The Olympic Games As a Political Tool: Case Study Beijing 2008

MASARYK UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Department of International Relations and European Studies

Field: International Relations

The Olympic Games as a Political Tool: Case Study Beijing 2008

Bachelor thesis

Andrea Bittnerová

Thesis supervisor: Ing. Mgr. Richard Turcsányi UČO: 397711 Field of study: International Relations, European Studies Matriculation year: 2011

Brno, 2014

I hereby declare that I have written this thesis individually and by only using sources which are stated at the end of this work in the list of references.

…………………………………….. Brno, May 7, 2014

Acknowledgment

First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor, Ing. Mgr. Richard Turcsányi, for his valuable advice and offering different approaches to be taken into account in my thesis. He has been more than helpful since the beginning and I am very grateful for any suggestions that helped me during my writing.

I would also like to thank my mother, who has always been supportive of everything I have done during my life and has never stopped believing in me.

Table of contents

1. Introduction ...... 4 2. Reasons for hosting the Olympic Games ...... 7 3. Controversies ...... 10 3.1 Protests ...... 10 3.2 Human rights ...... 11 4. Legacies ...... 13

Case study: Beijing 2008 ...... 16 5. Reasons for hosting ...... 16 6. Controversies ...... 19 6.1 Foreign protests and responses ...... 19 6.1.1 Torch relay ...... 20 6.2 Human rights ...... 22 7. Chinese political strategies ...... 24 7.1 Opening ceremony ...... 24 8. Legacies ...... 27 8.1 Uncertain position in the international field ...... 27 8.2 Consolidated nationalism and high level of government‟s legitimacy ...... 29 8.3 Minimum change in human rights policy ...... 32 8.4 Physical legacies ...... 33 8.5 Whose success? ...... 34 9. Conclusion ...... 37 References ...... 41

1. Introduction For over one century, The Olympic Games have been the most popular sport event and the highlight for all the successful athletes and entertainment for millions of spectators. Every four years, each participating country might become more nationalistic due to cheering for their representatives and consequently being proud of gained medals. According to Hoberman (2008), the Olympics were founded to bridge cultural divides and promote peace. “The Olympic Games are competitions between athletes in individual or team events and not between countries. Any form of discrimination with regard to a country or a person on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or otherwise is incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement. The International Olympic Committee (the IOC) should oppose any political or commercial abuse of sport and athletes, to promote a positive legacy for host cities and host countries” (The IOC 2013a, 9-21). However, as much as the IOC, host and participating countries try to act as non-political to the whole world and defend the apolitical nature of the Games, when prospective host cities hand in their applications, a very political process starts. Countries today use this largest sport event as a political tool for both domestic and foreign policy in order to show their country to the advantage, their development and they also have high hopes in many positive legacies, especially long-lasting ones, such as economic growth, strengthened nationalism or more significant role in the international field. The tool may be believed to be a result of today‟s globalized world. Nevertheless, exploiting the Olympics for other, non-sport related reasons dates back to the early years, as seen in the case of the Berlin Olympics in 1936, where Hitler tried to legitimize the Nazi regime. On the way to holding the event, host countries are in the constant spotlight of the IOC, participating countries, NGOs and media. They very often, in case of controversial hosts, try to eliminate human rights abuses (e. g. forced evictions due to building of stadiums) or criticize the country‟s regime. China is a perfect example of such a controversial host country. It may not be exaggerated to say that the Chinese Olympics had the highest expectations in the recent history and China was very well aware of that. It considered the Games as a great opportunity to present its emerging economy to the world, how developed it was and that everybody should regard it as a major international player. It was also supposed to serve for domestic policy reasons, such as bringing more people into sports, new infrastructure or consolidating nationalism. During the course of preparations, many other actors, for instance

NGOs or other countries used the Beijing Olympics for pointing at political issues. Therefore, the Beijing Games will serve as a case study of this thesis. One of the major motivations for writing this thesis is looking at the topic from another perspective than it is probably mostly viewed of, its contemporary nature and its lack of studies in the academic arena. Interestingly enough, as Cha (2009) points out, the connection between politics and sports has not yet been extensively studied. Although international sport is clearly a field where different nations and individuals interact and it has been a relevant area for a long time, the literature written on the topic is surprisingly rare. What is more, the literature on legacies of the 2008 Beijing Games is even rarer, but this might be due to its recent holding. The thesis aims to analyse the Olympic Games as a tool for both domestic and foreign policy of a host country. It will be divided into two parts – a general introduction to the topic and the case study of the 2008 Beijing Games. The first part will present reasons for hosting the Olympics and controversies which can harm the way to achieving them caused by various actors, such as NGOs or other countries. Lastly, legacies which the Games bring will be described. Numerous actions from the history of the Olympics will serve as examples. The second part of the thesis will present a case study of Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. Concepts from the first part will be applied to see how China fits into discovered information, and the process of the Games as well as legacies will be analysed in detail. It is expected that the Chinese example will stand out among other Olympics. The thesis will try to answer a question: What legacies do the Olympic Games bring to the host nation? Legacies should be understood as tangible (new infrastructure, green spaces) and intangible (strengthened nationalism) as well as positive (gaining knowledge from organizing the event) or negative (terrorist attacks). Evaluating legacies is important because it reveals whether goals which a host country wanted to achieve were fulfilled and thus the event could have been proclaimed as successful. Moreover, legacies are something that can remain in the host nation for both short and long time and have an impact on both domestic and foreign policies. The research question will be answered by looking into the initial goals which host countries set and whether they, in the final, do fulfil them. Moreover, it will be discussed what controversies make it difficult for the host countries to achieve those goals, meaning what actors stand in the desired smooth way leading to holding the event. The case study will also reflect the same question and will follow the same path of finding the answer. All these issues will be answered by studying academic articles. However, information provided by the IOC, NGOs websites and public opinion polls will also be included.

Moreover, various media articles will be discussed, especially in the post-Games era. Since the 2008 Beijing Games are still relatively a recent event, there is a lack of articles in the academic sphere. Thus, articles on various newspaper websites will be included to be able to evaluate the legacies, which are the core theme of this thesis. On the basis of all these sources, the thesis will aim at evaluating legacies of the Games and predicting further course of this mega-event in the world.

2. Reasons for hosting the Olympic Games According to Cottrell and Nelson (2011, 733), the Olympics are a perfect arena for political plays. Firstly, usually all the states are invited and their heads often show up at the opening ceremony. Together with sportsmen and representatives of various nations, they are accompanied by huge media coverage. Secondly, in case of host government, new alliances can be created about local policies and actors can develop pressure on politicians. On the other hand, any kinds of alliances and supports can take place. Berg (2008, 15) claims that sport, in fact, is not the content of the Games, only their style. The real core is thought to be nationalism and geopolitics. No matter how different the political regimes are, many state strategies to bid for the Games, to host them or excel at them, are connected by the concept of „soft power‟. By this concept, we are supposed to attract others and make them want what we want or do what we want. We can influence them by our ideology, culture or institutions. Applying this concept on the Olympic Games, we will find out that countries wish to improve their image, show off globally, bring tourism, increase trade or bring national pride. Therefore, countries try to reach their goals in both domestic and foreign policy (Grix 2013, 17). Improving the image, according to Grix (2013, 18-19), can be found in two ways. On the one hand, if a country has a poor image or bad reputation in the past, a major sport event might help to change people‟s minds. On the other hand, exploring a state to the whole world and endure the huge media attention may not always come along with improving the image and increased influence. For instance, despite hugely represented dance teams and choir for that time, the 1936 Berlin Games seemed to do little about using its soft power and changing its reputation worldwide, even though the Games were brought along with a great propaganda. For many, the Games represent a pretext for host nations to conduct domestic and foreign policy without being blamed for doing so (Berg 2008, 16). Governments seek direct and indirect political benefits. The Games are supposed to cause economic growth, raise employment, bring revenues from commercial activities and taxation and make connections between the state and multinational corporations (Jennings 2013, 7). For instance, representatives of London did not hide their aim to build the 2012 Games around concrete benefits, such as “the physical regeneration of the industrial waste ground of the Lower Lea Valley area of east London; supposed health benefits (through getting people active and

