HE INDIAN MUTINY OF 1 857 .

A SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY

EVEN S T .

AP TAI F . R . E D C N S GWIC K .

(Royal F ield A rtillery .)

L ON D ON

F O S T G OOM C O . L TD R E R R , ,

1 5 C H AR I G R S S S .W . , N C O ,

1 909 .

PREFACE .

Among the imme nse mass of literature dealing t 1 857 1 858 1 859 with the even s in India in , , and , there exists no brief general a ccount of the purely military events of the great struggle . This boo k c is a humble attempt to remedy the deficien y , and no one ca n be more aware than the author of its o a i t sh rtcomings . Nevertheless , in the hope th t ma y be of some use to those commencing a study ” of our t a of one grea est Small Wars , and th t it may possibly afford a certain assistance to those i to whose time is limited , and who yet w sh obtain a gene ral knowledge of the military problems presented to us by the political exigencies of our great oversea Empire , this little book is now pub i h d lli l s e . With regard to the spe ng of the names , I have endeavoured to employ that most generall y a old S of use d . I have however ret ined the pelling s C a wn - f or the name Lucknow , pore , Meerut , I L a khn a o K a hn ur M i ra th doubt if , p , , would be s generally recognized . For any mistake in the ma f or spe lling of names I trust I y be forgiven , the differences in the various authorities are considerable .

F or the facts of the story I have relied on the on works of Kaye , Malleson , and Forrest , Lord ’ “ ” — n Y a on Robe rts Forty o e e rs in India , and certain Blue Books most kindly shown me at the

Library of the India Office .

‘

. . . Exeter , F R Sedgwick

1 7 1 908 . Dec . ,

1 4J ~O7 R 1 C ON T E N T S .

Introduction .

- I . 1 857 . Chap . India in

Outbreak of Mutiny . — Chap II . The course of Mutiny .

- Chap 0 III . The situation . — Chap IV . Sir Colin Campbell . — Chap V . Capture of Delhi . — Chap VI . The Siege of Lucknow . Havelock

Outram enter Lucknow .

— b Chap VII . Sir Colin Camp ell relieves Luck

now . — Chap . VIII . Battles near Cawnpore . — Chap . IX . The Doab and Behar . Outram at

ta Lucknow . Preparations to at ck

Lucknow .

- X . . Chap . The Capture of Lucknow

h — ’ C ap . XI . Sir Hugh Rose s Central India Cam

a i n p g . — Chap . XII . The Final Operations . Some Lessons

of the War . APPENDICES .

Appendix I . Distribution of Troops in India at the out

break of Mutiny . Appendix II Numbers of troops despatched from England

showing month of arrival in Ind ia .

Appendix III . List of Regiments despatched from every source to India during the whole course of the

Mutiny .

Appendix IV . Effect railways would have had on the

course of the Mutiny .

LIST OF MAPS .

General Map of India . h Showing : R ailways existent in 1 857. T e

Grand Trunk Road . The distribution of

troops in May 1 857 . Inset : Map showing principal railways of

India in 1 908 .

Sketch Plan of Delhi .

Sketch Plan of Lucknow .

Sketch Plan of Cawnpore .

Sketch of Theatre of War .

INTRODUCTION

— — of Gre at and Small Wars Sea Power The — Causes of Small Wars The Indi an Mutiny

Unique .

Before commencing a sketch of the military events which are collectively termed the Indian

Mutiny , it will be well to briefly consider the s s how general nature of war of this clas , and the i Indian Mutiny was quite un que among them . e e o sse a Wars have b en divid d int two cla s , gre t s a war , th t is to say , wars between the trained e s forces of two gr at Powers , and mall wars , that is c , wars in whi h a Power has to deal with an enemy whose forces are not highly organized and e trained . It is singular how seldom it is r alized in England that our military forces have not taken part single handed in any grea t war since m the ti e of Henry V . British troops ha ve bee n engaged very often since that time in war with a great Power , yet hardly a single great engage ment has been fought by them in which they were other than a part of an allied army . In the Low ’ Countries , Marlborough s Armies were barely ’ half British ; in Spain , Wellington s troops were largely German and Portuguese ; the Army that ’ stood Napoleon s shock at Waterloo was less than e half British , and the coup de grac was dealt by an army of Prussians . l s When , however , the mi itary tudent turns from the consideration of Gre at Wars to that of e to Small Wars , it is int resting find that for more than a century and a half , there has never c s been a decade , and hardly a year , in which for e led by British officers have not been engaged in warfare , on the ever widening frontiers of our e Empire . The wars thus waged have b en of the e most varying typ s , and from them three stand — s out a s pre eminently great Sma ll Wars . The e three tried the resources of Britain to their utter on e the e r most , and in int rvention of a G eat s Power led to our ultimate defeat . The e three w R e ars are the American evolution , the Bo r War 1 899—1 902 of , and the Indian Mutiny .

All these three wars called for a great trans orta ti on p of troops from the Mother country , therefore a consideration of the military events s of these campaign , brings us first to a considera tion of the importance a nd limitations of Se a

Power .

In the American R e volution our Armies (largely composed of German mercena ries) were unsucce ssf ul a nd the i nterve n generally , _ finally of tion France forced the British Court , whose was policy always disliked by the nation at large , to grant independence to its American Colonists. French intervention in the American R evolu tion was chiefly valuable to the Colonists , on a ccount of the naval strength of the French

. wa s the t of nation Indeed , it naval s rength France as much as the American victories which t i brough the British Court to ts knee s.

8 Re ce nt revelations must have brought home to e n f or very man in the U ited Kingdom that , but our e Navy , foreign intervention in the Bo r War would certainly have occurred . During the Indian Mutiny there was no ques tion of foreign intervention , but it must not be f orgotten that , but for the Navy , the transport of troops would have soon bee n made most d l oult by any Power disposed to take advantage of our

own . Colonial embarrassments , to further its ends Nor can it be supposed that in an Empire such as ours c , situations will not o cur again requiring a g reat transporta tion of troops from the Home

Country .

s to c ss The first es ential suc e , therefore , in a ” a a e gre t Sm ll War is S a Power . In that great work Small Wars their prin ci les a n d c e C a llwe ll p practi e , Colon l , after pointing out the great dissimilarity of such wars e ts t se from one another, s for h the general cau s which lead a Colonia l Power into small wars and the necessity of studying thei r origins in order to s under tand the military operations . He says It is the milita ry aspect of small wars which concern us , and not their origin and causes . And yet their spe cial peculiarities can c generally be tra ed back to their source . For , ma : broadly , they y be divided into three classe s a n C mpaigns of conquest and an exation , cam pa igns for the suppression of insurrection or s lawlessnes , and campaigns undertaken to wipe out s to e o an in ult , aveng a wrong , or t overthrow ” a dangerous enemy . It will be observed that the first and third of s am of these clas es , c paigns conquest, and cam pa igns underta ken to overthrow a dangerous a re c ss enemy or avenge a wrong , ne e arily external ss c ns wars . The other cla , ampaig for the sup pression of an insurrection are necessarily t s in ernal war . The History of Revolts is the Hi story of of Guerrilla War , tedious and invertebrate oper a ti cns of , often bloody ambushes and bloody ” ' s di i cult of the reprisals . They are the mo t all ope rations which re gular troops can be ca lled on a s to perform , they are almost as unpleasant , and o much disliked , as duties which lead the troops int contact with mobs , generally called Duties in ” Aid of the Civil Power .

Such wars are always lengthy , the enemy is naturally more conversant with the country than of the regulars , and inevitably a certain number “ ” regretable incidents will occur in which th e regulars sustain reverses . In these days of news e papers such reverses are invariably exaggerat d , the and , in a country like England in which people are almost wholly ignorant of war , appear serious and unnece ssary . The most serious of the difficulties with which a the regulars must contend in all sm ll wars , and t ns re more par icularly in insurrectio is , that the is seldom or never a definite strategica l objecti ve for the regulars to aim at . In external war it is true there is often some form of a rmy to contend with . Its defeat and dispersion however often only complicate matters ,

1 0 " ’ di i culti es s a s and increases the of the regular , was the case in Afghanistan and the Boer War .

In addition to this , small wars often take place in an almost unknown locality , the country is M dI I C UI of often t for the movements troops , the " lines of communication are often long and di l cult s un ro to protect, supplie are generally nearly p curable . “ A consideration of these di 1 cultie s ha s led Colonel C a llwell to lay down the gen-era] prin “ ciple that in small wars Tactics favour the Re gular Army while strate gy favours the enemy

' In almost everyone of these n orma l con di ti on s of small wars , the Indian Mutiny was unique, at a ny rate in its earlier stages .

s The lines of communication were good , upplies were abundant , the country was well known , the information of the regulars was probably as good or e e b tt r than that of the insurgents , the country was practicable f or troops of all arms in all di re c tions , while from the first certain armies and great towns held by the rebe ls aff orded strategical objectives to the regular army . i s These peculiar ties aro e from the fact, that the agitators of the party desirous of upsetting British rule in India , found a fertile soil in which to sow its see ds of discontent in the minds of a some — d . what pampered , and ill discipline , soldiery The rebellion was principally a mutiny of a consider able army . The Bengal Army mutinied almost s e s en ma s , and formed a nucleus of regular troop s o e t re round which the di c nt nted ga he d . Thus at first se veral quite considerable armies con

l l c u f ronted the British Gene rals . Instead of a p p lace in arms aff ording no particular obj ective to the leaders of the British Army , certain collected ff forces of rebels a orded objectives , which allowed a determinate strategy to be employed from the outset .

e s In its latt r stage , however , the Mutiny degenerated into guerrilla warfare with all its r i concomitant disa dvantages . On the a r val of a column of regulars each member of the rebel bands hid his arms and became the peace ful ” of ms cultivator the soil , only to resume his ar a n d his trade of rebel when the column of regu lars had passed on its way .

It is only with the earlier stages of the war that i of this book s intended to deal . A full account e 1 858 to the guerrilla Op rations from May , , b 1 85 9 be . Novem er, , would very lengthy The a s t to sa gener l mea ures adop ed, that is y, the method on which the British leaders worked in t e of o s of hes guerrilla operations is , c ur e , great s military intere t .

This work doe s not deal with the causes of the Mutiny and R e bellion except in so far as they c e oncern the military op rations .

1 2 A CH PTER I . — — India in 1 85 7 British Troops Native Troop s Distribution— Causes of Discontent—Outbreak — of Mutiny Action of Government . By gradual steps the predominant power in India had come to be a British Chartered S of Company . o great had become the power this corporation that the British Parliament had re re intervened in its affairs and , through its p sen ta ti ves on the India Board , controlled to some extent the political affairs of the Company . The Governors of the various Presidencies and the — Governor General were nominated by the Crown . During the reigns of the immediate predecesso rs a h a d of Lord Canning , the Comp ny found it necessary to engage in Wars with the great i w S kh Empire , hich it had now absorbed , and also with Afghanista n where success can hardly be said to have crowned its arms . It had also been found advisable to remove of t k the King Oudh , and a e over the administration of his dominions . There can be no doubt that the ever encroa chin g power of the Company was viewed wi th much alarm by many of the Prince s of

- India . Lord Dalhousie had as Governor General sought to introduce many of our western ideas upon the natives . The forced abolition of certain most objectionable religious practises , and the denial of the right of adoption in certain cases , had aroused suspicions . But probably the most

1 3 serious cause of complaint among the Indian - o people, was the high handed meth ds and s manner of many of the official , who had to do of with the regulation the land in Oudh , in the

Southern Mahratta Country , and elsewhere . Many of the landowners (Ta lukdha rs) of Oudh had been shorn of their property , and few could be sure they were safe . What wonder that the people thought the Company greedy of possessing the land itself . A well known Civil Servant Mr . ’ Sherer in his report quotes Bacon s words , So s f or many overthrown estates , so many vote ” troubles . To guard its great territories the Government of India had a composite force of European a nd 0 native tr 0 ps . By a coincidence the European tr0 0 ps in India were abnormally under establish ment in 1 857 a n d amounted to some 4 Regiments of Cavalry ,

3 1 of Regiments Infantry , and 64 of Batteries or Companies Artillery .

These Batteries or Companies of whom 20 were batteries of Horse Artillery , were composed only partly of British , a portion varying from a third to a half were natives . The total white strength ffi was O cers , men . The distribution f o I . these troops is shown in Map , in Black . The European troops were armed with the fi E n eld . 6 r 9 r Rifle The Artillery with p . and p . 1 8 r 24 Field Guns , p . and pr . Heavy Field Guns ,

24 r . n 8 c and the seige guns consisted of p gu s , in h

Howitzers , and Mortars .

1 21 The native troops who were armed with the old s v i to Brown Be s musket, were di ided n three armies. Madras Army i of 7 Reg ments Cavalry . 52 Re of giments Infantry , 4 of Companies Artillery , 1 0 Companies of Engineers . Bombay Army 3 of Regiments Cavalry , 29 of Regiments Infantry , 1 0 of Companies Artillery , 2 of s Companies Engineer , The Bengal Army with which we are chiefly c f oncerned consisted o some .

34 e of R giments Cavalry ,

(Regular and Irregular) . 1 1 9 of I Regiments nfantry ,

(Regular and Irregular) . 32 of Companies Artillery , 6 Companies of Engineers . A regular Regiment was formed and administered in much the same way as a British

Regiment . An irregular regiment was c f ommanded by British O ficers , but the interior administration wa s to a great extent in the hands s of of the native officers . The total trength the native troops is given as of all ranks . i n 1 857 The distribution of the troops May , , is given in Appendix I and on Map I .

It must be very particularly noted that between C alcutta and Lucknow was only one European

1 5 the Regiment, that at Danapur The bulk of e t Europ ans were in the Punj ab . From Calcut a 350 600 it is miles to Danapur , to Allahabad and s a to Pe haw r . The increase in the territory owned by the

Company , and the consequent distribution of its forces over a far larger area, had coincided with a deterioration of the Native

Troops . The bulk of the Sepoys of the Bengal Army were enlisted in Oudh a nd resented our a nnexation of the country . One regiment had refused to go to Burma and it had won its point . It is said that the office rs were not of such a good

i class as formerly o cere d the Native Army . Certainly centralization of a uthority had be en c m carried to ex ess , and the powers of the com and ing ofli cer of the regular regiments had been curtailed in the most approved Horse Guard detri fashion , than which nothing can be more mental to the discipline of a native corps . As a — glaring example of over centrali za tion may be B a rra ck ur mentioned that at the p outbreak , a certain Sepoy distinguished himself by loyalty and bravery . General Hearsay promoted him on the spot . The General was severely reprimanded for his breach of regulations .

It is beyond the scope of this work to go into the causes of the unrest in Upper India , which cul mi n a ted in a mutiny of the Native Troops , it is sufficient to admit that the Sepoys had some e genuine grievanc s , which were exploited by certain agitators. These grievances found a culmination in the issue of cartridges for the new

1 6 tomed to panegyrics in the papers and elsewhere on our peculiar skill in governing subj ect races, certainly the honesty , and j ustice , and administra our ffi tive ability of o cials has , and does , improve the lot of our subjects , but there our success ends . “ ” “ e to We measure , wrote Henry Lawrenc , o s much by Engli h rule , and expect , contrary to all s experience , that the energetic and a piring among i mme nse sse our ma s should like dead level , and our arrogation to ourselves (even when we are notorious imbe ciles) of a ll authority and a ll

. e e emolument These s ntiments of mine , fre ly s e e expres ed during the last fift en years , have don c of me injury , but I am not the less convin ed their soundness , and that until we treat Natives , and s e as e p cially Native Soldiers , having much the same feelings , the same ambitions , the same ce e per ptions of ability and imb cility as ourselves , ” we shall never be safe . These words are preg nant of wisdom ; it may well be that we might all — read and mark them to day . Various acts of insubordination occurre d during th of 1 85 7 1 9th e early part , the Native Infantry were insubordinate at Berhampur . At Bar ra ckpur insubordination was rife and on the 29th 4 I 3 N . . of March , a Sepoy of the th , named Mangul

Pandy , attacked an officer and a white serjeant — major . The man was tried by a court martial composed of native Officers and sentenced to death .

1 h . 9t . The N I was disbanded , as also was the

n . I . 34th N . , and certain mutinous corps at Luck ow Still in the minds of British officia ls and oz fice rs there was no real conception of the latent irrita tion . The other native regiments went quietly

1 8 o ab ut their work, steps were taken to allay the suspicions about the cartridges , and the only mili tary movement made was to bri ng the 84th Regiment from Burma to Calcutta to assist to 1 9th disarm the and 34th Native Infantry .

Suddenly Calcutta was startled by the news o t that at Meerut the Sep ys had revol ed , murder i ng many whites ; had fled from that place to De lhi ; had induced the native troops there a lso to revolt ; and that the old King of Delhi had b e on of e n placed the throne the Moguls , and the a i St ndard of Rebell on raised .

The man to whom the destinies of British India were at this time entrusted was Lord

. a Canning A more ste dfast , firm and able man unf or it would be impossible to have found , but tun a tely his knowledge of India was slight and for a long time he was obliged to trust almost entirely to the advice of the membe rs of his c who of . ouncil , , with the exception Mr Grant L ow not to of and Colonel , did prove be possessed exceptional capacity . — — The Commander i n Chief in India was Ge neral Anson , a splendid soldier and most able man . Lord Elphinstone at Bombay and Harris at Madras were Governors of di stingui shed t a bility . Three celebra ed brothers governed s— areas which were dangerou John Lawrence ,

G , the Punj ab , eorge , Raj putana , Henry , Oudh with headquarte rs at Lucknow . The outbreak at Meerut is said to have preci — pita te d a pre arranged outbreak f or Sunday

May 30th .

