THE HOUR OF THE BEAST

A Thesis Presented to the Graduate Faculty of

California State University, Ha~vard

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in the Economics of History

By Hichael A. Sullivan June, 1993 THE HOUR OF THE BEAST

Bv

Michael A. Sullivan

Approved: Date:

ii PREFACE

That twenty centuries of stony sleep Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle, And what rough beast, its hour come round at last, Slouches toward Bethlehem to be born? W.B. Yeats

This thesis will argue that the essential issue facing contemporary society is the conflict between the individual and the state. It will also suggest that our ideals tend toward self-destructive contradiction, when freighted with the self-maximizing tendencies of the state bureaucracy. More specifically, it will propose that our modern conceptions of the

"Good," derived as they are from Classical, Christian, and Enlightenment sources, are currently drowning in their own conceits; that our theological and ideological perceptions, rather than promoting the individual sovereignty which has been the fundamental "goal" of our social evolution, are now unnecessarily explicating a reactionary nostalgia for the past and dread of the future. The defining metaphor of the thesis is embodied in the dialectic between the private individual and the tribal collective. Further elucidation will be provided with several oppositions. The ideological

iii perspective will be viewed through the contrast of the real, or material, versus the rationalization of the ideal, or moral. Our social interactions will be examined in light of the opposition between the free exchange of goods and ideas, the market, versus the rationalized control of goods and ideas, the State.

The political realm will be examined by way of the distinction between individual choice and authoritarian management.

I will attempt a modest universal history, suggesting that our essential path has been one of desacralizing our tribal, fundamentally religious, perceptions of the world as we tenuously "progress" toward a more profane individualism.

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. COMPLAINT ••••.•••.•••••..•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1

II. THE CHRYSALIS .•...•.••...••.•..•...••.•.••.••••.• 15

III. CONCUPISCENCE ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 28

IV. THE CLBRGY ••.•.•••...••...••.••••.••••...•.•..••. 55

V. THE DEATH OF GOD •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 77

VI. CHEERLEADERS, HUCKSTERS, & SNAKE-OIL SALESMEN •••• 94

VII. THE APES OF ZARATHUSTRA •••••••••••••••••••••••• 120

VIII. UTOPIAN MORALIS~1 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 151

IX. THE SIXTIES ••••..•..••••••.•.••••••••••••••••••. 175 x. THE CHURCH ••.••••.••••••.•••.•••••••••••••••••••• 196

XI. THE STATE ..••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••..••••• 226

XII. THE WEATHER ••••••••••••.••••••••••••••.•.••••.• 259

XIII. THE FALL .•••••••.•••••.••••••••••••••••••••••• 291

XIV. APOLOGIA .•••••.•.•••.•••.••.••••••••••.•••••••• 304

ENDNOTES •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 311

BIBLIOGRAPHY •••.•••..•••••••••.•••••••••.••••••••••• 322

v I. COMPLAINT

The state always has the sole purpose to limit, tame, subordinate the individual--to make him subject to some generality or other. Max Stirner

Our interactions with government are simple.

We pay taxes, and they spend our money. The very premise of government is based on the fact that we will not voluntarily pay these taxes; we must be coerced in some fashion. As the numerous tax revolts in the United states during the last twenty years confirm, the value we are receiving, in return for our tax dollars, is our primary concern.

It is perhaps a bit saddening, certainly sobering, to realize that our choices, at least in the modern nations of the world, have narrowed down to some variation of IIliberalll and "conservative," such as the

Democrats and Republicans typify in the United States.

The attempt to delineate our political options has not been assisted by the restraint of having to chart a course through this Scylla and Charybdis of institutionalized morality.. It seems that both parties deny their ideals in their practice of the same, while simultaneously abusing the people's intentions, pocket-books, and credulity.

1 2

Ronald Reagan was elected in the 1980's on a typical Republican program: the reduction of government spending combined with a pervasive respect for traditional forms of law and order. The actual consequences of his presidency are a study in irony.

The deficits that accumulated during his terms will plague us into the next century. We cannot suggest, however, that he ignored law and order while concentrating on restrained spending. George Schultz's testimony reveals that both Reagan and his vice-president, Bush, were well aware of the extra-legal operation run from the White House, which attempted to circumvent their own publicly stated policy concerning the arms for hostages' trade (not to mention the Contra connection which pushed the deceit even further).

George Bush even campaigned in 1992 by attacking his opponent's "character," while simultaneously insisting on the bold lie that he was "not in the loop" of information exchange concerning these events

(subsequently exposed by Schultz's revelations). It is sometimes difficult to decide whether our politicians suffer from overweening arrogance, or simple schizophrenia. Their protestations of innocence were reminiscent of the liberal Democrat Alan Cranston's 3

reminiscent of the liberal Democrat Alan Cranston's complete inability to perceive his own transgressions when he protected a failing Savings and Loan from government scrutiny because its president was one of his chief campaign contributors.

Reagan's reactions to the controversy, as explained by George Schultz, typify the way in which contemporary politicians practice self-delusion,

" •••Ronald Reagan still truly did not believe that what had happened had, in fact, happened. To him the reality was different••• He would go over the "script" of an event, past or present, in his mind, and once that script was mastered, that was the truth--no fact, no argument, no plea for reconsideration could change his mind".1

What the "conservative" Republicans have accomplished for governmental fiscal restraint and the sanctity of law and order, the "liberal" Democrats have achieved for their own sacred cows, justice and equality. Campaigning under cover of our legitimate yearnings for a world less abused by elitist privilege, the Democrats have created a welfare system for the disenfranchised which seems to be purposefully designed to keep them in perpetual bondage. A paternal desire 4

to help has been perverted into a denial of self-empowerment. The explicit message that the poor's problems are society's fault has delivered the implicit advice that one's own abilities to correct the problem are completely inadequate, thus destroying the only base of desire that might eventually transform this

"oppressive" reality. In short, if the poor do not correct the problem, no one will.

One of the most persistent ironies is that even when one disagrees with the basic platform of either party, one is still disappointed when the actualities delivered are so much worse than the visions promised. We find ourselves actually hoping for a

" realll Republican or a IIrealll Democrat. Either one would be preferable to the facsimiles we get today.

Bill Clinton, revealing some empathy with the electorate's yearnings, campaigned on the only issue that will result in election--a tax cut--as the

Reagan-Bush Republicans had already discovered. Perhaps trying to one-up the deceits of the Republicans, he became the first president in U.S. history to actually break his campaign promises before he was even

inaugurated, with the proposed delay of the

" middle-class tax-cutII justified by the bold lie that 5

the deficits were worse than he expected. Although the speed of his reversal deserves its place in the record books, it is not significantly different from

Reagan's much ballyhooed tax cut, which, when combined with the social security tax increase, actually raised the total government bite for most Americans during the 1980's. In some respects, the Reagan era was an experiment to determine just how much in the way of broken promises and hotly debated irrelevancies the populace will tolerate. We should not be surprised that effective Democrats (the kind that get elected) would utilize the findings, which suggest that, "they'll put up with anything".

Their presumption of public idiocy has been confirmed recently by the cynical way in which the

Clinton administration duped the American people into supporting its tax program. By appealing to the

"fairness" issue, they effectively diverted general resentment towards a tax increase. Considering that the wealthy did enjoy more significant tax relief than the middle-class during the eighties, Clinton's plan is somewhat "fair" in that it raises taxes on the higher brackets more than the lower. But, the "fairness" was supposed to be accomplished by lowering middle-class 6

taxes, not raising the higher brackets. It is almost as if the two parties work in tandem to increase government revenue in the most effective way possible--by taxing the middle-class (both parties know where the money is). Reagan raised the total cost for the average American by increasing social security taxes more than lowering income taxes--and even that was referred to as a tax cut. Clinton, although also elected on the promise of a tax-cut, raised middle-class taxes less than the higher brackets, and justified the whole package on the basis of

IIfairness. 1I The undeniable fact of twentieth century

American politics is that taxes on the middle-class have increased continually, regardless of the party in power.

Recently, it seems that we really do not expect anything more than a polite and polished demagogue, a charlatan who will promise us everything and deliver considerably less. Perhaps careerists who look like game show hosts, think like insurance salesmen, and act like privateers are all that we really want, or all that we really deserve.

The key to their ability to abuse the few areas where government can actually playa limited productive 7

role is linked to their ability to confuse and distract us with the petty moralisms that continually dominate the social agenda of both the left and the right.

By encouraging the attention-attracting capabilities of the innumerable and vociferous advocacy groups, the state deflects our resentment from its real inadequacies to a smorgasboard of personally derived

"moralll issues. It is not that we do not care about these issues--the heated indignation on both sides confirms that we do--but rather that government is not really capable of resolving such issues as the intrinsic value of homosexuality, the morality of abortion, and the ability of various racial groups to respect one another.

Clearly, all modern trends point toward individual sovereignty; we will make these decisions ourselves, irrespective of the advice we receive from our various paternal benefactors, such as church, state, or party. Although many of us might regret this tendency toward moral anarchy, few deny that it is the pervasive trend of modern times. However, we often confuse this positive trend with our legitimate fears of the lawlessness traditionally associated with the word, anarchy. 8

The essential trends of modernity point to an uncertain, and fearfully greeted, future. The

"conservative" appeal to the traditional virtues, which the Republicans use as a shield to cover their avarice, shares most of the seminal features of the "liberal guilt" behind which the Democrats hide their desires for power. Although the bureaucrats have the "sensible" reason of self-interest for promoting politics as a morality play, the fact that the people so easily resonate with such counterproductive vanities reveals our fear of success, self-actualization, the future.

Our social history has always been characterized by two contradictory tendencies, the urge towards enhanced freedom represented by self-mastery, and the corresponding fear of the same, usually expressed with nostalgic moralisms.

Although we often succumb to the facile assumption that the liberal Democrats and the conservative Republicans are "opposition" parties, it seems that they more accurately reflect various aspects of the same tendency, the latter one, our fear of becoming.

Rather than allow our social meanderings to mature and ripen naturally, we seem to have resurrected 9

the "\vitch hunt" of our Puritan ancestors as we continually sniff the ground for some injustice or evil in the world that requires urgent attention.

The Republicans prefer foreign objects so that they can utilize their favorite tools, the military and intelligence gathering bureaus. The Democrats seem to prefer domestic sources of "moral impurity" so that their dependent clients in the health, education, and welfare bureaucracies (and disciplines) can access the proceeds.

One might actually be reluctant to criticise these well-intended acts of idealism if they were ever reasonably successful. Instead, our best efforts seem to replicate the script for a Wiley Coyote cartoon; the more ardently we persevere, the more foolishly counterproductive the results become. The more we try, the more contradiction we achieve. Our history is a trail of ironies, seemingly designed and scripted to prove the vanity of grandiose plans.

The liberal impulse towards "freedom" and the conservative respect for "tradition" and "restraintII have dominated our approach to socio-political issues for at least the last two centuries. In themselves, both the liberal-radical desire for change, for the 10

new, for the rational, unencumbered with the superstitions of the past, and the conservative regard for continuity and the beneficent restraints of culture and tradition are worthy of respect. In the degraded world of modern political chicanery, we would be content with either. But, although the two parties pay the most cynical lip-service to these shibboleths, neither ever comes close to actualization. The liberal

Democrat's insistence on politically correct moralisms mocks even the concept of individual dignity. Likewise, the Republican's proclivity for extra-legal, conspiratorial scheming, from Watergate to Iran-gate, satirizes the traditional restraints of law and order far more profoundly than any nihilist could ever hope to.

Even the sixties, popular culture's most recent attempt to dethrone the autocratic paternalisms of the moral elites, the bureaucrats of our ideals, was deflected from its own priorities. The implicit antinomianism of "Smash the State" and "Do your own thing" was inexplicably transformed into the explicit conformism of "Deliver us from our enemies" as we knelt in humble supplication at the feet of the State; the same State whose unlimited appetite for power, 11

demonstrated by its attempt to sacrifice the nation's youth on the altar of theistic intent, had been the original impetus of our discontent. But now, even a careerist bureaucrat like Clinton is considered an heir of the sixties. Ralph Nader, perhaps once motivated by the tribulations of the "little guy", is now the champion of liability lawyers whose collective appeal is most aptly expressed by some promotional logo implying that "No claim is too outrageous ••• " (any doubts? check his contributor's list). The anarchistic generation of the sixties has paradoxically come to believe that the government bureaucrat can solve our problems. Ironically, they have transformed themselves into their own worst criticism. Although motivated by the best of intentions, their faith in the state has made them, in essence, fascists (from fascio--the bundle, or collective; a statist is a statist is a statist) as they anxiously yearn for the state to banish evil, unfairness, sorrow, perhaps even death itself, in one grand and glorious assault on the realities of existence. At least now we know the prophetic intent of that most banal of all sixties' expressions--"Don't

trust anyone over thirty." It was not a description 12

of reality, but rather a prophecy directed to our future selves.

Dostoievski's Grand Inquisitor warns us that history is the story of shooting ourselves in the foot; that humanity has a deep-seated pathological need to be tyrannized; that our real goal is to enthrone a succession of oppressive, self-created Gods--valiantly overthrown, and then jubilantly resurrected.

This essay presumes that nihilistic despair is not the flower of awareness which countless millenia of human yearning have aspired to. Although, by this stage of the journey, it is obvious that there is no transcendental "point" to our existence, no higher ideal which justifies and sanctifies our actions, perhaps this should be considered a liberation rather than a prison sentence. Humanity seems to be on a relentless quest, with no place to go. Perhaps it has always been this way, despite the confusion engendered by our idealistic pretenses. Perhaps, rather than yearning for some transcendental eschatology, our social and political musings are more effective when directed toward the practical mundanities of everyday life. It is possible that we should be pursuing the profane--that which is outside of the 1 3

temple--rather than the sacred. Perhaps we actually suffer from a surfeit of idealism, rather than a lack of it, as so many of our pundits keep insisting.

This essay will attempt a modest response to

Kant's very immodest request for a universal history.

Our socio-political decisions will be considered more as practical wagers rather than metaphysical certainties; the spirit of a how-to manual rather than an ecclesiastical jihad.

After Husserl, Freud, and Wittgenstein, no one can seriously speak of the "True" (not without invoking legitimate howls of derision). But, after

Popper, \ve cannot avoid speaking of the "valid" and the "helpful." The only real question concerning our socio-political decisions which we can address is,

"Will this dog hunt"?--will it help, and equally important, does it have a chance of working; the former satisfying our universal radicalism, our desire for increased opportunity for all, for each of us, and the latter addressing our equally universal conservatism, our insistence that it respect the constraints of reality (no pipe dreams, please).

To some degree, humanity has progressed beyond the Messianic mandates of Final Solutions, the 14

simplistic monological causalities which inform most

"religious" perspectives, both of the far left and the far right. We have learned the hard way that there are no grand strategies. To some degree, we are all

"eclectics" now. And yet, concurrently, not to mention ironically, we are tempted by grand generalities, that

Hegelian conceit which made a mockery of Marxian specifics while simultaneously enabling the sum to be much greater that its parts. 2 Hopefully, this paper will successfully negotiate that fine line between theorizing and moralizing, ever mindful of that inherent contradiction which confuses so much of our social philosophy--the one between the attempt to describe reality and the attempt to reinvent reality.

Any implied conclusions will hopefully resist the interpretation that they are proffering claims for decisive finality. They are offered more in the spirit of suggestions, hopefully illuminating the essential highlights of the never finalized process of our "Becoming". II. THE CHRYSALIS

The wise man belongs to all countries, for the home of a great soul is the whole world. Democritus

One of the premises of this inquiry is that humanity is slowly evolving towards a vague goal of one world, one family. One hesitates to call it a

"goal" because it has never been explicated as such.

Nevertheless, this sense of human universalism is the informing metaphor of the world's major religions and most of our political philosophy--conservative, liberal, and radical. It is one of the few concepts that Aquinas and Burke, deTocqueville and Smith, Marx and Bakunin could all agree on. This observation is not a program, certainly not a call for a world government, merely the recognition of an apparently dominant trend in world history.

The history of the world can be most easily characterized as one of continually expanding affiliations. Extended family groupings expanded to include the entire clan. Clans banded together to form tribes and eventually aggregated as gens, or peoples. Religion provided another unifying force, and in the case of the major organized religions

15 1 6

(Christianity, Buddhism, Islam) was capable of uniting even disparate linguistic groups. ?he most recent elaboration was the State, usually employing some combination of language, religion, and geographical proximity as social coagulants. Of course, it is not suggested that this process is uniform, that all cultures pass through each stage in some definite order of accreditation. Even within the same society, various levels may coexist. The assumption, neither original nor seriously contested in the history of social philosophy, is only that a general trend towards

One World cosmopolitanism is evident in the course of civilization's evolution.

One of the ironies in this process is the apparent contradiction that, as we extend our fealty to the ever-widening circles of family, clan, tribe, state, humanity, we are simultaneously progressing in the opposite direction to the individual. The enlarging process is continually supported by the greater freedoms allowed to the individual, just as the individuating process is constantly reinforced by the broadening social allegiances. As the total set becomes larger, the common denominator becomes smaller. We no longer need permission from the headman 1 7

to marry, change residence, or start a new career.

Clearly, we enjoy the greater freedom, and this enhanced individual autonomy is perhaps one of the prime pyschological motivations behind the entire adventure. "Unperceived" by rationalistic bias, the individual and the collective resonate well together.

Despite our enthusiasm, it is clear that we are also frightened by the new challenges. Our social philosophy appears to devote as much time and effort to retarding this process as it does to sustaining it. Although we laud the philosophical efforts of

Plato, we can also recognize his defense of the aristocratic elite as a nostalgic resistance to an emerging democratic spirit. Although the Church preserved civilization in the West for a millenium, it was active in its opposition to the emerging

freedoms of the modern era. This tendency of the previous stage to actively resist the transition into

the next is one of the more curious aspects of our social evolution. Among others, both Hegel and Marx have suggested that history is most accurately characterized as a succession of stages, with the most recent "protectorII transforming itself into a

IItyrant" by its active resistance to the emergence 18

of the next evolutionary rung. Although Hegel's dialectic is too imprecise for most applications, it is a good metaphor for describing this phenomenon.

Tribal affinities had to be overcome before

Christianity successfully unified Europe. Early

Christian missionaries usually concentrated on converting the local patriarch before attempting to baptize the whole tribe. Similarly, the Church, combined with lingering tribal affiliations, often provided the greatest obstacles to the formation of the modern state in the post-Enlightenment era. The progenitors of the various European states realized that allegiance to the Church posed the greatest threat to their own attempts at securing the people's loyalty, hence one source of the philosophe's antipathy to the Church and the nearly universal insistence on the separation of Church and State. Marxism's long-running battle with the Church is understandable. They are both vying for the same "audience" in each of us.

It is certainly comprehensible that those in power would resist the change to the new order, as it would usually curtail their privileged position and perhaps eliminate it all together. Consequently, , 9

although various animal species shed their "old skins" quite gracefully, humanity's transitions are usually marked by active and sometimes violent opposition.

The most recent form of social organization is the state. Although partially responsible for some of the accrued benefits of the last two hundred years, the state has engendered new problems, which are becoming increasingly more obvious. Although not alone in voicing the concern, Max Weber warned us of the "iron cage" resulting from the increasing

"rationality" of state bureaucracy. To some degree, the massive participation in this century's two world wars would have been difficult, if not impossible, without the coercive powers of the modern state.'

We were not blind to this possibility. The conservative, Burke; the liberal, deTocqueville; and the radicals Bakunin and Herzen; all noticed this problem when the modern state was just beginning to emerge. Isaiah Berlin, paraphrasing the ideas of

the nineteenth century Russian radical, Alexander

Herzen, stated, "•••the ideals and watchwords of

politics turn out, on examination, to be empty formulae

to which devout fanatics happily slaughter hecatombs of their fellows.,,2 Similarly, Carl Jung echoed, 20

"The Christian herd•••is brought to the sacrifice•••and killed gregariously, the most efficient way being war ••• the state is impersonal, a dark power••• the dark gods of the collective unconscious.,,3

We all tend to operate under the naive assumption that political leaders and government officials will strive to serve the "public good"

(Rousseau's fiction, the "general will", further trivialized by the government clerk), but it is increasingly obvious that government functionaries serve their own interests primarily. The pretense of public need is invoked by the bureaucrats merely as an implicit justification for their own job security. Even this minimum service level diminishes continually as modern existence becomes more abstract and the bureaucracies less accountable. Modern economic analysis of the political market has stressed the lack of incentive for the individual bureaucrat to accomplish anything other than the enhancement of his own bureau, the systematic control of informational choke points (the legislative overseer is never fon'larded "wrong" information, only "right" data which tends to enrich or empower the agency in question), and the impossibility of assessing 21

efficiency without the price mechanism to determine the relationship between marginal costs and marginal 4 benefits.

Anticipating Milovan Djilas' description of the "new class II by more than a century, Mikhail

Bakunin, the Russian revolutionary, warned Marx that the dictatorship of the proletariat would actually be the dictatorship of the state commissar. Max Weber confirmed that, "It is the dictatorship of the official and not that of the \vorker" that socialism \vould 5 engender. Even Leon Trotsky would eventually add,

"In a country where the sole employer is the state, opposition means death by slow starvation. The old principle, who does not work shall not eat, has been replaced by a new one: who does not obey shall not eat.,,6 In some respects, the peoples of the Soviet bloc were "lucky". The failure of their state bureaucracy was so absolute that it eventually became unbearable even to the bureaucrats themselves (the nomenclatura; surprisingly, the Russian language expresses an even greater disrespect than American

English) and was finally overturned.

Among the western democracies, the contradictions are not as acutely apparent. The 22

material advantages accruing from a free-market system have tended to counterbalance the ill-effects of the state bureaucracy. But, even in the West, the primary political question of the last quarter century has centered on this issue of bureaucratic effectiveness.

Voters in Sweden and the United Kingdom, perhaps the most "rationalized" states of the Vlest, have recently begun to scale back the state apparatus. New Zealand, once a typical Commonwealth example of state socialism, has turned about-face, and is now pursuing a path which is less dependent on the state.

The issue has become so obvious in the United

States, that even the recently elected president, a Democrat and heir to the New Deal bureaucracy, campaigned with the assumption that more government intervention was not neccessarily the solution to existing problems. Of course, we do not truly expect him to keep his promises, anymore than we expect the

Republicans to do so. This is actually the deeper, underlying problem with modern political control.

Not only are our choices limited, but even our choices are illusory, based on the flimsy foundations of campaign rhetoric. Political symbolism has become more important than substance, as if we are all living 23

inside a metaphor (and a bad one at that).

We want the services which are promised, but we are beginning to doubt the state's ability to deliver them. The Pentagon once justified its demands for more funds in terms of world communism, then international terrorism, and now a de facto jobs program. Although there is some merit in each of those reasons, the one constant is the demand for more money and increased power. Thousand dollar toilet seats remind us that increasing the Pentagon's budget is not likely to solve our legitimate security problems in a cost effective fashion. Over the last thirty years we have seen education budgets rise dramatically and overall achievement levels decline. Crime seems to rise in direct proportion with the police budget.

We have learned the hard way that there is no correlation between the amount spent and the results hoped for. If we appoint a state agency to solve a particular problem, it is unlikely that it will ever be rectified because its solution would be followed by the death of the assigned organization.

The will to survive is apparently not limited to sentient life.

This thesis will argue that the essential 24

issue facing contemporary society is the struggle between the state (bureaucracy) and the individual.

Although the state has coddled and protected us for the last two hundred years, it has also abused and tyrannized us during that same time. As Thomas

Jefferson warned us, the state with the power to do for the people, also has the power to do to the people.

Inexplicably, we have ignored the advice.

Late twentieth century realities suggest that the costs now outweigh the benefits. Statism, freighted with the easy allure of mystagogic collectivism, has been embraced by most industrialized communities in the twentieth century. It was called communism in Russia, fascism in Italy, national socialism in Germany, democratic socialism in England, and New Deal capitalism in the United States. Despite the variety of appellations, it was essentially the same phenomenon, modified only bv the degree of centralization involved and the amount of physical coercion employed. Clearly, those "modifications" were significant. The Final Solution and the collectivization of the kulaks were the "last steps" in this process. Thankfully, Great Brittain, the

United States, and fascist Italy never "progressed" 25

that far.

The irony is that the more complete the

totalitarianization, the more quickly this statist

tendency succumbed to pressures from "reality." In more benign atmospheres, where other forms of power

and wealth were sufficiently diffuse, the

contradictions were not as readily apparent. Perhaps

this is somewhat akin to the comparison of an "unlucky"

smoker who immediately develops health complications

which force him to quit, and the "lucky" smoker \l1ho

contentedly enjoys the habit until he dies of emphysema

in his fifties.

In exile in Paris in the 1930's, the

influential Russian Marxist-Hegelian, Alexander Kojeve,

developed the thesis that liberal capitalism satisfied

the worker's desire for Lockean property rights to

a far greater degree than Marxist socialism. The

End of History and the Last Man, a recent

popularization of Kojeve's ideas by Francis Fukuyama,

contends that liberal capitalism has proven its

superiority as an effective social cohesive. His

sanguine conclusion that "we are all liberal

capitalists now" is, however, perhaps prematurely

optimistic. Despite the collapse of communism in the USSR and the extensive reexamination of the "soft" forms of socialism in Britt~in and Sweden which fueled his enthusiasm, it appears that, in many \vays, "\

Marxist economists (cf. Nikolai Shemelev,

Vasily Selyunin, Aleksander Tsipko) would agree with free-market economists that the goal of individual empowerment sought by both socialism and liberal capitalism is notably restrained by statist attempts to facilitate the process.? Unfortunately, the bittersweet truth that our ideals tend toward self-destructive contradiction, when freighted with the self-maximizing tendencies of the state bureaucracy, is still not clearly perceived.

Statism is but the most recent incarnation of tribalism. Like the other step-children of tribalism--nationalism, ethnic prejudice, religious intolerance, jingoism--it will actively resist the emergence of a supra-national universalism. It will never directly admit that it fears extinction, but will attempt to survive by promising the benefits which it has partially conveyed in the past, but which it is now incapable of delivering effectively, and 27

by appealing to the moral suppositions which explicated its own reign.

The rhetoric of reform always differs from the actual results. state bureaucrats will inevitably use the state's resources for their own welfare, but drape their avarice in the cloaks of humanitarian service. Only the very foolish could suspect otherwise.

This essay will attempt to investigate some of the essential components of this evolutionary process in the hope that we might partially escape the tribulations of being recurrently stymied by the assumptions and perquisites of a prior condition. III. CONCUPISCENCE

We want what we will, but we don't will what we want. Schopenhauer

The rapid rate of progress that humanity has enjoyed since the dawn of the historical era is obvious to all. The growth of market exchange, combined with technological innovations, has provided significant advances in our material circumstances. From a time when almost all were involved in primary food production, first as hunter-gatherers and later as rudimentary farmers, we have slowly evolved toward a sophisticated division of labor, which has resulted in the incredible array of potential livelihoods available to the average modern today. This plethora of possibility tempts one to wonder what aspect of the modern world would most surprise Hammurabi--the sight of an airplane in the sky or the realization that one can earn a living from bungee jumping.

Complex theories of society have been developed to explain this phenomenon. Early intuitions suggested that great leaders and powerful empires were instrumental in initiating this progress. But by the eighteenth century this view was waning. Perhaps the coup de grace was delivered by Hegel who characterized

28 7.9

these leaders as mAre fools on the staqe of history.

Manv philosoohers concentraterl on the moral aspects of our evolution. Metaphysical notions such as Truth, Justice, and Equality dominated the discussion. Although the material circumstances of our lives have progressed significantly over time, it is difficult to argue that we have evolved morally--twentieth century atrocities yield to no era in the scope and magnitude of their depravity.

By the nineteenth century, this metaphysical idealism was succumbing to analyses based on the actual, physical aspects of our lives. The primacy of thought

(Descarte's trCogito, ergo sum tr ) was giving way to the tangible or real. Hegelian idealism was replaced by

Marxist materialism; tr •••material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness. tr1

Socrates had once posited the triad of reason, self-esteem, and desire as the determining psychological factors of our existence. This was adopted intact by Hegel, but Nietzsche, under the influence of 30

Schopenhauer, focused on will (Socratic thymos, or self-esteem) and desire as the prime psychological motivations. The British philosophical tradition of

Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, preferred the duality of reason and desire, subordinating thymotic will to desire.

Hobbes characterized will as merely "the last appetite in deliberating". 2 ~'lell ahead of his time, the prescient Bacon synthesized these various strands and identified our propellant as "avarice". Previewing both Marx's "materialism" and Nietzsche's "will to power", Bacon criticized the idealists who, "spend such an infinite quantity of debate touching good and the highest good" and urged them to, "cast their eye abroad upon nature and behold the appetite that is

in all things to give and receive.,,3 Bacon also understood that the desire for power intrigues us as much as the desire for wealth. Later, Freud's work

pointed to the insatiable aspect of these desires, our tendency to megalomania. Although our various

subjective impressions will accent different features,

a mixture of these last explanations has been generally

accepted as offering the most accurate description

of the psychological motivations within the realm of

historical causality. 31

Some combination of Socratic thymos, Bacon's avarice, Marx's materialism, Nietzsche's will to power, and Freud's desire suggests that concupiscence (Desire with a capital D, for everything from power to material advantage) is the driving engine of History. "I want more" was as relevant for the first one down from the trees as it is today. Despite its obviousness (we all try to " get aheadII and even an altruist like Mother

Theresa "wants more"), it is still difficult for us to recognize it, admit it, and discuss it. This aversion also characterizes our approach to the other sense of concupiscence, sexual lust. Despite its seminal importance to the species, we have continuously avoided meaningful discussion.

Perhaps motivated by our moralistic ambivalence

towards this subject, we tend to reject the concept of concupiscence as a motivating factor because we view it as an "endorsementII of the view that humanity

"should" be greedy and grasping, hence repulsive and

loathsome. But these evasions are unnecessary.

Concupiscence is a description of "what is", and its

relevance is unaffected by any particular individual's

impression of "what should be".

One of the enduring mysteries of modern 32

intellectual historv is the myth that Adam Smith et al. suggested that homo economicus is a normative description, that we "should" act in this way.

Actually, in some respects, Smith's description was far closer to the knee-jerk anti-capitalist's vision--"these businessmen will rob us blind if we aren't careful" (although he \vas way ahead of them in realizing that \ve all tend to our mvn "business"--not just capitalists).

It is not suggested that all people consciously perceive their primary motivation as self-interest.

Of course, the exact opposite is true, most of us disguise our personal need behind the veil of morality, the pretense of "doing the right thing". But, form follows function. The differing moralities of various cultures are determined by the economic exigencies which circumscribe their social lives. As the anthropologist, Paul Radin recognized, "No correlation is more definite or more constant than that between a given economic level of society and the nature of the supernatural beings postulated by the tribe at large or by the religious individual in particular.,,4

"Materialism" is widely accepted in the realm of sociological analysis, but we balk at extending 33

this concept to the personal. But most of us are aware of how our ideals evolve as the circumstances of our lives change. The hippie anarchist, complaining about the straitjacket of modern education, becomes a teacher with the state school system and eventually defends every pronouncement emanating from the central office, even justifying it in terms of "the children's needs" or the "importance of education". The politician, elected as a populist, goes to \1ashington to slay the dragon of "special interests". Considering the relationship of both Reagan and Cranston to the Savings and Loans debacle, we begin to understand that even the most idealistic intentions can be diverted by material realities. Just as economic needs determine social perceptions of morality, so too, the real circumstances of our personal lives create our perceptions of personal ideals. We are capable of

justifying almost anything. The irony is that we usually see the transition in terms of reformed ideals and evolving moral attitudes, while ignoring the changes

in our material circumstances which might have prompted

the evolution of our ideals. The other irony is that

this phenomenon, the pursuit of self-interest disguised as idealism, is easy to perceive in the "other guy", 34

but less ascertainable when we examine ourselves.

The idea of concupiscence as primary urge attempts to illuminate the motivation behind the production, exchange and consumption of tangibles such as subsistence rations as well as extravagant baubles; but also intangibles such as honor and power. At various times, we have all used our creative energies to attain both the necessary and the "unnecessary".

With but a little reflection, it becomes obvious that the line between the two is difficult, if not impossible, to draw. One person's extravagance is another's necessity. Even for the same individual, what was considered lavish in one's youth often becomes indispensable in middle age. All valuation is subjective; thankfully, the objects of our desire vary.

The existential irony is that the resistance to this idea is often generated by academics in the wealthy nations of the West, a group whose diet and other material circumstances would be considered extremely extravagant by the majority of the world's population. They keep complaining about "the rich," seemingly oblivious to the fact that they are "the rich."

The intellectual irony is that many of these 35

modern-day philosophes exhibit a distinct Marxist tone in their social philosophy, yet evade this essential focus of his work. Marx would be staggered by their resistance to one of his primary tenets.

Our confusion is even revealed in the very metaphors we use to picture concupiscence. The tuxedo clad fat-cat stuffing his face embodies our perception of the phenomenon rather than the yearning face of a young child staring into a candy store window or a working-class youth dreaming of the perquisites of wealth.

Our attitude of denial is partially prompted by our intuitive sense that "good things", such as civilization, can only result from "good intentions", despite the recurrent warnings about that "paved path".

But, as economic theory emphasizes, "good things" often

flow from purely selfish desire. The eighteenth century

psychologist, Bernard Mandeville, was perhaps the first

to explicitly admit this in his The Fable of the Bees, aptly subtitled, Private Vices, Publick Benefits.

Dr. Samuel Johnson tells us that every young man of

his generation had Mandeville's book in the mistaken

belief that it was a wicked book. Consequently, it

is not surprising that both Hume and Adam Smith 36

incorporated this novel perspective in their economic works, which were to become the foundation of modern economics. Although hardly an economist, Hegel echoes the same sentiment,

Passions, private aims, and the satisfaction of selfish desires are, on the contrary, tremendous springs of action•••• they respect none of the limitations which law and morality would impose on them; and that these natural impulses are closer to the core of human nature.5

Our fear is also reinforced by the fact that much of our folk wisdom and most of our religious thought warns us of the dangers of unrestrained desire.

These warnings of restraint are actually more akin to a "proof" than valid objections. The fact that most religious thought, from Christianity to Zen, continually addresses the perils of concupiscence is precisely because it is such a major motivating factor in our lives. This emphasis on concupiscence does not deny the validity of traditional ethical thought, but rather confirms it. The greater the implicit exposure, the more important it becomes to recognize it and hopefully harness it, a reality which religion seems to recognize to a greater degree than the religious. 37

~nother source of aversion to admitting our concupiscence is the hundreds of thousands of years we spent in small bands, where this instinctual

selfishness had to be restrained by the mores of the

tribe. These formative years of the human psyche have

left significant traces, despite the fact that the

justification for that ancient sense of morality is

no longer pertinent. Rousseau imagined that

civilization had distorted our instinctual drives,

but actually it empowered them. The customs of the

small band of "noble savages" required the most

persistent denial of our instinctual selfishness.

Civilization, with its set of abstract, impersonal

laws, has allowed us to transform this urge into a 6 socially productive propellant.

In order to satisfy our concupiscence today,

we must please others. The real question we face today

is what we demand in return for satiating another's

desire. Generally, it appears that those who admit

their motivation, such as capitalist entrepreneurs,

give us some real product in return for our

consideration; those who do not admit their motivation,

such as priests, academics, politicians and advocates,

give us words and appeals to our conscience in return 38

for our consideration.

There have been various explanations regarding

\vhich "class" directs our relentless push into the future, usually phrased in terms of master and slave

(Hegel, Nietzsche) or the elite and the masses (Marx).

Intuition suggests that those in power naturally control the process. Twentieth century Marxists have created an entire industry based on this common sense appraisal, and even a non-Marxist cultural materialist, Marvin

Harris, suggests that, " •••nothing that significantly benefits the lower strata can endure unless it benefits the upper stata even more."? Assuming that "desire" for "material advantage" directs the actions of humanity, it is obvious that those with the power will attempt to preserve their privileged status. The real question is how successful this attempt will be.

If one attempted to construct a condensed summary of world history, the dominant metaphor would have to illuminate the continual overthrow of the core by peripheral groups, despite our contradictory intuitive sense and the dependency theorists' insistence on the contrary. Semitic tribesmen, hungry for the material advantages possessed by the Mesopotamian elite, 39

eventually overthrew them. The Germanic tribes, disdained employees of the Romans, ultimately replaced them. Nahuatl tribesmen, referred to as Chichimecs

(literally, sons of bitches/dogs) by the reigning masters in the Valley of Mexico, eventually founded the Aztec empire on the ruined edifices of their mentors. The story is the same with the Incas in Peru, the Mongolians and Manchurians in China, and the peasant warriors of medieval Japan. Voltaire expressed the essential concept in one sentence when he stated that history is the sound of wooden clogs going up the stairs and velvet slippers going down. 8

If the elite were truly capable of controlling the status quo, then the world's wealthiest families would consequently have Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Olmec and Chinese surnames. Even Marxist theory was based on the Hegelian assumption that the history of power was one of dispersal and diffusion; that eventually the masses would control their own destiny.

