Technè 10:2 Winter 2006 Special Issue: Durbin, In Search of Discourse Synthesis/168 Chapter 18 Albert Borgmann and a Philosophy of Technology? I begin this chapter with Higgs, Light, and Strong and their argument in Technology and the Good Life? (2000) in favor of the need for a new discipline: Broadening the scope of Philosophy of Technology “The set of questions a philosophy of technology should address in order to fulfill its promise are often at the intersection of it and other fields. In our opinion, philosophy of technology at its best should appeal to a very wide audience partly because it illuminates our shared, ordinary everyday life, such as with things and devices, and partly because the issues it probes cut across the full range of disciplines. Many of these issues are already vital matters of concern for these disciplines, such as ethics, social and political philosophy, aesthetics, art history, architecture, music, anthropology, religion, history, history of science and technology, cultural studies, sociology, political science, economics, linguistics, literary criticism, visual culture, and the hard sciences. For example, one of the interdisciplinary successes that philosophy of technology has had is with environmental ethics. Issues that join both fields are addressed in journals regularly, and numerous books have appeared. However, this kind of success should be occurring with other fields as well. What does philosophy of technology have to offer other disciplines? In the view of some of our contributors, traditional philosophical approaches may not be capable of questioning and challenging technology in a sufficiently radical manner. Nevertheless, we can show the kinds of questions a robust philosophy of technology can raise and address. .” And on Borgmann as a focus: Why Borgmann’s Philosiphy Of Technology? “Albert Borgmann’s work is a good candidate to begin such a rethinking of philosophy of technology so that it is better prepared to answer the challenges laid before it. His work falls in the tradition of the kind of substantive philosophy of technology initiated by Heidegger, Ellul, and Mumford. As a philosophy of technology it is far more comprehensive and ambitious than earlier philosophy of technology, setting its sights on larger issues of social criticism Technè 10:2 Winter 2006 Special Issue: Durbin, In Search of Discourse Synthesis/169 while simultaneously meeting scholarly demands already established in the field by previous works. Specifically, there are four chief reasons why Borgmann’s work deserves a central place in advancing the philosophical study of technology. “The first reason is that Borgmann builds his theory from a descriptive phenomenological account. He takes up his field of inquiry with a description of the shift from 'things' to 'devices,' from fireplaces to central heating, from candles to sophisticated lighting systems, from wooden tables to Formica, from traditional foods and drinks to Lite versions, from shoelaces to Velcro, from craftwork to automation, from traditional performances and physical activities to home entertainment centers. For Borgmann these substitutions constitute a repeated pattern that can be described, a pattern that Borgmann claims also has repeated consequences (which can be similarly described) for our relationships to our physical surroundings, our relationships to ourselves and others. Discussing whether Borgmann’s characterizations are accurate is a fruitful beginning for a discussion of how technology effects our assessment of the good life. “Second are the diagnostic aspects of Borgmann’s philosophy. Borgmann locates the problem of technology in relationships. His critique considers the adverse effects technology has on our relationships to our physical surroundings, and our human relationships in their political, social, and aesthetic dimensions. In this sense, the focus of Borgmann's work is not simply technology itself as an object of study, but more thoroughly human relationships and our relationships to our surroundings as they are inevitably affected by technology. “Third, considered prescriptively and on the basis of his diagnosis, Borgmann argues that these relationships can be reconfigured into a socially reconstructive program. In fact, Borgmann’s theory, along with others such as those of Andrew Feenberg and Langdon Winner, is one of the few attempts at developing a comprehensive series of reform proposals for technology. It also addresses questions of nature and environment, rather than restricting reform of technology to built space and artifacts, thus exceeding the traditional purview of the field. Focusing on Borgmann’s work in conversation with and divergence from these other reform proposals will help to move the field forward. “From another standpoint, Borgmann calls for a philosophical reassessment of social life that challenges received notions of what constitutes the good life. While many moral theorists of late have followed the charge of the communitarians to expand moral discourse