Qadar and Riḍā in Islamic Psychology and Self-Determination Theory:
A Predictive and Comparative Exploration of the Effects of Religiosity,
Trait Autonomy and Locus of Control on Happiness in Muslims
Thesis
by
Nur Farizah Binte Mohd Sedek
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Bachelor of Arts
in
Psychology
State University of New York
Empire State College
2019
Reader: Ronnie Mather, Ph.D.
Become His spokesman—follow His command:
The union that you seek you’ll reach as planned.
Exertion’s thanking God for strength to act
While fatalism spurns it—that’s a fact!
—Mawlānā Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī1
Statutory Declaration / Čestné prohlášení
I, Nur Farizah Binte Mohd Sedek, declare that the paper entitled:
Qadar and Riḍā in Islamic Psychology and Self-Determination Theory:
Predictive and Comparative Exploration of the Effects of Religiosity,
Trait Autonomy and Locus of Control on Happiness in Muslims
was written by myself independently, using the sources and information listed in the list of references. I am aware that my work will be published in accordance with § 47b of
Act No. 111/1998 Coll., On Higher Education Institutions, as amended, and in accordance with the valid publication guidelines for university graduate theses.
Prohlašuji, že jsem tuto práci vypracoval/a samostatně s použitím uvedené literatury a zdrojů informací. Jsem vědom/a, že moje práce bude zveřejněna v souladu s § 47b zákona č. 111/1998 Sb., o vysokých školách ve znění pozdějších předpisů, a v souladu s platnou Směrnicí o zveřejňování vysokoškolských závěrečných prací.
In Prague, 09.12.2019 Nur Farizah Binte Mohd Sedek
Acknowledgments
He who does not thank the people is not thankful to Allah.
—ḥadīth2
I have been fortunate to have these beautiful souls on my side as I endeavor to close yet another momentous chapter of my life; the gratitude I express here can never be enough.
Dr. Ronnie Mather, my mentor and teacher, who has provided valuable, and sometimes, humorous, feedback at each stage of my one-year drudge in the thesis quagmire. When life happened and the summer days turned dark, I cannot sufficiently thank his patience and generosity in giving me the time to work through what I needed.
My teachers, I have taken something from each one of them. Dr. Vartan Agopian, whose statistical expertise became tremendously enlightening when I needed to divine what the numbers tell me. Along with Dr. Bethany Butzer, both of whose notes turned out to be precious materials that helped me organize my thoughts and writing. Dr. Edel Sanders, who, four years ago, planted the seed of encouragement that would, today, develop into this dissertation. Dr. Simon Weissenberger, with whom conversations about psychology and religion inspires my creativity. Dr. Atif Khalil, who has written beautifully about riḍā and whose work in Sufi psychology became the platform from where I leap.
Shaykh Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah Wymann-Landgraf, whose spiritual and intellectual guidance never left my side. When I was stuck, he directed me toward where I could find a thorough exposition of Islam’s theological understanding of determination and free will. Through his teachings, I have gained a deeper awareness of what it means to be al-Insān al-Kāmil.
Shaykh Hamza Yusuf Hanson, from whose knowledge I have benefitted in the past decade. Although I have neither met nor spoken to him, he is my first teacher on the path I have taken. If I am ever successful in my intellectual journey, it is to him I owe my gratitude.
My good friends, whose companionships have kept me sane. Ida Traxler, who has been my sounding board right from the very beginning, when the conception of my thesis was nothing more than a little speck in my mind. Melissa Ann Wells, whose discerning feedback on the literature review was priceless. Esra Koparan Weinfurt and the
Weinfurtovi, Nigar Huseynova, and Nela Lestakova, for giving me a sense of home in this foreign land.
My brothers and sisters across the world, in Islam and in humanity, many of whom I have never met, but who have nevertheless cheered me on, participated in my research, and especially, shared my questionnaire.
My greatest gratitude extends to my family — my parents, Mohd Sedek Bin Mohd
Azahari and Djamilah Raden Dung, and my siblings, Nurulhuda Binte Mohd Sedek and
Fakhrul Anwar Bin Mohd Sedek — without their unconditional and unwavering support, this work will never come to see the light of day.
Above all, my šukr and ḥamd are to God, upon whose qadar my entire journey exists.
Table of Contents
Abstract ...... 9
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 11
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 16
2.1 Islamic Psychology ...... 16
2.1.1 Qadar: The Islamic Understanding of Determination ...... 18
2.1.2 Riḍā: The Serene Acceptance of Qadar...... 21
2.2 Self-Determination Theory and the Psychology of Religion ...... 25
2.3 Locus of Control ...... 29
2.4 Happiness and Riḍā ...... 30
CHAPTER 3 HYPOTHESES ...... 32
3.1 Predictive Hypotheses ...... 32
3.2 Comparative Hypotheses ...... 33
CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY ...... 35
4.1 Participants ...... 35
4.2 Procedure ...... 36
4.3 Instrumentations ...... 38
4.3.1 Index of Autonomous Functioning (IAF) ...... 38
4.3.2 Authentic Decision and Self-Awareness Scale (ADSAS) ...... 39
4.3.3 Internality, Powerful Others, and Chance Scales (IPCS) ...... 40
4.3.4 Oxford Happiness Questionnaire (OHQ) ...... 41
4.3.5 Sahin-Francis Scale of Attitude Toward Islam Revised (SFSATIR) ...... 42 4.3.6 Demographics Questionnaire ...... 43
4.4 Research Design and Data Analyses ...... 43
CHAPTER 5 RESULTS ...... 46
5.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables...... 46
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Score Variables ...... 46
5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in Nominal Forms ...... 50
5.2 Correlation Matrices ...... 50
5.3 Tests of the Hypotheses ...... 53
5.3.1 Tests of the Predictive Hypotheses ...... 53
5.3.2 Tests of the Comparative Hypotheses ...... 67
5.4 Assessments on the Tests of Hypotheses ...... 76
5.4.1 Assessments on the Tests of Predictive Hypotheses ...... 76
5.4.2 Assessments on the Tests of Comparative Hypotheses...... 78
5.5 Exposition of the Addendum to SFSATIR ...... 79
5.5.1 Selected Statements of Low Religiosity Participants ...... 79
5.5.2 Selected Statements of High Religiosity Participants ...... 81
CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION ...... 85
6.1 Interpretation of Findings ...... 85
6.1.1 Preliminary Discussion of the Findings ...... 85
6.1.2 Interpretation of the Predictions and Correlations ...... 87
6.1.3 Interpretation of the Comparisons ...... 92
6.2 Limitations ...... 95 6.2.1 Limitations of the Sampling ...... 95
6.2.2 Limitations of the Instrumentations ...... 98
6.3 Implications and Future Research ...... 99
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION ...... 102
REFERENCES ...... 104
NOTES ...... 109
APPENDICES ...... 110
Appendix A Recruitment Notices ...... 110
Appendix B Informed Consent Form ...... 112
Appendix C Debriefing Form ...... 114
Appendix D IAF ...... 116
Appendix E ADSAS ...... 117
Appendix F IPCS ...... 118
Appendix G OHQ ...... 119
Appendix H SFSATIR ...... 121
Appendix I Demographics Questionnaire ...... 122
Appendix J Tables ...... 124
Appendix K Figures ...... 129
Abstract
Self-determination theory (SDT) centers on a person’s intrinsic need to grow through autonomous functioning to attain eudemonic happiness; however, a religious person may be cognitively predisposed to an awareness of control rooted in a higher power and, thus, unable to exercise authentic choices, and acknowledge their inner experiences, to be intrinsically motivated. This study focuses on the religion of Islam.
Two tenets of Islam are determinants that may play a role in a Muslim’s conceptualization of a self-determined outlook of life. These are qadar—predestination of God’s will; and riḍā—a serene acceptance of qadar, translated as contentment, satisfaction, and good pleasure. This research serves as a preliminary quantitative exploration to determine the predictive and comparative factors of these constructs: religiosity (of which qadar and riḍā are presumed), trait autonomy, locus of control
(LOC; internal, powerful others, and chance), and happiness (of which riḍā is presumed). There were 95 participants from a varied global population (38 males, 57 females; 18 to 75 years). Results showed predictive significances of trait autonomy, religiosity, internal LOC, and powerful others LOC on happiness. Trait autonomy showed the largest effect sizes. Statistical significances on happiness scores were found in the one-way ANOVAs. However, the three-way ANOVA rendered significances only in the main effect of trait autonomy and several pairwise comparison groups. The mixed findings suggest that while trait autonomy made the greatest overall impact,
Muslims with high religiosity, high trait autonomy, and internal locus of control were the most successful in attaining happiness.
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Keywords: Islam, qadar, rida, self-determination theory, psychology of religion, locus of control, happiness, eudaimonia 11
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The determinism versus free will argument is an old one. Throughout the centuries, philosophers and theologians from various Eastern and Western religions and traditions have attempted to deliberate its metaphysical, moral, and ethical implications (O'Connor
& Franklin, 2019). In the religion of Islam, a predetermined worldview is built into one of its six major tenets of creed (Binte Mohd Sedek, 2016; Winter, 2011). This belief is known as qadar, commonly translated into English as predestination. When discerned through a psychological lens, the conviction and understanding of qadar, or lack thereof, present several motivational ramifications in a Muslim. One such consequence is the issue with autonomy: Can a Muslim be self-determined, or does one simply acquiesce to despondency when nothing is within one’s control?
In The Nicomachean Ethics, the Greek philosopher Aristotle (d. 322 B.C.), asserts the theory of self-sufficiency (autarkeia) as a precursor to happiness (eudaimonia)
(Aristotle, trans. 1925; Bialožyt & Binte Mohd Sedek, 2019; Heinaman, 1988). Aristotle defines self-sufficiency as “that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing” (Aristotle, trans. 1925, p. 11). Since the ancient philosopher’s time, the ideas concerning happiness have undergone revivals and revivifications through various philosophical, religious, and psychological paradigms. The self-determination theory
(SDT) offers one such perspective within psychology. Creators of the theory, Edward L.
Deci and Richard M. Ryan, define SDT as a “an approach to human motivation and personality that uses traditional empirical methods while employing an organismic metatheory that highlights the importance of humans' evolved inner resources for 12 personality development and behavioral self-regulation” (Ryan & Deci, 2000, p. 68). In other words, SDT largely centers on a person’s intrinsic need to grow in order to have psychological well-being. This organismic valuing process, oriented towards the growth of a human being, is aligned to the humanistic psychology school of thought rooted in
Aristotelian philosophy (DeRobertis & Bland, 2018; Ryan & Martela, 2016).
Moreover, Aristotle’s theory of self-sufficiency parallels SDT’s basic need for autonomous functioning. Autonomy in the SDT framework has been defined as the ability of a person to exercise authentic choices and acknowledge their inner experiences, through which they become intrinsically motivated (Deci & Ryan, 2000).
As such, a person acting with autonomy is better able to live a fulfilling existence following their virtues, increasing eudaimonia (Ryan & Martela, 2016). Thus, in a theory of self-determination that embraces this view of self-sufficiency and its resulting sense of happiness, SDT is “explicitly indebted to Aristotle by way of a eudaimonic view of human health” (DeRobertis & Bland, 2018, p. 111).
Herein lies a complication. Implied in its nomenclature, self-determination seems to stand upon a philosophical viewpoint toward the human being as an independent agent, which is to say, having free will. SDT’s need for autonomy, as a motivational feature within one’s personality trait, puts the centrality of will in the human being. However, the moral philosophy of determinism versus free will has been grappled with by scholars and thinkers throughout the centuries, coming from various religions, traditions, and other belief systems. They have formulated ways of resolving this ancient puzzle, within their respective schools of thought, with regards to which position their followers are to take. Thus, depending on the belief system from where a 13 person comes, an individual may hold a viewpoint at either end of the spectrum— whether their own volition is in control of the circumstances they find themselves in, or whether a higher power has the ultimate authority over the events that occur in their life—or an integration of the two.
In Islam, qadar asserts that events happen upon the ultimate will of God through predetermination. Since happiness is predicated upon an intrinsic need for self- sufficiency, according to the Aristotelian paradigm and subsequently SDT, are Muslims adhering to the belief in qadar condemned to lower psychological well-being? This may not be the case, because although qadar is a canonical belief in Islam, there also exist certain theological understandings of the human being as a moral actor (Winter, 2011;
Wymann-Landgraf, 2012). Examples of this can be found in the Aš’arīyah and the
Mu’tazilah theological schools of thought, both positing nuanced differences in the understanding of determination and free will (Winter, 2011). Thus, the role of the human free will in affecting consequences may still be pertinent in the Muslim’s consciousness, albeit to differing degrees and comprehension.
As such, a Muslim may still perceive a level of control over his or her life, while simultaneously believing in qadar. Locus of control is most often described as a spectrum in which people adhere to either an internal locus of control or an external locus of control. (Rotter, 1966). Someone with an internal locus of control believes that they can directly impact life’s events. Conversely, one with an external locus of control tends to identify outside forces as being responsible for determining how life’s events unfold. People with an internal locus of control have been found to fare better in their psychological well-being than those with an external locus of control (Gerrig, 2013, p. 14
370). Where a Muslim stands on this spectrum is presumed to depend on their perception of how much control they have as opposed to the control God has over their lives. However, for a Muslim who fully believes that God is in control, while concurrently perceiving themselves as a moral actor with a free will to affect life’s events, this division may not be so clear.
Because autonomous functioning rooted in free will is necessary for happiness, it may be prudent for psychological research to be conducted to assess the extent of a belief in qadar and, subsequently, locus of control have on the happiness of a Muslim. In addition to qadar, another concept found in Islam also needs to be studied: riḍā. Riḍā has been translated into English to mean the contentment, satisfaction, and good pleasure of what has been predestined by God to happen (Khalil, 2014). Thus, riḍā is closely interlinked with qadar. It acts as both a theological and psychological response toward every occurrence in a person’s life, by instilling an awareness and acceptance that everything happens out of God’s will and power (Khalil, 2014). Because it carries within it the affects of contentment, satisfaction, and good pleasure, it may be said to engender well-being in an individual who practices it. Thus, it parallels happiness, as posited by Aristotle and the SDT.
Qadar and riḍā, therefore, are two determinants that may play a role in a Muslim’s conceptualization of a self-determined outlook of life. In attempting to research the answer to the question asked in the opening paragraph—Can a Muslim be self- determined, or does one simply acquiesce to despondency when nothing is within one’s control?—a preliminary quantitative exploration is proposed to determine the predictive and comparative factors of the constructs defined herein: religiosity (of which qadar 15 and riḍā are presumed), autonomy as a personality trait in the SDT framework, locus of control, and happiness (of which riḍā is also presumed). They are further elaborated in the following literature review.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The following literature review expounds the constructs defined in the preceding chapter: psychology in Islam qadar and riḍā, autonomy as a personality trait in the self- determination theory (SDT) framework, locus of control, and happiness (of which riḍā is presumed).
2.1 Islamic Psychology
The study of Islamic psychology has undergone a resurgence, particularly in the last half a century, led by Dr. Malik Badri. This is due to its oft-occurring prominence in the global affairs, as well as a dire need to cater to clients who have specific conceptualizations of the psychology of the human being built into their religion (Badri,
1979). Islam comprises an estimated world population of 1.8 billion as of 2015, making up 24.1% of the entire world population, the second-largest after Christianity, and spanning culturally-varied regions from the east to the west (Lipka & Hackett, 2017).
Many of its adherents are making positive and negative headlines in the media because their activities impact the global society. It has, thus, become ever more incumbent that a study of the inner workings of its followers is performed, by looking at it from within the religion, and by comparing and contrasting what is found therein with the now more presently-studied sciences of Western psychology.
17
One such endeavor has been initiated by the International Association of Islamic
Psychology (IAIP), which Badri is the president. It has published many research-based articles grounded in Islamic psychology as an independent paradigm (e.g. Rothman,
2018; Rothman & Coyle, 2018; Skinner, 2019). According to the IAIP website, Islamic psychology “approaches the person from the belief that God is the One who heals and it is only through our deeper connection to Him and our understanding of our relationship to Him that we can truly overcome the trials and tribulations of life” (n.d.). Islamic psychology proposes a holistic practice toward well-being that aspires to recognize “the nature of the self and the soul and the connection of the soul to the Divine” (IAIP, n.d.).
It derives its psychological principles from the Qur’ān, the Sunnah (Prophetic teachings), and the Islamic tradition, by studying the soul embodied in the human being
“with a focus on the heart as the center of the person” (IAIP, n.d.).
Thus, there is a salient interplay between God and the human being in the psychological makeup of a person adhering to Islam. This is a departure from the Western approach to psychology (Badri, 1979; Skinner, 2019). Review of the literature will be addressed with this understanding in mind, especially as it pertains to the concepts of qadar and riḍā in shaping the perspectives of Muslims regarding their locus of determination.
Because psychological literature in English concerning qadar and riḍā as they are conceptualized in Islam is almost non-existent, to the researcher’s best knowledge, they will be reviewed through the Qur’ān, the Sunnah, as well as theological resources in
English.
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2.1.1 Qadar: The Islamic Understanding of Determination
Central to Islamic theology is the well-known concept of qadar, one of the six pillars of
īmān (faith) in Islam (Binte Mohd Sedek, 2016). The noun is derived from the root word q-d-r in the Arabic language. It has been translated from various passages of the
Qur’ān into the English language to mean a divinely-ordained “destiny,”
“predestination,” “decree,” or, “[precise] determination,” (Sahih International; Tosun,
2012, pp. 116 – 117). The following verses illustrate how it is used:
And ever is the command of Allah a qadaran (divine destiny) maqdūra
(decreed). (Q 33:38)
He to whom belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth and who has not
taken a son and has not had a partner in dominion and has created each thing and
faqaddarahu (divinely determined) it with taqdīra ([precise] determination).
