because of inadequate ship- ping, were landed as early as possi- ble, using a novel technique to cross the reef. This tank landing scheme was developed in anticipation of ear- ly Japanese use of their armor capa- bility. Movement of this fire and logisti- cal support material onto a beach still close to, and under direct observation from, the commanding Umurbrogol heights was an inescapable risk man- dated by the Peleliu terrain. So long as the enemy held observation from Umurbrogol over the airfield and over the beach activity, there was no alternative to driving ahead rapidly, using such fire support as could be mustered and coordinated. Continu- ing casualties at the beaches had to be accepted to support the rapid ad- vance. The commanding general's concern for early momentum ap- PURPLE peared to be eminently correct. Units on the left had to assault toward the foot of Umurbrogol ridges,and quickly gettothe commanding crests. In the center, the 5th Marines had to make a fast advance to secure other possible routes to outflank Umurbrogol. In the south, the 7th JAPANESE DEFENSIVE PLAN — flitoCtiOt Ot p1 Ofl,00COUfltI,OttOCk Marines had to destroy immediately Di,.Ct 00 Ct tit., ,,titoflk anti — boot gun' Ouoktion Ct tilt ,tCCh,40 gun' those now cut-off forces before be- Tank, coming freed to join the struggle against central Peleliu. tacked west againstscatteredof the airfield, but then lost contact. The movement of the 5th Marines resistance from dug-outs and bomb By this time, the antitank ditchacross the airfield and to the western shelters near the southern end of thealong the center and right of Orangeedge of the lagoon separating the air- airfield, and through the scrub areaBeaches 1 and 2 was notable for thefield area from the eastern peninsu- slightly farther south. The 3d Battal-number of command posts locatedla (Beach Purple), created a line of ion's mission was to clear that scrub,along its length. Shofner's 3/5 wasattacking Marines completely across maintaining contact with 3/7 on itsthere, as was Harris' 5th Marinesthat part of the island oriented both right, while 2/5 was to drive acrosscommand post. Then an advance ele-east and north, toward what was be- the open area to reach the far side ofment of the division command postlieved to be the major center of the island. Advancing in its centerunder Brigadier General Oliver P.Japanese strength. The 7th Marines, and right, 2/5 battled completelySmith, the assistant division com-pushing east and south, completed across the island by mid-afternoon,mander, landed and moved into thesplitting the enemy forces. Colonel echeloned its left rearward to keepantitank ditch within sight of the air-Hanneken's troops, fully engaged, contact with 1/5, and moved to re-field clearing area. Simultaneously, were generally concealed against ob- orient its attack northward. The 2dimportant support weapons wereservation from the enemy still north Battalion's right flank tied for a whilemoving ashore. of the airfield and from the heights into 3/5 in the woods to the south The 1st Tank Battalion's M-48A1 of Umurbrogol. There was a gap be-

12 neither Selden's small CP group, nor ______Berger's 2/7, could get past the trans- fer line in their landing craft, and had to return to their ships despite their orders to land. Into this division posture, at about 1650, Colonel Nakagawa launched his planned tank-infantry counterat- tack. All Marine commanders had been alerted to the Japanese capabil- ity to make an armored attack on D- Day, and were well prepared. The at- tack emerged from the area north of the airfield and headed south, gener- ally across the front of the 1st Ma- rines' lines on the eastern edge of the airfield clearing. The attack moved directly into the 5th Marines' sector 'I where Boyd's 1/5 was set in, and r stretched across the southern area of the airfield. Marines in 2/1 and 1/5 'it. took the attackers under fire, infan- try and tanks alike. A bazooka gun- a ner in 2/i's front hit two of the tanks. The commanding officer of 1/5 had his tanks in defilade, just behind his 4front lines. They opened up on the Japanese armor, which ran through the front lines and virtually into his forward command group. Boyd's lines held fast, taking the attackers, infantry and tanks alike, under fire with all available weapons. Deparmen of Defense Photo (USMC) 96745 CplPeterP Zacharko stands by a captured Japanese 141mm mortar, which rained Major John H. Gustafson, in 2/S's shells down on the landing beaches and on the Marines as they proceeded inland. forward command post mid-way tween the 5th's right and the 7th's left,where it would not be in the way.across the airfield, had his tank pla- but it did not appear to be in a criti-General Rupertus ordered it to land, toon close at hand. Although the cal sector. remarking to his staff that he hadenemy had not yet come into his zone Nevertheless, it was by now appar-now "shot his bolt!" Ashore, it wasof action, he launched the platoon of ent that the D-Day phase-line objec-apparent that what was needed ontanks into the melee. Accounts vary tives were not going to be met inthis hectic beachhead was not moreas to just who shot what, but in a eitherthe southorthenorth.troops, but more room in which tovery few minutes it was all over. The Alarmed at the loss of the desiredmaneuver and more artillery. attacking tanks were all destroyed, momentum, General Rupertus began General Rupertus began to makeand the Japanese infantry literally committing his reserve. First, he or-plans to land himself and the mainblown away. dered the division reconnaissanceelements of his command group. Ad- Colonel Nakagawa's attack was company ashore, then, pressing com-vice from the ADC ashore, and hiscourageous, but proved to be a total manders already on the island, hechief of staff, Colonel John T. Selden, failure. Even where the tanks broke ordered his one remaining uncom-convinced Rupertus to stay on thethrough the Marine lines, they in- mitted infantry battalion, Lieutenantflagship. He compromised that deci-duced no Marine retreat. Instead, the Colonel Spencer S. Berger's 2/7, tosion by ordering Colonel SeldenJapanese armor became the focus of land. No commander ashore felt aashore. By now, the shortage of LVTsantitank fire of every sort and caliber. need for 2/7, but Colonel Hannekenwas frustrating the timely landing ofThe light Japanese tanks were liter- said he could find an assembly areafollowing waves. In consequence,ally blown apart. More than 100

13 is 5

PELELIU SECOND OPERATIONAL PHASE (D+I—D+8)

D fl*3 were reported destroyed. That figure,maximum advance of the day, overand control had been completely of course, reflected the amount of firethe most favorable terrain in the di-knocked out by 1700. The battalion directed their way; each Marinevision front.Itprovided neededexecutive officer, Major Robert M. grenadier,antitank gunner,andspaceforartillery and logisticAsh, had been killed earlier in the tanker thought he had killed the tankdeployment to support the continu-day by a direct hit upon his landing at which he shot, and so reported.ation of the attack the next day. LVT. About the time of the Japanese With the counterattack over and However, that relatively advancedtank attack, a mortar barrage hit the the Japanese in apparent disarray, 2/5position had an open right, south,3/5 CF in the antitank ditch near the immediately resumeditsattack,flank which corresponded to a holebeach,killingseveralstaffand moving north along the eastern halfin the regimental command struc-prompting the evacuation of the bat- of the airfield. The battalion ad-ture. At that stage, 3/5 was supposedtalion commander. As of 1700, the vanced halfway up the length of theto maintain the contact betweenthree companies of 3/5 were not in airfield clearing before it stopped tonorth-facing 2/5 and south-orientedcontact with each other, nor with the organize for the night. It was the3/7. But 3/5's battalion command (Continued on page 16)

14 A Horrible Place mong the few civilian news correspondents whodiscovered that productive wells could be drilled almost chose to share the fate of the Marines on shoreanywhere on the comparatively low ground, and person- Aon Peleliu was Robert Tepper" Martin, of Time, nel semi-permanently stationed near the beach found that who furnished the following description of what it was like even shallow holes dug in the sand would yield an only there: mildly repulsive liquid which could be purified for drink- Peleliu is a horrible place. The heat is stifling and ing with halizone tablets. But it continued necessary to sup- rain falls intermittently —themuggy rain that brings ply the assault troops by means of scoured-out oil drums no relief, only greater misery. The coral rocks soak and five-gallon field cans. Unfortunately, steaming out the up the heat during the day and it is only slightly cool- oil drums did not remove all the oil, with the result that er at night. Marines are in the finest possible physi- many or most of the troops drinking water from the drums cal condition, but they wilted on Pelellu. By the fourth were sickened. When the captains of the ships in the trans- day there were as many casualties from heat prostra- port area learned of this and of the shortage of water, they tion as from wounds . rushed cases of fruit and fruit drinks to the beaches to ease Peleliuis incomparably worse than Guam in its the problem somewhat. bloodiness, terror, climate and the incomprehensible The water situation presented a problem even in the case tenacity of the Japs. For sheer brutality and fatigue, of troops operating on comparatively level and open I think it surpasses anything yet seen in the Pacific, ground. Once the fighting entered the ridges, terrain certainly from the standpoint of numbers of troops difficult merely to traverse without having to fight, the de- involved and the time taken to make the island secure. bility rate shot upward so alarmingly that an emergency call was sent to all the ships off-shore to requisition every On the second day, the temperature reached 105 degreesavailable salt tablet for issue to the 1st Marines. in the shade and there was very little shade in most places The statement that heat prostrations equalled wound where the fighting was going on, and arguably no breezecasualties is apt to be misleading. Most of those evacuated at all anywhere. It lingered around that level of heat as thewere returned to duty after a day or two of rest and re- days dragged by (temperatures as high as 115 were record-habilitation; hence, their absence from the frontlines did ed). Water supply presented a serious problem from the not permanently impair the combat efficiency of their units. outset. This had been anticipated and in actual fact the so-But such numerous cases did strain the already overbur- lution proved less difficult than expected; the engineers soondened Medical Corps elements.

The antitank ditch dug by the Japanese along the center andthe 5th Marines' and 3/5's CPs were located there, as was the right of Orange Beaches 1 and 2 soon after the landing be-7th Marines shown here. BGen Oliver P Smith with the ad- came the locations of command posts of various units, Bothvance element of the division CP set up in the ditch also. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 94939 in, I.,. ;tSt. ' ,,,0'1. , yi;t

a r ¼.

15 Special Reef-crossing Techniques

nasmuch as Peleliu's fringing reef would not permit Two other reef-crossing innovations were used on D-Day. landing craft within 700 yards of the beach, suchA large number of amphibious trailers were incorporated craft deposited tanks at the reef's edge. There theinto the logistic plan, to be towed behind landing craft, and depths permitted tanks to operate in most areas, withoutlater, at reef's edge they would be taken in tow by amphib- being submerged, but not in all. A plan was devised to formian tractors. Ashore, trucks took them into tow, enabling tanks into small columns, each to be led by an LVT So longcritical supplies to be moved well forward to supply points as the LVT was grounded on the reef, the tanks could fol-just in rear of the fighting. Newly available crawler cranes low in trace. But when the LVT encountered a depth whichwere emplaced on barges near the reef's edge. They could floated it, tanks halted while the LVT literally "felt" out alift nets full of ammunition and other vital supplies from suitable shallow path. Then the tanks followed, still inboats to tractors at the transfer line. Other such crawler small columns, and so arrived at the shore at the earliest cranes were landed early and positioned by the shore party possible hour. The technique was one of the keys to time-to lift net-loads from L'VTs to trucks for expeditious deliv- ly employment of armor ashore before D-Day was over.ery forward. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95624. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95354.

9 I

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(Continued from page 14) success, but they were persistenta crisis developing. battalions to their right and left. enough to require resupply of ammu- At the end of the first 12 hours The 5th Marines commandingnition to forward companies. Dawnashore, the 1st Marine Division held officer ordered his executive officer,revealed scores of Japanese bodiesits beachhead across the intended Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W. Walt,north of the Marine lines. front. Only in the center did the to take command of 3/5 and to Elsewhere across the 1st Division'sdepth approximate that which had redeploy so as to close the gap be-front there were more potentiallybeen planned. The position was tween 5th and 7th Marines. Majorthreateningnightcounterattacks.strong everywhere except on the ex- Gayle moved 2/S's reserve companyNone of them succeeded in drivingtreme left flank. General Smith, from to his right flank and to provide a tie-Marines back or in penetrating thehis forward command post was in in position. Walt located and tied inlines in significant strength. The mostcommunication with all three regi- his 3/5 companies to build a moreserious attack came against the Com-mental commanders. The report he continuous regimental line. By 2230,pany K, 3/1, position on the Point,received from Colonel Puller, on the he had effected the tie-in, just in time.at the 1st Marines' left. left, did not afford an adequate per- Beginning then, the salient which the In the south, the 7th Marines ex-ception of 1st Marines' tenuous hold 5th Marines had carved betweenperienced significant night attackson the Point. That reflected Colonel Peleliu'scentraland southernfrom the Japanese battalion oppos-Puller's own limited information. defenders came under a series ofing it. But the Marines there were inThe other two regimental reports sharp counterattacks that continuedcomfortable strength, had communi-reflected the situations adequately. throughout the night. The attackscations to bring in fire support, in- In addition to the three infantry came from both north and south.cluding naval gunfire illumination.regiments,the1stDivision had None of them enjoyed any notableThey turned back all attacks withoutalmost three battalions of light ar-

16 Marines were battling to retain the position. Colonel Nakagawa, on the other hand, had reported that the landing attempt by the Marines had been "put to route." Inconsistently, he had also reported that his brave counter- attack force had thrown the enemy into the sea.