1 9 23rd m of 3rd e On the April , a nu ber the Nativ Light Cavalry refuse d to receive the new —five e n cartridges . Eighty m were tried by a court martial composed of native officers and sentenced to ten years imprisonment the e 9th sent nce was read on parade on the May , and the men put in fetters there and then , in the f presence o their comrades .

ra The next day , Sunday , at the Church Pa de s hour, the native troops mutinied , murdered mo t of e who their offic rs endeavoured to rally them , released the prisoners in the gaol and made a rush for the European lines . Most fortunately the Church Parade had been put off for half an hour on account of the heat , and the natives found the

British troops falling in . They tried to sack the ff s o to . cantonment , and then went Delhi The Mee rut Division was commanded by

General Hewett . The British Troops consisted of

The Carabineers . of l One Troop Horse Arti lery .

One Light Field Batte ry .

One Company Foot Artillery . 1 st a 60th i Batt lion R fles . Many of the Carabineers and Gunners unf ortun were , however , raw recruits . Most ately , Colonel Wilson , Brigadier at Meerut , e s did not follow up the Mutine rs , otherwi e he would probably have dispe rse d them . There were difficulties due to red tape regulations e m of connect d with the co mand the troops , and there was delay in issuing ammunition . A garri

20 e son must , it is true , have b en left in the station , still a close pursuit by the bulk of the British s c but troops would probably have been uc essful , b y nightfall nothing had been done .

t The Mutineers had time o raise Delhi . The i e old King of Delhi , who occup ed the once pow r ful throne of the Moguls , gave his name to the e movem nt . The Native Troops at Delhi mutinied 4 h I and with the exception of the 7 t N . "i murdered their 0 cers . The bulk of the Euro r peans and Christians were murde ed, some after s barbarous torture ; a remnant e caped to Meerut . i L e uts. An attempt was made by Willoughby ,

Forrest and Raynor , Conductors Buckley , Shaw , a nd Scully and Crowe , and Serj eants Edwards , of to Stewart , all the Bengal Artillery , defend the s too ar enal , but the Mutineers were numerous , and the gallant handful blew up the magazine rather than let it fall into the hands of the enemy : out four of the nine , though severely wounded , escaped .

1 2th F i ruz ur 45th On the May the Sepoys at p ,

a nd 5 7th N . I . 1 0th . and N Cavalry , mutinied and attempted to se ize the fort . They were driven off by the 6 1 st Regiment stationed at that place . The affair was mismanaged and the Sepoys o to allowed to make ff Delhi .

On hearing the news from Delhi , Anson despatched an aide to Kasauli to order the 75th l st (less one Company) to Ambala , the Bengal Europeans were also ordered from Dagshai to 2nd Ambala , the Bengal Europeans at Sabathu were ordered to hold themselves ready . Expresses

2 1 were sent to Firuz pur a nd Jaland-ar to order the occupation of the magazines by Europeans . Two 8th Companies , Regiment, were ordered from Jalandar to Philaur on the 1 3th the 2nd Bengal Europe ans were ordered to move to Ambala ; a third class siege train was ordered to be prepared at Philaur ; the Nasiri Gurkhas at Ja togh were o ordered to Philaur to esc rt this train to Ambala, i rmur but the regiment mutinied . The S Gurkhas at Dehra were ordered to Meerut and also the headquarters of the sappers and miners from urkhi R . The Nasiri Gurkhas soon recovered 5 their senses . On the 1 th Anson himself reached Ambala where transport and supplies were being l st busily collected , a wing of the Bengal c e on Europeans was at on e s nt to Karnal , the road H A of to Delhi , with two . . guns and a squadron th —i n— 9 Lan cers . The Commander Chief found f to c on himsel unable advance at on e Delhi , o c although urged theret by Sir John Lawren e , and there is little doubt that such a move was now d dangerous . Delhi could only have be en secure on the day after the Meerut outbreak , it soon became too st rong for a small force with very little artillery to ca pture .

’ Lord Canning s advisers took a view of the mutiny at Meerut which was not justified by events . They considered the mutiny to be a n ot sporadic manifestation , a serious disease m that had touched the whole Bengal ar y . Further it was believed that Anson would soon be in Delhi .

This belief was shared by civilians and soldiers , f c ofli cia l o fi ials and merchants alike . An letter of the 25th of May proves that the

22 Government were still blind to the full nece s sities of the case . Nevertheless reinforcements were called for from every side . At present the only European Regiment between Calcutta and Allahabad was the l 0th at 20 Danapur . On the th May the 84th was sent 2 r up country . On the 3 d the l st Madras Euro peans under Neill a rrived and also sta rted up country . Lord Canning also called on the Delhi force to send a regiment to clear the country thence to

Cawnpore . How impossible it was to comply with this order will appear in the next chapter . A request of the Calcutta citizens to be allowed 2 h to form a volunteer corps was refused on the 0t . Lord Elphinstone the Governor of Bombay was a man of most exceptional ability , clever , of the greatest energy , and above all very well acquainted with India . He was at Bombay when he a a t he rd of the outbreak Meerut , and interpreting the affair in a very diff erent ’ of manner to that Lord Canning s advisers , he considered the mutiny to be of the

m . ost serious character He at once , with the of a the consent and assistance Lord C nning , took following measures di 1 . He authorized the officer comman ng at Disa to send the 8 3rd and a troop of Horse A mi r Artillery to j , i f required , to pacify

Rajputana .

2 m of . He authorized the Com issioner Sindh to send the l st Bombay Europeans to

the Punjab .

23 3 . He despatched a company of Madras

Artillery , then on duty at Bombay , direct to

Calcutta .

4. He arranged to send the 64th and 78th

Regiments , then on the way from Persia,

direct to Calcutta, only transhipping at

Bombay .

5 . to He despatched a P . O . steamer Mauritius where the Governor at once placed 33rd the , a company of Artillery , and all the on money he could lay hands , at the service

of the Indian Government .

6 . He despatched a special steamer to the Cape where Sir George Grey chartered 89th 95th to vessels , and sent the and 6th 1 st 1 3 Bombay , and later the , the / th , the 2nd 60th 73rd 80th 31 st / , the , the , the , and as many h orses as he could procure to

Calcutta and Bombay .

7 . He persuaded Ashburnham , the Com h to mander of t e China Expeditionary Force , proceed to Calcutta and place the services of

the force at the disposal of Lord Canning . At the same time Sir George Grey had persuaded the transports conveying this

' force to go to Singapore instead of to

Hongkong direct . From Singapore they

one and all bore up f or Calcutta .

8 . He ordered the concentration at Poon a of a column of all arms to keep open the Grand Trunk Road from Bombay to

Agra . to out 9 . He took precaution prevent an

break a t Bombay itself .

24

The column to attack Delhi was to consist of three brigades . 75th Regiment . l t 1 s s Brigade t Bengal Europeans .

Brigadier Halifax 2 Squadrons 9th Lancers .

1 Troop Horse Artillery . 2 nd Bengal Europeans . 0th 6 Native Infantry .

2n d Brigade 2 Squadrons 9th Lancers . Brigadier Jones 1 Squadron 4th Bengal Lancers 1 Troop Horse Artillery

60th 4. Companies 2 Squadrons Carabineers 1 Battery Field Artillery Meerut Brigade 1 Troop Horse Artillery s Brigadier Wilson 1 C ompy . Native Sapper 1 20 Foot Artillerymen 2 with 1 8prs . (these men were to man the siege

guns) . a total strength of

About 400 European Cavalry . 00 1 Native Cavalry . 2200 European Infantry 900 Native Infantry 22 Field Guns.

The troops were ordered to concentrate at

Baghpat . This force was to a tta ck an enormous fortified — m 7 and well built city , with a peri eter of miles , packed with a rmed men with a nucleus of some

26 — well- trained and well armed Sepoy n e troops . Lord Canning and Sir John Lawre c , of di fi culti es e ignorant his , were urging hast and speed on Anson . On the 24th May General Anson died of cholera at Karnal . He was succeeded by Somorset m —i n— i n General , as Com ander Chief e a a t India , and by G neral B rnard in command

Ambala . General Barnard was a most distinguished l soldier , he had been Chief of the Staff to Genera Simpson after Lord Raglan ’s death in the Crimea unfortunately he had seen no Indian service . In pursua nce of orders Wilson marched with his brigade from Meerut on the 27th May .

Marching by night and resting in the day , the column reached Ghazi ud din Nagar near the

B indun River at dawn on the 30th and halted . Soon after the halt a scout repo rted that the enemy were in force on the opposite bank of the river .

of Straight in front the British position , and on the right of that of the mutineers was an i ron bridge , which was promptly seized by two com 60th the panics of the , while a Squadron of ’

oo . d Carabineers with Tombs Tr p of H . A move ’ n to the right to e fil a de the enemy s left . The e enemy opened fire with heavy guns , but wer silenced by the two 1 8 pounders . Two Companies of the 60th with the sappers and 4 guns of Scotts Field Battery were sent to support Tombs ; the B guns now crossed the indun River and , when the ir fire was seen to have unsteadied the enemv

27 60th the charged , thereupon the enemy bolted pursued by the Carabineers . Five guns were taken . ’ The enemy s losses were heavy , the British loss was slight . — Next day the enemy re occupied the ridge and t two opened fire , they were driven back , af er a ’ hours bombardment by the guns , and a spirited

advance of the Rifles .

1 st Si rmur t of On June , the bat alion

500 . Gurkhas , strong, joined the Brigade On 4th the the brigade again advanced , and passing

Baghpat j oined General Barnard at Alipur . At this point Barnard had collected the troops o a enumerated ab ve , the small siege tr in from ’ H odson s Si rmur Philaur , Horse , and the

Gurkhas . The enemy occupied a position at Badli ki - on Serai , extending from a Serai house , the of right (east) which was a swamp , to the village of Badli , between which points were placed two a entrenched batteries . The position w s about half a mile long , the flanks covered by the above mentioned swamp on the right , and the Western on A c c Jumna Canal the left . areful re onnais sance was made by Hodson . General Barnard decided to atta ck in front and on the right flank off to simultaneously , while the cavalry moving ’ the right threatened the enemy s left rear . 1 0 At midnight , Brigadier Hope Grant with Horse Artillery guns and 3 squadrons 9th a L ncers , guided by Hodson , passed the canal .

About 1 a m. the main column marched . The frontal atta ck was to be conducted by the guns

28 and two battalions; Brigadi er Graves with the 60th 2nd the , the Bengal Europeans and ’ Gurkhas went to turn the enemy s right . A t daybreak the guns advanced into action under hostile fire ; the 75th and a wing of the 1 st e of e Bengal Europ ans , with a wing the latt r regi

s . ment in re erve , advanced to the attack The losses were severe and the situation became critical . General Barnard then called on the men 75th for a final advance, the dashed forward with the bayonet and , j ust as they reached the Serai , ’ ’ Graves column appeared on the enemy s right . Seeing the chance Hope Grant charged home 9th a nd with the Lancers , the enemy fled in confusion . a nd of Without stopping , in spite the heat , Barnard pushed his men on The troops advanced clearing the gardens and houses till of within sight the Ridge , which guards Delhi — from the north west ; this was found to be occu pied in force . Instantly Barnard formed his e plan ; he himself , with Graves with thre to battalions , a squadron and four guns moved the two left along the cantonment road , Wilson with battalions and all the guns and cavalry moved along the city road through the suburb of Sabzi

Mandi , the Gurkhas extended between the columns h endeavoured to keep communication . On t e ’ a s Ridge stands a large house , known Hindu Rao s

House , and this point was the obj ective of both columns . As the left column advanced the enemy opened

fire from the Flag Staff Tower , but the guns , crossing with di i culty a partially destroyed

29 bridge over a canal about yards north of the Ridge , opened fire on the enemy and 60 h 2 nd . t quickly silenced them The , Bengal

Fusileers , and Gurkhas then ascended the hill and swept along its crest . Wilson meanwhile , although harassed by the enemy in Sabzi Mandi , succeeded in reaching the southern end of the ’ Ridge and clearing it up to Hindu Rao s House . The object of the day having been effected the force was at once placed in position before Delhi . 5 00 The losses of the enemy were about , and thirteen guns . The British loss was 53 killed and 1 30 wounded . While the events leading up to the advance of Barnard ’s force against Delhi were taking place e s rious revolts had taken place elsewhere . At Cawnpore were three Native Infantry and one a C N tive avalry Regiment , with one European

Field Battery . The troops were commanded by — Major General Sir Hugh Wheeler , a most gallant and distinguished soldier , who had entered the ’ 1 803 Company s Army in , and served in many 70 Indian campaigns , he was , however , over years of age . On the 1 4th May news of the Meerut outbreak 1 9 was received , and on the th Wheeler received orders to prepare for the accommodation of a large European force . To make a place of security for the residents to Wheeler had two courses open to him ; one , to 6 retire with all the Europeans the Magazine , miles away , this would have withdrawn the ofli ce rs from their men and precipita ted the mutiny , but would have been the best defensive

30 to o di s ta position ; two , ccupy a su ed hospi l and so b s me arracks in which the ick , women and c hildren of the 32nd Regiment were quarte red .

The latter course was decided on , and an e ntrenchment was begun round these buildings 0 ’ and provided with 1 guns . Wheeler s intention not to retire to the Magazine was strengthened by optimistic reports from the Lieute nant

of . . Governor the N . W Provinces at Agra O vi ee on minous signs ha ng b n observed , the 2 1 st May all the women and children were ofli ce rs brought into the entrenchment , but the still slept at the "uarte r Guards of their regi m ents . On the 22 n d 5 5 men of the 32md and 240 Irre g ular Cavalry arrived from Lucknow , and a native Te erek Bi thor noble , Dhundu Punt , Maharaj ah of , “ ” 300 better known as the Nana , arrived with

Mahrattas and two guns to support the British .

He was quartered at the Treasury . The Nana 7th had been adopted by Baji Rao , the Peshwa of the Mahrattas , as his heir , and in the eyes of the n l atives the Nana was egally the Peshwa , though h is claims had been ignored by Lord Dalhousie . On the 1 st June the advanced parties of the l st M adras Fusileers and 84th Regiments reached Sir d Hugh Wheeler . Wheeler then returne the men of the 32md to Lucknow .

e At this dat there were in Cawnpore , Euro peans 0 ffi 8 o cers of all arms .

60 men 84th Regiment .

74 men 32nd Regiment (mostly invalids) .

3 1 1 5 men Madras Europeans.

5 9 men Bengal Artillery . — A few civilians i n particular some rail

way engineers .

A large numbe r of women and children . In addition there were a few loyal Sepoys and — some 300 half caste children . There was food for a month .

Suspicions of the Nana had ari sen . On the night of June 4th a cashiered officer in a state of drunkenness fired on a patrol of the 2nd

Cavalry , this was the spark that set fire to the dry

2nd . tinder . Next day the N Cavalry mutinied , as l st d a did the Native Infantry , and the y following a s there was an uproar in the lines of the 53rd and 56th on Native Infantry , the guns opened fire

. e them The whole of the native troops ros , off sacked the Treasury , and marched towards to Delhi . At the last moment the Nana decided hi s throw in lot with the rebels , and persuaded to them to return Cawnpore , which they did on the 6th ; they looted the town and murdered at number of Christians , and opened fire on the entrenchment . The lines were manned by the defenders and the terrible siege began .

The entrenchment was under fire continuously da y and night ; food and water were short ; the heat was terrific ; there were no medicines ; the se t a n d barracks were on fire , and the women children forced to stay in the trenches . Fresh regiments arrived constantly to support the mutineers , but no help was forthcoming for the defenders . On the 22nd June the rebels

32 bourhood were disp e rsed and pursued by a few mounted men , five civilians , under a Mr . Gubbins , particularly distinguishing themselves . Hard ing’s Irregular Cavalry and a few Sepoys stood

firm . o At Sitapur , where were four native c rps , 4th o f mutiny broke out on the June , and the bulk the Europeans there were murdered . D uri a ba d At Azamgarh , Faizabad , Benares , , r a Sultanpu , and other st tions , troops also e r mutinied about this date , in some cas s mu dering s their officer , in others seeing them safely away towards Calcutta . The wanderings of some of these parties were most adven turou s . The muti nee rs j oined the rebels at Cawn p ore and Lucknow .

In preparation for the event , which he had fore seen , Sir Henry Lawrence had prepared the n Residency for defence , and provisioned it ab ud a ntl y , and called up some native pensioners to assist in the defence . On the 28th news of the Cawnpore massacre wa s a n d 29th received , on the , Captain Forbes , e t with some Sikh Cavalry , r por ed the enemy in force at Chinhat . The Residency and Machi Bhawan were occu s pied , and a force con isting of

One troop Volunteer Cavalry , 1 20 Native Troopers , 4 British manned guns , 6 Native manned guns , 300 32n d R egiment , 240 Native Infantry , wa s ordered to clear up the situation next morn ing by a reconnaissance in force .