(Q 25:2)
However, it should be noted that the precise meaning behind the root q-d-r is understood to be that which has been proportioned out in a precise measure (Hanson, 2014). It is similar to the meaning behind the word kitab, which is based on the root k-t-b and translated as “book.” The implication is that, just as a book is written in a precise way to induce a particular meaning by an author, one’s destiny is clearly and precisely written down by Allah. The following verses illustrate how k-t-b is used to mean either a
“book,” “divine decree,” or “clear register/record”:
This is al-Kitāb (the Book) about which there is no doubt, a guidance for those
conscious of Allah – (Q 2:2)
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Say, “Never will we be struck except by what Allah has kataba (divinely
decreed) for us; He is our protector.” And upon Allah let the believers rely. (Q
9:51)
And not absent from your Lord is any [part] of an atom’s weight within the earth
or within the heaven or [anything] smaller than that or greater but that it is in a
kitābin mubīn (clear register/record). (Q 10:61)
Together, these words form the basis of the Islamic understanding of qadar as a divine decree.
Tosun (2012) outlines five different aspects of qadar. Firstly, qadar is a clear record of
“cause and effect relationships and definitions” (p. 117) between and for every being and event that has, does or will occur in both the physical and spiritual realms.
Secondly, qadar is “a plan” (p. 118) of God’s actions upon the creation. Thirdly, qadar is the “distribution of resources” (p. 119), such as wealth or provisions that would come to a person, as something that has been predetermined. Fourthly, qadar is God’s immanent knowledge of every past, present, and future event as One who “witnesses
[…] without any limitations of time” (p. 119). Fifthly, qadar is Allah’s “anterior and posterior permission” allowing for the “wills and acts of His creations” (p. 120) to be manifested.
Additionally, Tosun (2012) provides the implications of the belief in the Islamic concept of qadar on an individual. The significance of a belief in qadar is that it frees the 20 individual from anxieties due to the knowledge that a wise and powerful God is in control. The following verse illustrates:
No disaster strikes upon the earth or among yourselves except that it is in a
kitābin (register) before We [Allah] bring it into being – indeed that, for Allah, is
easy –
In order that you not despair over what has eluded you and not exult [in pride]
over what He has given you. And Allah does not like everyone self-deluded and
boastful – (Q 57:22–23; emphasis added)
Findings in chaos theory have indicated that even though naked human perception may observe a particular event as one that is happening at random, every event is, in fact, a part of a deterministic “nonlinear dynamical system” that “[has] a very sensitive dependence on [its] initial conditions” (Boeing, 2016, p. 1). According to Boeing
(2016):
[D]espite their deterministic simplicity, over time, these systems can produce
wildly unpredictable, divergent and fractal (i.e., infinitely detailed and self-
similar without ever actually repeating) behavior due to that sensitivity.
Forecasting such systems’ futures thus requires an impossible precision of
measurement and computation. Chaos fundamentally indicates that there are
limits to knowledge and prediction because some futures may be unknowable
with any precision. (p. 1)
With such limits to our ability to determine with any precision the consequences of our actions, as well as with the knowledge that any small perturbations to the current status quo can have an impactful effect on a person’s life and the lives of those around them 21 and across the world, how does one then cultivate a sense of safety when contemplating his existence? Having a belief and an understanding of qadar, thus, positions a Muslim to adopt a more confident outlook on life, knowing that everything is under the control of an omnipotent God and are not happening at random, without becoming anxious about things which are beyond their control (Tosun, 2012). According to Tosun (2012), this allows a Muslim to have a level of certainty in their own autonomy when making decisions and plans to the extent that they are assured of their very purpose in life. This affords the Muslim a balanced attitude toward the two opposing internal and external loci of control that is more conducive to the healthy functioning of an individual. This balance is reflected in the ḥadīth, “Tie your camel and trust in Allah” (Source: Sunan al-
Tirmidhī, Vol. 4, Book 11, Hadith 2517). Along the same vein, when an event happens of which a Muslim may perceive as negative, they can also find solace in qadar because it postulates that no event happens but with a divine plan and, therefore, these events
“will serve certain higher goals” (Tosun, 2012, p. 121). This is illustrated in the verse,
“Allah is the best of planners” (Q 3:54; 8:30).
2.1.2 Riḍā: The Serene Acceptance of Qadar
The peace and security provided by a belief in qadar, however, cannot exist without riḍā, or a willing acceptance, of what Allah wills. Riḍā has also been translated as
“contentment,” “satisfaction,” and “good-pleasure” from early Islamic Sufi literature
(Khalil, 2014, p. 1). Before diving into riḍā as a theo-psychological phenomenon, a look at its primary occurrence in the Qur’ān is pertinent. Verses similar to the following have been repeated several times in the Qur’ān:
Allah has riḍā (is pleased) with them and they have riḍā (are pleased) with
Him. (Q 5:119; 9:100; 98:8) 22
The Muslim’s understanding of this verse points to a reciprocal relationship of riḍā between him or herself and God (Khalil, 2014). A common theme in Islamic teachings is that God reciprocates above and beyond the actions of the Muslim, as illustrated in this ḥadīth:
said, “Allah says: ‘I am just as My slave thinks I am, (i.e. I am (ﷺ) The Prophet
able to do for him what he thinks I can do for him) and I am with him if He
remembers Me. If he remembers Me in himself, I too, remember him in Myself;
and if he remembers Me in a group of people, I remember him in a group that is
better than they; and if he comes one span nearer to Me, I go one cubit nearer to
him; and if he comes one cubit nearer to Me, I go a distance of two outstretched
arms nearer to him; and if he comes to Me walking, I go to him running.’”
(Source: Sahih al-Bukhari 7405, Book 97, Hadith 34)
Thus, the believer is made to understand that not only does it entail them to be content, satisfied and pleased with Allah’s qadar, by virtue of them having riḍā also emanates
God’s contentment, satisfaction and good-pleasure with them (Khalil, 2014). Therefore, by extension, riḍā may be defined as the “acceptance and contentment between God and the soul” (Massignon, quoted in Khalil, 2014).
Having riḍā when one’s affairs are favorable and pleasurable requires little, if any, moral or internal effort. It is when the Muslim is afflicted with trials and tribulations in his life that riḍā becomes challenging. It is important that they remain content and satisfied with Allah’s qadar, even when it is not as favorable toward them as they would have wished. That is not to say that one needs to be unrealistically joyous when facing 23 circumstances that “naturally elicit distress, anxiety, suffering and pain” (Khalil, 2014, p. 5). According to Khalil (2014):
[…] genuine rida does not mean that one becomes numb to all pain, or that one
finds pleasure in suffering, but that the joy in submitting to the divine will far
exceed the discomfort of any tribulation which may accompany life, so that it is
as if the tribulation did not exist, or as if the tribulation were no different from
worldly gain. Rida, in this light, is the overwhelming peace which ensues from
surrendering the heart to God’s eternal decree, from abdicating the impulse to
control one’s destiny. Such a renunciation of will produces a sense of tranquility
infinitely greater than any experience of discomfort or pain which may follow as
a consequence of the unpredictable and shifting sands of fate. In response then
to the question of whether the pleasure of rida lies in the pain itself, or in
something which outweighs the pain, our Sufi psychologists seem to suggest the
latter. […] since there are consequences for events which the human being does
not anticipate in his short-sightedness […] Rida therefore requires not only a
relinquishing of one’s own will before the Divine will, but a humbling of the
intellect through a recognition that, in His omniscience, God has in mind the
best interests of the soul. (pp. 5–6)
Thus, riḍā is a psychologically adaptive and autonomous response of a believing
Muslim toward the difficulties that afflict him. For one to be content, satisfied, and pleased with a tribulation that has befallen them, one must recognize and accept that it is the qadar of the all-merciful and all-knowing God. This psychological shift from a state of displeasure to pleasure can only be achieved through a self-determined, conscious decision to relinquish one’s sense of control over their destiny. 24
Such a maneuver could be equated to a cognitive and behavioral approach to psychological adjustment. However, unlike these approaches, in Sufism, one’s ultimate goal is not to feel good, but to perfect one’s character as exemplified by Islam’s Prophet
(Khalil, 2014). This human perfection is referred to as the level of iḥsān, the third and highest level of God-consciousness to which a Muslim may aspire through a constant striving of refining one’s mindsets and behaviors (Binte Mohd Sedek, 2016). Thus, while riḍā has been understood to bring about contentment, it is but a first stage of having riḍā (Khalil, 2014). As aspirants toward the higher levels of God-consciousness through inward and outward human perfection, early Sufi scholars maintain that true contentment must necessitate giving way to love. This is possible because a true lover of
God “is satisfied with what is done [to him] by the Beloved” (Hujwiri, quoted in Khalil,
2014, p. 10).
In terms of being a psychological and therapeutical concept, the prominence of the human dimensions in riḍā, with its focus on perfecting the human being, aligns riḍā more closely with the humanistic psychology than the cognitive or behavioral paradigms. This humanistic aspect, thus, parallels riḍā to the humanistic paradigm of
SDT expounded in the Introduction. Furthermore, in the balance between qadar and riḍā, it is possible to see how one achieves a locus of control that inclines them neither towards seeking control nor seeing oneself as a hapless victim of circumstance.
In this way, the balance between qadar and riḍā demonstrates the autonomy and motivational framework found within the SDT.
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2.2 Self-Determination Theory and the Psychology of Religion
Self-determination theory (SDT) is a theory in human motivation initiated by two researchers at the University of Rochester, Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, and developed by others around the world (SDT [Weblink], n.d.). While most theories of motivation prior to SDT have tended to focus on the hypothesis that behaviors begin and endure because they bring the individual to the attainment of certain purposeful outcomes, more recent studies in motivation have found that there are differences in the types of goals or outcomes that will result in differences in behavior and the affects those behaviors produce in the person (Deci & Ryan, 2000, p. 227). Likewise, SDT acknowledges these differences of behavior toward goal attainment; however, the SDT framework makes a distinction from other goal-oriented theories in that it centers on the social, cultural and personal factors that impact motivational behaviors of motivational behaviors. An overview of how SDT is defined can be found on their official website as follows:
Self-Determination Theory (SDT) represents a broad framework for the study of
human motivation and personality. SDT articulates a meta-theory for framing
motivational studies, a formal theory that defines intrinsic and varied extrinsic
sources of motivation, and a description of the respective roles of intrinsic and
types of extrinsic motivation in cognitive and social development and in
individual differences. Perhaps more importantly, SDT propositions also focus
on how social and cultural factors facilitate or undermine people’s sense of
volition and initiative, in addition to their well-being and the quality of their
performance. Conditions supporting the individual’s experience of autonomy,
competence, and relatedness are argued to foster the most volitional and high 26
quality forms of motivation and engagement for activities, including enhanced
performance, persistence, and creativity. In addition, SDT proposes that the
degree to which any of these three psychological needs is unsupported or
thwarted within a social context will have a robust detrimental impact on
wellness in that setting. (SDT [Weblink], n.d.)
Studies involving SDT tend to investigate one of two key aspects of the theory: regulatory processes or psychological needs (Deci & Ryan, 2000). The examination of regulatory processes involves identifying and understanding the ways a person embarks in attaining their goals. Broadly speaking, these regulatory processes fall under either intrinsic or extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation, the enthusiasm to act based on one’s own innate interests, has largely been found to contribute to self-determination.
Furthermore, recent studies have focused on the possible role of extrinsic motivation in influencing one’s sense of self-determination.
For one such study, Ryan and Deci (2000) considered how external regulation, introjected regulation, identified regulation, and integrated regulation, four aspects of extrinsic motivation, possibly contributed to one’s intrinsic motivation for self- determination. Externally regulated behavior is the least autonomous of extrinsic motivation, done simply to “satisfy an external demand or reward contingency” (Ryan
& Deci, 2000, p. 72). Introjected regulation is more internalized; however, the behaviors performed have a superficial quality, done to “avoid guilt or anxiety or to attain ego enhancements such as pride” (p. 72). Next, behaviors done through identified regulation
“reflects a conscious valuing of a behavioral goal or regulation, such that the action is accepted or owned as personally important” (p. 72). Lastly, integrated regulation 27 presents the most autonomous form on extrinsic motivation, in that behaviors have been
“fully assimilated to the self, which means they have been evaluated and brought into congruence with one's other values and needs” (p. 73). They found that identified regulation and integrated regulation parallels closely with intrinsic motivations by encouraging the internal motivators needed for self-determination; nevertheless, they are still considered extrinsic because they are done for intentions other than the innate pleasure of doing the behaviors themselves (Ryan & Deci, 2000, p. 73).
According to SDT, three psychological needs must to be met for a person to engage in self-deterministic activities: autonomy, competency, and relatedness (e.g. Deci & Ryan,
2000). Autonomy ensures that one perceives himself as having the independence toward decision-making without feeling controlled, either externally or internally (Deci &
Ryan, 2000, p. 234). Competency is one’s recognition that he has the capabilities to successfully execute tasks beforehand (p. 235). An extension of attachment theory, relatedness addresses the social aspect of this theoretical framework. It holds that one is more prone to maintain a self-determined outlook when his environment supports a
“sense of security” (p. 235). When these needs are met, they foster a more intrinsic motivational outlook in an individual, thus allowing for self-determination to happen.
Because of its emphasis on a person’s regulatory processes, psychological needs, and personality traits, SDT closely aligns with the humanistic perspective (DeRobertis &
Bland, 2018). SDT parallels the work of Carl Roger’s organismic valuing process, as well as contemporary humanistic thought, in three ways. Firstly, it looks at motivation through the lens of a human being as opposed to a reward-based or punishment- avoidance system (DeRobertis & Bland, 2018, p. 107). Secondly, SDT does not reduce 28 the human being to a mere “functionalistic computationalism” of cognition, such as has been done with the SMART system of goal attainment (p. 107). Thirdly, SDT confronts conventions that are present within various psychological schools (e.g. behavioral, social constructionist) that denies the innate agency of the human being toward growth
(p. 107). According to Deci and Ryan (2000): “The starting point for SDT is the postulate that humans are active, growth-oriented organisms who are naturally inclined toward integration of their psychic elements into a unified sense of self and integration of themselves into larger social structures” (p. 229). Although SDT’s foundational premises have been charted extensively, further research of its precepts needs to be conducted to determine how they are related to other theories of determinism, specifically those connected to theological, religious and cultural traditions.
One of the more intriguing ways a study into SDT may be conducted is to observe its application through the paradigm of religion, tradition, or culture with particular understandings around the philosophy of determinism (e.g. Miner & Dowson, 2009;
Steffen, Clayton, & Swinyard, 2015). This is because, a determination of the “self,” and thus, autonomy, may only be partially internalized to the extent that the particular tradition places an importance on the determination of a “higher power” (Miner &
Dowson, 2009). Even so, there have been particular individuals within these traditions who accomplished incredible works and benefitted society. On the flip side, however, it does present a sober reality that others manifesting such a view of the world, where something else more powerful than themselves is responsible for their actions and life’s events, would be susceptible to a victim mentality. What differentiates these groups of people? An example of the aforementioned religion is the Abrahamic, with its emphasis 29 on an ultimate determination by an all-powerful God. This present study focuses on one of the three Abrahamic faiths, Islam.
2.3 Locus of Control
The humanistic motivational theories posited in SDT are intricately linked to theories regarding locus of control. The internalization of competencies for self-determination is dependent upon one’s understanding of human agency. As stated in the Introduction, locus of control is most often described as a spectrum in which people adhere to either an internal locus of control or an external locus of control. (Rotter, 1966). Someone with an internal locus of control believes that they can directly impact life’s events.
Conversely, one with an external locus of control tends to identify outside forces as being responsible for determining how life’s events unfold. One’s locus of control has been proven to have a direct impact on their psychological well-being. It has been shown that individuals with a moderately internal locus of control fare better in well- being than those who have an external locus of control (Gerrig, 2013, p. 370). Research on the locus of control in religious people, however, have found that they reported a lower internal locus of control (e.g. Furnham, 1982; McIntosh, Kojetin, & Spilka, 1985;
Pargament et al., 1982; Spilka, Shaver, & Kirkpatrick, 1985). Nevertheless, religious people may display a locus of control that is oriented toward God as an approach to coping with psychological adversities (Welton et al. 1996; Yusuf, 2018). Yusuf (2018), considers it a kind of Ghazalian happiness that is rooted in self-care, named after a twelfth-century Islamic polymath who has written a forty-volume study of the soul that
“expounds the journey of the nafs [lower, ego self] towards the higher attainments of the 30 ruh (soul) through a reflective devotional life” (Binte Mohd Sedek, 2019, p. 8). Persons who fall on either one of the extreme ends of locus of control may struggle with maladaptive psychological functioning. For example, an individual with an extreme internal locus of control may become susceptible to obsessive-compulsive thinking, and a person with an extremely external locus of control be prone to think of themselves as a victim of others or circumstances (Altın & Karanci, 2008; Kets de Vries, M. F. R.,
2012).
Levenson (1981) proposed a theory of differentiating between two expectations of externality—powerful others and chance. A person whose external locus of control is predicated upon powerful others may still be predisposed to “belief in the basic order and predictability of the world” (p. 15). Thus, they may also hold a belief that although control is held in others more powerful than themselves, there is still a level of certainty that can be expected in the interactions and relationships that have been established with them through which negotiations may be made to influence outcomes. On the other hand, those with an external locus of control that is oriented toward random and accidental chance happenings may hold a different perspective. They may be more prone to think that there is nothing that can be done to effect a situation, and thus, differ in their cognitive and behavioral attribution of life’s events (Levenson, 1981).
