Spain's Multinationals: the Dynamic Part of an Ailing Economy (WP)
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Spain’s Multinationals: the Dynamic Part of an Ailing Economy (WP) William Chislett Area: International Economy and Trade / Europe Working Paper 17/2011 15/9/2011 Elcano Royal Institute Madrid – Spain http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng 1 Spain’s Multinationals: the Dynamic Part of an Ailing Economy (WP) William Chislett * Contents (1) Summary (2) Background (3) Current Situation (4) Telecommunications: Telefónica (5) Energy: Repsol YPF and Gas Natural Fenosa (6) Banks: Santander and BBVA (7) Electricity: Iberdrola and Gamesa (8) Construction and Infrastructure: Ferrovial, Acciona, ACS, FCC, Sacyr Vallehermoso and OHL (9) Other Multinationals: Abengoa, Acerinox, CAF, Ebro Puleva, Iberostar, Indra, La Seda, Mapfre, Mondragon Cooperative Corporation, NH Hoteles, Prisa, Prosegur and Sol Meliá (10) Family‐owned Multinationals: Antolín‐Irausa, Inditex, Pronovias, Roca and Talgo (11) Brands (12) The Paradox of Exports (13) Conclusion Appendix (a) Foreign Direct Investment Outflows by Selected Country, 1990‐2010 (US$ billion) Appendix (b) Outward Stock as a percentage of GDP by Selected Country, 1990‐2010 Appendix (c) Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows of Spain and the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean (US$ million), 2005‐10 Selective bibliography (1) Summary Spain’s outward direct investment continues to rise. At the end of 2010, it stood at US$660.1 billion, higher than Italy’s and Germany’s in GDP terms. More than 20 companies have attained leading positions in their respective fields in the global market. Meanwhile, exports have become the engine of economic growth. While the US, the UK, Germany, France and Italy have lost global market share to varying degrees over the last decade, mainly to China and other emerging countries, Spain’s share of world merchandise exports has remained virtually unchanged. The challenge for Spain is to keep up this performance. * Former correspondent of The Times in Madrid (1975‐78) and the Financial Times in Mexico (1978‐84) and author of three books on Spain for the Elcano Royal Institute. 2 (2) Background1 Spanish companies began to invest abroad in the 1960s, but it was not until the country joined the European Community in 1986 and adopted the euro as its currency in 1999, which enabled companies to raise funds for their acquisitions at rates unimaginable just a few years back, that outward investment took off. EU membership changed the strategic focus of corporate Spain from one of defending the relatively mature home market –much more open to other EU countries– to aggressively expanding abroad. The liberalisation of the domestic market as European single market directives began to unfold made the big Spanish companies, especially the state‐run companies in oligopolistic sectors such as telecommunications (Telefónica), oil and natural gas (Repsol and Gas Natural) and electricity (Endesa)2 –all of which were to be privatised and become cash rich– and the big private‐sector banks, Santander and BBVA, conscious of the need to reposition themselves in the more competitive environment. The tougher environment was underscored by an inward FDI boom in the first years after EU entry when hardly a week passed without an acquisition and it seemed that Spain was up for sale. The strategic response to the threat of acquisition was to become bigger and go on the offensive. Liberalisation at home gave Spanish companies the opportunity to do this. And they seized it. Outward investment surged from an annual average of US$2.3 billion in 1985‐95 to US$21.7 billion in 1995‐2004 and US$40 billion in 2005‐07 (see Appendix A). In 1999 the stock of outward investment almost reached the level of inward investment and that same year Spain overtook the average developed country in the world in terms of its cumulative investments abroad. Latin America was a natural first choice for Spanish companies wishing to invest abroad in a significant way. Between 1993 and 2000, during the first phase of significant investment abroad, Telefónica, Santander and BBVA, the oil and natural gas conglomerate Repsol, Gas Natural, the power companies Endesa, Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa and some construction and infrastructure companies invested in the region. Latin America accounted for 61% of total net investment during this period –which averaged €13.1 billion a year excluding the Special Purpose Entities (ETVEs) whose sole purpose is to hold foreign equity–, compared with 22.5% by the EU‐15 and 9% by the US and Canada. Only the US, whose economy is 12 times larger than Spain’s and in whose backyard Latin America lies, invested more. During the second phase of investment, between 2001 and 2006, when total net investment averaged €26.8 billion a year, Latin America’s share was 16%, the EU‐15’s 67% and the US and Canada’s 6.4%. 