Conseil De L'atlantique Nord North Atlantic Council

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

NATO UNCLASSIFIED BXEMFi^AIft1V 373 and fi* i COPY PUBLIC DISCLOSE!!^ l\ ORIGINAL: ENGLISH 3rcL June, 1957 B - 1L * |>> SUMMARY REC ORD i C-R(57

Summary Record of a meeting of the Council' held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe., , on •Wednesday, 29th May, 1957, at 10.15 a.m.

PRESENT

Chairman: Mr. P.-H. Spaak

BELGIUM GREECE NORWAY

Mr. A. de Staercke Mr. M. Melas Mr. J. Boyesen T V CANADA ICELAND PORTUGAL

Mr. L. De Wilgress Mr. N. P. Sigurdsson- Count de Tovar f DENMARK ITALY TURKEY

Mr. M.A Yfessard Mr. A. Alessandrini Mr. M.A. Tiney

PRANCE LUXEMBOURG UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. A. Parodi Mr. N. Hommel Sir Prank Roberts i GERMANY NETHERLANDS UNITED STATES

Mr. H. Blankenhorn Mr. E.N. van Kleffens Mr. G.W. PerkinS

INTERNATIONAL STAFP'

Deputy Secretary General: Baron A. Bentinck

Assistant Secretary General Mr. A. Casardi for Political'Affairs:

Assistant Secretary General Mr. F.D. Gregh for Economics and Finance: DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Acting Assistant Secretary General Mr. A. Moreau • for Production and Logistics:

Executive Secretary: The Lord Coleridge

ALSO PRESENT

Standing Group Representative: General G0M. de Ghassey Head of the French Delegation to the UNO Disarmament Sub- Mr. Jules Moch Committee Head of the United States Dele- gation to.-the UNO Disarmament Sub-Committee TVTA mi"i ntirmnm CONTENTS

Item Subject PaSe I« Disarmament 3 II. Reorganization of British armed forces 27 III. Date of the next meeting- 27 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED NATO SECRET

I. DISARMAMENT / 1. The CHAIRMAN, in the name of the Council, thanked Mr. Harold Stassen and Mr. Jules Moch5 respectively heads of the United States and French Delegations to the United Nations Disarmament Suh-Committee5 for having come to Paris to give the Permanent Representatives a picture of recent developments in the . Suh-Committee. 2. , Mr. MOCH said that the four Western members of the Sub- Committee were anxious that their NATO partners should not only -be kept informed of developments in the Sub-Committee, but should also be given the opportunity of expressing their views before final decisions were taken. He -hoped"that the Council would be able to decide on a procedure which would make such consultation possible, without unduly delaying the work of the Sub-Committee. 3. He then explained to the Council the differences between the Soviet proposals of 18th March and their more recent proposals of 30th April. In the 18th March proposals two stages were contemplated, the first to cover the years 1957 and 1958, and the second to extend into 1959. In the first stage the . following steps were suggested: (a) • there should be a three months ^armaments "freeze"; (b) at the end of that period United States forces should be reduced to 1 or Tg- million men, and French and United Kingdom forces to 650,000 mën each; Soviet forces to be stabilised at 2-g- million men;

(c)_ a conference should he held later in the first stage to lay down criteri a for the size o f the forces other than those of the USSR, the United States? the United Kingdom and France. The USSR proposed that other countries should not have armed forces greater than 150/200,000 men. The criteria would be worked out on geographical, political and economic considerations; (d) there should be an unconditional undertaking that nuclear weapons would not be used; (e) signatories to the Treaty should agree that atomic weapons should not be installed in the territories of countries which did'not produce

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED such Yireapons; (f) all bases on foreign territories • should"'be ' suppressed, and there should be a reduction of the forces stationed by the East and the ' - West in German territory, and in the forces maintained in the areas of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In the second stage, which would-be reached during 1959, the USSR had suggested that all production of nuclear.weapons should "be ended, and that stocks of nuclear weapons held in arsenals and elsewhere should he destroyed. They also proposed international control of guided missiles. During this stage there would he further reductions in the armed forces maintained hy, the. countries of NATO on the one hand and the Warsaw Pact on the other. Moreover, the USSR had -taken up a suggestion made hy the French Government at the Geneva meeting in 1955 that the funds released hy such reductions should he used to help underdeveloped countries. At a later stage, they suggested that it might he possible for all armed forces, except police forces, .to he disbanded.

5. The proposals of 30th April were somewhat different. In the first place, only one stage was envisaged. There was no question of a "freeze" of armed forces or credits. However, the end result would'be much the same: the armed forces of the USSR were to be fixed at 2-g- million men, those of the Unite7d States at 1-g- million, and those of France and the United Kingdom at 650,000 each. The head of the Russian Delegation had said that these figures must be' regarded as a sine qua non in view of the enormous land area of the USSR and of the possibility of the United States to build up strategic reserves. ' 6. With regard to ground control, the USSR had agreed that ports, railways, and roads should be subject to control, but not airfields. Airfield control would only be acceptable at a later stage. The regions subject to control proposed by the USSR would cover France, the United Kingdom, the bulk of Western Europe and the East coast of the United States on the one hand, but would be limited, broadly speaking, to the satellite countries and the western fringes of the USSR on the other. As in the March proposals, the USSR advocated an unconditional declaration by signatories to the Treaty that they would refrain from the use of nuclear weapons as soon as the Treaty was signed. A good deal had been written about the "prohibition" of nuclear weapons, and he thought there was some confusion on this point. .Prohibition might in fact cover five cases:

(a) the prohibition of nuclear tests; (b) the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, whether or not subject to ^conditions; (c) the prohibition of the production of fissionable material; •(d) the prohibition of nuclear weapons;

(e) the prohibition of holding stocks of nuclear weapons. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 7. In their recent note the USSR had proposed the unconditional prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons: they had not referred to prohibition of holding stocks of such weapons. This would appear to indicate a rather greater degree of flexibility in the Soviet approach. . 8. Their attitude to the suppression of bases on foreign soil was also more flexible•in the April proposals. On this occasion, they had simply suggested that the question of foreign bases be carefully considered, and a list of . those which might be suppressed in the two years to come might be prepared. Again, their proposals with regard to the reduction of forces stationed in Germany also gave the impression of greater flexibility, in that they stated that a reduction by one-third of such forces "would contribute to relieving tension"» To .what extent this new wording represented a real concession depended on nuances of language, and too much importance should not be attached to it«

9. With regard to air inspection in certain limited zones, the USSR had. gone some way in their April proposals to meet the Western objection to the 800 kilometres zone on either side of the demarcation line in Germany, which had been the basis of the earlier proposal. The Russians how proposed two zones of inspection: one in Europe, the axis of which'would run through Eastern Germany, and the other in the Par East to cover the area divided by the Behring Straits. The Western members of the Sub-Committee still felt that the new proposals were not acceptable in that first, the bulk of Western Europe would be subject to inspection whereas the major industrial areas of Western Russia would not be subject to control, and secondly, a very large part of the United States would be subject to air inspection while only the comparatively less important territory of Siberia would be inspected in counterpart, A final proposal by the USSR that signatories to any Treaty should agree to the cessation of "warlike propaganda" in the press showed that the Russians had no conception that a free press could not be controlled. 10. He then turned to three further questions: first, the objections to. the new Soviet proposals> secondly, the advance they indicated, and finally, the difficulties which the four Western members of the Sub-Committee were faced with in adopting a common position. The objections to the new proposals could be summarised as follows:

(a) The proposal that the United States forces should be reduced to 1½ million, and those of Prance and the United Kingdom to 650,000 each, was a combination of ideas put forward at varying times both by the United States and by Prance and the United Kingdom. The Soviet proposal would still leave the West faced with a substantial and unjustifiable disequilibrium in their armed forces.

.(b) The proposal that .there should be-an immediate prohibition ;of nuclear tests was divorced from any suggestion that the production of fissionable material and atomic weapons should be DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED prohibited.