7 participating in sport); and environmental benefits (through making the Olympic Park a footprint for sustainable living)” (Falcous and Silk 2010, 170). As in many fields, when it comes to the Olympic Games, a difference between rich states and developing states can be felt. The former see it as a great commercial event, whereas the latter can take advantage of making contact with the outside world (Hill 1996, 194). We can trace a common agenda in hosting the Games by emerging economies. They want to demonstrate economic success, to signal diplomatic position or to use soft power, since they often lack other forms of international influence. In addition, organization of the Olympics by emerging countries can change the present angle of view that we have of these Games, alter means of planning and commercialization and ways how they influence stakeholders. This strategy is meant to serve both the society and the state and also consolidate a position in the international order (Cornelissen 2010, 3008). A lot of governments, particularly from developing countries, use the Games as means for their political goals, such as to support unpopular domestic policy, improve the government‟s legitimacy or encourage nationalism. Foreign policy aims are not excluded either (ibid, 3013). We might expect more Olympics being held in „emerging economies‟, since the venues for the 2014 and 2016 Games were chosen to be there1. The motive for the IOC to let these events happen there is not surprising. It wishes to broaden its markets and further spread its brand (Grix 2013, 16-17). Interestingly enough, it was the totalitarian regimes which gave the modern Games their pageantry. The torch relay was created by Nazi propagandists so as to transport Western journalists around German villages and to show the idyllic rural life (Berg 2008, 18). In addition, the Games were promoted by network of Nazi agents both inside and outside the IOC and Pierre de Coubertin2 called these Games as his life‟s fulfilment. In return, he was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize by the Nazi Foreign Office (Hoberman 2008, 22). Moscow prepared the most expensive opening ceremony until that time, a great advertisement for the Soviet regime and its communist superiority (Berg 2008, 18). The 1968 Mexico City Games served as a legitimizing tool for one-party government (Hoberman 2008, 22). Oppressive governments see the Games as a tool to take advantage of the publicity given to sport for showing off their state and ideology. A democratic state, such as Australia and its Summer Games in 2000, wanted to bring more tourists into the country and change the image

1 2014 Sochi (Russia), 2016 Rio de Janeiro (Brasil) 2 The Founder of the modern Olympic Games

8 of Australia being only a „good source for raw materials‟ (Berg 2008, 18). Germany and Japan wanted to prove by hosting the Games that they were no longer only the defeated nations after the Second World War, but also that they belonged to the international arena. The United Kingdom sought to make a picture of an „open, connected, creative and dynamic‟ state (Houlihan and Giulianotti 2012, 704). Sports makes a nation rethink its identity, whether they can be proud or not, how they show themselves to the world or rather how they want to be seen and together with performance, governments attempt to gain international prestige. In addition, sport can facilitate diplomatic discussions and also send messages of disapproval. It should not be viewed as a solution for diplomatic disputes or leading to breakthroughs or breakdowns. It usually helps when discussions are on a good way and already have a fertile common ground (Cha 2009, 1584-1593). Moreover, success in sports contributes to international prestige and is considered as a measure of national success (van Hilvoorde et al. 2010, 87-100).

3. Controversies Unfortunately for host countries, the path to holding the event is not always smooth. In fact, the period before the Games very often serves as an arena for various actions by different actors, both inside and outside, which can in final influence or even damage the overall image of the Olympics and can result in negative legacies. Host countries can be put under two types of pressure, according to Cha (2009, 1597- 1599) – tactical and ideational. In tactical, a country is put on the spotlight six years before and four years after the Olympics and its policies are questioned. We can see pressure by media, NGOs, attention drawn away from sports to any domestic or international issues and politicians might behave in a different way. By ideational we mean putting pressure on often authoritarian regime, for distances between its values and the Olympic ones. Although regimes often seek prestige, at the same time they have to adopt liberal values to their non- liberal thinking. One of the catalysts that can be seen when it comes to the Games is the aesthetic kind. For instance, the 1988 Seoul Games put traditional dog soup restaurants into back alleys in order not to insult foreign visitors or provoke foreign media (Hoberman 2008, 24).

3.1 Protests The Olympic Charter (IOC 2013a, 93) prohibits any kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas. The most recent example of this could have been seen during the 2014 Sochi Olympics, where Ukrainian sportsmen were banned to wear black bands to express their solidarity with protests in Ukraine (Walker 2014). Therefore, most of the protests take place before the Games. Protests should be understood not only as domestic groups or transnational activists, but also countries disagreeing with actions of other countries. The number has been rising steadily since the last century. State-based boycotts and bans have decreased whereas protests by non- state actors have increased. The latter ones can be transnational or domestic to raise international attention. The NGOs do not see it as putting pressure, influence or using it as leverage but they want to inform the world and get the media attention. The authors believe that protests have become a regular and expected part of the Olympics (Cottrell and Nelson 2011, 730-739). However, not always were the boycotts carried out. There was sometimes only threat which, nevertheless, sent some sort of a political signal. In 1936, the USA considered

10 boycotting the Olympics in Berlin. Iraq and other Middle Eastern states were discussing boycott of Israel because of its participation in the 1952 Helsinki Games. The Australian basketball team was threatening with boycott because an HIV-positive Magic Johnson was allowed to compete during the 1992 Barcelona Games (ibid 735-738). Russia threatened by leaving the Olympic family after an unsuccessful bid for the 1976 Games. Thus, the IOC awarded it with the Summer Games four years later (Hoberman 2008, 22). After the 1980 Moscow Games and American boycott, due to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (and most probably the rivalry between the two countries), the Soviets did the same for the 1984 Los Angeles Games (Hoberman 2008, 26). In the 1920, the Antwerp Games experienced not letting Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary and Turkey compete due to their actions in the First World War. Between the years 1960-1992 South Africa was excluded because of apartheid (Liu 2007, 217). In the bid for Toronto for 1996 Summer Games, there was a protest group Bread, No Circuses which disagreed with the city hosting the Olympics. The politicians tried to include demands of the group in their programme, nevertheless they realized that the process should not be political and withdrew from the discussions. Otherwise, the city was very well prepared (Whitson and Horne 2006, 86). Could this protest have cost Toronto the Games? Unfortunately, we could have also seen using the Games for terrorist attacks, as during the 1972 Munich Games, where 11 Israeli athletes and one policeman were killed by the Palestinian group Black September, or during the 1996 Atlanta Games, where a bombing attack in a park took place (Houlihan and Giulianotti 2012, 705).

3.2 Human rights Here are some examples of human rights violations: in 1968, ten days before the Summer Games in Mexico City, the Mexican government fired upon a demonstration of 5,000 students who were demanding greater human rights (Berg 2008, 17). During the opening ceremony of the 1976 Montreal Games, activists, gays and lesbians were told to stay out (Kidd 2010, 903). One year after the South Korean military government performed a massacre in Kwangju, where at least 200 people died and 1,000 got injured, just because of revolting against junta, the IOC awarded Seoul with the Summer Olympic Games. After the IOC announced Sochi to be the next host city for the Winter Olympics in 2014, protesters gathered during its meeting got beaten by the police (Hoberman 2008, 22-28).

Nevertheless, the longest human rights issue that the Olympic movement had to deal with was the South African apartheid. The IOC was first not so keen on excluding South Africa from the Games, since the politics should not be mixed with sports, but under the pressure of others, gave a chance to South African representatives to justify their actions. However, another point in the Olympic Charter says that it prohibits any form of discrimination. And moreover, the IOC can use its boycott to reform human rights if it disagrees with the domestic policy, according to international human rights law (Liu 2007, 218-219). National Olympic Committee of South Africa was suspended and subsequently expelled in 1963, respectively 1970. At first, the IOC was not active in monitoring or requiring international moratorium. Only after the 1976 Montreal Games, it made a bigger contribution and worked more efficiently (Kidd 2010, 904). Human rights activists, such as Human Rights Watch suggest that “media companies could promote freedom of expression in the press and on the internet, sportswear companies could uphold fundamental labour rights and construction and transportation companies could insist on full transparency of land acquisitions to justify evictions” (Liu 2007, 234). Nevertheless, there have been some achievements made regarding peacemaking. The 1994 Lilehammer Games helped a humanitarian relief in Bosnia. Humanitarian organizations could work on immunization campaigns in Afghanistan and Iran during the 1996 Atlanta Games. Between 2004 and 2008, both North Korean and South Korean athletes were marching under the same flag during the Summer Games. Moreover, the torch relay is seen as another way for promoting international understanding (Spaaij 2012, 766).