With the dawn of a new day, the two opposing commanders at Peleliu Ti: awoke from whatever sleep they may have gotten to face immediate grim prospects. General Rupertus, having been frustrated by his earlier effort to land his division reserve into the southern Caption by the artist, Tom Lea sector of his beachhead, was now "This is Sad Sack Calling Charlie Blue We found the battalion commander [LtCol aware that his northern sector stood Edward H. Hurst, CO, 3/7] sitting on a smashed wet log in the mud, marking posi- most in need of help, specifically on tions on his map. By him sat his radioman, trying to make contact with companythe extreme left flank. Rupertus or- commands on the portable set propped up in the mud. There was an infinitely tired dered 2/7 into Puller's sector for em- and plaintive patience in the radioman's voice as he called code names, repeating time ployment there. and again, 'This is Sad Sack calling Charlie Blue. This is Sad Sack calling Charlie At division headquarters afloat, Wary riflemen of the 5th Marines advance through a devastated Japanese bivouac tillery ashore and emplaced. All 30 area to the northeast of the Peleliu airfield. The concealed enemy troops took full ad- tanks were ashore. The shore partyvantage of the rocky terrain, forcing the Marines to clear out each nook and cranny. was functioning on the beach, albeit Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 96763 under full daylight observation by the enemy and under intermittent enemy fire. The division necessarily had to continue at full press on D plus 1. The objective was to capture the commanding crests on the left, to gain maneuver opportunities in the center, and to finish off the isolated defenders in the south. At least two colonels on Peleliu ended their work day with firm mis- conceptions of their situations, and with correspondinglyinaccurate reports to their superiors. At day's end, when General Smith finally got a telephone wire into the 1st Marines' CP, he was told that the regiment had a firm hold on its beachhead, and was approximately on the 0-1 objec- tive line. He was not told about, and Colonel Puller was not fully aware of, the gaps in his lines, nor of the gravity of the Company K, 3/1, struggle on the Point, where only 38 n -a Si

17 t '--.

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.:T-7 ?,nh,-; - " Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95921 At about 1650 on D-Day, Col Nakagawa launched his tank- vision had been prepared for such an eventuality, and the at- infantry attack from the north of the airfield and headed south tack was a total failure. More than 100 enemy tanks and their across the front of the 1st Marines' lines. The 1st Marine Di- covering troops were reported as being literally blown apart. more had been learned about the ex- Over on Colonel Nakagawa's side,Day, but were preparing to renew the tent of Marine D-Day casualties:despite the incredible reports beingfight. Predictably, their attack would 1,111, of whom 209 were killed in ac- sent out from his headquarters, hebe launched behind a hail of naval tion (KIA). While this was not acould see from his high ground agunfire, artillery, and aerial attacks. hefty percentage of the total rein-quite different situation. The landingThey would be supported by U.S. forced divisional strength, the num-force had not been "put to route."tanks which had so readily dis- ber was grim in terms of cutting-edgeAshore, and under his view, was apatched the Japanese armor on strength. Most of those 1,111 casual-divisionof American MarinesD-Day. ties had been suffered in eight of thedeployed across two miles of beach- In his own D-Day counterattack, division's nine infantry battalions.head. They had been punished on D-Nakagawa had lost roughly one of Except in the center, Rupertus wasApparently covered by a returning 1st Marine Division veteran'sgraffiti, not yet on the 0-1 line, the first of this Japanese light tank remains on the northwest corner of the Peleliu airfield. Its eight planned phase lines. turret blown off,it is the only one left from the failed enemy attack of 1944. Caption and photo by Phillip D. Orr Having received less than a com- prehensive view of the 1st Marines' situation, Rupertus was more deter- mined than ever to move ashore quickly, to see what he could, and to do whatever he could to re-ignite the lost momentum. That he would have Ii,... to operate with a gimpy leg from a sandy trench within a beach area still under light but frequent fire, seemed less a consideration to him than his need to see and to know (General Rupertus had broken his ankle in a preassault training exercise, and his foot was in a cast for the entire operation.).

18 ____ the south, the 7th Marines already ••Ca•.. held its edge of the airfield's terrain. The scrub jungle largely screened the regiment from observation and it was opposed by defenses oriented toward the sea, away from the airfield. :., Puller's 1st Marines, which had al- — ,— ready suffered the most casualties on D-Day, still faced the toughest terrain and positions.It had toattack, relieve Company K, 3/1, on the Point, and assault the ridges of Umurbrogol, south to north. Sup- porting that assault, Honsowetz had 4 to swing his east-facing 2/1 leftward, and to capture and clear the built-up area between the airfield and the ridges. This his battalion did on D plus 1 and 2, with the 5th Marines assisting in its zone on the right. But then he was at the foot of the com- Caption and photo by Phillip D. Orr. manding ridges, and joined in the "Sick Bayin a Shelihole:The Padre Read, 'I am the Resurrection and the Light'deadly claw-scratch-and-scramble at- About thirty paces back of the lap trench a sick bay had been established in a bigtackofDavis'1/1againstthe shell crater made by one of our battleship guns . . . Inthe center of the craterJapanese on and in the ridges. at the bottom a doctor was working on the worst of the stretcher cases. Corps- As Colonel Puller was able to close men, four to a stretcher, came in continually with their bloody loads . . . . The padre stood by with two canteens and a Bible, helping. He was deeply and visiblythe gaps on his left, and swing his en- moved by the patient suffering and death. He looked very lonely, very close totire regiment toward the north, he God, as he bent over the shattered men so far from home." pivoted on Sabol's 3/1 on the left. his five infantry battalions. Elsewherehidden fire to strike with dangerousSabol, aided by Company B, 1/1, es- he had lost hundreds of his beacheffect. His forces were largely invisi-tablished contact with and reinforced defenders in fighting across the frontble to the Americans, and relativelyCompany K on the Point. Then he throughout D-Day, and in his uni-impervious to their fire superiority.headed north, with his left on the formly unsuccessful night attacksHis prospects for continuing to holdbeach and his right near the West against the beachhead. Nevertheless,keyterraincomponents seemedRoad along the foot of the western- he still had several thousand deter-good. most features of the Umurbrogol mined warriors, trained and armed. The Marines were attacking forti-complex. In Sabol's sector, the terrain They were deployed throughoutfied positions, against which carefulpermitted tank support, and offered strong and well-protected defensiveand precise fire preparations weremore chances for maneuver than complexes and fortifications, withneeded. They were, especially on thewere afforded in the ridges further to ample underground support facili-left, under extreme pressure to assaultthe right. Hard fighting was in- ties. All were armed with the dis-rapidly, with more emphasis uponvolved, but after D-Day, Sabol's bat- cipline and determination tokillspeed than upon careful preparation.talion was able to move north faster many Americans. With enemy observation andthan the units on his right. His ad- As he had known from the start,weapons dominating the entire Ma-vance against the enemy was limit- Nakagawa's advantage lay in the ter-rine position, staying in place was toed by the necessity to keep contact rain, and in his occupation and or-invite being picked off at the hiddenwith Davis' 1/1 on his right. ganization of that terrain. For theenemy's leisure. General Rupertus' The relative rates of movement present, and until that time when heconcern for momentum remainedalong the boundary between Sabol's would be driven from the Umur-valid. flatter and more open zone and Da- brogol crests which commanded the This placed the burden of rapidvis'very rough zone of action, airfield clearing, he held a dominat-advance primarily upon the 1st Ma-brought the first pressing need for ing position. He had impressive ob-rines on the left, and secondarilyreserves. Tactically, there was clear servation over his attackers, andupon the 5th in the airfield area. Innecessity to press east into and over

19 A Paucity of Reserves

lanning for the seizure of the southern Palaus progressed toward operations. The 1st Marine Division had (Angaur and Peleliu-Ngesebus) had been thenine infantry battalions with which to attack more than Presponsibility of III Amphibious Corps (Major 10,000defendingJapanese on Peleliu. Major General Paul General Roy S. Geiger). But General Geiger and his staffJ. Mueller's 81st Infantry Division had six infantry battal- had been fully occupied duringthecritical planning weeks, ions with which to attack 1,500 (earlier reported as 2,500) up to and including the capture of Guam, from 21 July to Japanese defenders on Angaur. Terrain and circumstances 10 August. The Guam operation ended more than a month on the two objective islands were similarly imbalanced. later than originally contemplated. Meanwhile, someonePeleliu was considerably larger and had far more complex else had to fill the corps planning function for the Palau terrain. Its defensive fortifications were obviously far more undertaking. A temporary headquarters, X-Ray Corps, un- developed, and it offered fewer predictable landing beaches der Major General Julian C. Smith was established. The than Angaur. Only the subsequent rapid shifting of plans two major tactical tasks of the southern Palau operation and higher-level responsibilities can account for such force were assigned to the Army 81st Infantry Division (Angaur) allocation imbalance not having been corrected at Corps and 1st Marine Division (Peleliu-Ngesebus). The 81st Di-or Expeditionary Troops level. The effect of all these im- vision was also tasked to set aside one RCT as corps reserve. balances was still further magnified between 13 and 17Sep- This partition of division level-planning effort was con- tember. Higher level changes in plans and naval decisions venient, but it slipped into a gross imbalance in force allo- stripped Ill Corps of all its reserves. cation which was neither recognized nor corrected as plans the rough terrain, and systematical-it in turn supported. The walls wereable defenders in underground caves ly reduce the complex defenses. Thatfour-feet thick, of reinforced con-and fortifications within an incredi- job Davis' 1/1, Honsowetz's 2/1, andcrete. Happily, Davis was given able jumble of ridges and cliffs. Every Berger's 2/7 did. But more troopsnaval gunfire support team whichadvance opened the advancing Ma- than Sabol had also were needed tocalled in the fires of the the USS Mis-rines to new fire from heretofore hid- advance north through the open ter-sissippi. Between them, they madeden positions on flanks, in rear, in rain to begin encirclement of thefairly short work of the entire com-caves above or below newly won rough Umurbrogol area, and to findplex, and 1/1 could advance until itground. avenues intothe puzzle of thatran intothe far more insoluble Nothing better illustrated the tac- rugged landscape. By 17 September,Japanese ridge defense systems. tical dilemmas posed by Umurbrogol reserves were badly needed along the Major Davis, who was to earn athan did the 19 September seizure of, 1st Division's left (west) axis of ad-Medal of Honor in the Korean Warthen withdrawal from, Hill 100, a vance. But on 17 September, neitherin 1950, said of the attack into andridge bordering the so-called Horse- the division nor III Amphibiousalong or across those ridges, "It wasshoe Valley at the eastern limit of the Corps had reserves. the most difficult assignment I havePocket. It lay in the sector of Lieu- As Sabol's 3/1 fought up the easi-ever seen." tenant Colonel Honsowetz' 2d Bat- er terrain on the 1st Marines' left, Da- During the 1st Marines' action intalion,1stMarines,to which vis' 1/1 drove into the center with histhe first four days of the campaign,Company B of Major Ray Davis' 1st left on the break between coral ridgeall three of its battalions battledBattalion was attached. Company B, country and Sabol's more open flatalongside, and up onto Umurbrogol's1/1, having landed with 242 men, zone. Among his early surprises, asterrible,cave-filled,coralridges.had 90 men left when its commander, he approached the foot of the ridgeBerger's 2/7,initiallyin divisionCaptain Everett P. Pope, received area, was another of the blockhousesreserve, but assigned to the 1st Ma-Honsowetz' order to take what the Admiral Oldendorf had reportedlyrines on D plus 1, was immediatelyMarines were then calling Hill 100. destroyed with pre-D-Day gunfire.thrown into the struggle. Puller fedThe Japanese called it Higashiyama Although it had been on the plan-two separate companies of the bat-(East Mountain). ning map for weeks, those who firsttalion into the fight piecemeal. Short- Initially supported by tanks, Pope's encountered it, reported the emplace-ly thereafter, 2/7 was given a centralcompany lost that support when the ment as "not having a mark on it!"zone of action between Coloneltwo leading tanks slipped off an ap- The blockhouse was part of an im-Puller's 1st and 2d Battalions. The 1stproach causeway. Continuing with pressive defense complex. It was con-Marines continued attacking on aonly mortar support, and into the nected to and supported by a web offour-battalion front about a 1,000face of heavy defending mortar and pillboxes and emplacements, whichyards wide, against stubborn andmachine-gun fire,Pope's Marines