34 On the 30th the troops assembled at the Iron

Bridge , and reached the Kokrail Stream without interference .

e on It s emed that the enemy were not coming , and at first it was intended to withdraw , but patrols reported that the enemy were still at h Chin at , so the advance was continued . The men having had no refreshments were much fatigued by the heat .

e e The en my , numb ring some men or 1 8 s s more , with about guns , ucceeded in urround ing the tiny column ; the Native Artillerymen mutinied , and overturned the guns into the ditches ; the 32n d were foiled in an attempt to I sma il a n capture the village of g g, which would have served to cover the withdrawal . The

Native Cavalry bolted , but a dashing charge ’ of Radcliff e s 35 Volunteers cleared the s front , and omehow or other , covered by the s e s Volunteer Cavalry , and a sist d by native oldiers 1 h I 3t N . . of the , the Europeans got back to the Bridge over the Kokrail Stream . Here the te a 500 Volun er C valry again turned , charged rebel horsemen , and dispersed them . Four guns were got into action to cover the retreat ; these the enemy dared not face and the shattered remnant got safely back .

One hundred and eighte en Europeans and 1 82 Natives were killed or missing ; 54 Europeans and 1 1 Na tives returned wounded . This action seems to have been fought by Law rence as an administrator rather than as a soldier . A reconnaissance in force is a poor way of get

35 ting information , and it would seem that Lawrence hoped to check the enemy and thus turn them away from Lucknow and save his Province from the horrors of war . The Europeans at Lucknow were now l be e a gure d in the Re sidency . At Agra were quartered the 3rd Bengal

European Regiment , a battery of artillery , a detachment of native cavalry and two native infantry regiments . It was some time before action was taken , either by Colvin the Lieutenant Governor of the north - west provinces or by h l P olw e e the Brigadier . Finally on the 3l st May the native corps were disarmed , a volunteer corps was raised , and Agra placed in a state of defence . On the 1 4th June the Gwalior contingent rose “ against their British 0 cers in spite of the fact that the Maharaj ah Sindhia held for the British . The Mutineers murdered some 1 3 men and 5 women and then marched off towards Agra ; the e e rest of the British escap d to Agra , aft r l incredib e hardships . On July 4th P olwhe le went out of Agra to engage the Mutineers They were found about strong with 1 1 guns strongly posted near the village of S a ssi a h among orchards and s enclosures , with their guns killfully concealed lwh le fi . P o e among trees , and dif cult to locate formed his troops with the infantry in the centre and three guns on each of their flanks while the — — Volunteer Cavalry 1 00 strong covered the mm flanks of the line . The action co enced

36 by a long artillery duel during this the Re be l Cavalry tried to attack the guns but were off driven by the Volunteers . It was not until ammunition wa s well nigh exhausted that P olwhe le ordered the infantry to attack . As usual the rebels fled be fore the sight of the h ad levelled bayonets , but the gun teams been destroyed , and the caissons were empty , no pur c suit was therefore possible . As is always the ase s st with Asiatics , as soon as the pur uit opped they rallied and pressed the column as it retreated . e e 60 The British loss s were very s vere , killed and 1 0 0 wounded .

s Agra remained isolated for many month . It is an accepted maxim of strate gy that before striking it is well to assemble the greatest force s possible , but thi axiom applies only to pure strategy and must not be construed literally . Politically it was quite impossible to abandon the T garrisons of Cawnpore and Lucknow . o succour these posts it wa s necessary to secure the long line of communication from Calcutta to

Cawnpore . The most important points of this line were

B . Danapur , enares and Allahabad At Danapur c were still four native corps , and to wat h them the whole of the l 0th Regiment was requisite . t l Calcut a itse f required a British garrison , if only r to watch the native troops at B a rra ckpu . There remained immediately available the 84th and 1 st Madras Europeans . The lines of communication to Allahabad —1 consisted of . The Ganges River , a wide and

37 navigable stream on which plied a numbe r of

t . 2 . river s eamers This way was slow . The railway to Raniganj and thence the Grand Trunk

Road .

1 st Neill , who commanded the Madras Euro peans , pushed up by rail and road with a detachment . Detachments of the 84th went the s of ame route , while the bulk both corps went by river . “ — — At the outset a j ack i n o i ce of a station i " ° l i ’ ’ master put d cu t e s in Neill s way . Neill s action was characteristic of the man , he put the station officials in charge of the guard , and reported the circumstances afterwards , and it is recorded that hereafter the railway officials were s e ob equiously polit . The story is of interest as showing how little the danger of the situation was understood by the Europeans at Calcutta .

'

Neill reached Benares on the 3rd of June . General Ponsonby who commanded there had r three Native Co ps (one Sikh) .

63 Madras Europeans .

1 53 l 0th Regiment . l 3 guns O phe rts Battery . It was decided to disarm the Native Troops who were in a mutinous state . There was a muddle a bout the arrangements and a sanguinary fight took place before the mutineers were dispersed . The bold action of u Mr . G bbins , the Commissioner , saved the town itself . The Sikh Regiment which at first was mutinous returned to its duty .

38 Meanwhile the Native Troops at Allahabad , except a detachment of Sikhs , had mutinied and were sacking the town . The moment he heard the news from

Allahabad, Neill , who had succeeded Ponsonby , 50 invalided , pushed up from Benares with of his

48 of . men in hours , in spite the heat Next day he took the offensive with his motley band of Madras Europeans , Volunteers , and Sikhs , captured the bridge , received a reinforcement 1 00 of men , and attacking the enemy everywhere , by most unremitting exertions , subdued the town . On the 1 7th the British Magistrate resumed his ’ duties . This action of Colonel Neill s is one of the most brilliant of the Mutiny . While Neill was opening the road to Allahabad

Sir Patrick Grant had arrived in Calcutta , summoned by Lord Canning to be commander in chief . He proved unequal to the responsibility a nd remained at Calcutta writing memorandums . To relieve Cawnpore he despatched Brigadier General Havelock who arrived at Allahabad on t the 30 h June . In the firs t week of June the 64th and 78th 37th from Persia , and a wing of the from Ceylon with a battery of Artillery reached Calcutta . Other troops steadily followed during the follow ing months , arriving from the Cape , the China Expeditionary Force and Mauritius (see l Appendix III . ) whi e in October and the follow ing mon ths the great reinforcements sent from

England began to pour into the country . (See A n ppe dix II . ) A Naval Brigade was also formed under

Captain Peel of the Shannon .

On the day Havelock arrived at Allahabad , Renaud set off with a column consisting of 400 300 Europeans , Sikhs and two guns , to act as advanced guard ; another party of 1 00 men and 2 rd guns were sent by steamer . On the 3 July Renaud reached Lobanga where he was ordered to halt by

Havelock who had heard of the fall of Cawnpore . Neill (Havelock’s junior) refused to credit the report of the fall of Cawnpore a nd telegraphed direct to Calcutta denying it . Grant foolishly telegraphed direct to Renaud to proceed .

Fortunately Havelock caught him up . On the 7th July Havelock having collected transport left Allahabad with

A Troop Volunteer Cavalry 20 strong . 3rd h 76 Company 8t Battalion B A . 64th P i 4 The Regt . f From e rs a n l 85 8 h 284 The 7 t Regt . l Expedition J 4 The 8 th Regt . 1 90 Irreg ular Cavalry 30 Sikhs 1 50 On the 1 2th he rallied Renaud and pushed on to Ba li n da d within four mile s of Fathpur . The Volunteer Cavalry reconnoitring to the front ’ came upon the rebels , who , thinking only Renaud s

t . par y was in front of them , boldly attacked

Havelock was anxious to rest his troops , but s th e be eeing that enemy was not to be denied , resolved to fight . He placed his guns in the centre o 64th under esc rt of two companies of the , the cavalry covered the flanks , and the rest of the

40

The Madras Europeans moved forward as skir~ mi sh ers , the guns advanced three in the centre , on three on the right , and two the left, to cover the p assage and clear the opposite bank by enfila de fire ; the rest of the troops followed i n extended order . The enemy tried to blow the bridge up but the Madras Europeans closing on the centre rushed forward with the bayonet and secured it . Starting early on the 1 6th it was before the column came in touch with the enemy . To defend Cawnpore the Nana ha d collecte d a formidable army . An advanc ed force of several thousand with seven guns had occupied a line of l vi lages about 5 miles from Cawnpore . A few hundred yards in front of the rebel lines ran a line of Mango groves and availing himself of this as a screen Havelock decided to turn the enemy ’s left . The co untry is quite flat with a few swampy pla ces . The cavalry and a few skirmishers covered the front and it was some time b efore the rebels perceived the movement , on doing so they opened a heavy fire on the column but failed e e to check it . Wh n the rebel left was complet ly opened up Havelock wheeled into line , the guns came into action and the force advanced in echelon of battalions from the right , the front covered by part of the Madras Europeans . The 64th and 78th each carried a village with a the the bayonet and , r llied by General himself , ’ a gain pressed on against the enemy s reserves . ’ The charge was carried right across the enemy s r 1 8 line , while the Volunteer Caval y ( men) charged a rebel regime nt of cavalry some 350

42 u strong a nd routed it . The col mn then reformed a nd without pause pushed on ; it was brought up by a line of rebels holding a village and mango h 78 h 0 . 64t t t pe The guns were not up but the , and Madras Europeans cleared the village and plantation . Again the column was reformed and pushed d on , and on coming over a gentle swell of groun , the main body of the enemy was found , nearly d strong , and only a few hun red yards distant . The column at once deployed into line and lay down waiting for the guns , but the enemy bring ing his guns into action pressed forwar d : th e cannonade became so severe that Havelock rode out to the front and called on the men to charge . 900 Instantly responding , the whole line only e white soldiers , dashed forward ; the rebels at onc a n broke d fled .

These actions are of considerable interest . ’ Havelock s bold turning movement in the first e ngagement was very daring for he left a his front and therefore his b gage , and line of 1 8 t retreat , covered only by Volun eer Cavalry 1 i and 00 R fle me n . The distance he had to move ll was of course sma , only about yards , but the tactical lesson is none the less valuable to us

- to day . The rebel left was only about yards from the Ganges River , thus Havelock place d himself between hi s enemy and an impassable obstacle .

The latter two engagements a re noteworthy as s howing that thus early in the war , before the

43 inevitable demoralization of defeat aff ected the mutineers , a bayonet charge by British troops wa s a certain solution of the most di fi cult tactical e problem . Unless the reb ls were caught in a building or trapped in some way they never stood against a bayonet charge . It is recorded that the 78th when they charged the first time did so in c fi s absolute silen e , so erce was their anger again t the bloodthirsty murderers in front of them . Bithor After the action the rebels retired on . Havelock’s worn out troops bivouacked that night within two miles of the Cantonments . They had marched 1 26 miles i n 9 days of the e hot w ather , had fought six separate actions , three of them on one day , cholera was c raging in the for e , yet they were never stopped m of for a oment , had killed many hundreds

23 . rebels , and captured guns It was with some difli culty that the troops were prevente d from exacting retribution from the of inhabitants , when they learnt of the massacre the women and children which had taken place two days earlier . Next day the 1 8th June Havelock moved his force to the civil station of Nawabganj a nd entrenched a well selected position there . On the 1 9th a force proce eded to Bith or and ’ 2 th destroyed the Nana s palace . On the 0 Neill 220 a n d with men a quantity of stores arrived , and the same evening the passage of the Ganges was 25 h G commen ced . On the t Havelock left awn i n t pore , leaving Neill command here , and on the 2 8th had concentrated a force of Europeans 00 1 and 3 natives and 0 guns at Mangalwar .

44 On the 29th the force advanced and found the enemy in position near Unao . The road runs be ee b tw n swamps , thus oth flanks of the rebel 64th 78th line were covered , but the and forced their way into the village which formed the e c ntre of the position , captured the guns and pushed on past the town of Una o . Here it was seen that a large rebel force w as advancing to — k re ta e Unao . Without pausing Havelock pushe d on quickly and occupied a bit of dry s ground between the wamps , drawing up his force in line . The rebels advanced against the line but could not deploy and fell back with heavy losses . After a short halt the column pushed on again B a shi ra t a n until it reached the walled town of g j , also found to be held . Sending the 64th round by the left to get in rear of the town the guns were brought up to silence the enemy at the gateway . The first attempt to storm failed , but after a little more cannonading a second attempt succeeded , and the 64th town was carried . Unfortunately the were late and the retreating enemy escaped . In two days 1 00 men had been killed and

o 1 00 . w unded , and died of cholera At this rate none would have reached Lucknow , so Havelock decided to withdraw to Mangalwar , which he did next day . Neill was ordered to make a bridge d to head over the Ganges on the Ou h bank , collect supplies and in particular to prepare two 24 s prs , for the light guns were powerle s against th e villages .

45 ’ Havelock s retirement was severely criticized , Neill in particular permitting himself to employ was most insubordinate language , but it manifestly necessary .

On the 3rd August a company of the 84th

l h rt 24 . two 9prs . of O p e s Battery and two prs joined Havelock and as the enemy had reoccupied B a shi ra tga nj it was decided to dri ve them back . The movement was made on the 5th . The enemy had occupied a Serai house half a mile —e a a 84 south st of the town , gainst this the th 24 advanced under cover of the prs . while the 78th and the Sikhs with si " guns moved round the south of the Serai . The enemy at once fell a s b ck on to the villages outh of the town . From these villages the enemy were driven by a n d the fire of the guns , the force , pushing on on through the town , found four guns posted the road and the enemy drawn up between two small villages From these positions they were again driven by the Artillery fire . An attempt to circle round the British right was foiled by the Sikhs who had been left at the Serai . The 2 23 British loss was only killed and wounded , but cholera was still rife in th e camp and a Havelock returned to Mangalw r . On this day Neill reported that the Gwalior i r Mutineers were mustering at B tho . Every eff ort was now made to complete the bridge and r bridgehead at Cawnpo e , and this was aecom li h p sh e d on August 1 1 t . The same day Neill sent in an alarmist report of the approach of the i h or Mutine ers from B t .

46 On the 1 2th as the enemy were again near B a shi ra t a n g j , Havelock set off to drive them back . They were found posted on the main road , a their right on a small village , their left on 400 e hillock about yards from the village , on ach

flank was a small battery , and the Cavalry were

on . 78th o the left The , the Madras Eur pea ns and four guns were instantly sent ’ t o turn the enemy s left . The guns came but into action under a tempest of fire , seei ng a chance they limbered up again and moved off to a position completely e nfila di ng the ’ Th enemy s left . e rebel lines began to waver and instantly the Highlanders and Fusiliers dashed t a at hem , c ptured the guns and turned them on th e enemy , and pursued them through Ba shi ra t a n g j .

c to Havelo k returned Mangalwar , and next day c recrossed the river to Cawnpore , under over of u r a rearg a d of the Madras Europeans , the

Volunteer Cavalry , and four guns ; the with d ra wa l was not interfered with .

1 5 th e On the , Havelock reported that his forc was now reduced to men , and urgently t required rest to recover its health . To res , s however , was impo sible .

l 6th c ed Bithor On the Havelo k mov out to , and after an eight hours ’ march came within sight of e the rebel position . The left rest d in a village on the bank of the Ganges , the right in the

M a ra ili t one . village of , a dis ance of about mile Covering the right of the enemy’s position was a d e e p unfordable nullah , and beyond it were a

47 b Two ody of rebel horsemen . guns were mounte d b near the road a out the centre of the line . ’ e i The en my s cavalry advanced to reconno tre, but l they , as well as the troops beyond the nu lah , were dispersed by a few rounds from the guns . The British Infantry then deployed and advanced or to without pause stay , for manoeuvre was m c i possible . The advan e pressed the enemies ac to e skirmishers b k the position , the guns cam i a nd the nto action right left of road , the two ’

24 . 500 prs upon it , about yards from the enemy s lines ; the Madras Europeans stormed the ’ village on the left of the enemy s line , where the mutineers actually stood till the t bayone s crossed , and then , pressing on together i w th the Highlanders , entered the trenches and wheeling to the left cleared them . The enemy tn Bith or c fell back . through whi h town they were driven with terrible slaughter .

Next d a y Havelock returned to Cawnpore .

B . ehar was ruled by Mr William Tayler , a man of the greate st ability a n d energy . The chief town of his district was Patna , and a e the chief milit ry centre Danapur , at which wer th e 1 0th Regiment and four native regiments . The importance of the position of Danapur between Calcutta and Allahabad should be ’ noted . Rattray s Sikhs were also in the district 1 50 and dependable . With the aid of of these men a rising at Patna was suppressed , but Mr . Tayler ’s representations with regard to the spirit of the troops at Danapur were denied by Genera l

Lloyd , and the Government left the decision as to whether the Sepoys were to be disarmed or

48

of m Danapur , he heard the ovements of the u Danap r mutineers , and that they intended crossing the Ganges There were Government s tuds at Ghazipur and Baksar , which Eyre 2 h 0 5th secured . On the 9t July 1 6 men of the a t s Regiment arrived Baksar , and at the ame time Eyre heard of the situation at Arrah , but not of the defeat of the relieving force . Eyre took on himself the responsibility of making an attempt to relieve the place . His c c 1 54 5th 3 for e onsisted of men Regiment , guns , and 1 8 mounted volunteers . Bullocks were 3 procured for the guns and at 5 p m. on the oth

July Eyre started . ’ 3 l st On the Eyre heard of Dunbar s defeat , but nothing daunted he advanced next day . Pushing ’ on he came in contact with Kunwar Singh s force , which outnumbered his by fully twenty to one , a nd attacked it , when his gun fire failed to drive the enemy back , he sent in his infantry with the a bayonet . The result was not in doubt for moment . Arrah was rell e ve d and Eyre returned to his boats . ’ Mr . Tayler s strong measures had kept Behar fairly quiet but , unfortunately , his chief , Mr . dl d Halliday , not understand strong measures , e and relieved him . Western Beha r then degen rated into almost complete anarchy .

r Easte n Behar was kept fairly quiet by Mr . e Y G orge ule , who succeeded at least in holding the line of the Ganges safe . Chutia Nagpur wa s full of disbanded Sepoys a n d remained till near the end of the war in a — state of semi anarchy .