(c) The USSR linked prohibition of the production of fissionable material v/ith the holding of stocks of atomic Y/eapons.- His own Government took the view that it was quite possible to control the production of fissionable material, but quite impossible to control what stocks of weapons were, in fact, held. The link proposed by the Russians was therefore unacceptable. * /

' • • NATO SECRET C-RÇ 57)5k "

(d) In tho new proposals less provision was made for control. With'regard to ground control, only • control at fixed points Was contemplated, and mobile control was ruled out.. Further, there was to he control neither at airfields nor at centres of production. 11. . The advantages of the new proposals were as follows :

(a) The principle of air inspection was accepted. True, the present Russian suggestions were unacceptable, but less unacceptable than in the past. The fact- that the Russians v/ere prepared to see the dividing line pass through Eastern Germany instead of insisting on the demarcation area in Germany represented a real step forward. Further, the principle of air control from the beginning had been accepted by the Russians.. (b) It also seemed In the new proposals that the Russians were insisting less strongly on regional réductions than they had done in the past..

(c) The Russians seemed to be willing to reconsider the ceiling of 150 to 200,000 for'the armed forces to be maintained by Western countries other than the United States, the United Kingdom and France. ^ (d) They had given up their earlier proposal that all bases on foreign soil should be liquidated. (e) They no longer insisted on a fixed date by which all stocks of atomic weapons should be destroyed. (f) In general, the proposals were more flexible, and the attitude taken by the Russian negotiators in discussion had also been more flexible. 12. Finally, there was the question of difficulties to be overcome and possible divergence of views among the four members of the Sub-Comrnittee. These difficulties could bo summarised as follows: . " / (a) Air ' control. The Soviet proposals should certainly be carefully considered, but this particular question could not be settled on a purely geographical basis. In view of the enormous land area of the USSR-and the satellite countries, any arbitrary line based on pure DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED geography would mean that the whole of Europe and the greater part of the United States would be subject to , air inspection, whereas vast areas of the USSR would not. The latest Russian proposal for air inspection of Europe based on a line running through Eastern Germany would mean that the whole of industrial • Europe would be subject to inspection, whereas only a fringe of industrial Russia would-be controlled. \ ' French public .opinion could certainly not accept such a state of affairs,. (¾) Tho USSR had proposed a percentage reduction of conventional armaments, on the grounds that this was a simple solution. The objections to this were twofold: (i) countries like the USSR already equipped to furnish upwards of 300 divisions would still be grossly over-equipped even if it were accepted that their armed forces should total 2-^ million men. This over-equipment would give them the chance to build reserves of equipment in case of need. (ii) a number of countries in the West were under- equipped, largely owing to the loss they had suffered in the Second World War. France was a case in point: if any percentage reduction were agreed, France would not be in a position to equip the 650,000 men postulated under the recent Russian proposal. The V1Zest must therefore insist that any percentage reduction in armaments must be worked out in such a way that no country was unable to equip the forces allowed to it under the proposed agreement. He did not think there would be any difficulty in working out the details of such an arrangement.

(c) Tho question of nuclear disarmament was one which might bring to light 'divergencies ^of view among governments of the West. The position was particularly delicate with regard to the Russian.proposal that all nuclear tests should come to an end. France was building up its nuclear capacity, and would soon be in a position to carry out nuclear tests. The point of the Russian proposal was. to prevent any country not at present in possession of nuclear weapons to carry out the tests necessary for them to produce such weapons. France, and other countries in the same position, could only renounce the right to go on with such tests provided the countries possessing nuclear weapons agreed that further production of such weapons should be stopped after a certain time and that stocks of nuclear weapons should gradually be dissipated. In other words, France, and other countries>in the same position, c-ould not accept the idea of a 3-power club possessing nuclear weapons in a position of superiority vis-à-vis countries who did not possess the weapons.

(d) So far as a declaration of tho uncohditiona'l prohibi- DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED tion of the use of atomic weapons was concerned, the French Government' was in agreement with the United Kingdom Government that a declaration to this effect might be made at the end of the whole disarmament operation, but that any such declaration in the early stages could only be conditional, and linked with a comparable reduction of conventional weapons. (e) The problem of regional reductions was one more directly concerned with the problem of European security than with that of disarmament properly so-called. However, there were clear links with the disarmament problem. He' believed that at the first stage negotiations it would be better to consider carefully the Russian proposals with regard to reducing forces, stationed in the two zones of Germany, and forces maintained by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in order to probe Russian sincerity in this field. (f) Finally, with regard to control, he thought that the West should insist that the fixed control proposed by the Russians was not enough and that mobile control v/as essential. This applied particularly to an overall agreement on disarmament that might be reached. For the first stage disarmament now under discussion, " he would be prepared, though reluctantly, to accept a lesser degree of control of factory production if this would make it possible to reach a first step agreement.

13. To conclude, he did not believe that any of the difficulties- to which he had referred were insoluble. ' With regard to procedure in the Sub-Committee, it was obviously possible for the West to put up counter proposals, and in fact his Delegation had communicated, unofficially, a number of counter proposals to his colleagues.. Hovrever., he thought it would be wrong at the present moment to be too rigid: the negotiations were at present in a fluid stage and flexibility was essential. It had been suggested that the Press was taking an over-optimistic line. He had himself been criticised in his six years, of service in the cause of disarmement for being too optimistic: he had replied that he regarded the cause of disarmament- as a crusade, in which patience and reason were essential. It would be a tragedy for the-whole world it no solution to the problem could be found.

1U. Mr. . STASSEN said that he hoped that as a result of theN present meeting the Council would be able to decide on a procedure for establishing close contact between the Western member's of the Dis- armament Sub-Comraittee and the .NATO Council. He noted that members of the United Kingdom and Canadian Delegations to the Sub-Committee were present, in addition to Mr, Moch and himself, and that the Western members were fully agreed on this consultation with NATO. If any real progress was to be made in disarmament, there must be close relations between the Sub-Committee and the members, of NATO not represented on it. His Government was very anxious to see close DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED participation by NATO in tho work on disarmament: he could not state too strongly that it was the policy of his Government that any measures of disarmament applicable to Europe could only be accepted by the United States if the NATO countries concerned had approved them. Further, his Government hoped that the NATO Council would be able to make its views known before any decisions were taken in the ,,Sub-Committee.- 15. He thought it might help the Council if he outlined the background of American thinking on this problem during the past two or three -years. More than two years ago, when the pace of the development of thermo-nuclear weapons became apparent, together with power of destruction inherent in such weapons, President Eisenhower had called for a number of special'studies so that a coherent United States policy for the atomic age particularly in relation to disarmament negotiations, could be worked out. " Outstanding personalities in the United States were invited to preside over the preparation of these studies: for example, Dr. Lawrence, in connection with the nuclear scientific problems involved, General Doolittle in connection with the air aspects of the problem and General Bedell Smith in connection with land forces problems. Each of these were outstanding in their own particular field. As a result of their studios, certain principles had emerged which had' been incorporated into United States policy. First, it was agreed that if large-scale war broke out, the range of devastation-wo.uld be unlike anything hitherto known. Secondly, in the event of a large- scale war both.sides would inevitably suffer a net loss, and "winning" the war would still mean v-ast material damage. Thirdly, even though radiation from present atomic tests would not cause harm to health, . radiation from the use of atomic weapons in war was almost certain to cause grave harm to health in areas removed from the point of impact of tfhe bombs. 16. In view of this, his Government concluded that it was in the interest of all nations to-try to see whether the dangers of. an outbreak of war could not be lessened. History had clearly shown that peace could not be achieved through weakness. Reasonable strength must, therefore, be maintained, and the forces at the back of reasonable strength must.always be alert" and ready. However, it had become apparent that the factor of a surprise attack was more important at the present epoch than it had ever been before. The United States Delegation had always insisted on this point in disarmament negotiations. One of the ways of guarding against surprise attack was by means ,of thorough inspection, and in this • field, air inspection was an essential' component. It was incon- ceivable in modern conditions that ground inspection would be adequate to guard against the danger of surprise attack. Insistence on air inspection had, therefore been a fundamental in American policy. Thus President Eisenhower had stated at Geneva in 1955 that the United States would accept air inspection over the whole of its territory if the USSR would do the same.