20 reached the summit near twilight,ing mortars and by hand-to-handic of the Japanese defenders' skillful only to discover that the ridge'sbrawls involving not only rifles butuse of mutually supporting positions northeast extension led to still higheralso knives, and even rocks, thrownthroughout Umurbrogol. ground, from which its defendersintermittently with grenades, as sup- By D plus 4, the 1st Marines was were pouring fire upon the contest-plies of them ran low. Pope's mena regiment in name only, having ed Hill 100. Equally threatening waswere still clinging to the ridge topsuffered 1,500 casualties. This fact led fire from the enemy caves inside thewhen dawn broke; but the numberto a serious disagreement between parallel ridge to the west, called Fiveof unwounded Marines was by nowGeneral Rupertus, who kept urging Brothers. In the settling darknessdown to eight. Pope was ordered toPuller onward, and the general's su- Pope's men, liberally supported bywithdraw and was able to take hisperior, Major General Roy S. Geiger, 2/i's heavy mortars, were able towounded out. But the dead he hadIII Amphibious Corps commander. hang on. Throughout the night, thereto leave on the ridge, not to be reco-Based on his own experiences in com- was a series of enemy probes andvered until 3 October, when the ridgemanding major ground operations at counterattacks onto the ridge top.was finally recaptured for good. ThisBougainville and Guam, Geiger was They were beaten off by the support-action was illustrative and prophet-very aware of the lowered combat ef- ficiency such losses impose upon a Near the edge of a clearing, a Marine rifleman fires a rifle grenade with good effect committed combat unit. into an enemy position up ahead into the northern, difficult portion of Peleliu. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 96106 On 21 September, after visiting Colonel Puller in his forward CP and observing his exhausted condition, and that of his troops, Geiger con- ferred in the 1st Division CP with Rupertus and some of hisstaff. Rupertus was still not willing to ad- mit that his division needed rein- forcement, but Geiger overruled him. He ordered the newly available 321st Regiment Combat Team (RCT), 81st Infantry Division, then on Angaur, to be attached to the Marine division. _% ,_ a Geiger further ordered Rupertus to stand down the 1st Marines, and to send them back to Pavuvu, the divi- Ssion's rear area base in the Russell Islands. On 21 September (D plus 5), •'l Rupertus had ordered his 7th Ma- rines to relieve what was left of the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 1st Ma- rines. By then, the 1st Marines was reporting 1,749 casualties. It report- edkilling an estimated. 3,942 Japanese, the capture of 10 defend- ed coral ridges, the destruction of three blockhouses, 22 pillboxes, 13 antitank guns, and 144 defended caves. In that fighting the assault battal- ions had captured much of the crest required to deny the enemy observa- tion and effective fire on the airfield and logistic areas. Light aircraft had begun operating on D plus 5 from Peleliu'sscarred,and still-under-

21 brogol assault, the 5th Marines on its right also faced an assault situation, but one of substantially less opposi- tion and easier terrain. Lieutenant Colonel Boyd's 1/5 had tofight across the airfield, from southwest to northeast, and through the built-up area similar to that which faced Hon- sowetz's 2/1. The battalion was sub- jectedto observed fire from the Umurbrogol and to small arms fire from Japanese defendersinthe rubble-filled built-up area. Boyd's coordinatedtank-infantryattack quickly carried the day. He soon had control of that area, and the east- west, cross-island road, which could lead the 5th toward its next objective, IC, the eastern peninsula of Peleliu. On the 5th Marines' right, 2/5 had a more difficult time. Its progress was stubbornly opposed by infantry from the woods on its right, and by ar- 1"I tillery from Umurbrogol, which took a particular interest in the tanks 2/5 was using to support its attack along the edge of the woods. Whether the Japanese infantry in those woods had been posted to defend that position, b- ' C or whether they were just surviving Japanese infantry from the D-Day counterattack, was never established. Department of Defense Photo (!JSMC) 95661 At a conference held in the 1st Marine Division command post, Col Harold D. The fight took all day and inflicted "Bucky" Harris, 5th Marines commander, center, explains to MajGen Roy S. Geiger, heavier casualties on Gayle's battal- Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps, left, and MajGen William H. Ruper- ion than had D-Day. By dusk, 2/5 tus, commander of the division,his plan of operations in northern Peleliu.had battled beyond the north end of repair airfield. With Purple Beach inalso learned that when aerial observ-the airfield, and halted for the night American control,thedivision'sers were overhead, they were nonear the woods concealing the ap- logisticallife-line was assured. longer free to run their weapons outproaches to the eastern peninsula. Although the Japanese still had someoftheir caves and firebarrages As the two-battalion attack of the observation over the now operatingtoward the beach or toward the air-5th Marines (D plus 1) was heavily airfield and rear areas, their reducedfield. When they tried to get off moreengaged on its front and right, the capability was to harass rather thanthan a round or two, they couldregimental headquarters near the to threaten. count on quick counter-battery, or abeach was hit by an artillery barrage Furthermore, the Marine frontmuch-dreaded aerial attack fromwhich, coupled with D-Day's loss of lines in the Umurbrogol had by nowcarrier-based planes, or —after243/5's commanding officer and execu- reached close to what proved to beSeptember—from Marine attacktive officer, engendered a significant the final Japanese defensive posi-planes operating from the field onrearrangement in command assign- tions.Intelligencethenavailable Peleliu. ments. The early D plus 1 barrage hit didn't tell that, but the terrain and sit- the regimental C took out numbers uation suggested that the assault re- of the staff, and buried the regimen- quirements had been met, and that tal commander in the crumbling in the Umurbrogol it was time for On D plus 1, when the 1st MarinesJapanese antitank trench in which the siege tactics. The Japanese defendershad launched their costly Umur-CF was "sheltered." Fortunately, the

22 burial was temporary, and Colonel That 5th Marines' forward posi- Now the 7th Marines, whose 2d Harris emerged with a twisted andtion generally coincided with theBattalion was already in the thick of battered leg, but still able to hobble.northeast sector of the airfield earli-the fight for Umurbrogol, was about Two of his principal staff officerser mentioned. Possession of thatto move out of its own successful bat- were casualties, and his sergeantvisual boundary meant that in mosttle area and into a costly assault major killed. Harris elected not to beplaces on the regimental right, front-which, by this time, might have been evacuated, but he needed help in theline Marines were spared the hostilemore economically conducted as a regimental CP. Ordering Lieutenantobservation and directed fire fromsiege. Colonel Walt back from the 3d Bat-Umurbrogol. As with the 7th Ma- talion to the regimental CP, Harrisrines, largely hidden in the jungle of directed the commanding officer ofthe south, this lessened the need for 2/5 to send his executive officer,headlong assault. There would now As the 7th Marines moved to its Major John H. Gustafson, to takebe freedomto maneuver moremission, the 5th Marines was again command of 3/5. Then Harris direct-deliberately and to coordinate sup-successfully opening up opportuni- ed Boyd to send his 1/5 operationsporting fire more carefully. ties on Peleliu's eastern, "lobster claw" officer, Major Hierome Opie, to join peninsula. Most of those opportuni- 3/5 as Gustaf son's executive officer. The 7th Marines' ties, unfortunately were never ex- Fortunately, 3/5 was having a rela- Complete Destruction of ploited. tively quiet day, unlike its hair-raising Enemi,i in the South regrouping on the night of D-Day. By the end of D plus 2, the 5th Marines stood at the approach to the After daylight, as 2/5 attacked north, In the south, from D plus 1 througheastern peninsula, and astride the 3/5 stretched along the east edge ofD plus 3, the 7th Marines was in East Road just east of the 1st Marines' the mangrove lagoon which separat- vigorous assault against extensive terrible struggle in Umurbrogol. It ed Peleliu from the eastern peninsu- fortifications in the rear of the Scarlethad fought somewhat clear of the la. In that position, 3/5 also tied into Beaches. These were defended by a galling fires from Umurbrogol, and 3/7 as that battalion attacked south. full battalion, the elite 2d Battalion,planned an assault on the eastern Thus 3/5 protected each regiment's15th Regiment. Although isolated peninsula across a narrow causeway, flank against any Japanese move-and surrounded by the Marines, this ment across the intervening water, which the Japanese should certainly battalion demonstrated its skill anddefend. Then a D plus 3 reconnais- and into the rear of the attacking bat- itsunderstandingofColonel sance of the causeway revealed that talions. No such threat developed,Nakagawa's orders and mission: to the causeway was not defended. The and as the afternoon grew on, theresell Peleliu at the highest possible 2d Battalion hastened to seize the op- emerged a more pressing employ-price. The 7th Marines attacked with ment for 3/5. portunity and moved acrossin 3/7 on the left and 1/7 on the right.strength. The attack was hit by its As Walt returned to his post beside They enjoyed the advantage of at-own supporting fires. The forward the now only semi-mobile Harris, tackingtheextensive and well-battalion CP group was strafed by Major Gustaf son was told to get 3/5prepared defenses from the rear, and Navy planes and then hit by artillery into position to bolster and thenthey had both heavy fire support and airburst, causing the loss of 18 bat- relieve 1/5, as it closed in on its 0-2the terrain for limited maneuver in talion headquarters personnelto objectives. their favor. Both sides fought bitter- "friendly fire:' Throughout the next day (D plusly, but by 1530 on 18 September (D 2), the 5th Marines kept tied in withplus 3), the battle was substantially Nevertheless, a bridgehead across the 1st Marines on its left and cap-over. The Marines had destroyed anthe causeway was well established on tured some control of the foot of theelite Japanese reinforced infantry bat-D plus 3, and the 5th Marines' East Road. On the right, 2/5 hackedtalion well positioned in a heavilyColonel Harris moved to exploit it. and combed its way through the jun-fortified stronghold. Colonel Han-During the afternoon, he thinned his gle and mangrove north of the air-neken reported to General Rupertusforces holding the East Road sector, field,alongside the road leadingthat the 7th Marines' objectives hegave the former 3/5 mission to Com- toward the eastern peninsula. Thehad set for D-Day were all in hand.pany L, 3/5, and gave the remainder thick scrub, nearly impenetrable,The naval gunfire preparation hadof 3/5 a new mission. He ordered reduced progress to a crawl. It com-been significantly less than planned.Gustaf son into a position within the pensated by concealing most of theThe difference had been made up bybridgehead established by 2/5, and advancing Marines from enemy ob-time, and by the courage, skill, andfurther ordered both battalions then servation from high ground to 2/5'sadditional casualties of the infantryto capture and clear the eastern north and northwest. companies of 1/7 and 3/7. peninsula. Earlier he had expected

23 elsewhere on the other islands, and near Ngardololok, thereappeared to be many opportunities to attack by fire against the cave-infested north- south ridges of central and northern Peleliu. Such positioning of heavy weapons would be very difficult, but relative to the intense infantry bat- tles underway in Umurbrogol, such difficulties seemed acceptable. Many of the prospective targets could have been vulnerable to direct, flat trajec- tory fire across the front of U.S. units advancing north in central Peleliu. Corps artillery units had conducted such direct fire training before em- barking for the Peleliu campaign. Such tactical advantages and oppor- tunities from the eastern peninsula were advocated but never exploited. Only later, in the fighting for north- ern Peleliu was the 5th Marines able to secure point-blank, heavy, single- gun fire support.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 96936 A Marine war dog handler reads a note just delivered by canine messenger, a Dober- man Pinscher, one of the breeds used in the Pacific This Marine has a pump shotgun. With southern and eastern Peleliu captured, there now began an encir- such an attack to be against thebut the war dogs warned of, and ef-clement of the Japanese defenders in strong defending forces originallyfectively thwarted,the attemptedcentral Peleliu, and an attack against reported on the eastern peninsula.surprise. the Japanese defending northern However, the apparent reduction of By the end of D plus 4, the twoPeleliu and nearby Ngesebus and defending forces now appeared tobattalions had cleared the main bodyKongauru. This was the obvious next offer an opportunity to seize Purpleof the eastern peninsula and hadtactical phase for combat on Peleliu. Beach quickly, a logistic prize ofreached Purple Beach from the rear.However, securing it was less neces- some significance. Harris knew thatThe defenses were most impressive,sary for the basic Peleliu tactical and the division would need to shift itsbut many were unmanned. Thosestrategic goals than for the mopping- logistical axis to Purple Beach, awayenemy troops encountered seemedup of the island. As the 1st Marine from the fire from Umurbrogol,andmore interested in hiding than inDivision'sAssistant Commander, away from the threat of westerlyfighting, leading to speculation thatBrigadier General Oliver P. Smith, storms. Nakagawa's trained infantry hadlater phrased it, "by the end of the Before dark, Gustaf son moved twobeen moved west to the fight on D-first week, the Division had control of his 3/5 companies across theDay and/or D plus 1. By D plus 5,of everything on the island that it causeway, and moved his own CPPurple Beach was cleared, as werethen needed, or later used' group in with the 2/5 CP, where thethe long peninsulas southwest and The airfield had been seized, was two commanders jointly planned thenortheast of Purple Beach. On Dunder repair and improvement, and next day's advance. Hoping for lit-plus 6, 2/5 seized the two islands im-in use. It was no longer any threat, tle resistance, they directed rapidmediately north of the northeastif it had ever been, to MacArthur's movement, but armed their pointpeninsula, and the next day occupiedlong-heralded return to the Philip- units with war dog sections to guardthe small unnamed islet just 1,000pines. Peleliu's best logistical beach against ambush. Their lead compa-yards east of the northern ridges of(Purple) had been secured, providing nies moved out just after dawn. InPeleliu. a secure logistic axis to the main bat- the 3 / 5 sector, there was an ambush, From that position, and positionstle areas. The Japanese defenders in