4. Legacies As it was mentioned, host cities want to gain positive legacies from hosting the Olympics. The IOC published a booklet about the Olympic legacy. Legacies are divided into five categories – sporting, social, environmental, urban and economic. According to the booklet (IOC 2013b, 1-66), “creating sustainable legacies is a fundamental commitment of the Olympic movement and a unique set of various legacies can change a community and a region forever”. The Olympics have the power to bring lasting legacies and be a catalyst for change. These legacies can be both tangible and intangible. Among the former are “new sporting or transport infrastructure, urban regeneration and beautification of the host city”. In the latter category, we can find “increased sense of national pride, new and enhanced workforce skills, a „feel good spirit‟ among the host country‟s population, rediscovery of national culture and heritage, and finally, increased environmental awareness”. However, the IOC also reminds that the event has to be carefully planned and legacies do not happen themselves. Nevertheless, the IOC‟s view of legacy is not the only relevant one. Explanation of the term ranges from urban planning and sport infrastructure, which according to Gratton and Preuss (2008, 1923-1927) are commonly recognized aspects, to less recognized ones, for instance, enhanced international reputation, increased tourism, chances for city marketing, better interregional cooperation and so on. The host population gains knowledge and skills from staging a mega-sport event. Employees and volunteers achieve skills and knowledge in event organization, human resource management, security, hospitality, service, etc. These legacies can be regarded as positive ones. On the other hand, we also have to take into consideration the negative legacies, such as debts from construction, infrastructure that is not needed after the event or socially unjust displacement. One of the problems is that countries usually underestimate risks and overestimate benefits. The predicted cost of the event is usually higher and foreseen benefits are either a failure or are not measured at all (Jennings 2013, 8). Atlanta received negative post-Games attention due to inconvenient transport, accommodation and small vendors which were supposed to be a tool for raising money for the city (Andranovich et al. 2001, 126). According to Preuss (2007, 207-2015), legacies can be all planned and unplanned, positive and negative, tangible and intangible. We should also keep in mind that the Olympics create different legacies in different cities. A lot of legacies are not positive, moreover, they cannot be entirely planned. “Negative incidences such as a bomb attack, hooligans,

13 organizational shortcomings or just bad weather also influence the image of the host. Exaggerated nationalism or unfair spectator behaviour spoils hospitality, and poverty and crime create doubts about a potential tourism destination” (Gratton and Preuss 2008, 1928). According to Rowe (2012, 297) it would be naïve to think that the Olympics could have a significant impact on social problems in the host city/country, and that the broadcasts would influence social and political thinking of spectators. This thesis believes that the main types of legacies – planned and unplanned, positive and negative, tangible and intangible are interconnected. For instance, unplanned legacies are very often negative, be it bad weather, terrorist attacks, various protests or boycotts, negative media coverage. As it was argued, these can result in negative memories and opinions. Planned legacies can be both positive and negative, and often tangible. The government aims at building new infrastructure, such as transforming transport and roads, and often beautifies the cities. This usually happens, the city profits from it for a long time, but sometimes results in huge debts. On the other hand, sporting facilities are often left behind, thus resulting in a negative legacy. Moreover, from another point of view, it could be said that facilities are long-term, emotions and common memory usually short-term. For instance, the opening ceremony, if successful, is usually remembered only when it comes to another Olympics and the new ceremony is compared to the previous one. Unless a major event happened at the Games, such as a terrorist attack, it can be argued that emotional – intangible - legacies are soon not paid major attention. However, the whole process prior to the Games and the event itself results in one large legacy – what actions took place, what they resulted in and how we consequently remember the Games because of their previous course. We might even consider hosting the Games again as a legacy. If a country was successful in the first hosting, it may not be afraid to try again. It often has to do with new urban restructuration, as it was argued in the case of the 2012 London Games, or reassuring its position in the international field, as we could see with multiple bids of Japan. To give more concrete examples of legacies, two specific cases of intangible legacies will be briefly presented below. The 1988 Seoul Games were probably “the most celebrated contribution to progressive political change in the history of the modern Olympics”. Significant process of democratisation took place and South Korea became „a multi-partyism and electoral democracy‟. The Olympics were not standing in vacuum outside of the political situation. It is argued that the Games were a political project with the intention of causing political changes. Hosting the Games aimed at making home government legitimate, protection from North

Korea and announcing that South Korea was ready to enter the industrialized world as economic power. The Games attracted the most athletes until that time and did without any political boycotts. The Olympics are believed to have accelerated democracy in South Korea because the government was under scrutiny and had to reconsider its policies. The international media played a crucial role in the democratisation process. The government could not stand receiving negative image because it endangered its legitimacy (Black and Bezanson 2004, 1246-1253). Sport can sometimes be a source of elevated global status for a country and larger scope of activity in the international field. One of examples can be Australia. This country has contributed to many peace missions and gained prestige and respect among international actors. It hosted the Olympics twice, both times successfully, and the Australians are successful athletes who gain a nice number of medals and who are devoted to their performances. Apart from bringing spotlight to its sport event, Australia also showed its values such as open economy and global citizenship (Cha 2009, 1590-1591).

Case study: Beijing 2008

5. Reasons for hosting Reasons for the Chinese bid should be viewed and understood from different perspectives. Although China followed some common paths (which we could read in the first part of this thesis) as other countries, it also showed ways of thinking which differed from other bidders, even significantly in some cases. First of all, the bid should be regarded from the angle of developing countries. In the previous section, it was argued that developing countries, especially emerging economies, which can afford to host such an event, seek to demonstrate economic success, to signal diplomatic position or to use soft power, together with improving the government‟s legitimacy or encourage nationalism (Cornelissen 2008, 3008-3013). In case of China, “hosting was a chance to showcase rapid economic development to the rest of the world, win respect and favour internationally and an opportunity to develop favourable media coverage worldwide” (Chen et al. 2012, 188). The Olympics were also meant to be a tool for evaluating Chinese international communication strategy. This should not be surprising. For instance, China was viewed, as confirmed by several studies, by consumers from developed countries as having a poor image of products (Heslop et al. 2009, 404). According to Sands (2008, 40), the Olympics were supposed to be a „coming out party‟, an event which would show economic maturation and to „lesser extent, political power‟. China was meant to have an image, at least in the Premier‟s Wen Jiabao opinion, of a country which is „democratic, open, civilized, friendly, and harmonious‟. In addition, the Games would not only be an event for Beijing, but a national event for whole China, since the event would take place in other six cities. According to the mayor of Beijing, Liu Qi, the Olympics would “consolidate national unity and show the world the achievements of China‟s modernization campaign”. China‟s international influence would be strengthened and mutual understanding between the Chinese and the world population would be boosted (Hong and Zhouxiang 2012a, 150). Second of all, the wish to host the Games stems from the particularity of Asian nations. In the history of the Olympics, only three countries from that region have hosted the Games – Japan (Tokyo 1964, Nagano 1998); South Korea (Seoul 1988); and China (Beijing 2008). As Hong and Zhouxiang (2012a, 145) believe “hosting the Olympic Games is seen by most

Asian nations as a means of national restoration, the construction of national identity, economic prosperity and international recognition”. Lastly and very importantly, unlike other countries, the Chinese bid should be viewed in the context of its overall sport policy. Bonde (2009, 1559) argues that sport‟s main function in China has been to serve the state‟s interests. Sport had an important place in the Communist- led country to connect the state and the society. After the 1952 Games, where the Chinese were shocked by athletic performances of East European and Soviet sportsmen, the government gave birth to a centralized sports system, thus adding deeper international meaning to sport (Xu 2006, 92). In addition, strong Chinese bodies were also meant to serve for a national defence (Hong and Zhouxiang 2012b, 187). The Chinese athletes were supposed to delete the image of a „sick man of Asia‟ and convince everybody about China‟s modernity and strength with their performances (Xu 2006, 92). Sport should also be understood as a „continuation of politics by other means‟. After nation building, competing with other countries was another goal. Cultural diplomacy was the main theme, sportsmen could enjoy travelling abroad without many restrictions and the aim was to spread friendship, the contest was coming the second. The famous „ping-pong diplomacy‟, where Chinese players played in the USA and Americans in China, resulted in a major amelioration in Sino-U.S. relations (Xu 2006, 92-93). Therefore, “the 1980s were an era of opening up and winning medals on the international sports stage became part of China‟s quest for power and glory” (Hong and Zhouxiang 2012b, 188). Since 1985, China set its Olympic Strategy and tried to win the Games from that time on. In 1978, China concluded its isolation and re-entered the IOC in 1984. It was thus competing again after 20 years. China aimed at becoming not only sports power, but also political and economic power which would be equal to its main rivals – the USA, Japan and South Korea. However, as Hong and Zhouxiang (2012a, 145) argue, we should not see the year 1984 as a starting point for Chinese motivation to host the Games, but we should already take into account the year 1908. Even though China was not a member of the IOC yet and it had no competing athletes at that time, it wondered when the first Chinese athlete would win a medal and when China would host the Games. Through the Games of the New Emerging Forces, China gained support and established its leadership in the Third World. Moreover, in 1990, China hosted the Asian Games. Those were successful, the facilities did not want to be left to waste, the Chinese sympathized with the government, thus this was also one of the motivations for hosting the Olympics (Zhou et al. 2012, 191).