The dependency theorists, embodying the defining metaphor of the modern academy's prevailing moral view, would argue that the monolithic quality of modern capitalism has changed all that; that capitalism has finally provided the world's Caucasian elite with the 40

proper mechanism for complete domination. Considering

America's post war hegemony, this explanation might have seemed appealing when they wrote in the 1960's.

But, considering the relative positions of Japan and

America in the ensuing twenty five years, this conceit is no longer tenable; it cannot begin to explain how the world's preeminent power became little more than an indebted supplier of raw materials and importer of technologically sophisticated manufactured items to a peripheral state which it had defeated and utterly dominated less than a half century before.

Perhaps it is actually the unsatiated who propel the cart of progress. The elites certainly ride on the seat and perhaps even hold the reins. But perhaps it is an illusion to believe that they control our direction. Maybe we are pushed into the future, not pulled. Rousseau's statement that power belongs to the people is more normative than descriptive, and yet it seems to be inforIT.ed by an underlying truth.

Although there are many significant countertrends within this general movement, it seems fair to describe the history of social development as a levelling process where fixed power continually erodes and spreads to an ever greater number of people; from the aristocrats 41

to all landowners, eventually to all men, then to women, and ultimately, even to foreigners.

This analysis is not intended to contradict the thesis, suggested by Toynbee and others, that societies are not really overturned, but rather, they commit suicide; they surrender their power as they are abandoned by their own drive and will. The emphasis in this analysis is merely placed on the complementary fashion in which the unempowered move into the vacuum.

The process is, of course, interwoven; the two aspects are inseparable.

Two steps forward and one backward is far too optimistic a description; a thousand forward and nine hundred ninety-nine backward is probably more accurate.

Consequently, we are easily confused by the retrograde motion of various eras. But, looking back a thousand, or five thousand years, it is difficult to argue with the basic premise that progress is essentially the diffusion of opportunity, and that the driving force comes from below, from the "hungry".

Two psychological corollaries are also worthy of mention, envy and patience. Envy is the prompting behind concupiscence. Often, we do not even realize 42

that w~ want ~omethinq until we ~ee someone else with it (liThe el1vionc: man thinks that if his neiqhbor breaks a leg, he will be able to walk better himself"). Like concupiscence, envy is universal ("Envy is at home everywhere"). It is also similar in the sense that it is self-destructive if grasped. Unrestrained, it is dangerous, as the French Revolution proved ("Envy cuts its O\'1n throat"). "Proverbs in many languages agree that the greatest damage done by the envious man is to himself.,,9

Religion and folk sayings confirm envy's pervasive existence, but warn against utilizing it as a methodology. Although a productive stimulant in some ways, unrestrained envy has probably been responsible for much of our social confusion; certainly, radical progressivism has often cannibalized itself by failing to understand the afore mentioned difference.

The issue, often overlooked by the heirs of Christian moralism, should transceild mere denial and approach the simple practicality of a "how-to" manual.

Satisfaction can be achieved by understanding and restraint, not by indulging the urge, nor by sublimating it. Unlike the Mind, Culture is patient. Discussing 43

the turmoils of mid-nineteenth century revolution, the Russian radical, Herzen, reflects,

••• thought was impatient enough, it wants everything at once, it loathes waiting--but life is not satisfied with abstract ideas, does not hurry, takes each step slowly because its steps are difficult to correct. Therein lies the tragic position of thinkers.10

This dichotomy of patience and impatience is another of the many paradoxes that characterize our history. Concupiscence, driven by envy, is essentially impatient, hence unproductive and self-destructive.

It is an effective stratagem of desire only when tempered by patience, a truth generally unrecognized, or misunderstood, by the intelligentsia. It is completely unrecognized by the masses, who cannot afford the luxury of whimsical desire; its "truth" is "in their bones". They know the value of patience without being cognizant of it.

Dickens made a career of lamenting the working class conditions of nineteenth century England; Carlyle and other upper-class commentators reiterated the same message with some insight and much compassion. Perhaps because their angst was fueled more by a reactionary aversion to their own loss--the world of the country 44

squire, and its attendant privilege, was dying forever--they failed to realize that the people never compare their situation to perfection, only to yesterday. From an upper-class perspective, the squalor of Manchester was indescribably uglier than the placid countryside of Sussex. But the workers were in touch with a deeper sense of prophecy; they "knew" that the factory tmvns embodied "hope" (for their future).

The wealthy dilettante, traversing the idyllic farm country in his carriage saw peace and plenty. The country people actually experienced servitude and hopelessness (for their future). Rising population, evolving agricultural technology, and the excesses of aristocratic privilege had doomed that way of life.

They "knew" this in a way that only those who faced those constraints could. We know that they preferred the factory towns because they came in droves, but this reality does not deny the actual conditions, nor

suggest they they did not complain.

The important realization is to remember that a phrase such as "actual conditions" is a fiction.

The perception is completely subjective. To the

twentieth century European the living conditions of

the nineteenth century British worker could only be 45

described as "deplorable". The average Somalian, in

1992, would term it "enviable". Paleolithic man .."ould probably have described the same scene as "luxurious".

On several different occasions during the same nineteenth century, scattered groups of Inuit (northern

Eskimo) parents watched their children slowly starve to death. Since their fate was the same as their children's, we can only guess how they would have viewed the "horrors" of child labor.

Nineteenth century capitalism provided sustenance for the marginalized peasant farmer, a class no longer needed by an increasingly mechanized world.

Capitalism literally created the proletariat out of 11 nothing, as Marx understood well. The capital which the British industrialists accumulated, certainly for their ovm "selfish" benefits and purposes, provided work for people who would otherwise have had no means to support their growing families. In the 1840's, countless numbers of Irish peasants died of starvation.

Does anyone really believe that they would have (or should have?) viewed the chance to work long hours at low pay with contempt? We must remember that one person's "starvation wages" are another's "big money".

All valuations are subjective, and they all depend 46

on the alternative possibilities which determine our choices.

This is not merely a restatement of the old

Hegelian conundrum, the Real is Rational, dialectically alternating with the Rational is Real. It is not suggested that the worker's condition were ideal, or even good, but rather, the best available. We all might \.,ish that conditions were "better," but \vhy limit ourselves to the nineteenth century factory. We could wish this on all of previous history. We might wish that the "greedy capitalists" had paid higher \vages, but, of course, they paid only enough to attract the workers (as they still do, like all of us; when was the last time you paid your babysitter the same wage that you paid your doctor). Some of us might suggest that the State should have intervened, taxing the profits in order to better the working conditions.

But, this is a mere pipe dream; remember, this was the same State which had ascribed property rights to the aristocrats and pushed the peasants off the commons, thus forcing them to seek salvation from the capitalists. In The Communist Manifesto, Marx demonstrated that he understood the motivations of aristocratic "7

"feudal socialists", but his twentieth century heirs have iqnored the advice as theY reiterated aristocratic anqst. 12 Irony is evervthinq when considerinq our tortured political path. Imagine Marx's consternation if he could witness the modern paradox that he has no heirs in the discipline of economics, where he might have expected to find them, but rather has spawned an eclectic mob of idealists denying his basic premises as they attempt to promote his conclusions (matched only by the incredible irony that he would find very few Harxists in the nominally communist USSR (pre-1989), while finding hordes of them in the academies of the capitalist West). The ultimate contradiction is revealed in the fact that some of his basic premises have withstood the rigors of twentieth century actualities, while almost none of his conclusions 13 have. Impatient for the "Second Coming" of worker's rights, generations of socialists have lamented the meek subservience of the worker, his tendency to compromise with capital and to patiently accept the gradual gains of syndicalist unionism. But who was

"right"? The nineteenth century workers got what they

"wanted" \l1ithin a few generations and today live better 48

than the aristocrats of nations that did not undergo the "horrors II of nineteeth century capitalism. Perhaps the working masses are not nearly as stupid as the intelligentsia, who so often invoke their name, imagine.

Perhaps they are not too easily satified, just more patient, hence more realistic. Some real improvement today is preferred to the Christmas lists of the theoreticians; the history of the nineteenth century workers' movement is one of the workers accepting small, gradual gains while the intelligentsia dreamed of total transformation. The history of complaint, which typifies the intellectual perception of history, rarely addresses systemic issues; more often it is nothing more than an expression of the grievance that things are not changing fast enough to satisfy our intellectual angst.

This restless desire for II improvementII is not only appropriate, but also inevitable. In our hearts,

ll we are all IIradical and always have been. We see contradictions and we instinctively want to change them; not slightly, but completely. But, the process of actualizing must be guided by restraint and patience if we actually want to realize the intended goals.

Culture and Society, and their preferred vehicle, the 49

masses of humanity "know" this, which is why they move slowly--in essence, conservatively. Mind, embodied in the intelligentsia, does not.

Our intuitive aversion to greed, lust and envy, informed by the folk wisdom of religion and popular sayings, is based on the fact, learned by all eventually, that when we grab impulsively, we destroy the object of desire. The point is not to pretend to deny the propellent of concupiscence, but to understand its guiding exigencies. History is the story of learning how to have our cake and eat it too.

Success comes from listening to our "Gut" as well as our "Mind". We have always wanted everything, but if we hope to achieve it, we have to proceed within constrained parameters. The lessons of history are

Culture's way of speaking to us. They are all directed towards helping us recognize those parameters.

Another feature of our cultural evolution which is often overlooked, particularly by the ordered scholarly mind, is the messy, experimental quality of human exploration. We should remind ourselves that most of our progress is neither planned, nor intended.

Mandeville's satire of rationalist planning, The Fable 50

of the Bees, Vico's statement that man became all that he is without understanding it, Hume's philosophical scepticism, Hayek's focus on "unintended consequences", and Bakhtin's opposition of the canonical and carnivalesque are rare exceptions to the prevailing monological assumptions which inform the vast bulk of our social philosophy. Cartesian rationalism enhanced the pre-existing mental conceit that society is "planned", or should be. This prejudice is exemplified in the writings of Saint Simon, Comte and

Durkheim, and still dominates the discipline which they founded, sociology (not to mention the other social sciences).

Although this conceit is appealing to the social engineer, it has little explanatory power. Certainly no one "invented" language, law, the market, science and technology, or any of the seminal features of civilized life. Although all of them utilize rational, empirical methods, they w~re not planned nor invented; they evolved slowly, incorporating innumerable contributions from various sources. These are examples of spontaneous orders, self-regulating organisms, capable of much greater complexity than those which are deliberately planned. Cybernetics is one recent 51

discipline which attempts to understand this mechanism, but biology (evolution), philology (history of language), and economics (the development of market exchange) have a long history of exploring these unplanned, almost unconscious, orderings.

Numerous man-made ecological disasters

(importing one species to control another, resulting in a "cure" which is worse than the original "disease"), the failure of socialism, and American Prohibition are but a few examples of "good ideas" which failed miserably because of the failure to recognize the limitations of planning and intentionality.

Karl Popper's The Poverty of Historicism and

The Logic of Scientific Discovery reveal the experimental quality of even our most rational exercises. In short, he argues that we will try anything. If it works, we use it. Only rarely is our first "plan" workable; even then we continually tinker with it, mocking even the concept of intended design.

The chaotic inconclusiveness of evolution, both social and biological, is stressed by Darwin and modern evolutionists, " •••according to Darwin, the best proof of evolution is imperfect design, compromise 52

structures•••messiness and tinkering, not perfect adaptation, are the true marks of historicity.,,14

Darwin's assertion that we are the result of the proces3 of evolution and not an end-product "created" by the

One Mind was resisted by the dominant religious dogma of his time. Even though his reasoning was probably influenced more by social thinkers than by biologists, twentieth century social dogma still actively resists the compelling evidence that our social world also evolved independently of Logical Intention. Most twentieth century social scientists, although nominally atheistic, seem to believe that, at some point, Mind entered the body of this shuffling ape and we became

Human. This deistic fantasy fails to realize that our intelligence developed in tandem with the process of acculturation. It was a process of discovery rather than a single act of discovery. Finality will always elude us. Mikhail Bakhtin, the Russian literary critic, poses the opposition of the canonical and the carnivalesque to illustrate this same point, "Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of 53

their dialogic interaction.,,15

Our Mind, displaying its own lust for schematic consistency, seeks (and finds) order, permanence and

purpose. It explains everything within the confines of this epistemological catechism. Bakhtin, echoing

insights from the Russian literary tradition, suggests

that Life and History are more accurately described

by the absence of, or inability to achieve, these

qualities of symmetry and harmony. The "carnival sense

of the world" mocks our attempts at objective finite

definitions and strips these conceits to their naked

denominators, the desire for death and the stasis of

completion.

Although Bakhtin develops this thesis primarily

from literary sources, Friedrich Hayek, the Austrian

economist, critiques the desire for the order of

"end-state" perfection in much the same way. Nietzsche

discusses this desire to rest-in-peace in terms of

the state,

Like every organizing political power, the Greek polis was mistrustful of the growth of culture and sought almost exclusively to paralyse and inhibit it••• to rivet it to one stage of development. The same thing was later desired by Plato too for his ideal state."16 54

The puerile desire for the "happily-ever-after" fairy tale ending has dominated political thought from

Plato to Marx to Rawls. The desire for completion, or final satisfaction, ignores the restless exigencies of our relentless quest. This urge to return to the comforts of the womb is somewhat understandable, but our ability to actually achieve it is questionable. IV. THE CLERGY

Convictions, not lies, are the greatest enemy of truth. Friedrich Nietzsche

Our perceptions of ourselves, History, is controlled by the priests. Originally magicians who interpreted the signs of a dimly perceived, mysterious world, they served the dual function of herald

(officiating priest) and bard (historian, reciter of the epics). As social organization became more sophisticated, they evolved into their role as priest-scholars, telling us when to expect the seasonal events which were necessary for sustaining the growth of agriculture (Egypt, Meso-America) and preserving literate culture (Christian Europe, China). Today, we call them intellectuals. Clearly, there are no distinct demarcations between these elaborations.

There are still plenty of priests today (and even a few magicians). Only the broad sweep of this transition is suggested.

The more important realization is that our awareness of ourselves is, to a great degree, in the hands of this scholarly elite. It does not concern us that the typical university professor hardly considers himself to be a member of the elite. The

55 56

average Medieval priest was equally unaware of his status. It is not the overall level of wealth that is being stressed, but rather the sense of distinctness from the crowd and inclusiveness within the select group (consider highbrow, Ivory Tower, eggheads and

"flatlanders"). To some degree, this cliquishness

is the inevitable result of the specialization of labor.

The minor animosities between the various professions is of little concern, but the monopolistic control of our historical self-awareness should be recognized.

Perhaps the first intellectual in the history of western civilization, Hesiod (ninth century B.C.),

lived in " •••an age of crisis, born of the conflict

between two social systems, the old order of familial

collectivism and a new economy based on the profit motive and the division of labor." In Hermes the Thief,

Norman O. Brown calls him the "first nostalgic

reactionaryII (unfortunately, not the last).1

Between the Homeric Age (c. 1100 B.C.) and

the Classical Age (fifth century B.C.), much of Apollo's

persona was usurped by Hermes. Brown traces this

development and suggests that it reflects the growing

power of the merchants and craftsmen in contrast to

the waning power of the patriarchal aristocracy. Hermes, 7

whose name derives from "herm", the stone boundary

markers which delineated home turf from the foreign, was the patron of the first "boundary crossers", merchants and craftsmen. These pioneers formed the

first of many alliances between labor and capital in

their struggle with Land and landed privilege; modern

capitalism recapitulated the same alliance, but it

is usually overlooked with a false emphasis on the

assumed antagonism of labor and capital.

Hermes' mythological "ascent" represents one

of the first hesitant steps towards One World

universalism. The "herms" eventually moved from the

frontier, the unclaimed territory between villages

which served as the first markets, "[marketsl ••• the

only places at which members of the different primitive

groups met for any purpose except warfare," to the

center of the community, the agora, or marketplace. 2

Naturally, the identification with Hermes remained

strong, as the name of the Athenian marketplace, Hermes

Agoraios, implies. To barter or exchange, allow into

the community, and turn enemy into friend all derive

from the same Greek verb, katallatein. The "catalyst"

of trade was embodied in Hermes.

The warrior elite, represented by their patron, S8

Apollo, engaged openly in that hallowed Indo-European tradition, cattle raiding. The powerless baby Hermes, like all tricksters (cf. the coyote and raven in the

Americas; later, B'rer Rabbit), used stealth, trickery, art (craftsmanship), and economic gain (profit), to steal Apollo's cattle (as opposed to robbery by force) 3 in order to achieve "equality with Apollo." liThe theme of strife between Hermes and Apollo translates into mythical language the insurgence of the Greek lower classes and their demands for equality with the 4 aristocracy. 11 This general theme of assault on elitist privilege, is still the defining characteristic of

Western civilization.

Hesiod's Theogony and Works and Days were the first "books" actually written down in the Western tradition. The Homeric epics had not yet passed from oral recitation to the written form. Although the popular Homeric poems were quite sympathetic to Hermes,

Hesiod cursed his " s tealthy disposition" • In Hesiod, we find the first duality between acquisitive individualism (capital and labor/Hermes) and the agricultural practices of the landed gentry

(land/Apollo). We also find the first opposition between idealism and materialism; lithe divine is equated 59

with the ideal, which is in contradiction with the real."S

Hesiod's treatment of Zeus' wives, Themis and r.1etis, poses the dichotomy of "Horal Law" and

"Intelligence. ,,6 The first literate mysogonist, Hesiod bemoans "the accursed race of women" as he laments sexual appeal as a form of Hermetic guile and cleverness. Driven by his fury with the changing social realities, Hesiod clumsily invents a distinction between technical intelligence (science, Metis and its root, guile) and royal intelligence (morality, Themis) in his Theogony. But Homer, echoing popular sentiment, does not recognize this distinction, using the same root word to describe the practical arts of Hephaestus and the royal wisdom of Zeus. Evidently, the mythology of the folk understood what Hesiod missed, that those born without land and privilege must utilize their cleverness and industriousness to achieve the perogatives of the royalty.

To some degree, the evolution of this myth also foreshadows Proudhon's "property is theft". But, unlike Proudhon, folk poetry understands that the powerless have no other alternative. If it is theft, that is the best thing about it. Hermes, "the giver 60

of good", understands the practical necessities which inspire the unsatiated, and explains it to his mother in the Homeric Hymn, "I will take up whatever business is most profitable."?

Hermes' more blatant explanation, "A man's country is where he can do business" (premonitions of the first multinational?), in Aristophanes is hardly evocative of the civic virtue which was the official ideology of fifth century Athens. 8 The official status of Hermes, like many folk heroes of the future, was not nearly as prominent as his general popularity implied, reflecting the priestly resistance to the changes embodied by Hermes, despite Athens' rise to power via the the merchants and traders. The clerics did not share the peoples' enthusiasm for this contemporary "rip-off" artist who would eventually become the patron of communication, science, eloquence, 9 boundaries and commerce.

The evolution of this American slang term also reveals the connection between clever industriousness and theft. To "rip-off" originally meant the appropriation of an abandoned or unused good. It eventually evolved to mean unfair advantage, such as the monopolistic prices of a "rip-off" drug dealer 61

or concert promoter, and finally came to mean theft in the purest sense.

This analysis is not intended to justify "theft" in the modern sense of the word, but rather to illuminate some ambivalent aspects of "cleverness" which we pretend to ignore. As children, we felt proud when we pulled off a clever marble trade, and humiliated if we were outsmarted. Of course, this was but two sides of the same coin, and, like most children, we learned to live with it. Unfortunately, some adults are less flexible. Even free-market economists defend the market in terms of the mutual benefits of trade.

It is true that in the vast majority of trades, both parties win. But, we should not ignore the legitimate advantages derived from "unfair" advantage, from knowledge unknown to the other party, from the clever manipulation of words and symbols to achieve our own advantage, exemplified by the adroit manipulation of oaths common to culture heroes from various parts of the world. The issue transcends our personal feelings as to its rightness or wrongness. It is based more on the recognition of its inevitability, and the realization that it fuels our material progress. We have always utilized our private knowledge of 62

particulars and ultimately, it works, even for those who are temporarily disadvantaged by their lack of 0 information. 1 Is there a more effective way to truly internalize the new information? We generally learn more from our failures than from our successes. Of course, we generally do not "take advantage" of friends and family, only strangers. "Screwing" each other seems to be one of the ways we get to know each other.

The more significant aspect of the Hermes myth is that it embodies the idea that exchange is ultimately as important as production, a realization which would escape the conscious detection of Western intellectuals for the ensuing two millenia, despite the fact that this is also true of information, a reality which they were certainly aware of. When Marx digested the insights of the marginal utility revolution in economics in the late nineteenth century he abandoned his work on Das Kapital, perhaps realizing that the middleman had a legitimate functior., after all, and that his organizing metaphor, which was based on the antiquated labor theory of value, was flawed. 1 1 Inexplicably, his followers seemed to have missed the connection.

One of the amazing ironies of history is that Marx wrote his dissertation, On the Differences between 63

the Natural Philosophy of Democritus and Epicurus.

Imagine how different the histories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries might have been if this budding classical scholar had pursued the Hermes myth instead.

His commanding scholarship and vigorous imagination might well have perceived this implicit entrepreneurialism personified in Hermes' gradual achievement of equality with Apollo. Who knows? He might well have anticipated Menger's marginal utility work by several decades. Perhaps, he and that

Manchester capitalist, Engels, would have become "real" friends.

The trading city states of the Mediterranean

(Phoenician, Cretan, Greek) exemplified the various aspects embodied in Hermes--trade, piracy, and craftsmanship. Unlike the many neighboring theocracies, these communities had to discover effective means to adjucate the differences which arose between their citizens. Religious states did not have to enumerate their own definitions, God had the answer and the priests had the monopoly on interpreting His will (cf. the Inquisition, Hitler's "final solution" and Stalin's collectivization of the kulaks; all "divine" inspirations). 64

The heavily armed privateers of the merchant states were less inclined to prostrate themselves before any self-appointed elite. Consequently, the tradition of secular law was born of the hoplite's individualism and self-esteem. Forced to find an effective social cohesive: individual property rights, free market exchange and contractual due process made their first tenuous appearance and the inherent contradiction between trade and piracy was resolved. Trade was more profitable than piracy and ultimately employed more people, rewarding those societies which practised and developed it. It prevailed for that reason. Only later was it perceived as morally superior. Form follows function.

But, this is no cause for despair; our concupiscence is probably a better guide than our spirituality. It is certainly more forthright and direct, less opaque and hypocritical. Few would argue

that there was some progress from the armed robbery of the aristocratic Apollo to the clever theft of Hermes

to the contractual law of the traders. Our morality

always follows our necessity, which actually outlines

the general path along which it will evolve in order

to lend normative credibility to our material paradigms. Bacon expained this in excruciating detail.

Kant realized that social morality evolved to protect the property rights which engendered that same society.

Hegel and Marx understood the derivative nature of morality. Nietzsche said little else. And yet, inexplicably, twentieth century academics ignore this hard-won wisdom in recurrent attempts to formalize virtue and morality as independent variables. Economic realities determine our morality. No amount of priestly angst will ever change it (although it has proven more than capable of confusing the issue).

Even our typical fife and drum "history" enumerates the various wars and kings of our several communities while often ignoring the more significant evolution of the market and its influence on our ultimate perceptions of ourselves.

The social evolution which began in Hesiod's era, the retreat of aristocratic privilege before the advances of the egalitarian traders, culminated in

the Peloponnesian War bebveen "tribalist" Sparta and

"commercial" Athens. Thucydides, and later, Plato,

sided with the oligarchs, recapitulating Hesiod's

"nostalgic reactionary" status and foreshadowing

twenty-five hundred years of intellectual resistance to the masses' desire to have their voice heard ann represented. This "betrayal" is never complete, nor is it suggested to be conspiratorial in the full sense.

To a great degree, the warnings of both Thucydides and Plato coincide with one of the essential sub-texts of this essay--beware of grabbing too impatiently, lest a handful of thorns rather than the rose be your reward. Their warnings against demagoguery and the tyranny of the majority are to be respected, even if we did not really learn the lesson (the umpteenth historical irony, those who are the most intent on idolizing any given insight are the least likely to profit from it).

The anonymous Old Oligarch's attack on Athens, emphasizing the close connection between democracy and naval power as derivatives of the hoplyte's self-esteem, determined the critical response of both

Thucydides and Plato towards the emerging egalitarianism of democratic Athens. Despite the critical importance of the Athenian navy in resisting the Persian attempt at conquest, despite the flowering of Greek culture under the umbrella of Athenian trade, despite even

Thucydides' awareness of the essential significance of these events (at various points in The Peloponnesian 67

\'Jar he elucidates the ovenvhelming importance of the traders to Athenian prominence), Thucydides follows the Old Oligarch's lead and points to the greed of the merchants, and consequent naval imperialism, as 1 ") the underlying cause of Athen's fall. ~

This critique is not intended to deny the importance of Thucydides, nor to pretend that other

Greek city-states were not uneasy with Athenian attempts at national domination, but rather to reveal how easily intellectuals betray their own principles of unbiased investigation in defending their own class interests.

How easily we transform disinterested scholarship into outright advocacy, blinding ourselves to the delicate nuances as we build our case. Concentrating on the subtle, Thucydides diminishes the obvious. As every schoolboy knows, the main reason for the Spartan victory was the betrayal of the Athenian artistocracy (Socrates' students, the families of Thucydides and Plato) who joined with the Spartans to defeat the Athenian democrats.

Like most retrograde movements, the aristocratic attempts at retaining their status were ultimately ineffective; the democrats were soon back in power.

Perhaps even more pertinent, these perseverations were 68

ultimately irrelevant. What Hegel would eventually call the " a bsolute spirit" had already moved on to more fruitful territory.

Rome would further enhance the spirit of democratic egalitarianism which began in Greece and provide the environment for the next revolution, the more extensive Christian universalism which would extend the franchise to women, slaves and foreigners

(imperfectly, of course; nevertheless, some progress, as even the very idea would have been incomprehensible to the Greeks).

Some have suggested that Christian dualism descends from the marriage of Hebrew theocracy and

Greek proto-scientific rationalism. Others have suggested it comes from the Zoroastrian influence on

Judaism. Without denying any of these possible influences, we have already seen the intellectual's distinction between the ideal and the real which dates back at least as far as Besiod. It is the defining conceit of the rational mind. In his Laws and The

Republic, Plato elevated this conceit to the status of philosophy in defense of oligarchic privilege (the aristocratic ideal in contrast to the vulgar concupiscence of the masses). Christian dualism centers 69

on this same dichotomy, as does most Western social philosophy--the opposition of the ideal and the real/material. Even today, the high priests of academia pose the purity of their idealism against the crass materialism of the marketplace (as their annointed icon, r'larx, shakes his head in disbelief).

It was Curiosity and Desire which prompted

Eve to taste the fruit in the Garden of Eden. The underlying implications suggest that the Hebrew patriarchs " understood" our basic urges unconsciously, but consciously recapitulated the same fear of self-knowledge; they denied it. Instead, they transferred this Desire to the other, to Woman.

Reluctant to acknowledge the universal nature of

Concupiscence, the onus was put on Woman.

But the fruit in the Garden of Eden was not merely good and eVil, it was the knowledge of good and evil. Perhaps the danger resides in knowledge itself. It is not evil which restrains us, but rather the mental constructs which attempt to deny it. As

Blake would later remind us, the real lesson of the

Genesis parable was intended to prevent the Tree of

Knowledge from strangling the Tree of Life.

The simple minded priest sees only the 70

dichotomy; do good and avoid evil, freighting the naive assumption that \'1e could ever kno\{ the difference in any transcendental, perfect sense. In his Beyond Good and :evil, nietzsche reveals that he \'las one of the few who realized that we must transcend the facile categories of opposition, enshrined by Hegel as the dialectic, if we want to move on. There is no going back to the simplicity of puerile certainty, a fact which has escaped every moralist from Hesiod to Plato to !1arx.

~he essential philosopher of the Church was st. Augustine, originally a Manichean. This Gnostic heresy reveals many of the salient features of both

Christianity and the secular moralism which \'1ould ultimately replace it. Here we find the dualistic opposition between the light (reason) and dark (matter), and also the concept of the elect, the fe\{ \{ho IIJ;:novl II •

Revelation was achieved by knowledge available only to the elect. Like their academic heirs, they ignored history, using it only for the purposes of undisguised wish-fulfillment; the Manicheans had no need for the

Old Testament, for the true believer is not only unable to profit from experience, but essentially unwilling. 71

Sectarianism is another of their contributions.

From the Latin root, we understand its meaning as one who cuts himself off from the dominant group, but also the more fanciful implications of the head separated from the body (further developed by Christianity and enshrined in the academic dismissal of corporeal desire), not to mention other body parts which have continually plagued both the Church and the academy

(the Romans also used the same root to signify castration, as in gelding a horse). Sectarianism plagued not only the Church, but also the guiding theology of the modern academy, socialism (cf. Lenin's introduction to his Imperialism; he complains more about other socialists, even other communists, than he does about their mutual enemy, the capitalists).

Perhaps the most prophetic aspect of the f1anichean vision was the duality of a loving God and a just God. This eventu~lly transformed itself into the dichotomy of a good God and a \vicked Satan. This aversion to the harsh justice of reality, as treacherous as it is admirable, will eventually become the dominant litany of the secular clerisy. The desire to become our own God, to create and remake the world, to dominate 72

Nature and tame the harsh realities, is the informing metaphor of our relentless quest. Unfortunately, realizing it also destroys it. As the mystics

(Christian, Sufi, Zen) warned us, and Wittgenstein confirmed later, if it is worth saying, it cannot be said; that is, the subtle nuances of our existence resist being explicated or formalized logically.

The historical failure of the Gnostic llanicheans can best be attributed to their extremism. If they had only tempered their essential ideas, they might have achieved the worldy success which their numerous fellow travelers (Christianity, Islam) and heirs

(socialism) realized. Modern moralists are confused by their Manichean-inspired ambivalence towards the the muddied waters of reality; the aversion was so strong for the original Gnostics that they declined to procreate and the elect even refused to prepare food, perhaps foreshadowing the modern academy's strident warnings to the poor concerning population growth and the paroxysms of guilt engendered by meateating, but more essentially recapitulating the intellectuals recurrent aversion, not only to sensuality, but also to matter in any form.

The opposition between the moral and the 73

concupiscent, the ideal and the real, the ethereal and the sensuous has become the essential paradigm of Rightousness. Although previewed by Hesiod, Plato and other gropings of the Mind in an attempt to discover

some teleological conceit, this dichotomy was finally

developed into a sophisticated ideology by the Church

(after incorporating some of the Manichean essentials).

The real message wrapped inside this conceit was the Church's encapsulation of the individual's

realization that urgent grasping destroyed the object

of desire, rather than attaining it. This was a

considerable accomplishment, and perhaps rather typical

of our confused evolution.

This awareness would attain its highest form

of expression in the works of Shakespeare. His

essential theme, contradicting the lessons of geometry,

was that the shortest distance between individual A

and object of desire B is never a straight line. The

long way around, discovering ourselves on the way, 13 was ultimately preferable.

The Church enshrined this truth in a code of

ethical behavior which paraded under the banner of

divinely inspired morality, thus confounding generations

of free thinkers who would hotly contest the moral 74

truth of various customs, not realizing that it was merely practical advice, and not morally correct wisdom which was really being proferred. Twentieth century moralists have further compounded the problem by attempting to use neason to create Morality to overrule

Custom, missing the point so completely that they are still grappling with the shado\v in a vain attempt to move the sun. Clearly, Humanity must learn to be more careful \'1i th its conceits; \'lho knows \'lhat some "idiot" will do with them in the future.

Perhaps the most important contribution of

Christianity was the enhancement of the Classical sense of the individual's dignity. The Socratic concept of the "soul", the individual as independent entity, was nurtured by the Church and attained its purest expression in Kant's "Categorical Imperative", the realization that the individual, per se, constituted both a means and an ends. This achievement, in itself,

\'1Ould more than justify &11 of the excesses and injustices of which the Church has been rightly accused.

Unfortunately, these significant accomplishments were accompanied by other less salutory developments.

The most significant was the further solidification of the intelligentsia as a separate "class" ("estate" 75

if one prefers).14 This involved the evolution of a class interest which differed from the needs of the masses. Posing the dichotomy of the moral and the concupiscent in teros of denying our desire was merely a subtle attempt to deflect the masses from the surplus which the priestly class increasingly monopolized.

Deprecating instinctive desires for wealth as somehow

" uil\lOrthy of humanity" \'las a far more effective strategy than armed force. Although the priest class pursued wealth, utilized force (war), and indulged sexual desires, they developed an ideology for popular consumption which denied all of these.

Another salient development was the marriage of the priests and the warriors. Although this was not the first, nor the last, time in which they formed an alliance with the warrior elite, this was perhaps the first instance in which the priest class dominated the partnership. As such, this refinement was a significant advancement for elitist control. Society was becoming too large and too diffuse to control with armed force. There were significant economies to be gained by internalizing the control mechanism. Of course, this was partially in evidence from the very beginnings of civilization, but the priests required 76

the assistance of the warriors to maintain it. But, the individual's increased participation in the daily rituals now provided the appropriate avenue for instilling the proper respect. Later, the spread of literacy would replace religious participation as the most effective form of "mind control." Ironically, and perhaps inevitably, both individual access to the mysteries, and to the information, would eventually lead to further erosion of elitist control. rIyopia is not limited to the masses. It seems to define all of us. v. THE DEATH OF GOD

I tell thee that man is tormented by no greater anxiety than to find someone quickly to whom he can hand over the gift of freedom with which the ill-fated creature is born. But only one who can appease their conscience can take over their freedom. Dostoievsky's Grand Inquisitor

The first Dajor heresy (from the root

Deaning--a ta]~ing; of power, of the magic of explanation) to rock the intellectual placidity of the !ledieval Christian world was the Reformation, yet another example of the periphery diffusing the power of the core, the village priest challenging the oligarchy of Rome.

The Counter-Reformation was led by the Jesuits, perhaps the first to realize the emerging power of the Idea: the idea, in contrast to God; ideology rather than theology. Their strongest weapon was the two-sided sword of education and indoctrination. The vast majority of Continental universities were founded by the Jesuits at this time.

The English universities were also religious, maintaining that association \vell into the twentieth century. The first American colleges were originally founded with the intention of preparing the clergy for their ecclesiastical careers; only later would 77 78

the state follow suit with the land grant colleges.

The academic discipline of philosophy was originally an extension of theology. The social sciences, initially termed the "moral sciences," descended from this spiritual milieu, the hybridization of church and academy, theology and philosophy.

The university has never completely outgrown this nascent inclination to lecture, to convert, to indoctrinate, although modern academics have distanced themselves from their heritage by labeling those characteristics, "Jesuitical"; the clarion call of their Enlightenment birthing, invo]-;:ing the name of the group they emulated and replaced.

As the traditional orthodoxies wore away under the corrosive power of this thrust and counterthrust, the secular intellectual began to replace the cleric as the dominant interpreter of historical meaning.

Reason was enshrined and the dogmatists driven from the temple (in theory, anyway). No one could doubt the benefits of this transition. Science, market exchange, and the law all flowered under this impetus.

Plato's intent to replace reverence for tradition with reason had finally been realized on a massive scale.

\'lhat Karl Popper vlOuld eventually term "critical 79

rationalism" appropriately became the guiding norm for our diverse investigations.

However, new problems also emerged with the pervasive worship of a transcendent rationalism, as

Pascal would soon warn us with his comment on the two extravagances--to exclude reason, and to admit only reason. Reason, but also the hubris of Reason, would guide the secular clerics as they led us, 11oses-liJ~e, into the Promised Land.

Perhaps the most significant event of the

Enlightenment was the event we euphemistically refer

ll to as "the death of God • Using the passive voice, we pretend that we had nothing to do with it, as if

He died of natural causes, or perhaps suicide.

Like all of our hesitant steps into the future, our attitude betrayed both desire and dread. Despite our pretences, it is obvious that we killed Him; and for the best of reasons, we no longer needed Him.

God had died long ago, wh~n evolution passed from nature to civilization. Evidently, this had not become obvious until the eighteenth century, suggesting that Culture has always been conservative. Even this belated event was probably a bit premature; we were filled with dread over the naked uncertainty of our brave new world, 80

revealing the reason \'lhy Culture is aluays conservative.

Seemingly oblivious to the only logic that could justify the murder, that, in fact, He never existed and the passing was as illusory as the coming, we immediately began scrambling to ta]:e over His job. T!hen prophecy moved from the 3ible to theories of History, the State filled the vacuum left by God's demise, Reason became the "Holy Spirit," and the academics usurped the role of the clerics. Our academic moralists, although often opposing the dictates of the Church, essentially recapitulated their mission, and usually vlith the same fervent zeal. Dostoievski's Grand Inquisitor claimed that our history is characterized by the continual reforging of our own chains, and this social transition from the priestly elite to the secular clerisy seems to confirm his foresight.

