Foreign Policy Analysis (2008) 4, 275–300
Indian-Americans and the U.S.–India Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation of an Ethnic Lobby?
Jason A. Kirk Virginia Military Institute
The transformation of U.S.–India relations has been, arguably, one of the most significant developments in American foreign policy in the past decade. Both countries’ leaderships regard a recent nuclear cooperation agreement as the most important step yet in their emerging ‘‘strategic partnership.’’ But the deal is also deeply controversial—critics see it as a major departure from decades-standing nonproliferation norms—and its approval by the U.S. Congress in 2006 was far from assured. This paper argues that an increasingly professional and well-funded ‘‘India lobby’’ among Indian-Americans was critical in pressing members of Congress to support the nuclear agreement. Moreover, this episode may portend its emergence as one of the most important ethnic communities seeking influence over U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century—if it can sustain momentum for its ambitious long-term goals, such as securing a perma- nent seat for India on the UN Security Council, through the uncertain near-term future of the nuclear agreement itself.
The transformation of U.S.–India relations has been, arguably, one of the most significant developments in American foreign policy in the past decade. From a prolonged pattern of estrangement during the Cold War and well into the 1990s, the world’s most powerful and most populous democracies are now pursu- ing a ‘‘strategic partnership’’ that encompasses deepening economic ties, unprecedented joint military exercises, and most recently, an exceptional bilat- eral nuclear agreement that effectively accepts India as a nuclear power outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and allows for nuclear trade previ- ously prohibited under the NPT and U.S. export laws. This agreement, first announced by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and U.S. President George W. Bush over reciprocal state visits in July 2005 and March 2006, is regarded by both leaderships as the most important step yet in the emerging ‘‘strategic partnership’’ between the two countries. The deal is also deeply controversial; U.S. and international critics see it as a major departure from the ‘‘country-neutral’’ norms that for decades have defined the global non- proliferation regime, and it has faced strong opposition from Washington’s for- midable nonproliferation specialist community.
Author’s note: The author thanks Yongwook Ryu, doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard University, for his perceptive comments on an earlier draft of this paper presented at the 2007 Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago. Equally constructive were the comments of three anonymous reviewers for Foreign Policy Analysis. The author is solely responsible for any remaining errors, and may be contacted at [email protected].