5 0 ai re ca u Eastern Bengal was kept f rly quiet, p tion being taken in time .

It will be seen that not only the mainte ~ nance of the districts from which supplies could be but of procured , even the line communication itse lf from Calcutta to Cawn pore were in constant how danger . In this juncture one circumstance of ea e ever , proved gr t valu ; that was the i l assista nce of the N pa e se .

of of On hearing the outbreak the mutiny ,

Maharajah Jung Bahadur , the actual ruler of Nepal place d the whole military resources of the

Gurkha nation at the service of Lord Canning .

ua n ur men were accepted , and reached J p 1 ua n ur s on the 3th July . At J p the Gurkha were organized and drilled , and their presence contributed to keep the district in check .

R ohilkha nd rebelled , and at all the stations the h Se poys mutinie d . A noble named K an Bahadur Khan declared himself Viceroy under of his to the King Delhi , and rule was enough make the return of the British extremely welcome to the unfortunate inhabitants .

Not marked on map . The one ray of light which broke the darkness of the gathering storm in the North appeared in the Punjab . Sir John Lawrence was at R a wul Pindi when i the Mutiny broke out . Th s great man held his e 8 provinc for the British , a province which short years before had severely tried the f ’ m strength o the Company s Ar y , and not content

5 1 s with that alone , he at once de patched reinforce 1 3 ments to Delhi . On the th May the Guides out of f or a marched Mardan Delhi , ccomplishing the 600 mile march in 2 1 days . The infantry kept up with the cavalry with the aid of some

a t to . bullock c r s , in which the men took turns ride The same day a moveable column under of 52nd Chamberlain was formed consisting the , a e e 33rd troop of hors artillery , a field batt ry , the and 35th Native Infa ntry and a wing of the 9th

Cavalry . Moving from station to station the m column disarmed most of the Mutineer regi ents , ms though some went off , showed the British ar in the districts and kept the province quiet . Finally under Nicholson th e column pushed on to Delhi where its arrival turned the scale in favour of the British . The value of the Punjab is at once apparent on looking at the map . It assured a base to the

De lhi force . Without it all the British must have been confined to their respective stations n a d few could have been saved .

Turning now to the Central Provinces and fl Bombay, we find that the personal in uence of the resident Ma jor Ternan kept the Raja of Dilberi e loyal , though he had bitt r cause for complaint of his treatment by Lord Dalhousie . The great s landowner of the districts of Sagar , Chanderi ,

Jhansi , Lalitpur and Jalaun broke into rebellion , chiefly be cause of the irritation cau se d by the ’ Government s land schemes.

5 2 3l st . At Sagar itself the N I . remained loyal and prote cted a number of Europeans . Among the bitterest enemies of the British was numbe red the Rani of Jhansi . This lady fomented the Mutiny . When it broke out the r British took efuge in the fort , whence they were treacherously beguiled , and then barbarously s a ma s cred by order of the Rani . In the district of B a n d a lkh a nd the chiefs for the most part remained loyal and assisted

European fugitives , but a state of semi anarchy prevailed for a long time .

Maharajah Sindhia , as we have seen , remained loyal , but his troops joined the

Mutineers .

Bhopal was held for the British by the Begum . Colonel Durand at Indur succeeded for some time in keeping things going quietly . However ’ l st H olka r s on July troops mutinied , and e Durand with the Europeans retreat d , not on e Mau , but on Sihor , under prot ction of some o contingents from the Bhils , Bh pal , and other places .

The troops at Mau also mutinied .

Durand was joined , after some delay , by the

flying column organised by Elphinstone . This column had been delayed at Ahmednagar , but on now , commanded by Stuart , pushed to ’ a Durand s aid and b sed on Mau , which was ’ was itself held by Hungerford s British Battery , able to hold the line of the N a rb a dda River . In spite of very j ust grievances the Southern Mahratta chiefs were held to their allegiance by — Mr . Seton Kerr , the agent .

5 3 Bombay was kept in order by the brilliant F or e e . tt . Chief of Polic , Mr j The Nizam’s troops at first showed symptoms of unrest but finally fought most gallantly on the

British side . The column organised by Elphin stone to keep the Trunk Road clear unfortunately allowed itself to be delayed for some time at Arme dn a ga r in consequence of the unrest in the r Hyde abad Cavalry . With the exce ption of Jodhpur all the great a R jput chiefs remained loyal . To George was a Lawrence , one of a famous family , due in great measure this success . The native troops all over the district mutinied , but availing himself of the se rvice s of the European troops a t i e D sa, plac d at his disposal by Lord Elphinstone , Lawrence was able to make head against th e

i . rebels , and clear the prov nce

It is apparent that in every case in which the e s native chiefs had been well treat d by the Briti h . s o those chiefs t od loyal , and it is indeed remark able that more serious outbreaks did not occur in th e d Southern Mahratta country , where the lan policy of the Administration had embittered the whole of the landed gentry . Wherever a mutiny took place the turn aff airs took almost always depended on the character of s or f the chief Briti h Administrator , of the o ficer commanding the troops If one or both were

of a . men strong ch racter, as a rule the mutiny was held in check sufli cie ntly to prevent damage . In

5 4 th some c ase s a subordinate showed e way . K a ntz ow Thus at Mainpuri , de saved the Treasury and warded off trouble until the off Mutineers cleared , though Crawford , the

Commander of the troops , and Cocks , the a Commissioner , had gone off to Agr In every ca se in a station in which were quartered British troops , when a decision was promptly come to and boldly carried s through , the measure of the authorities were successful . Wherever there was hesi i ta t on and half measures there was failure .

The lesson is easy to read and learn , it ffi is di cult to put in practise . Even when every corps had mutinied ofli ce rs maintained their trust in their own corps , and there was more than one c a se of indignant remonstrance by officers when m their regiments were disar ed . It will be asked how it was tha t the Bombay t regiments for the most par , and the Madras

t o . regiments altoge her , st od firm Were not their grievances as serious as tho se of the Bengal Army " As a matter of fact they were not so f e a fect d by recent changes , for the underlying s a n d trouble , the di affection in Oudh the neigh bouri ng provinces was the chief cause of the

. w a s o mutiny The mutiny m re than a mutiny , f it was part o a rebellion .

5 5 CHAPTER III . — — The Situation Lines of Communication the — — Theatre of War the Climate Disease — — Transport Time from England Immedia te — — Re inforce ments Resources of Material Instant

Action of Government .

In the first chapter we have seen how dangerous was the British position in Upper

India at the time of the outbreak at Meerut . In the last chapte r we have seen that the rebellion l i spre a d gradual y over an immense terr tory . R ohilkha n d Oudh , , and the Doab , were com lete l t p y lost , as also were the dis ricts of Banda ,

Kalpi and Jhansi . Stuart and Durand were with di rcult m i of N a rba dda y aintain ng the line the , Chutia Nagpur and Behar were in a sta te of

. l anarchy Fortunate y , however , Madras and the

Punjab were quiescent . The disturbed area could be entered from four directions : 1 . From Ca lcutta via The Ganges River to Allahabad and thence by the Grand Trunk road through Cawnpore ; Or by railway to Raniganj and

thence by the road to Allahabad . Allahabad is nearly 600 miles from

Calcutta ; De lhi about 900 miles . The most important points on the Ganges

route were Danapur, Benares , and Alla

habad , which lies at the junction of the

Jumna and Ganges rivers .

c the lated , and jungle overed a large part of country . To describe the climate of this area the year may be divided into three portions , the hot a n Th d . e weather , the cold weather , the rains to e hot weather from April July , the rains middl e c of July to end of Septemb r , the old weather o Oct ber to March . During the hot weather and the rains it was supposed that British troops could n ot possibly withstand the rigours of th e climate . The most serious disease from which British wa s troops suffer in the East is cholera , and it rife at first among the troops . Dysentery , te typhoid , and sunstroke accoun d for the remainder of the long sick roll . The transport of a column operating in the Eas t i e f s always a matt r of great di ficulty . The bulk e is pack transport , the pack animals b ing a n d elephants , camels , mules , ponies , donkeys , oxen . Bullock carts are also largely employed Th e heavy field artillery was dragged by was elephants and bullocks . The horse supply s a e con iderable in Madras , and bout hors s were sent from Cape Colony . From Engla nd the times for voyages averaged as follows during the war

To Calcutta by steamer 82 days ; by sailing 1 1 6 ship days . To Madras by ste amer 90 days ; by sailing 1 31 ship days . To Bombay by ste amer 76 days ; by sailing 1 1 8 ship days .

5 8 Speaking generally we may say nearly 3 months by steamer and nearly 4 by sailing ship were required to convey reinforcements from us was England , th it October before the first of these arrived (see Appendix II .) Later in the War the overland route was f or the i or employed troops , t me to Bombay

Karachi being about four weeks . Only a few thousand men were sent by this route . The immediate reinforcements in sight there fore were only small Lord Canning at first re ceived a wing of a n infantry regiment from 2 e 3 s Ceylon , regim nts from Mauritius , regiment from the Cape a n d 4 regiments from the Chinese

Expedition , besides some artillery and engineers , s d o a n d and more important till , a supply of oct rs medical stores . As has so often been the case with the British

Army , a long peace found the reserves of warlike m t . ma erial at a low ebb True , a munition for the E nfield was e rifle asy to manufacture , still easier was it to make ammunition for the Artillery , but to provide other supplies , vehicles , gun carriages , a harness and so forth , required time . The tr ns — port for a large force was non existe nt and even a s for a small force it took time to collect . It h been noted that Anson was delayed at Ambala , c A l and Havelo k at l ahabad , for a considerable i t me from this cause , and the narrative will show il further ca ses of sim ar delay .

5 9 CHAPTER IV

Arrival of Sir Colin Campbell — Organization — — n . . pressed o Plans Outram and Havelock . i — a — Delh Central Indi Summary .

On the news of the outbreak in India and ’ Anson s death reaching London , Sir Colin Campbell wa s asked to go out there as —i — Commander n Chief . The man on whom the eyes of every one in India was now turned was a — o 65 war worn veteran f years of age .

His father was a working carpenter in Glasgow , of his mother was good family , and her brother obtained for the lad a commission in the 9th

Regiment . He saw service early in the Peninsula , a rti cu where he distinguished himself greatly , p l a rl Y y at the storm of San Sebastian . ears of garrison work followed and then he saw service in

China , and in the Second Sikh War as Brigadier . He commanded the Highland Brigade in the

Crimea, and had not expected further employ ment in the field . But the hour called for the mm —i n man , and he came out to India as Co ander

Chief . On the 1 7th August the day on which Sir Colin Campbell arrived at Calcutta it may be said that the blaze of mutiny had reached its greatest heat , and from now on began to decline . True , sparks were still carried from the great central confl a g ration to light up sporadic outbursts in other places , but on the whole the forces of order now

6 0 wa began to gain control . That this was so s due in no small measure to the personal qualities of f Sir Colin Campbell , and his Chief of the Staf

General Mansfield , who worthily supported him .

- At this moment the North West Provinces Delhi , h k n b R o i l ha d . , and Oudh , were lost The Punj a though passive was really in a state of ferment . Central India though not quite lost was yet in a state of anarchy .

Raj putana was doubtful . In Behar and Chuti a a n d Nagpur , the mutineer Sepoys , Kunwar

Singh , forced the British to keep close to their cantonments . The insurgents disposed of the revenues and produce of a vast e and wealthy district , they had at their servic a a fully trained men , a numerous C v lry , e and a well equipped Field Artillery , besides larg of of numbers guns position , and enormous supplies of ammunition . Behind these trained ” s troops stood the levies of Badmashes , wash bucklers all ready for a fight , and the armed retainers of the Chiefs . The native drilled troops were called N uj ibs. To compete with this great force the British a t had a besieged garrison Lucknow , and still held Agra and Sagar . A force of some men were before Delhi endeavouring to capture that great and politically extremely important A town , which was defended by a large army . force of some men at Cawnpore had falle n back baffled from the attempt to relieve

. two Lucknow These principal forces were based , the former in the Punjab , the latter on Bengal .

6 1 The lines of communication of the former were , ’

s . owing to Sir John Lawrence s ability , fairly afe b A siege train was eing collected at Lahore , a n d be with its arrival at Delhi , much might

hope d . The safety of the Lines of Communication between Cawnpore and Bengal was however most

precarious . The Ganges with the fall of the waters after the rains are over would become a

long and circuitous route . The other line , that of the railway to Raniganj and thence the Grand be Trunk road via Allahabad , must largely e mployed .

The troubles in Behar had induce d the Civil Authorities to requisition detachments passing o n their way to the front for immediate proteo tion , thus the problem of reinforcing Havelock at

Cawnpore was a complicate d one .

With regard to the other districts . The Nepalese troops occupied Ju a n pur and Azim l gurh . In B a nd a kha nd Willoughby Osborne was with some difli culty maintaining the British

. k supremacy Nagpur was kept in chec by Mr . Plowden with some Madras troops and a c ompany of European Madras Artillery . The N izam had been held by Major Davidson and his e able minist r , and the Hyderabad troops later on did yeoman service for the British . Durand and Stuart at Mau were holding the line of the N a rba dda and keeping open communication with

Bombay . George Lawren ce was to be relied on to hold Rajputana , the mutinous troops having left that district .

6 2 Thus terribly serious though the situation was one feature there was of good in it . Sir Colin was able to see almost the full extent of the trouble . The sore on the body politic of India , like a boil which has reached its worst , was now most painful , but on the other hand it had come to

a . head , and was ready for the lancet ’ was Sir Colin s first care organization . The Government and Sir Patrick Grant had done nothing . No means of transport were pre pared ; there were no horses ; rifle ammunition was deficient ; guns , gun carriages and harness was required ; supplies were short ; English spe aking servants for the regiments shortly expected were not yet procured . All the se wants

Sir Colin se t himself to remedy . ea o To improve the m ns of transp rt , a bullock train was established on the Grand Trunk R oad from Raniganj to Al lahabad Supplies we re s a sent up by River , men were ent up to Allah bad by rail and bullock train . Besides the troops at Cawnpore there were 53rd already available the at Fort William , a 37th l 0th 5th wing of the , the at Danapur , the , lun 90th . Vo various Artillery units , and the A teer force of all arms was raised in Calcutta , a bo so- Y dy of called eomanry , mostly adventurers , - of — was also raised , and a number of out work European sailors were enlisted in Calcutta for garrison duty . Other reinforcements were daily expected from the Cape , the Mauritius and the

China force Last , but not least , the Naval

e R . N . was now Brigade under Captain Pe l , , ready to be se nt to the front .

6 3 The troops required on the Lines of Communi

. l 0th cation were numerous The , a wing of the

37th 53rd Y . , the , the eomanry , etc , were all thus of utilized , besides detachments from most the c orps at the front . To secure the safety of the Grand Trunk Road small movable columns were formed ; un f ortu n a tel e te s y, as has b en no d , the Civil Authoritie on e s often requisitioned thes column , which were i thus diverted from their spe c fied duty .

31 st On August , Sir James Outram arrived in

Calcutta . He was posted to command the Danapur and Cawnpore Divisions which were united into one command . Outram proceeded at once to his district taking with him that great

R . E . Sta fl . soldier Robert Napier , , as Chief of the Having put matters in order at Danapur he pushed on to Allahabad . Outram now proposed to Sir Colin that he should withdraw Havelock’s exhausted troops to Allahabad and himself organize at Benares a column to move on Lucknow direct from that place instead of via Cawnpore . Outram believed the

to . Sye River Bridge be destroyed In fact , this was not found to be the case .

Meanwhile Havelock , who did not know yet ’ Outra m s that he was under command , had repor ted to Calcutta that the health of his troops was so bad that he must be reinforced or gra dua llv disappear by disease . Reinforcements would enable his troops to rest and recover their health . In view of the menacing position of the Gwalior

Troops , who were near Kalpi , Sir Colin decided

6 4

Sir Hugh Rose and was to consist of two brigade s of one R with a strength British Cavalry egiment , two European Infantry Re giments and three s e batteries ; four Regiment Native Cavalry , thre s of Regiment Native Infantry , three companies of the Sappers and a siege train . The bulk native troops belonged to the Hyderabad contingent . This column was to attack Jhansi and then sweep the country as far a s Kalpi . r m The Mad as column , to be com anded by o of one two Whitl ck , was to consist European and Native Cavalry Re giments ; Five Batteries ; two 3 Regiments British Infantry , ; Regiments Native

a of . Infantry, a det chment Engineers This force , a ba l ur the based on J p , was to clear country west of that point and Allahabad , and crossing Ba n lk da ha nd to reach Banda . It would however be a long while before these two columns could be ready to move . While all these plans were being formed and the active work of the various departments was beginning to bear fruit , reinforcements continued 0 to arrive . More of the tr0 ps of the China e 23rd a 82nd 93rd two Exp ditionary Force , , p rt , , A E R . . R . Companies , one Company . , were shortly followed by the first troops despatched

1 3th R A . from Cape Colony , half , one Company 0 t with 6 horses . Other horses began o arrive e s e of s to from the Cap , and uppli s all sort began pour in . Thus Sir Colin might well hope that with

Lucknow relieved and Delhi captured , and arrangements made to deal with Central India,

66 he would soon be able to collect such a force as would Be able to restore British supremacy i n R ohi lkh a nd — Oudh , , and the North west

Provinces . It must be noted however that the first task must be to succour the garrison of Lucknow . It would not be till this was safely accomplished that final plans to crush the rebels could be formula ted . This operation took many weary months . Leaving this side of the theatre of war for the moment it will be well to see how the British fared at Delhi .