Just as the Church served legitimate needs before becoming superfluous, the secular rationality which replaced it also characterized a step forward.

The advances of science and technology were certainly beneficial, but the secular moralism which veiled its own religious outlook under the cloak of science was problematical. It is somewhat understandable that we would worship science. This was magic made real. 31

The difficulties arose when we transferred the scientific methodology to inappropriate applications, such as the social sciences. Hayek termed this attitude

"scientislll", the attempt to use science to anSVler all of life Is questions. Comte IS positivism and !Iar~c Is

"scientific socialisI;l" are perhaps the most egregious examples of this attitude, but it is still prevalent today as the informing metaphor for most of the social sciences. In some respects, the success of scientific eI;lpiricisrn was self-defeating. Our ancient need for self-deception was merely transferred from the realm of the natural world to the domain of metaphysics.

Popper refers to the same phenomenon as

"historicism", the attempt to find the One explanation.

The philosophes rightfully dismissed theological explanations as superstitious, but to some degree, they, and their intellectual descendants, recreated the same animistic desire for absolute exegesis, the

final account.

The real significance of "the death of God" \vas the growing realization that our civilization, its laws, traditions and customs, did not come from God but rather, was man-made. This realization in itself was certainly a step forward. The mistake was in assuming 32

that it was consciously created (i.e. planned). The implication vas that we could use our Reason to change what we had made in the first place in order to fulfill our normative expectations. Giambattista Vico was one of the few dissenters who realized that we were not really architects of the human order, that we could not change things at will without affecting other parts 1 of the structure.

The retrospective irony is that we exchanged the One Mind of rational planning for God, merely substituting one form of animistic deism for another.

The further irony is that, to some degree, the conceit of a divine creation was more relevant than the assumption that We had planned it all. Culture, like

God, resists explication: the taboo ostensibly erected around God effectively protected Culture from impatient prying~ a fiction, yes, but a productive one.

Inheriting the assumption that History has a goal, Redemption, from our Christian tradition and adding the realization that Culture and Society were self-created rather than divinely inspired, the intelligentsia set about the task of cleaning up the mess we had made of things. This was not the first time that we had complained about the status quo, merely 83

the first tiDe \le engaged in the hubris of the "total transformation of society". The desire to change was neither new nor inappropriate, but allowing the intelligentsia to claim the leadership role was regrettable. IDpatient with the slower pace of Culture, the nouveau clerics as):ed us to \'lorship at the feet of their new Trinity: Reason, Conscious Planning, and the Word (of God).

The assumption of transcendental immanence ascribed to this Trinity was the fatal flaw of the cleric. This expectation was habitual, approaching the status of a genetic deficiency. The ecclesiastical mission of the preacher combined with the rational faith in the consciously chosen word has characterized these servants of the One I'lind since the time of Hesiod.

The English word "cleric" has ahvays had the dual meaning of priest and man of letters, or scribe (the original Bnglish sense of cler]~; also preserved in the French clerc). American English, typically insensitive to elitist pretense, has devalued the meaning of the word, clerk, to a shop assistant, thus reemphasizing the subservient relationship of idealism to materialism and simultaneously restoring the original

sense of servitude v,rhich reason o\'led to "hunger". 34

'1'11e ort-remarJ:ed ancient hostility of the scribe to the merchant was partly based on class envy. ~ven the man of letters I raison d'etre, written language,

}lad first evolved in order to record market exchanges.

But, perhaps even more importantly, the axiology of the scribe differed. The power of the written word must have astounded the first initiates and we can assume that they valued its significance. Although originally developed in service to the market, it would rapidly be used to usurp the pover of the magicians and priests. The incantations and magical formulas which delineated the perquisites of the priest caste would now be available to all who were willing to petition the scribe for his valuable services. Not surprisingly, the scribe also assumed the claim to transcendence which had always been the perogative of the priest. The clerical claim for priestly transcendence combined with the scribe's awe for the rationally chosen, the conscious word, has enticed humanity ever since. Just by "thinking" that some change was necessary, we could make it real. This hubris of believing that we could effect significant change by conscious decision was not only enticingly 85

attractive, it has also proven to be seriously flawed.

Western culture was undergoing a process of significant transformation. Science was transforming our technology in unimaginable ways. An expanding mar}:et order made this technology available to an ever-grm'ling number of people, \lhich in turn created more demand for those advances and the rapid rate of material progress and social change \vhich characterizes the modern era began to reveal itself. These changes

'.vere difficult to process. LiJ:e children, and for the same reasons, culture is both eager for the new and simultaneously deeply conservative, fearful of change. Authentic change had to be experienced at a real, material level and digested slowly. It was sociological indigestion, not transcendental transformation, which the feverish zeal of the clerics engendered. This impatient idealism was somewhat understandable, but ultimately counterproductive.

rlar;:et exchange r.ad been bringing people together for millenia, but freed from the restraints of the ~edieval Church, it began expanding at a phenomenal rate, bringing in its wake the Industrial

Revolution, modern "capitalism", the revolution in scientific and technological applications, and to some 36

degree, even the Enlightenment itself. Idealists \'1ho believe in the primacy of thought will have some difficulty \lith this last clause. There is no need to argue over the chicken and the egg, but consistent materialists will be more sympathetic to the idea that evolving economic patterns spawn new ways of evaluating and appreciating our social metaphysics. Although only partially recognized, even today, this was the great commercial flowering which would empower the

impoverished masses of Europe, and eventually the world

(still in process).

The inherent logic of a competitive economy was a posteriori. If you made a profit, you were

"right". A priori knowledge was no longer needed.

The mar]~et economy had no need for metaphysical epistemology. The great misfortune of the clerics was the obvious consequence that it had no need of 2 metaphysicians either. ~1e no longer required the

services of a superfluous elite to prophesize our

destiny. Long in bondage to astronomer priests who

told us when to plant, or moraling priests who told

us how to live with God's grace, the maturity of the modern mar]~et allmved us to separate prosperity and metaphysics for the first time. The teleological 37

incantations of the priestly class vere finally revealed as nothing more than a conic charade. Centuries later, philosophy \-1Ould catch U;J \1i th the marJ~et' s foresight and "metaphysics" ~'lould becol':le the embarrassed synony!TI of "reactionary" in its infantile insistence on

transcendence, but the essential sea change occurred

\1i th the mar]:et' s liberation.

Our uses of knowledge split into two basic

areas, the practical and the ethereal. Like,dse, the

intelligentsia split into the two divisions which we

still recognize today. On the one hand, the scientists

and practical e:~perts, guided by their mm brand of

empirical rationalism, were generally welcomed. On

the other hand, the metaphysicians--the professional moralists, both the Church pastors and the academic

clerics--had less to contribute and were devalued

accordingly. The plebians had finally taken control

of their destiny. The patriarchal nobility's preference

for the ars liberalis over the ars sordidus (artes

serviles) which characterized both the Classical and

the Medieval eras had finally been turned on its head.

Respected as a near-magical elite for centuries,

the clerics resented being subjected to market

valuations. Defending their own class interests, they 38

recalJitulated the antagonism to marl~et mechanics "hich had been pioneered by Hesiod, developed by Plato, and codified by the Church. It was but a short step to an overt anti-mar}~et theology, now more properly defined as ideology. Co~bining the long heritage of elite resistance to plebian attempts at equality, usually expressed in some form of the moral ideal versus material concupiscence, with the new magic of Reason, the clerics began e~~perimenting Hith nml liturgies.

Common to all of the emerging rituals was the incantation that it should be the teleological conceits of the clerics, not the market, that determined society's needs and ultimate direction. This dogma would determine the essential perspective of the secular moralists from Rousseau to Rat'lls. :even "conservatives" in the academy today often share this one trait with their "liberal" opponents, a common agreement that that there is some higher ideal to serve, usually expressed by some variation on the theme that "business" is both vulgar and oppressive. Of course, they are partially right on both counts. It is vulgar (vulgus, the common people). It is also oppressive, to metaphysicians at least, in the sense that it does not value their dubious contributions. These are the 89

best features of marketeI:lpOUerment , not the \'lOrst, as the clerics have almost managed to convice us.

Outmoded elites often justify their continued presence in terms of apparent need, usually dressed in the vocabulary of past prejudice. The intelligentsia had little difficulty in exploiting the cultural prejudices of the dying age, feudalism. Rational redistribution was the defining feature of the Thomistic corporatism ~lich characterized the feudal age; it ivould soon be transformed into nascent socialism by the secular clerics.

Dependent on the aristocratic warrior to ensure domestic tranquility and a priestly hierarchy to provide

God's sanction, the Medieval serf accepted the organizational role provided by the elites in exchange for the economic surplus of their labors. However, the increasing wealth and the enhanced sense of self-worth engendered by a maturing market and expanding property rights began to change that. For the masses, wealth had always been something to save. Now they realized it was also meant to be spent. Ignoring elitist warnings, they increasingly decided that they would prefer to indulge their own extravagances.

~lodern "capitalism", as market mechanisms ilOUlc1 90

soon be called, lIas developed by <:rhetto-bound Jeus. 3 l'1arket innovations had often been instigated by outsiders of one forill or another; "Greeks, Syrians, and Je\vs" in the late ~oman era. It \laS certainly not the landed aristocracy who provided the capital.

They Here often as cashless as the farm Hor];:ers uho tilled their soil. Of course, some of the nobility could still command significant resources and the successful merchant cities of Italy, Great Britain, the Lowlands, and the Baltic thrived under the unified direction of local aristocracy, craft guilds and merchant ban];:ers. Capitalism developed and utilized the emerging technologies of the modern era quite successfully. The selfish greed of the entrepreneur

Has one of the essential fuels, and the "harsh" realities of the price system Here a very effective means of passing information. The important point to realize is that "\'le" invented and utilized capitalism, not "they."

The market had evolved organically from its nascent beginnings in Hesiod's time. Capitalism was merely its modern form. The extensive division of labor which characterized modern capitalism valued some tasks more than others and the varying monetary 91

rewards which it parceled out often seemed quite irrational. They were irrational and, in many cases,

"unfair". '2.'his did not bother us. If T,:le had reali::ed anything over the millenia, it was the inescapable fact that life was unfair and inherently irrational.

CuIture, and the \lOr]::.ing nasses, \'las satisfied that material circumstances were improving. Although the theologians might have imagined that higher pay signalled higher spiritual worth, we never fell for it. Higher pay was enough for us. "We I 11 taJ::.e the cash, thanl::.s, you can keep the thymotic illusions II , incapsulated the collective response of the working class to intellectual angst in the post-Enlightenment era. Our envy was not so destructive that we would collectively shoot ourselves in the foot simply because our neighbor reaped a higher reward than we did. We

\'lere still too "hungry" to indulge such vanities.

We should remember that this conciliatory attitude toward capitalism did not require any great degree of deferred gratification on the part of the working classes. As is obvious to all but the religious fanatic, the \'lorker was the "darlingll of modern capitalism. Although even the rich have benefited, 92

in that there are considerably more of them now than before, it '(vas the II poor ll uho reaped the most significant advantages. Wall street entrepreneurs indulge roughly the same degree of autonomy and material opulence which Louis XIV's courtiers enjoyed. But, the changes in the lives of the working masses, engendered by the r.10dern marJ;:et order ];:nm"n as capitalism, dwarf any parallel comparison of the L1 II r ich. lI •

Although the scarcity of capital prevented an immediate transformation of society, this hardly justified the cleric's claim that the emerging market order was elitist, although it might have appeared so at first glance. Capitalism's Dionysian quality,

\'lhat Schumpeter "lOuld eventually call, lithe process

ll of creative destruction , inadvertently affronts our

ll personal sense of IIfairness • But, this f.1aenadic frenzy

is precisely the same quality which has transformed our material circumstances in such unimaginable \'lays.

Bluntly, this is the best thing about it.

Consequently, class interest remains the best explanation for the cleric's intransient resistance

to this emerging popular phenomenon, combined with

their historical prejudice against plebian concupiscence 93

and their recently acquired f~ith in an imoatient

TIeason. Although the full implications of the intelligentsia's grab for power would not become obvious until the twentieth century, the essential aspects were already in place by the eighteenth century. Not only did the clerics descend from their monasteries and ivory touers into the street to give advice on purely laical matters, thus betraying their rightful charter as disinterested observers, but they also began to guild purely laical concerns (i.e. driven by avarice)

in the transcendental robes of clercical idealism.

We are still wrestling with the confusion caused by this adulterated alloy. VI. CHEERLEADERS, HUCKSTERS & SNAKE-OIL SALESMEN

But man, proud man, Drest in a little brief authority, Most ignorant of what he's most assured, His glassy essence, like an angry ape, Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven As make the angels weep Shakespeare

One of the substantial problems with the utopian moralisQ which came to dominate our ideas of culture and society was its impatience, its lust for immediate satisfaction. r.rhe desire to ma]:e our \vorld "better" is intrinsic, inherent, literally unavoidable. It defines us. The real question is "ho\l?".

Romanticism was the first reaction against the supposed primacy of Reason. It questioned the possibility of perfecting our world according to the dictates of the One Plan, realizing that various individuals would define that vision of perfection differently. Transcending the illusions of their

Enlightenment ancestors, the Romantics realized that,

"morality is moulded by the \vill. ,,1 Realizing that diverse individual "\1ills" define morality differently, they partially transcended the puerile search for

"Truth" \vhich had plagued the "Age of Reason"

(ironically, their most famous progenitor, Rousseau,

94 95

"didn't get it"; consider the implications of the

"general uill").

Consequently, Romanticism vas partially responsible for promoting the enhanced status of the individual. For these reasons, many of Romanticism's descendants--Turgenev, Ibsen, Dostoievski, ~olstoy,

Flaubert, galzac, Joyce, and i~afJ:a--have been dismissed as reactionaries by socialists and others ~10 worship at the shrine of Collective Reason. ~lthough contemporaneous, the Saint-Simonians invented the words,

"socialism" and "sociology," in purposeful contrast to "individualism." '='hat great nineteenth century individualist, deTocqueville, even apologized for introducing the French term into English because of its negative connotations (selfish versus altruistic; simple-minded rationalism at its best). "Naive"

Americans were oblivious to clerical guilt; they embraced individualism as a celebratory banner of national identity. But, two hundred years of sociological persistence have managed to resurrect

its reprobate connotation--once again, "individualism" is a "dirty \lord".

Unfortunately, Romanticism also reinforced the "bleeding heart" aspects of our Christian heritage. 96

'::..'he n.oi.1antic resryectec1 Dotivation more than results, a calamitous conceit when focused on the evaluation of our political possibilities. neality does not respect intent; this seeDS to be one of the lessons that we have to learn repeatedly. Unfortunately, we

seem to have misplaced the ~omantic insight warning of the dangers of l1ubristic reason. '\le have retained only the myopic respect for intent, which we

inexplicably uelded to the "logic" of Christian piety

to produce the fervent rationalist zeal which

characterizes most clerical advocates down to the

present day. ?he impracticality of this intractable

composite has proven to be even more significant than

the wild, improhable irony that originally informed

this strange brew.

Rousseau, perhaps the first Romantic to indulge

a passion for social philosophy and one of the most

influential clerics of modern times, embodied the

contradictions mentioned above. Driven by the desire

to free men from their "chains", he ultimately

established the foundry which has been reforging our

chains for the last two hundred years, an irony as

predictable as it was tragic. Recapitulating the

imagination's avoidance of present realities by invoJ~ing 97

the past and the future ("Once upon a time •••happily ever after", the essential Daradigm of all dreaos),

Rousseau attempted to reimpose the cultural unanimity of our primeval past \vi th his \1orshi~) of the "noble savage" (read, Garden of :eden). Ignoring his own best impulses towards the sanctity of the individual, he proposed the tyranny of the "general uill" ("public interest" is the tuentieth century modulation) by \'!hich the state would herd us toward the Second Coming.

In this conceit, the clerics would find their new vocation and the means to do it; a proclivity for social engineering and an alliance with the state. Both of these features would dominate the intelligentsia's mission dmvn to the present day.

We should not overlook the social scientists' ability to find Hhatever they are looking for. Defining their teleology in terms of the solution of social problems, it is not surprising that they should find them everywhere. In this case, it is analagous to making mountains out of the numerous molehills ,'!hich determine the contour of all social landscapes.

This is not intended to suggest that we should ignore social inconsistencies, but to point out the necessity of "allmving" them to resolve themselves. 98

Orpheus, the perfect symbol of the intelligentsia's

irapatience, lost the obj ect of his desire by "facing"

it. Averting our conscious gaze, uith our bac;~s turned, unconsciously endouing Culture and simultaneously being guided by it; allouing the impersonal parameters arising out of our actual material circumstances to do their

\'lOrk slm'lly and carefully is the only "ticket" that has ever Horked for us. 'I'rust our concupiscence; although slouer than the "I'1ind," it is much more

thorough.

"I join myself, body, goods, v1ill and all my

powers, to the Corsican nation, granting her oHnership of me, of l:lyself and all who depend on me," \vas the way Rousseau expressed our recurrent desire for an

external source of validation, for God, in his proposed 2 constitution for corsica. Rousseau realized the

obvious, that there \vas an essential conflict between

our mvn natural, instinctively "selfish" desires and

the needs of the state. Following Hesiod and Plato,

he betrayed humanity's inclinations towards autonomy

in favor of his ovm subjective vision of "civic Virtue",

ostensibly to save the lesser people from themselves;

hence the need for social engineering and the alliance

Hith state power to enforce the cleric's will disguised 99

as "general \7ill". ?he amazing contradiction inherent

in this conclusion is revealed ~y the fact that

Rousseau, above all others, is remembered for his respect of the instinctual over the "reasonable".

If there is anyone who should have resisted the pretense of cerebral domination, it was Rousseau. As much as any example in our oaradoxical history, this incongruity reveals the convoluted lunacies of which we are capable.

Whether the primary motivation was clerical class interest or merely sloppy thinking born of normative desire is of secondary importance compared to the tragic irony that a legitimate insight can be contorted into a contradictory conclusion.

Hegel preserved the cleric' s tlanichean distinction between the actual and the ideal (he even recapitulates some of the details, particularly the demi-urge as creator; cf. Philosophy of Right). His

particular phrasing was similar to Rousseau's, the dichotomy of "economic \'1ill" (individual avarice, restrained by common laVli "nurgerliche Gesellschaft") and " e thical \1ill" (identified \vith the "staat").

The prototype of the academic court jester which Vlould

come to dominate twentieth century political life, 100

he slavishly provided the nascent ?russian state vith its quieting theology, trw State as the II .second Cm,ting ll

(IIEnd of aistoryll). One of the first popular philosophers to realize the seminal difference betveen the unco~scious dictates of Society, characterized as lIeconomic uill ll , and the conscious purpose of the

State, idolized as lI e thical ,.,ill ll , Hegel, displaying the intellectual's instinctive prejudice for the primacy of thought reinforced by the Romantic preference of motivation over result, endorsed the IIconscious decision" as representing Humanity's highest achievement. His preference for the planned, the mentally sanctioned, implied that if we did not consciously plan it, it was somehow irreparably flawed.

Substituting belief in History for belief in God and anticipating ~instein's famous remark that God does not play with dice, Hegel assumed that deistic intent is the true marl-=. of divinity in Man. Thus, "ethical will ll becomes the lI uni versal .vill" as enforced by the lI universal class ll of state bureaucrats (shadoVls of

Plato's II guardians" and previe,,,s of I'lilovan Dj ilas' line." class II) • hIthough his criticism of the Church's attempt to hide the mystery of God's Plan was appropriate, he recapitulated its essential error in 1 01

assuming that there was any Plan at all.

~erhaps in unconscious homage to nousseau's memory, irony and satire also seem to dominate Hegel's informing metaphors. ne is legitimately re!nembered for his insight that History was not planned by a series of philosoJJller l~ings, ':mt rather that these leaders were used by History to achieve its own purposes.

Ignoring his sole stro]~e of brilliance, he proceeded to deny this insight by endowing the State as the repository of conscious will in pure form. EVidently, he believed that his own normative desires would be

the one exception, that he would be the first to outwit

History's "cunning of reason."

Hegel's conceit that the "ueltgeist" (\'lOrld

spirit) illuminated the individual only when they

participate in the "Volkgeist" (spirit of the People)

is debatable. But, his impetuous equivalence of the

VolJ:geist with the staat, combined with his

transformation of the Lockean "special right" to

property into a "general right" (even Hegel \vould have

balked at the obvious conclusion, but his student,

!1arx, did not) would eventually find the only resolution

this inanity deserved on the bloody fields near

Stalingrad, with the Hegelians of the right embodying 102

the first pre~ise and the Hegelians of the left personifying the latter. 3 Reading our strange history, one is te~pted to believe that God's indispensable role \las that of the .Scapegoat.RevisinS-j BaJamin' s dictum, it appears that vIe had to invent Him in order to have Someone to blame for our self-created fate.

Accepting responsibility for our m·m lunacies \laS perhaps too much for our frail shoulders to bear.

I?ousseau Has a cheerleader, innocent and well-intended; but ultimately irrelevant in the sense that he only encouraged what was occurring anyway.

His confused "hurrahs" only added to the pandemonium.

The tragi-comic aspect of his influence is a reminder of the hubristic dangers of impatient thought.

But, with Hegel we are tempted by the sinister shades of Marxist class conspiracy. His follies, and his significant, although generally unrecognized,

influence on the modern academy, are difficult to

interpret in any way other than as an unconscious expression of the cleric's desire for permanent job security, veiled behind the rubric of the "history of the spirit". One is tempted to \'1onder whether

Frederick III actually dictated the lines, but of course, a man of Hegel's imagination would not require 103

such mundanities for delivering "the goods." :?rovide the political leaders with a justification for their predations, ensure the bureaucrat's job security, tempt the people with comfortable truisms, and orovide a cushy job for yourself at the same time; this was

Hegel's true genius. Bvery academic advocate since then has danced to the same tune.

~his insistence that History be redeemed rather than understood is the essential determinant of the utopian moralism which has plagued us to the present day. The third member of of our modern Trinity, in contrast to the first two, actually provided us with some helpful insight; and yet, ultimately, gave voice to one of the cruelest jokes we have ever played on ourselves.

I(arl rIarx developed, at least partially, a consistent conception of materialism for the first

time in our history. Bacon had elucidated the motivating force of avarice. tlandeville developed

the idea of unintended consequences, but clung to the moralistic condemnation of "gross luxury" as "private vice". Although 1'1ancleville realized that the public would ultimately benefit from these selfish desires, we would wait for Hume to point out that luxury was 1 0 l~

a meaningless subjective category and that it was inappropriate to consider its pursuit a vice. But, even Rume, in his Z\n Inquiry Concering the Principles of Ilorals, Horries about the, II avidity•••of acquiring goods and possessions" as "insatiable, perpetual, 4 universal, and directly destructive of society. II flarx's economic mentor, hdam Smith, had the good sense to realize that even these regrets \Jere ultimately irrelevant, but he also echoed the same sensibilities in his nraise of the soldier's life, "the great school of self-command", over the II gentle virtue" of commercial

'.t: 5 l l.Le.

I'larx \las perhaps the first to understand the implications of the great advances fueled by modern capitalism and the Industrial Revolution, uninfluenced by any taint of nostalgic moralism. Unencumbered by the rationalist bias that suggested we hau created our Horld in a fit of divine inspiration, rIarx respected the restraints of Culture to a far greater degree than his Bolshevi]~ heirs. He \'las more of an evolutionist than a revolutionist. He also understood the importance of the individual's desire for Lockean property rights as the defining characteristic of modernity.

Although he was the first to see it, he was 105

also, unfortunately, the first to forget it, thus confirming the epistemological powers of

Judaeo-Christian moralism. It was appropriate that modern clerics continually railed against the powers of the Church, it literally defined them; even today, the irate Irish singer, Sinead O'Connor, seems obliviously unaware that destroying the Pope's picture is as reverential as praying to him. Both activities worship his presence.

It is particularly ironic that Adam Smith, the supposed apologist of modern capitalism, had almost nothing good to say about capitalists in his entire

900 page book, The Wealth of Nations, as he accurately describes their inherent tendency toward monopoly and other anti-market practices. Marx, largely free of

"bleeding-heart" Christian tendencies, seemed to appreciate the capitalist's intemperance. But, he recapitulated the essential Christian paradigm with his Gnostic assumptions (cf. Ernst Topitsch's

Sozialphilosophie zwischen Ideologie und Wissenschaft).

For Adam Smith, the capitalist was "bad"--and that was the best thing about him (i.e., although striving for monopoly, his greed was manageable (self-regulating via competition) and it propelled capitalism). For 106

Marx, the capitalist was "good"--and that was the worst thing about him (i.e. although the economic development stemming from this mode of production was "good", the

Messianic vision of the Judaeo-Christian fraternity demanded its "improvement," because the "goodness" of capitalism, although productive, was oppressive to the working masses; even the brilliant economic historian, Schumpeter, falls into the trap, tracing

Marxian descent through Ricardo and diminishing the influence of Smith and, more importantly, the labor theory of value; fair enough, economically speaking, but there is little economic content in Marx (none that compares with his theological importance)--it is pure religion, hence the Smithean suspicion of capitalist monopoly was critical, as was the labor theory of value (his organizing metaphor); contrary to Keyne's assertion, people rarely listen to economists, but, to Voltaire's chagrin, they do listen to priests--if Marx had been an economist, none of us would even know his name).

His faith in an intellectual elite, although not as complete as Lenin's, inexorably led to an implicit Hegelian statism, embodying the perfect denial of his vain expectation for the "state to wither away". 107

His impatience, characteristic of modern progressivism, was ultimately self-defeating. Although Marx shares many of the faults that plagued other nineteenth century progressives, his messianic message is worthy of deeper investigation, as he, more than any other single person, determined the essential course of the modern clerisy.

As European industry and trade began to expand, the economic scarcity that had characterized the Middle

Ages began to diminish and private business activity gathered momentum. Before nascent capitalism was able to expand significantly, however, the state imposed large taxes and massive regulation. The state bureaucracies rapidly "realized" that the taxes and tariffs imposed on the market were an ideal source of funding for their own growth and sustenance. The state received these funds from various monopoly groups in return for restricting competitive firms and technologies from entering the market. This inclination for redistributive and discriminatory policies was even extended to competitive modes of production.

In order to protect its clientele, the English Privy

Council, in 1623, went so far as to order the destruction of a needle machine and all the needles it had already produced. 108

The mercantilist era was characterized by the belief that the economic welfare of the state could only be secured by government regulation of a nationalist character. state sanctioned monopolies, subsidies, taxes, regulations, special privileges, and favoritism were the means by which this was established.

Like the statist interference of our modern era, mercantilist bureaucracies increased the costs of transactions rather than reducing them. The

justification for intervention was also similar; moral necessity demanded that mere economic sense be ignored.

Mercantilist Europe inherited from the Middle Ages the concept that all people were born sinners and, therefore, the elite were obligated to protect the

lesser people from themselves. Order was possible only if individuals were regulated and controlled by

the state. Unsupervised, free market activity would

inevitably lead to disaster (substitute self-interest

for sin and you have the present-day justification

for state intervention). The inefficiency and

consequent impoverishment engendered by this bureaucracy

gave birth to the liberal revolution exemplified most

spectacularly by the French and the American 109

Revolutions.

Although originally founded on the principles of opposition to monopolistic privilege, dictatorial states, aggressive nationalism and political exploitation characterised by the mercantilist era, nineteenth century progressivism inexorably changed the focus of its attention from monopoly to the market itself. Concentrating on the illusory dilemma of the market, rather than the legitimate obstacles posed by elitist excesses, was problematical. Not only did it distract attention from the real problem, but, it also created an unconquerable "enemy" out of a natural ally, the market. Capitalism, fueling unimaginable advances in science and technology, was leading Western civilization into the modern era. Although perhaps poorly perceived, this reality was insurmountable, and any sociological analysis which attempted to deny this was doomed to frustration--the philosophical equivalent of beating one's head against the wall.

This fruitless quest to tame the anarchy of the market served to enhance the intrinsic impatience of the intelligentsia, which in turn, suggested the solution of a revolutionary elite leading a strong nationalist state in order to guide a besotted humanity to the 110

Promised Land. It was naively assumed that this "new elite" would somehow be different than the privileged classes which the radical progressives were attempting to dethrone. By misdirecting energy on an imagined problem, we inadvertently strengthened the real one.

The influential proto-socialist, Saint Simon, initially concerned with empowering the masses, ultimately proposed an elite that would supposedly organize society for everyone's benefit. If they disagreed, they would be "treated like cattle.,,6

Although nominally espousing the natural rights of the common man, he ultimately proposed a hierarchial organization that was not significantly different from the mercantilist elite which elicited his critique in the first place. Attempting to reform the state in order to free the market of individual desire, he ultimately recommended the substitution of a "new and improved" state in order to repress the market.

It is almost impossible to overestimate the influence of the Saint-Simonians on the future evolution of radical progressivism. They had "the strongest effect in diffusing socialist ideas among the educated classes."7 Saint Simon and his student, the logical positivist Auguste Comte, ultimately affected the 111

socialists, the anarchists, the syndicalists, all forms of "liberal" progressivism, and perhaps most significantly, the young Karl Marx.

Modern capitalism was struggling to emerge from the restraints of mercantilism, but significant patterns of poverty and need were still evident--a problem that capitalism would correct to a remarkable degree over the ensuing years. Karl Marx could not foresee the

future, and therefore began to address the specific, albeit temporal, concerns of his age. He started with the premise of empowering the masses. Although

forgotten and ignored by the heirs of Marxism today, he was an individualist. He was concerned with the dignity of man, not as a vague universalist concept,

but in a direct and immediate way. His philosophical

conception would satisfy even the most rigorous methodological individualist of the twentieth century.

He was also a cultural materialist who first found

his own voice in the celebrated break with Hegelian

idealism.

In direct contrast to German philosophy, which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven••••We begin with real, active men, and from their real life process•••the premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises ••• they are real 112

individuals••• the first premise of all human history.8

The individual is the social being.9

All emancipation is restoration of the human world••••Only when the actual, individual man has taken back into himself the abstract citizen.10

This was the essential articulation of Marx's materialism as opposed to Hegel's romantic idealism.

His point was to stress that we must look at real

individuals, not idealized theories of community and

society imposed from above. Not only did he articulate the necessity of beginning with the individual before generalizing outward to society, in direct contrast to our contemporary collectivists, he also understood

the economic basis of our morality. Ironically, many of the same scholars that worship Marx today

simultaneously dismiss economic realities which they

consider too utilitarian, heartless, and realistic, veiling their own confused ambivalence with Polyannish

references to the "dismal science."

Regardless of our appraisal of his actual

suggestions on how to improve the lot of humanity,

we must understand that Marx's intention was to analyze

society from the point of view of the actual person,

not some metaphysical concept. The discipline of 113

economics was poorly developed in the mid-nineteenth century. Significant insights would come in the following years, particularly the marginal utility theory which would replace the labor theory of value as the dominant metaphor of economic analysis. Marx was rightfully concerned with the effects, but misinterpreted the economic causes. Consequently, his proposed solutions leave much to be desired. It appears that the market achieved his goals far more successfully than the socialism which he helped create

(cf. the lectures of Kojeve for a Marxian-Hegelian perspective with the same conclusion). The era's faith in science, reason, and planning contributed to his miscalculation, as did the Saint Simonian inspired notion of a bureaucratic elite. In retrospect, it is saddening that his followers abandoned the legitimate task of winnowing the useful from the erroneous. Rather than worship every word as hallowed text, they should have examined the methodology and conclusions in light of the subsequent historical actualities.

Marx suggested that the working class would become increasingly miserable under capitalism; in fact, the exact opposite happened. He postulated that communist revolutions would be built on the much admired 114

foundation of industrial capitalism. He thought that they would occur in industrialized nations with a developed proletariat, and suggested that they would be essentially non-agrarian and non-nationalist; in fact, the exact opposite occurred. Every communist revolution in history has occurred in agrarian,

"pre-capitalist" environments. Despite Marx's claims, all of the revolutions have also been intensely nationalistic. Yet, none of his devoted followers attempted any kind of serious re-evaluation of the premises. Rather, they indulged in theological cover-ups to justify an increasingly untenable position.

He deserved better followers. They should have kept their eyes on the road rather than climbing the signposts. Had they been true to his ultimate goal, the intrinsic dignity of humanity, they might have gracefully abandoned this self-induced fear of the anarchy of the free market as both unwarranted and misleading. Marx was clearly wrong about the tendency of capital towards ever increasing concentration. The subsequent history of Europe proved that the market was very capable of fulfilling his stated desire for working-class self-mastery. The sovereignty of the 115

individual is best served by the market; our most successful collective institution, our most favorable way of getting to know each other, of communicating with each other (consider a simple dollar bill: no other commonly used item has literally "touched" so many other people; a chain letter that works). It allows the individual a remarkable degree of maneuverability, despite the seemingly oppressive aspects which often characterized nineteenth century capitalism. Capitalism was an emerging technology and, like other major technological innovations (e.g. bronze, iron), it was used to secure the advantage of those groups "in the know", sometimes at the expense of those who did not grasp its exigencies. However, as previous history has demonstrated, the peripheral groups would rapidly master the essentials, and attain some form of equilibrium. Clearly, Marx could have profited from spending more time in the streets, and less in the library.

Despite Marx's awareness of our proclivity to abuse power, he naively assumed that the socialist bureaucrat would be an exception, concluding with the absurd assumption that a strong state would "wither away" after accomplishing its goal. In his Critique 116

of Hegel's Philosophy of the State, he demonstrates that he was once aware of the problem.

Bureaucracy considers itself the ultimate finite purpose of the state. Since bureaucracy converts its formal purposes into its content, it everywhere comes into conflict with real purposes••• Bureaucracy is the imaginary state beside the real state•••For the individual bureaucrat the state's purposes become his private purpose.11

•••the state interest becomes a particular private purpose••• transformed into objectives of the department, and department objectives into state objectives.12

Marx, only thirty years later, in a celebrated debate with the Russian anarchist, Michael Bakunin, inexplicably reverses himself on this issue with the specious logic that somehow Communism would be different. Bakunin, in a description of what a Marxist

"dictatorship of the proletariat" would actually look like, delivers a chilling prophecy of the "new class" 13 long before Milovan Djilas made the term famous.

We cannot pass it off on the dichotomy of the young

Marx and the old Marx, for even in his later life, when not defending his own theology, Marx was well aware of the oppressive quality of the state bureaucracy. Criticizing the federal bureaucracy of

Napolean III in The Eighteenth Brumaire, he demonstrated 117

that his ultimate aim was to abolish the conditions in which, "social relations of individuals appear as an autonomous power over individuals.,,14

Marx realized the distinction between historical analysis based on perceptions of "what is" and wish-fulfillment fantasies based on moralistic conceptions of "what should be." This prompted his insistence on "scientific socialism" and was the source of his criticism towards the "utopian socialists" in 15 The Communist Manifesto. It is ironic that "market" sympathizers often point to the Manifesto for examples of his sympathy to capitalism, but rarely use it against twentieth century Marxists. But, there is no better

"ammunition," because the utopian socialist vision is all that has survived of Marx in our century. It is not particularly surprising that only "bleeding heart" socialism has prevailed. The "Christian" element was always its strongest component, both for Saint

Simon and for Marx. Although Marx failed in his attempt to "stick to the facts," to discover the real exigencies of historical determinism, to transcend the normative fantasies of the Christian socialists, he did try, and the nobility of his failure was instructive.

His followers never even made the attempt to 118

move beyond the prisons of their own personal definitions of "should." The contradictions and ironies of our paradoxical history are almost perfectly illuminated by the fact that most of these modern

Marxian fantasies of the "good," of what "should" be, are not only distinctly antithetical to any consistent definition of "materialism," but also fundamentally, both Christian and bourgeois!

Marx would not be the first advocate, nor the last, to become so deeply enmeshed in his vision to lose all sense of perspective, to forget what he already knew. But, how do we explain the generations of

Marxists who were able to ignore this obvious problem, especially as it actually developed in the Soviet Union,

Eastern Europe, and China? How does the historian explain that the followers of Christ could produce the Inquisition and the followers of Marx create the

Stalinist terror?

There is no need to praise Marx, nor to bury him (he obviously requires neither), only to understand him. Dismayed by the problems of mercantilist capitalism, he sought a solution. The dignity of the individual was his starting point; defined as freedom from oppressive monopoly. His real opponent was the 119

monopoly of the state. Although renowned as a materialist, the clerical dualism of the real and the moral ultimately determined his path; he misplaced his ire on an amoral market, and the unanticipated consequence was the creation of an even stronger state.

Rather than continue an active dialectic with subsequent history, which might well have resurrected the inherent advantages of the free market, his followers pursued an uncritical worship and articulation of accepted dogma. His mistakes became enshrined and his best ideas were forgotten. Didactically debating the means

(communism), everyone ignored the ends (human freedom).

