Comparison and Evaluation of the Moral Significance of Emotions in Aquinas, the Manualists and Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990
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The University of Notre Dame Australia ResearchOnline@ND Theses 2000 Comparison and evaluation of the moral significance of emotions in Aquinas, the Manualists and Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990 Thomas Ryan University of Notre Dame Australia Follow this and additional works at: https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/theses Part of the Religion Commons COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Copyright Regulations 1969 WARNING The material in this communication may be subject to copyright under the Act. Any further copying or communication of this material by you may be the subject of copyright protection under the Act. Do not remove this notice. Publication Details Ryan, T. (2000). Comparison and evaluation of the moral significance of emotions in Aquinas, the Manualists and Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990 (Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)). University of Notre Dame Australia. https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/theses/25 This dissertation/thesis is brought to you by ResearchOnline@ND. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses by an authorized administrator of ResearchOnline@ND. For more information, please contact [email protected]. COMPARISON AND EVALUATION OF THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF EMOTIONS IN AQUINAS, THE MANUALISTS AND CATHOLIC MORAL THEOLOGY 1960-1990. THOMAS RYAN, S.M. Supervisor Dr. Peter Black, C.Ss.R. Thesis Submitted for the partial fulfilment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Theology University of Notre Dame Australia Fremantle, Western Australia July 1999 1 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A project such as this makes one realise how much one owes to so many people. I should like to say thank you to them all. Firstly, to my parents Teresa and John Ryan who, with all their children, gave us all both encouragement and opportunity to develop our gifts together with a certain flexibility of faith and attitudes. Secondly, to my Marist family, the priests of the Society of Mary in New Zealand and Australia who, as teachers and confrères, have never ceased, personally or by policy, to place great weight on nurturing people and their talents for the sake of the Kingdom. Finally, I am grateful to my colleagues in the College of Theology in the University of Notre Dame Australia. To Dr. Peter Black, C.Ss.R. for his careful and affirming supervision; to Professor Michael Jackson and Associate Professor Eileen Lenihan RSJ (College of Education) whose constant support as colleagues and friends have contributed to the completion of this project. ********************* 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Declaration and Acknowledgements Chapter 1. THE PROBLEM 12 Defining the Problem 12 Historical Context 20 Related Research 31 Methodology 35 Definition of Terms 43 Significance of the Study 46 Limitations of the Study 47 Format of the Study 48 2. EMOTION: A WORKING DEFINITION 50 3. BENCHMARKS FOR EMOTIONS AND MORALITY IN AQUINAS I: FOUNDATIONS 78 Context 79 Structural Considerations 79 Doctrinal Considerations 82 The Nature and Function of Emotions 85 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page Chapter 3. (continued) The Moral Significance of Emotions 94 Emotions as Morally Good or Evil 95 Emotions as Intrinsically Good or Evil 96 Emotions and Practical Reason: A Working Blueprint 101 Overview and Comments 111 4. BENCHMARKS FOR EMOTIONS AND MORALITY IN AQUINAS II: SPECIFIC ISSUES 116 The Moral Significance of the Positive Emotions 117 Love, Fittingness, Pleasure 117 Desire ( Concupiscentia ) 125 Pleasure as Delight ( Delectatio ) and Joy ( Gaudium ) 127 The Moral Significance of the Negative Emotions 131 Pain ( Dolor ) and Sadness ( Tristitia ) 131 Duty of Self-Care and the Negative Emotions 134 Virtue, Character and the Negative Emotions 139 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page Chapter 4. (continued) The Moral Significance of the Affective Virtues in Character 143 Necessity of the Affective Virtues 145 Location of the Affective Virtues 148 The Immanence of the Affective Virtues 149 Emotions as Instruments of Virtue 150 Habituation, Transformation, Character and Affective Virtues 152 Affective Virtues and the Mean 154 Acquired and Infused Virtues and Human Affectivity 157 Overview and Evaluation 160 5. EMOTIONS AND THE MORAL LIFE IN THE MANUALIST TRADITION c. 1960 173 The Moral Significance of the Emotions 173 Emotions and the Human Act 173 Context 173 Definition and types of emotions 175 Antecedent and Consequent emotions 178 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page Chapter 5. (continued) Fear 181 Habitual Impediments to the human act 186 Affective virtues and character 189 Theological Anthropology in the Manualists 206 Context 207 