Overall, the Chinese bid sought achieving goals in both domestic and foreign policy. Regarding the former, the Chinese government wished to raise its legitimacy, strengthen nationalism, build new infrastructure and transform the city. Considering foreign policy goals, the Chinese wanted to present themselves as a strong developed power, which should have a significant position in the international field, as well as not being considered as a threat or a cheap labour country and thus improve their image.

6. Controversies The explanation of controversies in the first part of this thesis can be also applied on events that happened during preparations for the Chinese Olympics. However, unlike other countries, China caused some controversies itself because of unfortunate responding to the actions that came out.

6.1 Foreign protests and responses It might not be exaggerated to say that China stood against the biggest negative publicity and opinions in the recent history of the Olympic Games. It had to counter all sorts of various protests, but sometimes, unfortunately for itself, the response resulted even in a more negative view. China was attacked mainly for its human rights situation, also for treatment of Tibet or the authoritarian regime. It was viewed as a threat. It was also viewed as an East-Asian country with cheap labour. One might compare the 2008 Beijing Games to the 1936 Berlin Games, as Fürst (2008, 5) points out. What they had in common seemed to be demonstrating new power on the rise, correction of the world order and offering the West and its allies an alternative and challenge through antidemocratic modernity. However, there are also many differences, be it awarding Berlin with the Olympics while it was still a democracy and aim to bring it back to the international field, or Germany‟s orientation against the West. Obviously, in today‟s globalized world heavily influenced by media, what journalists write can have a significant impact on foreigners‟ views of a country. For instance, the American media have a negative coverage of the Olympics if the relations between the USA and the host country are characterized by animosity (Heslop et al. 2010, 412). And this was definitely the case of China. The most infamous example was done by a CNN reporter Jack Cafferty. He called the Chinese „thugs and goons‟ and the Chinese products were in his opinion a „junk‟. Consequently, the Chinese foreign ministry demanded an apology, which of course came as no surprise, and were persuaded that Cafferty‟s coverage reflected his „ignorance and hostility towards China‟. CNN then really apologized and claimed that Cafferty‟s „strongly held opinion‟ was of the Chinese government, not the Chinese people (Finlay and Xin 2010, 881). However, due to not only this negative coverage, but also some others, the Anti-CNN website was set in China because of „alleged bias from the Western media towards interpretation of Chinese events‟ (Hong and Zhouxiang 2012c, 169). In addition, there was even a case where foreign media disagreed with Chinese reporters who

19 were abroad. A Chinese woman, working in a German radio, was suspended after having said that China implemented more than any other country the Article 3 of the Declaration of Human Rights, by pulling around 400 million inhabitants out of poverty (Hwang 2010, 855). The Chinese tried to avoid coverage of protests as much as they could – newspapers focused on the greatness, websites telling about protests were censored. Political leaders were upset by protests, accusing the world running against them and everybody was trying hard not to fail and to deliver the wanted message (Cha 2010, 2362). Even famous celebrities, probably trying to use their publicity to stir a change, expressed their opinions on the Games. The famous American director, Steven Spielberg, was supposed to be an artistic adviser in the 2008 Games but declined because of his disagreement with the Chinese policy in the Darfur conflict (Hudson 2008, 55). The well-known Hollywood actress, Sharon Stone, believed that earthquakes in Sichuan Province were „karmic retribution for Beijing‟s treatment of Tibet‟. This statement resulted in her losing a contract with Christian Dior (Finlay and Xin 2010, 883). China was probably aware of a lot of small details and symbolism it might evoke. For instance, the mascot of the Games was changed from a dragon to a panda, since the former might express aggression in other people‟s eyes. However, even the panda received many various comments, from „exaggerated political correctness to outright stupidity‟ (Caffrey 2008, 809). In addition, after winning the bid, Beijingers were ordered by municipal government‟s Office of Spiritual Civilization to avoid their bad habits, such as spitting, booing, not following traffic rules or smiling a bit (Xu 2006, 98-99).

6.1.1 Torch relay The torch relay is very likely to have been the largest area for foreign protests and also the most significant one. Due to its vastness and duration, it truly was a perfect field for everybody disagreeing with any Chinese policy to show off so there. For the analysis, it was probably the most important event that influenced the Chinese path to the successful Games, and it also brought legacies. We still remember it even now as very controversial and it might be remembered as such for a longer time. In addition, due to the vast protests, as Finlay and Xin (2010, 882) mention, the IOC forbade international torch relays. The torch relay became truly political and caused many protests, mainly in London, Paris and San Francisco (Hwang 2010, 858) because of the Chinese policy in Tibet and Darfur and „human rights and environmental policies in general‟ (Sands 2008, 42). The Olympic torch was supposed to pass through Taiwan, but Taiwanese representatives refused this because it

20 might have made an impression of China incorporating Taiwan into its land. Nationalist thinking was harmed when, according to the Chinese, „militant anti-Chinese and pro-Tibetan forces‟ attacked a Chinese Paralympic fencer during carrying on the torch while sitting on her wheelchair in Paris. Generally, counter-politics are not accepted, because only the host nation and the IOC should have a political monopoly (Bonde 2009, 1563-1565). French government and politicians were not ashamed to show off their political beliefs towards human rights situation in China and when the torch passed Paris, they expressed by various means their disapproval of the Olympics taking place in Beijing. Also, the French president at that time, Nicholas Sarkozy, threatened with boycotting the Games. In response, the Chinese began to boycott French products and stopped shopping at Carrefour retail stores, which were believed to have given money to Tibetan movement. As a result, most Carrefour branches had to be shut down. Sarkozy sent a letter to the attacked Paralympic athlete expressing his apologies about the incidents which had caused embarrassment of the Chinese nation (Hong and Zhouxiang 2012c, 160-168). The torch was going to the top of Mount Everest, which technically belongs to Tibet (Caffrey 2008, 817). The torch relay took place soon after unrest there. From peaceful protests, they turned into violent ones, resulting in attacking ethnic Chinese, because the Tibetans wanted the right to self-government. As a result, Beijing responded by sending troops to stop the riots. China‟s way of handling „situation Tibet‟ is often referred to „constituting a form of cultural genocide, resulting in cultural, social, economic, and political marginalisation of the indigenous population‟. However, the Chinese government claimed that it improved lives of Tibetan people, for instance by supporting them economically. Hwang (2010, 858-862) comes up with a question why then there was unrest in Tibet if the population had been doing better off and its cultural and social rights had been ameliorated. Beijing claimed that the protests were not about human rights but about an ethnic conflict. It blamed Dalai Lama for trying to bring independence to Tibet by getting public attention. The Chinese argument about the publicity is proved to be more legit by the fact that the Tibetans set a counter torch relay and Dalai Lama was travelling a lot and gave speeches in several countries prior to the Games. In this context, it should also be mentioned that the Tibetans did not focus only on the torch relay. They saw the whole time prior to the Games as a chance to point out to the world their situation. In the summer of 2007, a group of Tibetan sportsmen protested in the United Kingdom in search of being included in the 2008 Games since the National Olympic Committee had been established in Tibet. But protests by Tibetan movement were taking

21 place all over the world. Prior to the event, activists from the United Kingdom, the USA and Canada hung banners from the Great Wall of China and posted their action on websites. Two other activists were giving information from Beijing about the city before the Games through a blog, which was, as well as the previous group‟s activity on websites, then detained by Chinese authorities (Davies 2009, 19-20). Finlay and Xin (2010, 876) find that well-known Western discourse that regards China as a fear was even empowered by the controversial torch relay, which according to them, overshadowed other aspects of the Olympics. Being aware of so many controversies, China in the finale preferred to influence foreigners through its television and media where it could control the content. Therefore, it consequently “restricted visas to limit the number of visitors to the Games” (Heslop et al. 2010, 413).

6.2 Human rights Before receiving the Games, Chinese political leaders promised to alter their human rights policy (Moore 2008, 7-8). Sands (2008, 43) adds that China, prior to the Games, became more open and accessible. “By February 2008, 221 million Chinese had regular Internet access and a direct connection to the rest of the world”. Hwang (2010, 865) claims that only in 2004 China included „respect for and protect human rights‟ into the Constitution. Even the motto of the Chinese Communist Party is „People Coming First‟. Exactly one year before the opening ceremony, the IOC was aware of 28 non- governmental organizations3 that planned to exploit the Beijing Olympics for highlighting political issues. In human rights field, the two most influential NGOs were Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The former was very fruitful in publishing reports and also became involved with national Olympic committees in home countries of section offices. Human Rights Watch also published several reports and met with national Olympic committees. Apart from that, it ran a website about the Olympics, published a book and met with some heads of states and foreign ministers (Brownell 2012, 307-308). Nevertheless, during the Games, attention from human rights issues, such as treatment of political prisoners, suppressing uprisings in Tibet or cooperating with questionable regimes in the developing world was withdrawn (Bonde 2009, 1562).