Socialist scholars have consistently ignored the essence of his thesis as they mindlessly constructed a temple dedicated to its antithesis. Like the Man who embodied the apocalyptic Christian vision, which influenced him so greatly, Marx, truly, was betrayed by a kiss. VII. THE APES OF ZARATHUSTRA

Be my brother or I'll kill you Sebastien Chamfort

Although originally an avid supporter of the

French Revolution, Chamfort, after witnessing the

Jacobins' proclivity for the guillotine, suggested changing the popular revolutionary slogan, "liberte, 1 egalite, fraternite" to the epigram mentioned above.

These words rather playfully encapsulate the horrible reality which has plagued the modern clerisy's pursuit of social progress. This impatient insistence, which cannibalized nineteenth century radicals such as Saint

Simon and Marx, would become even more pronounced as the rapid rate of social change began to erode traditional mores.

Just as humanity longs for the Golden Age of the Past, so too, individuals identify truth with the customs of their youth. Until the early nineteenth century, the slow pace of cultural change ensured that most people would live from adolescence to maturity to dotage in essentially the same world; hence the

limited life span of the individual rarely affected one's assessment of social issues. However, starting

in the nineteenth century, and accelerating

120 121

geometrically in the twentieth, the rapid rate of cultural change has spawned a purely personal nostalgic yearning for the past, which actively reinforced the parallel conservatism of the One Mind. It is much more problematical for one born in the age of the horse and buggy to pursue a reasonable appraisal of political and social issues in their mature years when that maturity coincides with the moon landing. What was difficult for Hesiod to overcome (a longing for the stability of childhood), becomes almost impossible for Carlyle and Dickens, and is so ingrained in the consciousness of a twentieth century Californian that it becomes a form of oblivious innocence.

Hence the ironic contradiction that those whose lives are most subject to both the corrosive powers of modernity and the resultant freedoms are also the most likely to cringe in face of what they otherwise embrace. The prototypical Californian of the late twentieth century would actively resist any attempt to corral the post-modern privileges, such as non-traditional sexual freedoms and the wide array of eclectic "hobbies", which define the parameters of that "lifestyle". They would surrender neither the mobility nor the anonymity of modernity, yet they 122

are also the most likely to criticize the essential paradigms which engendered these freedoms. Modernity has made conservatives of us all, longing for the comfortable truisms of a childhood which is lost forever.

The wealth spawned by nineteenth century industrialism was "a rising tide which lifted all boats.,,2 The emerging freedoms engendered by this increased wealth immunized the working class from the strident cries of the radical intelligentsia.

Consequently, the clerics abandoned the attainable leg of the revolutionary tripod, freedom, and began to perseverate on the illusory goals of equality and fraternity (in essence, recreating the suicidal curse of the French Revolution, where, lithe finest opportunity ever given to the world was thrown away, because the passion for equality made vain the hope for freedom,,3).

The working class, restrained by the reality of having to work for a living, has never embraced any consistent desire for equality, much less fraternity. Fraternity is so naturally intrinsic to our species that we are more than capable of finding it ourselves without the assistance of "experts"~ it is not a political issue, at least not for the working 123

masses. The workers have sought a basic equality of opportunity and equality under the law, but these principles were ancient and proclaimed by the Church more than a thousand years prior, even if not completely actualized. The essential movements of the nineteenth century were confirming these egalitarian tendencies and, more importantly, producing an unparalleled material freedom which truly empowered the equality that would otherwise be nothing more than an empty phrase. But the modern clerics, resentful of their essentially superfluous position, delineated a more metaphysical definition of equality and fraternity which would approach the absurd by the late twentieth century. The surest way to attain permanent job security is to find a task that will never be finished, hence the clerical emphasis on the solution of "social problems," as if these could ever be completely solved.

The career of emptying the ocean with a bucket would provide employment down to the Nth generation, but it is not likely to affect the ocean, nor accomplish much else of significance.

Humanity's approach to the duality of freedom and fraternal equality has often been expressed in terms of master and slave (cf. Hegel, Nietzsche). 124

Seeking to overcome the elitist privilege which characterized social relations, we sought a general enhancement of all three (liberte, egalite, fraternite) so that the master/slave dichotomy would be transcended.

But, resentful of the master's privilege, we balked at admitting that we wanted to attain the same status.

This attitude was enhanced by Ollr clerical aversion to the recognition of our own concupiscence, our own legitimate desire for self-mastery. This ambivalent aversion recapitulated our ancient "fear" of real freedom. By focusing on the illusory panaceas of transcendental equality and mystagogic fraternity, the clerics could effectively soothe our fear of the future with metaphysical talismans. It was on these rocks that nineteenth century progressivism foundered and split into the liberal and radical components.

Subconsciously realizing that the market was delivering emergent freedoms at a far faster pace than we were capable of digesting anyway, the radical movement found a transcendent role which justified its self-perpetuating importance and simultaneously assisted an anxious humanity in its avoidance of actualizing the freedoms it both sought and feared.

But, our desire was too strong, and it was 125

being satiated too effectively to be distracted so easily. By and large, we ignored their clarion calls in the nineteenth century. It would require a wealthy host to afford the attempted actualization of all these aggregate vanities. The industrialized nations of

Europe and America finally provided the proper environment in the twentieth century, exemplified particularly by the United states in the late twentieth century. The positivistic faith in our ability to create our own world with the transcendent powers of reason and planning; the pretension of a dichotomy between the moral and the concupiscent disguised as the difference between altruistic and egotistic; and the handicap of bias engendered by a limited life span were the metaphysical inanities which prompted our cleric's conclusions. The ability to forge an alliance with the state, the enhanced status of the university, and the perverted wisdom of concentrating on impossible objectives such as consummate equality provided the clerical intelligentsia's thymotic urges with an effective outlet, and, perhaps more importantly, job security. Morality, previously identified with culture and tradition (the Latin root is moralis, meaning manners and customs, such as our English "mores" still 126

implies), had now become effectively rationalized and

institutionalized. The priestly class, seemingly doomed to extinction, had effectively resurrected their teleological mission and returned as the bureaucrats of our ideals.

We should not overlook the importance of a host culture wealthy enough to indulge such vanities.

The wealthier we become, the more ashamed of it we

seem to be. Perhaps our genuine fear of self-mastery

explains this ironic resistance. As the study of the previous "successful" cultures (ancient Egypt, classical

Rome and post-Renaissance Spain) suggests, and as

Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy

implicitly reminds us, wealth is its own disease; it makes us silly (consider the Russian folk saying, "s

zhiru besystsya"--"to go crazy from too much fat,,).4

The real challenge of modernity is not how to live within "limits", but rather how to live with the

enhanced material circumstances which we have diligently

pursued for countless millenia. Slow and steady

progression poses little problem, but the rapid momentum

of the modern era seems to engender a schizophrenic,

ambivalent response.

The twentieth century state embodies the 127

actualization of these trends. The marriage of the priest caste and the warrior caste, represented by the state, could divert our intrinsic desires by appropriating the surplus resulting from the actualization of those desires. Increased material benefits were taxed away to support yet another parasitic elite.

Mystagogic collectivism could pose as rationalized fraternity even as it rejuvenated the dying embers of tribalism by strengthening nationalism.

The pursuit of the impossible, the transcendent equality which even Nature denies, could be disguised as the legitimate pursuit of freedom. The traditional clerical aversion to economic reality could now effectively reunite the liberal (the new statist liberalism of

Bentham and J.S. Mill) and radical camps as they focused on personal freedom and ignored the empowering aspects of economic freedom embodied in property rights, essentially banishing the "old" liberalism (the classical liberalism of Hume, deTocqueville, Acton, among others), with its concern for economic enfranchisement, to the discredited refuge of working class prejudice. The aspiration to Godliness which characterizes the modern cleric's faith in Rational 128

Creation (faith in Planning) ensured the intelligentsia of a permanent place in a world which really had no further need of magicians.

Although one is tempted to excuse this clerical proclivity for institutionalized moralism on the basis of innocent metaphysical vanity, the more mundane explanation of class interest disguised as teleological mission keeps insistently returning. The market economy which began to establish the mythological parameters of modernity not only increased our ability to

ll IImanipulate wealth, thus diminishing our need for metaphysics and ~ priori explanation. It also gave birth to a new conception of knowledge itself.

The innocent faith in the autonomy of reason and desire had never been questioned. It was as obvious for Hesiod as it was for Kant and Hegel. But all the prophets of the modern era, Kierkegaard, Husserl,

Nietzsche, Freud, Jung, and Wittgenstein agreed on one essential issue--we do not know what we want, and even if we did, we could not say it (define it). Our desire, seemingly explicated by reason, was really a jumble of confused subconscious urges. This did not imply the cessation of desire, but rather the complete impossibility of establishing a priestly elite 129

with the requisite expertise to logically delineate these needs. We can hardly pretend that the intelligentsia were unaware of these developments.

In fact, the Frankfurt School's (Adorno, Marcuse,

Habermas, ultimately Norman O. Brown) attempt to incorporate these post-modern insights into the dominant paradigm of clerical management is the virtual embodiment of Nietzsche's warning that, "Convictions, not lies, are the greatest obstacle to truth."S It is also an excellent proof that concupiscence ("the will to power," sometimes, merely job security) is the driving motivation of humanity, informing the supposed "altruism" of the clerics as well as the admitted "egotism" of the plebian laity.

Moral relativism is not merely an unfortunate by-product of the modern era, it is the defining characteristic. Individual subjectivity is unavoidable.

Irrespective of our personal normative impressions, it is the new mythos. "Nothing is true and everything is permitted.,,6 However amoral this may strike us, it cannot be avoided in the post-modern culture of the developed world in the late twentieth century.

Moral anarchy is the determing metaphor of our time. Our ambivalence is perfectly reflected in 130

the connotations of "lawlessness" \vhich we ascribe to that word, anarchy. But, obviously, moral anarchy can only survive when backed by the full force and weight of impersonal rules to protect us from each other. Law and order are the essential complements to any form of anarchism. Homogeneous societies, with strong mutually observed cultural or religious laws might be able to survive without civil law, but the anarchy of the modern era requires a strong civil law.

It is almost as if we knew we were moving in this direction of total personal sovereignty, and yet, were so fearful of the prospective freedom that we utilized our favorite moral category, duality, to project the image of the bomb-throwing terrorist, the antithesis of the cultural tolerance necessary for any kind of real anarchism to occur. It is the terror of complete moral freedom which frightens us, hence we construct a mental image of its opposite in order to enforce the taboo restricting the realization of our most sublime desire, freedom.

Retrograde appeals to civic virtue, the nostalgic yearning to resurrect the past which guides moralistic appeals from both the right and the left, are understandable, but they ignore the compelling 131

determinants of modernity. The appeal to civic virtue only works if everyone's definition of "virtue" is the same. Many of those who resisted draft registraticn during the Vietnam era acted out of a sense of public duty. Most of the students had student deferments, but refused them because they felt that patriotism demanded that they stand up to the irresponsible demands of the "machine". Needless to say, the more traditional approach assumed that real civic virtue was properly displayed by answering Washington's call to duty.

When a society no longer shares a common definition of "morality," the various individuals will create their own, hopefully following culture's sensible advice along the general path of respect for other individuals.

Scanning the annals of our history for consistent appeals to public virtue reveals three other occasions which are renowned for this approach: the

Stoic's Rome, Machiavelli's Renaissance Italy, and eighteenth century England's classical republicanism.

Stoic thought flowered after the Republic had expired; they were appealing to previous conceptions of public dignity which were rapidly dying. Machiavelli's conception of "civic virtue" was oblivious to the fact that the Renaissance had changed Italy irrevocably. 132

The "country" party's invocation to classical republican virtue was issued when Locke's "liberalism" and Adam

Smith's "capitalism" had already combined to form the dominant social metaphor of that era, one so strong that it continues to inform us today.

Not surprisingly, we are bombarded with similar appeals today, and for the same reason. Like the other three examples, we no longer have a common sense of purpose, and like the other three, we long for the one recently passed. In the academy, Pocock and Wood, among others, have attempted to rewrite American colonial history from this perspective. More popular works, such as Lasch's studious Progress and Its Critics and Bloom's otherwise insightful The Closing of the

American Mind echo the same theme of the regret for lost innocence. But, the cohesive power of a shared definition of "civic virtue" only works when it actually exists. When one has to "appeal" for it, it has already disappeared, hence the strident urging to resurrect it. The very fact that one is prompted to call for its return is the most definitive proof that it no longer exists in sufficient strength to ever be effective as a social coagulant. Although it might have existed ~o some degree in homogeneous societies 133

such as nineteenth century America or post-war Japan, it is pure vanity to believe that late twentieth century

America is going to discover a metaphysical commonality.

Effectively coping with the realities of our times will require more than mere Christmas' lists.

Carl Jung once playfully suggested that the twentieth century could best be understood if we

imagined that everyone had thoroughly read Friedrich

Nietzsche and then consciously set about actualizing h 1S' pred"1Ct"10ns. 7 Perhaps we could, at least, agree with him that Nietzsche is the essential prophet of our time. His writing often seems contradictory, the voice of a mad poet rather than a rational pedagogue.

Nevertheless, we can ellicit a few consistent trends, most of which actually seem more relevant today than

in his own time.

Nietzsche's nihilism springs from the

realization that there can be no a priori assumption

of objective, ethical significance intrinsic to reality.

We created it all unconsciously; God, morality, right

and wrong, ideals of all sorts. Homo aestimatus, man

the valuer, the estimater, who invents his own meanings,

might be his recommended substitution for the more 134

materialist (not to mention, oppressively rationalist) homo economicus.

The feeling of "ought" ••• its origin in the oldest and most original personal relationship that there is, the relationship between buyer and seller•••Making prices, assessing values, thinking out equivalents, exchanging•••constituted thinking itself••• the oldest form of sagacity.8

"Ought", descending from "owe", and the progenitor of the normative "should"; proprius, meaning one's own, the common Latin root of property, prosper, proper, both senses of appropriate and both meanings of appreciate; virtue as worth, in particular, subjectively defined self-worth. Our very language reveals the primacy of our instinct to assess our own values, hence

Nietzsche's "will to power", described as concupiscence in this essay, as our prime motivation.

Nietzsche was one of the first to understand that we have always found our wisdom in the marketplace

(not to mention other forms of sustenance). It is interesting that he opposed Apollo with Dionysius, rather than Hermes, but evidently he considered the dual bias of rationality and pretentious morality embodied by Apollo more of a threat (hence, Dionysius as an appropriate antipode). Perhaps also, the 135

aristocratic pretensions of the Apollo cult excited his ire; unconsciously, of course, as he ostensibly exhibited a general respect for the aristocratic "blond beasts". Or perhaps he demonstrated a touch of that

"self-loathing" he so aptly criticized in others; perhaps his frustration with the Hermes-inspired bourgeoisie clouded his perception. Bourgeois values quite sensibly erect a defensive wall to protect the individual and family from Dionysian frenzy. Modern society's abstractions were increasingly Dionysian, hence the bourgeois urge towards psychic security

(self-defense) which has always troubled the Romantics.

It is also surprising that he failed to realize that modern market organization rendered material benefits more powerful, more compelling, than the comparitively illusory pleasures of the will to political domination displayed by the aristocratic warrior. Perhaps Nietzsche himself was truly the last

"Protestant theologian", not Hegel, as he suggested

(this is, unfortunately, not true; hence the motivation for this essay).

Nevertheless, the implication of his nihilism was a new direction, not a regression. The realization that "God is dead" implied freedom from the old 136

orthodoxies. Our task was to revalue everything, not in imitation of the tired clericisms of the past, and not guided by the innocent impressions of an autonomous reason, but rather by understanding the strengths which served as our real propellants in the past.

The strengths of the master's consciousness, not the herd instinct of the slavish conscience, would lead us to our various individual actualizations of self-mastery. That anything so obvious could be ignored should make us suspicious. That the academic clerics of the twentieth century could actually construct an ontological edifice based on the exact opposite presupposition evokes a sentiment considerably stronger than suspicion.

Nietzsche astutely identifies the source of the problem as priestly conceptions of petty moralism, the hand-wringing "pious illusions" of "theologians" and "Church Fathers".

The really great haters in the history of the world have always been priests, who are also the cleverest haters••• 9

Nietzsche believed that the entire basis of our morality was in error, formed by "reactive" types 137

who developed elaborate codes of metaphysical morality in order to veil the spontaneous passions which actually motivate us. He saw the moralists' attempt to separate the "good" from the "bad" in history, the proclivity to redeem history rather than attempt to understand it, as yet another religious veil created to hide our realities; an elaborate self-deception•

••• the word "good" is far from having any necessary connection with altruistic acts, in accordance with the superstitious belief of these moral philosophers•••holds that "moral", "altruistic", and "disinteresse" are concepts of equal value.10

•••morality consists of words and is among the coarser or more subtle deceptions (especially self-deceptions) which men practice.11

Amor fati, the essential aspect of the "eternal recurrence", implied that all events were of equal importance, regardless of our moralistic impressions.

The fratricide upon which Rome was founded and the rape of the Sabine women were as "morally" relevant/irrelevant as the transition from the kings to the republic, the founding of the Church, and the fall of Rome.

There is no such thing as moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena.12 138

Nietzsche also understood that the process of increasing individuation was the essential progression of our civilization, in contrast to the easy appeal of mystagogic collectivism which informed the cleric's moral appeal. Fascism (from fascio, the bundle, the collective) and communism/socialism have an ontological identity; they both descend from

Rousseau's unresolved confusion over the volonte de tous (the oxymoronic will of all individuals) and the volonte generale (general will). Their mutual proclivity for totalitarian methods was repeatedly denied by the academic clerisy until the facts became too obvious to refute. But they still renounce the ontological similarity; even the ostensibly anti-statist

Noam Chomsky expresses disbelief over the term "fascists of the left", naively assuming that these two words are incompatible, which echoes the academic's vain conception of the left and the right as opposite poles. 13 Our universal indignation and outrage over the Holocaust prompted the clerics to pretend that

it was not perpetrated by the National Socialists (a hallowed term), but rather by the fascists, a term originally identified with Mussolini's regime, which was distinguished by little else other than a rather 139

benign tolerance of Semites.

In contrast with the dominant clerisy, Nietzsche understood that our path led inexorably Beyond Good and Evil to the,

ripest fruit ••• the sovereign individual ••• the autonomous IIsuper-moral" individual {for lIautonomous" and II moralll are mutually exclusive terms).14

Although the young Marx might have agreed with this regard for the sovereignty of the individual, the intelligentsia would develop their appeal by denying it. Although probably prompted by confusion and naivete, their inclinations were certainly confirmed by the success of their teleological appeal to collectivism which would soon ensure their place in their most esteemed creation, the state bureaucracy

{despite the diversity of their various approaches, most twentieth century social scientists display an almost surreal respect for the institutions of the state and the proto-state, particularly in their historical analysis; although many claim descent through

Marx, this prejudice is pure Hegel with a dash of

Saint-Simon).15

According to Nietzsche, the IIherdll instinct 140

found its most perfect expression in the state, not culture, as some have erroneously implied. To some degree, Nietzsche sympathized with traditional culture, understanding that it led to individuation. He understood that mythology, religion, even morality as "mores" provided the sheltering cradle for valid individuation.

Nietzsche feared that nominally democratic institutions, although preserving the formal appearance of freedom, would eventually impose "herd" values on everyone, effectively overpowering the individual, which they ostensibly sanctified. In Thus Spake

Zarathustra, he warns that the "new idol", the state, would lure the people into the false worship of the new God. This would be accomplished by identifying the state with the people and the "good", while simultaneously encouraging the loss of self-identity,

...this lie crawls out of its mouth: I, the state, am the people.16

On earth there is nothing greater than I: the ordering finger of God am I--thus roars the monster.1?

As opposed to the positive aspect of nihilism, modernity's demand for revaluation, Nietzsche also 141

recognized the downside, the identification of the state and Culture, nationalism as jingoistic totalitarianism.

Nietzsche continually pointed to the inherent opposition of Culture and the state.

Like every organizing political power, the Greek polis was mistrustful of the growth of culture and sought almost exclusively to paralyse and inhibit it••• the education sanctioned by state law was intended to be imposed upon every generation and to rivet it to one stage of development•••This culture evolved in sprte of the polis.18

The market, like culture (perhaps one could even suggest that the market is, if not the flower, then certainly the roots of popular culture, together with the common law which helps foster it), has always developed most impressively in the absence of a strong central government. Nietzsche echoed this fear of the state's proclivity to strangle individual freedom, originally delineated by both deTocqueville and the

British Whigs, of the "tyranny of the majority",

Liberal institutions cease to be liberal as soon as they are attained: later on, there are no worse and no more thorough injurers of freedom than liberal institutions.19 142

Nietzsche identifies the "despotic" element implicit in democracy, and to an even greater degree, socialism, with the tendency to divert our attention from freedom to the illusory panaceas ("diverted resentiment") of social "justice" and income equality (cf. Hayek's Law,

Liberty and Legislation for the same insight from a completely different perspective).

Considering Nietzsche's regard for both culture and the individual, it is difficult to understand his inability to perceive the empowering qualities of liberal capitalism, unless we consider his own clinging vestige of clericalism, the condemnation of plebian desires for equality attained largely by the "rising tide" of material benefits engendered by the market.

In some ways, Nietzsche himself was reduced to a blushing schoolboy (the red-cheeked beast?), yearning for the philosopher to transubstantiate the "stuff" of Western civilization, and doubting whether he, himself, was up to the task. Instead, an eclectic mob of "Zarathustrian apes" created their own values, concentrating on ·our eternal desire for "more" (what did he expect? the cat was out of the bag!).

But, we should not overlook the prophetic instincts of this mad philologist. He seems to be 143

speaking of a liberalism which had not even come into existence yet, although the perceptive observer might have noticed the almost unconscious combination of

Christian piety and hubristic reason in the historicism of nineteenth century Continental scholarship (cf. the Younger Historical School, that German movement which had the most profound, yet almost unrecognized, influence on the twentieth century university).

Nietzsche's condemnation is directed more towards twentieth century Anglo-American liberalism. His critique seems to preview the statist welfare liberalism which would replace the classical libertarian, liberalism of the eighteenth century, which actually resonated with, and ultimately confirmed his essential realizations. He astutely perceived the nascent beginnings of this constrictive utilitarianism in the writings of the British rationalists (cf. J. Bentham and J.S. Mill). A consistent reading of his respect

for both individualism and his respect for the wisdom of the marketplace offers a compelling argument in

favor of this interpretation. Even his haughty, "People don't care about

happiness, only Englishmen do," playfully confirms

his power of prophecy.20 Within a century of his death, 144

there would be more people studying English in China than both England and North America combined; and for the very reason that he was attempting to disparage

(but also instinctively recognized); they are learning

English to trade, often with the Japanese, with whom they share both an underlying cultural similarity and a common written script, but are unable to communicate verbally except with the common language of twentieth century avarice. Desire has always been the universal psychological impulse. Evidently, now we are all learning to spell it the same \vaY--"I--w-a-n-t".

The love of victim status, so characteristic today, could only have been perceived by a true prophet when only its barest foreshadowings were becoming evident. Nietzsche associated it with the "morality of pity" and astutely perceived its beginnings in the

"explosive emotionalism" and "introspective morbidity" characteristic of academic moralists.

I saw the great danger of mankind•••the beginning of the end, stability, the exhaustion that gazes backward, the will turning against Life••• I realized that the morality of pity which spread wider and wider, and whose grip infected even philosophers with its disease, was the most sinister symptom of our modern European civilization.21 145

Marx had revealed the way that idealism, despite its pretensions, actually evolved from our material circumstances. Nietzsche attacked idealism from the other side, from the "pyschological" perspective.

He realized that "ideals" mislead us, they betray us, into believing that there is some higher purpose external to our nature. Whether that "higher goal" is prescribed by religion (theology) or some universal purpose described by philosophy (ideology) is ultimately irrelevant. The moralists, of all stripes, would have us believe that we can attain perfection by the pursuit and ultimate realization of some ideal. Nietzsche suggests that the vanity of higher purpose itself must be overcome; that we must remember that Man created ideals to serve himself. Apollonian wisdom is oppressed by the weight of the transcendent. The Dionysian "free spirit" mocks the very concept of wisdom, realizing that it is only his own shadow, a self-created reflection of his own desires.

It is unfortunate that no one has combined the insights of Marx and Nietzsche. Nietzsche's aversion to plebian desire for material gain prevented him from accomplishing "the Fearful Deed" himself.

One would like to imagine that Marx would have been 146

better suited to the task, but perhaps it required the real-time experiments of the twentieth century to reveal the obvious. In the German Ideology, his declaration of autonomy from the other "Young Hegelians" of the 1840's, Marx devotes 60 pages to Feuerbach,

20 to Bruno, and 320 to Max Stirner, Nietzsche's predecessor who first formulated the idea that our actual exigencies would be found inside, not forced from outside, the single, real individual. He was one of the first to systematically address the fact that altruism and the "good" are not necessarily synonomous. Assuming that our ire is usually attracted to the most compelling competition, we have to conclude that Marx felt most deeply threatened by the one thesis that might have complemented his own. Despite some recognition of the critical importance of individual

sovereignty revealed in the early Marx, he fell prey, more easily than Nietzsche and Stirner, to the reigning orthodoxy of mystagogic collectivism guided by facile

Christian assumptions of the "good."

Their mutual inability to connect the dots

should not prevent us from linking methodological

individualism, partly buried in Marx but overwhelming

in Nietzsche; materialism, obvious in Marx, but only 147

implied in Nietzsche's critique of idealism; and the affirmation of life embodied in the desire for self-actualizing Power, expressed as the final victory of the proletariat by Harx and implied by the ubermensch

(Overman) in Nietzsche.

Only iconoclasts like Marx and Nietzsche, largely free of the institutional moralism which predetermined the thinking of most secular clerics, could have contributed anything of significance to our unfolding story. And yet, even they were not completely free of it. Marx understood the determinate importance of materialism, the historical primacy of the working masses over elitist dominance, and the teleological relevance of the individual. His failure was to surrender to the easy allure of a chimerical collective, combined with the inadequacy of nineteenth century economics.

Nietzsche understood the foolishness of the collectivist appeal, the importance of admitting to, and working with our chaotic strengths, and the absolute primacy of the individual. Yet, he failed to see how the masses preferred confirmation of those values in the material realm, once again confirming the Mind's

Gnostic aversion to the sensual and to the material. 148

If we substract their own lingering vestiges of clerical prejudice, and then combine the insights of both, we begin to comprehend the confusion inspired by late twentieth century political contradictions.

The Ubermensch, or Overman, has always been one of Nietzsche's most controversial insights, inspiring the same degree of pyschological terror as

Marx's claim for the ultimate dictatorship of the proletariat. The essential relevance for the late twentieth century is the, by now obvious, fact that if we do not become "Supermen" (Overmen), we will continue to subject ourselves to the whim of every tyrant, charlatan, or demagogue able to make a convincing case for the stewardship of our conscience.

If there were a consistent community based ethos, such as Christianity partially provided in the past, to safeguard our independence, it would not be so neccessary. But, this is the late twentieth century.

We have abandoned the traditional sentinels of the past; whether that was wise or not can be debated endlessly, but it is certainly too late to go back now.

Our History is linear, in the sense that time itself determines that there is only one direction, 149

forward. Fear of the future fills us with dread, even as we hurriedly push on. That is to be expected.

This ambivalence has always marked the parameters of our pointless quest. Appeals to varying conceptions of "virtue", ahlays located in the recesses of our past, fallon deaf ears.

This is not meant to suggest that "virtue" should somehow be transcended, but rather that our moralistic "conceptions" of virtue are often marked by contradiction, hence, ultimately, unvirtuous. Vico's insight, expanded by Hume, preserved by the Scottish philosophers (Smith, Ferguson), and kept alive in the twentieth century by the Austrian economists, that our imaginations, inevitably driven by concupiscence, are only capable of desiring some petty selfish goal, some silly utility. But, when constrained and guided by Culture's advice on social interaction (which we have slowly compiled in the forms of language, law, and the rules of exchange), our particular aims are transformed into universal ends. Our Nietzschean

"propellants" will never be eliminated, except by death, either physical or cultural. As Nietzsche realized better than any before, our Minds easily succumb to clerical conceptions of the "Good," well-intended, 150

but ultimately self-destructive. VIII. UTOPIAN MORALISM

Hurry along as fast as you can and don't take no cut-offs. Virginia Reed of the Donner party

Desperate contingencies have often been our best tutor. The first part of the aphorism mentioned above is merely an accurate description of our journey, the second is sound advice.' Driven by the whips of our own concupiscence, we have always hurried along.

In this sense, we are all radicals, and always have been; desire is impatient, almost by definition. But this impatience also constitutes its own inherent danger, which our various homilies have continually warned us of--the essential "moral" of most parables.

The simplest way to ensure that we do not attain the objects of our desire is to surrender to this impatience. It is expressed in the modern era by the radical's universal desire for bypassing the essential determinants of our Humanity with some kind of short-cut. The puerile call for the "total transformation of society" exemplifies this proclivity perfectly. Although we could never stop "feeling radical," if we want to progress beyond the purity of our intent to the self-actualizing power spawned

151 152

by real results, \'le need to remember to "think conservatively." Burke would have been a far more informative guide to nineteenth century radical plans than the impatient angst of its leading theoreticians.

The ability to distinguish between the alterable aspects of the "superstructure II and the seemingly impregnable resistance of the lIinfrastructure ll is the key to effecting significant social change. The infrastructure changes slowly. It requires the gradual erosion of deep-seated cultural determinants, and the transitions are measured in generations, or even centuries.

Conversely, elements of the superstructure can be altered more easily, and the changes can be measured in months or years. Many well-intentioned people's inability to discern the difference has probably caused more human misery than all the lI evil" tyrants in history.2

This dilemma is also the basis for our confusion towards the concept of morality. Its original meaning, the customs which evolved organically in tandem with the growth of civilization, implies that the IImoresll of a group are Culture's way of communicating with the people. It should be respected because of its ontological power, but that does not imply that it 153

should be slavishly obeyed as the conservatives insist

(although they are partially correct in insisting that we let Culture lead the way, since It has repeatedly proven to be much better suited to the task than we are). The other, more commonly used modern sense of the word, implies the Christian ethical paradigm which has informed Western civilization for the last two millenia. This sense must also be respected, for two thousand years represents a significant constructive influence. However, we must realize that Christian piety is much more recent than our basic hearth laws and is, therefore, more easily altered. This adaptability is even more relevant for the more recent

Christian surrogates such as socialism and statist liberalism. Although the conservatives drag their feet in resistance to any alteration of either of these moralities, the "Big Brother" liberals actually shoot their own feet.

Our deep cultural mores evolved over thousands of years in the small band. Modernity has demanded changes so that we can adapt to the opportunities presented, and generally, embraced, by the extended order of the world family. Luckily, we do not have to "think" about it, we can just let it happen. Our 154

concupiscence (Culture's favorite advisor on the needs of humanity, indeed, all forms of Life) has led us past far greater obstacles. The reason that Lockean,

Anglo-American liberal capitalism is so widely admired and imitated by such diverse societies around the world is that this has proven to be the best adaptation (and spur) to modernity; guided by impersonal and abstract rules rather than personal values, because the personal is inherently biased, partial, inequitable, hence inefficient.

Inexplicably, the modern liberal manages to combine the worst forms of both definitions of the

"moral," employing the ecclesiastical, in-your-face moralizing of the Puritan witch-hunter and the supposed

"radicalism" of the Communist true-believer in the vain attempt to resurrect the collectivist mores of the authoritarian small band, a morality which is no longer necessary, hence no longer sacred. This is a profoundly conservative reaction, especially when compared to the "soft" radicalism of Culture, which, although slow to change, is perfectly capable of radical transitions when necessary, and is currently guiding us through the treacherous shoals which delineate the route between the small band and the extended modern 155

order. Life has been evolving in response to radical changes for millions of years. Evolution, later

Culture, has been leading us by the hand, the extended hand of concupiscent aspiration, through incredibly radical changes (if the difference between tree dwelling primates and modern humans is not radical, what is?) for thousands of generations. Our nostalgic reactions, both conservative and radical, merely express our dread of the future.

Are we so sure of ourselves that we want to second guess God and Nature and Fate and Evolution and Culture? Are we so sure of the derivatives our hubristic reason has distilled from Christian piety that we will use them to overrule Culture's suggestions for adapting to the widely-embraced pleasures and freedoms of modernity's extended order? Have we really progressed to the point where the most compelling metaphor for our social and political activities is expressed by the self-destructive perseverance of Wiley

Coyote; the more we try, the more we lose.

Although we should always remind ourselves to beware of the enticing simplicity of "cut-offs," considering our recent history, it appears that we cannot help but "hurry along". It appears that we 156

are currently in the process of transitioning into our next phase. The Church and priest served their function in our history and were replaced, reluctantly, by the state and secular cleric. Our current evolution is now being retarded by the academic moralists and the state bureaucracy. We might perceive the reason for this resistance to be rooted in the moral prejudices of the foregoing era inappropriately applied to a new situation, or the consciously hypocritical defense of elitist self-interest, but it probably involves an almost unconscious combination of both. 3

This essay has suggested that the statist, clerical stage is merely the last sub-phase of the more dominant Christian era which has dominated our civilization for the last two millenia. We are now evolving into a more autonomous form of anarchistic individualism. The assumption is based on two compelling observations. The first is that the new phase enhances and promotes most of the essential promises of all earlier stages of evolution, most especially those affirmed by the recent modulations of the preceeding era. The second is that it excites the most outrageous criticism from the reigning orthodoxy; whatever most upsets the status quo probably 157

represents the essential vision of the future, particularly when there is no inherent disagreement with the stated intentions of the existing order, when it is merely a continuing fulfillment of the existing

"promise."

The Nietzschean-Marxist synthesis explicated here resembles its supposed opposition, Humean empiricism, and its descendant via Locke and Smith,

Anglo-American liberal capitalism. Perhaps, we have all been saying the same thing, after all.

It also fullfills the Christian promise of an individual definition of God. Most religions were tribal and rooted in a particular place, the fatherland.

Our Judaic mentors progressed from the spatial to the temporal definition of God, wandering through the desert with their Ark, untied to a specific homeland (the ironies never cease, the first documented examples of "ethnic cleansing" are to be found in the Bible, when the Hebrews "transcended" their greatest insight and impatiently seized their "homeland"; if the young

Adolph had missed Bible class, would we have been spared the "final solution"?). But, Christianity contributed the second significant step from tribalism to cosmopolitan universalism (the fundamental break, when 158

this Jewish sect emerged and became "Christian," occurred with the realization that even Gentiles could become "Jewish" (i.e. Christian); Paul and the other cosmopolitans prevailed over the "Galileans," and did not insist on circumcision, dietary restrictions and other restraints of Jewish law).

The essential contradiction in Christianity was the formalization of this universalism, initiated and eventually completed, when Paul, Augustine,

Constantine, and finally, Theodosius, made Christianity the state religion of Rome. By abandoning the individual foundation which authenticates real universalism, Christianity consolidated its small advance and simultaneously surrendered any hope of transcendent completion. Culture found this quite sensible; It knows that the one thing we have plenty of, is time.

Even before the Christian era, Socrates foreshadowed the essential elements of our future.

He confirmed the content of Athens' democratic ideals by "dying for his country," rather than participating in an easily arranged escape, while simultaneously defying the hollow form of the statist's insistence on conformity by refusing to except exile. Unlike 159

Rousseau and the modern clerics, he refused to surrender the dignity of the individual to tribal conceptions of the public interest.

Luther defended the individual's dialogue with

Divinity from the City of God corporatism personified by the Medieval Church. The essential intent of the post-Enlightenment radicals was to promote individual self-empowerment. Although both the Reformation and progressivism, like the Church before them, partially succumbed to various versions of mystagogic collectivism, this contradiction should not cloud the essential thrust of their movement, the continuing delineation of the individual as the seat of all meaning and value. Twentieth century insights (Freud,

Wittgenstein, Heidegger) continued in the same direction, confirming subjective sovereignty.

All of these trends are ostensibly pursued by the modern academy and supposedly enshrined as the objectives of the state. The unfortunate reality is that actually the University and the state are the greatest obstacles to the continuance of this evolution.

When the methodology employed begins to oppose the stated objectives, we know we are dealing with

Contradiction with a capital C. The state bureaucrats, 160

in conjunction with the University clerisy, vociferously mount defenses to prevent us from realizing the obvious conclusions to their most hallowed claims. As Nietzsche warned us, they justify their work in the name of morality. The economic reason is the preservation of class interest. The metaphysical means of justification is the perversion of inconsistencies implicit in that prior definition of morality. This problem was negligible in the time of Hesiod, and merely problematic in the nineteenth century. Society was not nearly wealthy enough to indulge such vanities. But, particularly in the last quarter century, it has reached the level of Compelling Contradiction.