1 I would like to thank the following for helping me prepare this paper: José Antonio Herce and María Romero Paniagua of Analistas Financieros Internacionales (Afi); Nuria Lafuente de Mier, of BBVA; Ana María Rivera Pérez, of the Madrid Stock Exchange; José Juan Ruíz, Chief Economist of Grupo Santander’s Americas division; Carlos Solchaga, former Finance Minister (1985‐93) and Director‐Partner of Solchaga Recio; and José Luis del Valle, advisor to the Chairman of Gamesa. 2 Endesa has been more than 90% owned by Italy’s Enel since 2009. 3 As well as the companies’ own push factors, there were several pull factors. Two of them were purely economic: liberalisation and privatisation opened up sectors of the Latin American economy that were hitherto off limits, and there is an ongoing need for capital to develop the region’s generally poor infrastructure. Two are cultural: the first is the common language and the ease, therefore, with which management styles can be transferred. Another attraction is the sheer size of the Latin American market and its degree of underdevelopment. The macroeconomic fundamentals of Latin America as a whole and some countries in particular, such as Mexico and Brazil, had also become sounder as a result of major reforms, making the region a less risky place to invest. Mexico, Chile and Brazil have achieved investment‐grade status, which means the risk of debt default is minimal and institutional investors are less hesitant about investing in their financial markets. Lastly, democracy has been gradually taking root in an increasing number of countries. The initial move into Latin America was, as Mauro Guillén has pointed out, the ‘path of least resistance’ for Spanish companies facing deregulation and take‐over threats on their home ground.3 Spanish executives were ideally suited to handling new businesses in Latin America as they had gained a lot of experience of how to compete in industries under deregulation in their own country. By the early 2000s, Spanish companies had become among the largest operators in telecommunications, electricity, water and financial services throughout Latin America and the region a major contributor to the bottom line of a significant number of Spanish companies and banks. While the 1980s were a ‘lost decade’ for Latin America, as countries struggled with foreign debt crises, the first decade of the 21st century has seen the continuation of a profound transformation that began in the 1990s and is benefiting Spanish investments in the region. The shift away from Latin America as of the early 2000s, after Argentina’s financial meltdown, which hit Spanish banks and companies there but hardly affected the Spanish economy as whole, and into Europe, particularly the UK, and the US and Asia, to a lesser extent, was marked by several emblematic investments: Santander’s €12.5 billion purchase of the UK bank Abbey in 2004, the acquisition by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) of two small banks in California and Texas and Telefónica’s purchase in 2005 of a stake in China Netcom and in 2006 its €26 billion acquisition of the O2 mobile telephony operator in the UK, Germany and Ireland. In 2010, Spain accounted for just 4% of foreign direct investment in Latin America compared with 17% by the US, 13% by the Netherlands and 9% by China. 3 See his The Rise of Spanish Multinationals, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 4 Today, there is a striking number of Spanish companies that have diversified into foreign markets, thanks to which they have withstood relatively well the sharp downturn in their home economy since 2008. This is particularly true of the big Spanish companies in the Ibex 35 stock exchange index, more than half of whose revenues in the first six months of 2011 were generated abroad (see Figure 1). Several listed companies make more than two‐ thirds of their sales and profits abroad and in the case of Gamesa, which makes wind turbines, more than 90%. With their home economy in a bad shape, Spanish chief executives ‘go to great lengths these days to emphasise how un‐Spanish their companies are when presenting their results to international investors’.4 Spain, along with South Korea and Taiwan, has produced the largest number of truly global multinationals among the countries that in the 1960s had not yet developed a solid industrial base. There is also a host of small and successful ‘pocket‐sized’ multinationals. Figure 1. Domestic and International Revenues of Ibex 35 Companies, First Half 2011 (% of total) Company Sector International Domestic Abertis Motorways 55.08 44.92 Acciona Construction 32.82 67.18 Acerinox Metals 90.22 9.78 Banco Sabadell Banking 4.60 95.40 ACS Construction and services 52.50 47.50 Banco Santander Banking 80.56 19.44 Bankinter Banking 0.92 99.08 BBVA Banking 57.97 42.03 Ebro Foods Food 92.18 7.82 Enagás Electricity 100.00 0.00 Endesa Electricity 35.02 64.98 FCC Construction 49.50 50.50 Ferrovial Construction 65.56 34.44 Gamesa Windturbines 91.11 8.89 Gas Natural Gas 39.28 60.72 Grifols Pharmaceuticals 80.48 19.52 Iberdrola Electricity 51.79 48.21 Indra Electronics 39.21 60.79 Mapfre Insurance 50.18 49.82 OHL Construction 70.21 29.79 Red Eléctrica Electricity 2.70 97.30 Repsol Oil 52.95 47.05 Sacyr‐Vallehermoso Construction 36.58 63.42 Telefónica Telecoms 71.72 28.28 Total 59.35 40.65 Source: El País based on figures from the National Securities Market Commission.