17- The first

18. . He then showed, with the help of charts, the first proposals for an air inspection zone in Euroioe put forward by-the Russians and the counter concept suggested by the United States Delegation - generally speaking, the Russians wished to have the dividing lino as far west in Europe as possible, and the 'Western- powers to have it further east so that a wider zone of industrial Russia would be subject to inspection. The main principle insisted on by the United States in this connection was as follows.

19-. The United States was willing to see a progressive - development of air inspection coupled with the reduction of armaments if the first step in air inspection was logical and if it increased the safeguards against the possibility of surprise attack. It would not be acceptable under any conditions to use the demarkation line between the two zones In Germany as a dividing line. It would imply a continuing division of Germany, German reunification, in the eyes of the United States Government, was essential to any satisfactory solution in Europe. -20. He then referred to the report on the work of the Sub- Committee submitted to the Council under reference C-M(57)69. In paragraph 4(d)2 of that document the reactions of the United States to the Russian proposals were indicated, together with.th.e outline of counter-concept communicated to the other members of the Sub-Committee. In brief, the United States felt that if air inspection could not cover tho entire United States and Soviet territory at the. beginning, then air inspection should start in the two zones in which the rival forces were closest: that is, in Europe and at the Bering Straits. So far as Europe was concerned the United States had suggested that the zone of inspection should run' from 5 east to 30 east (longitude) and as far north as 45 latitude. Once again he stressed the fact that any proposals of this kind were subject to agreement by the countries concerned. The USSR had replied by proposing' that the dividing line should be moved 5- west, and should not extend so far north and should be moved to the south. In fact, this meant that most of the industrial DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED area in the west, and,the military installations in the north, of the USSR would be exempt from'inspection. At the same time, the Russians had stated that their 30th April proposals should bc regarcLed as a negotiating document and not as something which had to be accepted or rejected in its entirety. 21. He believed - that the negotiations at present going on were more realistic than1 they had boon at any time in the past eleven years.1 However, real difficulties still remained. Although it seemed that the Soviets were prepared to make concessions, their present policy might still represent only a sophisticated form of propaganda. Equally, there was some evidence to show that the USSR wanted a limited, first step, disarmament agreement ; Ifno agreement could he reached, the world v/a.s faced with the prospect of expanding stockpiles .of atomic weapons on hoth sides, with the improvement of fast delivery of such weapons, and with the deployment of the weapons at "basc-s which would he come increasingly closer on each side. For that reason his Govornmont wanted to soe whether the plans for a first step toward disamament wore acceptable, and practicable. There could clearly be no measure of disarmament without effective control, and none in Europe without the approval of the members of NATO. There were many difficulties

22. His Government supported the French position as stated by ' Mr. Moch in respect to those countries which did not at present possess thermo-nuclear weapons. , He agreed that it was impossible for sovereign states to abstain indefinitely from the production of such weapons unless it was agreed that the States at present possessing them would accept a "cut-off11 date under inspection after which production would cease, and after which a programme would be followed to reduce stocks of atomic bombs on' both sides. At the same time, the United States could not agree that all, stocks of atomic weapons should' be eliminated since there could be no effective inspection to guarantee compliance with such a common front, and furthermore his Government felt that the deterrent represented by modest stocks of such weapons was a continuing essential to ther preservation of peace and to the security and independence of the democracies.

23. The USSR had put forward the theory that the kind of inspection proposed by the United States for the "cut-off" of manufacture of bombs would mean that the West would take over the operation of USSR nuclear economy. That was not the case. His Government was convinced that the kind of inspection they were - advocating would in the long run help the development of atomic capacity for peaceful purposes.

2k. In the latest Russian proposals there did seem to be a real step forward, first in their dropping their earlier insistence on liquidating all foreign bases, and secondly in their giving up their original proposal that any dividing line for inspection zones must be based on the present demarkation line in Germany. His DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Government attached particular importance to the latter point, because of its implications so far as the reunification of Germany was concerned^.

25- Finally, he stressed again the fact that his Government was desirous that the members of NATO participate closely in the work of the Disarmament "Sub-Committee, and that the United States would accept no agreement on disarmament affecting Europe without the approval of the countries of NATO concerned. He urged the Council to try to, work out a^procedure by which close participation between four Western members, of the Sub-Committee and the Council of NATO could be brought :.cout. ' 26. -The CHAIRMAN' suggested that the Council should first put any questions of a general nature to Mr.; Moch and Mr. Stassen, and then consider the -problem of procedure for establishing the contacts to which Mr. Stasseh had referred. While the procedure must be effective, it must not-hold up negotiations in the Sub-Committee. 27. In the discussion which followed all the speakers expressed their gratitude to Mr. Moch and Mr. Stassen for the valuable statements they had made. 28. Based on the Italian paper the ; ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that it was very -important that public opinion in NATO countries should realise that there had been thorough discussion in NATO of the work of the Disarmament Sub-Committee. Any proposals put forward by the western members of the Committee would gain force if it were known^ that they represented a viewpoint shared by all members of the Alli- ance. He then put forward certain ideas studied by his authorities before the results of recent meetings, of the Sub-Committee were known. His authorities believed that the first objective should be agreement on control, and that any agreement on disarmament, evén a partial one, must be based on effective control. There were three categories of control: fa) control against surprise attack (b) control of atomic weapons (c) control of conventional weapons. Control against surprise attacks could come into force independently of any other agreement;- that is, without affecting the present military strength of the various countries. ^ Control of this kind must be based essentially on air inspection and, to be effective, must extend over a geographical area wide enough to take into account . guided missiles. - 29. The control of atomic and conventional weapons was clearly linked with an agreement on disarmament. • The purpose of control in this case would be to implement the agreement. Of course, any control measures proposed for'any member country would be subject to the agreement of the country concerned. 30. In the opinion of his Government, various agencies should be set up to ensure control: regional agencies, so far as aerial inspection and inspection of conventional armaments were concerned, and" more general agencies for control of nuclear weapons. The • regional agencies should be organized in such a way as to enable any country subject to control to exercise control, in its turn, over the countries controlling them. All controlling agencies should - operate within the framework of, UNO, should be financed by UNO, and should submit their reports to the Security Council. 31. The second main objective should be an attempt to define what were, on the one hand conventional weapons, and on the'^ other ' ,

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED atomic weapons. The recent Soviet proposals included tactical atomic weapons in the second category. To accept this idea would , clearly mean placing countries with comparatively small forces in a weak position. It therefore seemed essential to his authorities to make it clear in any definition of armaments that the tactical atomic weapon was to be considered as a conventional weapon. 32. After an agreement on controls and on the definition of armaments had hoen reached, the next stage should ho the study of the possibility of reducing conventional weapons. ' In this connection, he did not think that the reduction of defence budgets could be accepted as a criterion, since the defence budget of the USSR was • not subject to any control. Further, the essentia,1 goal to aim at was not a simple reduction in numerical strength, but a reduction in effective military power. Reduction in military manpower meant very little in view of the modernisation of weapons. The basic factor which should be taken into consideration was effective military power.

33. Only after agreement on this point had been reached could work start on-a general atomic agreement which would include sus- pension of atomic tests and general atomic disarmament. Later, provided always that CL groement on conventional disarmament had been reached, plans could be worked out for tho destruction, under bilat- eral control, of stocks of atomic weapons. With regard to atomic tests, his. Government believed that these could only be suspended - provided a general agreement on atomic disarmament were reached. However, in view of the present state of public opinion, every effort should be made to reassure their peoples with regard,to the possible dangers of radioactivity.

3I4-. He wished to conclude by three recommendations:

t(a) Since any disarmament proposal would have important military results for NATO, he wished to repeat the view already expressed by his authorities that any such proposal should be submitted for careful study by the military authorities of the Alliance, in particular, SACEUR. (b) It appeared that the USSR paid more attention'to what was going on in the Disarmament Sub-Committee than elsewhere. In view of this, the west should be careful to sèe that the Press did not inspire unjustified optimism in the public opinion of their countries. . (c) Consultation among the members of NATO on the problem of disarmament, v/as essential.