3 For instance: Reporters without Borders, Students for a Free Tibet, Support the Monks or Save Darfur Coalition

Regarding a different angle of view, we should have a brief look into the Chinese discourse of human rights. The Chinese unofficially communicated in informal conversations with the IOC on this issue. They believed that Western governments and public opinion abused „human rights problems‟ as an excuse in order to attack China due to fear of its fast development. They assumed that others should realize that various countries have various values, for instance in human rights field, because of “different stages of economic development and different cultural backgrounds”. And they were also convinced that the human rights situation in China was at its best, although at the same time realized there was still space for amelioration, which the Games should contribute to (Brownell 2012, 312). However, every time Beijing attempted to show off the readiness of preparations, some bodies exploited this situation to point at human rights situation such as forced evictions, child labour, forced abortions or political dissidents in prison (Cha 2010, 23712). China believed that pulling so many people out of poverty was major human right success. New infrastructure, being built for the Olympics, was also meant to serve ordinary citizens. The government claimed that even people were more open-minded, tolerant and rational. The level of literacy and education was raised as well (Hwang 2010, 867-868). Despite all these statements about improving human rights, freedom of speech was, in fact, limited prior to and during the Olympics. And China did not abandon its methods in punishing those opposing the regime. For instance, one human rights activist, who set a petition wishing for human rights, not the Olympics, was sentenced to five-year imprisonment (Bonde 2009, 1562).

7. Chinese political strategies Protests which endangered China‟s image and Chinese counter-actions have been discussed. In this section, Chinese own strategy for pursuing its goals will be presented. In the previous part, it was argued that for instance, South Korea hid its dog soup restaurants not to offend visitors. In addition, opening ceremonies, as in the case of 1936 Berlin Games or 1980 Moscow Games, were meant to be a major strategy how to take foreign countries on their side. It has been argued that China ordered its citizens to behave in a more appropriate manner, attempted to get rid of those who opposed its regime and restricted visa to foreigners visiting. Nevertheless, the main Chinese political strategy – the opening ceremony – is regarded so significant that it will be analysed in detail and thus has a separate section in this thesis.

7.1 Opening ceremony In this thesis, the opening ceremony of the Games is viewed as the most visible and most important Chinese political strategy of the whole Olympics. It was the unique time when China had the chance to show off everything it wanted to convince others about all its slogans and beliefs prior to the Games. In addition, it was also an opportunity to deal with the controversies that had come up. And last but not least, the opening ceremony is something that is remembered for a while after the Games and thus is an important legacy. China was working with ten thousand people for over three years to make its opening ceremony the main highlight of the Games and the course of the ceremony was a state secret (Bonde 2009, 1566). The ceremony might have been more important for China than for any other host country. The past century is considered to have been a humiliating and marginalized era for the Chinese and the Olympics were also supposed to be a psychological cure for putting behind historical burdens and emotional traumas (Gong 2012, 199). The ceremony aimed at presenting Chinese past and present success to the world. Chinese people are often aware of a bad perception they are given due to Western media coverage. Thus, the government leans the soft power strategy on Confucianism and its main value – harmony. According to Chen et al. (2012, 188-191), the main messages of the opening ceremony were „harmony‟, „peace‟, „unity‟ and „power and innovation‟. Unity is seen as both national and international. The Chinese could not omit to present their main inventions given to the world – „papermaking, movable type printing, the compass and gunpowder‟. The emerging globe sent a message that China is not closed to the outside world anymore, on the contrary, it is

24 fully globalised and integrated. The light show was a great example of China‟s technological development (ibid, 194). It seems that the Chinese paid attention to every single detail. Even the timing of the opening ceremony at 8:08 pm sharp, August 8, 2008 is in perfect symbiosis with Chinese numerology, where the number 8 symbolizes „prosperity, fortune, happiness, and good luck‟ (Gong 2012, 197-198). Three important moments of the ceremony should be highlighted here, being presenting 56 Chinese ethnic groups, a small girl lip-synching and reaction to the Sichuan earthquake. Why these three? They were very often discussed in the literature. In addition, all three definitely aimed at impressing audience and using their emotions for Chinese communication strategy, for getting people think exactly what the Chinese wanted them to. However, unfortunately for China, these actions were not faultless. The march of 56 children, who were representing 56 ethnic groups, was accompanied by a popular Chinese patriotic song „Ode to the Motherland‟. This group was also carrying a flag which was then handed to a group of soldiers. The Chinese government expressed the „national unification, political independence and internal unity from outside interference‟. This sequence received rather negative opinions. Some believed that despite this showcasing of various ethnic groups, there were still many inter-ethnic tensions and territorial issues, as it could have been seen prior to the Games (Gong 2012, 200). Some were not very convenient with the army carrying the flag, although the presence of the army is very natural at Chinese events. Moreover, it was later found out that the supposed-to-be 56 ethnic groups were actually representing only one ethnic group (deLisle 2009, 191). Some American commentators were also intimidated by Chinese men banging on traditional drums‟ (Finlay and Xin 2010, 885). As mentioned, this march was accompanied by the song „Ode to the Motherland‟, which was sung by a cute nine-year-old girl. Later, the music director of the show himself revealed that this girl had actually been lip-synching for a seven-year-old girl whose voice had been very good but her appearance had happened to be less so. In fact, this decision was undertaken by the Politburo members of the Chinese Communist Party who believed that this action was a matter of „national interests‟. The music director added that “the child on camera should be flawless in image, internal feeling and expression. . . . It is the image of our national culture”. It might not be astounding that the Chinese and global public were polarized by this issue. Nevertheless, as Gong (2012, 200) points out, we should not be surprised by this Chinese move. China wanted to impress with the best image possible, especially because it „traditionally privileges face, order and status‟. Considering the third point of the ceremony,

China also wanted to show its condolences to the Sichuan area after the earthquake and therefore, a basketball player and a small boy from the Sichuan area, who had saved some people‟s lives, walked hand in hand during the opening ceremony (Bonde 2009, 1566). The opening ceremony and the Games are also evaluated by the number of heads of states attending it. Some famous politicians who supported the Free Tibet Campaign, which was criticized by many Chinese, were not present, such as the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the German President Angela Merkel, the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk or the Czech President Václav Klaus. On the other hand, the American president George W. Bush and the French president Nicolas Sarkozy did attend the ceremony. Interestingly, this was called „shameful‟ by some Western media (Hong and Zhouxiang 2012c, 172). Media responses to the ceremony appeared very quickly. Associated press claimed that the show was “a stunning display of pyrotechnics and pageantry through which once- reclusive China commandeered the world stage”. BBC had a similar reaction when it described the ceremony as “spectacular . . . explosive . . . unforgettable . . . chest-beating on an epic scale”. The Times ranked it as “a stunning visual show which . . . raised the bar dauntingly high for the organizers of London 2012” (Gong 2012, 204). The Los Angeles Times did not feel that “the show was a welcoming ceremony for a resurgent China rejoining the world stage” but it was rather “about China for at least the next 17 days becoming the world stage. The Chinese, accustomed to humiliation, real and perceived, by foreigners for centuries, are secure enough these days that they were willing, even eager, to share the spotlight” (Ruwitch 2008). In addition, the headline of The Guardian‟s article was „Patriot Games: China makes its points with greatest show‟ (Williams 2008) and New York Times titled their article „China‟s Leaders Try to Impress and Reassure World‟ (Yardley 2008). These headlines imply the desired image of power that China tried to seek. Gong (2012, 206) comes with an interesting point about a crucial message in the ceremony which we should realize. Athens, the symbol of ancient democracy, and the USA, the symbol of modern democracy are both deeply in debts. However, this ceremony showed China‟s prosperous “authoritarian model of development, a centric and liberal statism and for the first time since 1949, it was confident enough, at a non-political occasion, to enlighten on its political model and ideological system”.

8. Legacies China set itself many goals which it wanted to achieve. Every goal it would conclude would consequently result in legacies. Also, actions demanded by other actors, either implemented or not, bring about legacies as well. In this core section of this case study, four main goals – position in the international field, consolidated nationalism, high level of government‟s legitimacy and physical legacies, and one demanded action – human rights, will be analysed together with their expected legacies. In the final part, it will be discussed whether we could overall proclaim the Games being successful for China and if not for it, whether for anyone else.