2.4 Happiness and Riḍā
Happiness, therein, needs to be further defined. Two forms of happiness pervade: hedonia and eudaimonia (Huta, 2015). Hedonic happiness is associated with pleasure, 31 enjoyment, and comfort that is directed in the gratification of the self’s immediate needs and wants. On the other hand, as expounded in the preceding paragraphs, eudemonic happiness is related to self-actualizing tendencies that are derived from finding meaning, investing in personal growth, and leading an ethical life. According to Ryan and Martela (2016), eudaimonia is not so much a psychological state of happiness but a
“good and fulfilling way of life, the ingredients of which then contribute to happiness and thriving” (p. 109). Based on these definitions, riḍā may be said to be comparable to eudaimonia. This is because implicit in riḍā is the enduring acceptance of all of God’s decree, whether one is in comfort or pain (Khalil, 2014). Thus, it is unlike the instant pleasure of hedonia. Moreover, the effects of riḍā are even more pronounced when one is in discomfort because it is usually in trials and tribulations that a person is called upon to a deeper self-reflection. Thus, although a belief in qadar may, on the surface, be linked to an external locus of control, the conscious effort of practicing riḍā in one’s life may indicate a more internally-oriented locus of control.
32
CHAPTER 3
HYPOTHESES
Based on the preceding paragraphs, the current study will explore two different types of hypotheses. Firstly, hypotheses based on the predictive capabilities of religiosity, trait autonomy, and locus of control on happiness in a sample of the Muslim population will be assessed. Then, hypotheses based on the comparative examination of different categorizations of religiosity, trait autonomy, and locus of control on happiness in the sample of the Muslim population will be examined.
3.1 Predictive Hypotheses
For the predictive hypotheses, it is hypothesized that:
H01: The independent variables religiosity, trait autonomy, and each of the three loci of
control will individually not predict happiness.
H02: Happiness will not be predicted by trait autonomy and internal locus of control,
and religiosity will not add to the prediction.
H03: Happiness will not be predicted by trait autonomy and negatively-directed
powerful others locus of control, and religiosity will not add to the prediction.
H04: Happiness will not be predicted by trait autonomy and negatively-directed chance
locus of control, and religiosity will not add to the prediction.
H05: The addition of religiosity on each of the regression models mentioned in H02 to
H04 will demonstrate to not be statistically significant predictors of happiness.
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Ha1: The independent variables religiosity, trait autonomy, and each of the three loci of
control will individually significantly predict happiness.
Ha2: Religiosity will add to the predictive significance of the regression of trait
autonomy and internal locus of control on happiness.
Ha3: Religiosity will add to the predictive significance of the regression of trait
autonomy and negatively-directed powerful others locus of control on happiness.
Ha4: Religiosity will add to the predictive significance of the regression of trait
autonomy and negatively-directed chance locus of control on happiness.
Ha5: The addition of religiosity on each of the regression models mentioned in Ha2 to
Ha4 will demonstrate to be statistically significant predictors of happiness.
3.2 Comparative Hypotheses
For the comparative hypotheses, it is hypothesized that:
H06: The independent variables religiosity, trait autonomy, and locus of control will
individually not be statistically different for the different groups of participants on
their happiness.
H07: Furthermore, the interaction between the independent variables religiosity, trait
autonomy, and locus of control will not be statistically different for the different
groups of participants on their happiness.
Ha6: The independent variables religiosity, trait autonomy, and locus of control will
individually be statistically significantly different for the different groups of
participants on their happiness. 34
Ha7: Furthermore, the interaction between the independent variables religiosity, trait
autonomy, and locus of control will be statistically significantly different for the
different groups of participants on their happiness. 35
CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
The following methodology was employed to examine the previously mentioned hypotheses.
4.1 Participants
The participants were recruited through the use of online communication tools, namely
Facebook and Reddit (communities: “religion,” “islam,” “psychologyresearch,” and,
“islamicpsychology”), and via email and messaging communications to the researcher’s contact list. Several participants also shared the link to the questionnaire packet to others. Due to the nature of the study, only individuals who identify as being Muslims were invited to participate. Even though the convenience sampling and snowballing methods were primarily used for the recruitment of participants, a varied demography was expected, thus providing a diverse sample for the research.
Data were collected from a total of n = 95 participants, out of 322 clicks on the survey link, yielding a 30% response rate. There were 38 (40%) males and 57 (60%) females.
Their ages ranged from 18 to 75 years (M = 40.29, SD = 13.174); two of the participants did not input their ages correctly, resulting in missing values. The most represented ethnic/cultural group was South-East Asian (28%), followed by White European (21%),
West Asian / Middle Eastern (16%), and South Asian (14%). Their nationalities were varied. Of the most represented, 20 participants were Singaporean, 16 were Canadians 36 and mixed-Canadians (British, Chilean, Pakistani, Palestinian, and South African), eight were Czechs, and six were Malaysians. Other nationalities include Afghan, Algerian,
American, Australian, Azerbaijani, Bosnian, British, Egyptian, Eritrean, Ghanaian,
Indian, Indonesian, Italian, Lebanese, Dutch, New Zealander, Nigerian, Pakistani,
Russian, Turkish, Ukrainian, and Yemeni, comprising five participants or less. A majority of the participants were born Muslims (75%) while the rest identified as converts or reverts. 89 participants were Sunni Muslims, with some indicating to be within at least one of the four schools of Sunni thought (Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and
Shafi’i). One participant identified as both a Sunni and a Shia. The remaining five participants described themselves as liberal/modern, or just a Muslim.
4.2 Procedure
An online survey packet was formatted using Google Forms and distributed via the channels mentioned above (for samples of recruitment notices, see Appendix A). Before the actual questionnaires were displayed, each participant indicated their willingness to participate in the research on an informed consent form (see Appendix B). The survey packet contained five instrumentations that measure the four constructs currently being studied. Firstly, autonomy within the SDT framework was measured using two separate scales, the Index of Autonomous Functioning and the Authentic Decision and Self-
Awareness Scale, to capture the nuanced differences in which it may be exhibited in an individual. Next, the Internality, Powerful Others, and Chance Scales was used to measure the participants’ dispositions toward an internal and external loci of control.
Then, the Oxford Happiness Questionnaire was utilized to measure the participant’s 37 level of life satisfaction and well-being. This scale also acts as an indicator of the participants’ attainment of riḍā, based on the parallels that it has to happiness, as delineated in the Introduction and Literature Review sections above. Lastly, the construct of religiosity was measured using the Sahin-Francis Scale of Attitude Toward
Islam Revised. An assumption was made whereby the higher the religiosity, the more likely it was that the participants adhere to the beliefs and principles of qadar and riḍā that were mandatory upon them in their religious tradition. The Sahin-Francis Scale of
Attitude Toward Islam Revised was inserted as the last instrumentation in the questionnaire line-up to minimize the effect of social desirability biases that might occur on the other questionnaires if it was hinted to the participants that their religiosity was being assessed. These instrumentations will be individually elaborated in the proceeding section.
Furthermore, because there has not yet been any questionnaire created to assess qadar and/or riḍā as their own particular construct, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, two open-ended questions were inserted at the bottom of the Sahin-Francis Scale to elicit the participants’ attitude toward these constructs as they are specifically referred to in Islam. These questions were: “Please write a short paragraph about how the belief in
plays a role in your life,” and, “Please write a short paragraph about how rida (قدر) qadar
plays a role in your life.” At the end of the questionnaire packet, demographic (رضا) information such as age, gender, nationality, and ethnicity of the participants were acquired. Statistical data about the participants’ experience in Islam, such as the duration they have been a Muslim and whether they were born into the religion or converted, were also collected. After submitting their completed questionnaires, the 38 participants were displayed a debriefing form (see Appendix C) to inform them about the research in which they had just participated.
4.3 Instrumentations
Five measures, four of them well-known and one newly developed, were used to capture the constructs being studied in this study.
4.3.1 Index of Autonomous Functioning (IAF)
The Index of Autonomous Functioning (IAF; see Appendix D) was developed by
Weinstein, Przybylski and Ryan (2012) as an instrument to measure autonomy. It is comprised of three subscales: “authorship/self-congruence,” “interest-taking,” and, “low susceptibility to control,” (p. 398). There are a total number of 15 items in the questionnaire, with each subscale comprising five items. Participants indicate on a five- point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“not true at all”) to 5 (“completely true”) as to the extent to which they perceive themselves as able or capable in making decisions that reflect their value systems.
The rationale for each subscale of the IAF is based on the definition of “personality” laid out in the SDT. Firstly, the “authorship/self-congruence” subscale aligns with the concept of authenticity in making decisions based on one’s value systems (Weinstein et al., 2012, p. 398). A sample item from this subscale reads, “My decisions represent my most important values and feelings.” Secondly, the “interest-taking” subscale reflects the ability of a test-taker to be internally and externally aware of the impact their 39 decisions have, and therefore, become self-governing in the decision-making process (p.
398). A sample item from this subscale reads, “I often reflect on why I react the way I do.” Thirdly, the “susceptibility to control” subscale is a reverse-scored component of the questionnaire that takes into account the idea that in order to be undeniably autonomous, a test-taker would be expected to display a low disposition of being easily liable toward internal or external pressure as a motivation (Weinstein et al., p. 398). A sample item from this subscale reads, “I do things in order to avoid feeling badly about myself.” The IAF has been shown to have high reliability and validity, after having been assessed through at least seven studies (pp. 399–411). In a developmental study of the instrument, it has been found to be highly reliable, with an internal consistency of .81 on the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (p. 400).
4.3.2 Authentic Decision and Self-Awareness Scale (ADSAS)
The Authentic Decision and Self-Awareness Scale (ADSAS; see Appendix E) was created by Bialožyt and Binte Mohd Sedek (2019) to determine autonomy within the
SDT framework based on a participant’s ability in “making decisions that are in accordance with one’s true self […] and the awareness of the emotional experience of one’s self” (p. 6). The 9-item scale comprises of two subscales, namely “Authentic
Decision” (5 items) and “Self-Awareness” (4 items). A sample item from each of the subscale reads: “Whenever I make an important decision, I prioritize my own values and needs over what others expect of me” (Authentic Decision subscale); and, “I am aware of the way I feel at any given moment” (Self-Awareness subscale). A five-point
Likert scale is utilized as the scoring system for the instrument, whereby participants rate from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly Agree”). Three of the nine questions 40 are reverse-scored items. The scale has been shown to have good construct validity and acceptable reliability with an internal consistency of .7 on the Cronbach’s alpha.
4.3.3 Internality, Powerful Others, and Chance Scales (IPCS)
The Internality, Powerful Others, and Chance Scales (IPCS; see Appendix F) was developed by Levenson (1981) as an improvement to the Internal-External Locus of
Control Scale initially constructed by Julian B. Rotter. While Rotter’s (1966) I-E Scale was conceived as a unidimensional instrument to solicit a test taker’s disposition toward an internal or an external locus of control, the IPCS measures an individual’s locus of control through the scales of “Internal” (I Scale), “Powerful Others” (P Scale), and,
“Chance” (C Scale; p. 16), indicating three different dimensions of internality or externality. The I Scale indicates an individual’s disposition toward an internal locus of control. A sample item reads: “I can pretty much determine what will happen in my life.” The P Scale measures an individual’s belief that events happening to them are a result of the actions of others more powerful than themselves, indicating an external locus of control. A sample item reads: “My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others.” The C Scale assesses an individual’s conviction that events happening to them are a result of chance, suggesting an external locus of control due to random outcomes.
A sample item reads: “When I get what I want, it’s usually because I’m lucky.”
Each of the I, P, and C Scales consist of eight items, amounting to a total of 24 items for the entire instrument. Participants score each item on a six-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 3 (“Strongly Agree”). A high score on each subscale determines the level of control an individual perceives the measured dimension has on their lives. Internal consistency calculations done on three different sample groups 41
(students, adults, and hospitalized psychiatric patients) yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of between .51 to .67 for the I Scale; .72 to .82 for the P Scale; and, .73 to .79 for the C
Scale (p. 22). Validity tests have also generated expected results of the constructs being measured. For example, the P and C Scales have been found to moderately, but significantly, correlate with each other (.41), and both scales have been found to correlate minimally or negatively with the I Scale (-.25 to .19). These correlation patterns would be expected, given that P and C Scales are both directed toward assessing an individual’s level of external control (Levenson, 1981, p. 23).
4.3.4 Oxford Happiness Questionnaire (OHQ)
Hills and Argyle (2002) developed the Oxford Happiness Questionnaire (OHQ; see
Appendix G) as an improved version of their previous instrument, the Oxford
Happiness Inventory. The OHQ is a 29-item scale that aims to measure an individual’s subjective well-being, or happiness as is implied in the questionnaire’s nomenclature.
Each item consists of a sentence, whereby participants score on a six-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 6 (“strongly agree”). Of the 29 sentences, 17 are positively worded, such as: “I feel that life is very rewarding;” “I find beauty in some things;” and, “I feel fully mentally alert.” The other 12 sentences are negatively worded, such as: “I don’t feel particularly pleased with the way I am;” “I don’t think I look attractive;” and, “I do not have particularly happy memories of the past.” The negatively-worded items are subject to reverse-scoring. Psychometric assessment done on the OHQ has shown it to have a high internal consistency of .91 on the Cronbach’s alpha (p. 1075), as well as a high construct validity (p. 1080). The OHQ was also utilized to measure the level of happiness that may provide clues as to the attainment of riḍā in the participants. A face validity evaluation was done by the researcher to ensure 42 that the items on the OHQ apply to riḍā, compared to other inventories measuring similar constructs.
4.3.5 Sahin-Francis Scale of Attitude Toward Islam Revised (SFSATIR)
Sahin and Francis (2002) first developed the Sahin-Francis Scale of Attitude Toward
Islam “as part of a wider venture designed to translate the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the affective dimension of religiosity” (Francis, Tekke, & Robbins,
2016, p. 3) for those who hold the Islamic religion and belief systems. It has since been amended into the Sahin-Francis Scale of Attitude Toward Islam Revised (SFSATIR; see
Appendix H). It is a 23-item questionnaire that measures the affective reaction of participants toward beliefs and practices that are central to Islam. These include questions such as: “I find it inspiring to listen to the Qurʼān;” “I know that Allah/God helps me;” “I think praying/salāt is a good thing;” “Attending the Mosque or religious gathering is very important to me;” and, “I love to follow the life/sunnah of the
Prophet” (p. 16). It utilizes a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“disagree strongly”) to 5 (“agree strongly”). Psychometric measurements of the SFSATIR were done on students in Malaysia, which gave favorable results toward confirming the scale’s “homogeneity, unidimensionality and internal consistency reliability,” with a
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .92 (p. 9). Construct validity of the instrument is also supported by the results of the study (p. 9). Because specific instrumentations measuring qadar and riḍā have not yet been developed, to the researcher’s best knowledge, the SFSATIR was used to estimate levels of religiosity in the participants.
An assumption was made whereby the higher the religiosity scores on the SFSATIR, the higher their qadar and riḍā should be.
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4.3.5.1 Addendum to the SFSATIR
For this current study, two open-ended questions were inserted at the bottom of the
SFSATIR to elicit the participants’ specific attitudes toward qadar and riḍā. These
plays (قدر) questions were: “Please write a short paragraph about how the belief in qadar
plays a (رضا) a role in your life,” and, “Please write a short paragraph about how rida role in your life.” Because this study is primarily quantitative, these questions were simply intended as an expository inquiry into the participants’ specific attitudes toward qadar and riḍā as they are specifically named in Islam. They were not qualitatively assessed in this research.
4.3.6 Demographics Questionnaire
A demographics questionnaire (see Appendix I) was created to comprise questions eliciting the participants’ age, gender, nationality, and ethnicity. Additionally, questions were asked to obtain the participants’ experience as a Muslim, such as whether they were born Muslim or converted into Islam, the duration of time they have been a
Muslim, as well as the school(s) of thought with which they identify.
4.4 Research Design and Data Analyses
Two methods of quantitative designs were employed in this current study. Firstly, correlational research designs in the forms of simple and multiple linear regressions were used to determine to determine whether or not and to what degree religiosity, trait autonomy, and each of the three loci of control were predictors of personal happiness.
The predictor variables were derived from the following scales: religiosity, from the 44 total scores computed on the SFSATIR; trait autonomy, from the IAF and ADSAS; after which, a composite z-score was computed to combine the two scales; and, the three loci of control were acquired from the total scores on each of the IPCS subscales. The outcome variable happiness was taken from the participants’ total scores on the OHQ.
Secondly, comparison-group quasi-experimental research designs were performed to discover the group differences and the interactions between religiosity, trait autonomy, and locus of control as independent variables, on happiness as the dependent variable.
One-way between-groups ANOVAs were used on each of the independent variables to test the effect of each construct as they pertain to the dependent variable individually.
Then, a three-way between-groups ANOVA was conducted to discover whether there was an interaction between the independent variables on the dependent variable.
Score data on the independent variables were manipulated in the following ways prior to conducting the ANOVAs. Mean splits were done on both religiosity and trait autonomy to yield a High/Low grouping. As for the locus of control variable, participants were grouped according to their highest recorded total on either one of the three scales. Thus, participants who scored the highest on the I Scale were categorized into the Internal group, while those scoring the highest on either the P or the C Scale went into the External group. To remove ambiguity, a cut-off difference of more than 3 was applied, due to each item on the IPCS bearing a scoring weight of between -3 to 3.
Therefore, in the event that a participant’s I and P/C Scales were differentiated by 3 or less, a Mixed group category was assigned.
45
Additionally, descriptive statistics were done on the demographic data collected, as well as on each variable. All computations were analyzed using the IBM Statistical Package for the Social Sciences program (SPSS).
46
CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
Based on the computations of data acquired from the previously-mentioned inventories, the following statistical outputs were derived.
5.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Score Variables
Score variables were obtained directly via the previously mentioned instrumentations.
Religiosity had a mean score of 107.12 (SD = 12.159) and a median score of 112.00.
Data scores ranged from 57 to 115, out of a possible range of 23 to 115. Data were not normally distributed (p = .000), as assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk’s test (see Table 1). It had a skewness of -2.530 (SE = .247) and a kurtosis of 6.541 (SE = .490). Visual inspection of the histogram (see Figure 1) and normal Q-Q plot (see Figure 2) confirmed the assessment. The highest occurring score was 115, contributed by 20 participants.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Religiosity Scores Shapiro- N M Mdn SD Min Max Wilk (p) Religiosity 95 107.12 112.00 12.159 57 115 .000 Valid N (listwise) 95
47
Trait Autonomy was created by merging the scores on the IAF and ADSAS. Scores on the IAF had a mean of 54.85 (SD = 5.932), which was almost at the median value (Mdn
= 55.00). Data scores ranged from 34 to 69, out of a possible range of 15 to 75. Data were not normally distributed (p = .039), as assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk’s test (see
Table 2). It had a skewness of -.003 (SE = .247) and a kurtosis of .794 (SE = .490).