35. Finally, it had been suggested that the United States was trying to impose their policy on other members of the Alliance. This was not true. However, he thought that a communique should be issued at the end of the meeting to stress the fact that a discussion on the work done in the Disarmament Committee had taken place in the NATO 'Council. • This would give , the lie to any' suggestion that the United States were trying to force their views on the Council. . 1

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 36. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his- Government had some doubts about the wisdom of the partial control to which reference had been made. They were afraid that partial control, unless there v/as good faith on both sides, might moan a risk to the security of the West. In effect, there, would be effective control in Europe under the recent Soviet proposals, but no effective control of the USSR. Again, if control was to be effective it should include control of factory production, and that was not contemplated in the latest proposals. But it was above all the question of good faith that was' vital: could the West seriously trust Russian good faith? . So far as procedure was. concerned, he agreed that it was important to move quickly. , However, the Council must have a constant supply of information as to the way in which negotiations in London were going on if it was to ho ahle to inject its views effectively "before decisions were taken.

37.' The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities' approved the general line taken hy the Suh-Committees and in particular its concentration on a .first step measure of disarmament,, independent of any overall scheme. ' His Government was also glad that emphasis v/as heing laid on control, especially on control against surprise attack. With regard to the inspection zones, his Government v/as not happy ahout. the zone in the northern area of Europe, which implied that almost all of Scandinavia would he subject to inspection, and practically no part of northern Russia. Ho hoped the Sub-Commi- ttee would hear this in mind in subsequent discussions. He thën referred to a suggestion put forward, he thought, by SHAPE some" two years ago, that there should be overlapping radar chains in Europe. This idea did not seem to have caught ont he would be interested to ^know the reasons why it appeared to have been dropped. 38. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government was not conversant with àll the details of recent proposals. His Government hoped that they would be kept fully, informed, since Dutch territory was involved. The presence of Mr. Stassen and Mr. MOch- at the present meeting in his opinion represented a very real step forward. Previously, progress reports had been submitted to the Council but he felt that they were not enough.- Progress reports summarised past history, and what was wanted was consultation in NATO in advance of decisions. Apart from the United Nations, there were two categories of countries which might be affected by the••; Sub- Committee's plans: first, NATO countries, and secondly, non-NATO countries to which the Sub-Committee's plans might, extend. So far as the NATO cou., ^nes were concerned, he hoped that the exercise in which they were•now taking part might become a continuous"exercise. "It should not be forgotten that NATO countries already had•obligations ^Ln respect of the defence of the West which might be affected by the Pfeub-Conmittee ' s plans. So far as the countries outside the. NATO area which might be affected by the Sub-Committee.'s plans were concerned, he felt that they had a right to be consulted in good time before any final decisions were taken, in the same way that NATO countries expected to be consulted. . He thought that this was implicit in what Mr. Stassen had said.. In any case, his/ Government hoped to be consulted on the main linos of the Sub-Committee's plans, through the Council. He thought it could bo safely loft to the Sub- Committee to v/ork out a procedure v/ith the NATO Secretariat through which effective consultation could be brought about.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 39. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he. .could not give; tho final vicv/s of his Government' at the present stage, though his Government approved the general line taken in the Sub Committee. He was glad to hoar Mr. Stasson stress the importance the Sub- : Committee attached to linking the reunification of Germany with; disarmament. He agreed with previous speakers that, every effort should be made to reach an agreement ,on disarmament, since a breakdown in negotiations would have a disastrous effect on public opinion. HG also agreed with previous speakers that roal consultation meant moro than the submission of periodical progress reports,, valuable ns those might bc. He "wondered whether , the Council might not got a. report from tho Sub-Committee after.„each important meeting. , Pinallys he urged that governments should be informed in good time of any proposals mad© by either side in the Sub-C ommi 11 e e.

1+0. Tho PROTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE said that ho had one question to ask. Stress had been laid from the opening of the negotiations on disarmament with the USSR on the question of limiting zones of inspection. Each side wished to see the zono of inspection extended as far as possible into the territory of the other sides and to limit the area of its own territory subject to inspection. This bargaining nttitudo seemed an indication of a lack of trust on both sides: if there really was good faith why was it nccessary to limit the zones of inspection? In tho absence of good faith on both sides,, he wondered whether any agreement would bo of real value.

1+1. Tho GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities regarded the work of tho Sub-Committee with hope9 but also with fear. Thoy wore afraid that the kind of disarmament proposed might be dangerouss evon with a system of Controls unless there was good faith on both sides. His Government did not believo that the USSR had any real intention to respect thoir signature to any agreement that might be reached,, whereas- the countries of the West would feel .committed to anything they had signed. This might prove dangerous to the independence of the Western countries. 42. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he had little to add to what had been said by Mr. Moch and Mr. Stassen. -His Government at present saw no justification for optimism. Trues there had been.encouraging signs recentlys and for that reason his Government thought that the West should go on probing Soviet proposals in an attempt to reach a partial agreement on disarmament. His Government hoped that NATO as a whole would assist in this process. One essential question to be probed was the degree to which' the USSR really wantod disarmament; ors in other Wordss what concessions they were prepared to make to reach a first-step disarmament agreement. There was one specific point of considerable interest to the NATO T Council: that iss tho question of air and ground inspection. #hen the Council decided on the question of procedures this point should be given particular attention.

43. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that there was a substantial measure of agreement among the Western members of tho Sub-Committee on the objectives to be aimod at and the methods to achieve them. They all agreed that there were strong reasons to press for partial

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED disarmament as a first step. There was also no doubt that .the NATO Council must continue to co-operate in disarmament problems. With regard to procedure for-working out contacts between the Sub- Committee and the Council3 ho thought that the four Western members of the Sub-Committee could be trusted to keep the Council informed of all important proposals. The present meetings from the NATO point of Views had been of great value,, since it enabled member governments to Inject their views at an early stage. Progre'ss reportss however well prepared,, 'could never do this. He agreed with the Netherlands Represontativo that NATO was responsible for the defence of the West and that anything affecting the defence of tho West that came before the Sub-Committee should be submitted for consideration "by. tho Council. HO also agrcod with the United Kingdom Représentative that tho Council should examine thos problem of air and ground inspection. Ho was not suro that tho Italian Ropresontativo was.right in thinking the timo wns_now ripo for consulting SACEUR3 though no doubt SACEUR would havo to bo consulted at a later stage. Any procedure for contact between tho Sub-Committee and tho Council should be flexible. Ho thought the Council could trust tho judgment of the four Western members of tho Sub-Conimittoo as to what questions should bo referred to tho Council for their consideration. Pinally3 sinco tho work of the Sub-Committeo went on by fits and starts3 hc- did not agree with tho Gorman Representative's proposal that reports should be submitted to tho Council after each meeting of tho Sub-Committee.

The CHAIRMN summed up the position so for reached in tho discussions as follows; .(a) .representatives should ask their governments to agree formally that tho discussion begun ot tho present meeting should continue during subsequent meetings;

(b) the' International Staff should be asked to , prepare a document incorporating the statements by Mr. Stassen omd Mr. Moch9 together with the questions put to them. This would serve as Q basis for further discussion; (c) it v/as important to have regular information from London as to progress of work in the - • Sub-Committee. This might be brought about if One of the Western^members of the Sub-Committee accepted responsibility for reporting to the Council5 if appropria te <, after each meeting of the Sub-Committee;

(d) Future discussion of disarmament should take place at Council Ievel5 and not at Committee level; (e) it would be of great value if meetings on the lines of the present meeting could be arranged whenever questions of substance had been discussed, in the Sub-Committee.