8.1 Uncertain position in the international field Testing the Chinese communication strategy to the outside world and convincing everybody that China was a rising developing power who other countries should not be afraid of, could be said to be the most important foreign policy goal. Global Language Monitor tracked 50,000 print and electronic media over the past decade and came to a conclusion that „Rise of China‟ was the top search phrase, defeating „the Iraq War‟ and „the 9/11 terrorist attacks‟ (Gong 2012, 205-206). We cannot trace a common opinion on the communication strategy in the literature. As we could have seen in the part on „Opening ceremony‟, most articles were cheering about the spectacular show. Nevertheless, when it comes to the general legacy of China trying to convince our minds, it is a different story. Some authors confirm that China indeed showed its international position and power, however, are later not sure about the consequences of this. Moreover, many authors rather have negative views of the means by which China performed its image. This last note could be summed up by Heslop et al. (2010, 404) who claim that although the Games might have looked technically successful, post-event assessments are, on the contrary, lower. A Chinese ambassador to Britain, Fu Ying, believed that “China‟s relations with the world, especially with the West, have made a large step forward through the Olympics”. Cha (2010, 2360-2376) assumes that we cannot expect significant changes happening in China now but the seeds of change are already planted and we shall wait what they are going to bring. He believes that at external level, China is expected to be „more responsible stakeholder in world affairs‟. He continues that if there is international pressure on policies by the host government, avoiding solving them would lead to embarrassment and failure in displaying the country‟s greatness. He also claims that China fulfilled its initial goals but on

27 the other hand, those who called for political change were only empowered. And the last but not least, everybody in the international community has their eyes set on China with higher expectations as a result of the Olympics. DeLisle (2009, 200-204) agrees as well that the Olympics offered the picture of China “having the ability to be a stakeholder in the international system and the intention to be a responsible one”. However, together with this idea, some concerns emerged, such as whether China has capacity and will to play that role. Some were worried about the Olympics-related behaviour which only proved Chinese unwillingness to stick to international norms. This could have been seen when the whole world, soon after the Games, was struggling with the global economic crisis and China did not agree with common international economic policies and wanted to deal with this crisis its way. Thus, deLisle believes that although China has substantially involved itself in the international community and there has also been progress in its internal situation, he sees a problem in China‟s lack in accepting international norms and regimes. Finlay and Xin (2010, 886-894) acquiesce to this argument. They suppose that the Olympic spotlight highlighted Chinese refusal to conform to Western values and thus it resulted in a detrimental impact on China‟s image. The attempt to present an alternative to American and Western ideas of progress was not successful, moreover, due to the influence of NGOs and civil society groups which promoted a significant anti-China narrative prior to the Games. Regarding a doubtful age of Chinese gymnasts or the lip-synching girl at the opening ceremony, some believed that “both Chinese showmanship and Chinese athletes were mass produced fake”. Heslop et al. (2010, 419-425) claim that despite positives such as no incidents of terrorism, weather manipulation or events being held without delays, confusions, or mistakes, there were prevailing more negatives and thus the overall feeling was rather negative for both Chinese and foreigners. The authors see one of the core problems in China‟s chase after being „too perfect‟. The West may judge “the rigidity, precisions, and scale of coordinated human activity as an indicator of oppression, rather than as a triumph of national pride”. For instance, the Financial Times marked the Olympics with a slogan „Control Freaks‟ (Cha 2010, 2360). Interestingly enough, in February 2009, less than six months after the Games ended, a BBC World Service conducted a survey of public opinion in 21 countries. “China‟s positive ratings fell six points over the year to 39% and its negative ratings rose from 33% to 40%. Europeans had become more negative towards China and a majority of Americans remained negative, with „views essentially unchanged at 52 per cent‟”. A poll‟s representative analysed

28 this result as “China having much to learn about winning hearts and minds in the world” and he concludes that the Olympics were not enough for enhancing China‟s image (Finlay and Xin 2010, 876-877). In addition, another, recent global public opinion poll discovers rising negative views of China. Although China is increasingly believed to be seen as an emerging superpower4, which is something it wanted to achieve through the Games, people do not like this country5. In Asia, due to the Chinese military power, the negative views are more negative than in the past, especially in Japan, where only 5 per cent of respondents are in favourable opinion of China. That is a drop by 29 per cent contrary to the year 2002 (Whitehead 2013). The Chinese can profit from the biggest favour in Africa, which should not come as a surprise since the Chinese presence and investments have been there for a long time (Pew Research Global Attitudes Project 2013). Therefore, no matter how hard China attempted to improve its image, it was still seen as a threat, its different and unique means of pursuing some actions (e.g. choosing a prettier girl over the one with a better voice) were not received in a positive manner and it seemed as a country unwilling to comfort to Western (often considered universal) norms.

8.2 Consolidated nationalism and high level of government’s legitimacy One of the main domestic policy goals for the Chinese government was to consolidate Chinese nationalism which would lean against a high legitimacy of the government/Communist party. These two factors shall be analysed together since they are interconnected. Thanks to supporting nationalism, the government gains more popularity and secures its position as a rightful form of governance. The term „consolidated‟ rather than „strengthened‟ is used for nationalism here, since – as it will be argued – it was already quite strong in China. This time, nationalism might have been believed to be united within a new perspective. Before the Games, some claimed that the Olympics had a support around 95% among nation (Xu 2006, 94), some, on the other hand that citizens in rural areas stood on the other side, suffered from poverty, labour migration and eviction and thus their support was doubtful (Caffrey 2008, 816-817). However, nationalism may have been strengthened prior to the Games, especially among the youth, when it came to Western criticism of the Games in Beijing. People were convinced that the West was intentionally writing negatively about the

4 France, Germany, Spain and Britain even believe it has taken over the USA 5 Nevertheless, there is a bigger support of China among young people contrary to their parents or grandparents

Chinese and this common disgust united them (Sands 2008, 43). In addition, the Chinese might have been also more united when it came to the disastrous earthquake. However, some authors question the position of nationalism in contemporary China. The Chinese President Hu Jintao believed that the Games had “inspired millions of Chinese people and stimulated the development of sport in China”, which would then improve their „fitness and living standards‟ (Hong and Zhouxiang 2012b, 184). Gong (2012, 191) assumes that thanks to „historico-cultural invocations and reconfigurations of Chinese and global memories‟ the Chinese gained a new form of national identity. However, he continues with worries that such „rhetorical exploits‟ were not very successful when it came to legitimizing the Chinese government in the world. Other authors continue with scepticism, such as Caffrey (2008, 821) who believed that the Games would not be a catalyst for transformation of „the political economics of unrest in the country‟, but may result in the opposite. To conclude, Cha (2010, 2377) argues that the Chinese patriotism could simply later turn to anger and demand for change if the government could not deal with a next SARS crisis or a next disastrous earthquake. According to him, the Olympics were well-run but the government should increasingly answer more to public demands in order to show the positive results of their leadership. To understand better the means which the Chinese government uses for uniting the population, the concept of the sgovernment‟s legitimacy will be discussed. For many, this explanation might give interesting findings. It is a Western view that legitimacy of the government comes hand in hand with democracy and therefore, citizens not experiencing democracy cannot be satisfied with the ruling body (Jacques 2012). In addition, a lot of foreign observers claim that the ordinary Chinese population is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the country‟s regime. However, the Chinese government enjoys a very high level of support, comparable to the standard of Western democracies, as Wenfang et al. (2013) argue. In a recent face-to-face survey it was found out that the average person‟s support was around 8 on the scale of 10. Another survey close to that date, 6th Wave World Values Survey, conducted at the end of 2012 and at the beginning of 2013 shows the average support as 7,5 out of 10. A survey by Pew Research Global Attitudes Project (2014) reveals that in 2002, only 48 per cent of the Chinese population was satisfied with the country‟s direction, whereas since 20056 the satisfaction was rising until 2010 up to 87 per cent and since then it has been more or less stable with a difference no larger than 5 per cent. This rise can be understood because of General Secretary Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao takeover

6 There are no data for years 2003 and 2004

30 of the power in 2002-2003 when they undertook actions letting many of those who had not enjoyed the reforms up to that date to benefit from them (Saich 2011). Some have argued that due to the oppressive nature of the regime the Chinese were afraid to tell the truth and the media censorship allowed a stream of only positive messages and thus we cannot take these results seriously. However, a lot of political online discussions take place, as well as frequent protests and petitions or everyday conversations and the Internet is not as censored as it used to be anymore. The key lies in the government‟s responsiveness. This might come as a surprise since the authoritarian regimes are known mainly for the opposite because the regimes lack national elections (Wenfang et al. 2013). In addition, also one of the public opinion polls reveals that the Chinese regarded the core driving force behind reforms to be the social reality (44 per cent), the will of the leadership came second (26 per cent) (Lu 2012). Van Aken (2013) claims that if in democratic societies people do not agree with a party, they will vote for a different one in next elections. However, since China lacks national elections, citizens do not have this choice, and the government has no second chance if public dissatisfaction evolves. As a result, the Communist Party introduced a system which has proven flexible to reply to various pressures. However, as Wenfang et al. (2013) argue, this should not imply that this responsiveness is stable or monolithic. The Chinese are sensitive to major political events and regime‟s legitimacy might be questioned. This is also the case when the policy performs badly and fails to deliver desired local services. In addition, according to Saich (2011), when the Chinese disagree with the government, it is very often with the local one, as it shows less support than the central government. One then might ask - why the paranoia, censorship of the internet and arresting dissidents if the government is legitimate? The problem is that the country is very vast and governing it is thus more than difficult. The Party fears events it cannot foresee. On the other hand, this anticipation of unstable events underlies its good governance (Jacques 2012). Government‟s high level of legitimacy has been rather stable in the last couple of years and profits from the high support thanks to its responsiveness, which was well proven during an event very close to the 2008 Games, the Sichuan earthquake in May the same year. The government‟s response was quick, „transparent, to an unprecedented extent‟. One million Chinese youth volunteers helped with rescuing (Sands 2008, 43). When the Sichuan earthquake took place, only after an hour and a half did the Chinese premier Wen Jiabao fly to the damaged area and the same day, People‟s Liberation Army provided tens of thousands