Liberal bourgeois capitalism has resisted the assaults of clerical denunciation for almost two hundred years. In the post-war era it has proven its efficacy beyond any shadow of doubt, but is still resisted by the self-induced blindness of religious fanaticism which typifies the academic perspective. It does not solve all problems immediately, as the clerics continually remind us. But we never asked for tran~cendental perfection. We only asked for improved material freedoms. It works better than any other 1 61

"system" we have contrived and is quite elastic in its demands. The "bourgeois" requirements have become soft enough to accomodate the wealthy homosexual communities of the West and the Oriental extended family, confirming Adam Smith's fear of the "soft virtues" and simultaneously, not to mention paradoxically, affirming his faith in capitalism.

We have so many real-time experiments that prove its superiority over socialism that the academic insistence to the contrary is approaching the absurd; a child clinging to its security blanket arouses our sympathy, but does not inspire confidence as a guide to the future.

By now it is obvious that socialism was not a step forward into the future, but the most reactionary attempt to recreate the illusions of the past. It is ironic, but the histories of Russia, China, Mexico and Vietnam suggest that pre-modern societies progressing to the modern use authoritarian socialism as a stepping stone to libertarian capitalism rather than vice versa as Marx suggested. Perhaps this was appropriate. Despite the conservatives' criticisms, perhaps it was the easiest and fastest way to make the transition. A consistent conservative should hardly 162

need reminding to respect the power of the Leibnitzian

"real", of the "actual", that freighting metaphor of history which Pangloss, in his "idiocy", actually 4 appreciated more fully than voltaire.

Although "r1arxism" is hardly spoken out loud anymore (even clerics are partially influenced by reality), the collectivist perseveration on "perfect" justice and equality remains the dominant metaphor informing most academic social analysis.

The irony is that the harshest criticisms of the anarchy of the market come from the wealthiest societies. Only a society which has already "proven" the efficiency of the market engenders the classes capable of this kind of transcendental self-loathing.

When pedestrians complain about the injustice of shipping traffic we can chalk it up to the natural envy of the unenfranchised. But when the passengers are the only ones suggesting that boats are no longer necessary, it is difficult to decide whether their comments are motivated by the purest idiocy or the most subtle form of self-interest.

These observations are not intended to suggest that liberal capitalism is in any way "ethically" superior to rational redistribution alternatives such 163

as socialism. It is only suggested that it "\'Jorks" better. Max Weber attempted to drape transcendental robes on the "Protestant work ethic". Other clerics have defined "bourgeois" in similar ways. But, these metaphysical confusions are as unneccessary as they are interesting. This is not a teleologiocal issue; it is merely a practical one. If one wants to grow corn, it is useless to complain that corn will not grow on rocks. One simply prepares the soil in a way that accomodates the corn's growth. If a society wants the material advantages engendered by capitalism, it must provide the proper environment. If we think of it in terms of pleasing capital rather than pleasing capitalists, we can eliminate the personalized envy that often clouds our perception. Capital has its own rules. It likes to grow. Capitalists are simply the people who recognize this reality and accomodate themselves to it.

Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan are only a few examples of "third world" countries \"hich have provided a conducive environment and consequently attracted sufficient capital to provide economic growth for their people

"key" ingredient; nor should vle be confused by the clerical insistence that it was central planning which accounted for their success; the "\vise" bureaucrats at Japan's MITI actually tried to "abolish" Honda in order to "assist" Nissan, Toyota and Hitsubishi, yet Honda has become the most wildy successful of the four).5

Many other countries, often influenced by the socialism of western clerics, did not provide this environment and then looked for exogenous reasons to explain their failure. Again following the lead of modern clerics, they posited racism and imperialism in the guise of dependency theory as the functional excuse for their failure to attract capital. These excuses were emotionally satisfying, in that one could pin the "blame" on foreigners, but they did not contribute to the economic well-being of their societies. Capital is always somewhat "imperialistic" in that it demands a share of the profits as compensation for its risk. Individual capitalists naturally hope and plan for this share to be as high as possible. Resisting their greed by seeking alternative sources of capital was the solution, but pretending that capital could be attracted without 165

respecting its demands was absurd.

Reality has far outstripped our perceptions.

The fundamental antagonism toward capitalism is based on the idea that the people are somehow excluded from this elitist conspiracy. This attitude was perhaps somewhat legitimate, in that the scarcity of capital in the nineteenth century demanded strict forms of conservatorship in order to husband this valuable resource. The roles are reversed now, highly qualified labor is in greater demand than capital (remember, that half-billion dollar a year man, Michael Milken, was a "worker," as are many of our "fat-cats"). Capital is everywhere, and it is relatively cheap. Our bias is based on outmoded nineteenth century perceptions, as are many of our economic attitudes. Most of us still perceive international trade in terms of minerals, automobiles, and other tangibles. Actually, international financial transactions account for over twenty times the trade in real goods.

With the exception of some academics, the vitality of capitalism is now taken for granted throughout the world. Latin American countries such as Mexico, Chile and Argentina have reconciled themselves to the exigencies of modern capitalism in 166

order to achieve the economic growth which all ideologies have promised, but only capitalism has delivered with any regularity. The East bloc nations, having suffered through the real life horrors of socialized planning, have embraced market exchange without any of the metaphysical doubts which seem to plague the clerics of wealthy capitalist countries.

In Czechoslovakia, one of the main political debates 6 is between the Hayekians and the Friedmanites. Milton

Friedman is a "student" of Friedrich Hayek; they both endorse an almost radical version of the free-market paradigm. The fact that the Czechs could posit the limits of their discussion between the poles of two

"free-market" capitalists reveals that their preference

for the market over rational redistribution is unequivocal.

The philosophes, and their heirs, looked behind

the veil of Christianity and discovered that the moral defenses of Christian life consisted of superstitious

lies. Like proud children with exciting new discoveries, they ran home with each bold revelation

exposing the artificiality of traditional society.

Of course, they were "right". But, they missed the 167

essential point. r.1orality is always a "lie". t10rality is not ordained by God. It is carefully constructed by Culture as practical advice, disguised under the veil of transcendental "truth". The dictates of traditional morality are expressions of the "easiest" path, as discovered by countless generations of experience. Custom does not say, "Deviate from these rules and God will punish you", although it is usually phrased that way, particularly in the Christian West.

Properly interpreted, Custom suggests, "stray from this path at your own peril: We have tried everything and Our way involves the least amount of psychic stress; it is the easiest, the surest way". If the clerics really had the courage to face the implications of their realization that "God is Dead", thi:;: would have been obvious. But, evidently, we were not quite ready to face the reality that the security of our Christian era was ending.

The essential characteristic of our transitions is that the old myths no longer work and therefore we are forced to seek new paths, albeit fearfully and unwillingly. These explorations always involve significant amounts of pain and waste as we attempt various "solutions". Culture avoids this unless it 168

is absolutely necessary because discovering a new mythos is not easy, as the trauma of modernity confirms.

Christian morality has "''lorked'' in a pragmatic way for two millenia. It is no longer tenable, as Nietzsche realized a century ago. One does not have to be a prophet to realize this now.

The modern cleric, concentrating on the transcendental "appearance" of Christian moralism, has denied the transcendental truth (rightfully so;

God is an invention spawned by our fear), but has recapitulated the same problem by attempting to modernize the transcendental message. This proclivity to see God's work everywhere, the attempt to redeem history rather than understand its compelling motives is merely a continuation of the Christian paradigm, appropriate in its time but useless now. A secondary irony of failing to appreciate the pragmatic intent of morality is the simultaneous loss of the practical benefits of the "illusion" (unfortunate; God is a fiction, but a productive one).

The essential lesson of modernity is that political philosophy is not a moral quest in search of transcendental Truth and Justice. It is purely practical; more like a wager than a holy war. The 169

only goal is to find the most efficient way to allow

the individual the greatest degree of freedom, usually

achieved by letting him pursue his own path. To

paraphrase Pericles, the individual can be trusted,

let him alone. The "good" and "evil" of Christian moralism have become outdated. We obviously need to move on. But, the clerics cannot lead the way. They

are emotionally and intellectually unsuited to the

task.

Culture always determines our direction,

following its gut as well as its mind, perhaps inspiring

Pliny the Younger's, "In the body politic, as in the

natural, those disorders are most dangerous that flow

from the head."7 The temple has its rightful place;

on the hill, the ivory tower. Our recent attempts

to make the academy more relevant have backfired.

First, it betrays the essence of the spiritual quest

by encumbering it with practical relevance. Secondly,

and more importantly for society at large, its

spiritualization of purely laical concerns diverts

our material desires from their natural fulfillment

by confusing them with ambivalent notions of

transcendence. It is important to keep metaphysics

where it belongs and let the marketplace, with its 170

attendant street wisdom, determine the requirements of the profane mundanities of our social existence.

This essay has suggested that the seminal

tendency of Western culture is individualism.

Individual sovereignty, freed from elitist prescription, allows concupiscent desire to pursue its materialist

path uninhibitedly. The rest is commentary. The hedonism of Pop culture supports this analysis. Perhaps one of the few American exports which still commands respect throughout the world, Pop bypasses multicultural hand-wringers as it rapidly induces the world's youth

into a monoculture of individualized consumerism.

We might complain that the monoculture hardly reveals many aspects of "true" individualism and that the

consumerist frenzy mocks the legitimate yearnings of

our materialist desire for better circumstances. Both

of these reactions are partially true and wholly

irrelevant. Regardless of our various ideological

stripes, we are not totalitarians (except perhaps in

our dreams). No one would seriously suggest that we

forcibly rip them from their rock 'n roll concerts

and make them listen to opera. They have "chosen". 171

Like all animate life, we are insatiable. t1aterial desire has no "end". .There is no finality to our quest, no place where we can pretend to stop and proclaim, "Eureka". Hmvever, we are also quite adaptable and if circumstances dictate, we can scale back our expectations. But, only material reality has that power. We are not likely to listen to the cleric's cry of "wolf". Only "real" limits have the power to restrain us.

Intellectual angst laments that our consumerist escape from the "realm of necessity" into the "realm of freedom" hardly fullfills Marx's expectations.

That is true, but also irrelevant, for the same reasons listed above. We can ease the contradictions of the present, but we can never be certain as to where it will lead us. For better or worse, this is the path that we have chosen. We hardly need to marshall three millenia's worth of metaphysical hermeneutics to predict yesterday's weather. A simple glance around the room should suffice to reveal that some things are obvious.

Marginals from Macoa to Macao are revealing the same preferences for Coca-cola, blue jeans, rock 'n roll, and "I Love Lucy" reruns that contemporary Westerners do. The ascetic elitism of the clerical ideal might 172

find this proud concupiscence offensive, but clearly, the rest of the world does not.

We should remember that this is the first time in history that the masses have "spent" the excess.

Traditionally, we have forced that onus on some elite group, usually warrior or priest, to expiate the guilt of indulgence. Although we still do not admit it, we have "materially" realized that Adam never fell.

We no longer feel compelled to renounce our wealth and desire for more, judging ourselves with some patriarchal projection of our fear of that same desire for "more." vIe are no longer ashamed to indulge the excess ourselve, in spite of the clerical exhortations to the contrary. That our spending frenzy might result in tasteless pap is to be expected. An aesthetic capable of discrimination takes time to develop.

Perhaps we should even be more careful in our dismissal of popular culture. The novel was originally shunned as a plebian vulgarity. During the Tokugawa shogunate, the daimyos were continually reissuing edicts prohibiting the lower classes (all but the Samurai warriors) from indulging any extravagance beyond essential subsistence. Ignoring the prohibitions with a multitude of clever evasions, the merchant class 173

used their increasing wealth to support ukiyo-e, the wood-block prints which would greatly influence late nineteenth century Western art, and kabuki, the wildly extravagant theatre form which would inspire Sergei

Diaghilev and his Ballet Russe to reinvent twentieth century theatricality for the Western world. These plebian art forms were shunned as vulgar--so too, the

Impressionists and theatrical modernism in their time--by the ruling elite, the Samurai, whose own artistic tastes suffocated under endless refinements of the ossified Noh tradition.

Who can know, or even guess, where this

Dionysian excess might eventually lead? It seems unlikely that we will all become perennially opiated on visions of Vanna White, but our emergence will more

likely be measured in generations rather than years.

We should remember that the cathedral at Chartres did not emerge from the waves, Venus-like, in virginal

perfection. Its foundation of hardship and privation, while perhaps not as banal as modern pop, was considerably uglier.

William Blake's advice might be pertinent, not only the obvious reference concerning the roads

of excess leading to the palace of wisdom, but perhaps 174

the more relevant, "Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse an unfulfilled desire."B Our history is one of discovering new desires. who can even imagine, much less predict, the consummation of this constant craving? IX. THE SIXTIES

Every revolution evaporates and leaves behind only the slime of a new bureaucracy. Franz Kafka

The 1960's are often invoked as a symbol of revolution and change. This era is remembered as a challenge to bourgeois values. With the advantage of perspective spawned by a quarter century's distance, it is now clear that actually, it was of, by, and for the bourgeoisie.

This was never in doubt for black Americans.

Their struggle was defined by the attempt to attain the promises of bourgeois life. As such, this movement was not radical in any historical sense. It was merely the continuation of the American paradigm, where privilege had diffused from the land-owning elite, to all men, to all women, to all minorities (however imperfectly).

The youth rebellion of the sixties was more significant in terms of its historical implications, in that these upper-middle class children represented the cutting edge, the avant-garde, of modern culture.

Despite our pretenses to the contrary, the youth movement was essentially an expansion of bourgeois

175 176

determinants; a revision and a modernization, not a challenge.

The bourgeois revolution began in the eighteenth century in an ultimately successful attempt to wrest power from the landed gentry. It reached several plateaus along the way, but none more "complete" than the post-war America environment where it attained, at least, the priorities it was capable of imagining.

Although far from "perfect attainment", the majority of American middle-class families had escaped the poverty of their immigrant grandparents and enjoyed a rising tide of expectations that appeared to be unlimited. Although to a lesser degree, this same situation was echoed in the other modern areas of the world. The children of this bourgeois "fulfillment" carne of age in the 1960's.

Responding to the realities of their existence, sixties' youth set about transforming the bourgeois paradigm, adjusting its parameters to suit their needs and desires. Bourgeois "morals" were modified and expanded to suit changing perceptions engendered by increased wealth. There were many contradictions and much that could be characterized as thymotic tantrum, but the seminal trends were natural responses to changed 177

circumstances.

We naturally tend to admire a "poor" man who rises at dawn to tend his garden, and suspect a "rich" man of psychopathic tendencies if he displays the same frugal work ethic. The children of this era truly were richer than their Depression reared parents; naturally they perceived the world differently.

Homosexuality, evolving images of the gender-appropriate, a more hedonistic approach to various sensual pleasures, and a desire to determine our own social parameters all exemplified logical extensions of the basic middle-class ideal, given the circumstances of the time.

Considerable confusion was engendered by the merging of the Marxian definition of "bourgeois" and the rather nebulous fashion in which we defined it in the sixties. For the young radical, bourgeois meant two cars and 2.2 children in the suburbs. These constraints appeared oppressive and when we confronted the paradigm, we intended to stretch it, to "loosen it up". The Marxian definition implied private ownership, the entrepreneurial spirit, and a life directed towards consumerism. Despite our affectations, we really had no problem with these bourgeois 178

determinants. We were not opposed to the market in any real sense. We were as consumerist as our parents, just better at it, more discriminating and consequently less biased against foreign products. Our first income was often spent on Japanese stereos and motorcycles, and our purchases of various intoxicants did more for

Latin American balance of payments than all the

Dependency theorists combined. Nor did we really object to the entrepreneurial spirit. Both our dealers and our rock stars competed openly for our consideration with all the entrepreneurial zeal that they could muster.

External impressions of our significance were another factor contributing to the loss of our

anarchistic, libertarian ideals. The media were

intellectually unsuited to the difficult task of

explaining this phenomena to their readers with any

degree of subtlety and insight. Quotes from

"knowledgeable sources" was their metier. Eager for

the fifteen minutes of fame promised by Andy Warhol,

there were more than enough willing to put themselves

forward as "spokesmen". Consequently, the likes of

Abbie Hoffman and Tim Leary soon began systematizing

the sixties so the folks at home could understand what 179

their children were doing.

There were no "leaders" in the sixties. It just happened. Organizers were more pitied than admired. Few people ever tried LSD because of Leary's advice (more likely, their friend's advice); nor did they follow, in any real sense, the otherwise amusing antics of Abbie Hoffman. But the amorphous, anarchistic style of the era was easily sidetracked by media concern for the "real" story. This conceit embodies the history of social commentary; desire destroys its object.

The desire for the real story, unfortunately guided by inappropriate prejudices (in this case, a reliance on quotable sources; leaders; the elite who "know") guaranteed that they would miss any insights concerning this leaderless expression of populist angst that they might have otherwise stumbled upon.

Multiple contradictions were to be expected.

We claimed to be anti-materialist, but actually characterized it. We looked askance at our parent's popular entertainments, but practically invented Pop. In retrospect, it is obvious that the extent of our

"revolution" was little more than the preference for

MTV over the "I Love Lucy" show, the Grateful Dead rather than Tony Bennet. 180

But, pretending that these urges were nothing more than the conniption fits of a spoiled generation misses the mark. Just as the individual should acknowledge his dreams, yet refrain from listening to the specific content (advice), so too, the dominant culture is well advised to incorporate the vision of its youth without neccessarily responding to every specific complaint.

The issue then, is to interpret the "dream" of the sixties and identify the seminal strands. In retrospect, it appears to represent the continuing evolution of the expansion of "individualism" in Western culture, the rather natural progression of individual sovereignty, from its Greek and Judaeo-Christian roots, to an appropriate modern definition. The essential trends of this enhanced individual empowerment were expressed in the libertarian expansion of personal freedoms and the antinomian attack on statist moralism which sought to constrain those emerging freedoms.

The sixties' youth movement was the first populist revolt against the modern state to occur in a rich, successful society. The Free Speech Movement in Berkeley, in 1964, was directed against the bureaucratic rigidity of the university. This was 181

also the causus belli in Paris and Mexico City (this fact has not stopped the University from claiming the sixties as their own; reality rarely impresses the cleric). "Do not fold, spindle, or mutilate", the warning on the now outmoded computer program cards, was the updated version expressing the same sentiment of the early American flag logo, "Do not tread on me".

The dominant issue for college students in the sixties, the movement against the Vietnam war, was a challenge of the patriarchs' right to direct the fate of the nation's youth. Although usually phrased in terms of the immorality of the war, perhaps the underlying motivation was the dimly perceived reality that there was no "booty" to be gained. These were, after all, the children of the well-to-do. This was their inheritance at stake.

That they would drape their perceptions in the cloaks of Christian morality is understandable.

They had been raised on the unexamined pap of American television and the most common statement of their childhood was some variation of "It's not fair, Mommy".

Many critics have perceived the draft resistance in terms of cowardice. This is more lament than 182

description. The reason that all modern states use teenagers to fight wars is because children are too

"stupid" to be cowardly. This was especially true for post-war American youth, who were raised on World

War II nostalgia movies celebrating the glories of patriotic valor. Pain, suffering and death were for the "other guy". The early draft resisters were generally students with safe 2-S deferments, easily followed by graduate school or a conscientious objector essay to guarantee perpetual deferment. The Coast

Guard, Navy and Air Force were also alternatives.

If avoiding the bullets was truly their primary concern, middle class youth had much more effective means at their disposal. For better or for worse, draft resistance in the sixties was the purest expression of civic virtue that we have been treated to in the late twentieth century, although, naturally, the more traditional citizens viewed this resistance as the most profound betrayal of mother and country.

Although there had been unpopular wars before, and draft riots as well, this was the first time that a populist movement of the "enfranchised" had challenged the very legitimacy of the state to determine our direction. "Smash the State" embodied the true heart 183

of the sixties. Anarchism is the only political label that even comes close to describing a revolution that would be carried out by whomever showed up. Most of us perceived the strident attempts at organization by the SDS to be as outmoded and "fascistic" as the federal government's attempts to conscript us. Our few intellectual influences were more often literary than political. Kack Kerouac's description of America, that sense of, "wild, self-believing individuality" resonated more suggestively for us than any of the 1 more standard academic complaints. Proudhon and

Thoreau, not Marx and Lenin, were our inspirations

(or, as the popular poster playfully suggested, Groucho

Marx and John Lennon, not Charlie and Vlady).

The only significant insight of the sixties was that all "real" change was essentially cultural.

Political change was perceived as superficial, at best.

Usually it was merely the exchange of one elite for another. This insight was a significant accomplishment, combining the wisdom of the bourgeoisie (the ones who actually acomplished what Marx only dreamed of) and the instinctive desire for "improvement" characteristic of the revolutionary. For perhaps the first time in history, the people realized that there were many forms 184

of "oppression". ~'1ordsmiths and other demagogues could be as abusive as any other elite. We had finally learned that there was more than one way to get

"screwed." We were legitimately suspicious of anyone who tried to "moralize," telling us how to live our lives. The ego-maniacal extents to which the supposed

"leaders" of the sixties celebrated their own, personal good fortune at the expense of the "movement" proved this even more conclusively than the posturings of the main stream demagogues.

"All power to the people" expressed this amorphous desire for individualized self-direction, albeit in the trite and unreflective fashion of the times. Idealogues were pitied, and sometimes tolerated, but rarely admired. The perversions to which ideology

(and its parent, theology) had been employed were fairly obvious and, consequently, had little appeal. The

KGB, CIA, and SDS were practically indistinguishable, all relying on the force of authority. Politics was coercion, either physical or mental, and was therefore perceived as incapable of producing any lasting, significant change.

Unfortunately, we forgot this as we accomodated ourselves to adult responsibility. Children eventually 185

grow up and put away childish things. Paying home mortgages, raising children, and pursuing the careers necessary to support them forced us to decide just which aspects of the bourgeois ideal were capable of being jettisoned; very few, it turned out. Partially, it was this sense of "maturity" which suggested that we align ourselves with some existing power. The

liberal Democrats spoke the right language, hence we moved in that direction. This was unfortunate because

the interest group politics of the statist liberals was almost the exact opposite of our anarchic

individualist direction (not to imply that the archaic moralisms of the Republicans would have been any more appropriate).

One of the sillier euphemisms of the sixties was, "Don't trust anyone over thirty". In retrospect,

it has become the most prophetic. The warning was directed to ourselves. It was if we had a premonition

of what we might become as adults. Ideally, we would

retain the beneficent aspects of this popular revolt

and leave behind the childish tantrums as we matured into the gravitas of middle age. It now appears that

we have pursued the puerile, and forgotten the

significant. Impatient with the first stirrings of 186

adult responsibility, we too easily adopted the language of our parentis in loco, the academics, and began to express our own yearnings in terms of the academy's dominant orthodoxy, socialism.

Socialism's failure is ultimately tied to its inability to effectively transmit information. The market, with its price mechanism, is far better equiped to send the appropriate signals necessary for a functional society. Although this is obvious in the

"real world", both the family and the university are immune to this exigency. They are both essentially, and perhaps appropriately, socialistic. The first generation in the history of the world to attend university, en masse, it is understandable that these children, knowing only the family and the university, would adopt the essential outlook of socialist collectivism. This was further enhanced by "the cleric's intellectual preference for rational redistribution

(naturally, directed by the intelligentsia). Although our cultural radicalism was despised by the working class and despite the fact that we practically defined consumerism, we inadvertently adopted the socialist religion of the modern intellectual. It was mostly the fault of sloppy thinking, actually encouraged by 187

our supposed mentors. But, the essential contradiction was evident even then, usually embodied in the conflicts between the "hippies II (hedonistic consumerism) and the Ilradicals" (moralistic platitudes).

Our Luddite tendencies (back to the land,

"drop-out" of modern society) were, of course, profoundly conservative, but without guidance it was easy to pretend that we were challenging the very limits of the traditional. Although Max Weber would have laughed out loud to witness our perversion of his own, rather trite mythologizing, the association of the

"protestant work ethic" with the teleology of capitalism also reinforced our imagined antipathy (naturally, rich children have an intrinsic aversion to work).

In short, we became knee-jerk socialists. Got a problem? Anything from your girlfriend dumping you to failing a mid-term; it must be the fault of capitalism. Unlike our academic mentors, we had an excuse--we were young and often stoned.

Abbie Hoffman personifies this contradiction perfectly. A natural hustler-entrepreneur, brilliant at self-promotion, more than capable of extorting funds from even the most reluctant sources, and essentially committed to anarchistic cultural evolution, he 188

nevertheless assumed that the market was the enemy.

Although he probably belonged on Wall street or Madison

Avenue, he ended up espousing the kind of trite Marxist vulgarities which would have caused even an illiterate

Russian peasant to blush. This committment to an outmoded orthodoxy, inadequately expressing our own unique yearnings, was probably the greatest tragedy of the sixties.

In many ways, we recreated the recurring paradigm of twentieth century politics, individualist populism perverted by demagogic elitism. Authoritarian revolutionaries have always prevailed over libertarian radicals, as Marx's victory over Bakunin in the

International revealed as early as the mid-nineteenth century. Our anarchistic tendencies merged with the

Puritan witch-hunter from the depths of our national subconscious, and, emboldened by the Enlightenment's bureaucratic rationalism, produced a "hip" thought police; as if Dr. Benway (the control addict in William

Burroughs' The Naked Lunch) had abandoned his medical studies and pursued a degree in sociology instead.

We have unconsciously become "social engineers," incessantly moralizing (is there really much difference between Dan Quayle and Murphy Brown? They both volunteer 189

a profusion of unsought advice). The Puritanical

Righteousness of the dominant culture was our first

"dragon." "Ironic" is not strong enough to describe the fact that we have now become what we once despised.

Perhaps a distinction should be made between th~ sixties and the post-sixties. The sixties were an affirrn~tion nf lifp. ThA accent was on living one's own life, not criticizing others' life choices. The goal was to find our own definitions, not impose those concepts on others. The post-sixties moralists, merely invoke the sixties, like an icon, and with the same religious fervor. The fact that most of these Dr.

Benways are now partisans of the University, the very antithesis of the sixties, transcends mere irony and limps toward the sublime.

The most significant twentieth century revolution, the Russian revolution, was begun by bourgeois social democrats in the spring of 1917.

In the fall of 1917, the Kerensky government fell to the "Soviets" ("all power to the soviets"), not the

Bolsheviks as subsequent Communist mythology maintains.

The Soviets were worker councils, essentially anarchistic and populist; as Lenin realized, they were

far more radical than his own party of revolutionary 190

cadres. Although originally subservient to this

populist worker's movement, once the Bolsheviks had

consolidated power they ruthlessly eliminated any vestige of \vorker control, as the rlakhnovtchina and 2 Kronstadt incidents demonstrate.

The German Youth movement, a turn of the century

phenomena characterized by barefooted, long-haired,

guitar-playing youths who espoused the joys of free-love

and shunned the constraints of bourgeois life,

foreshadowed many of the essential components of the

sixties. As might be expected, by the 1920s, many

of these former "hippies" were social democrats

(Fabians, liberal socialists). Although rarely

discussed, by the mid-1930s, the majority of them were 3 National Socialists. These people did not become

"evil" in their middle age, but they did fail to guard

their ideals from the ravages of "fulfillment"~ as

the old saying reminds us, "Be careful what you ask

for, for you just might g~t it". Because National

Socialism spoke to them in the "right" language, they

overlooked the substantive realities which it promoted. The oral histories of the Spanish Civil War

reveal a similar innocence displayed by the Phalangist

youth. They were economic "radicals" (i.e. socialists), 191

but cultural conservatives (interestingly, the same terminology is used to describe the Clinton democrats).

They eventually supported Franco and are now remembered as a right-wing organization. But, even their worst critics recognized that their motivations were of the loftiest intent. The same purity of purpose is obviously true of the other more common, leftist variety. Even one of socialism's severest critics,

Ludwig von Mises, admitted that its motivation was

"grandiose," "magnificent," and "aroused the greatest admiration. ,,4

The illusory difference between the leftist and rightist forms of socialist collectivism, and the relative ease with which our political desires self-destruct in their attempts at actualization, is also exemplified by the Iron Guard in 1930's Romania.

It originally began as a pacifist youth organization, but eventually supported Hitler and ultimately participated in excesses that embarrassed even the

55.

The point is, that not only do socialism and fascism resemble each other in the totalitarian methods to which they ultimately often resort, but, perhaps more importantly, they share the same ontology. They 192

both begin with the grandest and noblest desire for

"betterment," perverted primarily by their naive faith

in the "public good," as if we could ever agree over

something so personal or disagree about something which

seems so obvious. This paradoxical faith spawns a

rather nebulous imprecision in our aspirations, and upon these rocks, the naive faith of youth often

founders. As creative writers know, most plays and novels, as models of life, are about wanting something; when the writer is unclear in visualizing this object of desire, the story meanders and eventually

self-destructs. Perhaps our political desires require

the same sense of accuracy.

Although it is still difficult to adequately explain how the anarchistic thrust of this popular movement was sidetracked, the Grand Inquisitor's insight

that we do not really want freedom, but prefer our

self-created shackles, is a compelling argument.

There are certainly other, more obvious and more optimistic, aspects of our long story. The various

freedoms available to the individual, both material

and social, have grown continuously over the ages.

Even if one does not completely agree with Hobbes' 193

characterization of pre-civilized life as "nasty, short, and brutish", no one would seriously argue with the essential premise that our material existence is much easier today that at anytime in the past. The advances

of the last two hundred years have contributed to these

enhanced individual freedoms. Our philosophical meanderings, of whatever ideological stripe, have all

agreed on the sanctity of the individual. Kant's

"categorical imperative", Romanticism's emphasis of

personalized meaning, Marx's concern for the property

rights of the worker, the almost universal rediscovery

of the inescapable relevance of subjectivity (Menger

in economics; Freud in psychology; Husserl, Nietzsche,

Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Sartre in philosophy),

and the essential thrust of twentieth century popular

culture all verify our sustained desire for

emancipation, for individual sovereignty.

We moderns no longer wait for the approval

of the Church or the state to pursue our various paths.

A kind of sociological anarchism prevails in the modern

industrialized states and it seems unlikely that these

liberties will ever be voluntarily surrendered. We

want it all, now! (or in Jim Morrison's classic sixties'

phrasing; "\ve want the world and we want it now"). Although the hand-wringing moralists. nf hn~h ~he lefr and the right, still maintain a constituency, their strident calls for reform are largely ignored.

Definitions of civic virtue are too diverse and too subjective to have any consistent appeal to modern ears deafen8d by repeated calls of "wolf".

The anarcho-individualism of the sixties echoed the seminal political movements of the modern era.

They all attempted to fullfill civilization's promise of individual sovereignty. They all failed, at least partially, and for essentially the same reason. Their original sense of anarchistic, individual empowerment ultimately metamorphosed into the temerity of collectivist dogma, variously labeled along the ideological continuum as tending toward fascism or socialism (as if there were any difference between these authoritarian appeals to our social and moral sensibilities).

Seemingly fearful of embracing the freedoms we have already accomplished, we search frantically for some exogenous force to validate our existence.

There has never been a lack of those willing to step forward to fill the role, guardians of our conscience of one form or another. 195

Perhaps we forgot, as many did before us, that moral outrage and righteous indignation are good at

igniting fires, but less effective at sustaining them.

Revolutions decay. Their life-span would shock a

fruit-fly. The indignant burn out on their own fury and gladly allow the torch to pass to anyone willing

to shoulder the burden. Eventually, after everyone

succumbs to fatigue, the bureaucracy assumes control and pursues their own agenda, which, of course, is always dressed in the passionate rhetoric of the now

subservient "employer."

The irony of the sixties is that, if there was ever a group prepared to realize that Adam and

Eve never Fell, it should have been the baby-boom

generation. The many freedoms of our actual lives, often "superfluous" but always insisted upon and hotly

defended, confirm that we had realized this, yet our

political aspirations reverted to the primitive

preference for the consoling stasis of pious moralisms.

Anxiously scurrying to banish unfairness, sorrow, evil,

perhaps even death itself, we failed to realize that

the more strenously we attempted to seize and actualize

this mirage of perfection, the further it receded. X. THE CHURCH

The monotonous canon runs thus: The young man must begin with a knowledge of culture, not even with a knowledge of life, still less with life and the living of it. This knowledge of culture is forced into the young mind in the form of historical knowledge; .•.as if it were possible to sum up in a few years the highest and most notable experiences of ancient times. Friedrich Nietzsche

Max Stirner was more succinct in his criticism of modern education, describing it as a place, " •••where 1 the young learn to twitter like the old". Oscar Wilde suggested, "Education is an admirable thing, but it is well to remember from time to time that nothing that is worth knowing can be taught.,,2 These insights seem to have been lost on the contemporary academy.

The contemporary university prepares modern youth for intellectual subservience to the state, particularly in its emphasis on the illusion that we can eliminate the "problems" of the world with the sacred knowledge of the academy, when properly interpreted by the clerics in their role as the bureaucrats of our ideals. Only the young and inexperienced could ever succumb to the allure of such a heart-warming panacea, but unfortunately, the university is precisely where we send our youth to finishing school. The conceits of the Mind resonate

196 197

harmoniously with the illusions of youth. The effect is accentuated by the fact that the university has long been associated with the ease and perquisites of the upper-class, the only ones to attend university until well into this century; consequently, working-class children naturally associate these romantic idylls with the attitude appropriate to the style of life to which they would like to become accustomed. The fact that academics are the first parental substitutes to be encountered upon leaving the home further reinforces the "imprinting".

But, as this essay has attempted to describe, these idealistic illusions are not the stuff of life, but rather the denial of life. They are based on the overestimation of the Mind's ability to rationally

control our social environment, the impatient insistence on immediate gratification of our seemingly "moral"

urges, and most importantly, the false dichotomy of

the material and the spiritual in their roles as the well springs of human motivation. These conceits

provide the intelligentsia with a teleological mission

of transcendent importance (in their minds, at least)

and perennial job security. A "hungry" culture \'lOuld

be completely immune to these vanities, but the wealthy 198

cultures created by modern capitalism seem quite

susceptible to this form of self-loathing and

self-denial.

The recent directions of the university's intent reveal some of the ways in which it denies its own

scholarship as it attempts to redeem the world by

substituting a facile moral logic for the love of wisdom. Our nostalgia for the comforting enclosures

of our tribal past is expressed in the widely popular

invocation of "relevance". The attempt to unite the widely divergent aspects of our modern lives, although

comforting, actually denigrates the purity of these various perspectives. The attempt to make our lives

"whole" results only in further fragmentation. Trade

schools are relevant. The university should be

profoundly irrelevant. Let the relevant deal with

the relevant; let the laity deal with the laical, the

profane, and let the clerics work with the sacred,

their proper domain. We ~an find relevance in our

own lives, unless we divert our energies by insisting

on finding it for everyone else.

It is now assumed that the educated person

should have an opinion on everything. Perhaps they

overlook the value of not having to voice an opinion 199

on everything. Knowledge is expensive, consequently, most of us are uninformed on all but a handful of subjects. When we inflate the currency, we pay the price of ill-informed opinions degrading our social discourse. Like many of the mirages we pursue so ardently today, the more we attempt to procure the relevant, the less likely we are to actually achieve it.

Our current use of the word, "discrimination", indicates other aspects of our confusion. We now use it negatively, when we mean to imply bias or prejudice.

Discrimination more accurately implies the ability to distinguish between the various degrees of quality.

It should be the sine qua non of an education. By denigrating the real sense of its meaning, we invite the repellant countenances of relativism to dominate our perceptions.

"Revolution" is another example of our etymological inconsistency. It properly means a turning around, such as the orbit of a planet which this word originally described. Used in a political context, it would imply a "corning around", a profoundly conservative concept exemplified by the Confucian historical sense of constant repetition. Neglecting 200

its real sense, we use it to mean rebellion, a renewing of war, which is morally unacceptable to our impatient modern radicalism which illogically combines pacifism with a suicidally aggressive stance.

Life is not an English exam and word meanings evolve. It is not suggested that we all consult a dictionary before speaking. But, the emerging meanings of words can help us realize where we have been and where we are going. Serious meditation on the word, revolution, would accomplish much of what this essay is attempting to clarify, the inextricable linkage of radical impulse and conservatively inclined action necessary for accomplishing any kind of social evolution; feel radically, think conservatively, act independently. If you cannot bring it back around, bring it back home, then it is probably just thymotic tantrum, comforting but useless.

The countless dead-ends of the modern academy's moral quest have been much discussed recently. One of the more interesting was the raging debate on the

Columbus quincentennial. Recreating the conceits of the Church, the traditional explanation of the European discovery of America centered on the selfless spirit of these noble explorers bringing the wonders of 201

civilization to the unenlightened savages. Recreating the conceits of the philosophes, the revisionist version exposes this fantasy and reveals that actually Columbus was a avaracious conqueror int~nt on lining his pockets with the sweat of the native population. Following the cleric's intent to redeem history with pious moralisms, it is but a short step to reviling Columbus as a international criminal rather than admiring his legitimate accomplishments. But, with only a little reflection, it is obvious that no one would have undertaken such a perilous journey for some metaphysical vanity. Of course he came to get rich, with the result of coming one step closer to reuniting the human family.