Visual inspection of the histogram (see Figure 3) and normal Q-Q plot (see Figure 4) confirmed the assessment. The highest occurring scores were 51 and 55, each contributed by 10 participants.
Scores on the ADSAS had a mean of 31.28 (SD = 5.379), which was also almost at the median value (Mdn = 32.00). Data scores ranged from 18 to 43, out of a possible range of 9 to 45. Data were normally distributed (p = .172), as assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk’s test (see Table 2). It had a skewness of -.274 (SE = .247) and kurtosis of -.330 (SE
= .490). Visual inspection of the histogram (see Figure 5) and normal Q-Q plot (see
Figure 6) confirmed the assessment. The highest occurring score was 32, contributed by
9 participants.
A composite z-score was computed to combine the two sets of data. The composite data had a median value of -.0140 and a standard deviation of .80210. Data ranged from -
2.71 to 1.66, with a normal distribution (p = .584) on the Shapiro-Wilk’s test (see Table
2). It had a skewness of -.280 (SE = .247) and kurtosis of .421 (SE = .490). Visual inspection of the histogram (see Figure 7) and normal Q-Q plot (see Figure 8) confirmed the assessment. The highest occurring score was .25, contributed by 3 participants.
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Trait Autonomy Scores Shapiro- N M Mdn SD Min Max Wilk (p) IAF 95 54.85 55.00 5.932 34 69 .039 ADSAS 95 31.28 32.00 5.379 18 43 .172 Trait Autonomy 95 .0000 -.0140 .80210 -2.71 1.66 .584 Valid N (listwise) 95
Locus of Control comprised three different sets of data scored on the IPCS subscales:
Internal, Powerful Others, and Chance. Internal scores had a mean of 27.23 (SD =
8.749), which was very close to its median value (Mdn = 27.00). Data scores ranged from 4 to 46, out of a possible range of 0 to 48. Data were normally distributed (p
= .560), as assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk’s test (see Table 3). It had a skewness of -.321
(SE = .247) and kurtosis of -.090 (SE = .490). Visual inspection of the histogram (see
Figure 9) and normal Q-Q plot (see Figure 10) confirmed the assessment. The highest occurring scores were 32 and 35, each contributed by 7 participants.
Data on Powerful Others had a mean score of 16.76 (SD = 10.106), which was relatively close to its median value (Mdn = 15.00). Scores ranged from 0 to 44, out of a possible range of 0 to 48. Data were not normally distributed (p = .031), as assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk’s test (see Table 3). It had a skewness of .483 (SE = .247) and kurtosis of -.250 (SE = .490). Visual inspection of the histogram (see Figure 11) and normal Q-Q plot (see Figure 12) confirmed the assessment. The highest occurring score was 9, contributed by 9 participants.
Chance scores had a mean of 19.61 (SD = 9.012), which was relatively close to its median value (Mdn = 18.00). Data scores ranged from 1 to 39, out of a possible range of 49
0 to 48. Data were not normally distributed (p = .037), as assessed by the Shapiro-
Wilk’s test (see Table 3). It had a skewness of .308 (SE = .247) and kurtosis of -.552 (SE
= .490). Visual inspection of the histogram (see Figure 13) and normal Q-Q plot (see
Figure 14) confirmed the assessment. The highest occurring scores were 13 and 20, each contributed by 8 participants.
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Locus of Control Scores Shapiro- N M Mdn SD Min Max Wilk (p) LoC Internal 95 27.23 27.00 8.749 4 46 .560 LoC Powerful Others 95 16.76 15.00 10.106 0 44 .031 LoC Chance 95 19.61 18.00 9.012 1 39 .037 Valid N (listwise) 95
Happiness scores had a mean of 122.68 (SD = 19.259), which was relatively close to its median value (Mdn = 124.00). Data scores ranged from 67 to 165, out of a possible range of 29 to 174. Data were normally distributed (p = .329), as assessed by the
Shapiro-Wilk’s test (see Table 4). It had a skewness of -.351 (SE = .247) and kurtosis of
-.166 (SE = .490). Visual inspection of the histogram (see Figure 15) and normal Q-Q plot (see Figure 16) confirmed the assessment. The highest occurring scores were 105,
116, 137, 141, and 144, each contributed by 4 participants.
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics of Happiness Scores Shapiro- N M Mdn SD Min Max Wilk (p) Happiness 95 122.68 124.00 19.259 67 165 .329 Valid N (listwise) 95
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5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in Nominal Forms
Data on the score variables were manipulated to obtain categorizations of the values into nominal groups. The methods of classification were elaborated in the preceding
Research Design and Data Analyses section.
A mean split was applied to religiosity scores to organize the participants into a high/low grouping. 69 participants (73%) were categorized as high religiosity, while 26 participants (27%) went into the low religiosity group (see Figure 17). Likewise, a mean split was applied to the composite scores of trait autonomy to obtain a high/low group.
47 participants (49%) were grouped as high trait autonomy, while 48 participants (51%) went into the low trait autonomy group (see Figure 18). Participants were split into three loci of control groups. 51 participants (54%) were categorized as having an internal locus of control, 19 participants (20%) had an external locus of control, while 25 participants (26%) went into a mixed internal-external locus of control group (see
Figure 19).
5.2 Correlation Matrices
Because data on some of the variables were found to be abnormally distributed while others had normal distribution, both the Pearson (see Table 5) and the Spearman-rho
(see Table 6) correlation matrices were generated in order to ascertain how these variables relate to each other. The following correlations were noted. Religiosity correlated positively and significantly with trait autonomy, rs(93) = .456, p = .000, and happiness, rs(93) = .453, p = .000 (see Table 6). It correlated negatively with all three 51
loci of control; however, it was not significant for internal locus of control, rs(93) =
-.029, p = .781, while it was significant for both powerful others and chance loci of control, rs(93) = -.316, p = .002, and, rs(93) = -.236, p = .021, respectively (see Table 6).
Trait autonomy was significantly directly related to happiness r(93) = .533, p = .000
(see Table 5). It was also directly related to internal locus of control, but this relationship was not significant r(93) = .134, p = .195 (see Table 5). It was, however, significantly negatively related to powerful others and chance loci of control, rs(93) =
-.367, p = .000, and, rs(93) = -.306, p = .003, respectively (see Table 6).
Internal locus of control was significantly directly related to happiness r(93) = .311, p
= .002 (see Table 5). Additionally, both powerful others and chance loci of control significantly and negatively correlated with happiness, rs(93) = -.355, p = .000, and, rs(93) = -.211, p = .040, respectively (see Table 6).
How the loci of control correlated with each other was also observed. Internal locus of control correlated positively with both powerful others and chance loci of control, but only significantly with powerful others, rs(93) = .328, p = .001, and, rs(93) = .184, p
= .074, respectively (see Table 6). Furthermore, powerful others locus of control correlated positively significantly with chance locus of control, rs(93) = .665, p = .000
(see Table 6).
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Table 5 Correlations of the normally distributed variables Trait LoC Autonomy Internal Happiness Trait Autonomy Pearson 1 .134 .533** Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) .195 .000 N 95 95 95 Locus of Control Pearson .134 1 .311** Internal Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) .195 .002 N 95 95 95 Happiness Pearson .533** .311** 1 Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .002 N 95 95 95 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 6 Non-parametric correlations of the non-normally distributed variables Trait LoC Auto- LoC Powerful LoC Relig- nomy Internal Others Chance iosity Happiness Spear- Locus of Correlation -.367** .328** 1.000 .665** -.316** -.355** man's Control Coefficient rho Powerful Sig. (2- .000 .001 . .000 .002 .000 Others tailed) N 95 95 95 95 95 95 Locus of Correlation -.306** .184 .665** 1.000 -.236* -.211* Control Coefficient Chance Sig. (2- .003 .074 .000 . .021 .040 tailed) N 95 95 95 95 95 95 Relig- Correlation .456** -.029 -.316** -.236* 1.000 .453** iosity Coefficient Sig. (2- .000 .781 .002 .021 . .000 tailed) N 95 95 95 95 95 95 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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5.3 Tests of the Hypotheses
5.3.1 Tests of the Predictive Hypotheses
5.3.1.1 Results of the Simple Linear Regressions
Simple linear regressions were conducted to test the effects of religiosity, trait autonomy, and the three loci of control, as singly predicting happiness on the sample. It was established that religiosity statistically significantly predicted happiness, F(1,93) =
13.928, p = .000, and accounted for 12.1% of the explained variability in happiness (see
Tables 7 and 8). The regression equation was: Predicted Happiness (PPH) = 61.453 +
(.572 x religiosity) (see Table 9).
Table 7 Model Summary Std. Error of the Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Estimate 1 .361a .130 .121 18.057 a. Predictors: (Constant), Religiosity
Table 8 ANOVAa Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 1 Regression 4541.366 1 4541.366 13.928 .000b Residual 30323.160 93 326.055 Total 34864.526 94 a. Dependent Variable: Happiness b. Predictors: (Constant), Religiosity
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Table 9 Coefficientsa Standardized Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 61.453 16.511 3.722 .000 Religiosity .572 .153 .361 3.732 .000 a. Dependent Variable: Happiness
Trait autonomy statistically significantly predicted happiness, F(1,93) = 36.991, p
= .000, and accounted for 27.7% of the explained variability in happiness (see Tables 10 and 11). The regression equation was: PPH = 122.684 + (12.808 x trait autonomy) (see
Table 12).
Table 10 Model Summary Std. Error of the Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Estimate 1 .533a .285 .277 16.377 a. Predictors: (Constant), Trait Autonomy
Table 11 ANOVAa Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 1 Regression 9921.201 1 9921.201 36.991 .000b Residual 24943.326 93 268.208 Total 34864.526 94 a. Dependent Variable: Happiness b. Predictors: (Constant), Trait Autonomy
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Table 12 Coefficientsa Unstandardized Standardized Coefficients Coefficients Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 122.684 1.680 73.015 .000 Trait Autonomy 12.808 2.106 .533 6.082 .000 a. Dependent Variable: Happiness
Internal locus of control statistically significantly predicted happiness, F(1,93) = 9.959, p = .002, and accounted for 8.7% of the explained variability in happiness (see Tables
13 and 14). The regression equation was: PPH = 104.040 + (.685 x internal locus of control) (see Table 15).
Table 13 Model Summary Std. Error of the Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Estimate 1 .311a .097 .087 18.402 a. Predictors: (Constant), Locus of Control Internal
Table 14 ANOVAa Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 1 Regression 3372.519 1 3372.519 9.959 .002b Residual 31492.007 93 338.624 Total 34864.526 94 a. Dependent Variable: Happiness b. Predictors: (Constant), Locus of Control Internal
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Table 15 Coefficientsa Unstandardized Standardized Coefficients Coefficients Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 104.040 6.202 16.775 .000 Locus of Control .685 .217 .311 3.156 .002 Internal a. Dependent Variable: Happiness
Powerful others locus of control statistically significantly predicted happiness, F(1,93)
= 12.263, p = .001, and accounted for 10.7% of the explained variability in happiness
(see Tables 16 and 17). The regression equation was: PPH = 133.585 + (-.650 x powerful others locus of control) (see Table 18).
Table 16 Model Summary Std. Error of the Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Estimate 1 .341a .117 .107 18.199 a. Predictors: (Constant), Locus of Control Powerful Others
Table 17 ANOVAa Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 1 Regression 4061.784 1 4061.784 12.263 .001b Residual 30802.742 93 331.212 Total 34864.526 94 a. Dependent Variable: Happiness b. Predictors: (Constant), Locus of Control Powerful Others
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Table 18 Coefficientsa Unstandardized Standardized Coefficients Coefficients Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 133.585 3.630 36.802 .000 Locus of Control -.650 .186 -.341 -3.502 .001 Powerful Others a. Dependent Variable: Happiness
Chance locus of control did not statistically predict happiness and the results were not significant, F(1,93) = 3.372, p = .070, and it only accounted for 2.5% of the explained variability in happiness (see Tables 19 and 20). The regression equation was: PPH =
130.523 + (-.400 x chance locus of control) (see Table 21).
Table 19 Model Summary Std. Error of the Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Estimate 1 .187a .035 .025 19.020 a. Predictors: (Constant), Locus of Control Chance
Table 20 ANOVAa Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 1 Regression 1219.814 1 1219.814 3.372 .070b Residual 33644.713 93 361.771 Total 34864.526 94 a. Dependent Variable: Happiness b. Predictors: (Constant), Locus of Control Chance
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Table 21 Coefficientsa Unstandardized Standardized Coefficients Coefficients Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 130.523 4.694 27.808 .000 Locus of Control -.400 .218 -.187 -1.836 .070 Chance a. Dependent Variable: Happiness
5.3.1.2 Results of the Hierarchical Linear Regressions
A multiple linear regression was used to determine whether the religiosity of the participants added on to the predictive significance of the regression of trait autonomy and internal locus of control on happiness. A hierarchical model was used, whereby trait autonomy and internal locus of control comprise model 1, adding on religiosity for model 2 (see Table 22).
The data did not violate assumptions of independence of errors at the acceptable value of 1.858, as assessed by the Durbin-Watson test (see Table 23). Assessments of the scatterplots suggest that the data assumed linearity between the composite predictors, the individual predictors, and the standardized residuals (see Figures 20 to 23). The data assumed no multicollinearity at the tolerance values of greater than 0.1 (see Table 24).
The data did not violate assumptions of homoscedasticity, as assessed by the scatterplot of studentized residuals against the unstandardized predicted value (see Figure 24).
Assessment of the histogram showed the residuals were normally distributed (see Figure
25).
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Trait autonomy and internal locus of control (model 1) could statistically significantly predict happiness, F(2,92) = 24.009, p = .000, as well as when religiosity is added to the model (model 2), F(3,91) = 18.962, p = .000 (see Table 25). Model 1 accounted for
32.9% (adj. R2 = .329) of the prediction, and model 2 accounted for 36.4% (adj. R2
= .364) of the prediction, with an adjusted R2 change of .035 from the previous model
(see Table 23). The regression intercept, coefficients and beta (β) values are displayed in Table 24. In this model, trait autonomy, t(91) = 4.682, p = .000, internal locus of control, t(91) = 3.163, p = .002, and religiosity, t(91) = 2.484, p = .015, were all statistically significant predictors to happiness (see Table 24).
Table 22 Variables Entered/Removeda Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 1 Trait Autonomy, Locus . Enter of Control Internalb 2 Religiosityb . Enter a. Dependent Variable: Happiness b. All requested variables entered.
Table 23 Model Summaryc Std. Change Statistics Adjusted Error of R R R the Square F Sig. F Durbin- Model R Square Square Estimate Change Change df1 df2 Change Watson 1 .586a .343 .329 15.780 .343 24.009 2 92 .000 2 .620b .385 .364 15.354 .042 6.171 1 91 .015 1.858 a. Predictors: (Constant), Trait Autonomy, Locus of Control Internal b. Predictors: (Constant), Trait Autonomy, Locus of Control Internal, Religiosity c. Dependent Variable: Happiness
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Table 24 Coefficientsa Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Coefficients Coefficients Statistics Std. Model B Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 1 (Constant) 108.069 5.362 20.153 .000 Trait 12.023 2.048 .501 5.871 .000 .982 1.018 Autonomy Locus of .537 .188 .244 2.859 .005 .982 1.018 Control Internal 2 (Constant) 69.527 16.369 4.247 .000 Trait 10.046 2.145 .418 4.682 .000 .847 1.181 Autonomy Locus of .581 .184 .264 3.163 .002 .973 1.028 Control Internal Religiosity .349 .140 .220 2.484 .015 .861 1.161 a. Dependent Variable: Happiness
Table 25 ANOVAa Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 1 Regression 11956.404 2 5978.202 24.009 .000b Residual 22908.123 92 249.001 Total 34864.526 94 2 Regression 13411.232 3 4470.411 18.962 .000c Residual 21453.294 91 235.750 Total 34864.526 94 a. Dependent Variable: Happiness b. Predictors: (Constant), Trait Autonomy, Locus of Control Internal c. Predictors: (Constant), Trait Autonomy, Locus of Control Internal, Religiosity
Next, a multiple linear regression was used to determine whether the religiosity of the participants added on to the predictive significance of the regression of trait autonomy 61 and powerful others locus of control on happiness. A hierarchical model was used, whereby trait autonomy and powerful others locus of control comprise model 1, adding on religiosity for model 2 (see Table 26).
The data did not violate assumptions of independence of errors at the acceptable value of 1.690, as assessed by the Durbin-Watson test (see Table 27). Assessments of the scatterplots suggested that the data assumed linearity between the composite predictors, the individual predictors, and the standardized residuals (see Figures 26 to 29). The data assumed no multicollinearity at the tolerance values of greater than 0.1 (see Table 28).
The data did not violate assumptions of homoscedasticity, as assessed by the scatterplot of studentized residuals against the unstandardized predicted value (see Figure 30).
Assessment of the histogram showed the residuals were normally distributed (see Figure
31).
Trait autonomy and powerful others locus of control (model 1) could statistically significantly predict happiness, F(2,92) = 20.813, p = .000, as well as when religiosity is added to the model (model 2), F(3,91) = 15.444, p = .000 (see Table 29). Model 1 accounted for 29.7% (adj. R2 = .297) of the prediction, and model 2 accounted for
31.6% (adj. R2 = .316) of the prediction, with an adjusted R2 change of .019 from the previous model (see Table 27). The regression intercept, coefficients and beta (β) values are displayed in Table 28. In this model, trait autonomy, t(91) = 4.349, p = .000, was a statistically significant predictor to happiness, while powerful others locus of control and religiosity were not (see Table 28).