31 troops. China also accepted foreign help and, maybe to surprise of others, gave a full media coverage of the disaster (Hwang 2010, 865). Given both positive and negative assessments of the position of nationalism, we could argue that it was consolidated thanks to the Games, be it during the earthquake, due to Western criticism or support of the Olympics. In addition, it could be assumed that this nationalism took a new form, as Gong argued. The Chinese citizens were presented with a spectacular show which reminded them of all the Chinese success and attempted to assure them that the century of humiliation was over. What is more, it was most likely the first time during the long media coverage prior to the Games when the Western media sent out mainly positive messages. And last but not least, the performances by Chinese athletes and the number of medals proved Chinese fitness and strength. Thanks to this consolidated nationalism, the government‟s position was not endangered and its legitimacy was rather questioned by the international actors than its home population. However, the government‟s legitimacy has rather been a phenomenon of the last years and thus the Olympic Games are not believed to have significantly strengthened it, which is nevertheless still a very positive message for Chinese leaders. However, if it does not reply properly to any major issue, be it a protest or a natural disaster, its legitimacy will be jeopardized. In addition, it should also be careful with persecuting its opponents as a means of not endangering its position.

8.3 Minimum change in human rights policy It may be argued that the human rights were the main topic of China hosting the Olympics. Countless actions by different actors tried to put pressure on China to ameliorate its human rights situation. After the Olympics, as Brownell (2012, 308) states, Amnesty International reported that 1.5 million people across the globe had expressed their desire to improve human rights in China. According to Bonde (2009, 1555), the Games did not result in ameliorating human rights situation. DeLisle (2009, 202-203) claims that Beijing has deepened its commitment by engaging with the international human rights regime and the main institutions, and is also more tolerant to some „international human rights-promoting efforts‟. And China did make an important step in human rights area due to the pressure of the international community. Previously, it was mentioned that many disagreed with Chinese policies in Darfur and took advantage of the publicity of the Games to express this. Beijing made maybe small, but significant changes in its Darfur policies. It no longer blocked UN Security Council resolutions condemning the regime in Khartoum. A special envoy was sent to Darfur, visited refugee camps and made

32 some tough statements against the regime. According to a U.S. special envoy for Darfur, Beijing had an essential role in a UN-African Union peacekeeping mission. In addition, China was the first Asian country to offer their forces to this mission (Cha 2010, 2376). Nevertheless, some criticized China for failing in fulfilling „Games-related pledges‟ and its authoritarian regime. And it should not be expected that Western-type elections would take place in China in the near-future (deLisle 2009, 202-2013). If we looked at one of the core and most problematic elements of the human rights situation in China, freedom, China has a status of non-free country. With number 7 being the worst indicator, China has 6.5 in the freedom rating, 6 in civil liberties and 7 in political rights. These are current numbers from 2014. However, since 2008, when the Games were held, the numbers have not changed. And what is more, the data have been even the same since the announcement of Beijing winning the bid in 2001 (Freedom House 2014). In Amnesty International reports on China from 2010 and 2011, we can find statements such as “the authorities continued to tighten restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly and association” or “the Chinese government responded to a burgeoning civil society by jailing and persecuting people for peacefully expressing their views”. Moreover, if we choose „China‟ in information on country on Amnesty International website, only from March 2014 are there 18 matches, and on Human Rights Watch website four. These examples imply that the human rights situation did not improve in China after the Games, the Olympics thus did not serve as a catalyst in this area. Backing away in Darfur and subordinating to Western values might be rather seen in a way that China might have not put so much importance into this issue and a change in it would not endanger it significantly. On the other hand, human rights at home have to be understood through the domestic policy which, as it was discussed, is not desired to be threatened by those who disagree with it. Therefore, having claimed to ameliorate its human rights situation prior to the Olympics might have rather been seen through the Chinese discourse of human rights, for instance getting many people out of poverty, than adopting Western values.

8.4 Physical legacies On the Olympic facilities, China spent 40 billion dollars which was the highest amount ever. All venues were finished before the deadline. The largest single airport terminal in the world was built, as well as new subway lines (Cha 2010, 2366-2367). The plans were that the sporting facilities would be later used for other sporting events, the Olympic Village would be

33 turned into a residential area offering apartments as a solution for housing shortage, and open green spaces would become parks (Ong 2004, 43-44). In fact, the Olympic Village indeed turned into luxurious apartments area with vast parks (Walton 2012). However, only after four months, the Bird‟s Nest (the stadium of the opening ceremony) was already dirty and covered in dust (deLisle 2009, 179). Moreover, to pay off a large debt for this stadium could take up to thirty years. The Bird‟s Nest and the Water Cube are still in use, though. On the other hand, „venues for kayaking, beach volleyball, BMX, and baseball‟ have not been touched since 2007 (Byrnes 2012). Some athletes expressed their concern over the air pollution and even claimed they might not compete due to their health, a marathon world record holder did not even compete at last. Several national teams even booked places in Japan and South Korea and flew to Beijing only for their competitions. Government fought the air problems - closed factories, planted new trees, used cloud seeding for influencing the weather and implemented car bans (Cha 2010, 2368-2369). The environmental situation, especially huge pollution, are still a large issue in China and it can be expected to receive more complaints and be put under pressure in transforming its environmental policy (deLisle 2009, 201-202). DeLisle‟s article is from 2009, however, an article from 2012 by FlorCruz also mentions that “pollution indexes are still hitting record highs”. Therefore, Beijing can definitely profit from its new terminal and subways, from large green spaces, but still has to fight its air pollution problems. Facilities might be more used when it comes to another sport event.

8.5 Whose success? After presenting and analysing legacies, the remaining question is – Were the Games successful for China? And if not for it, for whom? In this context, success should be understood as fulfilling one‟s goals. In the 2008 Beijing Games, 204 national teams participated. That was more than ever before. It was historically the first opening ceremony outside the USA which was attended by an American president. We could have seen the largest number of both accredited and non- accredited journalists at an event (Brownell 2012, 306-307). The Games were the most watched event on TV ever until that time (Cha 2010, 2360). Performance was also very crucial for the Chinese. Many authors, for instance deLisle (2009, 181) refer to a current competition between the USA and China as a new Cold War. In the last century, we could have seen the USA and the USSR racing in who will get more

34 nuclear weapons. Nowadays, China and the USA compete who will get the most medals, moreover, who will get the most golden medals. Such country will prove to be the strongest power. Therefore, regarding performance, China was only close to having done better, since it won 51 golden medals. Not only was it more than during the 2004 Athens Games (32 that time), but it was also more than the number of any other country. And they also scored the second in the overall number of medals, running-up to the USA. Who gets more golden medals scores higher on the medal rank due to given points. This, obviously, resulted in a debate that the USA was still more successful because it had the most medals overall (Cha 2010, 2365). Thus, as for organizational aspect, spectacular opening ceremony and performance, we can argue that China reached their goals in this context and therefore was successful. Considering showing off its rising power was also accepted by external actors. However, when it comes to its international reputation and offering alternative to the Western values, this, as it was argued, is something that China might need to work on more. Considering consolidated nationalism and government‟s legitimacy, both were successfully fulfilled by the Chinese government. However, as it was argued, the government‟s high level of legitimacy has been present for longer time and the Games did not have a major influence on it. On the other hand, it was not endangered or significantly challenged, at least not at home, thus this can come as success for China. Regarding other actors, for the IOC, the Games resulted in huge success. In the opening message of the IOC‟s Final Report on the 2008 Beijing Games (IOC 2010, 5) from 2010, Jacques Rogge, the president of the IOC, calls the games „exceptional‟, and “from an operational and organisational point of view, the Games were a resounding success”. He continues with praising the Chinese nation and the government for supporting the Games. His praise does not finish with this statement. He claims that “not only do the Games leave a great legacy for Beijing and China, but they also mark a historical milestone for the Olympic Movement. Never before had the Games been hosted in the world‟s most populous nation. Never before had so many countries won medals. Never before had the hearts and souls of so many children been touched by the spirit of Olympism”. He also does not omit China‟s original intentions of hosting – “The Beijing 2008 Games have surely contributed to China‟s opening up to the world and becoming more integrated within the international community. Through these Games, the world learned more about China, and China learned more about the world”.