beyond a thin assessment of the good, Technè 10:2 Winter 2006 Special Issue: Durbin, In Search of Discourse Synthesis/170 Borgmann adds a call for attention to the material and artifactual foundations of a thicker reconception of the good. “Borgmann’s is not an abstract theoretical contribution to an assessment of the good life but a grounding and practical means to create a context and a language whereby our material world can be normatively assessed as part of a more robust moral ontology. Borgmann puts it this way after briefly acknowledging a debt to Heidegger in formulating the wider contours of these views: ‘Heidegger says, broadly paraphrased, that the orienting power of simple things will come to the fore only after the rule of technology is raised from its anonymity, is disclosed as the orthodoxy that heretofore has been taken for granted and allowed to remain invisible. As long as we overlook the tightly patterned character of technology and believe that we live in a world of endlessly open and rich opportunities, as long as we ignore the definite ways in which we, acting technologically, have worked out the promise of technology and remain vaguely enthralled by that promise, so long simple things and practices will seem burdensome, confining, and drab. But if we recognize the central vacuity of advanced technology, that emptiness can become the opening for focal things. It works both ways, of course. When we see a focal concern of ours threatened by technology, our sight for the liabilities of mature technology is sharpened’ (Borgmann 1984, 199). “And finally, fourth, Borgmann’s work is important because of the depth and breadth of his diagnosis and his prescriptions. Borgmann’s reform program advocates a set of issues that any political system must address if it is to be effective in a social sphere dominated by technology. The work is therefore potentially of interest to a great variety of political positions and not simply an appeal to the most effective program for the reform of technology by a particular ideological persuasion.” It should be noted that, in his reply to his critics at the end of the volume, Borgmann is skeptical about the editors' claims about using his work as a focus of a new discipline: “As regards our position within academic philosophy, there is not much reason to lament insignificance within an enterprise that is itself insignificant.” But given the optimistic assessment of the disciplinary potential in Borgmann's thought, especially in Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life (1984), I think we need here a review of his thinking as a whole. I attempted that in a review that formed the basis for a chapter in my Social Responsibility in Technè 10:2 Winter 2006 Special Issue: Durbin, In Search of Discourse Synthesis/171 Science, Technology, and Medicine (1992). Here is that assessment, which I put under the heading of Borgmann as a “modest neo-Heideggerian.” In Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, Borgmann is poetic, as I noted in my review and book. I began both with these quotes from Borgmann’s book: “The great meal . where the guests are thoughtfully invited. the table has been carefully set, where the food is the culmination of tradition, patience and skill and the presence of the earth’s most delectable textures and tastes, where there is an invocation of divinity at the beginning and memorable conversation throughout . “The great run, where one exults in the strength of one’s body, in the ease and the length of the stride, where nature speaks powerfully in the hills, the wind, the heat, where one takes endurance to the breaking point, and where one is finally engulfed by the good will of the spectators and the fellow runners . “Like a temple or a holy precinct, the wilderness is encircled and marked off from the ordinary realm of technology. To enter it, we must cross the threshold at the trailhead where we leave the motorized conveniences of our normal lives behind. Once we have entered the wilderness, we take in and measure its space step-by-step. A mountain is not just a pretty backdrop for our eyes or an obstacle to be skirted or overwhelmed by the highway; it is the majestic rise and elevation of the land to which we pay tribute in the exertion of our legs and lungs and in which we share when our gaze can take in the expanse of the land and when we fee1 the cooler winds blow about the peaks.” Much of Borgmann’s focus is on these “focal things and practices,” which partly explains the poetry of his approach. But he is also intent on pointing out that amidst the clamor of our technological world, there are poetic authors who have highlighted focal things. The quotes above, about the culture of the table and running, are largely borrowed. To discover more clearly the currents and features of this, the other and more concealed, American mainstream, I take as witnesses two books where enthusiasm suffuses instruction vigorously, Robert Farrar Capon’s The Supper of the Lamb and George Sheehan’s Running and Being.