Ignoring his intent, and concentrating on the unintended result (he never found India, encapsulating humanity's frustrated quest almost perfectly: we never seem to find what we are looking for; we often stumble on to something much "better"; remember, it was Indian spice, not American gold, that originally prompted these excursions), we are thankful that Columbus, like all of us, was motivated by material greed rather than idealistic pretension.

We know that the European colonialists exploited the native Americans. If we had to make a "moral" 202

judgement, we might consider condemning this migration.

But, although relatively recent and of great significance, this migration was no different than the countless others which have characterized our history of intermingling. They were all based on exploitation, of resources and opportunities and people.

The gentle Arawaks who greeted Columbus in the Caribbean had already been invaded, conquered, and exploited by the Caribs from South America. Sharing the same skin "color" did not hamper the Carib's ability to

"brutalize" the local Arawaks. Typically, the males of all ages were imprisoned, fattened, and then eaten; the "luckier" females became breeders. 3

The dominant historical myth suggests that

Cortez successfully stormed the valley of Mexico because of the shock value of primitive firearms and horses.

Actually, most non-Aztec f1exicans were "rooting" for

Cortez and a significant number of them fought with him. Like all imperialists, the Aztecs exploited other groups as ruthlessly as the Spanish eventually would, and for the same reason--they had the power to do it.

Their superior social and/or military organization enabled them. As difficult as it is to admit it, might

is the only right we have ever recognized. 203

Despite the Mexicans' nostalgic condemnation of Malinche, the Vera Cruz area princess who assisted

Cortez in order to free her people from the Aztec yoke, it is difficult to imagine that non-Aztec peoples should have tolerated cardiacal evisceration on an Aztec altar in order to appease some vague sense of Mexican solidarity (there was no r1exico yet, only independent tribes, all foreign to each other). The highly cultured

Zapotecs of Oaxaca, the first to develop a written language in the New World, had been subjugated by the Mixtecs in the eleventh century, the Toltecs in the twelfth century, the Aztecs in the fifteenth century, the Spanish in the sixteenth century and the

Mexicans in the nineteenth century, and again in the twentieth century (Zapata was a Zapotec; his revolutionary ideas lost out to Big Brother state 4 socialism). Naturally, they complained every time.

The story is the same allover the Americas, and the rest of the world. Successful imperialists rarely found virgin territory. They usually arrived on the heels of some other invader. Only a racist

would be concerned with the skin color of the various

alien conquerors. The recent clerical interpretation

suggests that only Europeans participated in these 204

conquests, but even the most superficial glance at history dispels this myth; the Europeans were simply the most successful in recent times. This history of rape and pillage is saddening in many ways, but it is Our history and all the mea culpas of eternity will never change it.

However, if we focus on the results of our predations rather than the moral impulses which attempt to judge them, our shock rapidly turns to awe. Although the Americas have hardly attained the kind of transcqndental perfection which might satisfy clerical concupiscence (that, of course, will never happen; every plateau attained will open new vistas of "more"), even the poorest campesino now attains a longer life-span, sees fewer of his children die in their youth, consumes more calories than ever before, and enjoys fewer restraints on his freedom than under even the most benevolent cacique of his ancestors' past.

True, the comforting myths of his tribal heritage have been destroyed forever and he must seek his way in the tangled labrynth of modernity, but this is both our fate and our joy. The most cosmopolitan sophisticate of the modern city suffers (and enjoys!) the same destiny. This bittersweet mixture of regret 205

and delight has always characterized our journey.

Ask him if he \-lOuld like to go back; "In your dreams, pal" is the resounding response of both the affluent and the impoverished, implying both that only in one's dreams could turning back the clock even be conceived, and, even if we could, we would not abandon the luxuries of the present. Some measure these luxuries in terms of Manhattan penthouses rather than Long Island suburbs, while others define it in terms of plastic bowls rather than laboriously woven baskets, but the appreciation and the implicit endorsement is similar.

One of the incentives for this facile abuse of history seems to reside in the self-loathing denial of our distinctiveness which engenders a worshipful pity for the "losers" who litter the landscape of our expedition. To some degree, this compassionate humanitarianism is both natural and inevitable. But, lamenting the losses caused by an earthquake in a distant land accomplishes nothing; it is mere self-indulgence. However, a renewed commitment to better building methods, via the pursuit of excellence propelled by the pride and greed of the various participants, will improve the chances of those who face a similar problem in the future. Worshipping the 206

losers is mere self-pity, emulating the winners helps us to transcend the need for tearful commiseration.

The frantic search for victim-status validation which characterizes the contemporary American social dialogue

is but another variation on this same theme.

Perhaps the most telling example of the academic's proclivity to reinterpret history to suit

the contorted needs of their religious conviction is exemplified by twentieth century perceptions of the

founding of America. Motivated by their desire to

overturn the dominant myth of liberal capitalism, the

antithesis of their preferred rational redistribution,

the hagiography of this seminal event is an obvious

choice. Although widely divergent in many aspects,

most of the recent approaches attempt to portray

nineteenth century American liberalism, with its twin

pillars of individualism and capitalism, in a negative

light. This is prompted by the academy's vain effort

to protect its theology of rational redistribution

from the challenge of America's historical success.

The modern paradigm was established with Beard's

The Rise of American Capitalism in 1927. The tradition

of associating Hamilton and the Federalists with the

emerging capitalistic order, and Jefferson with the 207

leveling effects of American democracy finds its voice here. Beard discusses the Constitutional debates and the American political tradition in terms of conflict and resultant compromise, ostensibly descending from

Federalist fascination with Hobbesian notions of the state. He also establishes the parameters of the debate in terms of European intellectual history and its influence on the tabula rasa of the American mind.

In 1948, Richard Hofstadter's The American

Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It asserts that, despite some minor differences, all of the formative philosophies shared a common belief in the virtues of capitalism--individualism, property ~ights, competition, limited government. He stresses the similarities between the Federalists and the Republicans in regards to their endorsement of capitalism, perhaps the first main-stream historian to make this seemingly obvious connection. His motivation is not to praise capitalism, but to bury it, a popular theme among late twentieth century historians and a mentalite which will dominate most of the scholars in his wake. He castigates Jefferson for not having a more interventionist attitude, reduces the Jacksonian era to just another phase in the expansion of liberated 208

capitalism, and considers Lincoln just another conservative trying to maintain free enterprise for free labor. Although few would argue with the limited truth of these statements, the condescending tone of reproachment characterizing his presentation of these success stories is the real message (one of the earliest exponents of the "hair-shirt" version of American history; see how "bad" we are, even our "good" guys are culpable).

Perhaps understandably in the late 1940s, with

Britain's Labour government on the ascendent and the socialist Wallace in the Democratic party primaries with Truman, Hofstadter actually endorses a model of centralized planning for the United States. This appears to be the end purpose of his polemical equation of all currents of American political thought as supportive of a greed inspired capitalistic illness.

Nevertheless, for the contemporary scholar, having recently witnessed the completion of a seventy year real-time experiment in the glories of centralized planning (and thankful that we got the placebo),

Hofstadter's sanguine endorsement of state control tends to challenge our confidence in his analytical abilities. 209

In 1955, Louis Hartz published The Liberal

Tradition in America. The issue of capitalism recedes here and he concentrates on another critical issue, the dichotomy of European influence versus organic, domestic development of American liberalism. Hartz endorses the notion of independent American development which contradicts the Beardsian thesis which had placed

American political evolution in thrall to post-Enlightenment British thought. He admits many parallels, but diminishes the power of "sources" and

"influences". Lacking an aristocracy to rebel against and an oppressed proletariat to worry about, he characterizes American liberalism (Whiggery) as

"irrational", thus confirming Hofstadter's prejudice

(but, vlithout the "attitude"), and, seemingly, for the same implicit reason of providing a justification for statist interventionism.

In addition to introducing the "domestic content" argument for American political evolution,

Hartz thoroughly endorses Hofstadter's claim that this tradition is best viewed in light of its underlying consensus rather than perpetual conflict resolution.

The apparent differences of Federalist and Republican are seen more as a reflection of the attempt to mimic 210

European debates rather than actual realities. Lacking both the mob and an aristocracy, the American discussion fragmented unnecessarily from general agreement to artificial extremes with liberal Whigs portrayed as reactionaries and liberal Republicans characterized as demagogues.

During the 1960s and 1970s, revisionist historians returned to the double pronged Beardsian thesis that, 1) there were significant differences and subsequent conflict between the two main post-Revolutionary parties (Republican and Federalist), and, 2) that this conflict was best understood in light of British opposition rhetoric of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Bernard Bailyn's The Ideological

Origins of the American Revolution pursues this line of argument and, in 1978, Lance Banning's The

Jeffersonian Persuasion continues in this vein. H0 first elucidates the history of the British "court" and "country" debates and suggests that the "country" opposition (minor aristocrats fearful of the emerging

"paper aristocracy" of banking and mercantile capitalism) provided the critical influence which freighted the political ideals of the Jeffersonian

Republicans towards their fear of government sponsored 211

5 oppression. He characterizes the Federalists as enthralled with classical notions, which saw liberty in danger from its own excesses. His thesis is weakest when asked to explain the reason for the ultimate triumph of the Republicans, particularly in wake of the "proof" of the Federalist argument provided by the excesses of Robespierre. He argues that American perceptions of liberty were closest to the Republican vision. That is almost certainly true, since we know that they not only prevailed, but also inspired the next minor "revolution" in American social evolution, that of the Jacksonians, who also prevailed. However, the question is how and why they were predominant, what was the process by which these ideas became

"American".

Although the details have been accumulated by many, very few American historians have synthesised the various strands which elucidate the growing importance of Atlantic trade as an influence on emerging

American liberalism; a new social vision that owed little to the past and combined the appeal of mass democracy and a rising standard of living derived from the market order. The origins of American capitalism

(and liberalism) are to be found in the agrarian middle 212

colonies among the followers of Jefferson, not in the pro-banking advocacy of the Hamiltonian Federalists.

It was the Jeffersonian Republicans, with their utopian ideas of free trade and an optimistic vision of the future based on populist visions of capitalism, that first gave shape to American liberalism cum capitalism.

Despite fifty years of fascistic faith in the state, the fact that, even today, Americans as diverse as

Archie Bunker, Elridge Cleaver and the last Vietnamese to get off the boat essentially share this same view, is powerful testimony to the strength of this classic liberal paradigm. Even if one decries this individualistic spirit as naive, selfish, and uninformed, it is difficult to argue that Americans have generally perceived capitalism, competition, individualism and liberal respect for property rights as a form of populist empowerment, not the conspiratorial cover-up justifying the likes of a Donald

Trump, which seems to have such a great appeal for

American academics.

Perhaps the modern historians' aversion to the study of economics is responsible for their failure to emphasise the emergence and ultimate preeminence of the Scottish philosophers, such as Hume, Smith and 213

Ferguson, in expounding the new creed of liberal individualism; but, eighteenth century Americans had fe\'l doubts. "Let me sell as the market goes ••• [and) ••• the market was the best judge of values" 6 were typical statements of the time.

To a great degree, the conceit of the British country and court opposition should be replaced by the defense of an old order as Federalist, and the vision of a new society, both capitalist and liberal, as Republican. The Republican victory in 1800 was a decisive "revolutionary" event \vhich forever brought an end to aristocratic values in American politics.

The liberal values of John Locke \vere at the forefront of the Republican synthesis which "endmved American capitalism with the moral force of their vision of a social order of free and independent men.,,7

Jeffersonian populism and American liberal capitalism were integrally linked. This was obvious to the

Federalist Madison and the Republican Jefferson, but seems to have been forgotten in the cloistered halls of the modern American academy.

This same thesis, somewhat ironically in that he perceives it as the embodiment of what is wrong with America, is presented by John Diggins in his 214

polemical jeremiad, The Lost Soul of American Politics:

Virtue, Self-interest, and the Foundations of American

Liberalism. Diggins seems furious with the idea, suggested by Pocock and Banning, that not all Americans were greedy, self-centered capitalists, but rather collectivist purveyors of precapitalist civic virtue

(which Pocock et al associate with the Jeffersonian

Republicans, as derived from the British "country" party). Diggins, a la Hofstadter, prefers the stance of the perennially indignant, suggesting that America has always been liberal and capitalist and may it rot in hell as a well deserved punishment.

Diggins praises the Christian themes in Melville and suggests that Lincoln was saved from the crime of liberalism because he believed in "••• what the humanists had dismissed as superstition--the wrath of God."B He laments the loss of "Christian virtues••• [which, he assures us] died out in the late nineteenth century.,,9 Although David Duke and Dan

Quayle would probably agree with him (much to Diggin's embarrassment, one suspects), it is difficult to share his unabashed praise of Puritanical Calvinism, even though he buried it under a facade of post-sixties radical chic. His absolute confusion is best revealed 215

when he takes issue \vith Bailyn (The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 1967) and ~'lood (The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, 1969) for

suggesting that religious values played a larger role than secular humanism in forming the basis of the "civic virtue" explanation offered by Banning and Pocock.

Although this writer certainly sympathizes with Diggins' desire to challenge the "civic virtue" thesis, his

Puritanical critique of the pervasiveness of religious values is somewhat confusing, not to mention, ironic.

Current scholarship, Hofstadter, Pocock, and

Banning in particular, paints the Jeffersonian

Republicans in terms of nostalgia for the past, rooted

in outmoded concepts of "agrarian self-sufficiency"

rather than enthusiasm for the future via the process

of commercial enrichment from the Atlantic trade.

This approach reduces Jefferson to the status of "the

heroic loser" rather than the "conspicuous winner"

which is a more realistic alternative. Perhaps the

Hamiltonian revival of both court and country ideology

was what prompted the counterpoint of the American

liberal vision, personified by Jefferson and Madison.

Classical Republicanism (British "country" opposition

thought) represented "only a language for lamenting, 216

as opposed to understanding, commerce.,,10 American

Republicanism was more focused on the future. John

Locke provided the philosophical underpinnings for liberalism, Adam Smith shovled hmv lithe invisible hand" of the market could empower (enrich) the individual under the limited Lockean form of government, and

American Republicans synthesized these values (Locke's idealism, Smith's materialism) as they created nineteenth century American liberalism. Although, late eighteenth century Americans were too hungry to be ashamed of a profit, lilt was the economy's ordering of society with minimal compulsion that stirred the

Jeffersonian imagination, not its capacity to produce 1 1 wealth. II

Both the Federalists and the Republicans endorsed the egalitarian powers of capitalism and both stressed a desire for a weak central government; where they differed was in their perception of which part of the government was likely to tyrannize them, the

Hamiltonian Federalists fearing the tyranny of the majority embodied in the legislative branch (and the state governments), while the Jeffersonian Republicans were more fearful of the elitism of the executive and

judicial branches (ironic that today it is the 217

"conservative" Republicans who have inherited the mantle of the Jeffersonian "rabble" in their complaints about the judiciary). But, for both, it was the government that prompted their fears, not the mob, not the aristocracy of wealth--populism and elitism were only metaphors which colored the rhetoric--and certainly not capitalism.

Their differences regarding capitalism were minor, mainly a preference for easy credit by the

Republicans and a concern for sound banking and currency demonstrated by the Federalists. The same debate rages today between the Keynesians and the Austrians, and also between the Federal Reserve and Wall street, but no one would suggest that any of these parties are not capitalist in the fullest sense of the word.

The consensus-conflict opposition was always a shibboleth (they merge into one another: consensus is formed by smoothing over differences; there were certainly differences, but obviously a consensus was formed), designed more to ease late twentieth century angst among academic historians (Hofstadter, Diggins) or to bolster one's argument unnecessarily (Hartz,

Banning, Appleby). It is an informative metaphor in the works of Hartz (consensus), as well as Banning 218

and Appleby (conflict), and all three use it appropriately. But for Hofstadter and Diggins, it is used to justify a sophomoric neo-Marxian assumption that America has always been cursed by capitalism and that is the source of our modern dilemma. It is true enough that most Americans were motivated by the desire for personal enrichment. Most colonials had never heard of Locke or Bolingbroke, but they knew a profit when it hit their account.

If this proud concupiscence is morally offensive to some academics--religionists have always been bothered by it--it might be suggested that they indulge their mea culpas in a more appropriate fashion (although one suspects that they probably recapitulate the essential motivations when they renegotiate their contracts).

Despite the volumes of explication, few modern historians have discussed the innumerable modern ironies which descend from the debates between the Hamiltonian

Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans. The identification of the Hamiltonian Federalists with capitalism is pervasive, and yet one could argue that the Federalists ultimately hampered the market by espousing "Big Government." Today's Republicans 219

replicate the Federalist mistake, not realizing that pro-business is often anti-market (the only thing that keeps capitalists "honest" is the ruthless structure of the price mechanism~ protect them from their own stupidity and you have the anti-market, pro-business elitism which the Democrats rightfully accuse them of). And yet, the Republicans constantly harp on the dangers of "Big Goverment," and, irony of ironies, in the distinctly Hobbesian tone of the social engineer

(another Republican shibboleth), which was the informing 12 metaphor of the Hamiltonian Federalists.

We all invoke the name of Jefferson (especially

Clinton, but Reagan too), yet we emulate Hamilton in our pursuit of the mega-state (we need not be confused by Republican rhetoric~ their funding of the military establishment is perhaps even more wasteful than the typical Democratic "pork" which they rightfully criticize). The original anti-Federalist argument was directed against "Big Government" because of the

Montesquieu-inspired fear that it would enrich us, thereby spoiling us (what an argument~ it is not surprising that Jefferson changed almost nothing of the Federalist structure after he took power). 13 Now, despite our simultaneous complaints, we embrace the 220

idea of "Big Government" so that it Hill enrich us

(Clinton's faith in governmental "jobs programs," descending from the New Deal's confidence in macroeconomics; the Reagan years prove that the

Republicans have no substantive problem \vith "Big

Government," as 101!g as they control it). Like most religious invocations, the names of the gods (ancestors, household deities, founding fathers) can be used to justify whatever political moralism is currently popular.

Europeans, from de Tocqueville to Gorbachev, have continually characterized Americans as overly concerned with wealth. The American intelligentsia have been flattered to mimic them. The European critique has some validity, but it is colored with the envy of an aristocratic world towards the merchant

ideology which ultimately overturned the hierarchical privilege to which the European gentry had become accustomed. Perhaps Americans prefer an aristocracy determined by money rather than by birth. As tasteless as it might be, it is certainly more accessible. Or perhaps America realized what seems to elude most

American academics: that Donald Trump is not the 221

end-result of capitalism, merely an irrelevant

by-product, that the greatest social wealth is more

likely to be accomplished by harnessing individual

selfishness rather than attempting to ban it, and that

the greatest social happiness is more likely to be

achieved by letting the various individuals find it

rather than telling them where it is.

There are countless other examples which reveal

the ecclesiastical fervor of the modern academics as

they attempt to reinterpret our history in light of

their own theological prejudice. Only rarely does

new information surface; usually some contemporary moral view requires that they return to the archives

and revise the standard interpretation (they even

proudly call themselves "revisionists," displaying

no embarrassment over possible associations with

Stalin's historicism, although the resemblances are

uncanny).

It is remarkable how many modern intellectuals,

although generally pacifistic, endorse the authoritarian

and the militaristic archetypes of our past. The

twentieth century defense of Stalinism could perhaps

be attributed to other factors, but Norman O. Brown's

praise of Sparta over Athens (cf. Love's Body, the 222

chapter entitled, "Liberty") is paradoxical, or considering the chapter's title, merely satirical.

Michael Mann's The Sources of Social Power reveals the same bias, as do many of the twentieth century attacks on the individual, which are often disguised as critiques of the market (cf. Karl Polanyi, Gunmar

Myrdal, Oscar Lange). Brown phrases his preference in terms of greater equality, but one wonders how the helots (agricultural slaves) would have reacted to that statement. It was the freedoms engendered by the market economy of Athens, and subsequent inequalities of wealth accumulation, which is the more pertinent source of irritation for the modern academic.

But, even this is difficult to admit, because so much of what we admire in Greek culture flowed from Athenian commercialism--art, theatre, philosophy (Nietzsche was the child of all three, yet he also betrayed the

same "self loathing"). It appears that the "real" reason for this desperate conceit is to provide a

justification for twentieth century statism.

In many cases, it is easy to admire the

academics' diligent research and methodical

investigation; generally speaking, they are excellent

at accumulating the details. But, their general 223

inability to see the larger picture is almost embarrassing. This essentially theistic outlook was once primarily confined to the more parochial disciplines of sociology and political science, but now has spread to most of the other social sciences.

Even in the humanities, they have started to abandon disinterested investigation in favor of "moralizing" on the hot topics of the day. The deconstructionists are enjoying their romp in English literature; History has not yet found an exotic foreign doctrine to emulate, but that has not deterred them, as the preceeding analysis hopefully demonstrated.

The most viable explanation for this parochialism, in addition to the general themes concerning the clerical confusion of the ideal and the material, is the isolation of the various disciplines. The twentieth century academic is beginning to resemble one of those fantastic crabs, the ones with a single giant claw which dwarfs the rest of the body. They are specialists, well-informed regarding the details of their specific discipline

(actually, their expertise is usually limited to one unique area within their discipline), but hopelessly inadequate when it comes to integrating their 224

specialized knowledge with the general thrust of human

endeavor. Considering the enhanced importance of the computer today, this provincialism is somewhat

surprising. Even the most inexperienced hacker realizes that the total amount of knowledge accumulated

is irrelevant; it is the access to the information which is ultimately of greater importance.

In other respects, however, this development is more salubrious. The details accumulated by twentieth

century scholarship dwarf the work of previous centuries. Ironically, one must suspect that this writer would even applaud this development. Given his frustration with the plethora of sanctimonious

deisms emanating from the academy, one would imagine

that he should be pleased that they stick to the

"business" which they are capable of accomplishing,

the accounting and detailing appropriate to the clerk.

Although one might prefer that the cleric pursue the

inherently clerical, this writer laments the loss of

respect for the generalist in the twentieth century

academy. Discussing the same problem, the Austrian

economist, Friedrich Hayek, once suggested that the

economist who only knows economics is a danger, not

only to economics, but also to the general society 225

which he hopes to serve. Unfortunately, very few contemporary academics have heeded his advice.

In many respects, this essay embodies the apprehension spawned by the discouraging transition of libertarian liberalism into the collectivist, essentially fascist, liberalism of the twentieth century. nut, perhaps the underlying context is informed by an even older sense of the word, liberal, which hearkens back to the Italian Renaissance libere, the inquisitive scholars who maintained a fierce independence, beholden to no institution, discipline, or ideology, in order to pursue unbiased investigations into the structures of our social existence. This spirit has largely disappeared from the modern university.

Everyone will share in the loss. XI. THE STATE

Somewhere there are still peoples and herds, but not where we live, my brothers: here there are states. State? What is that? Well then, open your ears to me, for I shall now speak to you about the death of peoples. Friedrich Nietzsche

Although the separation of Church and state was demanded, and accomplished to some degree, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the twentieth century has witnessed the reunification of the Church

(in its modern form, the university) and the state.

Although the classic liberalism of the early nineteenth century understood that the practical realities of living together, the concerns of the state, were best approached \vithout any recourse to the moral definitions of the Church, the appeal of an exogenous source of authority seems to be so compelling that we have literally reconstructed the chains which bind our political realities (state) to the seemingly transcendental moralisms of the contemporary cleric

(church/university).

Although political leaders have always sought talented assistance, it is in this century that the majority have been selected from the university, paralleled only in the Medieval era when clerics also

226 227

constituted the primary choice for government clerks.

The Medieval cleric could claim exemption from civil jurisdiction, requesting to be tried in the ecclesiastical courts. This privilege survives today in the vestigial "diplomatic immunity". Then, as nmv, the clerical advocate was an ambassador to the corporeal world, often displaying the hauteur common to the visiting dignitary (consider the case of California's

Superintendent of Schools, Bill Honig; he "knevJ" that only greedy "business types" give state jobs to their

\vives, therefore, he must be "innocent").

The more "progressive" party in the United

States, the Democrats, has naturally led the way in initiating this dependence, as Roosevelt's, and later,

Kennedy's administrations exemplify. But, in the late twentieth century, American political problems are almost never partisan--both parties imitate each other's worst excesses. Republican administrations betray the same tendency.

The problem with this reliance on the university is not that the clerics are completely incompetent.

On the contrary, they are usually professional and articulate. The trouble lies in the "Ivory Tower" expectations that they bring with them, the mind-set 228

that colors their vision of the social world. Purely spiritual aspirations are presented as practical, material solutions. Rather than focusing on the difficult, but possible, solutions of our various problems, the issue becomes a clash of religious beliefs, a morality play.

One of the more pathetic, and simultaneously interesting, examples in recent memory is the celebrated debate between the standing vice-president of the United states, Dan Quayle, and a fictional television character, Murphy Brown. Quayle attacked the independent status of the character, particularly her decision to have a child without first securing a husband; a rather typical conservative Republican's response to the increasing independence of American women. He also suggested that the media was partly responsible for this tendency in modern society because it presented this actuality in a positive light. The character, the actress, the show's producers, and the media all paid lip service to the bourgeois ideal, but essentially countered that Murphy did nothing

"\vrong". We could debate the pros and cons, but the majority of us are probably not interested in this kind of personal advice from either of these rather 229

dubious sources.

The more telling observation arises from the question of why the vice-president would have initiated this discussion. Trailing in the polls, he hoped to appeal to the morality of the electorate and exploit the distinction between the traditional conservatives, whom he hoped to sway, and the more modernized liberals, whom he assumed were already Democrats. This dichotomy of preferred definition of "custom" has been the major determinant of every election since the sixties. Rather than debate the practicalities of war, abortion, racial equality and the like, we have primarily debated the

"morality". But, there is no transcendental truth in any of these subjects; they are not spiritual concerns. Machiavelli once made a distinction between the "morality of the city" and the "morality of the soul." Our profound confusion of the two has created innumerable contradictions, the least of which is the inanity of a standing vice-president arguing with a fictional character.

One of the more dismaying aspects of this assertive righteousness is the resurrection of the witch-hunt on the American scene. The perfect embodiment of the consequences of our unrestrained 230

secular Puritanism is revealed in the day-care scandals of the eighties, where several of the defendants were actually accused of "dancing naked" in front of their students. Although child abuse is certainly a problem, and one that deserves serious attention, in retrospect, it appears that the bulk of these accusations were nothing more than collective hysteria. The irony is that most of these children did suffer some psychological trauma, not from the accused molesters, but from the well-intended social workers who

"convinced" them that something really had taken place. 1

The celebrated Mike Tyson rape case is another example. Although we will probably never know exactly what happened, it appears that, at the very least, the rush to judgement was compromised by our legitimate and justifiable condemnation of rape, including the

"softer" forms (i.e. date rape) which ,,,ere rarely prosecuted in the past. The increased attention on the "expanding" definition of rape is appropriate, but we cannot automatically assume that the accusation is the same as the proof, no matter how heinous the crime.

The Michael Milken case is yet another example of the way we allow our moralisms to cloud our 231

judgement. Admittedly, the case was confusing, revolving around several laws which most of us could barely pronounce, much less understand. Although the media offered little in the way of serious explication, the key puzzle piece was provided towards the end of the case when the prosecutors suggested a total finacial impact of $376,000, and the judge, after serious consideration, decided that $316,000 was a more approprla. t e f'19ure. 2 But, we already knew that the total amount which had crossed his desk during his career was staggering, in the hundreds of billions.

And $316,000 was all that they could come up with!

He probably lost more in pocket change. He almost certainly lost more to accounting errors and other

"slop" factors.

Although it was enticing to foist our collective angst on those greedy Wall street entrepreneurs, this evidence, provided by the prosecutors, was "proof" that 99.999 ••• % of his business was legal. We imagined that the "excesses" of the boom were finally coming back to haunt the perpetrators, and many of us chuckled in smug satisfaction (how much sympathy can you have for a guy who made half a billion dollars in one year, our envy "reasoned"). But, all \'1e had accomplished 232

was the public "lynching" of a convenient scapegoat.

In retrospect, it appears that rlilken ,,,,as prosecuted for being successful and rich, rather than for real ccriminal offenses.

The real "challenges" of the eighties, the erosion of shareholder rights, the downgrading of triple

A debt when a high-yield (junkbond) offering diluted the total paper outstanding, the way in which workers' pension plans were bandied about with absolutely no concern for the workers' ownership of those retirement assets, were left unaddressed. Ironically, it was the capitalists, the owners, who suffered the most from these predations (unnoticed by the typical leftist who still considers ownership a dirty word and has evidently not yet realized that even the worker often participates as a capitalist, a shareholder).

Yet, we should be careful about the rush to judgement on these issues as well. The avant garde of market exchange is barely understood, even by the participants themselves (the well-meaning government attorney is even more clueless). The "piracy" of the eighties may have been appropriate and ultimately productive. To borrow Mao's one great line (when asked about the value of the French revolution), it is still 233

too early to tell.

Consider some of the other ironies. Although

Milken may have been the most successful and highly paid of the Wall street entrepreneurs, he was not part of the old hierarchy. In fact, his business was essentially a challenge to the old guard. Was no one surprised when those most powerful of all white patriarchs, those puppet string pullers, refused to save their boy by calling their "running-dog lackeys" in l'Jashington to heel. "Our" envy may have been satiated, but "they" were the happiest of all, they actually made money on it (r.1ilken had been "stealing" their business for years). Unlike the more conservative banks and the old money firms on the street, Milken actually loaned money to small operations with little history of profitable business (he was one of the few

\·,ho \'lOuld actually loan to "us"). It is significant that other firms were not prosecuted for similar

"technical" violations, v;hereas Drexel Burnham Lambert was hounded into bankruptcy.

Although many of us are suspicious of government attorneys, and their motivations, we trust their every

\'lord \'lhen they go after a "money guy," despite the fact that this particular district attorney (Rudolph 234

Giuliani) was actually running for mayor of New York

City at the time. Although the eighties boom in high-yield paper (and consequent job production) was bound to correct itself at some time, it is interesting that it occurred in 1989, a time when both the equity markets and the bond markets \'lere rising (high-yield paper is usually valued as some combination of both; "equity in drag" is the Hall street aphorism). The only related event to occur was the verdict and sentencing of Milken (evidently, capital can read the newspapers). The high-yield market has since recovered, but not the jobs. Perhaps the image of shooting ourselves in the foot is more than mere metaphor.

We face significant challenges in the modern world--child abuse, rape, and white collar crime are only a few. Our task will not be eased by the emotional indulgences of the righteous. These "evils" \'1ill not disappear simply because we are outraged. Justice is not the same as vengeance, a significant realization which required millenia of trial and error to actually achieve. Concentrating on protecting and defending our legitimate interests, rather than gratifying indignant reprobations, has been our most successful path in the past. There is no reason to assume 235

otherwise in regard to the future.

For two thousand years, the Christian nations of the West have renounced war in a metaphysical sense, yet have practised it constantly. Despite our idealistic aversions, our practical selves embraced war. War will only wane when the practical justifications are no longer tenable, Hhen the "real" disadvantages outweigh the advantages. America's involvement in Vietnam and the Soviet Union's involvement in Afghanistan accomplished more for the anti-war position than all the rhetoric of the peace-niks. Speculative approbation, although interesting and emotionally soothing, has never had the power to actually change our behavior.

The result of this "moralification" of American politics is that the Republicans have come to represent those attitudes opposed to modernity and the Democrats have come to embody all those tendencies which promote change. But, of course, the reality is far too complex and subtle to be expressed with such a facile dichotomy.

We are all becoming "more modern" and, simultaneously, we are all resisting it. In a tribute to existential irony, the Republicans have combined their cultural conservatism with a vague pro-market (at least, 236

pro-business) stance. Yet, market-spawned individual empowerment is the most consistent corrosive which the traditional has yet encountered, hence the

Republican schizophrenia. The Democrats, not to be outdone by their competition, have embraced an attitude which ostensibly sanctifies the urge to transform, yet actually retards our evolution towards the future by the most convoluted attempts to recreate the comfortable illusions of the past (the essential impact of reformist socialism and its communitarian ideal).

The state's real function is to help resolve the practical difficulties of living together. It is not necessary to find a moral consensus in order to achieve these legitimate goals. The ideal state is the one that governs least (radicals, conservatives and liberals all agree on this; only twentieth century institutional moralists--fascists, statists, "Big

Brother" liberals--would protest), in the sense that enforcing the observance of abstract, impersonal rules would constitute the mandate. The modern state, however, has become the place where various interest groups vie for " rents", or special favors, based on the pleading of moral justifications for exclusive dispensations, in much the same way that their Medieval 237

counterparts (special interest groups are hardly new) sought special dispensations. The result is, not only that organized groups gain an advantage over the independent individual, but perhaps even more importantly, the state apparatus must expand sufficiently to entertain all of these appeals for elitist status. The condition becomes even worse when the state sets about the task of actually implementing those programs which it selects on the basis of a presumed moral priority.

The entire thrust of civilization has been directed tmV'ards escaping the control of various "Gods," towards desacralizing the parameters of our choices.

Yet, the modern state seeks to reimpose some moral authority over the "sinners" within its jurisdiction.

It is of little consequence hovl these "Gods" are defined, the traditional virtues espoused by the conservative Republicans and the guilt-ridden preferences of the liberal Democrats aimed at achieving

"perfect justice" are essentially equivalent in that they both display overt favortism to morally selected elites (business and the military for the Republicans; health, education and welfare for the Democrats).

More importantly, they both fail dismally in achieving 238

the objectives of their intent, which seems to be the curse of political action Hhich attempts "to get the job done" rather than establishing abstract, impersonal rules, and then, "letting it happen".

One of the difficulties in discussing the state is that many of us have a difficult time separating the various elements of culture, society, and state

(hint: if they tax you for it, it is probably the state). Although the financial aspect is the strongest difference (the history of the state is the history of taxation), there is also the element of individual endorsement. We are all "created" by our culture and society, which to some degree, actually determine the questions which we are even capable of posing. But, we can neglect and even "overrule" various aspects of the Culture's advice (at our own peril perhaps) as evolving definitions of the family, gender specific, and career have proven. The state, however is autocratic. When the state limits itself to enforcing basic hearth laws, the universal prohibitions against violating other individuals, there is little contradiction involved. But, when it attempts to superimpose some moral purpose derived from a certain group's sense of perceived justice, it belittles all 239

of us by denying our own definitions of personal morality.

Perhaps the most egregious moralism of the modern state is rational redistribution, the orthodoxy which it borrowed from the university (which the university borrowed from the fledieval military state, which they bOrrO\led from Plato, which•••plus ca change••• ). Seeking a means of ingratiating itself into the fabric of society, the state found rational redistribution appealing for the same reason that the university found it so enticing--perennial job security.

Unfortunately, other than providing a teleological mission for the government bureaucrat, this moral faith in the powers of the state to rationalize our lives has had little success in accomplishing its stated goals. The historical examples we might select to illustrate this failure are numerous. One of the most insightful is presented by the Peruvian economist,

Hernando DeSoto, who investigated the conflict between the socialist state, Peru, and the impoverished campesinos who created a thriving black market in Lima.

His findings are documented in The Other Path.

Coordinating the efforts of a group of statisticians and scholars, the Instituto Libertad y Democracia, 240

he began collecting data and collating the evidence in an attempt to understand what was actually happening

"in the street". Contrary to the modernists' expectations (modernize and educate first, development will follov,r), he discovered that illiterate "peasants" were perfectly capable of capitalism. And, despite the implicit claims of the "vulgar ~1arxist" Dependency theorists, he discovered that private property was the solution, not the problem.

He describes the origins of the contemporary problem--the mass migration of impoverished

"country-folk" to the capital, Lima, a problem common throughout Latin America. He outlines their difficulties in adapting to the urban environment, the hostility of their reception, and the well-intended, but useless, attempts by the authorities to smooth their way. He then proceeds to enumerate the ways in which they adapted to their multi-faceted problems, without the help of, and often in spite of, government intervention. These marginals, which he refers to as "informals", naturally resorted to extralegal means.

He discovers that the problem is not "the market" (black market), but the state. The proper licenses and permits demanded by the socialist government for even simple 241

ventures such as street-vending and mini-bus operating

usually amounted to several years earnings. Serious

expenses, liJ~e housing, \'lere completely unattainable

for most of the informals. ~hese bureaucratic legalisms

forced the people to utilize, even create, an

extra-legal black market.

DeSoto focuses particularly on housing, trade,

and transport. In face of the state's inability to

accomplish the necessary tasks, the informals built

an astounding 47% of the housing, ran 83% of the

markets, and managed 93% of the transportation 3 services. Revealing a surprising degree of

sophistication, the informals developed tactics for

overcoming the economic scarcities and the more

intractable government resistance. They usually formed

impromptu committees to deal with property disputes,

community crime, health and sanitation concerns, and

most importantly, confrontation with the state.