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Table 26 Variables Entered/Removeda Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 1 Trait Autonomy, Locus . Enter of Control Powerful Othersb 2 Religiosityb . Enter a. Dependent Variable: Happiness b. All requested variables entered.
Table 27 Model Summaryc Std. Change Statistics Adjusted Error of R R R the Square F Sig. F Durbin- Model R Square Square Estimate Change Change df1 df2 Change Watson 1 .558a .312 .297 16.153 .312 20.813 2 92 .000 2 .581b .337 .316 15.933 .026 3.551 1 91 .063 1.690 a. Predictors: (Constant), Trait Autonomy, Locus of Control Powerful Others b. Predictors: (Constant), Trait Autonomy, Locus of Control Powerful Others, Religiosity c. Dependent Variable: Happiness
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Table 28 Coefficientsa Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Coefficients Coefficients Statistics Std. Model B Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 1 (Constant) 128.285 3.385 37.900 .000 Trait 11.327 2.219 .472 5.105 .000 .876 1.141 Autonomy Locus of -.334 .176 -.175 -1.898 .061 .876 1.141 Control Powerful Others 2 (Constant) 98.097 16.365 5.994 .000 Trait 10.000 2.299 .416 4.349 .000 .794 1.259 Autonomy Locus of -.293 .175 -.154 -1.672 .098 .862 1.159 Control Powerful Others Religiosity .275 .146 .174 1.884 .063 .855 1.169 a. Dependent Variable: Happiness
Table 29 ANOVAa Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 1 Regression 10860.786 2 5430.393 20.813 .000b Residual 24003.740 92 260.910 Total 34864.526 94 2 Regression 11762.193 3 3920.731 15.444 .000c Residual 23102.334 91 253.872 Total 34864.526 94 a. Dependent Variable: Happiness b. Predictors: (Constant), Trait Autonomy, Locus of Control Powerful Others c. Predictors: (Constant), Trait Autonomy, Locus of Control Powerful Others, Religiosity
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Likewise, a multiple linear regression was used to determine whether the religiosity of the participants added on to the predictive significance of the regression of trait autonomy and chance locus of control on happiness. A hierarchical model was used, whereby trait autonomy and chance locus of control comprise model 1, adding on religiosity for model 2 (see Table 30).
The data did not violate assumptions of independence of errors at the acceptable value of 1.782, as assessed by the Durbin-Watson test (see Table 31). Assessments of the scatterplots suggested that the data assumed linearity between the composite predictors, the individual predictors, and the standardized residuals (see Figures 32 to 35). The data assumed no multicollinearity at the tolerance values of greater than 0.1 (see Table 32).
The data did not violate assumptions of homoscedasticity, as assessed by the scatterplot of studentized residuals against the unstandardized predicted value (see Figure 36).
Assessment of the histogram showed the residuals were normally distributed (see Figure
37).
Trait autonomy and chance locus of control (model 1) could statistically significantly predict happiness, F(2,92) = 18.354, p = .000, as well as when religiosity is added to the model (model 2), F(3,91) = 14.085, p = .000 (see Table 33). Model 1 accounted for
27.0% (adj. R2 = .270) of the prediction, and model 2 accounted for 29.5% (adj. R2
= .295) of the prediction, with an adjusted R2 change of .025 from the previous model
(see Table 31). The regression intercept, coefficients and beta (β) values are displayed in Table 32. In this model, trait autonomy, t(91) = 4.789, p = .000, and religiosity, t(91)
= 2.061, p = .042, were statistically significant predictors to happiness, while chance locus of control was not (see Table 32). 65
Table 30 Variables Entered/Removeda Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 1 Trait Autonomy, Locus . Enter of Control Chanceb 2 Religiosityb . Enter a. Dependent Variable: Happiness b. All requested variables entered.
Table 31 Model Summaryc Std. Change Statistics Adjusted Error of R R R the Square F Sig. F Durbin- Model R Square Square Estimate Change Change df1 df2 Change Watson 1 .534a .285 .270 16.458 .285 18.354 2 92 .000 2 .563b .317 .295 16.175 .032 4.250 1 91 .042 1.782 a. Predictors: (Constant), Trait Autonomy, Locus of Control Chance b. Predictors: (Constant), Trait Autonomy, Locus of Control Chance, Religiosity c. Dependent Variable: Happiness
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Table 32 Coefficientsa Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Coefficients Coefficients Statistics Std. Model B Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 1 (Constant) 123.795 4.231 29.258 .000 Trait 12.614 2.223 .525 5.675 .000 .907 1.103 Autonomy Locus of -.057 .198 -.027 -.286 .775 .907 1.103 Control Chance 2 (Constant) 90.484 16.686 5.423 .000 Trait 11.064 2.310 .461 4.789 .000 .811 1.234 Autonomy Locus of -.022 .195 -.010 -.111 .912 .900 1.111 Control Chance Religiosity .305 .148 .192 2.061 .042 .862 1.159 a. Dependent Variable: Happiness
Table 33 ANOVAa Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 1 Regression 9943.400 2 4971.700 18.354 .000b Residual 24921.126 92 270.882 Total 34864.526 94 2 Regression 11055.253 3 3685.084 14.085 .000c Residual 23809.273 91 261.640 Total 34864.526 94 a. Dependent Variable: Happiness b. Predictors: (Constant), Trait Autonomy, Locus of Control Chance c. Predictors: (Constant), Trait Autonomy, Locus of Control Chance, Religiosity
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5.3.2 Tests of the Comparative Hypotheses
5.3.2.1 Results of the One-Way ANOVAs
One-way ANOVAs were conducted for each of the independent variables of the current study to determine if happiness were different for participants in the different groups of religiosity, trait autonomy, and locus of control, respectively. The data met the assumptions of homogeneity of variances for each of the independent variables, as assessed by Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances, p = .341, .338, .630, respectively (see Tables 34 to 36 in Appendix J).
Participants who were high in religiosity had higher happiness (M = 126.68, SD =
17.372), than those who were low in religiosity (M = 112.08, SD = 20.313). This difference was statistically significant, F(1,93) = 12.147, p = .001 (see Table 37).
Likewise, participants who were high in trait autonomy had higher happiness (M =
132.60, SD = 14.981) than those who were low in trait autonomy (M = 112.98, SD =
18.103). This difference was statistically significant, F(1,93) = 33.034, p = .000 (see
Table 38). Additionally, participants who had an internal locus of control had the highest happiness (M = 129.73, SD = 17.883), followed by those with a mixed locus of control (M = 116.40, SD = 16.148) and then, those with an external locus of control (M
= 112.05, SD = 19.654). This difference was statistically significant, F(2,92) = 8.921, p
= .000 (see Table 39). However, a post-hoc Tukey analysis revealed that the statistical significant differences were found only between those with an internal and an external locus of control (17.67, p = .001), as well as between those with an internal and a mixed locus of control (13.33, p = .008) (see Table 40).
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Table 37 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Dependent Variable: Happiness Type III Sum of Mean Partial Eta Source Squares df Square F Sig. Squared Corrected 4027.695a 1 4027.695 12.147 .001 .116 Model Intercept 1076502.389 1 1076502.389 3246.596 .000 .972 Religiosity 4027.695 1 4027.695 12.147 .001 .116 Error 30836.832 93 331.579 Total 1464749.000 95 Corrected Total 34864.526 94 a. R Squared = .116 (Adjusted R Squared = .106)
Table 38 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Dependent Variable: Happiness Type III Sum of Mean Partial Eta Source Squares df Square F Sig. Squared Corrected 9138.228a 1 9138.228 33.034 .000 .262 Model Intercept 1432133.428 1 1432133.428 5177.131 .000 .982 Trait Autonomy 9138.228 1 9138.228 33.034 .000 .262 Error 25726.298 93 276.627 Total 1464749.000 95 Corrected Total 34864.526 94 a. R Squared = .262 (Adjusted R Squared = .254)
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Table 39 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Dependent Variable: Happiness Type III Sum of Mean Partial Eta Source Squares df Square F Sig. Squared Corrected 5663.422a 2 2831.711 8.921 .000 .162 Model Intercept 1143016.995 1 1143016.995 3601.150 .000 .975 Locus of 5663.422 2 2831.711 8.921 .000 .162 Control Error 29201.104 92 317.403 Total 1464749.000 95 Corrected Total 34864.526 94 a. R Squared = .162 (Adjusted R Squared = .144)
Table 40 Multiple Comparisons Dependent Variable: Happiness Tukey HSD 95% Confidence Mean Interval (I) Locus of (J) Locus of Difference Std. Lower Upper Control Control (I-J) Error Sig. Bound Bound Internal External 17.67* 4.788 .001 6.27 29.08 Mixed Int-Ext 13.33* 4.350 .008 2.96 23.69 External Internal -17.67* 4.788 .001 -29.08 -6.27 Mixed Int-Ext -4.35 5.422 .703 -17.26 8.57 Mixed Int-Ext Internal -13.33* 4.350 .008 -23.69 -2.96 External 4.35 5.422 .703 -8.57 17.26 Based on observed means. The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 317.403. *. The mean difference is significant at the
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5.3.2.2 Results of the Three-Way ANOVA
A three-way ANOVA for unrelated scores was conducted to determine whether there was a statistically significant difference in happiness based on the participants’ religiosity, trait autonomy, and locus of control. It should be noted that no participant was categorized for one of the conditions being compared (low religiosity, high trait autonomy, mixed locus of control), resulting in missing data. The organization of the participants into the other conditions were noted in Table 41 in Appendix J.
Nevertheless, the data did not violate the assumptions of homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances, p = .245 (see Table 42 in
Appendix J).
The main effect of trait autonomy to happiness scores were found to be statistically significant, F(1,84) = 17.330, p = .000, 2 = .171. However, the main effects of religiosity and locus of control were not found to be statistically significant. None of the other interaction effects were significant, and likewise, the effect of the interaction between religiosity, trait autonomy, and locus of control was not found to be statistically significant (see Table 43).
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Table 43 Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Dependent Variable: Happiness Type III Sum of Mean Partial Eta Source Squares df Square F Sig. Squared Corrected Model 13734.849a 10 1373.485 5.460 .000 .394 Intercept 771618.943 1 771618.943 3067.533 .000 .973 Religiosity 804.107 1 804.107 3.197 .077 .037 Trait Autonomy 4359.179 1 4359.179 17.330 .000 .171 Locus of Control 1069.570 2 534.785 2.126 .126 .048 Religiosity * Trait 274.304 1 274.304 1.090 .299 .013 Autonomy Religiosity * Locus 69.298 2 34.649 .138 .872 .003 of Control Trait Autonomy * 1149.051 2 574.525 2.284 .108 .052 Locus of Control Religiosity * Trait 401.145 1 401.145 1.595 .210 .019 Autonomy * Locus of Control Error 21129.678 84 251.544 Total 1464749.000 95 Corrected Total 34864.526 94 a. R Squared = .394 (Adjusted R Squared = .322)
As found in the one-way ANOVA above, a post-hoc Tukey analysis revealed that there was a statistically significant mean difference between those with internal and external locus of control (17.67, p = .000), as well as those with internal and mixed internal- external locus of control (13.33, p = .003). However, it should be noted that these significances were greater in the three-way ANOVA statistics (i.e. their significance numbers were lower) than what was found in the one-way ANOVA statistics. There was no statistically significant difference between those with external and mixed locus of control (see Table 44).
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Table 44 Multiple Comparisons Dependent Variable: Happiness Tukey HSD 95% Confidence Mean Interval (I) Locus of (J) Locus of Difference Std. Lower Upper Control Control (I-J) Error Sig. Bound Bound Internal External 17.67* 4.263 .000 7.50 27.84 Mixed Int-Ext 13.33* 3.872 .003 4.09 22.56 External Internal -17.67* 4.263 .000 -27.84 -7.50 Mixed Int-Ext -4.35 4.827 .641 -15.86 7.17 Mixed Int-Ext Internal -13.33* 3.872 .003 -22.56 -4.09 External 4.35 4.827 .641 -7.17 15.86 Based on observed means. The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 251.544. *. The mean difference is significant at the
Pairwise comparisons of simple main effects with a Bonferroni adjustment, whereby the mean differences between participants with high and low religiosity were compared, revealed that for those with a low trait autonomy and an external locus of control, there was a statistically significant mean difference between those who were high in religiosity than those who were low (20.722, p = .032). There were no statistically significant difference for the other groups, while data did not load for one of the comparisons due to a lack of participants in one of the groups being compared (see
Table 45).
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Table 45 Pairwise Comparisons Dependent Variable: Happiness 95% CI for (I) (J) Mean Differenced Trait Locus of Relig- Relig- Difference Std. Lower Upper Autonomy Control iosity iosity (I-J) Error Sig.d Bound Bound Low Internal Low High -7.333 8.190 .373 -23.620 8.954 High Low 7.333 8.190 .373 -8.954 23.620 External Low High -20.722* 9.531 .032 -39.675 -1.769 High Low 20.722* 9.531 .032 1.769 39.675 Mixed Int- Low High -8.989 7.287 .221 -23.480 5.503 Ext High Low 8.989 7.287 .221 -5.503 23.480 High Internal Low High -9.533 7.661 .217 -24.768 5.702 High Low 9.533 7.661 .217 -5.702 24.768 External Low High 2.500 13.735 .856 -24.814 29.814 High Low -2.500 13.735 .856 -29.814 24.814 Mixed Int- Low High .b . . . . Ext High Low .c . . . . Based on estimated marginal means *. The mean difference is significant at the b. The level combination of factors in (I) is not observed. c. The level combination of factors in (J) is not observed. d. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.
Additionally, pairwise comparisons of simple main effects with a Bonferroni adjustment, whereby the mean differences between participants with high and low trait autonomy were compared, revealed that for those with a low religiosity and an external locus of control, there was a statistically significant mean difference between those who were high in trait autonomy than those who were low (42.000, p = .003). It was also relevant to note that for those with a high religiosity and an external locus of control, there was a marginally significant mean difference between those who were high in trait autonomy than those who were low (18.778, p = .052). There were no other statistically 74 significant differences, while data did not load for one of the comparisons due to a lack of participants in one of the groups being compared (see Table 46).
Table 46 Pairwise Comparisons Dependent Variable: Happiness (I) (J) 95% CI for Trait Trait Mean Differenced Locus of Auto- Auto- Difference Std. Lower Upper Religiosity Control nomy nomy (I-J) Error Sig.d Bound Bound Low Internal Low High -8.033 9.604 .405 -27.132 11.065 High Low 8.033 9.604 .405 -11.065 27.132 External Low High -42.000* 13.735 .003 -69.314 -14.686 High Low 42.000* 13.735 .003 14.686 69.314 Mixed Low High .b . . . . Int-Ext High Low .c . . . . High Internal Low High -10.233 5.791 .081 -21.750 1.283 High Low 10.233 5.791 .081 -1.283 21.750 External Low High -18.778 9.531 .052 -37.731 .175 High Low 18.778 9.531 .052 -.175 37.731 Mixed Low High -14.733 8.190 .076 -31.020 1.554 Int-Ext High Low 14.733 8.190 .076 -1.554 31.020 Based on estimated marginal means *. The mean difference is significant at the b. The level combination of factors in (J) is not observed. c. The level combination of factors in (I) is not observed. d. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.
Furthermore, pairwise comparisons of simple main effects with a Bonferroni adjustment, whereby the mean differences between Muslims with internal, external, and mixed locus of control were compared, revealed that for those with a low religiosity and a low trait autonomy, there was a statistically significant mean difference between those who had internal and external locus of control (27.667, p = .025). There were no other 75 statistically significant differences, while data did not load for two of the comparisons due to a lack of participants in one of the groups being compared (see Table 47).
Table 47 Pairwise Comparisons Dependent Variable: Happiness 95% CI for Trait (I) (J) Mean Differenced Relig- Auto- Locus of Locus of Difference Std. Lower Upper iosity nomy Control Control (I-J) Error Sig.d Bound Bound Low Low Internal External 27.667* 10.238 .025 2.657 52.676 Mixed 10.056 8.359 .697 -10.364 30.476 External Internal -27.667* 10.238 .025 -52.676 -2.657 Mixed -17.611 9.531 .204 -40.893 5.671 Mixed Internal -10.056 8.359 .697 -30.476 10.364 External 17.611 9.531 .204 -5.671 40.893 High Internal External -6.300 13.270 .636 -32.688 20.088 Mixed .b . . . . External Internal 6.300 13.270 .636 -20.088 32.688 Mixed .b . . . . Mixed Internal .c . . . . External .c . . . . High Low Internal External 14.278 7.287 .160 -3.524 32.080 Mixed 8.400 7.093 .719 -8.927 25.727 External Internal -14.278 7.287 .160 -32.080 3.524 Mixed -5.878 7.287 1.000 -23.680 11.924 Mixed Internal -8.400 7.093 .719 -25.727 8.927 External 5.878 7.287 1.000 -11.924 23.680 High Internal External 5.733 8.442 1.000 -14.890 26.357 Mixed 3.900 7.093 1.000 -13.427 21.227 External Internal -5.733 8.442 1.000 -26.357 14.890 Mixed -1.833 10.238 1.000 -26.843 23.176 Mixed Internal -3.900 7.093 1.000 -21.227 13.427 External 1.833 10.238 1.000 -23.176 26.843 Based on estimated marginal means *. The mean difference is significant at the b. The level combination of factors in (J) is not observed. c. The level combination of factors in (I) is not observed. d. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni.
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Analysis of the line plots suggested that there was an interaction between religiosity, trait autonomy, and locus of control, since the lines were not parallel (see Figures 38 to
41). However, only the main effect of trait autonomy and the differences between several of the conditions were statistically significant (see Tables 43 to 47), whereas the
ANOVA test confirmed that the three-way interaction was not statistically significant
(see Table 43).