24 their caves, and in northern Peleliu fully developed would be premature.General Rupertus, who clung to a be- and on Ngesebus, retained some His advice was ignored by Vice Ad-lief that his Marines could do it capability to harass American rear in- miral Theodore S. Wilkinson. without help from the Army. The III stallations, but that was sharply cur- A related decision on 17 Septem-Corps plan tasked the 81st Division tailed by the Marines' counterfire. ber committed the III Corps' finalto reinforce the Marines in seizing Only two significant Japanesereserve to the Ulithi landing. The taskPeleliu and then to relieve the 1st Ma- was assigned to the Western Attack capabilities remained: they could bit- rine Division for the mop up, but the Force, which was ordered to seize terly resist from their cave positions general continued to exhort his com- and they had a limited capability toUlithi with "available resources:' Overmanders to "hurry up." General Smith's advice, Wilkinson reinforce Peleliu from Babeithuap. Earlier,General Rupertus and chose to commit the entire 323d RCT, Such reinforcement could only be by Colonel Puller had shrugged off a the 81st Division's other maneuver small-unit infiltration, which faced suggestion from the 5th Marines' element. The 321st subsequently and U.S. naval screening operations in the "Bucky" Harris that they take a look successfully occupied an undefend- area. Likewise, American encircle- at the Umurbrogol Pocket from the ment of the stubborn Umurbrogoled Ulithi while reserves were sorelynewly available light planes of Ma- needed at Peleliu. Pocket faced two obstacles. First was rine Observation Squadron 3. Har- the lack of additional maneuver regi- By 20 September, the 81st Divisionris' own aerial reconnaissance, made ments from III Amphibious Corps'had defeated or cornered all sur-immediately after those planes ar- reserve. General Geiger in fact hadvivors of Angaur's 1,400 defenders.rived on 19 September, had altered no corps reserve pending the releaseThe Slst's commander declared An-his view of the Umurbrogol from of some units from the forces in-gaur secure. He tasked his 322d RCTsober to grave. It convinced him that volved in the seizure of Angaur. That to complete the mop-up, and report-attacking the Pocket from the north landing by the 81st Infantry Divisioned to General Geiger that the 321stwould be less costly than the origi- (lessthe 323d RCT) had beenRCT was available for further oper-nally planned and ordered attempts launched on 17 September, afterations. The lack of enough troops tofrom south to north. Both Puller and which there was no corps reserve. begin encircling Umurbrogol was noRupertus responded to Harris that longer an obstacle. they had their maps. The operation on Angaur, the planning which attended it and the The other obstacle to reinforcing The prelanding scheme of maneu- decision on itstiming, impactedthe division on Peleliu and encirclingver was built on the tactical concept heavily upon the Peleliu operation.the Pocket lay in the thinking ofthat, after capturing the airfield, the The naval planners early on pro-Once the troops entered the Umurbogol Mountain, they found sinkholes and posed landing on Angaur beforedifficult terrain much as pictured here. Japanese soldiers in the caves and heights Peleliu. Only when Major Generalabove could fire at will at the Marines, who were like so many "fish in a barrel." Julian C. Smith, commanding Ex- Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 108432 peditionary Troops/X-Ray Planning ..'M-tt;1Zr4Vfl •ci7'r.1áLP Group, explained that such timing would invite the numerous Japanese in northern Palau to reinforce Peleliu was it agreed that Angaur be assault- ed only after the Peleliu landing was assured of success. However, the An- gaur landing was initiated before the r4 Peleliu landing had been clearly resolved. The commanding general of the 81st Division wanted to land T as soon as possible, and he was sup- 111 ported in his view by his naval task unit commander, Rear Admiral Wil- IIil liam H. P. Blandy. Opposing the 17 September date for the Angaur land- ing was Marine Major General Julian Smith. Smith argued that committing the element of III Corps Reserve be- fore the Peleliu operation was more ',i'1

25 1st Marine Division would pushThe 5th's mapping team, launcheded ashore on the early morning of 23 north along a line across the widthafter Harris' regiment was commit-September. Colonel Nakagawa sud- of the main or western part of the is-ted against the Pocket, encountereddenly had reinforcements in the form land. Once abreast of the southernLieutenant Colonel Walt,theof a partially mauled infantry battal- edge of Umurbrogol, that conceptregimental executive officer, on Hillion in northern Peleliu. and maneuver scheme were reflect-100 during their sketching, and so ed in a series of four west-to-eastnamed the hill. En circleinentofUrnurbrogol phase lines, indicating an expected Even after General Geiger had or- cnd Seizure of linearadvance,southtonorth.dered General Rupertus on 21 Sep- Northern Peleliu Clearly, it was expected that the ad-tembertostand down Puller's vance along the flatter zones westshattered 1stMarines, General A plan to encircle the Pocket, and deny reinforcementtonorthern and east of I.Jmurbrogol would be atRupertus expressed the belief that his approximately the same pace as that Marines, alone, would shortly clearPeleliu was immediately formulated. General Rupertus' staff was closely along the high-central ground of the entire island. After taking a closer attended by selected III Corps staff Peleliu. Such thinking may have beenlook at the situation on the ground. consistent with Rupertus' prediction Geiger ordered RCT 321 from An-officers, and General Geiger also was of a three-day assault. Developments gaur and attached it to the Marinepresent. The plan called for two regiments in Sabol's sector to the west, and indivision. Encirclement of the Umur- the 5th Marines' sector to the east,brogol Pocket now became tactical-to move up the West Road, the Army 321st Infantry leading in the attack, apparently did not change division-ly feasible. level thinking. Until additional forces and the 5th Marines following. The became available, such a linear ad- Capture of northern Peleliu andMarines were to pass through the vance may have seemed all that wasNgesebus became more pressing withArmy unit after it had gone beyond possible. the discovery on 23 September thatthe Pocket on its right, and the 5th some part of the enemy's substantial Even so, there was no apparent would continue then to take north- troop strength in the northern Palausern Peleliu and Ngesebus. reexamination of the planned south-was being infiltrated by barge from to-north linear advance, and for days The 321st RCT, by now battle test- Koror and Babeithuap into northerned, was tasked to push up the West after the Pocket was sealed off at itsPeleliu. northernmost extremity, the division Road, alongside and just atop the commander kept ordering attacks Although the naval patrol set towestern edge of coral uplift which from south to north, generally fol-protect against just that reinforcingmarked the topographical boundary lowing the initial landing plan. Asaction had discovered and destroyedbetween the flat western plain, and had been revealed to "Bucky" Harrissome of the Japanese barges, mostthe uplifted coral "plateau." That in his early aerial reconnaissance ofenemy troops seemed to have wad-plateau, about 300 yards west to east, the Umurbrogol Pocket, such attacks would offerlittlebut casualties. Troops, heavily supported, could ad- vance into "the Horseshoe" and into "Death Valley," but the positions they reached then proved untenable and withdrawal was usual at day's end. Some part of this thinking may have well come from the inadequa- cies of the map in use. The 5th Ma- rines in early October produced a new and more representative sketch map. It located and identified the de- tails within Umurbrogol sufficiently to facilitate maneuver and fire coor- dination. That mapping effort, incidentally, led to the misnaming of Honsowetz' Hill 100, where Captain Everett P. Pope earned his Medal of Honor.

26 constituted the western shoulder of the Pocket. The plateau rose some 30-80 feet above the West Road. Its western edge, or "cliff 7 was a jumble of knobs and small ridges which dominated the West Road, and would have to be seized and cleared to permit unharrassed use of the road. Once the 321st RCT was past this up-lift, and the Pocket whichit bounded, it was to probe east in search of any routes east through the 600 yards necessary to reach the eastern edge of that portion of Peleliu. Any opportunities in that direction were to be exploited to en- circle the Pocket on the north. Behind the 321st RCT, the 5th Ma- rines followed, pressed through, and attacked into northern Peleliu. Han- neken's 7th Marines relieved the 1st, which was standing down to the eastern peninsula, also relieving the 5th Marines of their then-passive security role. The 5th was then tasked to capture northern Peleliu, and to seize Ngesebus-Kongauru. This maneuver would involve the use of the West Road, first as a tac- tical route north, then as the line of communications for continued oper- ations to the north. The road was ISOLATION OF UMURBROGOL comparatively "open" for a distance 26,27 SEPT about halfway, 400 yards, to the Umurbrogol Front, 26 Sept northern limit of the Pocket, and — Route of Task Force paralleled by the ragged "cliff" which constituted the western shoulder of the up-lifted "plateau." That feature was no level plateau, but a veritable moonscape of coral knobs, karst, andof the Pocket and the coral "plateau"tered small units and individuals who sinkholes. It had no defined ridges orwas a virtually impassable shoulderdid not sally forth, and who bitterly pattern. The sinkholes varied fromof the Pocket. resisted movement into their moon- room-size to house-size, 10 to 30 feet The plateau was totally impenetra-scape. When Americans moved along in depth, and jungle- and vine-ble by vehicles. The coral sinkholesthe West Road, these Japanese ig- covered. The "plateau" was general-and uplifted knobs forced any infan-nored individuals, took under fire ly 30 to 100 feet above the plain oftry moving through to crawl, climb,only groups or individuals which ap- the road. Some 200-300 yards furtheror clamber down into successivepeared to them to be rich targets. to the east, it dropped precipitious-small terrain compartments of rough The only tactical option along the ly off into a sheer cliff, called the Chi-and jagged surfaces. Evacuating anyWest Road was to seize and hold the na Wall by those Marines whocasualties would involve unavoida-coral spires and cliffs commanding looked up to it from the southern andble rough handling of stretchers andthe road, and to defend such posi- eastern approaches to the Pocket. Totheir wounded passengers. The areations against infiltrators. Once those them, that wall was the western edgewas occupied and defended by scat-heights were seized, troop units and