Content 209 Comparison and Contrast within Manualists and with Aquinas 213 6. EMOTIONS AND MORAL LIFE IN RENEWING CATHOLIC THEOLOGY 1960-1990 220 The Moral Significance of the Emotions 221 Emotions and the Human Act 221 Context 221 Content 223 Antecedent and Consequent emotions 224 Fear 227 Dispositions and Habits 228 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page Chapter 6. (continued) Understanding the emotions 229 Continuity with Aquinas and the Manualists: Peschke 229 Retrieval from within a Tradition: Maguire 230 Creative Interpretation from within a Tradition: Grisez 233 Discontinuity and Development: Haring 236 (i) Context 237 (ii) Psychological Structure of the emotions 239 (iii) Object of the emotions 241 (iv) Nature of the emotions 242 (v) Categories of the emotions 244 Summary 245 Affective Virtues and Character 247 Context 247 Virtues in general 248 Fundamental Direction: the Ruling Passion 249 Morality of the “Heart.” 250 Systems and the diversity of virtues 251 7 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page Chapter 6. (continued) The Affective Virtues 252 Temperance 253 Fortitude 254 Affective Virtues: Divergent Approaches 255 Innovation from within a Tradition: Grisez 255 A Renewed Moral Theology: Peschke and Haring 256 Theological Anthropology in the selected post-conciliar authors 261 Context 261 Content 262 Comparison and Contrast amongst authors with Manualists and Aquinas 265 Comparison and Contrast amongst selected authors 266 Comparison and Contrast with Manualists & Aquinas 267 Dynamics of Human Subjectivity 268 Aspects of Morality 271 Moral Vision and Vocation 272 8 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page Chapter 7. CONTEMPORARY SOUNDINGS AND BENCHMARKS 274 The Moral Significance of the Emotions 274 Emotions and the Human Act 274 Emotions and Morality: A view from Moral Philosophy 274 Moral Significance of Emotions 276 Emotions and Moral Reasoning 280 Moral Reasoning: Alternative of “Seeing” Differently 282 Mutual Tutoring of Reason and Emotion: The Psychological Dynamic 288 Psychological Foundations 289 Thinking and Emotion in Collaboration 292 Emotions in Relation to Virtue and Character 293 Self-esteem: Foundations of Identity 293 Empathy and the Moral Life: The Shelton Model 297 Psychological Foundations 298 Empathy, Morality of the Heart and Christian Vision 303 9 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page Chapter 7 (continued) Affective Conversion: An Emerging Understanding 305 Overview 309 Theological Anthropology in Selected Contemporary Writing 310 Comparison and Contrast with Aquinas, Manualists, Post-Manualists 313 Convergences 314 Divergences 315 Evaluative Overview 319 8. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, POSTSCRIPT 324 Summary of Findings in the Study 325 Conclusions 340 Implications of the Study 341 Recommendations 344 Postscript 344 BIBLIOGRAPHY 347 ABSTRACT 360 10 11 CHAPTER 1 The Problem 1. Defining The Problem “It is regrettable that moral theology has neglected the role that emotions play in the moral life” says William Spohn, S.J. (1991, p. 85). In his view, this seems to emerge from the influence of a rationalist natural law tradition which, unlike Aquinas, “did not pay as much critical attention to this dimension” (Spohn, 1991, p. 69). He points to the place of the emotions in the virtue-centred ethics of Thomas Aquinas and to contemporary philosophy’s rediscovery of character and virtue in which “it pays more attention to the affective side of the agent” (Spohn, 1991, p. 69). Aquinas, with other contemporary moral philosophers, recognised that “well-ordered affectivity guides moral decision-making through discerning perceptions and virtuous dispositions” (Spohn, 1991, p. 69). Such is the summary of one respected commentator’s survey of Catholic Moral Theology at the start of this decade. These observations also have implications for various understandings of the human person within Moral Theology. This is particularly true in the light of the phrase used in the official Vatican commentary on No. 51 of Gaudium et Spes , that “human activity must be judged in so far as it refers to the human person integrally and adequately considered.” The final phrase “integrally and adequately considered” is, arguably, the dominant motif in the past thirty years of Moral Theology. Spohn’s comments together with their inference have been an important catalyst for this researcher. The correlation of these two elements (emotions and the human person “integrally and adequately considered”) provides the springboard for this 12 study. Its aim is to examine the moral significance of the emotions firstly in Aquinas, secondly, within and beyond recent Catholic Moral Theology (1960-1990), to compare and contrast them, then, finally, to evaluate these sources in the light of some contemporary views of emotions and of the human person. The problem generated by the convergence of these elements can be expressed in a statement: There appears, until recently, to be an incomplete, and possibly inadequate, understanding