5.4 Assessments on the Tests of Hypotheses
5.4.1 Assessments on the Tests of Predictive Hypotheses
Based on the results of the preceding tests, the following conclusions may be reflected upon the predictive hypotheses.
Firstly, it was found that religiosity, trait autonomy, and internal locus of control were significantly directly predicting happiness. Moreover, powerful others locus of control significantly and negatively predicted happiness. However, chance locus of control did not have a statistical significance in predicting happiness, even though its negative correlation with the dependent variable was significant. Thus, the first null hypothesis
(H01) was partially rejected and the alternative hypothesis (Ha1) could only be partially accepted.
Secondly, statistical significance was found on the hierarchical regression model of trait autonomy and internal locus of control, with religiosity added on to the final model. 77
This accounted for 36.4% of the prediction, of which the addition of religiosity contributed 3.5%. Thus, the second null hypothesis (H02) was rejected and its alternative (Ha2) was accepted.
Thirdly, statistical significance was found on the hierarchical regression model of trait autonomy and powerful others locus of control, with religiosity added on to the final model. This accounted for 31.6% of the prediction, of which the addition of religiosity contributed 1.9%. Furthermore, the coefficients indicated that the prediction of powerful others locus of control on happiness was negatively-directed. Thus, the third null hypothesis (H03) was rejected and its alternative (Ha3) was accepted.
Fourthly, statistical significance was found on the hierarchical regression model of trait autonomy and chance locus of control, with religiosity added on to the final model. This accounted for 29.5% of the prediction, of which the addition of religiosity contributed
2.5%. Furthermore, the coefficients indicated that the prediction of chance locus of control on happiness was negatively-directed. Thus, the fourth null hypothesis (H04) was rejected and its alternative (Ha4) was accepted.
Fifthly, the t-tests associated with each of the religiosity b values revealed that religiosity made a statistically significant contribution to predicting happiness when it was added to two of the models, one with trait autonomy and internal locus of control, and the other with trait autonomy and chance locus of control; however, it did not when added to the model with trait autonomy and powerful others locus of control. An inspection of the standardized beta values across these models showed that while trait autonomy held the most correlational weight to the criterion across all the models, 78 religiosity made the most impact when added to the model with internal locus of control
(β = .220), followed by the model with chance locus of control (β = .192), and the least in the model with powerful others locus of control (β = .174). Thus, the fifth null hypothesis (H05) was partially rejected and the alternative hypothesis (Ha5) could only be partially accepted.
5.4.2 Assessments on the Tests of Comparative Hypotheses.
Based on the results of the preceding tests, the following conclusions may be reflected upon the comparative hypotheses.
Firstly, it was found that those with high religiosity had higher happiness compared to those with low religiosity. It was also found that those with a high trait autonomy had higher happiness than those with low trait autonomy. These differences were statistically significant. Furthermore, the differences amongst the internal, external, and mixed loci of control groups were also found to be statistically significant, even though the statistical significance was only between the internal and the external loci of control groups, and the internal and the mixed loci of control groups. Thus, the sixth null hypothesis (H06) was rejected and its alternative (Ha6) was accepted.
Secondly, the three-way interaction between religiosity, trait autonomy, and locus of control was not found to be statistically significant. Nevertheless, pairwise comparisons revealed that statistically significant differences were found between three of the condition pairs, and a marginal statistically significant difference was found on one of the condition pairs. Also, the main effect of trait autonomy was found to be statistically 79
significant. Thus, the seventh null hypothesis (H07) was partially rejected and the alternative hypothesis (Ha7) could only be partially accepted.
5.5 Exposition of the Addendum to SFSATIR
Because the main interest of the current research is the exploration of qadar and riḍā, answers to the two questions added to SFSATIR were selected based a participant’s high or low grouping on their religiosity scores. Their trait autonomy and locus of control were noted at the end of their statements.
5.5.1 Selected Statements of Low Religiosity Participants
The following statements were selected from five participants with low religiosity scores. Three participants, who scored the lowest on religiosity, did not know what qadar and riḍā were. Additionally, three more participants did not know what riḍā was.
One participant did not want to answer both questions.
Qadar: I believe that if things are meant to happen the way Allah will, than they will,
and if not Allah must have a good reason for why.
Riḍā: While I believe Allah has the most control over how my life will end up, I like
to believe that my actions and decisions matter, and that I will do what I can to
fulfill his wish for humankind.
Trait autonomy: Low; Locus of control: External (Chance); Religiosity score: 71
80
Qadar: I believe that what there are some things that we are destined for, we also play
a role in making our destiny happen. If I'm destined to be wealthy, I'm not
going to make money by just sitting around and playing video games, I have to
get out there and make my destiny happen.
Riḍā: I'm not sure if it does, although there are people who I would regard as role
models. I often ask myself, "What would Ustaz Hady think if I were to do
XYZ?"
Trait autonomy: Low; Locus of control: Internal; Religiosity score: 79
Qadar: Generaly qadar doesn't mean that things happen out of my control but that
Allah is all knowing and He knows all that will hapen. Thats why the believe
plays role of understanding the concept of Allah creation and testing humans.
Riḍā: If something bad happens, rida brings an ease because only what Allah wills,
with his wisdom, happens.
Trait autonomy: High; Locus of control: Internal; Religiosity score: 95
Qadar: Whatever happens had to happen
Riḍā: I don't think it does. I feel sad about how my life has gone and hope for a big
change in the future
Trait autonomy: Low; Locus of control: Internal; Religiosity score: 96
81
Qadar: Psychological contentment because I know our destiny is already written so I
only need to make hearty honest efforts to please Allah and accept any
outcome after that.
Riḍā: It is enough to review myself constantly, and question "Am I putting Allah
(swt) first in my live in every action I make?" If the answer is yes, then I am a
state of rida. If not, then I will be anxious state to make efforts to change that.
Its a constant battle and struggle to maintain the feeling of Rida, till our last
breath.
Trait autonomy: High; Locus of control: External; Religiosity score: 106
5.5.2 Selected Statements of High Religiosity Participants
The following statements were selected from five participants with high religiosity scores. Six participants did not provide an answer to both questions, one of whom asked what riḍā was. Additionally, six more people did not know what riḍā was.
Qadar: In the 45 yrs since I became Muslim I have been able to change much of what I
was and still am working on the rest; I am comfortable with what I see and
have experienced from the wonders of God [in the actions of Nature, which to
me is God] in maintaining the Balance that once existed. I've become
accustomed to listening to debates and arguments without getting emotional
and have a much better control of my one time propensity to take issue with
everything. I have patterned my life after the Revelation "O ye who believe, do
you think that because you say you believe you will not be tested?" and to that
end have reduced the amount of attachment to things and people deemed not in
my best interests. I have always had questions yet not in the veracity of what 82
had been said but rather to truly understand so I can better adhere to that which
has been laid down. I've never really given much thought to each of these taken
them as a given so I'm not that sure I have fulfilled the required paragraph in
total.
Riḍā: qadar, as I understand it has been what has kept me on the Right Path by
adhering to the Decree of Allah. I became Muslim shortly after I returned from
the War in Vietnam, broken and suffering from PTSD; a brother I know invited
me to the mosque with him and listening to the Khutbah made life seem
possible again and enabled me to fight through the PTSD. I see the Decree of
Allah in nearly everything, but particularly in the Laws of Physics the only
laws that truly matter to me because humans can't alter them or change them
like they do most other things to their favor. At 75 my body is failing me from
the wounds and disabilities of the war but nothing has changed in terms of how
I feel about what will come to pass and I am as prepared for that as I was for
combat where death was in the air daily.
I just noted that I made an error and will have to go up to qadar for the Rida.
Trait autonomy: High; Locus of control: Internal; Religiosity score: 110
Qadar: Believing in qadr brings me peace of mind knowing that whatever comes from
Allah is for the better.
Riḍā: I pray to Allah to give me rida with whatever he plans for me and He gives me
more than I can ask for.
Trait autonomy: High; Locus of control: External (Powerful Others); Religiosity: 112
83
Qadar: Qadr determines everything in my life. It doesn’t mean that I sit back and do
nothing though, it means I make plans, try my best to put them in to action, and
ask Allah to aid me in that. But it does mean that if the plan didn’t work out
then it’s not a problem because I know it’s the qadr of Allah.
Riḍā: Being pleased with whatever happens and whatever my situation is enables me
to not worry or stress about things. With any decision in life no matter how
small I know I can pray istikara and from that ask Allah to make me pleased
with whatever the outcome is even if it’s not what I had initially wanted, but
Allah knows best so I can be pleased whatever the outcome.
Trait autonomy: Low; Locus of control: External (Chance); Religiosity score: 113
Qadar: Every hardship and happiness is from Allah. Allah doesn’t test us with
something we can’t handle. We’re lot stronger than we think. We can survive
anything as long as we believe in Allah.
Riḍā: I strongly believe in this. Nothing is possible without Allah’s will. We may not
like or understand the cause for certain incidents but Allah knows best. After
every hardships comes ease.
Trait autonomy: Low; Locus of control: Mixed; Religiosity score: 113
Qadar: Allah always knows what's the best for us and even though we may not like it,
sooner or later we will discover the wisdom behind it.
Riḍā: Being satisfied with everything Allah gives us and accepting the tribulations as
they come, as a part of our life and trying to be successful and patient in it.
Trait autonomy: Low; Locus of control: Internal; Religiosity score: 114
84
Qadar: Through qadar I can find more tranquility and peace and acceptance through
whatever challenges I face, able to turn it into a positive and constructive
aspect of my life happening for me.
Riḍā: Through rida acceptance of Allah's decree upon all happening for me, I have no
need to feel like a victim through challenges but rather a victor allowing for
more peace and tranquility able to feel more connected to my purpose here
through all aspects of life and all connection with the creation and most
importantly my Creator
Trait autonomy: High; Locus of control: Internal; Religiosity score: 115
Qadar: It empowers me. I work hard and try my absolute best to achieve a goal. If it
worked out, I know that it was meant for me and that it is ultimately for my
best. Similarly if it didn’t work out, I know that it wasn’t meant for me and
thus not achieving the goal was always for my best.
Riḍā: It helps me to live in a balanced way, when things go well in my life I
remember Allah, who gave it to me.
And when things are challenging, I don’t let it to hurt me too much because I
know that Allah is testing me and I know that I am being rewarded for my
patience.
Trait autonomy: High; Locus of control: Mixed; Religiosity score: 115
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
Several hypotheses of the predictions and interactions between the constructs of religiosity, trait autonomy, and three loci of control on happiness have been proposed prior to the study being conducted. The findings returned mixed results. Based on the examination of the statistical output of the predictive and comparative analyses, as well as the reading of the two open-ended questions about qadar and riḍā, the following interpretations are deliberated.
6.1 Interpretation of Findings
6.1.1 Preliminary Discussion of the Findings
Because there have not yet been any specific psychological studies, quantitatively or qualitatively, done on the Islamic concepts of qadar and riḍā, to the researcher’s best knowledge, extrapolations on the findings may only be conducted in light of the Islamic theological understanding of these concepts and how they are regarded to manifest as motivational factors in the psyche of the Muslims adhering to the faith. In the current study, assumptions have been made whereby a higher religiosity score indicates a stronger demonstration of qadar and riḍā playing a role in the psychology of a participant. Furthermore, because riḍā is associated with contentment, satisfaction, and good pleasure based on the serene acceptance of qadar (Khalil, 2014), it has been assumed that it constitutes, to some degree, part of the makeup of happiness in a 86
Muslim. This may be observed in the significant direct correlation between religiosity and happiness scores.
It is important to note the highly negatively-skewed data on religiosity scores. A modal number of the participants indicated the highest possible score on the SFSATIR, while its median is only three points below. Based on these measures of the central tendency of religiosity, it may be said that this construct is highly predominant in the majority of the participants in this study. The reasons why this was the case will be elaborated in a later section under limitations. Nevertheless, in a sample that has put an importance in religiosity, this might have indicated a high representation of qadar and riḍā amongst the participants. However, based on the analysis of the addendum to SFSATIR, it has been found that while most of the participants could opine how the belief in qadar plays a role in their lives, an overwhelming number of them could not answer the latter question because they did not know what riḍā was. This can be attributed to qadar being one of the six pillars of belief, and thus, a part of an essential theological formulation in the Islamic creed; to know what is qadar and to believe in it is an inevitable aspect what makes one a Muslim (see e.g. Binte Mohd Sedek, 2016; Tosun,
2012). However, this may not be the case with riḍā per se, even though riḍā is deemed to be the vital response linked to the acceptance of qadar that, amongst others, has a psychological bearing to the well-being of a Muslim, particularly in the face of tribulations (Khalil, 2014). Thus, it may be surmised that the acquisition of knowledge of certain Islamic teachings, even such as one as pragmatically fundamental to one’s well-being as riḍā, needs to be undertaken via a deliberate endeavor; one’s identification as a Muslim, as well as one’s highly positive attitudinal stance of Islam, 87 does not necessarily equate to having a thorough understanding of what the religion has to offer.
The proceeding findings may be interpreted through an integration of the results of the tests that have been conducted for the predictive and the comparative hypotheses respectively. Going forward, the concepts of qadar and riḍā will be discussed through the presumed construct of religiosity. Similarly, while the statistically significant relationship between religiosity and happiness has been established, the latter of which riḍā may be a constituent, it is also acknowledged that the construct of happiness, as has been currently measured in the sample, may consist of other confounding markers of one’s contentment, satisfaction, and good-pleasure apart from riḍā. However, because specific instrumentations measuring the psychological acumen of qadar and riḍā have not yet been established, to the best of the author’s knowledge, liberty has been taken to view these concepts through more generalized lenses. Bearing these in mind, the following interpretations will utilize construct nomenclatures as they have been previously defined.
6.1.2 Interpretation of the Predictions and Correlations
The significant findings of the individual predictors, save for chance locus of control, demonstrate that they are instrumental in determining happiness in the sample of
Muslim participants. While trait autonomy held the highest correlational weight in individually predicting the criterion, religiosity came in second. A significant direct relationship between religiosity and trait autonomy was also found. Given that this was a highly religious sample, it may be inferred that the high religiosity of the participants had a significant part to play in their acquisition of trait autonomy. The reverse direction 88 may also hold; because the construct of trait autonomy, as it is known within the self- determination theory (SDT) framework, is that it is one of the three primary motivational factors that are present in the human being in relation to his or her personality and psychological needs (Deci & Ryan, 2000), it may give rise to an intrinsic motivational pull within the participants toward a way of life that religion, which in this case is the religion of Islam, may have to offer.
This relationship between religiosity and trait autonomy may seem to conflict at first because one would necessarily equate a religious way of life as that of complying with certain sets of laws and rules by which to abide, dampening self-governance. Two theories are proposed. Firstly, SDT posits the use of regulatory processes as a factor upon which an individual is driven to pursue a particular goal, under which intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are classified (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Intrinsic motivation, the enthusiasm to act based on one’s innate interests, has largely been found to contribute to self-determination. Thus, in this sample where adhering to the religion of Islam, as well as identifying as a Muslim, is a salient element in their lives, the innate interest one takes toward the religion acts as an intrinsically motivating agent fostering what may seemingly be contradictory aspirations—adhering to a religious way of life, within the boundaries of its decree, is itself an autonomous decision one undertakes. Furthermore, because religiosity is important to the participants, what may have started as externally motivated regulations may have been internalized (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Therefore, it may be that the participants have assimilated values found within Islam as their own, by identifying with these values as being pertinent and relevant to their lives. They may also have integrated them into being a salient part of their self-concept, such that the
Islamic values work in unison with other principles and beliefs the individuals hold. 89
This process of internalizing externally motivated attitudes, according to Deci and Ryan
(2000), gives rise to a “self-determined extrinsic motivation” (p. 236). Thus, where an individual’s ability to make authentic and self-congruent decisions, and one’s awareness of one’s own emotional experiences and self-interests are being exercised, an autonomously self-determined outlook of life is found to not be alien to religiosity; both of these constructs positively correlated with each other, and both correlated with and contributed to the attainment of happiness.
How the three independent loci of control predicted the criterion is worth noting. Both internal and powerful others loci of control significantly correlated with and predicted happiness, in the directions that were expected. Chance locus of control, however, did not predict the outcome, even though its correlation with happiness was significant. One clue as to how this may be explained can be extracted by observing how the three loci of control correlated with each other. Both internal and powerful others loci of control correlated significantly and positively. A significant correlation was only the case between chance and powerful others, and not between chance and internal loci of control. This finding is in line with Levenson’s (1981) theory of differentiating between the two expectations of externality. Therefore, in the event where there is some possibility of control, whether it be internally directed or through negotiating outcomes with powerful others, the prediction for happiness indicates to be notable. Nevertheless, the negative direction of the prediction in powerful others locus of control indicates that the lesser a person orients toward expectations of control in powerful others, the more happiness he will attain.
90
The correlations of religiosity to these loci of control are also worth investigating. While religiosity correlated significantly and negatively with the two externally-directed loci of control, almost no correlation was found with internal locus of control. These findings, particularly that of the latter and the powerful others dimension of the former, are interesting for two reasons. Firstly, the specific belief in qadar, a predestination measured out by a benevolent and an all-powerful God (Tosun, 2012), may be the explanation why, in a sample of highly religious Muslims, no relationship was found between their religiosity and their internal locus of control. This corresponds to Yusuf’s
(2018) position of a completely external surrendering of the locus of control to God as an approach to coping with psychological adversities, toward a kind of Ghazalian happiness that is rooted in self-care. It also affirms the findings in research of other religious traditions whereby those who are more religious reported a lower internal locus of control (see e.g. Furnham, 1982; McIntosh et al., 1985; Pargament et al., 1982;
Spilka et al., 1985). Furthermore, a caveat may need to be taken into consideration in differentiating between an external orientation toward other people as powerful others as opposed to an orientation toward God as a powerful other. Levenson’s (1981) multi- dimensional IPC locus of control scales, while useful in eliciting orientations of control based on the actions of other people, regrettably does not do so for test-takers who are cognitively predisposed to an awareness of control rooted in a higher power, such as those coming from a religious and/or spiritual frame of reference (Welton et al., 1996).