45. The COUNCIL: agreed to continue discussion at o special meeting to be held in the afternoon. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED AFTERNOON SESSION

46., Mr.. STASSEN commented on certain of the questions raised and certain of the suggestions made- at the morning, session. The questions raised were of three types: those fundamental to the entire matter under discussion;, those which referred to procedural approaches and those , which covered the specifics of the problem. •

47. The most fundamental questions were those which referred to the possible danger of any agreement or even of entering into negotiation towards an agreement in the matter of reduction and limitations of armament or under the title of disarmament. 48. There were problems and there were dangers even -in a negotiation of that,kind. The four powers represented on the Sub- Committee were aware of it and were alert to it. If the mere negotiation - seeking a first step - would cause a relaxation of defence efforts in the Western world, it would be very unfortunate.. As these negotiations were proceeding the Wéstern nations had the responsibility to maintain their defence efforts/ to be alert, and not to make tho mistake of taking unilateral or one-sided'disarmament actions in the absence of reciprocal actions on the part of the Soviet and in the absence of inspection procedures which were of vital importance. All should be aware of this and those considerations would also apply if a first step had been successfully negotiated. It was important for the people and the governments of the West not to misunderstand the effect of a first step on their security; they should know that it was' only limited, that it was only partial, that it was only a beginning, and that the security of the Western nations should continue to roly on their armaments and their armed forces, and that this responsibility could not be transferred to an embryo inspection organization. The decisions of the four Western powers to go forward with these negotiations was based on the awareness that the free nations were capable of managing the danger of undue relaxation and of maintaining the necessary vital defence capacity, I ^ 49. These risks of undue relaxation were being run in order to explore whether a sound and safeguarded first step could bo made. In the United States, under the direction of the President, the beginnings of every war in recorded history, the circumstances of every attempt to limit, or reduce, or control armaments had been reviewed. It was found that very often the outbreak of war occurred at the crescendo climax of an arms race. It occurred when the measures taken by one side for defence were interpreted by the other as a threat to its security. In an arms race, it'was frequently the case that intelligence overestimated-what the other side was DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED doing and attributed it to different circumstances. Then, at a very high-' level of arms preparation and under the strain of the burden of arming, some incident, some miscalculation or some deliberate calculation would set off the tragedy of war. The knowledge that such circumstances might lead to a war which would now cause devastations beyond any in recorded history, should justify every attempt to explore the possibility of undertaking a first step which might reverse present trends. 50. He recalled that after the war of 1812, England and the United States had started negotiations regarding the"limitation of armaments on the-Canadian border of the G-reat Lakes. Despite the objections which'were raised by statesmen and military leaders at that time, an agreement was reached which was still in force 140 years later,. One of. the reasons why this agreement worked was that both sides of the Great Lakes v/ere opened to inspection.

51. Referring to the fundamental question of good faith, he said that the negotiations v/ere based on the premise that one could not rely on the good faith of the other side and that the only 'thing which could be relied upon were the inspectors and their alertness to their duty. This had been the agreed Western position throughout the negotiations, and thus imposed a limitation on what '. could be accomplished in the first step. It was a sound limitation because, in anything as vital as -the security of the Western states, reliance upon the terms of a treaty, a paper document or a commit- ment could only be justified If it could be verified by inspection. 52. Referring to the comment of the Italian Representative on the specific problem of control, he mentioned three'categories s that which would affect the danger of a surprise attack, that which would affect the danger of a nuclear attack and that which would affect the danger of a non-nuclear attack. No basis had been found on which any- precise distinction could be drawn, so far as >control was concerned, between types of nuclear weapons.

53. Likewise, he agreed with the comment of the Italian . Representative that the Soviet Defence Budget was not a reliable basis of control. Control could not be based, upon the financial administration in the Soviet Union because their entire armament industry was operated by the State. What their'armament industry would charge the State for building armaments was entirely within their control. On the other hand, it might provide an additional means of cross-checking information or of observing any widespread violation. There might therefore be some provision affecting budgets, although it was considered that budget control was not a reliable method of verifying the level of Soviet .armaments..

54. Concerning the fundamental matter of the effect on our 'alliance of these negotiations referred to by the Belgian K Representative, it was believed that relaxation caused some problems to the other side as well as to our. side. The PourPowers believed that, perhaps,, these problems were more manageable on our side.- There we're many indications that the Soviet were concerned about the effect of inspection on the whole iron curtain, on their ' own"" relationship to Eastern European states and on the people in the Soviet Union. He wished to emphasise what Secretary Dulles had said a few weeks ago that it was a matter which should-be approached only on the basis of carefully measured steps carefully taken. It was believed, on balance, that it was preferable to approach and work out these problems intelligently, rather than to DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED shrink away from tho negotiations. In the knowledge of the con-' sequences of a modern war, the West was under an obligation towards its own people and, in fact, towards civilisation Itself, to do the maximum possible to turn the course of current history away from a war.

55. Referring to the size of the territories opened to inspection, he drew attention to the fact that all Western countries were at present quite opened to observation. That was not true of the other side-. Thus, if a basis could be worked out which would, open the Soviet Union to observation, this would hc to the advantage of the West. 56. It was agreed that every effort should he made to strike a sound bargain on any zones or on any beginnings of an inspection system. But in striking that bargain it was more important to look" upon the significance of an area from the point of view of safeguards against Communist surprise attacks than from its industrial importance. It was preferable to. establish a beginning of inspection of areas where attack airfields and attack Soviet divisions would be located than areas where industries and steel mills were located.

57. With respect to the question of methods of aerial and ground inspection, he explained that it would involve the participation of the nationals of all states that were being inspected in an appropriate inspection organization, and that the inspection vehicles or aircraft would themselves be inspected before they went on their task to see to.it that they were unarmed, and that they were equipped with authorised equipment only. They would have on board monitors or special observers belonging to the side being inspected as well as inspector crews from the other side,. These types of technical questions had been worked out with very - competent people who were aware of the grave significance of having an effective inspection system. Furthermore, in none of these talks on inspeotions had demilitarised or neutralised zones been discussed.. Extensive discussions had been held only on inspection zones and on reduction of armaments and armed forces in all areas of the world.. 58,. Drawing attention to the wide range of newspaper stories, speculations, and. distorted news items which had. been published in rccent weeks, he wished to stress that it. was important for all governments to know that they should seek reliable information ' by direct consultation with the four governments

59. On this matter of suspicion which was raised by the Portuguese Representative, he agreed that there was suspicion on the part of the Four Powers towards the Soviet; it was also correct that the Soviet had reciprocal feelings. There was mutai suspicion in the world and there were grounds for it. This suspicion had made it all the more difficult and- at the same time all the more important to . try to reach a sound first step. Even at present, there were indications that they suspected that the VZest really did not want to reach a first step agreement'of any kind.. However, they seemed now to be a little more aware of the thoroughness with which the problem was being approached and appeared; to believe that genuine negotiations could take place if they were so dis- posed. There was some .evidence that at the time of the Hungarian events in autumn 1956 the Soviet leaders had thought more

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED seriously than ever before of the implications of a nuclear war. This might be the reason for the different tone adopted by the Soviet, in November 1956 and in January 1957, in the United Nations discussions and in those held in London in March and April 1957. Perhaps there were other reasons: perhaps the accumulated burden and the economic drain imposed by the armaments programme was affecting them, perhaps it-was a combination of events,.and perhaps it was simply the 1957 version of a'programme aiming at deceiving the Western countries. 60. With regard to the radar chains, such installations v/ere contemplated, along with inspection zones, as part' of the safeguard against surprise attack. In any area where the Soviets would allow inspections, it should he possible to negotiate the establishment of radar stations on a reciprocal basis.

61. When the Soviet first proposed a completely unacceptable zone in the centre of Europe., measured on the demarkation line in Germany, an attempt was made to assess their willingness to accept aerial inspection. When, for the first time, they accepted aerial inspection, it was estimated that they would be more interested in moving the zone towards the southern than towards the northern area. • This estimate had proved to be correct, since in their next proposal the zone had been moved towards the South and the West. Having ascertained that they would move off the demarkation line in Germany and that they were prepared to talk'about opening ,up as much as a third of the whole Soviet Union in a first inspection zone, it was felt that the way was open to further'negotiations.