6 7 CHAPTER V .

l i — — De h The Ridge . The besieging force itself — i f . me n n orc 4 hn . besieged R e e ts. 0 Nicholson

The Storm .

On the 8th June Barnard had occupied Hindu ’

. s i s 2 Rao s Ridge Thi ridge about miles long ,

E . . . extending from NN to S S W . from the Banks of the Jumna River to just north of Delhi ; it has m a com and of some sixty feet over the town .

The position was one of some strength , but the right was enveloped by the suburbs of Delhi , i K shen a n a nd . Sabzi Mandi , g j , Paharipur The Town of Delhi is enclosed with a wall some 7 miles long provided with bastions at intervals , covered by a glacis and deep ditch .

’ The strength of Barn ard s force was inadequate e to invest Delhi , and in truth the b siegers were 9 h e on . t thems lves besieged the ridge On the , 1 0th 1 l th 1 2th , and June attacks were made on the Bri tish position by the rebels but were repulsed . On the 1 7th the enemy occupied and commenced B to entrench the adgah Knoll , which is a south ern continuation of the outcrop which forms the Two Ridge . columns proceeded to attack the

off . enemy , and succeeded in driving him On the 1 9th June the enemy made a most c dangerous atta k on the rear , moving through e Sabzi Mandi . They were repulsed after a se ver a ction by the cava lry with some guns .

6 8 On the 23rd June a serious atta ck from Sabzi a m M ndi was ade on the front and right . After this action Sabzi Mandi was held by a British piquet . On the 24th Neville Chamberlain with some of reinforcements arrived , and by the end the month the British force amounted to men . It was intended to carry the place by a coup de 3rd n e t main on the , but the i t ntion was fortuna ely abandoned for it could hardly have succeeded without any proper preparation by siege artillery . On the 4th a large force of the enemy was seen ma 300 king for Alipur . Major Coke with cavalry 8 00 infantry and 1 2 guns was sent to overtake f them . The o the column was

Lieutenant F . S . Roberts , Bengal Artillery . Next o morning C ke found and dispe rsed the enemy .

The latter rallied , as they were not pursued on ’ account of the great heat , and attacked Coke s t infantry which had halted , but they were bea en off ; the cavalry and guns had already marched off but returned on hearing the firing , and the cavalry pursued the enemy f or some dist ance . On the 6th General Barnard died and General

Reed assumed command . The canal bridges were now destroyed and the town water supply out . On the 9th July the rebel cavalry succeeded in surprising the piquet called the Mound Piquet r t of formed by a troop of the Ca abineers , mos whom were mere recruits , who bolted back to ’ camp , abandoning a section of Tomb s Battery of on Horse Artillery . The rebel Sowars dashed into the ca mp and called on the native gunners of

6 9 to the Horse Artillery mutiny , but the men stood e firm and the Sowars were driven out . M anwhile a large force of the rebels had attac ked Sabzi

Mandi . Despera te hand to hand fighting took off place , but the attacks were beaten with heavy losse s . The British loss on this date was 52 killed 1 68 and wounded .

1 4 On the th July another attack was made , chiefly against the Sabzi Mandi piquet . In the a fternoon a column was sent out to disperse the attackers . With severe fighting the enemy were driven through the gardens by the l st Bengal Europeans and the 1 st Punjab Infantry Regiment ’ i o e (Coke s R fles) , while Hods n , leading the Guid s , of Gurkhas , and some the Fusiliers , moved along the Grand Trunk Road . On reaching the city wall the force had naturally to retire . As proved so e often the case , as soon as the r tirement commenced the natives took heart and pressed on in pursuit . The Guides Infantry however occu pied various enclosures and an old Temple known ” e s as the Sammy Hous , turning sharply again t the enemy when possible with the bayonet , with the result that the rebe ls lost very heavily . The British loss this day a mounted to 1 5 killed and 1 93 ’ m wounded . The enemy s loss was esti ated at a thousand . On the 1 7th July General Reed was invalided and Briga dier Archda le Wilson assumed command . On the 1 8th the Rebels again attacked Sabzi r off Mandi and the idge but were beaten . By this time Sabzi Mandi had be en thoroughly

70 cleared and breastworks constructed to connect mm IIouse f rt fi d a n d with the ridge , the Sa y o i e , the whole position much strengthened . On the 23rd the Rebels occupied Ludlow Castle but were driven out . On the 28th a column of the enemy was observed to t r n d be h owi g a bri ge over the canal , with the object e vidently of making a sally to prevent the arrival of the expected reinforcements , but the bridge was destroyed by a flood . The l st August wa s the day of a great Mabom m a nd on edan festival , a fierce attack was made a ll the entrenchments which lasted night , but it ff was eventua lly beaten o .

7th a a nd On the an att ck was again made ,

Ludlow Castle occupied by the enemy . A counter attack was made and rebel guns were captured and brought in . In this action our losses were

a ll 1 1 8 . severe , in killed and wounded On this day General Nicholson arri ved in camp a nd his column followed on the 1 4th . It consisted of One Batte ry Horse Artillery ; 52n d Regiment ; Rest of the 6 1 st Regiment ; 2nd Punjab Infantry ;

Two hundred Multani Horse . News having been received that the enemy ha d sent a detachment to interrupt the lines of com muni ca ti on 250 , Hodson with Sabres , all natives , f was sent to watch the m . In spite o the rains he rea ched Rohtak that night and next da y was a ttacked by about men . He promptly s e e charged , and the rebel took r fug in some

7 1 buildings . Hodson made his men simulate et the r reat , and having drawn enemy out turned and charged , cutting down many . The enemy ’ t 5 0 on un H odson s 1 3 lef dead the gro d , loss was wounded .

On the 24th a la rge f orce of the enemy with 1 8 '“ out o l of guns left to the arriva the siege train , which was shortly expected . Nicholson with 6 1 st 1 st o a 2nd b i the , Bengal Eur pe ns , Punj a s , 9th 1 8 Lancers , Guides Cavalry , and guns left in pursuit and in spite of appalling weather caught up the rebels ab out sunset at a branch

' ~ of the Najafgarh Canal which was unfordable . ’ The enemy s position extended f or about yards with their right occupying a village near a bridge over the canal , and their right on a hillock o and a serai . Nicholson at once decided t attack s thi hillock and the serai . Under cover of the guns the infantry advanced in line and after storming the hillock changed front and bore down ’ on the enemy s right . The mutineers gave way , but a pa rty held out in a village in rear a nd wa s slipped off in the night . The British loss 1 0 just over 0 killed and wounded .

N o further attempt wa s made by the rebels to of a prevent the arrival the siege tr in , which rd of reached Delhi on September 3 . It consisted 2 3 heavy guns and ample supplies of ammunition . The total available British strength on this date m v 600 a ount to Infantry , Ca alry , and

Artillery ; of this total were British . d se ntr t ha d Cholera , y y , and yphus been more ’ destructive than the enemy s fire , and the average

72

o 4 K ud i a N . Battery in the s Bagh consisted of A 8 1 h 2 . 1 t . ten heavy mortars t a m . on the Nos 4 1 3 and Batteries opened fire and on the 2th N o.

Ba ttery . On the night 1 3th— 1 4th the breaches were ffi a n examined by four engineer o cers , Medley , L g , Gre a the d c a t c Horne , and , and pronoun ed pr c i 1 4 able . The assault was then ordered for the th . The force was divided into five columns

o. . a N I Brig dier General Nicholson . 75th Regiment ; 1 st Bengal Europeans ; 2md Punjab Infantry ; 550 45 Total Europeans and 0 natives. i It was to storm the Kashmir Bast on .

o . 2 . N Brigadier Jones . The 8th Regiment ; The 2n d Bengal Europeans; The 4th Sikhs ; i Total 500 Europeans and 350 nat ves .

It was to storm the Water Bastion .

3 . . N o . Colonel Campbell 52nd Light Infantry ; Kumaon Battalion of Gurkh as

' l st P unj a b Inf a ntry ;

250 750 s. Total Europeans , native m It was to blow in and storm the Kash ir Gate . 4 N o. . Maj or Reid . Si rmur Battalion of Gurkhas The Guides Some of the piquets ; The Kashmir contingent ;

74 00 In all some 1 Europeans and natives . It was to attack K i she nga nj and a a P haripur , and support the main att ck by

demonstrating against the Lahore Gate , which it was to enter after the walls were

captured .

. 5 . L on fiel No Reserve Column . Brigadier g d . 6 l st Regiment ; 4th Punjab Infantry ; Baluch and Jhind contingents ; 450 Europeans , natives . The 6oth Rifles were to cover th e front of the three storming columns . The remainder of the force remained in ca mp under arms . The Columns reached their positions long b efore dawn and were formed in the usual way , f s t t re . o torming par y , suppor , and serve Many on s a nd the men however were outpo t duty , it w a s full day before they re j oined their corps . At last Nicholson gave orders to the 60th to a a s i s dvance , and as soon they were establ hed within rifle shot of the breaches he sent hi s st m m r . or ers forward , and led his colu n in pe son

N os. 1 2 a N o. and Columns p ssed the breaches , 3 Column also attained its object . The party of engineers under Hom e and Salkeld succeeded in blowing in the Kashmir Gate in spite of the murderous fire which laid Salkeld and most of low the party .

o 4 m t N . Colu n had at firs some success but out to ac on the rebels swarmed att k it , and the death of Re id it fell back to the neighbourhood

75 . c out of the canal The enemy , ontinuing to pour of G e e to l the Lahore ate , thr at ned overwhe m the u c col mn and rea h the camp , but the Cavalry and Horse Artillery under Hope Grant advanced and r drove the enemy back , until the g ound prevented further movements of cavalry . Hope Grant and his troopers were obliged to remain halted unde r fire for some hours .

u The Reserve Column followed N0 . III . thro gh the Kashmir Gate and occupied the houses near . s e As a consequence of the e op rations , at dusk a part of the walls of Delhi were in our hands .

1 7th 1 8 r During the and th , by ca efully pushing forward from point to point under cover of fire from the field guns , much ground was made in the

City , and the magazine was captured . The siege guns mea nwhile shelled the Pal ace and Jumtma M a l Sj d . 1 9 20th On the th and the Burn Bastion , the Ga rsti n W Lahore Gate , and the Bastion , ere 20th captured . On the afternoon of the the a d Palace was c ptured . Next day Ho son captured i on 23rd the k ng , and the captured his sons ; having only a small party with him and f or fearing that these men would escape , the demeanour of the rabble was threatening , he shot hi them . It is unfortunate that he did it with s own hand .

Thus the city of the Moguls was c a ptured . men had stormed and captured a great city defended by well trained and desperate r men , but at ter ible cost . Nicholson was killed . a nd so many another gallant ldier , the total loss

76 ’ duri ng the three months siege being 992 killed a n d wounded . Some of the actual regi 60th mental casualties were very seve re . The be gan with 440 men and received reinforcements f 200 h o 389 . , their casualties were The Gurk as 3 1 9 m 4 lost fro a total of 5 0 . The Artillery lost 365 out of a total of The effective strength of the troops at Delhi on the 1 1 th September was by the 20th they had lost

or per cent . Directly Delhi fell Wilson decided to despatch troops to march through the Doab to Cawnpore . For this purpose he detached a corumn under Colonel Gre a th ed consisting of 9th La ncers Two Troops Horse Artillery One Battery Field Artillery 8th and 75th Regiments Detachment of Native Cavalry ’ and H odson s Horse 400 men l st and 4th Punjab Infantry men 950 In all some Europeans , Natives and 1 6 guns . The column was to clear the Doab and then march t o join Sir Colin Ca mpbell . On the 24th September the column marched and camped that night at Ghazi- ud- din Nagar They found the land laid waste in all directions the by the mutineers , an interesting testimony to general native feeling towards the rebe ls . On the morning of the 29th the column e ncoun tere d a party of the enemy who had occupied a position near Bulandshahr . A scrambling action

77 ’ ensued in the course of which Bouchier s Battery ’ charged the enemy s guns at a gallop . There was s 0 ome sharp hand hand fighting . Next day a * M a la a rh fort at g was destroyed . 5 th On the October Aligarh was reached . Here piteous messages from Agra reached Gre a the d and he decided to march thither . The h s Infantry were conveyed on elep ants , camel ,

. on l 0th bullock carts etc , and the they reached

Agra , the enemy having retreated .

The Agra authorities assured Gre a the d that no rebels were in the neighbourhood and , trusting their statements , he took no precautions . That afternoon while the camp was full of visitors the ’ enemy s guns opened fire on it . At first there was c of c a s ene terrible onfusion , but quickly falling in the troops moved against the rebels who were now located . The guns came into action and the infantry advanced ; a party of rebel horsemen who tried to get into the camp were driven off by 9th ’ the Lancers , who then charged the enemy s th f th left flank . This charge and e advance o e the ss infantry broke the enemy , and troops pre ing on occupied the rebel camp ; the enemy com le t l p e y dispersed .

The column halted three days , and started l 6th a again on the 1 4th . On the Hope Gr nt m 2 1 st joined it and took com and . On the the Column was at Bewar ; on the 23rd it had a skir mish at K a nouj and on the 26th reached

Cawnpore .

* a N ot marked on m p.

78 CHAPTER VI .

Siege of the Residency of Lucknow - Outram and Ha velock force their way through Lucknow to

the Residency .

It was on June 30th that Sir Henry Lawre nce with his handful of men had been driven to retire within hi s prepared position in Lucknow . On July l st the rebels attacked the British but were driven off . It was however clear that the s Machi Bawan , the large building ju t outside the Residency enclosure , could not be held . It wa s therefore abandoned and blown up . The Residency entrenchments enclosed a space of 60 of of near acres , and consisted a number well built houses and buildings of various sorts l connected by tre nches and stockades . The who e occupied a slight eminence which gave a certain m command over the town . Unfortunately ti e had not permitted the destruction of a number of houses within rifle shot of the defences which proved valuable points of vantage f or the rebel ifle n r me .

The garrison consisted of British 1 008 (of whom 1 53 were civilian volunteers) Natives 71 2 (of these 230 deserted

during the siege) . The non—combatants in the place were 1 280 of whom about 600 were Bri tish and Eurasian women and children .

79 The garrison was amply supplied with Th h a d ammunition and provisions . e provisions been obtained chiefly by the Civil Authorities. and Sir Henry Lawrence had himself procured large quantities of grain . Owing perhaps to the e ve rsta ndi ng official differences between military ofli ce rs k and civil , no proper inventory of the stoc t ’ of provisions was taken af er Lawrence s death , J until Sir ames Outram arrived .

This fact is interesting and instructive , partien la rly to those who have served in our Crown e s of Colonies and dep ndencies , and een something con this curious phase of English official life , the sequence being that the garrison was unnece s sa ril on u 1 5 y put half rations abo t th August .

The garrison was detailed to various posts , which were each provided with a garrison com mensurate with the numbers available ; these posts were held throughout the siege . Naturally as time went on the defence works became stronger and stronger ; on the other hand the numbers of the defenders steadily diminished . It is quite impossible in such a work as this to give a detailed account of this memorable siege . Day and night the whole place was searched by h of e s ot and shell . Daily some the defenders wer

of . killed , some the sick died On the 2nd day of the siege Sir Henry Lawrence was struck by a round shot while in Th m d his bed a n d mortally wounded . e com an e f then d volved on Major Banks , Acting Chie 2 l st a n d Commissioner . He was killed on July then the command was assumed by Colonel T . E .

80 garrison were beginning to doubt the reports brought in by the gallant and faithful native Un ud e to f ro messenger g , who carried l tters and s several times , that Havelock was at la t approaching .

25th to e On the the enemy were seen b retiring , and the peculiar crack of the E nfie ld Rifle was r heard near by . Shortly after this Out am and ’

8 7 . Havelock arrived , and the days siege ended The story of the defence of Lucknow is one that will always stir the hearts of British men and

. e women The Residency was no fortress , mer ly an entrenched camp defended by a handful of a British , and a few N tives , without whose aid it is doubtful if the defence would have succeeded . The total fighting strength left at the end of the 2 siege was 98 . Thus the casualties had been over A large number of women and r children were killed o died .

a n It is now necess ry to tur back to Cawnpore , and take up the story from the point at which Havelock and Outram were collected ready f or e 6 e an advance . Their force consist d of w ak R Bra s e rs 60 European egiments , y Sikhs , about 2 5 . Cavalry , and guns — On the night of 1 8th 1 9th Septe mbe r a floa t ing bridge wa s laid over the Ganges and ’ 1 Havelock s advanced force crossed . On the 9th ’ under cover of Eyre s battery the remainder of the column and baggage column passe d the river . On the 20th the rearguard and Eyre ’s guns l crosse d over . On the 2 st Septembe r in a deluge of rain the advance commenced .