Transportation problems for the new neighborhoods were

solved in similar fashion. LacJ~ing sufficient capital

for large buses and state permits, they "capitalized"

on the new technology inherent in the Japanese mini-bus

and simply began servicing their communities' needs

without state sanction. Supply needs were satisfied 242

in the same way. Often starting out as one man operations, a street vendor with a tray or box, the more successful traders eventually established fixed markets.

The informals' ability to organize and police themselves was a significant aspect of their accomplishment. Although this might seem self-evident to many, statists from Plato to Bismarck to Stalin have insisted that the people were incapable of managing their own affairs. Statist moralists, of whatever ideological persuasion, have always assumed that illiterate peasants were incapable of managing their own affairs in this complex urban milieu and, therefore, should be provided for, guided, and ultimately controlled by the state. Although the third premise, control, is never directly admitted, it follows inexorably from the first two (remember Thomas

Jefferson's warning; the state that can do for can also do to).

In DeSoto's analysis of the costs of formal compliance with a bureaucratic state he reveals the inevitable necessity of black market preferences for the impoverished. Although often well-intentioned, state regulations usually serve as barriers to the 243

poor in their attempt to enter the mainstream (cf. minimum wage laws in the US). He also points out that it would benefit everyone to eliminate the excessive formality vf these regulations--the government would gain legal tax income and the informals could economize with the advantages of formal, contractual law to protect their interests.

Of special interest to all of us living in this age of the mega-state is the author's contention that redistributive traditions often exacerbate our problems by enhancing a wasteful state bureaucracy.

Economic decisions become political decisions.

A legal system whose sole purpose is redistribution thus benefits neither rich nor poor, but only those best organized to establish close ties with the people in power •••Politicization, centralization, and bureaucratization can all be traced to the same source: redistributive laws.4

He presents a strong case, outlining the resultant corruption, uncertainty, and inevitable discouragement engendered by this authoritarian approach.

The author suggests that contemporary Latin

American problems are essentially the same ones that have always plagued this region, elitism. He approaches the discussion in terms of mercantilism, the market 244

controlled by the state and the ruling elite. In colonial times it was personified by a Spanish colonel, in the Independence Era it was typically represented by a ladino colonel, and it is currently embodied in a socialist colonel. They all attempted to restrain and control the market in order to benefit themselves, their families and their supporters.

The ethical origins of European mercantilism were quite similar to the justifications used by statists today. The people are born sinners; those in power must guide the people in order to save them from themselves; order must be preserved by subordinating the individual to the needs of society

(read state). The elitist moral stance is the least of the problems--in practice, this patronizing attitude inevitably leads to economic privilege for the bureaucratic elite. Whether this elite resembles capitalist "fat-cats" or the leftist "new class" is ultimately irrelevant. As DeSoto quips, there are differences between the fox and the wolf, but to the rabbit it is the similarities that count.

Marx might have profited from this analysis.

The capitalism which he evaluated was essentially mercantilist. Most of the problems he found were not 245

structural aspects of market exchange, but rather temporary problems of an emerging technology. As subsequent history has proven, and DeSoto documents extensively in Lima, the market has proven more capable of solving those problems than all the well-intended tomes of the social engineers.

The novelist, Mario Vargas Llosa, summed up the problem succinctly,

One of the most widely believed myths about Latin America is that its backwardness results from the erroneous philosophy of economic liberalism••• [actually, the problem isl ••• a bureaucratized and law-ridden state that regards the redistribution of national wealth as more important than the production of wealth••• [utilizingl •••the concession of monopolies or favored status to a small elite that depends on the state and on which the state itself is dependent.5

DeSoto's analysis of the situation in Lima exemplifies the contradictions resulting from the cleric's recurrent desire to lead the people into the

Promised Land. This satire is replicated in most of the modern attempts to resolve our social problems.

Although we might admire these well-intended efforts to "help the poor", their implicit reliance on pity doom them to "bleeding heart" consecrations of intent rather than the empowerment of result. The near 246

universal appeal of victim status, the current vogue in the United states, is a natural result of viewing the world through the veil of Christian moralism, seeing

God's work everywhere; piety and pity seem to be inseparable.

The clear advantage of gaining "legitimized" victim status is that benefits can then be extorted from the state. The state will not resist this tendency because it does not pay its own expenses, we do. In fact, it will usually encourage these activities because all types of redistribution enhance its own power and status.

Martin Luther King, Jr., at least in the formative years of his career, was well aware of the dangers of basing African-American emancipation on pity, the primary one being that blacks would begin to see themselves in this light, thereby emasculating their own legitimate aspirations towards empowerment.

He realized that substituting entitlement for empowerment would inevitably lead to a weakened self-image that constantly sought validation and 6 assistance from the dominant white cUlture.

The dominant group never gives away real power.

It might give away "things", but they will usually 247

be unconsciously selected to deny real empowerment, as the current welfare system, which encourages a sense of dependence, exemplifies. The push must come from below, from the "hungry", from the impoverished themselves. History has shown that Nietzsche's ubermensch provides a better role model for the unenfranchised than the long-suffering Christ.

However, recent advocates for African-Americans, perhaps enticed by the apparent generosity of liberal white guilt, and perhaps encouraged by the pervasive

Christian credence of the African-American community, have abandoned this stance. In the 1960's, universities dropped the photo requirement for admission candidates because it had often been used to exclude blacks.

Now, of course, African-Americans are specifically identified so that they can receive privileged admission status. The simple minded might assume that this is somehow the "opposite", but actually it is merely a perpetuation of the same elitist preference system; only the specific object has been changed. Informal racism has been replaced by legalized racism.

Remarkably, in a nation which prides itself on charting its course by democratic means, this transition from informal racism to institutionalized 248

racism was not effected by popular vote, nor even by

Congressional vote. It was accomplished primarily by bureaucratic decisions, defined and supported by the Federal courts. The contemporary court represents the most perfect embodiment of the various metaphysical delusions discussed in this essay, not surprisingly, as it also personifies the consumate union of the university and the state.

Although Thomas Jefferson is often invoked in various public speeches, it is surprising how little attention we actually pay to his astute warnings.

He understood the dangers of an activist court, those

"subtle corps of sappers and miners" who, he feared, might undermine our social foundations by centralizing power in the federal government, which would "lay all things at their feet.,,7 Abandoning several millenia's experience reminding us of the value of impersonal and abstract rules, the twentieth century American court has slowly, but inexorably, altered our legal system in favor of personal perceptions of morality, usually focusing on emotionally derived conceptions of victim status. Good intentions forcing artificial results, not parameters, are the objectives now.

These hoped for results will never be achieved 249

because we do not "know" what our real problems are, we are in the process of discovering them. The court's reliance on rationalized morality has doomed the court to the role of the hall monitor, haughtily imposing

their institutionalized moralisms on the community

at large. Although the primary reasons for this conceit are to be found in the various idealistic delusions described in this essay, we should not overlook that

inevitable drive for power and control which seem to

fuel even the best of intentions. Primarily because of the increasing centralization of the American government, the judicial branch is now far more powerful

than at any time in our past.

The courts have usurped the role of the

amendment process. This was originally in the hands

of the electorate, but is now controlled by yet another

elite. The fact that this ministry is well-intended

does not, in even the slightest fashion, rectify the

substantive problem that an elite group, by definition,

cannot access the information of the plebian masses.

We spent several millenia learning this lesson. Pious

concern for the "victims," although admirable in some

respects, is not sufficient reason to abandon this

hard-won accomplishment. We cannot afford the vanities 250

of those who want to play "God." Neglecting this social insight will eventualy harm us all--"victim" and

"victimizer."

The more interesting question is why the richest and most successful society in the entire history of humanity would find such a compelling attraction in the pretense that we are powerless and helpless victims.

Taking a clue from Nietzsche's prophetic powers, one might suggest that we are not victims yet, but give us a few years, we will accomplish it the old fashioned way, with hard work and attention to detail. We certainly seem to be making a promising start.

The powerful appeal of the piteous victim seems to reflect our desire to play God, to replace the God that we killed. The state is the perfect embodiment of that image, omniscient, omniferous, omnipresent, and omnipotent. But, like the puny little man behind the veil in The Wizard of Oz, the state is none of these. It is merely the reflection of our desire for death, for all the answers in a neat little package, for the rest-in-peace stasis which prompted our original

Creation myth and all subsequent variations. The bittersweet truth is that we do not know what we want nor where we are going. We have no choice but to allow 251

the complexities to work themselves out. We have to keep in touch with each other and allow the information to flow as smoothly as possible. The state was once helpful in this perennial endeavor, but now is an unnecessary hindrance.

This loss of information flow can sometimes approach the critical, as if our whole society indulged a collective pre-frontal lobotomy. The recently elected

Democratic administration is attempting to promote an ambitious spending program, a rather typical

Democratic suggestion. The irony of ironies is that this program is partially justified as a deficit cutting measure. This implicit sarcasm is matched only by the Republican's original intent to drive the deficit so high that the Democrats would never again have the opportunity to present another big spending program.

It appears that our politicians' satirical inclinations are unmatched by anything in our long literary history.

The Republicans originally overcame their justifiable aversion to deficit spending in the vain hope thay they would permanently cripple the Democratic urge in that direction. Matching the Republican's cynicism, the Democrat's simply borrowed a page from their opponent's playbook and now present their spending 252

programs as deficit reductions. The most amazing part of the whole charade is the patience with which the

American people seem to tolerate these shenanigans.

It is as if they have already given up; perhaps they no longer expect their political apparatus to deliver anything other than Swiftian satire.

Even this profoundly disheartening sham pales in comparison to the complete disregard for the obvious which seems to characterize the debate surrounding the new program. One of the tenets of macroeconomics is that extensive government deficits will eventually dominate the bond market, driving up interest rates and consequently crippling the private borrowing which would normally propel the general economy. To many traders' amazement, this has not occurred in the 1980's.

As American government deficits skyrocketed, both long and short term interest rates inexplicably continued to decline. The long bond was in the high teens in the early eighties and is now under seven percent.

Short term Treasury bills have declined from the low twenties to around three percent during the same time.

Interest rates are now lower than at anytime since the first oil crisis in the early 1970's. Although housing and other hard assets have climbed 253

significantly, although equity assets have also become much costlier, although wages and salaries have appreciated (less precipitous with inflation adjustment), money is cheaper than at anytime in recent memory.

The various reasons for this anomaly have been debated, but no one has presented a completely viable explanation. In some respects, this situation is an attractive metaphor for this paper, which would suggest that interest rates, like other aspects of our economy and our social life, cannot always be explained with facile certainties.

The more incredible phenomenon spawned by this paradox is the fashion in which our politicians, and the critical commentary which supposedly challenges and explicates their statements, can completely ignore reality while paying homage to theoretical "truths".

On several different occasions, the Democratic president, Bill Clinton, has justified his deficit reduction package with references to "high interest rates," implying that his deficit reduction plans will lower interest rates. These were not slips of the tongue, they have been repeated several times; nor is it an expression of fear for the future direction 254

of interest rates. Although we are no longer surprised that politicians would engage in bold lies to justify their predations, it is quite surprising that no one has called him to task on this outright prevarication.

In Clinton's defense, this does seem to be one lie that he is completely unaware of--he is not lying, he is merely ignorant, if that is any consolation.

However, his ignorant homage to a supposed macroeconomic truth, one which has obviously not withstood recent empirical testing, is perhaps ultimately more alarming than the politician's traditional proclivity for the convenient lie.

One does not have to be a bond trader, versed

in the sophistication of a vaguely perceived,

specialized market in order to appreciate this

equivocation. One can find headlines on the same pages of our popular journals, one explicating Clinton's hopes to reduce interest rates by deficit reduction,

and another proclaiming the lowest interest rates in

the long bond's history (the thirty-year was only

initiated in 1977). Perhaps the suggestion of a

collective lobotomy actually understates our political

insanity. Let us hope that Sophocles was exaggerating

when he said that those whom the gods wish to destroy, 255

they first make mad. 8

Another way in which the state retards our evolution is the way in which it perverts our legitimate concerns into a defense of the bureaucracy's concerns for preservation. The hotly debated "school choice" reforms exemplify this tendency. School choice reformers have suggested that vouchers be issued to the families with school-age children so that the various families could select a school which suited their own perceived needs for their child's education.

In some cases, the vouchers would be used for existing private schools. But, the real threat to the education bureaucracy is the fact that these vouchers would greatly enhance the creation of new private schools, materializing in response to the varied needs of our various families, and consequently reducing the necessity of an extensive state bureaucracy to oversee our education requirements.

As might be expected, the education bureaucracy has responded vigorously in defense of its perquisites.

As might also be expected, they have phrased the defense of their own self-interest in the language of social piety which characterizes our dialogue with the contemporary bureaucracy; they pretend that school 256

choice is an attack on education itself, or even more outrageously, as an attack on our very children.

Considering the hallo\'led status of "the poor" in the contemporary American political discourse, it is perhaps to be expected that the bureaucrats often phrase their defense in terms of its impact on the inner-city schools which are attended primarily by the poorer classes. This deception is particularly chilling because it is actually the poor who would benefit the most from the vouchers, particularly the upwardly mobile poor who incarnate the justification for most of our social programming. These are precisely the people who can most utilize the benefits of the school choice vouchers. Unable to move to the better neighborhoods (which already have good schools) because of financial restraints, they could, however, use their vouchers to select schools which are delivering an education more suited to their requirements, whether private or public. Many of them are already straining their limited budgets in order to pay for private schools which they feel, often justifiably, offer a more suitable environment for their children's education.

There are many remarkable ironies evidenced 257

by this debate. One is the way in which the upper middle class have resisted the proposed innovation, somewhat understandably as they would not gain significantly from it. The public schools in the better neighborhoods are already doing a reasonable job.

The irony is implicit in the way that they justify their resistance, once again, in terms of the "unfair" impact on the "poor," undoubtedly taking their cue from the education bureaucracy; evidently now, we not only believe the bureaucracy's indulgent lies, we even borrow their deceits to cloak our own self-interest.

Another irony is the way in which the various teacher organizations have resisted. Most teachers would retain their jobs, although perhaps in schools that have been improved by the inherent competition engendered by this movement. One might suspect that

it is the Teachers Union which is leading the resistance, but even most of the union bureaucrats would retain their positions. Only the worst excesses of the system would be eliminated by this change, the kinds that everyone--teachers, parents,

bureaucrats--complains about. It seems that when our

perceptions are freighted with the interest of the

bureaucracies, we actually become attached to those 258

very addictions in ourselves that we otherwise attempt to eliminate (laziness, elitist perquisites, inefficiencies of all sorts). Perhaps the greatest irony is that the people who are leading the resistance are, in general, the very same who nominally exhort the value of "change" (statist liberals love to invoke this shibboleth, a cynicism matched by their appropriation of the word "liberal" (free, independent) to disguise their essentially fascio-statist tendencies).

The state bureaucracies are somewhat suited to the administration of yesterday's solutions. They are completely inadequate when asked to address the problems of tomorrow. They are reasonably efficient at administering the rules, and yet embarrassingly inefficient when asked to help create values. Most of us recognize this, and yet we refrain from admitting the obvious conclusion. This faith in the collective embodiment of our fearful desire for an exogenous source of transcendental authority is woefully misplaced when administered by the modern state. The painful angst spawned by the reforging of the chains of our past is not eased simply by proclaiming the prison a kingdom. XII. THE WEATHER

Man became all that he is without understanding it. Giambattista Vico

Everybody complains about the weather, but nobody does anything about it. Although the mathematician, John von Neumann, thought that perhaps

science could eventually correct this deficiency, one of the great discoveries of modern mathematical physics, chaos theory, has revealed that the weather is too chaotic, too unpredictable, to be ascertained and controlled by rational methods. The same is true of other complex systems such as the economy (there are very few rich economists), evolution (if God created

this world, he was far from perfect), animal behavior

(ours too), culture and society (not for lack of

trying). Chaotic systems are not deterministic, they

are "unsimulatable". In other words, the best

approximation of the weather is the weather itself.

The hubristic concupiscence of our Mind rebels against

this conclusion and, retrospectively recognizing

patterns in the weather, the economy, and social

systems, assumes that recognition implies dominion.

But, so far at least, our attempts to rationalize and

control the social fundamentals have been as fruitless

259 260

as the quest for accurate, long-term weather pred lC' t'lone 1

Cybernetics and evolution provide us with the clues for approaching these mysteries. The key to survival for these organic orders is adaptation to the actual constraints actually encountered, not imagined or theorized. Feedback loops allow the information itself to chart its future course and resolve unanticipated difficulties. But, only information which has been challenged through successful competitive cooperation endures. Although too complex and chaotic for the rational mind to categorize perfectly, "selective systems" are quite capable of managing complexity in such a way that it almost seems rational when viewed from a distance by the limited human mind.

This contemplative respect is the most appropriate way to understand culture and society, as well as the economic determinants which guide them.

It is understood unconsciously by the working class and expressed in the popular sayings which espouse

"the school of hard knocks," and "get real," but is

resisted mightily by the servants of the One Mind, who naturally overrate the powers of their master. 261

It is difficult to rationally overcome problems in a complex order because the Mind does not even know what the real problems "are", or "will be". It does a little better with the problems that "were", but, unrecognized by the Mind, Culture is silently dealing with tomorrow's problems, not yesterday's.

Lenin dreamed of creating a military industrial powerhouse in the Soviet Union that would at least provide the people with the basic necessities. His followers succeeded beyond his wildest dreams. He would have been wildly impressed if he could have witnessed the Soviet Union of the 1980's because it had accomplished all that he could have imagined in the 1920's. The quintessential angst spawned by the ironies of our journey could be reflected in Lenin's complete inability to understand why the Soviet peoples were rejecting the "fulfillment" of his dream.

Nevertheless, the Soviet peoples "knew" that even though their system had realized the dreams of the past, it was woefully unable to deal with the visions of the

future. They had unconsciously realized that the complexity achieved by self-ordering systems is

considerably more productive than that accomplished by the systems which can be imagined and planned by 262

the comparatively paltry human mind.

It is so completely human, so perfectly natural, to rail against this inability to be "masters of our fate" and "captain of our ship" that one easily forgives the insistent tantrums of the clerical intelligentsia.

Clearly, the clerics are nothing more than the embodiment of all Humanity's desire to be in rational control of our own destiny.

Perhaps the proclivity for cathartic, emotional reactions is older than the species itself. This seems to be a genus-wide tendency, as the hysterical chattering which typifies the primate band's response to external novelties suggests the perfect metaphor for our own frenetic reactions. From a distance, the convoluted contortions and frantic scurrying we have needlessly subjected ourselves to inspires more bemused pity than frustrated anger.

But, of course, we are not privileged to that kind of disinterested objectivity. Of necessity, we are forced to realize the significance of "reality", irrespective of the way in which it denies our moralistic desires for the ultimate control of the

Godhead.

Although we can sympathize with the emotionalism 263

which prompts this resistance to the actual, it is difficult to understand the intellectual insistence on this impulsive arrogance, as most modern intellectuals have transcended the puerile demand for an omnipotent God, and have embraced Darwinian evolution as the most compelling explanation of our history.

Most of what this essay is attempting to communicate could be derived from a meditation on the process of evolution. The physicist, Heinz Pagels, also wonders why social scientists,

••• have rarely grasped the import of the Darwin-Wallace notion of selection for their own work••• A selective system is a pattern producing and recognizing system, be it the pattern of life on earth, the symbolic order of the mind, or the pattern of culture. A selective system manages complexity. 2

The philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn, points out that the resistance to Darwin's theory of evolution was not the idea of evolution itself, but rather the fact that evolution was blind, that it had no moral point. This was a restatement of the entrenched megalomania which had earlier resisted the Copernican

Revolution, with its wild assertion that we (the earth) are not at the center of the universe, and that we 264

are not at rest. Judging from the intellectual stasis we seem to seek so desperately from our various authority figures, it was the latter heresy that actually bothered us the most; the "revolutions" of life itself are perhaps harder to bear than the fact that we are not Life's ultimate and central purpose.

These insights seemed to defy our very humanity.

It was not the facts themselves that bothered us, but rather the lack of control and the subsequent humility which they implied. Intellectuals, from Hesiod to

Plato to Rousseau to Rawls, echo the same arrogant resistance to any system which is self-ordering, which is "imposed" on individuals \vithout their conscious consent. It is humiliation, not humility, which the cleric experiences when confronting a self-ordering, complex system such as the economy, or even civilization itself, hence the vociferous critique of the Real combined with the most subtle form of self-loathing 3 which punctuates their explanations.

Our invention of God was an attempt to shield 4 us from this horrible vacuum. Although we have now outgrown the pretense of a omniscient God, we continue to erect the same barrier against the infinite with the help of the social sciences, which combine two 265

legacies of our most recent intellectual ancestors, the nominally "conservative" Christian piety and the, supposedly antithetical, "liberal" Enlightenment's hubristic faith in reasonable progress. Although helpful in their own time, the contemporary alloy of these two conceits is undermining the same civilization which both claim to be attempting to preserve.

This rationalization and institutionalization of Christian piety is, naturally enough, primarily a Western (i.e. Christian) problem. We seem to imbue our social relations with overwhelming moral significance. Perhaps we expect too much, complete and holy transcendence, and then, ultimately disappointed by society's inevitable failure in face of such stringent requirements, we become morally indignant, intolerant of humanity's inability to satisfy our desire for perfection.

Oriental perceptions seem to realize that it is just chopping wood and carrying water. They seem better equipped to understand that our social interactions are essentially practical, not ethical.

Perhaps their neglect of rationalized morality allows them to more easily follow the dictates of cultural

"mores", that other, and more ancient sense, of 266

morality. This attitude also allows them to perceive

the "rational" more clearly, unencumbered by moral angst. Whereas the very definition of the Western hero is partially based on his ability to successfully challenge the status quo, the typical Japanese hero

is famed for the nobility of his failure. Although both are honored for challenging the existing

parameters, the Japanese seem more inclined to appreciate the difficulty of defying Custom. Whereas we pursue labrynthian trails of moral purpose, Oriental ethical thought cuts right to the chase. It realizes that defying tradition is always dangerous, hence

failure is forgiven.

In 1864 the Choshu clan in western Japan recklessly challenged the European powers. Soon after their provocations began, they were utterly defeated by the British Navy at Shimonoseki. Rather than indulge

their moral indignation over this humiliating defeat,

they simply sent a delegation to the British requesting assistance in learning modern naval techniques. Several years later, this small provincial clan was instrumental

in overthrowing the long-reigning Tokugawa Shogunate.

They also dominated the key positions in the much admired Japanese Navy until well into the twentieth 267

century. Their ability to make the quick about-face was facilitated by the clarity with which they perceived their lack of modern technology. This was based on their ability to transcend the innate obstacle of envious self-pity and pursue the effective rather than 5 the indulgent.

Compare this attitude with that of the Irish, who also suffered numerous humiliating defeats at the hands of the British. Rather than learn from their conquerors, they concentrated on moral reprobation and pious affirmations, which lingers to this day in their "justifiable" spite towards the British.

The Irish are the poorest people in Europe today, despite becoming "civilized" before either the Anglo-Saxons or the Japanese. In contrast, the

Japanese were one of the few non-Western society to successfully resist the worst predations of Western colonialism. They are currently one of the wealthiest nations in the world, and they still have their language, customs, eccentricities, and idiosyncratic foibles that we all seem so attached to, both culturally and individually.

Nietzsche once suggested that Oriental philosophy had nothing of import to add to the Western 268

dialogue. It is possible that he completely misjudged their "perspective." Perhaps the "whole glance" of the Oriental vision was so radically different that even Nietzsche missed it, despite the irony that it was precisely along the path which he pointed out to the Western tradition, the necessity of transcending the pretense of the ideal, that the Eastern intuition traveled. They seemed to have been spared the dilemma of Gnostic dualism, that implicit subservience of matter to mind that has plagued the Western mind for so long.

Consequently, they have also been profoundly confused by some of our hypocritical moralisms. Several years ago, attempting to deflect praise for higher

Japanese student scores, the Japanese prime minister graciously suggested that American scores would have been as high if the averages had not been reduced by immigrants and non-standard dialect speakers. His attempt to praise America was greeted by the most profound criticism, demanding an apology for his

"racist" remarks. The minority advocates who led this attack are the same people who criticize American education for precisely the same reasons which the

Japanese prime minister pointed to. The standard justification for specialized educational treatment 269

is based on these same sub-standard test scores

(essentially, "our test scores are low, give us more money"). Evidently, pointing out the obvious is not appropriate for some "slant-eyed, little foreigner."

This is, of course, the other great irony of American race relations; the racist has not disappeared from polite American society, he has merely redirected his attitude from blacks to Orientals (preferably foreign).

The further irony is that American minority groups have often been the worst offenders, despite their presumed sensitivity to this issue (cf. the treatment of Korean immigrants in the Los Angeles riots of 1992).

One of the contemporary academy's favorite doctrines is multiculturalism, supposedly directed towards the promotion of non-Western values. Like most Puritanically correct visions, it strangles itself with its own conceit. The one prevailing paradigm which they have borrowed from the West is their informing metaphor, the bleeding heart moralism which is not only, arguably our worst trait, but also the one which several other culture areas of the world have graciously been spared (to some degree, at least).

They use this pious conceit to bludgeon the one accomplishment of the West which the rest of the world 270

has repeatedly embraced, when given the chance--liberal capitalism.

They pretend to overlook the obvious fact that

"the blond beast" \'las everY\'lhere, and in many colors.

They also prefer to overlook the fact that the market has tamed the "beast" far more effectively than pious angst. The market in our mutual desires rewards many activities more richly than war: consequently, it has partially tamed it; the hostile takeover is now preferred to invasion precisely because it is more profitable (unprofitable assets are more easily shed).

The power of the "Idyllic Past" myth is as strong today as it was for our religious ancestors

(cf. Christianity's "Garden of Eden," Rousseau's "noble savage," the Marxian dream of "primitive communism").

Twentieth century anthropologists and sociologists have expressed our fear of the future with the

"fantastic" conceit that all cultures are equal

(cultural relativism). Of course, in "God's" eyes, this may be true. It would be difficult to maintain that any societal pattern is "morally" superior to any other. But, even though slavery, human sacrifice, and infanticide may be partially "utilitarian," there are better ways. Some cultures address and satiate 271

our universal concupiscence in a more effective fashion.

These cultures expand and spread, not because of imperialistic jingoism, but because they are embraced and imitated by outsiders. Although there are no absolute standards by which to judge various societies, there are limited standards--the only kind we have ever "used." Although never "perfect," some forms of technology (including patterns of social organization) are more effective than anything else available at the time, and are therefore "selected."

Only a cleric would even bother to debate the issue.

A simple glance at contemporary patterns reveals that marginals have overwhelmingly embraced the "modern."

Theoretical feminism reveals our profound confusion, in its alliance with this superstitious

fantasy, as it attempts to contrast itself with the patriarchal values of Euro-centric modernism. But, one does not have to search very hard to realize that

traditional cultures are far more oppressive of women.

Women's sovereignty is the direct result of European modernity. It has not happened anywhere else.

Every culture has its genius. This is obvious

to all but the racist. Ironically, the multiculturalists display this racist attitude in its 272

most subtle form. Their attempts to demonstrate other culture's accomplishments are usually defined in terms of the prevailing Euro-American bourgeois paradigm and they often fail to appreciate significant achievements because of their parochial attitude.

African-Americans were largely responsible for creating the first form of world communion--American popular music (swing, jazz, bop, now rock In' roll).

However, celebrating this grand accomplishment would reduce American blacks to the status of "dancing fools", completely unacceptable to the racist vision which can only perceive "value" when it imitates the ~vestern bourgeois ideal. Instead, they pretend that the

Egyptian development of geometry was a "black" discovery. Perhaps this silliness descends from the deeper perversion implicit in the multiculturalist's attitude, the idea that the individual can only find pride and self-respect by identifying with his race, religion, or ethnic group. Recently, a respected, but obviously over zealous, academic historian has even suggested that the Egyptians themselves were actually "black." One can almost anticipate the eventual solution to the enduring mystery of

Shakespeare's real identity. One can only hope that 273

they remember his best line, "r·le thinks thou dost protest too much."

When Descartes, and later Kant, delineated the difference between science and mathematics on the one hand, and all other "metaphysical" speculation on the other, they intended to illustrate the power of the "practical" by its subjection to the rigorous testing of competing ideas. The irony is that they may have defeated their intended purpose by pointing out the obvious difference. Because the magic of science was so compelling, other disciplines wanted to share the limelight, hence the birth of the social

"sciences", which rarely, if ever, employ the rigorous competition of the scientific method, but merely flatter their metaphysical speculations with an invocation of the name, science. Consequently, our courts today accept the opinions of psychologists as if the statements were unequivocably "true".

A doctor, x-raying an arm and concluding that it is broken in two specific places, represents a considerably different perspective from that of a psychologist who uses his scientific sounding jargon essentially as a metaphor, to interpret and describe 274

the indescribable (ten different physicians would agree on the exact placement of the break; ten different psychologists ~lould most likely have eleven different interpretations regarding any given psychological problem). And yet, social scientists, from Comte on, continually flaunt the superiority of their "scientific" approach.

Calvin Hall, one of the leading neo-Freudians of the postwar era, used to privately confide to his students that psychoanalysis had achieved a success rate which suggested that 1/3 of the patients improved,

1/3 got worse, and 1/3 stayed the same. To the best of his knowledge, this was approximately the same cure rate achieved by the Medieval priest and the primeval witch-doctor. Evidently, the vulgar terminology of the street, "head-shrinker" was not that far off, after all. Most interestingly, the equal thirds success rate was also accomplished by no treatment at all. This is not intended as an indictment of psychology, which has obviously become the preferred form of contemporary community therapy. But, it is important to realize that these psychological insights are not definitive, but rather interpretive, even poetic. Their transcendental claims for scientific status are not 275

valid. Psychology is not the same kind of science that put men on the moon. Hopefully, our trust can learn some humility, especially when dealing with the promises of the social sciences.

Of course, there are significant insights to be gained from discursive, philosophical approaches.

The double irony is that most social scientists avoid even this legitimacy by clinging to a false notion of "science". Actually, the traditional methods of the speculative philosopher are not that inherently different from those of the modern scientist. All of our knowledge is conditional, waiting to be falsified, either scientifically or philosophically.

The key is the word, falsify, as in proven wrong by experience. In the sciences, this process is usually fairly simple. The experimental results either verify

(temporarily at least, until proven otherwise) the hypothetical assumption or destroy it. But, in the social sciences, and the humanities, the ability to ignore reality while perseverating on the infallibility of one's theoretical assumptions is a serious threat to even the simplest sense of corroboration.

Unfortunately, this ability is highly developed in most social scientists. We should never underestimate 276

their ability to find what they are looking for, particularly when they are motivated by the deeply felt religious convictions which characterize the modern academic (once again, Nietzsche's warning that convictions, not lies, are the greatest enemy of truth).

As Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn have reminded us, even our hallowed science is largely determined by its outlook, the paradigm by which the problem is 6 perceived. By rushing to imitate the expectations of a naively perceived science, our humanists betray, not only the essence of science, but also the real genius of humanism itself.

Much of the confusion surrounding the cachet of science is more properly understood in terms of the difference between the "subjective" first person perspective and the "objective" third person perspective. As children, we eventually acquire the maturity needed to appreciate the "other guy's" vievlpoint and it is this sense of the "objective" that we naturally aspire to in our philosophical musings.

But, we often confuse the epistemological with the ontological. Epistemological objectivity, freeing us from the bias of the first person perspective, is an advance which literally separates the men from the 277

boys, although it cannot always be measured in age.

Ontological objectivity, however, is unattainable. The subjective and the objective are different empiric categories. In short, it is impossible to escape the tyranny of our own perspective and the illusion of the attempt betrays even the epistemological distinction, which is both valid and helpful.

In the realm of political philosophy, third person objectivity is a mirage. Although a rigorous attention to the actual results of our various activities would be a significant improvement over the fairy tales which determine our current attitudes, ultimately, our musings cannot be falsified or proven wrong. Rather than indulge long arguments about the

"truth", we would be better served by establishing individual polling stations where everyone can "have it their way".

This is, in essence, what the market accomplishes. The market interacts with individual choice, not with collectives. Unlike even the best form of the political process, democracy, which must deal in voting majorities, the market allows each individual to decide. Obviously, there are a few issues 278

which are perhaps best decided by the traditional political process. But rather than continually politicizing the consumer's choices (the twentieth century trend), we might be better off privatizing some of our political choices.

Our aversion to the market process is primarily an aversion to our social realities. It is prompted by the same anthropomorphism which resisted Copernicus and Darwin. The market's impact does "feel" abrasive, impersonal, even abusive. But our emotional reaction is based primarily on the small group dynamics of our primeaval inheritance, the altruistic familiarity of the group and the blind obedience to the leader of the small band. This pattern is reinforced in childhood because the family is based on the same dynamic. As comforting as this past might appear to us today, it is impossible to return to; we would not tolerate surrendering the freedoms of modernity, even if we could. The great advantage of the market system is that it is a self-regulating system which transmits complex social information with a minimal degree of effort. He can "do it in our sleep". Consequently, very little knowledge is required on the part of the individual in order to participate effectively. This 279

is precisely what has always bothered the clerical mind, which needlessly elevates the status of the conscious decision to the level of the icon, worthy of religious worship.

Dismayed by these seemingly harsh realities of existence, we have looked for some form of transcendental omnipotence, explicitly anthropomorphic, and ostensibly for the purpose of elevating humanity to some level "above" reality; gods, God, and now, the state. Hegel, the philosophical founder of the modern state, understood this explicit connection,

The correct conviction that the state rests on religion•••in order to preserve the state, religion must be carried into it, in buckets and bushels, in order to impress it upon peoples' minds •••when we say that the state is based on religion and that it has its roots in it, we mean essentially that it has arisen from it and now and always continues to arise out of it••• the principles of the state regarded as•••determinations of divine nature itself.7

Organized religion was effective, in its time, but it will not suffice now. We have come too far and we have been too successful. We have too many freedoms; we are too rich. The State, the prevailing modern form of organized religion, attempts to divorce the individual from his own interests in order to put him 280

at the disposal of the collective. Both the Jesuits and the Leninists (other militarists as well) all sought propertyless young men, hopefully celibate, because they realized that controlling sex and property, the twin pillars of individuation, were the key to effective social dominion.

Just as sex was "the dirty little secret" of the nineteenth century, property has become the twentieth century source of shame. Classical liberalism understood that both the personal freedoms and the property rights of the individual had to be protected.

This insight was needlessly divided into the twentieth century versions of liberal and conservative, the former concentrating on personal rights and the latter focusing on property rights. Consequently, our thymotic urges are squandered on irrelevant debates, one side finding the source of modernity's dilemma in fat-cat conspiracies and the other blaming our problems on welfare cheats. Culture worked for millenia to convince us that these two freedoms are inseperable. Perhaps we should not be so hasty in abandoning the insight.

The illusory diffraction of liberalism into these components is reflected by the insistence with which our various political visions lay claim to the 281

word, liberal; as if we all suspect that there is some inherent truth at its core. Socialists, fascists, libertarians; we all claim to be liberal. One of the great ironies of the contemporary political dialogue is that the contemporary vision closest to classical liberalism is now called "conservative" (not the David

Duke variety, but the Milton Friedman type).

Liberal, like liberty, derives from liber, the sons, or children; later implying freedman. The transition from son to freedman might seem arbitrary, but our language knows better. The son, upon taking his inheritance, becomes the freedman. Property was always the defining characteristic, a fact which the

Korean shop-owners in Los Angeles understand more fully than our contemporary "liberals".

Even if his "facts" are superficial, Freud got the basic metaphor right. We are all the children of Oedipus, fighting over our inheritance. The Oedipal myth reflects the definitive singularity, and ultimately, the enticing appeal, of Western restlessness. Traditional cultures worship the ancestors. \'Je "kill" them; we overthrow their paradigms, we try to surpass them. We do it by grabbing; our acquisitiveness guided us as we wrested 282

our freedom, first from the constraints of the natural world and later from the hierarchial control of the tribal patriarch. This seizure of property from God the Father, in both his natural and social incarnations, is our defining characteristic, our Right, our Blessed

Curse.

Perhaps such respect for a mere word should not be overlooked. Even our radical solutions pay homage to it. The "le ft" goes past ~1arx to Bakunin and Proudhon. The "right" goes out beyond Burke to

Ayn Rand. They meet in the libertarian anarchist, where the inherent opposition of the line meets the unity of the circle. Surprisingly enough, Locke, deTocqueville, and Acton are already there. Perhaps the "hope" of the radical leftist and the "concern" of the conservative rightist join together in the

libertarian liberal; perhaps our intuitive respect

for the word is justified.

All of them insisted on defending the social

from the political. The value of regionalism,

insistence on the decentralizat~on of authority, and

fear of the state, both monarchical and democratic,

are attitudes that all of them share--radical, liberal,

and conservative. Respect for the individual is 283

affirmed by all of them, in sharp contrast to the collectivist hype which pervades the leftist, rightist, and centrist versions of statism. Just as we are all

"liberals," perhaps our solutions are actually radical.