Considering NGOs, for them it might be argued that it was both success and failure. The former refers to putting pressure on China and publicizing their human rights violations. The latter refers to inability to put enough pressure to ameliorate the human rights situation. And as for the USA, representing a large part of the Western world, it might have been success up to a point, too. The Americans had long opposed the Chinese bid and their media brought about large criticism of the regime and its policies. Therefore, the argued Chinese position in the international community, meaning has not reaching its potential and lacking accepting international norms, could comfort their values.

9. Conclusion This thesis aimed at describing and analysing the use of the Olympic Games for political goals by host countries – a phenomenon, which has been surprisingly rather understudied. Reasons for hosting are part of both domestic and foreign policies. In the former, countries seek strengthening nationalism, economic growth, rising tourism or facilities. In the latter, we can find better negotiating position in the international field or improving image. By seeking fulfilling these goals, host countries expect gaining positive legacies. There are many definitions and understandings of legacies, ranging from tangible and intangible to positive and negative or planned and unplanned. However, through the thesis, it could have been seen that the way which a host country walks towards successful hosting and gaining positive legacies is disturbed by other actors such as foreign countries, foreign media or NGOs, which thus also exploit the Games for bringing up political issues. Host cities can usually long benefit from facilities (if they are in use), transformed transport or new green spaces. However, they often suffer from huge debts or criticism by media and foreign actors when something goes wrong during the Games. They can serve as a catalyst of change, but can also bring no major positive changes. In addition, legacies should be understood as things we remember long after the Olympics are over and very often contribute to various actions. For instance, the 1972 Munich Games will always be remembered for the terrorist attack, thus having negative and unplanned legacy. This attack, however, resulted in tightening security issues, which is also another legacy for other hosts. The 1988 Seoul Games, on the other hand, will be remembered as positive due to contributing to a change of regime in South Korea. We recalled this legacy again when it came to the 2008 Beijing Games where many hoped for a regime change as well. The 2008 Beijing Olympics were meant to serve as a perfect case study of the theory about politics and sport. China mainly wanted to show off that it was more than ready to take a role of a major international player in the international field, to act as a developed country, improve its negative image and consolidate the Chinese nationalism. Moreover, sport policy was not strange to China because it had been using it for political purposes for a long time. It might not be exaggerated to say that the Beijing Games might have been the most remembered in the recent history and, unfortunately for China, have probably been the most controversial7. When any controversies occurred during other Olympics Games, we could

7 Although due to recent holding of the 2014 Sochi Games and its very controversial nature regarding human rights and followed invasion of Crimea, it might be disputable which Games have evoked more controversy

37 have generally tracked one major one or a few minor ones. However, when it comes to China, we can track a lot of controversies which make these Games stand out. A lot of actors, from Tibetans to NGOs, from celebrities to foreign politicians to media made China their target for a stream of negative criticism in hope of changing Chinese actions, mainly in human rights area. By putting such amount of pressure, it was expected that China would make certain steps towards ameliorating its policies. In addition, Beijing wanted to have a look of an open and harmonious country. Thus, it had a great opportunity to bounce these negative approaches and make certain compromises which would be acceptable for the Chinese government. Nevertheless, apart from handling the earthquake, other political strategies are questionable. China focused so much on improving the image that it might not have realized that some of its actions caused just the opposite. For instance, trying to hide protests by some Chinese citizens by imprisoning them was not very wise, since this had been one of the many human rights issues which China had been criticized for. Rather, it might have been better to let these protests visible. The Western world already considered the Games controversial and this might not have been surprising for it. If China did not supress these actions, it may have showed its willingness to loosen its tight human right policies. Another argument might be that the opening ceremony was supposed to be the main vehicle for displaying everything it wanted and thus, China might have relied on this strategy too much and omitted other factors. At the beginning of the case study, it was presented that China aimed at fulfilling both domestic and foreign policy goals. Thus, legacies in both fields will be discussed below, as well as whether they resulted in being positive or negative. However, there are also goals and consequently legacies which coincide and therefore cannot be solely put in one category. These shall be discussed first. The opening ceremony evoked some controversies but overall it could be argued that it was huge success. The show received many positive reviews and was so spectacular that it will probably be remembered for a very long time. As a result, following opening ceremonies might not avoid being compared with it, as it was already seen during the 2012 London Games. Therefore, if the ceremonies are not as good as the Chinese, it might result in a worse overall evaluation of the Olympics. Regarding the domestic policy, the ceremony is believed to have brought more unity in the nationalistic thinking of Chinese citizens, since it was spectacular, reminded them of historical achievements and probably for the first time prior to the Games offered a positive Western media coverage. Considering foreign policy, China managed to show off its development and implications for being a stakeholder in the international arena. Both legacies can then be assessed as positive. Moreover, the Games were

38 the most viewed and most attended by representatives of states and journalists, and Chinese athletes gained the most golden medals. The Chinese may have felt proud because of those „firsts‟ in the history of the Olympic Games and the highest number of medals most likely spurred their nationalist feeling. The medals, on the other hand, were implying to the West that there was a new power on the rise, if anyone had doubted that before. These legacies are thus also considered positive. Discussing the foreign policy itself, China made a major step in enhancing its policies in Darfur, which was a positive move for human rights activists as well as international actors. The test of the Chinese communication strategy with the outside world, nevertheless, has rather been a failure. The aforementioned mishandling of some situations did no good and overall, the world was not sure how to see and treat China. In the West, the Chinese concept of offering an alternative to Western values was not accepted and many still see China as the country with cheap labour and not very quality products and many oppose the Communist regime. Thus, it may be argued that playing a more significant role was not reached and was an unplanned and negative legacy. Regarding the domestic policy, the Games brought new facilities, an airport terminal, subway lines or green spaces to Beijing. These can be viewed as positive, nevertheless the sport facilities are rather let behind and China is in debts of paying them off. Moreover, Beijing still struggles with its air pollution. And lastly, human rights were not ameliorated on the domestic scene. However, as it was already argued above, the nationalism was consolidated within showing Chinese citizens a new perspective to their nationalist thinking. In addition, the level of the legitimacy of the government might have been only slightly risen, since it had benefited from the public support and it still does. Besides, the position of it was not shaken by the Olympics and this can also be a positive legacy. Overall, the Games could be evaluated as having brought many positive legacies to China, arguably more than the negative ones. Nevertheless, China failed in probably one of its most important foreign policy goals – being a responsible stakeholder taken seriously in the international field and offering its state regime and its functioning as an alternative. Considering final remark of this thesis, we should take a look into the Olympic Games in perspective of the East Asian region, since it has not only implications for the future development of the Olympics themselves but also for the Chinese position in the region. In the history of the Olympics, only three countries from that region have hosted the Games – Japan (Tokyo 1964, Nagano 1998); South Korea (Seoul 1988); and China (Beijing 2008). Before the Chinese bid, it had been only two countries with two Games. If we look at a list of

39 all the cities that have bid for the Games (Games Bids 2014), we will find out that only Japan, South Korea and China have made multiple bids; and Malaysia and Thailand tried for the first time for the 2008 Games. Moreover, in the case of Japan it has been 12 bids in total! In South Korea, since 2010 they have made three consecutive bids. It might then be assumed that in both instances, the multiple cases of bidding were due to assuring of its position in the Asian region and the world and securing it, especially in connection with the rise of China. Regarding non-bids by other Asian countries, it might be the case of not having enough financial sources and facilities for hosting. However, with the 2018 and 2020 Games taking place in Asia, it might be more and more common that other Asian nations, especially if they are able to afford it, will bid for the Games in search of the same recognition as their neighbours get, to possibly balance the Chinese position. It seems that even China itself is aware of this rising competition in the region and in 2014 announced its bid for the 2022 Winter Games. If it wins the bid, it might want to follow similar goals such as showing off, keeping high level of nationalist feeling and government‟s legitimacy and demonstrate its development to secure its position in the international field once again and this time hopefully more successfully. However, if possibly organizing another Games, China should look back and evaluate what might have possibly gone wrong. In addition, not offering the world an alternative but acting as an equal, although in fact it might not aim at doing that, might offer better prospects for its future position.

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