27 trucks could move along West Road. -t Until seized, the "cliff" offered con- cealment and some cover to occupy- ing Japanese.Untilthosecliff positions were seized and held, the Japanese therein could be only tem- porarily silenced by heavy firepower. Until they were driven from their commanding positions,the road could not be treated as truly open. 'tV Those terrain conditions existed ' for three-quarters of a mile along the West Road. There, abreast the north end of the Pocket, the plateau of coral sinkholes merged into a more _a- •..- - systematic group of limestone ridges. .. t These ridges trended slightly north- — •-. - -a ij east, broadening the coastal strip to an east-west width of 200 to 400 yards. Into that milieu, the 321st RCT was launched on 23 September, be- I hind an hour-long intensive naval gunfire and artillery preparation r against the high ground command- ing the West Road. The initial Army reconnaissance patrols moved gener- Caption and photo by Phillip 0. Orr Discovered during a trip to Peleliu in 1994 was this 1,000-man cave, littered with ally west of the road, somewhatempty sake bottles, deep in the tunnels in the Amiangal Mountain in north Peleliu. screened from any Japanese still on the "cliff" just east of the road byfor that cliff abandoned it,side-lar ridgelines,the 321st captured vegetation and small terrain features.stepping down to the road. They thenparts of a key feature, Hill 100. These tactics worked until largeradvanced along the road, and soonTogether with an adjacent hill just units of the 2d Battalion, 321st,reported that 3/7 was not keepingeast of East Road, and designated moved out astride the West Road.contact along the high ground. Hill B, that position constituted the Then they experienced galling fire On orders from Colonel Han-northern cap of the Umurbrogol from the heights above the road. neken, the 7th Marines' command-Pocket. Seizing HillB, and con- The 321st's 2d Battalion hading officer, 3/7 then captured thesolidating the partial hold on Hill 100 relieved 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,high ground which 2/321 had aban-would occupy the 321st for the next along an east-west line across thedoned, but at a cost which did littlethree days. road, and up onto the heights justfor inter-service relations. Thereafter, As theregiment probedthis above the road. Near that point, the3/7 was gradually further committedeastern path across the north end of 1st Marines had been tied into thealong the ridge within the 321st zoneUmurbrogol, it also pushed patrols forward left flank of 3d Battalion,of action. This of course stretchednorth up the West Road. In the vi- 7th Marines. The orders for the ad-3/7, which still had to maintain con-cinity of the buildings designated vance called for 3/7 to follow behindtact on its right in the 7th Marines'"Radio Station," it reached a promis- the elements of 2/321, along the highzone, generally facing the southerning road junction. It was in fact the ground as the soldiers seized the suc-shoulders of the Umurbrogol Pock-junction of West and East Roads. ceeding west edge of the cliff and ad-et. Further north, as the 321st pressedColonel Robert F. Dark, command- vanced northward. However, theon, it was able to regain some of theing officer of RCT 321, determined advanced elements along the ridgeheights above its axis of advance, andto exploit that route, back south, to were immediately out-paced by thethereafter held onto them. add a new direction to his attack other 2/321 elements in the flat to Abreast the northern end ofupon Hill 100/Hill B. He organized their west. Instead of fighting northUmurbrogol Pocket, where the sink-a mobile task force heavy in armor to seize the ridge, units responsiblehole terrain blended into more regu-and flamethrowers, designated Task

28 Force Neal, named for Captain Ge-able firepower fully before sendingwith strong forces challenging the orge C. Neal. He sentitcirclinghis infantry into assault. His aerialcave defenses, and in position to en- southeast and south to join 2/321'sreconnaissance earlier had acquaint-gage them fully on the next day. efforts at the Hill 100/Hill B scene.ed him with an understanding of the The following day, 26 September, Below that battle, the 7th Marinesterrain. This knowledge strengthenedas the 321st launcheditsthree- continued pressure on the south andhis resolve to continue using all avail-pronged attack against Hill 100/Hill east fronts of the Pocket, but still at-able firepower and employingB (northern cap of the Umurbrogol tacking south to north. deliberate tactics as he pursued hisPocket) and the 5th Marines attacked As those efforts were underway,regiment's assigned missions. four hills running east to west across the 5th Marines was ordered into the On the afternoon of 25 September,Peleliu, dubbed Hills 1, 2, 3, and Ra- developing campaign for northern1/5 seized the Radio Station com-dar Hill in Hill Row. The row was Peleliu. Now relieved by the 1st Ma-plex, and the near portion of a hillperpendicular to and south of the last rines of its passive security missioncommanding it. When 3/5 arrived,northern ridge, Amiangal Mountain. on the eastern peninsula and its near-it was directed to seize the next highThese hillsand theridge were by three small islands, the 5th movedground to the east of 1/S's position.defended by some 1,500 infantry, ar- over the West Road to side-step theThen when 2/5 closed, it tied in totillerymen, naval engineers, and the 321st action and seize northernthe right of 3/5's position, and ex-shot-up reinforcing infantry battal- Peleliu. Having received the divisiontended the regimental line back to theion which landed the night of 23 Sep- order at 1100, the 5th motored,beach. This effectively broke contact tember, in caves and interconnected marched, and waded (off the north-with the 321st operations to thetunnels within the ridge and the hills. eastern islets) to and along the Westsouth, but fulfilled Colonel Harris'As the fight for Hill Row developed, Road. By 1300, its 1st Battalion wasplans to advance north as rapidly asColonel Harris had his 2d Battalion passing through the 321st lines atpossible, without over-extending hisside-step west of Hill Row and begin Garekoru, moving to attack the ra-lines. By suddenly establishing thisan attack on the Amiangal ridge to dio station installations discoveredregimental "beachhead' the 5th Ma-the north. Before dark, the 2d Bat- by 321st patrols the previous after-rines had surprised the defenderstalion had taken the southern end noon. In this area, the 5th Marines found flat ground, some open and some co- vered with palm trees. The ground was broken by the familiar limestone ridges, but with the critical tactical difference that most of the ridges stood alone. Attackers were not al- ways exposed to flanking fires from mutually supporting defenses in ad- jacent and/or parallel ridges, as in the Umurbrogol. The Japanese had pre- pared the northern ridges for defense as thoroughly as they had done in the Umurbrogol, with extensive tun- nels and concealed gun positions. However, the positions could be at- tacked individually with deliberate tank, flamethrower, and demolition tactics. Further, it developed that the defenders were not all trained infan- trymen; many were from naval con- struction units. On the U.S. side of the fight, a weighty command factor shaped the campaignintonorthernPeleliu. Colonel Harold D. "Bucky" Harris was determined to develop all avail-

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95375 Marines using rifle grenades, hand grenades, and "Molotov Note the torch in the foreground which was used to ignite the cocktails" battle Japanese holed up in caves in northern Peleliu. "cocktails" and the flaming bottle of gas ready to be thrown. and crest of the ridge, but was un-During the night of 27 September, one of the weapons from the 8th 155mm Gun Bat- der severe fire from cave positions intalion was moved into position in 2/5's sector about 180 yards from Amiangal Ridge. the central and northwestern slopes Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95941 of the ridge. What was not yet appreciated was that the Marines were confronting the most comprehensive set of caves and tunnels on Peleliu. They were trying to invade the home (and defensive position)ofalong- established naval construction unit most of whose members were better miners than infantrymen. As dark .3' fell, the 2d Battalion cut itself loose from the units toits south, and .4 .111 b formed a small battalion beachhead for the night. The next morning, as the 2d Bat- talion, 5th Marines, tried to move along the route leading to the north- ern nose of Amiangal Ridge, it ran into a wide and deep antitank ditch which denied the attacking infantry the close tank support they had so successfully used earlier. At this • point, the 5th Marines command

30 asked, again, for point-blank ar-shortened the fight for the northerntrenched Japanese infantry. For some tillery. end of the island. 35 hours, the battalion conducted the This time, division headquarters As that fighting progressed, themost cost-effective single battalion responded favorably. During the5th Marines assembled its 3d Battal-operationoftheentirePeleliu night of 27 September Major Georgeion, supporting tanks, amphibiancampaign. V. Hanna's 8th 155mm Gun Battal-tractors, and the entire panoply of Much of the credit for such effec- ion moved one of its pieces into po-naval gunfire, and air support totiveness was due to supporting avi- sition in 2/5's sector. The gun waslaunch a shore-to-shore operation toation. VMF-114, under Major Robert about 180 yards from the face ofseize Ngesebus and Kongauru, 600F. "Cowboy" Stout, had landed on Amiangal Ridge. The sight of thatyards north of Peleliu, on 28 Sep-Peleliu's air strip just three days pri- threatat dawn elicited enemytember. or to this landing, and immediately machine-gun fire which inflicted There followed an operationundertook its primary service mis- some casualties upon the artillery-which was "made to look easy" butsion:supporting Marine ground men. This fire was quickly sup-which in fact involved a single, rein-operations. The Ngesebus landing pressed by Marine infantry fire, andforced(butdepleted)battalionwas the first in the Pacific War for then by the 155mm gunitself. against some 500 prepared and en-which the entire air support of a Throughout the morning, the heavy 155mm fire played across the face of Amiangal Ridge, destroying or clos- ing all identified caves on the west face, except for one. That latter was a tunnel mouth, down at ground lev- el and on the northwestern base of the hill. It was too close to friendly lines to permit the gun to take it un- der fire. But by then, tanks had neu- tralized the tunnel mouth, and a tank bulldozer filled in a portion of the anti-tank ditch. This allowed 2/S's tank-infantry teams to close on the tunnel mouth, to blast and bulldoze it closed, and to press on around the northern nose of Amiangal. Simul- taneously, Marines swept over the slopes above the tunnel and "seized" the crest of the small mountain. The term seizure is qualified, for although 2/5 held the outside of the hill, the stubborn Japanese defenders still held the inside. A maze of inter- connected tunnels extended through- out the length and breadth of the Amiangal Ridge. From time to time the Japanese inside the mountain would blast open a previously closed cave or tunnel mouth, and sortie to challenge the Marines. Notwith- standing their surprise effect, these counterattacks provided a rare and welcome opportunity for the Ma- rines actually to see their enemy in daylight. Such tactics were inconsis- tent with the general Japanese strate- gy forPeleliu,and somewhat

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'p. .en -'I n — I'! Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 95931 Thecrews of amphibian tractors board a severely damagedpatrols when it carried troops attempting to infiltrate north- Japanese landing craft which was intercepted by U.S. naval em Peleliu and reinforce Ngesebus Island off northwest Peleliu. A western-looking aerial view of the northern end of PeleliuIsland is in the upper right. Veterans of Peleliu will be amazed showing Peleliu village and the Amiangal Mountain. Ngesebusto note how fully the island has been recaptured by vegetation. Caption and Photo by Phillip D. Orr

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32 landing was provided by Marine avi- ation. As the LVTs entered the water from Peleliu's shore, the naval gun- fire prematurely lifted to the alarm of the assault troops. Stout's pilots immediately recognized the situation, resumed their strafing of Ngesebus until the LVTs were within 30 yards of the beach. They flew so low that the watching Marines "expected some of them to shoot each other down by their ricochets." This action so kept (c the Japanese defenders down that the Marines in the leading waves were upon them before they recovered from the shock of the strafing planes. The 3d Battalion got ashore with no casualties. Thus enabled to knock out all the Japanese in beach defenses immediately, it turned its attention to the cave positions in the ridges and blockhouses. The ridges here, as with those on northern Peleliu, stood in- dividually, not as part of complex ridge systems. This denied their defenders opportunities for a mutu- al defense between cave positions. The attacking companies of 3/5 could use supporting tanks and con- centrate all fire means upon each defensive system,without being taken under fire from their flanks and rear. By nightfall on 28 Septem- ber, 3/5 had overrun most of the op- position. On 29 September, there was a day of mopping up before Ngese- A bus was declared secure at 1500. As Caption and photo by Phillip D. Orr planned, the island was turned overPossibly one of the best preserved specimens of its kind in the Pacific this Model to 2/321, and 3/5 was moved to di-10 120mm dual-purpose antiaircraft and coastal defense gun is on the western shore vision reserve in the Ngardololokof Ngesebus. The gun rests on its skid plate and was sited in a natural position. area. Such concentated support enabled As 3/5 was clearing Ngesebus, the Seizure of Ngesebus by one deplet-the heavily depleted 3d Battalion, 5threst of the 5th Marines was fighting ed infantry battalion gave a dramaticMarines, to quickly seize Ngesebus,the Japanese still in northeast Peleliu. illustration of an enduring principledestroying 463 of Colonel Nakaga-After capturing Akarakoro Point be- of war: the effective concentration ofwa'sbattle-hardened and well-yond Amiangal Mountain, 2/5 means. To support that battalion,emplaced warriors in 36 hours, at aturned south. It swept through the General Rupertus concentrated thecost of 48 American casualties. defenses east of that mountain with bulk of all his available firepower: a Other maneuver elements ondemolitions and flamethrowers, then battleship; two cruisers; most of thePeleliu also were attacking duringmoved south toward Radar Hill, the divisional and corps artillery; virtu-those 36 hours, but at an intensityeastern stronghold of Hill Row. That ally all of the division's remaining ar-adjusted to the limited support con-feature was under attack from the mor; armored amphibian tractors; allsequent upon General Rupertus' all-south and west by 1/5. After two troop-carrying amphibian tractors;out support of the day's primary ob-days, the two battalions were in com- and all Marine aviation on Peleliu.jective. mand of the scene, at least on the