This may provide the explanation of why the externally-oriented powerful others locus of control is still negatively related to religiosity.
Next, three hierarchical regressions were done to determine the mediation effect of religiosity, however, none was found. The statistical significances found on all three 91 hierarchical regressions of happiness conducted onto the predictors indicate the primary importance of trait autonomy on the outcome. Nevertheless, how religiosity adds to each of the regression models is of the main interest of the current study, and therefore requires deliberation. While it significantly contributed to the predictions involving internal and chance loci of control in their respective models, it did not for that of powerful others. To unpack the reasons why this was the case, an exposition into their effect sizes and significance values may need to be examined. Out of the three hierarchical analyses, religiosity made the most impact when added to the model with internal locus of control, and all three predictors (trait autonomy, internal locus of control, and religiosity) remained significant. In agreement with the findings of Steffen,
Clayton, and Swinyard (2014), the predictive independence of these constructs is indicative of distinct routes through which they affect the outcome. They suggest that
“religious orientation affects outcome through a sense of satisfaction with spiritual connectedness” (Steffen, Clayton, and Swinyard, 2014, p. 477). Conversely, yet perhaps similarly to their proposition about life aspirations, trait autonomy may have affected happiness through “a sense of satisfaction with current life functioning” (Steffen,
Clayton, and Swinyard, 2014, p. 477). Likewise, an internal locus of control possibly affects happiness through a sense of conceivable self-governance and authority over one’s existence.
On the other hand, religiosity was only significant, albeit weakly, when added to the model with chance locus of control, and it was not when added to the model with powerful others locus of control. Follow-up regression analyses were done to determine whether there are mediating factors that could lend an explanation to this phenomenon.
It was found that trait autonomy held as the primary mediator when happiness was 92 regressed individually onto religiosity and the two externally-directed loci of control; however, interestingly, internal locus of control does not have a significant effect on trait autonomy for the highly religious participants. This may indicate that these participants derive their autonomous functioning through factors other than their internalized capacities of self-governance. Being highly religious, this is possibly attributed to their secure attachment to God and their unwavering belief that God provides for their needs (Miner & Dowson, 2009). Furthermore, when religiosity was predicted from the three loci of control, it was found that only those with a negatively- directed locus of control in powerful others affected a higher religiosity in the participants. In other words, the more an individual orients his expectations upon the control of more powerful people, the less religious he becomes. Thus, this significant cancellation of one predictor onto the other may be the reason why, in the multiple regression model of trait autonomy, powerful others locus of control, and religiosity, trait autonomy remains the only prevailing factor affecting happiness. A more thorough mediation study between these constructs may need to be explored to tease out the nuanced ways these factors impact upon one another.
6.1.3 Interpretation of the Comparisons
As a precursor to interpreting the results of the comparative tests, the categorization of the independent variables into their respective levels needs to be discussed, particularly so, for the highly skewed data on the religiosity scores. Because the modal number is the highest possible score (115) on the SFSATIR and its median is only three points below (112), it was decided that the split would occur at its mean (107) so that the classification of the participants into their respective high or low categories were a better indication of where they stood in reference to another on the scale, while ensuring 93 that there would sufficiently be enough participants to fill the different conditions of the analysis. Nevertheless, for all intents and purposes, a person scoring 106 (92%) on the
SFSATIR, the highest recorded score in the low category, will still be regarded as having a much higher religiosity compared to another person’s scoring of 57 (50%), the lowest recorded score in the same category. Thus, the findings of the ANOVA tests must be read with this particularity in mind.
The comparative findings may be interpreted by integrating the representations of results of the ANOVA tests, namely, by considering the areas of statistical significance, by evaluating the averages, and by observing the line plots. The one-way ANOVAs returned statistical significances for all three independent variables, with trait autonomy bearing the greatest effect size, followed by locus of control, and religiosity. With the test of locus of control as the independent variable, significant differences were found between those with an internal and an external loci of control, as well as between an internal and a mixed loci of control. The average change of those with a mixed locus of control is only slightly higher than those with an external locus of control. This indicates that for those whose locus of control is mixed, their expectations of control directed toward the externality bear a consequential weight to their overall experience of happiness. With the significance found in the overall locus of control ANOVA test, it shows that having an internal locus of control remains a pertinent factor toward happiness.
Contrary to the findings of the one-way ANOVAs, when these independent variables were submitted to a three-way, the test returned a non-significance, barring the main effect of trait autonomy. Nevertheless, statistical significances were found when certain 94 conditions were compared. Firstly, similarly to the one-way ANOVA of locus of control as the independent variable, significant differences between internal and external loci of control, as well as between internal and mixed loci of control, were found in the three- way multiple comparisons of the levels of locus of control. These differences in the three-way were found to be even more significant than that of the one-way, indicating that where the internal locus of control interacts in tandem with religiosity and trait autonomy, its effects are even more pronounced. This finding may be in agreement with
Welton’s (1996) analysis whereby a religious person’s internal locus of control, in essence, is augmented by an externally-oriented God locus of control (p. 19). This is due to the belief that through an appeal to God’s generosity, compassion, and other giving attributes, the religious individual may gain even more confidence in his or her capabilities to effect an outcome (Furnham, 1982; Spilka et al., 1985).
Furthermore, comparisons of the condition pairs returned fairly telling results. The three significances that were identified had low religiosity, low trait autonomy, and an external locus of control as the common denominators. The only other noteworthy comparison was a marginally significant one between high and low trait autonomy amongst those with high religiosity and an external locus of control. The line graphs confirmed this observation. Amongst the lowest-scoring participants on happiness are those with low religiosity, a low trait autonomy, and an external locus of control. This is followed by those with high religiosity, a low trait autonomy and an external locus of control. Amongst those with high trait autonomy, however, the ones with the lowest happiness scores are those with low religiosity and an internal locus of control; nevertheless, this score is higher than those in the previous conditions. Conversely, amongst the highest-scoring participants on happiness are those with high religiosity, 95 high trait autonomy, and an internal locus of control. On the whole, an external locus of control results in a decrease in happiness amongst the participants. However, reiterating the above, for those with a low religiosity and a high trait autonomy, they seem to fare better with a locus of control that is oriented toward the external rather than the internal.
This finding is compelling for the precise reason that it is well known across the literature on locus of control that, generally, an internal locus is a better orientation than an external one toward measures of psychological well-being. However, this exposition seems to suggest an anomaly. A person who is low in religiosity may be assumed to be secular in his or her worldview, indicating a horizontally-oriented Weltanschauung of causes and effect based on the immediate material sphere. Such an individual, coupled with a high trait autonomy, may be someone who puts his or her aspirations, confidence, and optimism in his or her capabilities to affect the current worldly systems, for better or for worse. Thus, the question that arises is, with a materialistically aligned cosmological understanding of the world, will such an individual be psychologically better off putting his or her orientations of control in the external than in the internal? A philosophical commentary of this nature is beyond the scope of this study, but it is certainly worth exploring.
6.2 Limitations
6.2.1 Limitations of the Sampling
Several limitations of this study need to be disclosed. The first, and perhaps the most evident, is in the sample of participants itself. With an estimated world population of 1.8 billion as of 2015, making up 24.1% of the entire world population and spanning 96 culturally-varied regions from the east to the west (Lipka & Hackett, 2017), a sample size of 95 participants is hardly a representative constituent of the cognitive and behavioral diversities Muslims from different parts of the world hold. Lumping
Muslims as the embodiment of a single cultural category is a common liability of many cultural and cross-cultural research. Moreover, Muslims living within a particular culture may also hold differing theological perspectives. An example, one which pertains well to this current research, is the distinction between the Aš’arīyah and the
Mu’tazilah theological schools of thought, both positing nuanced differences in the understanding of determination and free will (Winter, 2011). However, due to time and budgetary constraints, the author has taken the liberty to open the study to anyone who identifies with being a Muslim, without further subcategorizing them into their various denominational schools.
Furthermore, the majority of the Muslims sampled were highly religious. The following reasons are proposed. Firstly, a number of the participants were recruited via the convenient and snowball sampling methods from the researcher’s contact list and discussion groups. If the idiom birds of a feather flock together is to be taken at face value, then this contributes to the explanation of this anomaly. However, some care has been taken to ensure that a more randomized sampling is initiated from the wider population, through the posting of recruitment notices on Facebook and Reddit.
Nevertheless, there may be three more reasons why the data deviates from a normal distribution. For one, studies such as the one currently conducted may have appeared more interesting, and therefore more pertinent to be a contributor thereof, to those who are already involved in matters of the religion. Thus, the ones who are already high on the religiosity spectrum, are the ones more likely to participate. Even so, the occurrence 97 of a modal number of participants scoring the highest possible on the religiosity construct, with its median just three points below, needs further deliberation. A person who is high in religiosity is assumed to consider his or her engagement in religious thoughts and practices a serious and meaningful matter. The SFSATIR has been developed to elicit the “attitudinal or affective dimension” (Francis, Tekke, & Robbins,
2016, p. 10) of Islam in its participants, and thus, acquiring the perceived importance of religiosity an individual may hold. However, a high regard for the religion may not necessarily translate to an actual partaking of its various practices and obedience to its creeds. Self-serving response biases, such as a socially desirable responding, an acquiescent responding, an extremity bias, and/or the deprivation effect (Heine, 2016), particularly those with an external locus of control (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999;
Shepperd, Malone, & Sweeny, 2008), may have compelled some of the participants to evaluate themselves as having a much higher religiosity than they may actually do.
Therefore, building on the aforementioned limitation, a second inventory in addition to the SFSATIR, or perhaps an entirely new one created to incorporate both actual and perceived religiosity, may need to be introduced.
Another limitation of the sampling that needs to be reiterated is the small sample size.
Due to there being twelve conditions for the three-way ANOVA test, eight of the conditions had less than 10 participants, while one of the conditions had none. This may have inevitably created a Type II error, resulting in a false negative. Thus, it may be the explanation why, despite the one-way ANOVAs returning significant results, the three- way did not.
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6.2.2 Limitations of the Instrumentations
Limitations of the instrumentations themselves need to be considered. First and foremost, there is as yet no inventory that addresses the concepts of qadar and/or riḍā as they are specifically understood in Islam, to the author’s best knowledge. Thus, the research utilized questionnaires that could provide the closest indicator as to the presence of these attributes within the participants; nevertheless, other confounding factors may have also been present. Besides the SFSATIR, which was used under the assumption that the higher the religiosity, the greater the manifestation of qadar and riḍā, the OHQ was also utilized to measure the level of happiness that may provide clues as to the attainment of riḍā in the participants. Nevertheless, these instruments, particularly the OHQ, have been specifically selected, over other inventories measuring similar constructs, by evaluating their face validities to ensure that their items apply to determining the occurrences of qadar and riḍā.
The IPCS also presents several limitations. As discussed in the findings above, while the
IPCS is comprehensive in eliciting orientations of control based on the actions of other people, it regrettably does not do so for test-takers who are cognitively predisposed to an awareness of control rooted in God or a higher power, such as those coming from a religious and/or spiritual frame of reference. This may even be more pronounced in a highly religious Muslim, who may have an internally-directed sense of agency due to his or her high level of trait autonomy, as evidenced by the direct relationship found between these two constructs, while simultaneously, have an externally-oriented locus of control grounded in a higher order. Thus, several items may present difficulties in answering, which may result in ambiguities. An example is the following statement:
“When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work.” A highly religious 99 individual, especially one who has matured in his or her religious acumens and thus has a secure attachment to God (Miner & Dowson, 2009), may very well be confidently certain of his or her capabilities to make his or her plans work, while at the same time, be fully aware that it is ultimately God upon whom all creations are made manifest.
Even though the IPCS elicits responses on a six-point Likert scale, and a participant may opt for an answer that lies in the middle of the spectrum, a specific method of assessing a locus of control in divinity may be more expository in indicating where an individual’s internal locus of control ends and where his or her locus of control in a divine power begins.
Another limitation of the instrumentations is the language in which they were presented in the current research. The entire questionnaire packet was written in English, which, judging by the demography of ethnic groups and nationalities the sample came from, was not the native language for a majority of the participants. Systematic response errors based on personal translations and cultural misinterpretations of certain words or phrases may have occurred.
6.3 Implications and Future Research
Extending from the above-mentioned limitations, several implications toward future research may be gleaned. Reiterating what has been discussed, several scales may be updated or new ones constructed: a religiosity scale assessing actual measures of religiosity in Muslims, and particularly, instruments measuring the specific constructs of qadar and riḍā. In addition to these, instruments that are designated to be used on 100 participants coming from various ethnic or linguistic backgrounds may be translated and recalibrated to ensure psychometric reliability and validity in their respective cultural environments.
Furthermore, follow-up research may be conducted to include the elements that have been excluded from this study. Firstly, the Measure of Overall God Control (Welton et al., 1996) may be incorporated into future studies. Extracting God locus of control dimensions along with the other three will give a better understanding of the relationships between the interaction of religiosity, trait autonomy, and locus of control in the participants. Secondly, Muslims who do not identify as strongly to the religion may be solicited to participate through the offering of incentives that are of material
(such as money or gifts), instead of otherworldly (such as procuring God’s blessings or rewards), value. This will ensure a more normal distribution of the religiosity construct.
Thirdly, a more thorough mediation study between the above-mentioned constructs may be explored to tease out the nuanced ways these factors impact upon one another.
Another implication may be considered by examining the findings of this current research in light of SDT’s theories toward the internalization of external motivations, particularly those related to attitudes toward religiosity. A theory contrary to that of
Steffen, Clayton, and Swinyard (2014) is proposed here, whereby, instead of diminishing well-being, extrinsic motivators of religiosity, when internalized through the regulatory processes of identification and integration (Ryan & Deci, 2000), may rather boost autonomous functioning and happiness. Thus, future research may be done to assess the pathways that contribute to this occurrence.
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Additionally, a mixed-methods or qualitative research design utilizing phenomenological approaches toward data collection may be conducted, to further tease out the specific subtleties that a belief in qadar and riḍā have on the autonomous functioning and the locus of control of a Muslim. This may be done in tandem with comparative studies between the different Islamic theological schools of thought. Also, cross-cultural comparisons, between Muslims and those of other faiths or worldviews, can be run to determine to what effect the beliefs of determination and free will in their respective psychological functioning and well-being. While these last two suggestions may be controversial and need to be done with utmost respect held for those coming from different theological and philosophical understandings, they may nevertheless be beneficial when added to the wider body of knowledge, particularly in clinical and counseling settings.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This current research intends to present a preliminary quantitative exploration of the motivational guideposts that are present in the Muslim psyche as a factor of their religiosity. An exposition of the literature review above seeks to demonstrate that the
Islamic concepts of qadar (loosely translated as a clearly-recorded predestination through God’s will and power on life’s events), and riḍā (a serene acceptance of qadar and translated as contentment, satisfaction, and good pleasure), are two determinants that may play a role in a Muslim’s conceptualization of a self-determined outlook of life. Through these tenets, a person’s trait autonomy and locus of control are influenced, which in turn contribute to their eudemonic happiness. The attainment of happiness has also been shown to infer that the Muslim has riḍā. The study uses self-determination theory (SDT) as a framework that centers on a person’s intrinsic need to grow through autonomous functioning to attain happiness; however, a religious person may be cognitively predisposed to an awareness of control rooted in a higher power and, thus, unable to exercise authentic choices and acknowledge their inner experiences to be intrinsically motivated.
The results showed predictive significances of trait autonomy, religiosity, internal locus of control, and powerful others locus of control on happiness, but chance locus of control did not significantly predict happiness. Trait autonomy has been shown to bear the largest effect sizes in the overall predictions, while religiosity had roles to play in the predictive significances of certain models. Nevertheless, the correlational significances of religiosity to all of the constructs, except internal locus of control, have 103 shown that a religious Muslim may have a different view of internal or external locus of control that is also aware in the control of divine power. This seemingly external locus of control in God may, rather, be psychologically adaptive as an approach to coping with psychological adversities, toward a kind of Ghazalian happiness that is rooted in self-care. As such, it parallels the internal locus of control. Furthermore, statistical significances were found in the one-way ANOVAs. However, the three-way ANOVA rendered significances only in the main effect of trait autonomy and several pairwise comparison groups. The mixed results suggest that while trait autonomy made the greatest overall impact on the highly religious Muslim participants, those with high religiosity, high trait autonomy, and internal locus of control were the most successful in attaining happiness. This finding is interesting because one would expect a religious person, who believes in God affecting their life’s events, to have conflicting outcomes of autonomy and locus of control. As such, future studies, particularly a qualitative one, may be conducted to discover the ways a Muslim adhering to the faith conceptualizes qadar and riḍā as factors that work in tandem with their autonomous functioning and locus of control.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Recruitment Notices
A sample notice for a participant canvassed on Facebook or Reddit.
Salam alaykum / Hello. My name is Nur Farizah. I am currently doing my thesis research for a BA in Psychology at SUNY-ESC. My research topics touch on the areas of motivation, personality and religious belief among Muslims.
Therefore, if you identify as being Muslim, I kindly ask for your participation in the research by completing a survey packet via the link below. Your participation will greatly help me do a thorough study of the subjects mentioned above, and also, more importantly, help me graduate and move on to higher things. :)
Click here to participate in the research: http://bit.ly/BAThesis-NurFarizah
After you submit the survey, you may read a more detailed description of what the study is about. I also would like to ask that you share this survey. Simply copy-paste this message and share it on social media or among your friends and family. Sharing is caring!
Here is the link again: http://bit.ly/BAThesis-NurFarizah
Thank you very much for your participation.
May God bless you.
Nur Farizah
A sample notice for a participant who is a contact of the author.
Salam alaykum (name), I pray you are well. May I ask for your help please? As you may know, I am now doing my thesis research. I need quite a number of participants to complete a survey about motivation and personality in Muslims. Would you help me with my thesis research by filling in a survey please? It will be up until (date). I need as many responses I can get, and the people I need are very specific — only Muslims, so every response helps. Thank you very much and may God reward you for your contribution.