62. Mr. STASSEN then examined the procedural questions raised. . He agreed that reports of progress were hot enough and that prior participation was required. He also agreed that the four NATO members on the Sub-Committee were neither a sufficient nor an adequate basis for representing the NATO nations. A point in the negotiations had been reached where a method of consultation and greater participation by the other NATO nations had become necessary. He pointed out that there were two'different aspects to this problem. There were the broad questions that affectcd all nations, which called for greater current information and current consultation with the NATO nations because of the. increased seriousness of the negotiations. Thon there was the matter of the participation in the particular questions affecting,Europe. This was a different question, which might be stated in the form: "How should NATO nations participate in the development of a Western position on armament control and on measures related to it affecting a European zone." In connection with this problem of participation, the proposal had been made that NATO should send someone to London. If NATO nations ' wished to designate someone in the Working Group in London who would informally and unofficially establish contact with the Pour1Western -. Delegations, the latter would be prepared to work out such an arrangement. On the other hand, someone could be designated in each of the embassies in London. There, representatives could meet together whenever a combined European view was needed. In any event, the Pour Powers were of'the opinion that it was up to NATO to dccido how best this participation could be established, as they were eager to obtain the full co-operation of all the NATO nations.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 63. Mr. Jules MOCH wished to associate himself with the comment made by his colleague, Mr. Stassen, on the importance and the interest of the discussion which had taken place in the morning. 64. ' Referring to the statement made by the Italian Represen- tative, he said that he was in agreement with most of the points made but, like Mr. Stassen, he had reservations on the problem of the distinction to bo made between tactical nuclear weapons and other weapons. It was impossible to differentiate between the various types of .nuclear weapon, it was impossible' to decide, on the basis of their respective powers, between tactical and strategic weapons. There was also a moral factor; an attempt had to be made at removing from man's hands these most powerful weapons. But the most important reason was that, if tactical nuclear weapons were assimilated, to conventional weapons, it would, be necessary to reduce their numbers, as in the case of conventional weapons. . In the present atmosphere of suspicion it would be irrational to reduce the number of' weapons over which there was no control.' While difficulties might be encountered in controlling, stocks of conventional weapons, it should be .borne in mind that each of these'weapons was in itself much less dangerous than any atomic weapon. If two or throe hundred guns were to evade control, it would not be catastro- phic, but the situation would be very different if it applied to à few atomic weapons.' It was therefore necessary to adopt the principle that the • production of all nuclear weapons should be limited and that stocks should be progressively used for pacific purposes. The Italian Representative having referred to the fact that tho reduction in forces strength was less important than, the reduction in armaments, Mr. Moch wished to,make it clear that, in the •view of the Four Powers, forces strength was merely a unit of measure and a simple means of determining the size of armaments remaining at tho disposal of countries. It was indeed more important "to limit armaments than manpower, otherwise it would bc possible for countries to mobilisa almost instantaneously, with tho help of equipment ""in reserve stocks. Moreover, the situation would differ considerably betweon countries having compulsory military sorvicc and thus having tho possibility of mobilising millions of trained young men in a few weeks, and other countries having only regulars and therefore an army with limited strength. 65. He then commented on the statement that the atomic disarmament should follow upon the réduction in conventional forces. In this connection, he recalled the principle that a disarmament treaty should be unanimously approved in order to be valid. Unan- imity could only be reached if, at each stage in the implementation of the Treaty, the security of all the parties concerned was simul- taneously increased. If disarmament measures were undertaken separ- ately, as had been tried in 1951» the Security of one group might, at one stage, be jeopardized while that of the other might be increased in view of" the disproportion between the nuclear and conventional power of each group.

66. He agreed with Mr. Stassen that the first step in disarmament measures bore an element of risk. If the other party was entirely in bad faith, it would be a few weeks before this would come to light and in the meantime, the Western world would have started to disarm. It was therefore essential to devise a first step which would not in itself entail vital risks for any of the Western powers. With, regard to the second step, the. problem was simpler, as the Soviet authorities, which had first favoured the automatic passage from one step to the next, now appeared to accept DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED the theory supported by the Four Powers whereby the notion of pas- sing from one step to the next was subordinate to the full implementation of the first Step0 67.' On the matter of control, he wished to draw attention to the-fact that circumstances• were different frorn^those after the first world war. At that time, control was imposed by a victor on a vanquished country. The vanquished had every reason to attempt to foil the efforts of the victor. In the present case, control v/as reciprocal. 68. With regard, to methods, no decisions had as yet heen taken hy the Pour Powers; eitfior~"counter proposals, if possible signed hy the Pour Powers, wou-ld he made, or the Soviet proposal would he examined item hy item, and each item would he the subject of a hard bargain.

69. He assured the Netherlands Representative that he fully agreed with the' view that other NATO nations- had to be consulted before decisions were taken. He pointed out, however, that tho proposed-method of associating the NATO Secretariat with that of the United Nations Sub-Committee would not be feasible as the Soviet were represented on the United Nations Secretariat. 70. In reply to the question put by the Portuguese Represen- tative as to the advantage of limiting the control, he recalled that at first full control had been envisaged and that this principle was still favoured by the United Kingdom and French Representatives. However., experience had proved that little had boon achieved by insisting on the observance of this principle. In order to recreate -a climate of confidence, an effort was being made to evolve a partial control plan. The question of the importance to be attached to the various control plans still required further discussion and he was not in a position to give a firm view. However, it would be logical to admit that reduced control would be compatible with important reductions in forces strength.

71. He wished to draw a distinction between air control and grOundj controlwhich.,served entirely, .different purposes. The OsBject" of air "control was to detect, through photography, suspect, troop movements, clandestine troop concentrations and to warn the powers concerned. T-his was also the purpose of ground control, but it was also intended to have mobile ground control for inspecting army units, garrisons, military establishments, stocks and factories and chock that men and equipment conformed to the figures reported. 72. He agreed with the Greek Representative that disarmament should be accompanied by a minimum of good faith. However, if good faith vrere complete there would be no need for a disarmament treaty. This lack of good faith waè a fact to be accounted for and, in this connection, he was convinced that'any form of control, however thorough it might be, would never provide 100% security from the technical point of view. It was to be hoped that control procedures and ; inspections would assist in establishing a climate of confidence which, in turn, would further the principle of disarmament. / 73. On the question of procedures, Mr. Moch said that he would welcome any means which would provide for close co-operation between the Four Powers and NATO. He suggested that the best means of en- suring that the Council was kept informed of developments might be

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED for the Four Powers to establish a working group which.would prepare a special telegram for dispatch to the.Council once a week. In addition, representatives of the Four. Powers on the Sub-Committee might come to Paris whenever there would be questions of importance to be examined with the Council. 74. MR. STASSEN pointed out that the-adherence of any State to such an agreement would involve a treaty which would have to be ratified in accordance with the constitutional processes of each • State.. 75. References had heen made in the press to the ability of the Suh-Committee of the United Nations to impose its views upon nations. .The United Nations Charter, however, did not invest the Suh-Committee with any such powers. Article 26 of the Charter, however, calls for the establishment of an "armament regulation system", and it was under this article that the work of the United Nations' Sub-Committee was being carried out. 76. Any first step towards disarmament required the prior agreement of an overwhelming majority of the States having a present • or potential military significance. Thus if certain States would not agree to abstain from manufacturing nuclear weapons, then the first step towards disarmament would have failed.

77. In the work of the Sub-Committee the Western powers had proceeded on the basis that any first step toward disarmament must include a safeguard clause permitting signatory States to revoke, in part or in whole, their commitments under the Treaty if, in their view, their security, called for such action. 78. He had spoken at length about Europe. However, he wished to make clear that his remarks applied equally to other parts of the world. 79. He made clear that the United States Government, in considering the restraints to be placed upon the use of nuclear weapons in a first stage of disarmament, would reserve the right to use those weapons under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. This would bc especially the case if an armed attack under that article included the use of nuclear weapons or if the attack were of such nature and magnitude that it could not be repelled without the use of nuclear' weapons. The United States Government would never sacrifice in any first step disarmament agreements, or in any later arrangements for disarmament, the defence commitments of the United States and of those States with whom it has collective defence arrangements. Similarly, they would not sacrifice the right of those nations associated with them in collective security agreements, to be trained in the use of modern weapons. 80. The Western members of the United Nations Sub-Committee on Disarmament were agreed that if further progress- is to be made it is not sufficient to criticise the Soviet position, but they must put forward counter-proposals. The Council might wish to keep this need in mind in considering how they wish to be more closely associated with the future work of the Sub-Committee.