33 _- _

Unnar - Ride - Ridge 3 \ ''' / 120 Drows .âli. . .l-- 4 — -4U.- — -dl- - — - - — — -4k- .-.W. ,L— ...M.. gi 41 - — — — - — - ,ii-- -4k- . U- Ai- . 4 L.- —.- ..iU- ..,I - — _' -. Il. -L.- - — -4- - - - - . \\ - -..- - —-..t-- - 41 -ii.-4j.. — j. — _,I.-,g... — — — . . i.-: - — - - Boot Oock .4-,1.,-- ..' . -- — %M -Uii •"- - - -.w -g - .,g -- - .1 - -41 44 -L - -- .-- .- - -_-4— - - -.11k-.". - .l1. — --1U - - - - -41k 41. J-- ,. _._44j. _4 — — -- - _4'. ___k__ _4. - _.41_ - UMURBROGOL POCKET gç -- -411l- .4 -— -- - -g-dlj _-- .41k -.JJ - - - - 41l- 0 50 100 _41l 4# 41k. 4 .41g. O fl63 —. —. — — A.hi ------topside of the hills. Inside there stillto commit itto the Umurbrogolrain as oversimplified, time-phased remainedstubbornJapanesePocket. linear objectives to be seized concur- defenders who continued to resist the rently with the flat terrain abutting contest for Radar Hill, as did the it to the east and west. defenders within Amiangal Moun- The southern slopes (generally tain's extensive tunnels. All could be In a very real sense, the Umur-called Bloody Nose) dominated the silenced when the cave or tunnelbrogol Pocket typified the worst fea-landing beaches and airfield, over mouths were blasted closed. tures of the post D-Day campaign forwhich the Pocket had to be ap- As theseoperations were inPeleliu. It provided the scene of someproached. After those heights were progress, the 321st at the north endof Peleliu's worst and most costlyconquered by the heroic and costly of Umurbrogol completed seizingfighting, and of some of the camp-assaults of Puller's 1st Marines (with Hills 100 and Hill B, then cleared outaign's best and worst tactical judg-Berger's 2/7 attached), and after the the ridge (Kamilianlul Mountain) ments.Itsterrain was the mostdivision had set in artillery which and road north from there to the areadifficult and challenging on the is-was controlled by aerial observers of 5th Marines operations. On 30land. Prelanding planning did notoverhead, the situation changed rad- September the 321st relieved the 1stperceive the Pocket for what it was,ically. The Pocket's defenders there- and 2d Battalions of the 5th Marinesa complex cave and ridge fortressafter retained only the capability to in northern Peleliu. That regimentsuitable to a fanatic and suicidalharass and delay the Americans, to reassembled in the Ngardololok area,defense. Plans for the seizure of theannoy them with intermittent attacks before it became once more necessary area treated the Pocket's complex ter-by fire and with night-time raids. But

34 scramble up onto the bare ridge tops, thereafter came under fire from fac- ing parallel ridges and caves. They were subject to strong night counter- attacks from Japanese who left their caves under cover of darkness. During 20 September, D plus 5, the 7th Marines had relieved the 1st Marines along the south and south- west fronts of the Pocket, and on the 21st the 3d and 1st Battalions re- sumed the attack into the Pocket, from southwest and south. These at- tacks achieved limited initial success- es behind heavy fire support and smoke, but succeeded only in ad- vancing to positions which grew un- tenable after the supporting fire and smoke was lifted. Assault troops had to be withdrawn under renewed fire support to approximately their jump- off positions. There was little to show for the day's valiant efforts. Attacks the next day (22 Septem- ber) against the west shoulder of the Pocket, from the West Road, up the western box canyon (Wildcat Bowl) and toward Higashiyama (Hill 140), all liberally supported with firepow- er, again produced early advances, most of which had to be surrendered at day's end, as all three attacking groups came under increasing fire This sketch shows the floor plan of the largest and most elaborate tunnel system dis- from the Japanese hidden in mutu- covered by Marines on Peleliu. It was prepared by Japanese naval construction troopsally supporting cave positions. The and was so elaborate the Americans thought it might be a phosphate mine.7th Marines had, unbeknown to it, after D plus 4, Umurbrogol's de-the offensive effort into the Pocketreached within about 100 yards of fenders could no longer seriouslybetween 21 and 29 September wasColonel Nakagawa's final command threaten the division's mission. directed from south to north, into thecave position. However, many sup- Nevertheless, after the critical ene-mouths or up onto the ridges of theporting ridges, and hilltops, would my observation sites were seized,twin box canyons which defined thehave to be reduced before a direct at- General Rupertus kept urgingPocket. Infantry supported by tanks,tack upon that cave could have any "momentum," as though the seizureair, and flame-throwing LVTs couldhope of success. of the Pocket were as urgent as hadpenetrate the low ground, but gener- The fight for Umurbrogol Pocket been seizure of the commandingally then found themselves surround-had devolved into a siege situation, heights guarding it from the south.ed on three sides. Japanese positionsto be reduced only by siege tactics. The stubborn character of the ter-inside the ridges of the canyons, hid-But the 1st Marine Division's com- rain, and its determined defenders,den from observation and protectedmander continued to cling to his be- became entwined with the deter-in their caves, were quite capable oflief that there would be a "break-thru" mined character of the general com-making the "captured" low groundagainst the enemy's opposition. He manding the 1st Marine Division.untenable. Other attacks, aimed atinsisted that continued battalion and This admixture was sorted out onlyseizing the heights of the easternregimental assaults would bring vic- by time and by the reluctant inter-ridges, while initially successful, intory "very shortly:' cession of General Geiger. Most ofthatsmallinfantryunitscould When the 321st's probes eastward

35 On 3 October, reinforced by the attached 3/5 (back from Ngesebus), the 7th Regiment organized a four- battalion attack. The plan called for 1/7 and 3/7 to attack from the north, against Boyd Ridge and the smaller ridges to its west, while 2/7 would attack Pope (Walt) Ridge from the south. The attached 3/5 was ordered to make a diversionary attack from the south into the Horseshoe canyon and its guardian Five Sisters on its west. This regimental attack against the Pocket committed four infantry "battalions," all now closer to com- pany than battalion strength, against the heights near the southern end of the Pocket (Five Sisters), and the ridges at the eastern shoulder of the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 98260 Pocket (Pope and Boyd Ridges). Af- Many of the participants in the battle with a literary turn of mind best compared ter heavy casualties, the attack suc- the ridge areas of Peleliu with the description of Dante's "Inferno." Here a flame ceeded, but the Five Sisters (four of thrower-mounted amphibian tractor spews its deadly stream of napalm into a cave. which 3/5 scaled) were untenable, near the northern end of the Pocketthe west and southwest sectors of theand had to be abandoned after their brought them within grasp of seal-Pocket, the division stripped hun- seizure. ing off that Pocket from the north,dreds of non-infantry from combat The next day, 4 October, the 7th they deployed two battalions (2d andsupport units (artillery, engineer, pi-Marines with 3/5 still attached made 3d) facing eastward to complete theoneer), and formed them into twoone more general attack—in the encirclement. composite "infantillery" units. Undersouth, again to seize, then give up, This attack against Hill B, the stop-11th Marines' Lieutenant Colonelpositions on the Five Sisters; in the per at the northern end of the Pock-Richard B. Evans and 5th Marines'north, to try to advance and consoli- et absorbed the 321st Infantry's fullMajor Harold T. A. Richmond, theydate the positions there earlier seized. attention through 26 September, aswere assigned to maintain the static In that 4 October action, the 3d the 5th Marines was fighting inhold in the sectors earlier held by 2/7Battalion, 7th Marines' push led to northern Peleliu. The 7th Marinesand 3/7. They faced the karst plateauan unexpectedly rapid advance which continued pressuring the Pocket frombetween the West Road and theit pressed to get up onto Hill 120. It the south, and guarding it on thePocket. was hoped that this would provide west. With the 321st victory on the The 7th Marines' flexibility re-a good jump-off for the next day's 26th, that unit's mission was expand-stored by this relief, its 1st and 3doperation against the next ridge to ed to press into the Pocket from theBattalions relieved the 321st units onthe west. However, Hill 120, as with north. This it did, while simultane-29 September, along the north edgeso many others in the Umurbrogol, ously clearing out the sporadicallyof the Pocket. Then on the 30th, theywas then under enemy crossfire defended Kamilianlul Ridge to itspushed south, securing improvedwhich made it completely untenable. north. Its attack south from Hill Bcontrolof Boyd Ridge anditsThe attacking company was with- and adjacent ridges made very limit-southern extension, variously calleddrawn with heavy casualties Among ed progress, but permitted some con-Hill 100, Pope's Ridge, or Walt Ridge.these casualties was Captain James solidation of the American holdThe latter dominated the East Road, V."Jamo"Shanley, commanding along the north side of the Pocket,but Japanese defenders remained inCompany L. His company was at- now 400 yards wide in that zone. Oncaves on the west side. The 7th Ma-tacking Ridge/Hill 120 when sever- 29 September, the 7th Marines wasrines' partial hold on Pope Ridge gaveal of his men fell, wounded. Shanley ordered to relieve the Army unit inlimited control of East Road, anddashed forward under heavy fire, that northern sector. thereby stabilized the east side of therescued two of the men and brought To relieve 2/7 and 3/7 of their nowPocket. But the U.S. hold over thethem to safety behind a tank. He largely static guard positions alongarea needed improvement. then rushed back to help a third,

36 ______when a mortar round landed im-also suggested. Still determined to se-sance during the first week on Peleliu mediately behind him,mortallycure the Pocket with Marines, Gener-had convinced him that siege tactics wounding him. His executive officer, alRupertus turnedtohisonlywould be required to clear the mul- Lieutenant Harold J. Collins ran outremaining Marine regiment, the 5th.titude of mutually defended posi- to rescue him, only to fall by his side Colonel Harris brought two firmtions within Umurbrogol. As he had instantly killed by a Japanese anti-concepts to this final effort for his 5thearlierexpressed himselfinthe tank round. Marines. First, the attack would bepresence of the corps and division For his heroism Captain Shanleyfrom the north, an approach whichcommanders visiting his regimental was awarded a Gold Star (second) foroffered the greatest opportunity toCP, Harris continued with his poli- the Navy Cross he had earned atchip off one terrain compartment orcy to "be lavish with ammunition and Cape Gloucester, New Britain.one ridge at a time. His 1st Battal-stingy with. . .men'slives' He was There, his company was in the leadion positions along the east side ofin a strong command position to pre- in seizing Hill 660, a key terrain fea-the Pocket Would be held statically,pare support thoroughly before or- ture in the Borgen Bay area. perhaps incrementally adjusted ordering advances. improved. No attacks would be The 7th Marines had now been inlaunched from the south, where the The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, the terrible Umurbrogol struggle for3d Battalion was positionedinrelieved 3d Battalion, 7th Marines in two weeks. General Rupertus decidedreserve. position on 5 October, but did noth- to relieve it, a course General Geiger Colonel Harris' aerial reconnais-ing but reconnoiter positions where

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Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 97433 Marine riflemen accompanied by tanks push forward to theenemy water supply and rid it of Japanese troops onceand for inner recesses of Horseshoe Ridge in an effort to cut off theall. The going got no easier as the Americans pushed forward. heavier firepower could come intosuspected targets just south of the keytober sent a tank sortie into the play. Engineer dozers were broughtHill 140, which 2/5 had selected asHorseshoe. This time, the mission up to prepare paths into the northits key objective. was not to seize and hold, but to des- ends of the box canyons, along which As 2 / 5 picked off successive firingtroy by fire all identifiable targets on LVT flame throwers and tanks couldpositions in the north, 3/5 on 7 Oc-the faces of the Five Sisters, and on later operate. A light artillery batteryMarines who fought on Pope Ridge would not recognize it in this photograph of was emplaced along the West Roadthe southern end of the ridge looking north showing how the vegetation took over. to fire point-blank into the west- Caption and photo by Phillip D. Orr facing cliffs at the north end of the Pocket, as were weapons carriers and tanks later. Troublesome sections of certaincliffswereliterally demolished by direct fire, and the rubble dozed into a ramp for tanks to climb toward better firing posi- tions. Light mortars were used exten- sively to strip vegetation from areas in which firing caves were suspect- ed, and planes loaded with napalm- filled belly tanks were used to bomb