8 2 Close to Mangalwar the enemy were found s h a posted acros the road , the rig t in a vill ge , the centre and left covered by breastworks and a battery of six guns , from which fire was opened a on the British Artillery s it advanced for a ction . One of the British gun elephants was wounded of and caused much confusion , however a line guns soon confronted the rebel position . The 90th were sent to turn the rebe l right and then a general advance drove the enemy back ; they were followed by the Volunteer Cavalry , among whom Outram plying his stout Malacca ca ne was foremost , and driven in headlong rout through

Mangalwar with a loss of 1 20 killed and two guns . Next day the advance was re sumed and the bridge over the Sye Rive r found intact . The c for e halte d at Banni .

a m . on the 23rd At . the advance was e r sumed , the road leading through a swamp , which at this season was a great sheet of water .

te . About pm . the Cavalry loca d the enemy was The position they occupied was strong . It 2 r on near miles long , the right ested some l of hi locks , the centre occupied a slight swell ground and the left held the great walled enclosure called the Ala mba gh . This position was occupied by nearly trained Sepoys and 30 guns in addition to a number of adherents to e d the mutineer caus , forme in regiments called N u ibs j . Havelock pursued his favourite method of 1 st attack , the Brigade and guns were to attack 2nd in front , the Brigade with the Cavalry and

8 3 ’ Olphe rts Battery wa s to turn the enemy s left c to As the column advanced , being onfined the f u of road , some loss was suf ered by the g n fire the rebels , however at last an area of dry ground whereon the troops could deploy was reached . 1 st The Brigade , which was leading , halted to let the 2nd Brigade get forward and make its turning Ol he rts movement , p Battery galloped forward ’ e over t rribly bad ground , and Eyre s heavy guns th came into action . As soon as e guns were well in action a simultaneous advance of the two brigades Ala mba h drove the enemy back . The g was then Ol he rts u stormed , and the Cavalry and p g ns pursued the enemy almost to the Char Bagh f f Bridge . That night news o the capture o Delhi was received in camp .

24th the orce September the , _f halted but the day was not without incident for the baga ge was a a tt cked by r ebel horsemen who were driven off . ” The enemy then sniped the camp with two 9pr. guns concealed in a wood .

Havelock had intended to move from the Alam ba gh to the Dilkusha Palace and thence bri dge the Gumti and gain the Faizabad—Lucknow road . With this object canal boats had been brought up from Cawnpore for use as pontoons . Reconnaissances however showed that the rain had rendered the route impracticable f or a s artillery . To advance through the city w s impos ible . The route selected therefore was by the Char Bagh Bridge and the left bank of the i canal . This meant that the force must first s eze the Char Bagh Bridge then turn to the right and

8 4 the circle round city . The sick and wounded were left in the Ala mba gh with 300 of the 78th as escort .

a m. 25th two At on the the advanced guard , ’ 5th im e companies Reg ent and Maud s Battery , led the advance and soon were in action . After a short pause the Infantry stormed the house which the Mutineers were holding a nd pre ssing on reached the canal bank . On the town side the enemy had erected a breastwork and 6 gun battery d ’ covering the Char Bagh Bri ge . Two of Maude s a mi guns c me into action , the skir shers of the Madras Europeans occupied the canal bank on the left of the road , and Outram in person went to t the 5th usile e rs the righ with F , to sieze the ’ walled garden there and thus e nfila de the enemy s n position . The fire on the gradually increasi g number of the British was so severe that Neill ordered the bridge to be stormed , an action which was nobly pe rformed by a few men of the Madras e 84 Europ ans and of the th , led by Arnold and

Tytler . Arnold and Tytler fell but the men led by Capta in Havelock and Corporal Jacques were not to be denied ; Tytler picking himself up led the 9oth to capture two guns that were so po sted as to be able to take the column in reverse ; they were captured and brought off in triumph by

Olphe rts who led up some spare limbers .

of 78th The column now pushed on , the rest the be ing left to hold the bridge . Some companies of the 90th formed the bagage guard . The enemy hotly pressed the 78th who finally took the f of ensive .

8 5 Meanwhile the main column pressed on and was unmoleste d till it rea ched the Kaisar

. 78th o Bagh The having lost t uch , had pushed up other streets and arrived at the Kaisar Bagh ; here they opportunely stormed the battery which r was fi ing on the main column . After another short delay the 78th a n d Sikhs pushed on again and reached the Residency Bailey Guard , but by this time night had fallen . The bagage with only 1 00 of 90th about men the , wedged in the narrow

e . stre ts , was in a precarious position Next day the bagage guard was reinforced by Colonel Napier w 26th ith various detachments . On the night 27th the bagage and ammunition was brought up and the main body pushed on to the grounds wa s of the Chatar Manzil . The Residency now b entered , but it was found impossi le to capture the Iron Bridge . Unfortunately some of the hospita l dhoolies lost their way in the town and the majority of the wounded who were in them f were massacred . One party o wounded men and some of the escort however took refuge in a house ou and held t till relieved .

The losses were very hea vy ; during the movement from the Alamba gh to the Residency . General Neill and Colonel Campbe ll of the 90th and other well known office rs were killed . Once the town was entered the fighting w as downright bludgeon work , skilful generalship was not so much required as prompt initiative by subordinate

f a nd e s . o ficers , even privat oldiers ’ Colonel Napier s reconnaissances throughout s the operations were mo t thorough , and the various narratives show that the success was

86 largely due to careful an d thorough arrange ments . It was an unfortunate necessity tha t forced Havelock to advance through the streets . On arriving in Lucknow Outram assumed command . He saw that it was necessary for him to 0 st p in Lucknow , for he could not cut his way out e encumb red with the women and children , a n d other noncombatants . However supplies were found to be more plentiful than had been se s ses suppo d , and a few sortie cleared the hou near the entrenchment , which were then blown up . The investment continued so close that communication could not be kept up with the 78th out Ala mba gh . The detachment of the held 7th e there however , and on the Octob r it was re inforced by 250 men of the 64th and two guns with plenty of stores.

87 VII .

Sir Colin Campbell Relieves Lucknow .

Sir Colin Campbell left Calcutta on the night of the 27th October and arrived at Cawnpore on 3rd the November . While Sir Colin wa s on his way up country a force under Colonel Powell consisting of 403 9 r Europeans and two p . guns attacked a consider able force of the Mutineers at K huj wa south of t Allahabad and rou ed them after a sharp action , chiefly noticeable for the fa ct that the success was of due to the bayonet charge the British , not to l ski ful dispositions . The question which now confronted Sir Colin was whether he should move against the Gwalior troops , who were at Kalpi with the Nana and a Ta nti a large body of men under Topi , or to the relief of Lucknow . In an ordinary war the first v o was the ob ious c urse , for the dispersal of the

s . Kalpi force would se cure the ba e Sir Colin , of however , considered that the immediate relief

Lucknow was essential , and it is clear that he was right . On the 6th November orders were issued that 5 00 s 5 50 General Windham , with Briti h and a Madras Inf ntry and gunners , was to hold o n Cawnp re , while the main body under Sir Coli was to advance to Lucknow to withdraw the a garrison . The force for this expedition and ’ month s supplies were collected at Bunti ra ; communication was opened by a Mr . Kavanagh

88

As the total effective of this force was only it will be see n how weak the ba tta lions

WGPO . On the 1 2th the force advanced and was soon ’ in touch with the rebe ls . As the enemy s fire opened Bouchiers guns went into action and ’ Gough with H odson s Horse circled right round ’ the enemy s left . His movement was conce aled e of by trees , and a larg body the rebels was completely surprised , their camp captured and a number killed . That night the force halte d close Al a mba h to the g . The 75th were left in the A la mba gh and their place 1 11 the column taken by the detachments in garrison there . Sir Colin was determined not to repeat ’ Havelock s movement through the stree ts . The plan adopted was to march round the city by the s s east , occupying succes ively the Dilku ha Park , e c the Martini re , and the line of the anal , then with the right secured by the Gumti River to i of mask the Ka sar Bagh , and under cover the troops performi ng this duty to bring away the of occupants the Residency . The main body advanced between the Ala mba gh a n d the Jella a e lab d fort , which had b en seized the ’ e Gre a the d s day b fore , with infantry and s e a s a some gun d ployed a left flank gu rd . It was not till the Dilkusha Park wall was n reached that the column was fired o . The s wa s 1 3 s Dilku ha quickly occupied , and gun were brought into action against the enemy in the

Martiniere . The infantry then advanced a nd

90 cleared this building with the bayonet . The cavalry pursued the rebels as they fell back . ’ t Adrian Hope s Brigade , with a Field Bat ery

two 24 . c c s of and prs , was pla ed on the anal ide e the wood of the Martini re , Little , with the 1 7 t Cavalry and the th Bat ery , occupied the plain e ’ in front of the Martini re , and Russell s Brigade e was plac d in front of the Dilkusha , and occupied two villages close to the canal . While the stores and ammunition were being e c brought up, sev ral suc essive attacks were made s by the rebels again t the left and the bagage , but

se . 93rd were repul d The , guarding the convoy , had a very rough time and it was morning of the 1 5th before all was up and stored in the Dilkusha where the 8th Regiment was left with half the cavalry and a battery .

’ In order to draw the enemy s attention to his right flank a demonstration was made by the left wing , and the mortars kept up a steady bombard ment on the Begums Palace and the barracks on M this day eanwhile Sir Colin , by a personal s e s the reconnais anc , atisfied himself that ground on his right was pra cticable . During the night — i 5th 1 6th a further supply of small arm ammu niti on wa s brought up from the Al amba gh by ’ e h ad s ffi to Lieut . Rob rts who a mo t di cult task accomplish . m 1 6 a . On the th at an advanced guard , ’ d H odson s e consisting of a squa ron Hors , a troop 53rd of Horse Artillery , and a company Regi ’ ’ m sse ent , led the way , Hope s and Ru ll s Brigades followed , then the ammunition and Engineer

9 1 h s Gre a t e d . Park , and brought up the rear The column movi ng in echelon with the right in s to front cros ed the canal and turned the left , and soon were under fire from the houses . The lane a long which the troops were moving was narrow and here the cavalry were in the way ; some confusion occurred before they were got clear . Meantime the battery had come into action in a particularly di cult situation . The fire was chiefly from the Sikandar Bagh and Kaisar Bagh , both of which places were strongly held . More guns came up , the houses of a 93rd Sultang nj were cleared by the , a small hole was knocked in the wall of the Sikandar Bagh s 5 3rd 93rd and through it the tormers of the , , and

Bra syers Sikhs rushed . The gate was soon opened and a grisly massacre of the Sepoys inside the building took place . "uarter was neither asked s of r nor given , and it is aid that the ebels

were left there dead . e e Aft r r forming , the head of the column pushed on until it was brought up by the Th massive Shah Najaf Mosque . e building was of massive masonry and to breach it Peel laid his guns alongside the wall as if he were gomg into ’ action against an enemy s frigate . An attempt to storm the place failed , but fortunately a hole 93rd was discovered by a Sergeant Paton of the , w as the stormers pushed in , and the Mosque captured . Meanwhile Outram had not been idle . As soon as Sir Colin ’s troops reached the Sikandar

Bagh the garrison attacked the B irun Khana . At the breaches in this building were practicable and the place was stormed .

92 On the evening of the l 6th then only the Mess House and the Moti Mahal intervened between the two force s . This space was however dominate d by the guns in the Kaisar Bagh . ’ On the 1 7th Russell s Brigade remained near

Banks House to hold the left and left rear , the Mess House and Moti Mahal were battered by the mm Artillery and stormed by the 90th . Thus co u n i ca ti on between the two forces was fully estab

li shed . The most difficult part of the task still remained , that of withdrawing the garrison and the occupants of the Residency . a nd Russell at Banks House still covered the left , on the 1 8th some guns were succe ssfully taken there , and some buildings from which a galling

fire was kept up on the left rear were occupied , but had to be again evacuated . Up to this time Sir Colin had hoped to use the Trunk so Road for his retirement , but as the enemy was strong on the left he was obliged to abandon hi s intention . On the 1 9th reconnaissances discovered some rough tracks that would serve the purpose , the garrison retiring by the same lane that the column had used in the advance . About noon of this day t the withdrawal commenced , and during the nigh the women and children were brought out , and all sa fely reached the Sikandar Bagh . 20th ’ On the , under cover of Peel s heavy guns , the rest of the property in the Residency was

. s to removed As a feint , preparation were made assault the Kaisar Bagh which w a s by now breached .

93 At midnight on the 2 1 st Outram and the rear

guard left the Residency , which had been prepared

for destruction . Inglis was the last man to leave . After this each advanced post retired through its ’ supports . Then Hope s Brigade withdrew , then ’ Peel s guns , last of all the rearguard with the

Chief in person . Shortly before dawn the whole force was safely in the Dilkusha , every man at his allotted post . ff The Sta work was absolutely perfect , and as a model of a skilful withdrawal of a small force

much encumbered with bagage , along a most difficult route in the face of a tenfold superior

enemy , this achievement stands almost unique . On the 24th of November Sir Henry Havelock

died . Never was a man more widely mourned ” or more honoured in his death . On the 24th Hope Grant was moved to the Ala mb h a a g and Outram left at the Dilkush . The m women and children followed Grant , and Outra

closed up on the 25th . On the 26th Sir Colin issued orders for Outram with

The Volunteer Cavalry ,

Irregular Cavalry ,

Punj ab Cavalry ,

Four Batteries ,

Some Engineers , 5th 75th 78th 84 90th l st , , , th , , and Bengal

Europeans , s 22 in all ome men and guns , to remain near Al a ba h the m g and watch the rebels in Lucknow . Hope Grant with the rest of the troops was to

escort the convoy to Cawnpore .

9 4 It ha sbe en questioned whether Sir Colin wa s right in giving up Lucknow and establishing a. force outside it with a view to holding it in check . cfli cer Outram , who was the chief political , and on Sir Colin were at variance this point , for

Outram wished to hold the Residency . On milit ary grounds however it seems clear th at Sir Colin was right and Outram wrong . A force tied up in the Residency was only a target for the enemy ff s and could not e ect any valuable military purpo e , whereas a mobile force outside could cc - operate usefully with the rest of the Field Army . of a Lucknow was purely political import nce , e s c e it contained no magazin s , or ar enal , and over d

a . no important j unction of ro d , rail or river CHAPTER VIII .

— s Redan Windham at Cawnpore . His itua — — tion H e moves out against the rebels H e is forced to retreat into his entrenchment — Arrival — of Sir Colin Campbell Ta nti a Topi defeated and pursued .

t . To secure his base , the bridge , and the grea accumulation of stores on the right bank of the C a wn ore Si r had Ganges at p j Colin Campbell 64th left Redan Windham with a wing of the , a few sailors , parties of various corps , for the most part men left to look after the baggage of 500 t their regiments , about natives , and four ligh

. 500 guns In all some men , of whom were 5 00 t no British and natives , but here were ’ W Cavalry . Windham s orders ere to watch

. the large force of mutineers at Kalpi , to hold the entrenchment i f attacked , and to forward all available men to the main force as they arrived , for the rear detachments of the corps with Si r Colin had by no means all come in when he started . On the 1 2th November his spies reported to Windham that the mutineers were crossing the

Jumna . Windham applied for and obtained per mission to retain the detachments as they came up. Even after this however he twice forwarded large drafts to Sir Colin . Gradually his force began to increase and by the 25th it consisted of some 1 4 s men and guns , consisting of detachment 34th 64th 82nd 8 8th of the , Rifle Brigade , , , and Re 27th 1 4 s . giments , the Madra N Infantry , and guns

96

a s e d null h was cros ed , the reb l a vanced guard 3 driven back and guns captured , but no pursuit o was p ssible without mounted men . The main body of the re bels closed up and the British were obliged to withdraw , which they did with some difficulty . Windham encamped again that night at his old camp at the junction of the Kalpi and l ’ i De hi roads . Windham s situation was n ow cri t cal for he had a great town between himself and his supports while rebels flushed with success confronted his bare 1 27th At 0 a m. on the the rebels commenced their attack a dvancing along the Kalpi and Bithor roads . Carthew with the 34th was sent to the Bithor the Road , Walpole with the Rifle Brigade , 88th s 82nd , and the gun , held the Kalpi Road , the e stood in the interval posted in a clump of tr es . Carthew by vigorous and skilful dispositions checked and even drove back the rebels along the Bith or Road , but the main attack , supported by to s heavy artillery , continued be pres ed a gainst the front and the rebels extending to their s right, encircled the British left . The Briti h a 82nd then fell b ck to the brick kilns , the was posted in some buildings to cover the right and protect the withdrawal ; at the same time , most unfortunately , Windham called in 4th Carthew and the 3 . The enemy at once entered the lower part of the town and attacked the e n tre n chme nt h of itself, while the detac ment the 82nd its , from some unexplained reason , left posi tion and fell back . At this juncture Redan Windham justified A of ri his soubriquet . detachment the Rifle B gade

98 coming up the Grand Trunk Road from Allahaba d i had opportunely arrived . Placing h mse lf at the ir hea d Windham cleared the uppe r town with the e to m a he s t bayon t ; returning the ain b ttle , en ’ Carthew with the 34th and Chamier s batte ry to

open up the right again . This work was splen di dl of y performed , and the rest the troops were

able to get back to the entrenchment , though in

great confusion and without thei r camp equipage . On the 28th the rebels renewed their attack ’ against Windham s position . In addition to the entrenchment Windham still held the main portion Bi h of the town . Carthew was placed on the t or

Road , Walpole on the Kalpi Road . Both assumed ofl e nsi ve the , and both were successful , but the enemy ’ s numbers were so great that gradually

Carthew found his left in great danger . He was obliged to fa ll back a little a n d at nightfall i t retreated to the entrenchment . Th s movemen allowed the large stores accumulated a t the asse mbly rooms to fall into the h ands of the s s mutineer , and endangered the afety of the bridge of boats . F or this action the blame was at first laid upon

a . ee C rthew It s ms , however , that the night before when discussing matters with his subor di na te leaders Windham had used the following “ : o out words Well , gentlemen , when we can h ld ” no longer we must retire to the entrenchment .