81.• The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE recalled that President Moch had made a useful suggestion earlier when he had proposed that the four delegations in London might together arrange to keep the Coüncil informed of their work. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 82. Mr. Jules MOCH said that such an-effort would have to be of a quadripartite character'to be of value and to achieve a balan- ced report. These reports would, of necessity,. have to be short. They would not, of course, prevent other exchanges but would be intended to supply the Council with information about the Sub-Committee's work on a regular basis. .- 83. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE suggested that these reports might he sent once a week so as to reach the 'Council before it's regular Wednesday meetings. This9 of c Ourses would not prevent special reports on matters of urgency and importance heing sent when this was warranted. These regular reports might he complemented hy more frequent contacts between the Councils such as their meeting of today with Mr. Stassen and President Moch9 and mombers of the Sub-Committee. Perhaps this might be done once a month.

84. Tho NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE wished to. inject into what had been suggested by the French Representative the idea that it was not merely a question of the Council being informed of past events. It was also important that the ^Council should be able to express opinions on matters under consideration in the Sub-Committee before they wore docidod.

85. Mr« STASSEN said that the representatives of France and the Netherlands had raised a very important question. If they were to work effectively and soundlys the Wostorn members of the UN Sub-Committee must receive ideas as woll as convey information. They must receive ideas from their NATO partners. Thoy must be able to participate in tho. formulation of the Western position,s particularly in regard to questions affecting Europes but alsoj of Course9 to the oxtent they Wisheds in other questions as well.

86. He-shared the view of the Representative of tho Notherlandss. and Others9 that there should bo instituted immediately a method by which the Western members of the Sub-Committoe could reçoive ideas from their other NATO partners. He suggested member governments might be asked their views on this point possibly before next week.

87. . Tho> CANADIAN. REPRESENTATIVE said that Mr. Stassen had made a very useful point9 which was in line with the distinction he had made earlier between general information concerning the "work of the Sub-Committee and matters of specific concern to Europe or to NATO defence. 88. His Delegation considered it was important that NATO should make a contribution«, particularly in the latter field. Tho provision of a general weekly report was as good an arrangement as could bo envisaged'. • In addition9 the Western members of the Sub- Committee might send .special reports on any urgent or important developments. He thought it should be possible to devise machinery for rendering regular reports to the Council. -.- 89. In fields of direct concern to NATO9 he thought certain specific points might be studied at once. For examples in the

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED matter of aerial inspection. In this connection he mentioned; boundaries for a zone of aerial inspection in Europe9 the location of ground control postss the levels of the forces of tho four Powers In Europo9 methods for reducing conventional armaments and military budgets in terms of the impact such reductions might have on NATO and Soviet capabilities in Europe. Doubtless other topics could bc considered. For the moment his Delegation suggested the questions of the boundaries for a. zone of inspection in Europe and the possible location of control posts might be.studied as a matter of urgency. At some later stage the advice of the Council's military advisers might bo injoctod into these studies. 90. HQ recallod THAT in tho United Nations it had, from time to time, "boon alleged that tho four Western members of the Sub-Committeo aro working only in the interests of NATO. . Thcso allegations wore unjustified but they roflooted tho suspicions with which certain countries view these matters.. Several of those countries had asked to bo heard by tho Sub-Committcc9 pursuant to proposals they had made in the United Nations Gonoral Assembly, Tho Sub-Committco felt if thoy hoard one country thoy would have to hear them all, so they havo confined themselves to receiving written requests. Only the other day, one of these countries renewed its request to be heard. The country in question might be resentful if it ,received the impression that-the four Western countries were consulting too, closely with their NATO partners. Eor these reasons, he hoped the study of these problems in NATO would-be treated with due discretion and lack of publicity. . .

91. Mr. Jules MOCH wished to make four points: (a) to emphasize the need referred to by the Canadian Representative of being discreet-about giving publicity to these matters insofar as they are treated within. NATO:

. (b) there would be no objection on the part of the' French Government, if their partners on the UN Sub-Committee were agreeable, to sending a joint telegram on a regular basis for the information of the Council;

(c) it would be valuable for the Western members of the Sub-Committee to have the views of the Council on the various questions which would be before them;

(d) no rigid distinction should be, made between • • European and other questions in considering a first stage agreement.,

92. The UNITED IvINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that, ns the fourth member of the UN Sub-Committeo, he was in complete agreement with tho various proposals which had "been made for informing the Council. He v/as sure his authorities would bo glad to join in preparing a weekly telegram and carrying out the other proposals which had been mado. It seemed to him that, as suggested by the Canadian Representative, a study should bc made of tho actual zones of air and ground limitations. Possiblytho Committoc of Political Advisors or some other body might be asked to begin this detailed work .and' to report to the Council.

93. Tho CHAIRMAN suggested that it would bc important to consider carefully tho different questions which had bean raised during the discussions. Perhaps governments might bc askod to be ready, by next Wednesday's mooting of the Council, to. express their views on these questions, and particularly on the idoa of a European zone

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED of. inspection and tho machinery needed for its control. These two questions concorncd the majority of the members of the Council dircctly and they might, therefore, bc treated urgently.

9b. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that if this suggestion wore followed up it might bc useful to tho Council to have a paper sotting "out the views of the four Western members of the UN Sub- Committee on a European zone of inspection. This paper could servo as a basis for discussion and would enable governments to have before . them concrete proposals on which thoy could moro easily express an opinion. 95. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE supported the suggestion made hy his Netherlands colleague. A paper hy the Western members of the UN Suh-Committee outlining the proposals for a European zone of inspection would -lend precision to the Council's discussions at its next meeting. • 96. . The CHAIRMN suggested that such a paper would require a few days to prepare. In order to save time members of the Council might be able to seek before next Wednesday at least the preliminary views of governments on the different ideas which had been put forward during the discussion and on which delegations doubtless would be reporting. . ,

97. Mr. STASSEN thought that a practical method of coming to a decision could now be devised. This method could best be translated in the form of two questions: ilWere the NATO nations Yifilling in principle to contemplate a European inspection zone as part of a first stop towards a world wide agreement for the reduction and control of armaments?" If the answer to this question were in the affirmatives the second question was: "Did the Council wish the four NATO members of the Disarmament Sub-Committee of the United Nations to send them a suggestion for such a European. inspection zono?;" He considered that any further move towards the submission of . dountor-p'roposals on an inspection zone was dependent upon the decision of principle to be taken by NATO nations concerning the establishment of a European zone within a world wide disarmament agreement. ' '

98. ' The CHAIRMAN said thats in his View3 Mr. Stassen's questions were the very questions which Permanent Represcntativosshould put to their Government and on which a reply should be given at the next meeting of the Council. He urged the members of the Council to have a reply by Wednosdays 5th June5 1957s otherwise the Council might be accused of delaying the discussions in London.

99. The Council then examined the text of a short note for the press read out by the Chairman5 and made a few amendments. 100. The COUNCIL: (1) expressed their gratitude to Mr. Stassen and Mr. Moch for the valuable statements they had .made; (2) .took note of the points made in the course of discussion;

(3) . approved - the text of the press statement read out by the Chairman3 as amended;

(4) agreed that the following questions should be examined and decided upon at the next mooting : DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED

(a) Wore the NATO nations Willing3 in principle3 to contemplate a European inspection zone as part of a first step towards a world-wide agreement for the reduction and control of armaments?