Certainly, if one insists on the polarity of opposition, the real distinction is between the individualism of the radical right (libertarian), radical left

(anarchist), and classical liberal on the one extreme and the collectivist faith in the state of the fascists, communists, socialists, and Big Brother liberals on the other.

Even those who read history will be condemned to repeat it if they do not read between the lines.

The ubiquitous fascist threat which the talk-shows love to discuss is not to be seen in a few isolated

European skinheads. It is embodied in the millions of well-intended moderns who place their faith in redemption at the feet of the state. The idea that the collective vlill "do it" (support, constrain, and enlighten) for us is the essence of fascism, communism, socialism and all the other forms of statism, including the welfare liberalism which has become so dominant in the late twentieth century.

Democracy is no guarantee of protection against 284

demagogues and charlatans; remember, Nazi Germany was essentially democratic--Hitler was duly elected. Wealth is some protection, but our contemporary affluence is not guaranteed; in fact, currently, our best efforts appear to be designed to modify the situation as rapidly as possible. When our concupiscent desires are threatened by poor economic conditions, the flame will appear to spontaneously ignite the tinder box of our faith in the collective, with its attendant jingoistic tribalism, frantically searching for some foreign source of infection on which to project its own inadequacies.

The collective will not protect us. We have to do it ourselves, even though we resist admitting it. Although trivialized by various applications in the twentieth century, Nietzsche's insight of the ubermensch, the overman, has particular relevance for us now. We do not want to destroy the propellant of civilization, concupiscence, but we do not want to be victimized by it either. Only the individual, empowered by the advice of Culture in the form of laws protecting both the person and the person's possessions,

can adequately defend himself from the predations of others. Like it or not, we all have to become Overmen

in order to realize our personal destiny without being 285

abused by every charlatan with a good sales pitch.

The unwary will suspect that this essay contrasts market capitalism with socialism. But, this is no longer an issue. Contemporary Marxists have essentially conceded that the market is more efficient than centralized control. They have finally accepted the Austrian synthesis as the best explanation of economic development (cf. After the Fall, a recent survey of contemporary Marxian thought).

The real contrast offered here is the dialectic between the state (the collective) and the individual.

This has always been the real issue, from the very beginning, when Saint Simon coined the term socialism in contrast to individualism. But, the clerics knew that this would never fly. The people had learned too much to sublimate their own individual desires to the collective; more particularly to various elite groups who usurped the rhetoric of the collective in order to pursue their own agendas. The market, however, was an easy target, because of the obvious inequities which it engendered. We have been jealous of the "rich" since the very beginning, even as we scrambled to join them.

Consequently, the focus shifted away from the 286

individual to capitalism, but never broke free completely. The nineteenth century radicals unconsciously realized that the key issue was private property. Probably confused by their own conceit, the attack on the individual under the rubric of ownership, they failed to realize that "private" vias the key, and that property was secondary (perhaps they thought "private" \'las just an another adjective).

Our entire history can be viewed as the organic development and subsequent increase of the "private."

From our first personal tools to the most recent family business, privacy has always been the essential issue; the "own" in ownership.

Even the modern "liberals" understand this dichotomy between the individual and the collective.

They struggle incessantly to protect the personal rights of the individual from "the people" (the police and the district attorney represent "the people" in contemporary court disputes). But, confused by their theological heritage, they press incessant attacks on the individual's property rights, not realizing that "own" and "ownerhip," like "private" and

"property," are inseperable. The modern conservatives defend our property rights, but assume that the police, 287

district attorney's office, and other statist authoritarian figures are ahlays "right," hence their haphazard guardianship of our personal rights.

Obviously, we need to combine both attitudes.

The liberal synthesis accomplished this to a great degree. It realized that the law had evolved over the ages to meet our incessant demands for precisely these two protections. We forced kings to kneel to it (Magna Carta), the Church to genuflect to it, and the aristocrats to bow to it (liberal revolution).

Yet now, as if oblivious to the centuries of hard work, we surrender it to indignant moralists and state bureaucrats, and barely even notice our loss.

Although it would be pointless to condemn the authoritarian collectives of our past (as if our task

\'las to identify the "good boys" and the "bad boys" in our ambivalent history), it is important to realize that our journey has always been marked by the attempts to free ourselves from collective control. Although the tribe, Church, and state have empowered and protected us in various ways, like all children, we looked forward with both hopeful expectation and some dread, to the time when we could free ourselves from parental constraint. Coinage and market exchange, 288

literacy and the consequent dispersal of ideas, the gradual diffusion of wealth--these have always been the essential opposition to the militaristic and religious authoritarianism of the state.

Thankfully, the hustlers will always be one step ahead of the dutiful government clerk. They represent the cutting edge of our desire for more, and clearly, we \vant our "hungriest" out there on the

"front line." But, as Adam Smith warned us, and we have learned repeatedly, if we do not empower and defend ourselves, they will take advantage of the power vacuum.

Perhaps this is appropriate. Until our sense of self-worth develops sufficiently, we are probably more successful when exploited. Our chains have always been illusory. As soon as we are prepared to throw them off, they usually disappear. Although the chains may be a mirage, our love of them is certainly not.

Until \ve are willing and able to escape the "need" for external authority, we will continually reforge them.

The Savings and Loan crisis is "proof" that the Republican's pro-business stance is as destructive as the Democrat's anti-business attitude (the market 289

is best left untouched; if you cannot "survive," it is because no one values your work--your occupation is anti-social). Trusting "good businessmen" not to abuse the government guarantees (the $100,000 per account federal insurance--the "key" to the \'lhole issue) is not a policy which Adam Smith would have recommended.

Boesky's coup in pulling off a government sanctioned "insider trade of the century" as part of his actual sentence--he was allowed, actually compelled, to sell his extensive holdings before the announcement of his crime, which caused the market to collapse, thus saving millions--also reveals the ability of the entrepreneurs to outwit the government bureaucrats.

Ralph Nader's evolution from the defender of the underdog to patron saint of the liability lawyers, who reap fortunes as our insurance premiums skyrocket, is yet another indication that we cannot expect someone else to watch over us and protect us.

If we truly want the farmer, woodsman, hermit, and grocer to compete successfully with the post-modern

"confidence" men (advocates, politicians; those who moralize to gain our trust), then, clearly, we want to minimize statist legislation rather than continually increase it. The hustlers always react more quickly 290

to the legal changes--that is their job. Nost of us do not even want to think about it. Our best efforts at protecting ourselves, particularly when exercised through the state collective, are often the most disappointing precisely because we always look for someone else to do it for us.

We find this profoundly unfortunate, as our continual dirges attest, but the fact remains that there really is no God to care for us, nor are any of our God-substitutes accomplishing this divine mission of reassurance with any degree of effectiveness. God is dead, it is time to bury Him. XIII. THE FALL

••• a wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and labor, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government.•• Thomas Jefferson

This essay has attempted to synthesize many divergent strands of our political and economic philosophy. It began with the assumption that we are essentially materialistic, a concept borrowed from many sources; perhaps Marx and his mentor, general economic theory, as explicated by Smith and Ricardo, deserve the primary credit. Adding the insights of

Bacon, Freud, and Nietzsche prompted the expansion of a limited materialism to a more inclusive

"concupiscence" as a primary propellant in human

history.

Evaluating the various approaches to our social

problems, usually delineated by some form of

conservative, liberal, and radical, it was suggested

that we have all said essentially the same thing,

irrespective of our various ideological labels. In

certain respects, we are all radical in that our desire

drives us to impatiently attempt to remedy the various

291 292

contradictions which we encounter in our social world.

In other respects, we are all conservative, particularly in the modern era, because the corrosives of modernity send us all scurrying for the shelter of bygone illusions. This reactionary longing for the illusions of childhood was especially evidenced by the typical

"radical" solutions of the post-Enlightenment era; intriguing concoctions seduced by every form of contradiction, paradox, irony, satire, and just plain confusion. It was also suggested that this

"conservatism," self-destructively prompted by envy, radical impatience, and intellectual angst, combined the seemingly contradictory oppositions of the radical's faith in omnipotent reason and the conservative's faith in Christian piety/pity. This reliance on two outdated moralities has led to frustration. We have learned too much. Neither is "sacred" anymore.

This essay also investigated another sense of both morality and conservatism. The morality of our "mores", or customs, inspired by the deep tissue of Cultural hearth laws, advises us with the "morals" of parables and other folk tales to recognize the restraints of a more empowering form of conservatism, the Nietzschean conservatism which legitimately fears 293

the hubris of the One Mind and reminds us of our

inability to ever completely escape the power of

Instinct and Culture.

Although we are not as "free" of these restraints as we like to imagine, we are not powerless either. We can tame Instinct and learn from the advice of Culture, but only the iciest clarity of perception will spare us from the futile conceits of our best

intentions. This realization suggests the unlikely pairing of anarchistic populism, unclouded by the envy and impatience which typically cannibalized its

intentions, and respect for our material propellants, which Culture has synthesized for us in the form of market exchange. The implication is that we have no need to fear the anarchy of the free market. We can

trust our "creation."

Post-Enlightenment progressives have been

continually derailed by their "moral" aversion to the

implicit individualism of the market order and their resultant preference for some form of mystagogic

collectivism, usually expressed with various schemes of rationalized redistribution. This faith is quite

understandable, considering the pervasive "authoritarian

collective" content of their common Christian cultural 294

heritage. These pieties were also primarily responsible for the feeling that we should somehow be ashamed of our inevitable pursuit of self-interest, naturally reinforced by the various elites \vho ardently encouraged this attitude in the subservient masses.

If this paper could go so far as to make a proposal, it might be expressed in the hypothetical, and quite fanciful, wish that the radical anarchist,

Kropotkin, might have read the "conservative,"

Nietzsche, and then, no longer ashamed of our actual, material, ubermensch selves, gone on to read the liberal, Hayek, who explained that Culture's most significant, recent gift (we made it; we earned it!) was market exchange, defended and empowered by laws respecting both the person and the person's property.

The anonymous assumes noblity by seizing, discovering, and utilizing the tools which make it possible.

If only Kropotkin had been "doing his homework."

Consider the following statement,

The state is government from above downwards •••this minority, even if it were a thousand times elected by universal suffrage and controlled in its acts by popular institutions, unless it were endowed with the omniscience, omnipresence and omnipotence which the theologians attribute to God, it is impossible that it could know and foresee the needs, or satisfy with an even justice the most pressing 295

interests in the world.1

Although Nietzsche would have been sympathetic, we naturally identify this quotation with Hayek. The

"know'ledge problem" is one of the main themes of the

Austrian economists, particularly Hises and Hayek.

Yet, actually, it was the anarchist, Bakunin, who penned these \'lords.

Kropotkin certainly also read that other anarchist, Proudhon, who first suggested that economic independence was even more important than political independence, a notion which the "pro-market" Austrians 2 would certainly sympathize with. Marx criticized

Proudhon as a "petit-peasant socialist" because of the voluntaristic implications which Proudhon espoused for small producers, that heresy which suggested that we find economic enfranchisement on our own, rather than \'laiting for a clerical elite to "show" us.

Kropotkin, like most nineteenth century social philosophers, missed this key insight of his mentors.

Although delineating themselves from other socialists by their fear and suspicion of Bismarckian statism, the anarchists searched in vain for an alternative social cohesive. We would have to wait for the 296

Austrians to point out the obvious. Free exchange has always been our preferred way of socializing with each other.

Of course, no person is an island. We are social animals. In a certain sense, all humans, like all primates, are collectivists. The real question is how we will collectively interact--guided by the

"mores" of the extended order of civilization, with its reliance on market exchange as the primary method of communication, or depending on our well-intended rational moralisms in their attempt to predict and control our social directions. The latter choice fails primarily because of the knowledge problem, our inability to "know" where we are supposed to be going.

It also flounders in its reliance on subjectively derived moralisms, tending to promote charlatans and demagogues to critical choke points in the communication flow (anyone who can make a convincing case for the stewardship of our conscience). Perhaps the words of the Austrian economist, Ludwig Mises, would be helpful,

The truth is that the alternative is not between a dead mechanism or a rigid automatism on one hand and conscious planning on the other hand. The question is whose planning? Should each member 297

of society plan for himself, or should a benevolent government alone plan for them all? The issue is not autonomism versus conscious action; it is autonomous action of each individual versus the exclusive action of the government.3

Perhaps we should be more humble in our expectations of our mind's capabilities. Perhaps, it is ultimately a matter of which street aphorism we want to describe the inevitable hierarchy spawned by the "actual use" of social interaction and communal information--"cream rises," or "shit floats."

It was also suggested that the clerical intelligentsia have been generally inadequate to the task of explicating our social contradictions because of their parochial outlook; one blinded by their faith in the rational and naive perceptions of the "good"--in short, their religious convictions. Prompted by these derivative moralities and the ambition for a teleological mission, their ancient desire to lead us into the Promised Land, they have ultimately betrayed both their own legitimate "genius" and, perhaps more

importantly, the general society's need for the continual resolution of conflict and contradiction.

The proper role of the intelligentsia is that of the kibbitzer who points out inconsistencies rather than 298

the pretender to the throne who tells us when we are operating within God's intended parameters. Although this writer does not doubt the secular cleric's purity of intent, we must remember that more people have been killed, tyrannized and abused in the name of God than were ever oppressed in the name of the Devil. It is not the evil people we have to worry about; it is the

"good" ones.

The modern state embodies many of the delusions which this essay has attempted to sketch. It tempts us with a vague conception of the "public interest" and encourages us to believe that, if democratically elected, it will reflect our deepest desires and effectively actualize them for us. There are some public goods which are most suitably addressed by a national organization, but most of our moral choices, our values, are best left to individuals to choose in their own eclectic fashion.

Because of the various exigencies discussed throughout this paper, the state is inadequate to the job we demand of it. Ultimately, it oppresses our ideals and our persons in the most profound way. The most incredible irony is the fact that we continue to sustain this anomaly out of our fear and ignorance, 299

even though it has become increasingly obvious that the state effectively frustrates the fullfillment of the essential freedoms which Humanity has sought in the past, and is largely achieving in the present.

Our dependence restates the anxiety of childhood. We look for exogenous authority in order to avoid personal responsibility. But, eventually the child grows up and embraces the new freedoms and responsibilities. Our social culture has been maturing over the millenia. We enjoy the new freedoms, but seem hesitant to take the next steps. Our fear ultimately invites abuse from whatever authoritarian elite we elevate to the status of caretakers of our conscience. The result of our paradoxical dilemma is humanity's continual lament, succinctly expressed in the Russian saying, "Za chto borolis, na to i naporolis" (we got screwed by the very same thing we had fought for). 4

The essential parameters of our social relationships are actually quite simple. In the West

(and obviously, despite the pretensions of the multiculturalists, we are all "cosmopolitans" now), it is expressed most succinctly in the Golden Rule,

"Do unto others as you \'lOuld have done to you." In 300

more secular terms, everyone wants the freedom to pursue his or her own path, as long as they do not directly interfer with another's desire for the same freedom.

The essentials of common law have evolved over the millenia to ensure these freedoms and they are reasonably efficient in this endeavor, particularly

if we can refrain from the hubristic desire to "improve"

them. Of course, they must evolve in order to meet new challenges, but the attitude which prompts and directs these changes is the crucial factor; we cannot rely on the clergy because their "attitude" is

fundamentally inappropriate. 5 Our "attitude" must respect reality, not wish-fulfillment.

Envy and impatience may be tolerable as motivations, but we should be wary of allowing them

to control our directions. This is difficult; Our work

is slow, and appears sloppy and inconclusive. Perhaps

there is some consolation in the fact that although

We do not learn much, We do learn a little; over the

centuries there has been "some" progress (modern moralists love to question this concept of progress;

their angst is probably justified when it comes to

their favorite kind, moral progress; but, material

progress is too obvious for words). Power has been 301

constantly diffusing, though rarely fast enough to satisfy our concupiscent desire for the stasis of perfection. The urge to push it along is understandable, but ultimately futile. The more we attempt to imitate God, the more we resemble Wiley

Coyote.

Accepting this bittersweet reality does not automatically reduce us to a mechanized heap of selfish automatons in a Spencerian jungle, but perhaps it will free us from the cleric's conviction that we have something to be ashamed of. Despite the clergy's exhortations to the contrary, the intrinsic truth that we have been compiling over the centuries divulges the secret revelation that Adam and Eve never fell.

In thrall to the priest's dialectical Gnostic vision, we have been taught to be ashamed of ourselves, particularly our concupiscent promptings. Influenced by the Christian ethical confusion of the "good" with the altruistic, we deny our relevant motives and consequently pretend that there is some higher ideal to serve. Yet all descriptions of this ideal insist that it is highly personal, intensely subjective, the substance of individualism. Perhaps we destroy its transcendental essence when we attempt to use it as 302

the basis for political interaction. Perhaps even more importantly, we subvert the foundations of dependable political interaction by attempting to make it sacred.

Eating the fruit in the Garden of Eden was not our downfall, but our glory. This inquisitive concupiscence not only defines Humanity, it is our best attribute, particularly when tamed, and thereby improved, by the long-sought restraints of law and civilized order. If Humanity is prideful, acquisitive and selfish--the one aspect which the entire ideological spectrum seems to agree on--then, so be it. What you see is what you get. There is no justification for being ashamed of what we are, and our means of getting here. It is ultimately counterproductive to pretend otherwise; it only leads to confusion.

There is an old joke about a man who notices a stranger pounding a drum and asks him,

"Hhat are you doing?"

"Keeping the tigers away," the other man responds. "Are you crazy, man? There aren't any tigers around here." 303

IIVlorks. Don't it! II

This is the essential II moralll of this vlOrk. If we want a better world, to some degree, we have to let it happen (of course, there is a whole universe within that "degree ll ; this paper attempts a description).

All of our insistent drum-beating, although touching, emotionally stirring, even impressive, only adds to the confusion and ultimately binds our chains a little tighter. XIV. APOLOGIA

God brake my head. Anthony, a Massachusetts Indian

I hope that this paper will not be interpreted as an attack on the motivations and intentions of any of the groups or outlooks which I have criticized.

I am well aware of the nobility of purpose which typically informs most socialists, Christians, academics, and other advocates of our imagination.

I hope it is also obvious that my critique of the modern academy is directed towards the dominant clerisy whose favorite "superstitions" have inadvertently allmved their best intentions to cannibalize the intended results. Other than this critique, I have the greatest respect for intellectuals, including most twentieth century academics.

Nor am I attempting to suggest that intellectual activity is, in any sense, "inferior" to more practical pursuits. Ideas and ideals are important. I only suggest that we remember that we created ideals to serve ourselves. They are not "true," only useful.

If these ideals are not working, then perhaps we should check the warranty.

Some critics might suggest that I have "used"

304 305

many of my sources in an iconoclastic fashion, particularly Nietzsche and Marx. I would counter that none of our "culture heroes" should be deified. 1!Je should not assume that they were perfect. We do not have to enshrine every word, nor even assume that they offerred a coherent "package." This is especially true of Nietzsche, with whom one can find textual support for almost anything. It is true that Nietzsche was critical of libertarian capitalism, whereas I combine him with Marx to present a defense of the same.

Even the Marx that I fuse him with--the individualist, the materialist, the one who praised capitalism as a mode of production, the prescient critic of our contemporary, "utopian socialist" fantasies--is hardly the one \~e recognize from our sociology survey courses.

I can only suggest that the sceptic read them, add the insights derived from subsequent twentieth century history, and then consider my interpretation.

Naturally, remember that they could have been profoundly wrong on any number of issues, which does not deny their insights in other respects. Obviously, the trick is to distinguish between what is currently helpful, and what has been rendered superfluous by subsequent history and experience. 306

I must asl~ the reader for similar indulgence in regard to this paper. Like all attempts to explain the exigencies of our social interaction, this thesis threads a very fine line between contradiction and opposition, inconsistency and insight.

Although I have argued that the individual is our fundamental source of "truth," I have often used holistic, almost sociological, paradigms to explicate that position. I reject the hard form of the Hegelian-Marxian historical dialectic, and yet suggest the soft conceit of a general trend toward enhanced individual sovereignty, dialectically linked with the image of the One vlorld Family.

I have attempted to reveal the hypocrisy of unexamined idealism and the ultimate subservience of the ideal to the material, and yet even putting pen to paper challenges that assertion. At times, I suggest that we clarify our confused impressions of the distinction between the ideal (sacred) and the material

(profane), while simultaneously proposing that there is no "real" dichotomy, other than the mental pretense.

Although critical of Christian moralism, particularly as it is delineated by the "progressive" clerisy of the modern era, the entire thrust of my paper is 307

eschatological (i.e., the historiography of the

Christian), in its concern with humanity's future.

Although I have criticized the religious outlooy. throughout this thesis, perhaps I should remind the reader that my complaint is directed only towards outmoded theologies, what we retrospectively term

"superstitious." Humanity has used many conceits in the past. These paradigms only became contradictory after we had learned too much to continue honoring them. They lost their sacred quality (i.e., useful) and became merely superstition. All peoples consider their own cultural paradigms sacred and true; only the illusions of the past are considered false. I am suggesting that many of our twentieth century ideals have become outmoded; they are currently nothing more than "superstition." This dependence on outmoded ideals breeds contradiction, which, I suggest, is the "real" source of our modern dilemma.

Although in apparent contradiction to the main theme of the thesis, in some respects, I am proposing that our impressions of social reality are essentially religious. Our various impressions of the "Good" are inevitably an eclectic mixture of vague empiricism, intuitive rationalism, culturally determined 308

superstition, and often, just plain confusion.

Ultimately, our social philosophy, despite its pretenses, is theological. But, my point is that any attempt to comprehend the ambiguity, paradox, and contradiction of our social existence must move beyond wish-fulfillment and begin to describe what we are actually doing, not merely what we say we are doing.

Our explanations must transcend the merely parochial.

In order to approach these bewildering complexities, we need more of the poet's ability to straddle contradiction and perhaps rather less of the philosophers' insistence on monological consistency.

But, even attempting to describe our exigencies necessitates a certain degree of logical regularity, inevitably favoring the strident advocacy of the district attorney over the appreciation of subtle nuance demonstrated by the poet.

The conceits of the mind are fundamentally

"ideal." Using words and ideas in the attempt to describe our "real" situation betrays, in some ""ays, a hubris almost as grand as those that I have criticized in this thesis. But, despite the inherent limitations of intellectual description, this does not imply that any whimsy is as good as another (although most 309

twentieth century social thought seems to think so).

Some approaches are more relevant in that they actually help ease the contradictions inherent in our social existence. In short, they work, at least partially, which is probably the most we can ask for.

It seems that any conceit is tolerable if we treat it as poetic metaphor. It is a way to comprehend the incomprehensible, to determine our indeterminate direction; it is one path by which to approach "God."

The danger arises when we employ these conceits inappropriately, when the bureaucrat in each of us tries to utilize these divine metaphors to transubstantiate our vague impressions into the dogma of rigid truth (e.g., "class interest" may, or may not, be a useful metaphor; either way, the collectivization of the kulaks, and consequent death of millions, reveals a profound confusion of the ideal and the real). It is the atavistic mind which insists on interpreting allegory literally. In this respect, we moderns are as superstitious as any witch-doctor of our distant past. The temptation to idealize our existence is strong, particularly for those cultures rich enough to indulge the vanity of the "should," that most hallowed, most obscure, and often, most 310

destructive of all deities.

Resisting our human realities is ultimately pointless. These actualities are both our strength and our weakness. Let our strengths propel us, and let Culture restrain our weaknesses, not our Mind, which will only attempt to explain (justify) them.

Thankfully (hopefully?!), hand-"lringing angst is never going to overcome concupiscence. Culture has already tamed it, that's enough. We might as well enjoy the ride, especially since we don't know where we're going.

Remembering my association of the intent of socialism as a rationalized fulfillment of the promises of Christian piety, and the association of capitalism with the kind of Nietzschean self-empowerment which might actually deliver the intended results of that universal love, perhaps I am suggesting nothing more than the truth embodied in the old joke, "If you are not a socialist at eighteen, you probably have no heart.

If you are still a socialist at forty, you probably have no brain." ENDNOTES

It is no inconsiderable part of wisdom, to know how much of an evil ought to be tolerated. Edmund Burke

I. CmlPLAIN'l'

1. George Schultz, "Something is Terribly Wrong Here" Time l1agazine, 2/8/93, p. 45.

2. cf. Joseph Schumpeter, Ten Great Economists, New York, Oxford University Press, 1951, p. 3-74

II. THE CHRYSALIS

1. cf. Don Lavoie, National Economic Planning: What is Left, Cambridge, Harper & Row, 1985.

2. Isaiah Berlin, Introduction, My Past and Thoughts: The flemoirs of Alexander Herzen by Alexander Herzen, New York, Alfred Knopf, 1973, p. xxxix.

3. Carl Jung, Nietzsche's Zarathustra: notes of a seminar given in 1934-1939, edited by James Jarrett, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 1517.

4. cf. James Buchanan, The Calculus of Consent, Ann Harbor, University of Michigan Press, 1962.

5. Max Weber, The Interpretation of Social Reality, New York, Scribners, 1971, p.209.

6. Leon Trotsky, quoted in Equality and Efficiency, by Arthur Okun, Washington,D.C., Brookings Institution, 1975, p. 39.

7. cf. Alexander Dallin, The Soviet System in Crisis, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1991.

311 312

III. CONCUPISCENCE

1. Karl Marx, Collected Uorks, New York, International Publishers, 1970, p. 21.

2. Thomas Hobbes, quoted in M.M. Goldsmith's Hobbes' Science of Politics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1966, pp. 52-62.

3. Francis Bacon, Collected Works, volume III, Philadelphia, Parry & McMillan, 1859, p. 229.

4. Paul Radin, Primitive Religion, New York, Dover Press, 1957, p. 192.

5. G.W.F. Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, translated by Leo Rauch, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Co., 1988, p. 26.

6. cf. Friedrich Hayek, The Fatal Conceit, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1988, especially chapter three, "Between Instinct and Reason." Anyone interested in the general thesis presented here would be well advised to read Hayek. He has had the strongest influence on this paper, far more than a few footnotes could ever hope to convey.

7. Marvin Harris, Cultural Materialism, New York, Random House, 1979, p. 110.

8. cf. Michael Mann, Sources of Social Power, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 73-105.

9. Helmut Schoeck, Envy: A Theory of Social Behavior, translated by Michael Glenny & Betty Ross, New York, Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1969, pp. 20-23.

10. Alexander Herzen, From the Other Shore, New York, George Braziller, 1956, p. 42.

11. cf. Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1964, p. 5.

12. ibid. pp. 52-62.

13. cf. Joseph Schumpeter, Ten Great Economists, New York, Oxford University Press, 1951, 313

pp.3-74.

14. Gary Morson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1990, p. 45.

15. ibid. p. 60

16. Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: a Book for Free Spirits, translated by Marion Faber, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1984, p. 174.

IV. THE CLERGY

1. Norman O. Brown, Hermes the Thief, Great Barrington, MA., Lindisfarne Press, 1990, p. 59.

2. H.S. Maine, Village Communities in the East and West, New York, 1880, p. 192.

3. Norman O. Brown, Hermes the Thief, Great Barrington, MA., Lindisfarne Press, 1990, p. 84.

4. ibid. p. 85.

5. ibid. p. 62.

6. ibid. p. 63.

7. ibid. p. 72.

8. ibid. p. 98.

9. M.P. Nilsson, Griechische Feste, Leipzig, 1906, p. 388.

10. cf. Paul Jeffrey, Reading Nozick, Totowa, N.J., Rowan & Littlefield, 1981, pp. 383-8.

11. No one has ever claimed that this was the only reason, nor even the primary one, for his failure to finish the work (nor do I). But, even this writer looks for reason in history. If reading Menger's marginal utility theory was not Marx's reason, it "should" have been. 314

12. This section is heavily indebted to Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies, (2 volumes), Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962.

13. This idea was developed by this same writer in an unpublished masters thesis in English literature in 1980 ("Cymbeline as Dream vJish").

14. 1\.11 references to "class" in this thesis should be considered only in the most general sense. 1\.s such, "estate" might be preferred by some flarxists.

V. THE DEATH OF GOD

1. cf. Giambattista Vico, The New Science of Giambattista Vico, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1968.

2. Credit is due to George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, who developed this approach in The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1979.

3. Paul Johnson, Intellectuals, New York, Harper & Row, 1988, p. 57.

4. Although "true believers" might find this difficult to swallow, it is not an original idea, nor very difficult to substantiate. Everyone from Braudel to Hayek to Schumpeter to Okun agrees, although perhaps Marx was the first to say it out loud, undoubtedly influenced by his mentor, Adam Smith.

VI. CHEERLEADERS, HUCKSTERS & SNAKE-OIL SALESMEN

1. Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, New York, Alfred Knopf, 1991, p. 237.

2. C.R Vaughan, The Political Writings of Rousseau, (2 volumes), Cambridge, 1915, volume 2, p. 250.

3. I liked the analogy so I borrowed it from Professor Fernandez of the History department at 315

California state University at Hayward.

4. David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Co., 1983.

5. cf. Adam Smith, The Theory of Horal Sentiments, London, Bohn, 1853.

6. quoted in Friedrich HayeJ~' s The Road to Serfdom, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1944, p. 24.

7. Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, NevI York, Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 192.

8. Karl Marx, Collected Works, New York, International Publishers, 1975, pp. 14-15.

9. ibid. p. 130.

10. ibid. p. 241.

11. ibid. p. 185.

12. ibid. p. 46.

13. Robert Cutter, The Basic Bakunin, Buffalo, New York, Prometheus Books, 1992, p. 26.

14. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. New York, International Publishers, 1953, p. 111.

15. Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1964, pp.45-46 and pp. 5262.

VII. THE APES OF ZARATHUSTRA

1. quoted in "An Enlightened Revolution," New York Review of Books, volume XXXVIII, # 17, October 24,1991.

2. This metaphor was commonly used in the late eighteenth century to describe the benefits of 316

the market order. I am not sure who said it first.

3. Lord Acton, quoted in Friedrich Hayek's Individualism and Economic Order, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948, p. 31.

4. Schumpeter never quite says this directly, but it is a fair conclusion. cf. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York, Harper & Row, 1950. Also, David Gurevich, Lenin to Lennon, New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1991, p. 263.

5. Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1982, p. 77.

6. William Burroughs, The Naked Lunch, New York, The Grove Press, 1959, p. 1.

7. Carl Jung, Nietzsche's Zarathustra: notes of the seminar given in 1934-1939, edited by James Jarrett, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 1518.

8. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Geneology of Morals: A Polemic, New York, Russell & Russell, 1964, p. 79.

9. ibid. p. 29.

10. ibid. p. 21.

11. Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak, Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 103.

12. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Geneology of Morals: A Polemic, New York, Russell & Russell, 1964, p. 21.

13. Of all places, an interview with Noam Chomsky in Rolling Stone, January, 1993.

14. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, New York, Russell & Russell, 1964, p. 63.

15. cf. Michael Mann's Sources of Social Power, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 105- 317

135.

16. Quoted in Mark Warren's Nietzsche and Political Thought, Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1988, p. 222.

17. ibid. p. 223.

18. Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, translated by Marion Faber, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1984, p. 174.

19. Quoted in Mark Warren's Nietzsche and Political Thought, Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1988, p. 221.

20. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols and the Antichrist, London, Penguin Books, 1968, p. 23.

21. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Geneology of Morals: A Polemic, New York, Russell & Russell, 1964, p. 8.

VIII. UTOPIAN MORALISM

1. quoted in "The Donner Party," a Public Broadcasting Station documentary, aired on PBS March 17, 1993.

2. cf. Soho Takuan, The Unfettered Mind, Tokyo, Kodansha International, 1986.

3. cf. Nietzsche's treatment of morality in Daybreak, Book II, # 103.

4. cf. Voltaire, Candide, London, Oxford University Press, 1961.

5. Daniel Okimoto, Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1989, p. 3. From the same book, page 3, consider, "Contrary to conventional wisdom, therefore, Japanese industrial policy may lack the consistency and vision often attributed to it." 318

6. Tina Rosenberg, "From Dissidents to IITV Democrats," Harpers flagazine, September, 1992, volume 285, #1708.

7. Pliny the Younger, Letter IV, c110. Betty Radice, The Letters of the Younger Pliny, Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1969.

8. ~'lilliam Blake, tlarriage of Heaven and Hell, plate 10.

IX. THE SIXTIES

1. Jack Kerouac, quoted in Understanding the Beats, by II.B. Foster, South Carolina, University of South Carolina Press, 1992, p. 8.

2. Daniel Guerin, Anarchism, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1970, pp. 82-109.

3. Peter Stachura, The German Youth Movement, 1900-1945, New York, st. Martin's Press, 1981, pp.

95-99.

4. Quoted in Friedrich Hayek's The Fatal Conceit, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1988, p. 6.

X. THE CHURCH

1. Max Stirner, The Ego and His Own, New York, Dover Publications, 1963,-p. 77.

2. Oscar Wilde, The Critic as Artist, quoted in Richard Ellman's (editor), The Artist as Critic, New York, Random House, 1969, p.78.

3. Irving Rouse, The Tainos: Rise and Decline of the People Who Greeted Columbus, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992, p. 25.

4. Joseph Whitecotton, The Zapotec Princes, 319

Priests and Peasants, Norman, Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press, 1977, pp. 89-93.

5. cf. J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975.

6. Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order, New York, Nevi York University Press, 19134, p. 30. Much of the following section is indebted to this worJ~. Although she seems to realize the populist influence of American liberal capitalism, she still manages to recapitulate the theology of her academic heritage, suggesting at one point, that we are beyond all that nml.

7. ibid. p. 104

8. John Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics, New York, Basic Books, 1985, p. 298.

9. ibid. p. 341.

10. Joyce Appleby, "Republicanism in old and New Contexts, II l'lilliam and Mary Quarterly, volume 43, 1986, p. 32.

11. ibid. p. 33.

12. Wilson McWilliams, The Federalists, the Antifederalists, and the American Political Tradition, New York, Greenwood Press, 1992, p. 6, p. 109.

13. ibid. pp. 47-67.

XI. THE STATE

1. Dorothy Rabinowitz, "From the Mouths of Babes to a Jail Cell--Child Abuse and the Abuse of Justice: A Case Study," Harpers Magazine, May 1990, volume 280, #1680.

2. Fenton Bailey, Fall from Grace: The Untold Story of Michael Milken, New York, Birch Lane Press, 1991, pp. 279-292.

3. The various references are in the first 320

section of Hernando DeSoto's The Other Path, New York, Harper & Row, 1989.

4. ibid. p. 191

5. ibid. p. xiv.

6. Norman Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks: A Political Memoir, New York, Harper & Row, 1979, pp. 70-75.

7. Thomas Sowell, Knowledge and Decisions, New York, Basic Books, 1980, p. 296. The entire chapter is an excellent investigation into the problem of court moralism.

8. Sophocles, Antigone.

XII THE WEATHER

1. This section is indebted to Heinz Pagel's The Dreams of Reason, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1988, pp. 145-158.

2. Heinz Pagel, The Dreams of Reason, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1988, p. 150.

3. Friedrich Hayek, The Fatal Conceit, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1988, p. 64.

4. cf. the work of Mircea Eliade, particularly Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1959, pp.8-20.

5. The cynic will be amused, wondering just how "beneficial" this advantage was, considering the destruction of Japan during World War II. For what it's worth, the Navy resisted entry into the war; it was the Army which pushed Japan into the confrontation.

6. cf. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970.

7. G.W.F. Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, translated by Leo Rauch, Indianapolis, 321

Hackett Publishing Co., 1988, p. 65.

XIII. TH~ FALL

1. Robin Blackburn, After the Fall, London, Verso, 1991, p. 183.

2. ibid. p. 184.

3. Ludwig Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1949, p. 698.

4. David Gurevich, From Lenin to Lennon, New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1991, p. 260.

5. The challenges of modernity are significant. It is not suggested that we resist any change at all, in some conservative homage to the past. It is only suggested here that the typical academic moralisms are inappropriate. Some excellent work is being done by the private property theorists (Coase et al.). Public Choice theorists are also doing some interesting work. Ironically, in the sixties, the university resisted public pressure to fire Herbert Marcuse at UC San Diego (rightfully so), while a sister institution (University of Virginia) \vas busily purging its Economics department of the politically incorrect (Coase and some of the Public Choice people). Although interesting in some ways, Marcuse has long since been forgotten (rightfully so), but several of those purged in Virginia have gone on to win Nobel prizes in Economics and are currently at the forefront of many critical contemporary issues. Apart from the university's obvious inability to distinguish the trite from the significant, the more interesting issue is the university's hypocrisy, rightfully resisting outside pressures with invocations of McCarthy era extremism, while simultaneously replicating its worst excesses. Inexplicably, the university still loves to indulge feelings of persecution, even as it assumes ever-greater power in determining the parameters of our social and political debate. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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