Here is the link: http://bit.ly/BAThesis-NurFarizah
111
A sample notice for a participant to forward to their contact list.
Salam alaykum (name),
A friend of mine is currently working on her BA thesis and needs your help in the research. She still needs quite a number of participants to complete a survey about motivation and personality in Muslims. Please do consider taking the survey and helping her in writing her thesis. Her survey will be up until (date). We do need to support such initiatives, especially those by our Muslim sisters and brothers, and any effort on our part will, God willing, be rewarded through their successes as well!
Here is the link to the survey: http://bit.ly/BAThesis-NurFarizah
112
Appendix B
Informed Consent Form
1. Summary: This research study will examine the effects of motivation, personality and religious beliefs. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to answer survey questions that ask about your motivation, personality, and religious beliefs.
2. Your right to withdraw/discontinue: You are free to ask questions or to discontinue your participation at any time without penalty. You may also skip any survey questions or study procedures that make you feel uncomfortable.
3. Benefits: Participation in this research study does not guarantee any benefits to you. However, possible benefits include the fact that you may learn something about how research studies are conducted and you may learn something about this area of research (i.e., factors that are related to motivation, personality, and religious beliefs).
4. Additional Information: You will be given additional information about the study after your participation is complete.
5. Time Commitment: If you agree to participate in the study, it may take up to 30 minutes to complete the survey.
6. Guarantee of Confidentiality: All data from this study will be kept from inappropriate disclosure and will be accessible only to the researcher. The researchers are not interested in anyone’s individual responses, only the average responses of everyone in the study.
7. Risks: The present research is designed to reduce the possibility of any negative experiences as a result of participation. Risks to participants are kept to a minimum. However, if your participation in this study causes you any concerns, anxiety, or distress, please contact the researcher at the email below to discuss your concerns.
8. Researcher Contact Information: This research study is being conducted by Nur Farizah Binte Mohd Sedek for a Bachelor’s thesis. The thesis instructor is Dr Ronnie Mather, Lecturer in the Psychology department at the State University of New York – Empire State College. If you have questions or concerns about your participation in this study, you may contact the researcher at [email protected].
9. Results of the Study: You may obtain information about the outcome of the study at the end of the Fall 2019 semester by contacting the researcher listed above.
10. Personal Copy of Consent Form: You may print a blank, unsigned copy of this consent form at the beginning of the study. 113
11. Verification of Adult Age: By clicking “I agree” below, you attest that you are 18 years old or older.
12. Verification of Informed Consent: By clicking “I agree” below, you are indicating that you have freely consented to participate in this research study.
By clicking “I agree” below, you confirm that you identify as being Muslim. ___ I agree.
By clicking "I agree" below, you attest that you are 18 years old or older. ___ I agree.
By clicking "I agree" below, you are indicating that you have freely consented to participate in this research study. ___ I agree.
114
Appendix C
Debriefing Form
Title of Research: Qadar and Riḍā in Islamic Psychology and the Self-Determination Theory
Thank you for participating in this research. You have made an important contribution to a developing body of knowledge in psychology. Now that your participation is complete, we can tell you more about the study you have just participated in.
The current study was designed to investigate the effects of autonomy, locus of control, and religiosity, on the motivation and well-being of a Muslim individual. Self- determination is the idea that a person who is autonomous, competent and has a social support system, will demonstrate higher levels of eudaimonic happiness and psychological well-being. However, Muslims also adhere to the principles of qadar and riḍā as central to their belief systems. Thus, it is necessary to determine to what extent these beliefs interconnects with a Muslim’s need for self-determination, and as such, the motivations that influence their behaviors and their psychological well-being. It is hypothesized that those with higher levels of autonomy, religiosity, and a balanced outlook on their locus of control, will demonstrate the highest attainment of psychological well-being (eudaimonic happiness).
In order to test these ideas, participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire packet to uncover their attitudes towards decision-making, religion, perceived control of situations, and happiness in life. Results will then be computed based on the collective answers given by the participants of this present study.
If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Nur Farizah Binte Mohd Sedek (e-mail: [email protected]).
For more information on this topic, some references are provided below.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227–268.
DeRobertis, E. M., & Bland, A. M. (2018). Tapping the humanistic potential of self- determination theory: Awakening to paradox. The Humanistic Psychologist, 46(2), 105– 128.
Khalil, A. (2014). Contentment, satisfaction and good-pleasure: Rida in early Sufi moral psychology. Studies in Religion, 1–19.
115
Rothman, A., & Coyle, A. (2018). Toward a framework for Islamic psychology and psychotherapy: An Islamic model of the soul. Journal of Religion and Health, 57, 1731–1744.
Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 80(1), 1–28.
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55, 68–78.
116
Appendix D
IAF
Below is a collection of statements about your general experiences. Please indicate how true each statement is of your experiences on the whole. Remember that there are no right or wrong answers. Please answer according to what really reflects your experience rather than what you think your experience should be.
1 = not at all true 2 = a bit true 3 = somewhat true 4 = mostly true 5 = completely true
1. My decisions represent my most important values and feelings. 2. I do things in order to avoid feeling badly about myself. (R) 3. I often reflect on why I react the way I do. 4. I strongly identify with the things that I do. 5. I am deeply curious when I react with fear or anxiety to events in my life. 6. I do a lot of things to avoid feeling ashamed. (R) 7. I try to manipulate myself into doing certain things. (R) 8. My actions are congruent with who I really am. 9. I am interested in understanding the reasons for my actions. 10. My whole self stands behind the important decisions I make. 11. I believe certain things so that others will like me. (R) 12. I am interested in why I act the way I do. 13. I like to investigate my feelings. 14. I often pressure myself. (R) 15. My decisions are steadily informed by things I want or care about.
Note: (R) indicates reverse-scored items. Not indicated on the survey packet.
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Appendix E
ADSAS
Please read the statements and think about which statement seems true to you at this point in your life. Please circle the answer that corresponds to your motivational and emotional experiences.
1 = Strongly disagree 2 = Disagree 3 = Neutral 4 = Agree 5 = Strongly Agree
1. Whenever I make an important decision, I prioritize my own values and needs over what others expect of me. 2. I am aware of the way I feel at any given moment. 3. When others ask me to do something, I feel pressured to do it. (R) 4. I have difficulties regulating the way I feel even when I want to. (R) 5. I am fully responsible for my decisions. 6. When I think about my inner world, I am always aware of the way I feel. 7. When I make decisions, being true to myself is more important to me than not upsetting others. 8. I am able to articulate my feelings to others, even when it is uncomfortable. 9. I sometimes find myself doing something just to please other people, rather than out of my own interest. (R)
Note: (R) indicates reverse-scored items. Not indicated on the survey packet.
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Appendix F
IPCS
For each of the following statements, indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree by writing in the appropriate number.
1 = strongly disagree 2 = disagree 3 = slightly disagree 4 = slightly agree 5 = agree 6 = strongly agree
1. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends mostly on my ability. 2. To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings. 3. I feel like what happens in my life is mostly determined by powerful people. 4. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on how good a driver I am. 5. When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work. 6. Often there is no chance of protecting my personal interests from bad luck. 7. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I’m lucky. 8. Although I might have good ability, I will not be given leadership responsibility without appealing to those in positions of power. 9. How many friends I have depends on how nice a person I am. 10. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen. 11. My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others. 12. Whether or not I get into a car accident is mostly a matter of luck. 13. People like myself have very little chance of protecting our personal interests when they conflict with those of strong pressure groups. 14. It’s not always wise for me to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune. 15. Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me. 16. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends on whether I’m lucky enough to be in the right place at the right time. 17. If important people were to decide they didn’t like me, I probably wouldn’t make many friends. 18. I can pretty much determine what will happen in my life. 19. I am usually able to protect my personal interests. 20. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on the other driver. 21. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I worked hard for it. 22. In order to have my plans work, I make sure that they fit in with the desires of people who have power over me. 23. My life is determined by my own actions. 24. It’s chiefly a matter of fate whether or not I have a few friends or many friends. 119
Appendix G
OHQ
Below are a number of statements about happiness. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each by entering a number in the blank after each statement, according to the following scale:
1 = strongly disagree 2 = moderately disagree 3 = slightly disagree 4 = slightly agree 5 = moderately agree 6 = strongly agree
Please read the statements carefully, some of the questions are phrased positively and others negatively. Don’t take too long over individual questions; there are no “right” or “wrong” answers (and no trick questions). The first answer that comes into your head is probably the right one for you. If you find some of the questions difficult, please give the answer that is true for you in general or for most of the time.
1. I don’t feel particularly pleased with the way I am. (R) 2. I am intensely interested in other people. 3. I feel that life is very rewarding. 4. I have very warm feelings towards almost everyone. 5. I rarely wake up feeling rested. (R) 6. I am not particularly optimistic about the future. (R) 7. I find most things amusing. 8. I am always committed and involved. 9. Life is good. 10. I do not think that the world is a good place. (R) 11. I laugh a lot. 12. I am well satisfied about everything in my life. 13. I don’t think I look attractive. (R) 14. There is a gap between what I would like to do and what I have done. (R) 15. I am very happy. 16. I find beauty in some things. 17. I always have a cheerful effect on others. 18. I can fit in (find time for) everything I want to. 19. I feel that I am not especially in control of my life. (R) 20. I feel able to take anything on. 21. I feel fully mentally alert. 22. I often experience joy and elation. 23. I don’t find it easy to make decisions. (R) 120
24. I don’t have a particular sense of meaning and purpose in my life. (R) 25. I feel I have a great deal of energy. 26. I usually have a good influence on events. 27. I don’t have fun with other people. (R) 28. I don’t feel particularly healthy. (R) 29. I don’t have particularly happy memories of the past. (R)
Note: (R) indicates reverse-scored items. Not indicated on the survey packet.
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Appendix H
SFSATIR
Below are a number of statements about how you feel towards Islam. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each by entering a number in the blank after each statement, according to the following scale:
1 = disagree strongly 2 = disagree 3 = not certain 4 = agree 5 = agree strongly
1. I find it inspiring to listen to the Qurʼān 2. I know that Allah/God helps me 3. Saying my prayers/duʻāʼ helps me a lot 4. Attending the Mosque or religious gathering is very important to me 5. Going to the Mosque or religious gathering is a good use of my time 6. I want to obey Allah/God’s law/sharῑ ʻah in my life 7. Mosque sermons/khutbah or religious meetings/deeni mehfilen are interesting 8. Allah/God helps me to lead a better life 9. I like to learn about Allah/God very much 10. Allah/God means a lot to me 11. I believe that Allah/God helps people 12. Prayer/salāt helps me a lot 13. I feel that I am very close to Allah/God 14. I think praying/salāt is a good thing 15. I think the Qurʼān is up to date 16. I believe that Allah/God listens to prayers/duʻāʼ 17. Islam means a lot to me 18. Allah/God is very real to me 19. think praying/duʻāʼ is beneficial 20. Belief in Allah/God means much to me 21. I do not find it hard to believe in Allah/God 22. I am happy to be a Muslim 23. I love to follow the life/sunnah of the Prophet
Addendum to the SFSATIR
plays a role in (قدر) Please write a short paragraph about how the belief in qadar .24 your life. .plays a role in your life (رضا) Please write a short paragraph about how rida .25
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Appendix I
Demographics Questionnaire
Your Gender Male Female
Your Age ______
Your Nationality ______
Please select the ethnicity/cultural category that best describes you 1. South Asian 2. East Asian 3. South-east Asian 4. Central Asian 5. West Asian / Middle Eastern 6. Black (African) 7. Black (African American) 8. White (American) 9. White (European) 10. White (Australian) 11. Native American / American Indian / Alaskan Native 12. Native Hawaiian / Other Pacific Islander 13. Latino / Hispanic
Please indicate how long you have been a Muslim. Less than 2 years 2-5 years 6-10 years 11-15 years 16-20 years 21 years or more
Please indicate which of these describe you the most. Born Muslim Convert Revert
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Please indicate with which of these you identify. (You may choose more than one.) Sunni Shia Maliki Shafi'i Hanbali Hanafi Kharijite Ibadi Sufi Ash'ari Maturidi Qadariyya Bateniyya Mu'tazili Salafi / Wahhabi Liberal / Modern Other_____
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Appendix J
Tables
Table 34 Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa,b Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. Personal Happiness Based on Mean .914 1 93 .341 Based on Median .841 1 93 .362 Based on Median and .841 1 90.884 .362 with adjusted df Based on trimmed .959 1 93 .330 mean Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. a. Dependent variable: Personal Happiness b. Design: Intercept + Religiosity
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Table 35 Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa,b Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. Personal Happiness Based on Mean .928 1 93 .338 Based on Median 1.028 1 93 .313 Based on Median and 1.028 1 89.570 .313 with adjusted df Based on trimmed .951 1 93 .332 mean Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. a. Dependent variable: Personal Happiness b. Design: Intercept + Trait Autonomy
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Table 36 Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa,b Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. Personal Happiness Based on Mean .464 2 92 .630 Based on Median .323 2 92 .725 Based on Median and .323 2 90.111 .725 with adjusted df Based on trimmed .435 2 92 .649 mean Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. a. Dependent variable: Personal Happiness b. Design: Intercept + Locus of Control
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Table 41 Descriptive statistics of the conditions for the three-way ANOVA Dependent Variable: Personal Happiness Std. Religiosity Trait Autonomy Locus of Control Mean Deviation N Low Low Internal 117.17 24.053 6 External 89.50 23.360 4 Mixed Int-Ext 107.11 9.752 9 Total 106.58 19.906 19 High Internal 125.20 15.073 5 External 131.50 9.192 2 Total 127.00 13.229 7 Total Internal 120.82 19.944 11 External 103.50 28.543 6 Mixed Int-Ext 107.11 9.752 9 Total 112.08 20.313 26 High Low Internal 124.50 16.366 10 External 110.22 10.256 9 Mixed Int-Ext 116.10 17.470 10 Total 117.17 15.791 29 High Internal 134.73 16.299 30 External 129.00 11.832 4 Mixed Int-Ext 130.83 12.024 6 Total 133.58 15.204 40 Total Internal 132.17 16.718 40 External 116.00 13.657 13 Mixed Int-Ext 121.63 16.899 16 Total 126.68 17.372 69 Total Low Internal 121.75 19.157 16 External 103.85 17.483 13 Mixed Int-Ext 111.84 14.702 19 Total 112.98 18.103 48 High Internal 133.37 16.272 35 External 129.83 10.128 6 Mixed Int-Ext 130.83 12.024 6 Total 132.60 14.981 47 Total Internal 129.73 17.883 51 External 112.05 19.654 19 Mixed Int-Ext 116.40 16.148 25 Total 122.68 19.259 95
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Table 42 Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa,b Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. Personal Happiness Based on Mean 1.298 10 84 .245 Based on Median 1.073 10 84 .392 Based on Median and 1.073 10 63.592 .396 with adjusted df Based on trimmed 1.240 10 84 .278 mean Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. a. Dependent variable: Personal Happiness b. Design: Intercept + Religiosity + Trait Autonomy + Locus of Control + Religiosity * Trait Autonomy + Religiosity * Locus of Control + Trait Autonomy * Locus of Control + Religiosity * Trait Autonomy * Locus of Control
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Appendix K
Figures
Figure 1. Histogram of religiosity scores.
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Figure 2. Normal Q-Q plot of religiosity scores.
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Figure 3. Histogram of IAF scores.
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Figure 4. Normal Q-Q plot of IAF scores.
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Figure 5. Histogram of ADSAS scores.
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Figure 6. Normal Q-Q plot of ADSAS scores.
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Figure 7. Histogram trait autonomy composite scores.
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Figure 8. Normal Q-Q plot of trait autonomy composite scores.
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Figure 9. Histogram of locus of control internal scores.
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Figure 10. Normal Q-Q plot of locus of control internal scores.
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Figure 11. Histogram of locus of control powerful others scores.
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Figure 12. Normal Q-Q plot of locus of control powerful others scores.
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Figure 13. Histogram of locus of control chance scores.
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Figure 14. Normal Q-Q plot of locus of control chance scores.
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Figure 15. Histogram of personal happiness scores.
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Figure 16. Normal Q-Q plot of personal happiness scores.
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Figure 17. Grouping of religiosity scores.
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Figure 18. Grouping of trait autonomy scores.
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Figure 19. Grouping of locus of control scores
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Figure 20. Scatterplot of standardized residual against standardized predicted value.
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Figure 21. Scatterplot of predictor internal locus of control.
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Figure 22. Scatterplot of predictor trait autonomy.
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Figure 23. Scatterplot of predictor religiosity.
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Figure 24. Scatterplot of studentized residual against unstandardized predicted value.
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Figure 25. Histogram of standardized residual.
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Figure 26. Scatterplot of standardized residual against predicted value.
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Figure 27. Scatterplot of predictor powerful others locus of control.
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Figure 28. Scatterplot of predictor trait autonomy.
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Figure 29. Scatterplot of predictor religiosity.
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Figure 30. Scatterplot of studentized residual against unstandardized predicted value.
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Figure 31. Histogram of standardized residual.
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Figure 32. Scatterplot of standardized residual against predicted value.
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Figure 33. Scatterplot of predictor chance locus of control.
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Figure 34. Scatterplot of predictor trait autonomy.
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Figure 35. Scatterplot of predictor religiosity.
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Figure 36. Scatterplot of studentized residual against unstandardized predicted value.
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Figure 37. Histogram of standardized residual.
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Figure 38. Interactions between trait autonomy and locus of control, dependent on low religiosity, on personal happiness scores.
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Figure 39. Interactions between trait autonomy and locus of control, dependent on high religiosity, on personal happiness scores.
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Figure 40. Interactions between religiosity and locus of control, dependent on low trait autonomy, on personal happiness scores.
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Figure 41. Interactions between religiosity and locus of control, dependent on high trait autonomy, on personal happiness scores.