(b) If the answer to (a) above was in the affirmatives did the CouncilsWish the four NATO members of the Disarmament Sub-Committee of the United Nations to sond thom a suggestion for such a European • inspection zono? (ç) Wero the four NATO members of tho Disarmament Sub-Committee willing to send the Secretary General for tho information of tho Council, weekly telegrams describing what v/as taking place in tho Disarmament Sub-Committee in London, those telegrams to bo more frequent when judged neccssary?

(d) If the four members would agree to send tho telegram suggested in (c) above, did tho Council 'agree to hold a'weekly discussion, when appropriate on the subject matter of those telegrams and to koop the NATO members of tho Sub-Committoo in , London fully informed of tho views expressed on the points raised?

(o) Did tho Council agroe that,' whon appropriate, discussion should take place between the Council and one or more of tho NATO members of tho Disarmament Sub-Committee?

(f) Did the Council agree that, whon appropriate, a member of the Secretariat should bc sent to London ,to attend meetings -of the four NATO mombcrs of the Disarmament Sub-Committee, in ordor to bo fully informed of their work?

NATO RESTRICTED_

IIo REORGANIZATION OF BRITISH ARMED FORCES- '

101. Tho UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE made a statement on changes in assigned and earmarked naval and maritime air forces, and circulatcd a note on this subject (both the statement and the note are attached at Annox).

102. The COUNCILi

(1) noted the statement of tho United Kingdom Representative on the re-organization of British naval and maritime ) air forcos.;

(2) agreed tihat this question would bo re-examined at a future mooting of the Council.

III. DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING 103. Tho Council fixed its next mooting for Wednesday, 5th June, 1957 at 10.15 a.m. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED

Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe. C-R(57 )54

RE- ORG AN IZ AT I ON OF BRITISH ARMED FORCES

• Statement by the United Kingdom " Permanent Representative

When I made my statement to the Council on 14th February on the re-organization of the British armed forces, I said that certain other changes in our assigned and earmarked naval forces would he indicated to the Council and the NATO Supreme Commanders in due course. I also said something about our future,naval plans in my statement to the Council on'the United Kingdom Defence White Paper on 4th April-, - 2. These naval changes come in quite a different category from.the army reductions which the Council have already discussed and there is certainly no question of their being of such a kind that the emergency procedure of C-M(55)82 needs to be invoked; But I thought the Council would find it helpful to have the information to complete the general United Kingdom picture in advance of the Overall and Annual Reviews. I am therefore circulating a note, which I would ask you all to treat as a secret document, since it includes specific military information showing the probable ear-marking of British naval and maritime air forc.es._ for NATO commands at the end of each year starting in 1956 and going up to- broadly the same period as that for which we have announced . our plans for the army and air force.

3- The Council certainly will not wish me to dwell again on the economic pressures which have obliged my Government to make- radical reductions in all forms of government spending and which have played a'maj.or part in the re-shaping of the British armed forces, including the Royal Navy. We have had to' -take into account far-reaching changes in weapons and in ' the whole design, machinery and equipment of ships of war. 4. For example, a Battle Class Destroyer of the type coming into service at the end of World War II cost £800,000 and an anti- submarine frigate of the 'type now being offered on loan to NATOJ navies cost £300,000. The expected costs of the guided weapon fleet escort and general purpose frigate now under design, which would replace those vessels, will be of the order of £7"2 million and £3 million respectively, .In other words, these ships which are nearly double the tonnage of, their 1945 counterparts cost nearly ton times as much. Their complements and their running costs will also be considerably larger. There is only one' conclusion: we can have far fewer of thorn.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 5. On the other hand I should not like members of the Council to conclude that the United Kingdom sets no value on ships which are not of the most modern type. I need only remind the Council of the United Kingdom First Sea Lord's reference at the - end of CPX YII to the way in which tho 50 distinctly bid destroyers generously transferred to the Royal Navy by the USA played their part in keeping the Atlantic lines of communication open in the critical days of World War II. 6. During the period under review in the Defence White -29- MATO SECRET ANNEX to C-Ri 57734

Paper down to 1962., most of our new ships and weapons will be under construction, a number of now ships, especially the anti-submarine •• types, will be coming into service. With our world-wide commitments and our large merchant marine, we have to plan our numerically smaller navy of the future round a number of powerful, highly mobile task forces. These groups, which can deploy quickly both air power and land forces will be acting in support of the free world wherever they may be.

7. The statement I have circulated gives as clear an indication as is passible at present of the cffcct cf this world- wide re-organization of the Navy on the United Kingdom's contributions to NATO Commands, up to the end of 1.959. In general, I think our colleagues will agree that they are not of the same order of magnitude as the réductions in army and air forces that we have already discussod in the Council. But in. all fairness, there are three points 'to which I should draw attention: the reductions in maritime aircraft, shown In tho second table, the reductions in D-day submarines and the withdrawal in 1959 of one light fleet • carrier.

8. These changes have been indicated to the NATO Supreme Commanders with whemwe are discussing them. It remains our. firm intention to continue to make a major contribution to the naval forces in all the NATO Commands. Our aim is, within the resources available, to develop a fleet which, while smaller in numbers than it has been, takes full advantage of modern developments in equipment and technique.

9. If I may complete the information du© to tho Council, I should like to remind you of the reference I made in. my statement of 4th April to the two divisions of the Territorial Army that are at present•ear-marked for SACEUR as 2nd Echelon Forces. "The Defence White Paper implied, perhaps somewhat prematurely, that the matter was being discussed with SACEUR but, in any case, we are now discussing it with him. The latest strategic advice as set out in M.C.14/2 and 48/2, with its greater emphasis on D-day forces in Europe, supports the viow expressed in the White Paper that these divisions would-be bettor assigned to home defence duties rather than to SACEUR, since even in the most favourable circumstances they could never be ready to-move to the Continent until some time after D+30. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED NATO SECRET AJTO to . PROBABLE ASSIGNMENTS TO NATO COMMKDS 5-5157)34

D ~ DAY D + 15 D + 50 SACLANT 31st December 31st December 31st December

1956 1957 1958 1959 1956 ' 1957— 1958 1959 1956 1957 1958 1959 • - _ Battleships _ 1 1 1 1 Fleet Carriers 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ' 2 _ — ^. Light Fleet Carriers 1 - 1 __ _ 2 1 Cruisers • 3 3- 2 2 3 3 2 2 if k 4 4 Destroyers and Frigates 22 22 22 20 32 31 - 31 28 k8 46 bb 45 Fast Minelayers 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 Submarines 31 25 24 22 31 25 2k 22 31 30 30 29 SACEUR " • - Light Fleet Carriers 1 , 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 Cruisers 2 2 2 2 3 2 ' 2 3 k k 3 3 Destroyers and Frigates 15 15 , . 15 13 16 16 15 21' 22 21 21 21 Past Minelayers - - •- _ _ - 1 1 1 ' 1 Submarines 9 7 6 4 9 7 6 k 9 - 9 . 8 8 I Minesweepers 10 10 10 10 14 12 12 12 12 12 12 12

CINCILYN

Destroyers and Frigates 10 10 10 9 14 ' Ik Ik 12 23 22 22 22 Minesv/eepers 4 4 . 4 4 • 10 1 k 3 3 3 3 • 3 3 PPB s 8 , 2 2 2 8 8 8 8- 8 8 8 8

NOTE: The 31st December 1956 figures are those actually assigned on 1.1.57. in SGM 1 57 except that assignments for SACLAM1 are not given for D + 15 and these have been interpolated. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED -31- NATO SECRET ANNEX to • - C-R(37)34

PROBABLE STRENGTH OF EARMARKED UNITED KINGDOM MARITIAE AIR FORCES UP TO DECEMBER, 1959

Dec. 1956 Dec. 1957 Dec. 1958 Dec. 1959 Coastal Command lb Sqns. 9 Sqns. 9 Sqns. 7 Sqns. 106 A/eft 70 A/cft 5b Vcft b2 A/cft

Malta 2 Sqns. 1 Sqn. 1 Sqn. 1 Sqn. 16 A/cft 8 A/cft 8 A/cft. 8 Vcft

Note: The December 1956 figures are those actually assigned on 1.1.57. in SGM 1-57 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED