Indian-Americans and the US–India Nuclear Agreement

Foreign Policy Analysis (2008) 4, 275–300 Indian-Americans and the U.S.–India Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation of an Ethnic Lobby? Jason A. Kirk Virginia Military Institute The transformation of U.S.–India relations has been, arguably, one of the most significant developments in American foreign policy in the past decade. Both countries’ leaderships regard a recent nuclear cooperation agreement as the most important step yet in their emerging ‘‘strategic partnership.’’ But the deal is also deeply controversial—critics see it as a major departure from decades-standing nonproliferation norms—and its approval by the U.S. Congress in 2006 was far from assured. This paper argues that an increasingly professional and well-funded ‘‘India lobby’’ among Indian-Americans was critical in pressing members of Congress to support the nuclear agreement. Moreover, this episode may portend its emergence as one of the most important ethnic communities seeking influence over U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century—if it can sustain momentum for its ambitious long-term goals, such as securing a perma- nent seat for India on the UN Security Council, through the uncertain near-term future of the nuclear agreement itself. The transformation of U.S.–India relations has been, arguably, one of the most significant developments in American foreign policy in the past decade. From a prolonged pattern of estrangement during the Cold War and well into the 1990s, the world’s most powerful and most populous democracies are now pursu- ing a ‘‘strategic partnership’’ that encompasses deepening economic ties, unprecedented joint military exercises, and most recently, an exceptional bilat- eral nuclear agreement that effectively accepts India as a nuclear power outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and allows for nuclear trade previ- ously prohibited under the NPT and U.S. export laws. This agreement, first announced by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and U.S. President George W. Bush over reciprocal state visits in July 2005 and March 2006, is regarded by both leaderships as the most important step yet in the emerging ‘‘strategic partnership’’ between the two countries. The deal is also deeply controversial; U.S. and international critics see it as a major departure from the ‘‘country-neutral’’ norms that for decades have defined the global nonproliferation regime, and it has faced strong opposition from Washington’s formidable nonproliferation specialist community. Author’s note: The author thanks Yongwook Ryu, doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard University, for his perceptive comments on an earlier draft of this paper presented at the 2007 Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago. Equally constructive were the comments of three anonymous reviewers for Foreign Policy Analysis. The author is solely responsible for any remaining errors, and may be contacted at [email protected]. Ó 2008 International Studies Association. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ , UK . 276 Indian-Americans and the U.S.–India Nuclear Agreement And yet, in approval votes (required under U.S. treaty and export law) the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate registered overwhelming support for the deal (in July and November 2006, respectively), moving the presidential initiative one step closer to policy (aspects still await approval by the international Nuclear Suppliers Group, or NSG, and the Indian government must attend to its own contentious domestic politics). The ringing congressional endorsement was surprising, not only because of the proliferation concerns that opponents raised—and events in Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea in 2004–06 have underscored global proliferation risks—but also because of the particular timing of the bill’s passage: in a mid-term election year, as an initiative of an increasingly unpopular President Bush. This paper will argue that Indian-American citizens’ groups in the United States, and the efforts of an increasingly professional and well-funded ‘‘India lobby’’ on Capitol Hill, were critical in pressing members of Congress to support the agreement. Moreover, this episode may represent the consolidation of an ‘‘India lobby,’’ and portend its emergence as one of the most important ethnic communities seeking influence over U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century. Exist- ing scholarly literature on ethnic lobbies and American foreign policy typically focuses on communities such as Jewish and Cuban Americans (the ‘‘Israel lobby,’’ in particular has been the subject of recent acerbic debates1) but Indian- Americans are quickly ascending to prominence as well, with potential ramifica- tions for U.S. policy in South Asia and beyond. The next section will very briefly review the literature on ethnic lobbies and U.S. foreign policy (some of which is quite normative and polemical; the analysis here will try to align with a more objective approach). Section III situates the U.S.–India relationship in its broader historical and changing strategic contexts. It makes clear that Indian-Americans are far from the only factor pushing the U.S. and India closer. In particular, presidential initiative has been critical, though this itself can be seen as a response to changing strategic circumstances (such as the end of the Cold War, and the continued ascendance of Chinese power). Section IV traces the evolution of the Indian-American community and its patterns of organization, communication, and political activism, especially in the period since the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act that greatly increased opportunities for Indian immigration to the U.S. Though some characteristics of the community conform to general predictions about ethnic lobby effective- ness—for example, Indian-Americans tend to have higher than average house- hold incomes, and are geographically concentrated in specific congressional districts—other characteristics would seem to impede policy influence; for example, community organizations until recently were highly segmented along professional or language-cultural lines. Nevertheless, as Section V shows, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw an increasing political activism in the community (especially among the younger generation), an especially keen interest in promoting U.S. recognition of India as ‘‘emerging power’’ on the world stage and a close U.S.– India relationship, and the laying of groundwork for congressional influence through ‘‘India Caucuses’’ in the House and Senate. But for all of the broader international-strategic reasons behind the recent turn in U.S.–India relations, there remain legitimate concerns about some aspects of the partnership—and none more so than the nuclear agreement—such that congressional support was far from assured. Section VI will demonstrate how, against formidable odds, 1 The American Israel Public Affairs Committee has been called ‘‘the quintessential ethnic lobby in the United States’’ (Ambrosio 2002a,b:11). In 1998, Fortune magazine ranked AIPAC the second-most powerful of all lobbying groups in the U.S. policy process, surpassed only by the AARP and ahead of the NRA and AFL-CIO. Unfortunately, even ostensibly academic discussions of the ‘‘Israel lobby’’ and its influence on U.S. foreign policy have tended to generate more heat than light; see Mearsheimer and Walt 2006. Jason A. Kirk 277 Indian-Americans organized and rallied support for the draft legislation with such energy and skill that the community can rightfully claim to have ‘‘deliv- ered’’ the landslide votes in its favor. Section VII summarizes the findings, and notes some future challenges facing the new ‘‘India lobby.’’ What emerges from this account is an argument for paying attention both to the external-strategic environment of international relations—and how it might ‘‘open doors’’ to new directions in U.S. foreign policy—but also to the internal- political factors that can also be critical in pushing policy in a particular direc- tion. In 2006, two historical stories converged: one involving the ongoing deepening of the U.S.–India relationship since 1998, the other a general consolidation of organizational capacity within the burgeoning Indian community in the United States. Without the latter, it is unlikely that the bold U.S.– India nuclear agreement would have made it over the requisite congressional hurdles in 2006. Looking ahead, however, the deal must survive potentially contentious reviews at levels largely beyond the reach of the ‘‘India lobby’’—among other nuclear states, and within India’s boisterous coalition government. If it were to still fall apart, it could prove very demoralizing both for the U.S.–India relationship itself, and for the presently fired-up Indian-American community that so skillfully steered it through the waters of U.S. Congress politics. Ethnic Lobbies and U.S. Foreign Policy Scholars and policy analysts have posited for some time that ethnic identity groups—‘‘political organizations established along cultural, ethnic, religious, or racial lines’’2—may seek to influence U.S. foreign policy in support of their country of origin or ancestry, and that under certain conditions, such efforts can be quite successful. Against myriad other international and domestic determi- nants of U.S. foreign policy, such ‘‘ethnic lobbies’’ have occupied a compara- tively minor part of the literature, but the past several years have seen increasing scholarly interest. Ethnic

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