38 the western (lower) face of Hill 100advances by 2/5 from the north.sembled mode, reassembled, sand- (Pope Ridge). When all ammunitionLight mortars were repeatedly usedbagged, and then effectively fired was expended, the tanks withdrew toto clear all vegetation from small ob-from its then-commanding position. rearm then returned, accompaniedjectives and routes of advance. BothIt could fire into the mouth of a very by LVT flame-throwing tanks andtanks and artillery were used atlarge cave at the base of the next guarded by small infantry fire-teams.point-blank ranges to fire into all sus-ridge, from which serious fire had Considerably more destruction waspected caves or rough coral areas.been received for days. effected, a large number of JapaneseAerial bombardment with napalm Sandbagging this piece into posi- were killed in caves, and many of thewas used to clear vegetation and, tion posed special problems, since the Japanese heavy weapons in thosehopefully, drive some defenders fur-only available loose sand or dirt had caves were silenced. Previous to thisther back into their caves. All ad-to be carried from the beach, or oc- time, some single artillery pieces fir-vances were very limited, aimedcasional debris slides. Nevertheless, ing from within the Horseshoe hadsimply at seizing new firing posi-the use of sandbags in forward infan- occasionally harassed the airfield. Notions.Advances were made bytry positions began to be used in- such nuisance attacks occurred aftersquads or small platoons. creasingly, and the technique was the 7 October tank sorties. The last position seized, Hill 140,later improved and widely used when For the next six days, the 5th Ma-just north of the Five Brothers, af-81st Infantry Division soldiers took rines headquarters afforded all avail-forded a firing site to which a 75mmover further reduction of the Pocket. able support to small, incrementalpack howitzer was wrestled in disas- By this mode of careful advance,

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39 I 'I the depth of the coral badlands, be- tween West road and the China Wall. .4 This clearing action allowed the com- posite "infantillery" unit to advance its lines eastward and then hold, as faras the infantry had cleared, toward the back of China Wall. Overall, the actions of the 5th and 7th Marines in October had reduced the Pocket to an oval some 800 yards, north to south, and 400-500 yards, east to west. According to Colonel Nakagawa's contemporaneous radio report back to Koror, he still had some 700 defenders within the Pock- .;- et, of which only 80 percent were ef- Ct- fective. In early October, some wag had suggested that the Pocket situa- 1 tion be clarified by enclosing it with barbed wire and designating it as a Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 97878 prisoner of war enclosure. Spoken in Maj Gordon D. Gayle, commander of 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, outlines in thebitter jest, the concept did recognize sand proposed enemy targets in the north for LtCol Joslyn R. Bailey, Marine Air- that the Pocket no longer counted in craft Group 11. Looking on are Col Harold D Harris, 5th Marines commander, the strategic balance, nor in complet- center, and LtCol Lewis W. Walt, behind Gayle, 5th Marines executive officer. ing the effective seizure of Peleliu. a number of small knobs and ridges Directly south of Hill 140, there But it still weighed significantly in at the head of the two murderous boxseemed no feasible axis for advance,the mind of Major General Rupertus, canyons were seized. Direct fire couldso 3/S's axis was shifted southwest,who wanted to subdue the Pocket be- be laid into the west face of Walt andapproximately paralleling the Westfore turning over to Major General Boyd Ridges, whose tops were oc-Road, and into the coral badlands inMueller the 81st Division's previously cupied by 1/5, but those cave-filledfront of the containing lines mannedspecified mopping-up task. In point western slopes were protected byby the composite groups guardingof fact, Rupertus' successful seizure other caves on the opposite, parallelWest Road. While the compositeof Ngesebus and northern Peleliu had ridge known as Five Brothers. groups held in place, 3/5 operatedterminated the enemy's capability to A week of such siege-like activityacross their front, north to south. Byreinforce the now-isolated Japanese pushed the northern boundary of thethis means the coral badlands wereon Peleliu. Creation of that tactical Pocket another 500 yards south. Oncleared out for an average (east-west)situation had effectively secured 12 October, the 3d Battalion, 5thdepth of 75-150 yards, along somePeleliu. Marines was called in to relieve 2d500 yards of the north-south front. This terrain, earlier judged unsuit- Without pressing for a declaration Battalion, 5th Marines. The relief that Peleliu had been effectively se- was seriously marred, primarily be-able for any but the costliest and most difficult advance, was nowcured, which would have formalized cause the forward positions being the completion of the 1st Marine Di- relieved were so close to the oppos-traversed with the aid of preparato- ry fire-scouring by napalm bombs.vision's mission, General Geiger had ing enemy. The incoming troops, in- for some days suggested that in con- Major "Cowboy" Stout's VMF-114 pi- cluding a company commander, were tinuing his attacks into the Pocket, picked off by snipers during this ex-lots' bombs fell breathtakingly close to both the advancing 3/5 front andRupertus relieve first the 5th, then the change, and a small group of enemy 7th Marines with his largest and reoccupied a position earlier subduedto the stationary composite units holding just east of West Road. freshest infantry regiment, the 321st by frequent interdiction fires. Despite RCT, still attached to 1st Marine Di- these losses and interruptions, the A similar effort was then launchedvision.Toallsuch suggestions, relief was completed on schedule,from the south by what was left ofGeneral Rupertus replied that his and on 13 October, 3/5 continuedLieutenant Colonel John Gormley'sMarines would "very shortly" subdue the slow and deliberate wedging1/7. Together, these two advancesthe Pocket. forward. seized and emptied about one-half of Two events now overtook Gener-

40 ____

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a44 DRIVE FROM THE NORTH a aa-4.4 .4fr7 a--.4- •..... Positions 6—8 Oct 4Thg aa LL Attock 9 Oct lLa.a—14- a-a-tt- Ca -41. Th - cJ Attock 10 Oct - -4C .J4--.41. a- - MC a. a--.a- -.J1. a- - - AAS ..a aAMC a- -aa-4l-ThS a-a- —a. Attock IlOct —_.41-- —a..—a-—a —ta..—a--—-a&—.a —a-a -a-- a--a--a -a- -a- a-aa- Positions 2/bNigtitIIOct a--s--a- -aa- -a-As- a--a - a--a- -a-- a--a--.41.. - -a--a- -A4.ra- Al.—a-—Ai- a-.—a—-Al.— a —a-— -S-r-4i.. RD 7163 a-a-a--a-a-—a- —a-— S-au- Ta al Rupertus' confidence. First, thedirected to turn over that responsi-on 15 and 16 October.While that 81st Division was made whole by thebilitytoVice Admiral John H.relief was in progress, Lieutenant return of its 323d RCT, fresh from itsHoover,asub-area commander.Colonel Gormley's 1/7 was still en- critically important seizure of Ulithi.When relieved by the 81st Division,gaged in the earlier-described coral Second, the perception that Peleliuthe 1st Marine Division would em-badlands action, to make possible the was effectively secured was validat-bark for return to Pavuvu. eastward movement of the contain- ed by a message which so stated from During the movement and turn-ing lines protecting West Road. The Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Com-over,tacticaloperations ashorerelief of 1 / 7 was accordingly delayed mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet/Com-necessarily remained under 1st Ma-until the next day. On 17 October, mander inChief,Pacific Oceanrine Division control until the 81sta full-strength Company B, 1/323, Areas. Major General Geiger wasDivision could move its commandnewly arrived from Ulithi, relieved directed to turn over command topost from Angaur. General MuellerGormley's surviving battalion, ap- Major General Mueller, whose 81stestablished his CP near Peleliu's Pur-proximately man for man. Division was now directed to relieveple Beach on 20 October. The Wild- the 1st Marine Division, to mop up, catDivision thereupon acquired and to garrison Peleliu,as long"custody" of the Pocket, and respon- planned. Rear Admiral George E.sibility for final reduction of its de- Fort,Rear Admiral Theodore S.termined, able, battered defenders. When on 20 October Major Wilkinson's successor as commander Meanwhile, the relief of the 5thGeneral Mueller became responsible of operations in the Palaus, wasMarines by the 321st RCT took placefor mopping up on Peleliu, he ad-

41 Department of Defense Photo (USMC 98401 As a result of Maj Gayle's targetting of enemy positions in theiu's airfield, and returned to the field to be rearmed, in perhaps Uniurbrogol, napalm-laden Marine Corsairs lifted from Pelel-the shortest wheels-down bombing run of the Pacific War. dressed the tactical problem as a siegeness of the 75mm pack howitzerwas carried on within 25 miles of a situation, and directed his troops towhich the Marines had wrestled upmuch larger force of some 25,000 proceed accordingly. Over a periodto Hill 140, they sought and foundJapanese soldiers in the northern of nearly six weeks, his two regi-other sites to which they moved packPalaus. Minor infiltrations aside, ments, the 322d amd 323d Infantry,howitzers, and from which they firedthose Japanese were isolated by U.S. plus 2/321, did just that. They usedpoint-blank intQ defending caves. ToNavy patrols, and by regular bomb- sandbags as an assault device, carry-support their growing need for sand-ing from Marine Aircraft Group 11, ing sand up from the beaches andbags on ridge-top "foxholes;' their en-operating from Peleliu. inching the filled sandbags forwardgineers strung highlines to transport Difficult and costly as the Ameri- to press ever nearer to positions fromsand (and ammo and rations) up tocan advances were,the Japanese which to attack by fire the Japanesesuch peaks and ridgetops. defendersintheir underground caves and dug-in strong points. They Notwithstanding these deliberatepositions had a similarly demanding made liberaluseof tanks andsiege tactics, the 81st troops still facedand even more discouraging situa- flamethrowers, even improving upondeath and maiming as they groundtion. Water was low. Sanitation was the vehicle-mounted flamethrower.down thebitter and stubborncrude to nonexistent. Rations were They thrust a gasoline pipeline for-Japanese defenses. The siege of theshort, and ammunition was even ward from a roadbound gasolineUmurbrogol Pocket consumed thescarcer. As time wore on, some of the truck, thereby enabling them, withfull efforts of 81st Division's 322dJapanese, when afforded opportuni- booster pumps, to throw napalmRCT and 323d RCT, as well as 2/321,ty, chose to leave their defenses and hundreds of feet ahead into Japaneseuntil 27 November 1944 (D plus 73).undertake futile,usually suicidal defensive areas. Noting the effective- This prolonged siege operationnight attacks. A very few succeeded

42 ______in being captured. the 81st Division's engineers pressedcluding two officers, were killed. Toward late November, evenforward and improved the roads andAnother soldier was captured the fol- Major General Murai apparentlyramps leading into or toward thelowing morning. His interrogation, came to this point of view. Still notheart of the Japanese final position.together with postwar records and in- in command, he nevertheless pro-This facilitatedthe tank andterviews, led to his conclusion that posed, in a radio message to Lieu-flamethrower attacks to systematical-Colonel Nakagawa and Major Gen- tenant General Inoue on Koror, aly reduce each cave and position aseral Murai died in the CP, in ritual banzai finale for their prolongedthe infantry pushed its sandbag "fox-suicide. defense. But General Inoue turnedholes" forward. The final two-day advance of the down the proposal. By this time, On 24 November, Colonel Nakag-81st Division's soldiers was truly and Nakagawa's only exterior communi-awa sent his final message to his su-literally a mopping-up operation. It cations were by radio to Koror. Asperior on Koror. He advised that hewas carefully conducted to search out he had anticipated, all local wirehad burned the colors of the 2d In-any holed-up opposition. By mid- communications had been destroyed.fan try Regiment. He said that the fi-day on 27 November, the north- He had issued mission orders to car-nal 56 men had been split into 17moving units, guarded on the east by ry his units through the final, phaseinfiltration parties, to slip through theother Army units, met face-to-face of defense. American positions and to "attack thewith the battalion moving south, As the tanks and infantry careful-enemy everywhere" During the nightnear the Japanese CP later located. ly pressed their relentless advances,of 24-25 November, 25 Japanese, in-The 323d's commander, Colonel Ar-

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* S K C On 27 September 1944, the U.S. flag was raised over Peleliu, comprised of 1st Marine Division Band members. The general symbolizing that the island was secured. The honor guard was editor of this pamphlet, Benis M. Frank, is eighth from the left. thur P. Watson, reported to GeneralJapanese to carry out their emperor'sthat a final banzai attack was under Mueller that the operation was over.war aims was starkly symbolized byconsideration. Not quite. Marine air on Peleliuthe last 33 prisoners captured on The Navy garrison commander continued to attack the Japanese po-Peleliu. In March 1947, a small Ma-moved all Navy personnel, and some sitions in Koror and Babeithuap,rine guard attached to a small naval35 dependents, to a secure area and joining the patrolling Navy units ingarrison on the island encounteredsent to Guam for reinforcements and destroying or bottling up any re-unmistakable signs of a Japanesea Japanese war crimes witness, Rear Admiral Michio Sumikawa. The ad- maining Japanese forces in the north-military presence in a cave in the ern Palaus. A late casualty in thatUmurbrogol. Patrolling and ambush-miral flew in and travelled by jeep action was the indomitable Majores produced a straggler, a Japanesealong the roads near the suspected Robert F. "Cowboy" Stout, whoseseaman who told of 33 remainingcave positions. Through a loudspeak- VMF-114 had delivered so much ef-Japanese under the military com-er he recited the then-existing situa- fective air support to the groundmand of Lieutenant Tadamichition. No response.Finally,the combat on Peleliu. Yamaguchi. Although the stragglerJapanese seaman who had originally reported some dissension within thesurrendered went back to the cave The stubborn determination of theranks of that varied group, it seemedarmed with letters from Japanese fa-