Carthew was therefore exonerated from blame , but the incident is instructive of the necessity f or preciseness in the giving of dire ctions . While the action was in progress Sir Colin ’ m e m a nd a t e e Ca pb ll s colu n was approaching , v ry

99 step the roar of the di stant cannonade be cM e l c earer . Ordering Hope Grant to take command and‘ halt with the Infantry and Field Artillery at i Mangalwar , the chief h mself pushed on with the ff Cavalry and Horse Artillery . He and his sta out s the di tancing the troops , were the first to reach boa t ' brid e g , where it is recorded that the subal tern of the piquet expressed his delight at seeing the m in effusive terms and ended We are at our m last ga sp . Colin Ca pbell had a bitter tongue to when roused , and suggest that British soldiers could ever be a t - their last gasp was like a red “ ra t wa g to a bull for him . The subal ern s sorry he spoke . — Duri ng the night 28th 29th the main column moved forward and careful arrangements were made to cover its passage of the river on the 29th .

Inglis had the reargua rd . Hope Grant pushed on and occupied the level space between the

entrenchment and the city . The rebels kept up a

steady fire on the British camp . General Windham’s conduct of this affair was n 1 7 certainly not a masterpiece . O the th he asked leave to attack an advanced detachment of 25th the rebels , yet on the on his own initiative he

moved out to attack their whole force . Without cavalry he could not hope to i nfli ct - a crushing defeat on the rebels and his orders were to only safeguard Cawnpore.

No doubt a vigorous offensive is the be st de f e n

I S sive , particularly against Asiatics , but there a r easonable limit to its value . For men with out cavalry a nd weak in artillery to attack

1 00

to a battery were threaten the centre , Hope and Inglis were to cross the canal and reach the Kalpi w road . The cavalry under Little ere to make a wide detour to fall on the enemy as he retreated ’ To m towards Kalpi . draw the ene y s attention to his left Windham was to open the ball by a

cannonade from the entrenchment .

’

4 h 9 a m . . On Dec . t at Windh am s guns opened At Walpole advanced and rushed the bridge ’ ’

Genera l a n . d s. west of g j The guns of Peel s , Long en ’ ’ Bouchier s and Middleton s batteries came i nto action a gainst the kilns and mounds in front of ’ the enemy s right . Under cover of this fire Hope and Inglis took ground to the left and wheeling n k h to the right formed in three li es . The Si s 53rd and covered the front, Hope followed and 53rd then Inglis . The Sikhs and forcing the enemy back from point to point reached the t canal , but found the bridge protected by a grea b e r me f or m n att y , and it see d a mo e t as if the ’ adva nce would be checked but Peel s sailors 24 r brought up a p . at a double , trundling it along to a e on d as if it were a y, and pl nt d it the bri ge so inspiring the British a nd surprising the re be ls a that the whole force d shed forward , forded the canal , and stormed over the rebel position , and pressing rapidly forward occupied the camp of ’

who fle d . s s the rebels in confusion Bouchier gun , attended by Sir Colin ’s and Hope Grant’s staff as es e e a cort , pursued the flying r b ls , for the c valry i a a had missed the r way . At l st the l tter arrived a nd spreading out pursued the enemy f or 1 4 mi the f o" . les , pursuit looking very like a hunt

1 9 guns were ta ken and many men kille d .

1 02 ’ Bouchier s exploit is only one among th e many wonderful performances of the Horse Artillery in the Mutiny . It will be recalled that Stonewall Jackson pursued Banks from Winchester with m n un m ou ted g ners , perhaps he ight have done better had he taken the guns themselves like Sir

Colin Campbell did . While the pursui t of the Gwalior Troops along “ the Kalpi road was being thus pressed , Mansfield ’ a with Walpole s Brig de , part of Adrian ’ : a nd two a e o Hope s Brigade, b tt ries pr ceeded to of t attack in the direction the Civil Sta ion , and thereby endanger the line of retreat of the left b c and centre of the re el line , whi h was principally held by N uj ib troops and reta iners of a the Talukdars . Mansfield pushed b ck the enemy but not wishing to commit his men i n the town itself , he halted for the night in his posi a nd tion . During the night the rebel centre left

fled as was to be expected . Not being minded to let this body safely escape , Sir Colin despatched e 75 0 Hop Grant after them with cavalry , infantry and 1 1 guns . Hope Grant found them at e on l oth S rai Ghat the , endeavouring to embark their fifteen guns . The Artillery came into action and the rebels fled afte r attempting a cavalry 1 5 attack , the whole of the guns were captured , ’ making a total of 34 out of T a nti a Topi s total of

50 . This engagement is a fine example of Sir Colin Campbell ’s combination of forethought and audacity . The plan arranged was simple in the dl o f or extreme , yet it was undoubte y m st daring , his small force was considerably dispersed at one

1 03 ’ M a n field period . s s refusal to press the attack against the town h a s been hotly criticized; An i m parti a l j udgment must admi t t hat it would have resulted in heavy losses and would probably at that s late hour have gained but scanty uccess , for the cavalry were away towards Kalpi a nd they alone of could reap the fruits victory .

1 04

Seaton now returned to Aligarh an d took the convoy to Mainpuri where he again had a n encounter with a rebel band which was dispersed . On the 1 8th December a column under Walpole left Cawnpore to sweep the Lower Doab and e n counterin g little Opposition joined Se aton near on the 3rd 1 Mainpuri January 85 8 . Sir Colin ha d to wait for his tra nsport to return

. 23rd from Allahabad This it did on the , and 24th so on the he al marched , Hope Grant with a column making a detour to Bi thor and Windham to destroy a rebel fort . The boats and ferries over the Ganges were destroyed . On the 30th despatches from Se aton reached Sir Colin brought to him after a most a dventuro us ride by Hodson and Macdowell . On the l st January 1 85 8 Sir Colin was rej oined d i by the etachments referred to above . Hear ng that a body of rebels under the Nawab of F a ra ka b a d was at Khudaganj and wa s destroy ing the bridge over the Kali Nadi , Adrian Hope was despatched to hold it . The bridge was found d partially estroyed . On the 2 nd Hope was attacked ; Hope Grant r was pushed on in suppo t, the main body follow ing . The rebel position at Khudaganj on the crest of a slight slope completely dominated the a wa s o a bridge , and the p ssage b th d ngerous and o s s sl w , at la t however the rebels gun were silenced 5 r h by the Naval Brigade . The 3 d ad meanwhile covered the front and it was arranged that the 93rd Highlanders should pass through them to ’ Gre athed take the village, while s Brigade turned the rebel right .

1 06 The 53rd however were not minded to allow Highlanders or a nyone else to sh ow them the bo to way . The men forced a bugler y sound the o the charge , and dashing forward so n cleared village . Hope Grant seized the chance , mov t ing his squadrons to the left , shel ered from view by the ground , he caught up the rebels , charged rs 5 da y and broke them , pu uing for miles until wa f or two light failed . It s incidents in this ’ pursuit , the saving of a sowars life , and the of h d capture single handed a standard , t at Lor

Roberts gained his V . C . It is related that Sir Colin was furious with the 53rd n for their breach of discipline , and havi g had them formed up rode up with the i nte n 53rd tion of rating them soundly . But the were not to be te e m his defea d , ev ry ti e the chief opened ” e f or mouth they gave Thre cheers Sir Colin , and shouted with all their might , until finally Sir Colin d ff r to a ro e o laughing . Is it necessa y remark th t the bulk of the men of the 53rd were Irish " On the 3rd the Column reached Fatehgarh and were joined there on the 6th by Windham and

Seaton . The Doab was now sufficiently cleared for the police officers to resume their functions. now to Reverting operations in Behar , we have see n that in July a force of Gurkhas wa s assembled at Jua npur where their presence kept the di strict in order . In September a body of rebels from Oudh threatened Azamgarh . men under Capt . of s e e Boileau , the bulk who e forc was form d by a e Shumshere Gurkha regiment command d by Sing , 50 m s 36 s e marched ile in hour , r aching

1 07 O 1 9 Azamgarh on the th September . On the 20th the rebels were attacked near Mandori . The s Gurkha stormed the rebel position , a party of or e Volunteer H s under Mr . Venables rendered good service in the pursuit .

Late in October the rebels made head again , and a force of Gurkhas caught and beat of 5 a t e them with guns Chanda , aft r a 1 t stubborn engagement on the 3 s October . Early i n November the Ju a npur force was 320 l 0th m increased by men of the Regi ent, two

9 . 1 70 of prs , and the Madras Infantry , under 4 h command of Colonel Longden . On the t Nov ember a body of rebels again crossing from Oudh was attacked by the united force and driven back .

The J n anpur force was about this time formed into a brigade under General Franks . At the same time a force of British and Gurkha troops was f o R owcrof t Ti rhut ormed under C lonel at , and cleared the Gandak River Valley .

i Lord Canning now nvited Jung Bahadur , of the Prime Minister Nepal , to form an 24 a army of men and guns , to cle r the ts of to cc— distric north Oudh , and operate in the attack on Oudh . The request was at once com plied with and the force passed the frontier 21 1 3 December st . On January th Jung Bahadur surprised a rebel force near Gorakhpur ; after a brief artillery action the Gurkhas charged a nd i pursued the enemy , inflicting terr ble losses upon n ow e o them . Jung Bahadur moved st adily t the Gogra River where R owcrof t with his small force a pproached him from Western Behar . Rein

1 08

On this da y Franks heard that the rebels pro posed to occupy a defile guarded by the Fort of

B udh a yun . By skilful arrangements the rebels c of were deceived , and the fort seized in advan e

h . M e hndee to n t em Hassan then retired Sulta pur , his force amounting to some men (of whom

25 . were Sepoys) , and guns The rebel position was behind a deep nullah

across the main road, with the left in Sultanpur , the right near the Serai of Ba d sh a hga nj . Franks dispositions for the attack were a dmi r h able . He marc ed straight down the main road ’ a s if to cross the nullah . He drove the enemy s outposts across the nullah and then personally reconnoitred f or a passage on the right of the H i t enemy . This he found . s force was o a great off hi s extent concealed by trees , and , moving to k ’ outfla n e d s o . left , he the enemy p sition

There was a sharp action , in which Lieutenant

M cL eod Innes particularly distinguished himself . The enemy fled with a loss of 2 1 guns and their of camp . Want cavalry and bad ground prevented a pursuit . That day the force was reinforced by the Lahore

Light Horse, the Pathan Horse and a detachment r of 3 d Sikh Cavalry .

On the 25th the column resumed its march . On the l st March Aikman with his Sikh 500 Cavalry , by a dashing exploit , defeated rebel infantry and 200 cavalry on the banks of the

Gumti . On the 4th March Franks arrived within eight t miles of Lucknow , and attacked a for called

1 1 0 B . b t howra A ody of rebels , loca ed in a massive — s o d well built hou e c uld not however be dislodge , 24 even by the pounders . The same evening the as column reported to Sir Colin Campbell , who , t will be seen in a subsequent chap er , had collected c a great for e outside Lucknow .

of f or This march was great value , it cleared the way f or Jung Baha dur and opened Upper

Oudh . The districts of Behar and Chutia Nagpur f or of remained , however, many months in a state partial anarchy . Kunwar Singh and his brothers out ua n ur held in Behar , near J p and Azamgarh , and bodies of disbanded soldiers in Chutia Nagpur made the main road dangerous . In the middle of January Lord Canning came u to up from Calc tta Allahabad , to the great a of c f or advant ge the public servi e , he was there free from his Council . It is now necessary to return to the operations of Outram . He had men , and his task was to watch a city with a popula tion of three quarters of 1 20 a million , defended by men and f or e guns , into Lucknow had poured all the reb l strength . His position was undoubtedly weak and dangerous , and Outram favoured withdrawal , but a crimo was ordered to hold out . Some rather n i ous correspondence took place between Outram ’ Sta fl and Sir Colin Campbell s Chief of the ,

General Mansfield . About the 21 st the rebels sent a pa rty to Guili ’ to try and cut Outra m s communications . On the 22nd this party was atta cked and heavily defeated , the men of the military train specially d istinguishing themselves .

1 1 1 On the 1 2th January a general attack was made

. l 6th on the position , but repulsed On the a second attack was made , and thereafter the enemy con 1 sta ntly harrassed the force . On the 5th February the enemy endeavoured to cut off a convoy . On the 2 l s 1 6th a strong attack was made . On the t a severe attack by a force of about men w a s repulsed , the cavalry distinguishing themselves in 25 the engagement . On the th the rebels in great strength , accompanied by the Nana , came out to attack . Outram went out with the cavalry to meet Th them and drove them back with heavy losses . e attack was resumed in the evening , but easily repulsed . This was the last attack . As a feat of arms the defence of the Ala mba gh lines , for twelve weeks against so large an army as wa s that of the rebel has seldom be en sur It e ea Si r passed . was in gr at m sure due to ’ utra m James O s personal qualities . The re bels had collected the following troops at Lucknow to oppose Sir Colin Campbell (vide

. . State papers , edited by Mr . Forrest , Vol . IV , p

37 Regiments of Sepoys 1 4 new levies 1 06 N uj ibs 26 Cavalry Camel Corps

Total

This does not include the armed retainers of

d . us e the lan owners of Oudh The guns , excl iv of te on s te to 1 31 . those moun d the wall , amoun d

1 1 2

t A u se his own to was in fac King of O dh eking , of overthrow him struck at the heart the rebellion , r s on and after that , police measu e , a large scale it is true , but still police measures , would finish i the work of pa c fica ti on . Meanwhile the whole of India and the Central East had its eye s turned

o . n Lucknow . There is no doubt that here we have an example of the political ne ce ssity be ing e sup rior to the military exigencies . All January every effort was strained to get up 1 70 the siege train from Agra ( miles) , to collect o et a troops near and at Cawnp re , to g up two gre t 4 6 . a n n prs from Allahabad d so o . The result me was delay , for which the omniscient gentle n of the press loudly blamed the chief . It is sad to have to relate that this stupid criticism was not co nfined to the press but found voice in the Army also . Sir Colin , however, knew well that he knew m of ore war than his critics , and remained ste F a te h a rh be adily at g , where threatened i R oh lkh a nd as well as Oudh . In the latter part of January a great show wa s made of crossing the

Ganges into Oudh . Hope Grant attacked a e Shumsha ba d s reb l force at defeating it everely , the cavalry having a very sharp action with the

c to off s. rebel avalry , who tried cut the gun

This a ction cle are d the Doa b a ga in . On the l st February Sir Colin moved to

o . Cawnp re Hope Grant followed , leaving Walpole to hold F a te ga rh f or a f e w days and is then follow , leaving only a small garr on there under Se aton . The troops were now collecting fast a t e s Cawnpore , and were pass d over the Gange and

1 1 4 i r ca nto nned Ba sh a t a n e tc . at Unao , g j , Banni , , the intention bein g to a ssemble the whole army

Bunti ra . wa s e ssa to near It , howev r , nece ry f o wait r Franks and Jung Bahadur . Meanwhile Hope Grant was sent on an expedi to t tion ake a small fort , where the Nana was bac s to . suppo ed be , but he had fled On his way k se a Grant was oppo d at Mianganj , and , fter a d sharp action , cleare the town of rebels , after a which the c valry rode then down . i On the l st March Grant returned to Bun t ra . s All was now ready f or the advance . Frank a o J was was rapidly ppr aching , ung Bahadur e him no to f or close b hind , there was time waste hot o already the weather was up n the land , so the e final advance commenc d .

1 1 5 CHAPTER X

The Capture of Lucknow .

Many months had passed since Ta nti a Topi ’ under the Nana s di rections had carried out the massacre of Cawnpore . Delhi had fallen , the North-West provinces were again almost tranquil , Lucknow was relieved , and for four ’ months Outra m s weak division had been watching the force of the rebels gathering for the defence of their last stronghold .

To attack it Sir Colin Campbe ll had collected a force of rather more than men and 1 64 u is as : g ns , d tributed follows — Cavalry Division Hope Grant . —9th Ist Brigade . Lancers , 2n d Battalion Military Train 21 0 Wale ’s Horse (Sikhs) 466 2n d Punjab Cavalry 520 Detachments 1 60 —2m 471 2md Brigade . d Dragoon Guards 7th Hussars 422 Volunteer Cavalry 5 9 l st Punjab Cavalry 1 06 ’ H odson s Horse 743

Tota l 36 1 3

1 1 6

n - a Infantry Divisio W lpole .