44 milies and former officers from thePalaus group, it destroyed facilitiesnications from Hawaii, and from the Palaus, advising the hold-outs of thewhich survived Admiral Marc A.Marianas, to the Philippines. The end of the war. On 21 April 1947, theMitscher'sdevastatingstrikeofholding was a convenience, but not holdouts formally surrendered. Lieu-March 1944. It insured total deniala necessity. tenant Yamaguchi led 26 soldiers toof support to the enemy from Koror's Such judgment could be disputed, a position in front of 80 battle-submarine basingfacilities,in-however, by the survivors of the In- dressed Marines. He bowed andcrementally decreasing the alreadydianapolis' 29 July 1945 sinking. handed his sword to the Americanwaning Japanese submarine capabil-Having delivered atomic bomb parts naval commander on the scene. ity east of the Philippines. The Unit-to Tinian shortly before, the ship was edStatesposition on Peleliuheaded for the Philippines, when it completed the neutralization of thewas suddenly torpedoed at night. some 25,000 Japanese troopsinThe ship went down in 12 minutes, northern Palau. The landing onand no report of the contact or the What advantages to the UnitedPeleliu did not contribute to thesinking was received. The fourth day States' war effort grew from the con-Regimental Landing Team (RLT) 323after the sinking, its 316 survivors quest of Peleliu? It assured absoluteunopposed seizure of Ulithi. Admiral(from a crew of 1,196) were sighted domination of all of the Palaus,William F. Halsey had earlier be-by a Navy patrol bomber working thereby adding, marginally, to thelieved that his forces could seizeout of Peleliu. The sighting led direct- security of MacArthur's right flankUlithi without first seizing Peleliu. ly to their rescue, and most certain- as he continued westward, then The most visible benefit of a sub-ly would not have occurred, but for northward from New Guinea into hisdued Peleliu lay in its use as a linkAmerican occupation of Peleliu. Philippines campaign. Within thein the flight path and line of commu- (Continued on page 48) With the senior officers present, division chaplains dedicateextreme right are: BGen Smith, assistant division commander; a new cemetery created at Orange Beach 2. The 1st DivisionCol Harrison (11th Marines), and, Col Harris (5th Marines). commander, MajGen Rupertus, with a cane, is near the centerNot present at this time was the 7th Marines' commander, Col and to his right is Col Puller (1st Marines). Grouped on the Hanneken, whose regiment was still engaged with the enemy. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 96989

45 Tom Lea's Paintings

om Lea, the artist of the paintings which illustrate to smile, or show expression, or talk. Mercifully, you're out this pamphlet, wrote of his experiences on Peleliu of it for a while; unmertifully, down in the center of that Tin Battle Stations, published in 1988 by Still Pointnumbness, though, you know you will have to come back Press in Dallas. Some of the sketches from this book were eventually:' reproduced with commentary in Volume 14. Number 2 of Reprinted by permission of Discovery,theUniversity of Texas at Discovery, a journal published by the University of Texas Austin. Tom Lea's artwork in this pamphlet is reproduced with at Austin. In this issue, James Jones, author of From Here the permission of the artist. The captions under each of the Lea to Eternity, wrote: "Lea was one of the artists put in thepaintings are the artist's own words. Benis M. Frank field by Life . Variousof his works appeared in the magazine, and up until the time he went into Peleliu, most ABOVE RIGHT "Artillery Support" At thesouthern end on ourside of of them could be pretty well classified as excellently done the field oppositethe hill ourartillerymen had dug holes and carried 75-rum field howitzers to the sites. As we came down to them thesebat- but high-grade propaganda. There was very little Ameri- teries were firing continuously, throwing shells into the lap hangars and can blood, very little tension, very little horror. Mostly, buildings at the foot of the hill, and at caves in the bill where lap mortar it was what could be called the Bravo America! and This and artillery and machine-gun fire was dealing out misery to marines, is Your Boy type of war art. His almost photographic style BELOWRIGHT"TheBlockhouse" Lookingup at the head of the trail easily lent itself to that type of work . I could see the big lap blockhouse that commanded the height. The thing "Butsomething apparently happened to Lea after going was now a great jagged lump of concrete, smoking. I saw our lead man into Peleliu. The pictures painted out of his Peleliu ex- meet a front line detail posted by the blockhouse while the other troops advanced down the hill with the three tanks and the flumethrowers. Iso- perience show a new approach. There is the tension of ter- lated lap snipers were at work on our slope, small groups of marines ror in the bodies here, the distorted facial expressions of fanned out on both sides of the trail to clean them out, while we climbed the men under fire show it, too. toward the blockhouse. "Oneof the most famous, of course,isthe Two- BELOW "Counterattack" The phone rang. A battalion CO reported the Thousand-Yard Stare portrait of a young marine who has laps' infiltration and the beginning of the counterattack. He asked what had all, or more than, he can take. The staring eyes, the reserves were available and was told there were none. Small arms fire slack lips, the sleepwalker's stance. I've seen men with that ahead of us became a continuous rattle. Abruptly three star shells burst in the sky. As soon as they died floating down, others flared to take their look on their faces. I've had it on my own face. It feels stiff, place. Then the howitzers just behind us opened up, hurling their charges and the muscles don't want to work right when you try over our heads, shaking the ground with their blasts.

Life Magazine artistTorn LeaaccompaniedMarinesonPeleliu.

46 47 (Continued from page 45) F. Halsey's recommendation throughbe cancelled. By that time, it was too What did the seizure of PeleliuAdmiral Nimitz to the Joint Chiefslate. And Peleliu was added to the cost? Marine casualties numberedof Staff on 13 September 1944, twolong list of battles in which Marines 6,526, including Navy corpsmen anddays before D-Day, that the landingfought and suffered, and prevailed. doctors, of whom 1,252 were killed. The 81st Division totalled 3,089 casualties, of whom 404 were killed in action. Total U.S. troop casualties was 9,615 for Peleliu, Angaur and Ngesebus, with 1,656 dead. By inflicting that many casualties, the Japanese were successful in im- plementing their longstanding "delay and bleed" strategy. The actions cost them an estimated 10,900 casualties, all but a tiny fraction killed. Just 202 prisoners of war were captured, only 19 of whom were Japanese military (seven Army, 12 Navy). The others were laborers,largely Korean. Among the Japanese military defenders, less than two per thou- sand were captured. The costs at Peleliu held warnings aplenty for the remaining Allied operations to be conducted across the Pacific to Japan. Even with total 10- cal air and naval superiority, with lavish naval gunfire and bombs, with the dreaded napalm weaponry, and with a 4:1 troop superiority, the sei- zure of Peleiju consumed one Ameri- can casualty and 1,589 rounds of heavy and light troop ammunition for each single Japanese defender killed or driven from his prepared position. A few months later, the at- tacks on Iwo Jima and Okinawa would confirm this grim calculus of For Extraordinary Heroism war against determined Japanese he Secretary of the Navy awarded the Presidenlial Unit Citation to the defenders, ably led,in prepared 1stMarine Division, anditsreinforcingorganizations,for defenses. T"extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces at The questionof whether the Peleliu and Ngesebus from September 15 to 29, 1944." In addition, Marine Peleliu operation was necessary re- Aircraft Group 11 and the 3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion were awarded the mains moot, even today, some 52 Navy Unit Commendation. On an individual basis, 69 participants in the years after the 1 September 1944 battle for Peleliu were decorated with the Navy Cross, the second seniormost landing. The heroism and exemplary combat award in the Naval service. conduct of the 1st Marine Division, The nation's highest award, the Medal of Honor, was presented to eight its Marines and Navy corpsmen, and Marines in the fight for Peleliu; five were decorated posthumously, as indi- cated by ('): *CorporaI Lewis K. Bausell., USMC, 1/5; Private First Class Ar- the soldiers of the 81st Infantry Di- thurJ.Jackson, USMC, 3.7; 'Private First Class Richard E. Kraus, USMCR, vision on that miserable island is 8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion; *PrivateFirst Class John D. New. USMC, written in the record. But there is an 2. 7; *Private First Class Wesley Phelps, USMCR, 3/7; Captain Everett P. Pope, enduring question of whether the USMC, ill.: 'Private First Class Charles H. Roan, USMCR. 2/7:andFirst capture of Peleliu was essential, es- Lieutenant Canton R. Rouh, USMCR, 1/5. pecially in view of Admiral William

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1996 440—649/40002 48 rigadierGeneral Gordon D. Gayle, USMC The basic source work for this pamph- let is the Marine Corps' official mono- B(Ret), graduated from the U.S. Naval Acade- graph, The Assault on Peleliu, by Maj my in June 1939 and was commissioned a Ma- Frank 0. Hough, published by the Govern- rifle second lieutenant. After completing Basic ment Printing Office in 1950, while LtCol School in Philadelphia in 1940, he was assigned Gordon D. Gayle was serving as deputy to the 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division with director of Marine Corps history and edi- which he served in three Pacific campaigns: tor of the monograph series. Other books Guadalcanal, Cape Gloucester, and Peleliu. For used in this narrative were: George W. his extraordinary heroism while commanding the Garand and Truman R.Strobridge, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, on Peleliu, he was Western Pacific Operations, vol IV, History awarded the Navy Cross. of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World He returned to 1st Marine Division in the Korean war to serve first as the execu- War II (Washington: Historical Division, HQMC, 1971); George P. Hunt, Coral tive officer of the 7th Marines, then as G-3 on the division staff. He is a graduate Comes High (New York:Harper & of the Army's Command and General Staff College. In 1963-65, he chaired the Long Brothers, 1946); E. B. Sledge, With the Old Range Study Panel at Quantico, developing concepts for the Corps' operational, Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa (Presidioorganizational, logistical and R&D needs for the 1985 period. He was promoted Press, 1981); Edward S. Miller, War Plan to brigadier general in 1964. Retiring in 1968, he joined Georgetown University's Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan Center for Strategic and International Studies. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991); Edward Behr, Hirohito: Behind the Myth (New York: Vantage Books & Random House, 1989); Bill D. Ross, Peleliu: Tragic Triumph, The Untold Story of the Pacific War's Forgotten Battle (New York: Random House, 1992); James H. Hallas, The Devil's Anvil: The Assault on Peleliu (Westport, 945 a Connecticut: Praeger, 1944); Harry A. Gailey,Peleliu1944(Annapolis, WORLD WAR II Maryland: Nautical & Aviation Publish- THIS PAMPHLET HIS1DRY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the ing Inc., 1983); Masataka Chihaya, Fading World War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines by Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Ugaki, 1941-45 (University of Pittsburg Press, 1962); Larry L. Woodward, Before Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance the First Wave: The 3rd Armored Amphib- of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war. ian Tractor Battalion —Peleliuand Okina- Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by wa (Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower Univ. a grant from the Marine Corps Historical Foundation and a bequest from Press, 1944); Burke Davis Marine: The Life the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in memory of her late husband, Thomas M. of Lieutenant General Lewis B. (Chesty) Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient of a Purple Heart. Puller, USMC (Ret) (Boston: Little, Brown Company, 1962). WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES The Oral History and Personal Papers DIRECTOR EMERITUS OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS Collections in the Marine Corps Histori- Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret) calCenter,Washington Navy Yard, GENERAL EDITOR, Washington, D.C., hold a number of in- WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES terviews and diaries of participants in the Benis M. Frank Peleliu operation. These documents from CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT the following were particularly useful: George C. MacGillivray LtGen Oliver P. Smith; BGen Harold D. Harris; BGen Harold 0. Deakin; and EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION LtGen Lewis J. Fields, along with numer- Robert E. Struder, Senior Editor; W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information ous personal interviews with campaign Specialist; Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician officersand enlisted men. veterans — Marine Corps Historical Center The author wishes to thank the Army Building 58, Washington Navy Yard Center of Military History for the loan of Washington, D.C. 20374-5040 the photographs of Tom Lea's artwork ap- pearing in this pamphlet. He also wishes 1996 to thank Phillip D. Orr for permitting use PCN 190 003137 00 of the interesting photographs of Peleliu as it appeared in 1994.