5th —23 rd Brigade . Regiment 79th 1 st Bengal Europeans th —2n Ba tn 6 . d fl Brigade t . Ri e Brigade 3rd 2md Punjab Infantry

’ Frank s Division . —F e Artillery . our Batt ries — Cavalry Benares Horse Lahore Light Horse Pathan Horse 3rd Sikh Irregulars

— British Infantry l oth Regi ment 20th 97th

This makes a total of me n and about r ho ses.

’ With Frank s Division were . 6 Batta lions of Gurkha Infantry and Artill ery ’ Jung Bahadur s Force about

Approximate Total 9000

1 1 8 At the beginning of March the forces were distributed as follows

the A la mba h In g Lines watching Lucknow , ’ u r m O t a s Division and a portion of the Cavalry .

am Bunti ra In c ps at and Mangalwar , remain l st 2nd der of the Cavalry , and Division and the siege train .

’ a Approaching from the e st, Frank s Division ’ followed by Jung Bahadur s Division . For the defence of Lucknow the rebels had prepared formidable defences . The citadel and of heart the defence was the Kaisar Bagh , which was very carefully prepared for defence . To cover the approaches to the citadel from the south - east the rebels had prepared two main lines . One along the bank of the canal covering all the bridges and one in rear of it embracing the

Moti Mahal , the Mess House , and the Little ba T c Imam ra . o over the approaches to the — Kaisar Ba gh from the north east a line at right a o be d ngles to the other two had als en prepare , a nd extended to the left to cover the pa ssage s of n the stone a d iron bridges . In addition to these lines the rebels had prepare d every building on — the proba ble lines of advance from the south e ast a n d east for an obstinate defence . The buildings formed a range of massive a u p laces and walled co rts , of vast extent , equalled perhaps , but certainly not surpassed , in any capital in Europe . Every outlet had been covered by a work , and on every side were ” prepared barricades , and loopholed parapets . ’ o (Sir Colin C ampbe ll s rep rt) .

1 1 9 i Sir Colin Campbell directed Napier , the ch ef i to Eng neer , prepare a plan for the siege , and his te plan was finally adop d by Sir Colin .

' 1 It was ( ) To sieze the Dilkusha Palace . Under cover of this position to pass a force round the city to attack from the north , and nfil di n establish batteries e a g the rebel lines . (2) A methodical advance covered by the erection of siege batteries , and assisted by the careful sapping through of houses a nd buildings was then to take place . Thus the enemy would be driven out to the westward and then pursued by ’ the great cavalry force at Sir Colin s disposal .

The right attack was entrusted to Outram , who was given Walpole ’s Division and Little ’s Cavalry Brigade (the l st) ° Hope Grant aecom ni utra m s o n wa s pa ed Outram . O w Division broken up . On the 2md March the adva nced troops

Cavalry , 3 s Troops Hor e Artillery , 4 a Guns Naval Brig de , 2md Infantry Division ,

e s Ala mba h l s mov d off, pas ed through the g ine , and occupied the Dilkusha after a skirmish . The — Naval guns were placed just north e a st of the on m Dilkusha a slight eminence , and next day ore i guns were placed in the Park n battery . 4th 5th During the night to , and during the 5th r w t of , b idges ere thrown over the Gumti eas 5th to the Dilkusha House . An attempt on the interrupt the bridging operations w a sbeaten off with loss.

1 20

a to out un ble escape , they fought it with the 600 f bayonet . Over o them were buried in the ditch next day .

N i a le se On this day the p troops , who had marched in to camp were posted to cover the left . ’ Franks Division formed in effect a general on o reserve the Cawnp re road . On the 1 2th and 1 3th Franks and L uga rd changed places and the advance was continued by the Engineers under Napier who , breaking through or blowing up the houses , gradually approached the enemy ’s final positions round the Kaisar Bagh .

’ At 9 Oclock on the 1 4th Franks stormed the e a Littl Imambarah , the re dy and prompt initia tion of certain subordinate office rs carried the troops forward to a point close to the Kaisar

Bagh . Franks supporte d his subordinates with his usual energy , his right occupied the Moti Mahal , the a the Ch tar Manzil , and Tara Kothi , while ’ his left da shed through Saa dat Ali s Mosque and stormed the Kaisar Bagh . The resistance in this c h palace of the Kings of Oudh was fier e , but s ort, and the loot taken in the whole range of buildings of great value .

not e Meanwhile , Sir James Outram had b en idle . On the 1 1 th he had camped close to the m the o to Gu ti , and occupied appr aches the iron i br dge .

1 4 e of m of is On the th , h aring the stor the Ka ar to Bagh he applied for permission fulfil his role , t n se s a nd by s ormi g and izing the bridge , falling

1 22 on the enemy as they evacuated the city . He e re ceived a reply from G neral Mansfield , Sir ’ of ff ss Colin s Chief the Sta , that he might cro the “ bridges if it did not entail the loss of one single

ma n .

Such an orde r i s absolutely incomprehensible . ’

a n d a . It was explicit , Sir J mes hands were tied f s a s e s It is mani e t th t had he torm d the bridge , i th e t and , gain ng open country , had despa ched e Sir Hop Grant in pursuit of the flying foe , the probable result woul d have bee n the complete disinte gration of the rebel forces . As it was e — d s they retreat d in fairly well formed bo ie , and , as the event proved , were still full of mischief . On the 1 5th Hope Grant wa s despatched along 2nd the Sitapur , and Campbell with the Cavalry

Brigade along the Sandila roa ds. They aecom li h p s ed little . On the l 6th Outram passe d the river with one h o brigade , and , pus ing up the right bank , t ok the os p itions covering the bridge s in reverse .

r While this operation was in prog ess , a body of the mutinee rs attacked the remainder of ’ Outra m s division , who were on the left bank n of watching the iro bridge . Under cover this attack about of the rebels were able to get across the stone bridge and to get away a up the Faiz bad Road . Outram in the afte rnoon carried the Machi Bhawan and Great

Imambarah . On the same day a body of mutine ers attacked Ala mba h the g , but were foiled and pursued by ’ a a nd Ol he rt the Milit ry Train p s battery .

1 23 During these two days Jung Bahadur had moved e up on the extreme left , and had turn d and taken all the enemy ’s positions on the south—west side of the town . During the 1 7th further progress in clearing the town wa s made .

On the 1 8th Outram stormed the Musa Bagh . ’ Sir Colin had ordered Campbell s Brigade to be to ls prepared pursue the rebe as they fell back , or w a t but Campbell lost his way, s o herwise his diverted from object , and the rebels escaped , except for such pursuit as the 9th Lancers could

1 00 . carry out . This regiment killed about of them The leading spirit of the mutineers had M oulvi z s throughout been the e of Fai abad . Thi determined man was still in Lucknow holding a L block of houses in the centre of the city . uga rd 2l s expelled him on the t . On the 23rd Sir Hope Grant caught up and dispersed a large body of rebels on the Faizabad

1 3 . road , capturing guns

With this action the siege of Lucknow ended . The British losses amounted to only 1 40 killed 5 95 T h and wounded . e sma llness of the loss is certainly to be attributed to the methodica l and I ' W careful plan of attack hich , except that the Kaisar " Bagh was taken a day earlier than t t . in ended , was rigidly adhered o throughout It is perhaps natural to att ribute success to the originator of a successful plan rather than to the mm e —i n— Co and r Chief . The credit f or the successful capture of Lucknow is often attributed r was to Napier , because the plan he d ew up

1 24

CHAPTER XI . — Sir Hugh R ose in Central Indi a Jhansi — — Kalpi Whitlock in Ba nda lkha nd Banda .

In Chapter IV . the arrangements to quell the rebellion in Central India were detailed . A column based on Bombay would first dea l with a c one Jh nsi , and then advan e to Kalpi , while m from Madras , com anded by Whitlock , would a ba l u advance from J p r on Banda . The most d angerous opposition might be expected from the

Rani of Jhansi and the Ra j a h of Banda . — Major General Sir Hugh Rose , who had been appointed to the command of the Bombay e column , landed in India in Decemb r , and on the 1 6th of that month took command of the troops at i . of t 50 d Mau He was a man a li tle over , stin h gui s e d both as a soldi er and as a diplomatist . Of him it has been said that no one wa s better able to conceal the iron hand beneath the velvet glove .

The force under his command consisted of two brigades .

l st . . . Brigade Brigadier C . S Stuart One squadron 1 4th Light Dragoons One troop 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry Two regiments Cavalry , Hyderabad Contin gent One troop Horse Artillery One Light Field Batte ry

1 26 Two s field batterie , Hyderabad Contingent One company Native Pioneers The 86th Regiment The 25th Bombay Na tive Infantry im One reg ent infantry , Hyderabad Contin gent

This brigade was at Mau . 2nd Brigade . Brigadier Steuart . 1 4th Light Dragoons (less one squadron) 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry (less one troop) One regiment cavalry (Hyderabad Contin gent) One battery Bombay Horse Artillery One field battery (Hyderabad Continge nt) One company Madras Pioneer The 3rd Bomba y Europe ans The 24th Bombay Native Infantry One regiment infantry (Hyderabad Contin

gent) . To this brigade wa s attached a small siege train . The brigade was at Sihor . It was impossible to commence operations until ’ Whitlock s Madras column had reached Ja ba lpur . By the 1 5 th January the 2nd Brigade was r 1 0th 1 st concent ated at Sihor . On the the 1 5 Brigade marched on C ha nda i ri . On the th the 2nd s t Brigade with Sir Hugh Ro e in person , lef th a rh Sihor to attack R a g . The force was rein 800 s forced by Bhopal levie . On the 24th Sir Hugh Rose arrived in front of a h r 2 t R t ga h and invested the town . On the 5 h re con na i sa nce s were made ; the enemy attacked

n off . the bagage , but were drive

1 27 of R a th a rh is one The fortress g a very strong , situated on the spur of a hill . The eastern and southern faces are built on a nearly perpendicular rock , washed by the Bina River . The western i side faces the town , the northern face , w th a i ditch and wall , faces the jungle and the h gher

s . ground , on a pur of which the fortress stands On the 26th Si r Hugh Rose endeavoured to force hi s way through the jungle on the north . but the enemy set it on fire . Meanwhile the rest o a n d drove the of the force occupied the t wn , u garrison i nto the fort . A road was now o t s through the jungle to the top of the spur . Thi spur runs north and south approximately . 27th On the the breaching batteries ope ned . On the 28th a practicable bre ach had been made ; on this day the Raj a of Banpur approached the to relieve the place , but was driven off by — cavalry . During the night 29th 30th the rebels evacuated the town . 30th On the Sir Hugh , with part of the force , followed in pursuit and found the rebels in posi tion near Barodia on the banks of the Bina River . The passage was forced and the rebels completely defeated . Sagar ha d been held by the 3l st Native

Infantry as previously recorded . Sir Hugh Rose reached that place on the 3rd February . Despa“tching a small party to destroy a fort at S a n a da fi on the 8th Sir Hugh marched on a rh ak Th e G ot of . , a fortress very great strength fire of the artillery was so good that the rebels

Not marked on Map .

1 28

1 st K hukwa sa The Brigade reached , near h a n da i ri 5th a C on the M rch . The fortress C h a nda i ri of is of very great strength , situated on a considerable hill . The town was formerly of very great importance . Advancing 6th on the , Stuart was not opposed , though jungles and ravines off ered every facility to the C h a n d a i ri enemy , until about a mile from , when an enclosure was held by the rebels but soon cleared . Pushing on , Stuart occupied the hills e west of the town . After a careful reconnaissanc i 1 3th breach ng batteries were opened on the , 1 nf or and on the 7th the place was stormed . U tun a te ly a letter with directions to the cavalry

e . miscarried , and the rebels escap d pursuit Jhansi is a city of the greatest importance and was the scene of one of the most revolting of the massacres of the Mutiny ; its capture w a s politically of the utmost importance . On the 20th Sir Hugh Rose reached C ha ncha npur and sent the Cavalry and Light

Artillery to invest Jhansi . The same afternoon he received orders from Lord C a n mng and Si r Colin Campbell to move to the relief of the Raj a a Ta nti a of Chark ri then besieged by Topi . se t However Sir Hugh Ro , suppor ed by Sir e e Rob rt Hamilton , decided to continue the sieg of Jhansi , for he considered that the importance wa s to off of Jhansi such , that leave it and turn more than 1 00 miles away to the relief of a politically insignificant place like Charkari would be a grave error . There is no doubt that he was right .

1 30 The fortress of Jhansi stands on a great rock rising out of the plain , and is solidly and skill fully constructed of blocks of granite ; except on the west it is surrounded by the town of Jhansi , a walled city of some 4 miles circumference . The garrison was some men mostly rebel Sepoys .

The Rani herself was in command .

Sir Hugh arrived in front of the place on the 21 st and spent the Whole day in a very careful 25th personal reconnaissance . On the the batteries opened fire on the town , and walls , for Sir Hugh had decided to take the ci ty first . To complete the investment flying camps ” in which were placed detachments of cavalry supported by small detachments of infantry were established on the faces of the town not covered by the actual siege operations .

T a nti a Topi had retired from Cawnpore after his defeat by Sir Colin Campbell to Kalpi . Thence a he proceeded to Charkari and c ptured that place , and under orders from the Rao Sahib now moved own on Jhansi with his men , the Gwalior contin of N u i bs gent , and a large body j in all some the men and 28 guns . The position of

British Commander was one full of peril . If he raised the siege the political consequence would se the R a be rious , and men of the ni would ’ ’ raise T a nti a Topi s force to Sir Hugh s

7 000 . total strength was barely , men Sir Hugh therefore decided to meet Ta nti a Topi with the men not actually engaged in the siege operations . These amounted in all to but men of whom only 500 were British .

1 3 1 During the night Sir Hugh received informa tion that a detachment of the rebels were passing the Be twa of , with the intention turning his left i r and entering Jhansi from the north . S Hugh was obliged to meet this movement and despatched that portion of his men which belonged to l st the Brigade under their Brigadier , Stuart , ims a while he h elf with the rem inder , only about i ’ 900 Ta nt a . , awaited Topi s onset On the morning of the l st April Tantia Topi s deployed his force in two lines , the econd c ms ommanded by hi elf in person , and thus advancing soon drove in the British piquets covering the detachments of the 2nd Brigade led by Sir Hugh in person . The British guns opened ’ fire, but the enemy s advance was not checked . Sir Hugh then adopted one of the boldest manoeuvres made in the whole history of the Mutiny . He massed his horse artillery and sent it with an escort of a squadron of the 1 4th to e nfil a de the ’ enemy s right , he himself with another squad ron attacked the left . By this time the ’ enemy s centre was close to the British line , and the natural confusion caused by these bold attacks it s . caused to he itate In that moment it was lost, for the 3rd Europeans springing to their feet fired a volley and went in with the bayonet . The first line broke and fell back on the second . At the same moment Stuart with the small detachment of the l st Brigade attacked the right detachment of on to the rebels and drove it back the reserve . Ta nti a Topi fired the j ungle and fell back under o Be c ver of his guns across the twa . But the

1 32

6th -7th On the night Sir Hugh moved to his left , and marched round the enemy ’ s right and on th T nti a attacked him the 7 . a Topi was forced to retreat ; unfortunate ly an error of direction of the 2nd Bri gade allowed him to do the this in good order , and heat was so great that the Infantry could not follow , but the Cavalry did what they could . The enemy however retired to a very steadily , though they were obliged ab n 6 1 don nine guns . The British loss was killed and wounded and very many cases of sunstroke .

Advancing slowly on account of the heat , Sir

Hugh marched on Gol a oli on the Jumna . Here he was in communication with a column consisting 88th s of the , the Camel Corp and some Sikhs sent

- by Sir Colin Campbell to cc operate . He also avoided the fortifications on the Kalpi road . Meanwhile the rebels had received an access of

strength and took heart again .

Kalpi is strongly situated , the fort stands on a c rock overlooking the Jumna, while the approa h to the town on the other sides is over ground inter se cte d t in every direc ion by deep nullahs , which make the operations of Artillery and Cavalry very i fii u difficult . This d c lt area was skilfully defended by the rebels . l 6th 1 7 1 8th 1 9th 20th On the , th , , and constant attacks were made by parties of rebels and all ’ repulsed . On the latter day a portion of Maxwell s column crossed the Jumna and j oined Sir Hugh . By the 2 1 st batteries were established by Maxwell on the left bank and Sir Hugh ’s batteries on his right front were in action all day . The

1 34 Camel Corps was sent over by Maxwell to rein force Sir Hugh . On the 22nd the enemy made a desperate and skilfully planned attack , a large force moving against Sir Hugh ’s more or less unguarded left

flank . When a fierce attack there had , it was hoped , drawn the British reserves to that side , the main body suddenly appearing from the numerous nullahs fiercely attacked the British Centre . For a time the skirmishers were forced to fall back , but

- a dashing counter charge cleared the front . At the same time on the left a successful charge drove the rebels back and they gave way everywhere . The broken rebels fled from Kalpi abandoning their great arsenal and all their warlike stores . It would be difli cult to exaggerate the import ’ ance of Sir Hugh Rose s march , whether considered from a political point of view or from the point of pure strategy . Like Sir Colin he was careful to prepare himself before making an advance . In all his engagements he made a personal reconnais sance before he acted . When he acted he did so with vigour and did not hesitate to set in every available man . His operations were conducted in the hot weather , yet the loss of his force by sickness and sunstroke did not prevent the men from mov ing with considerable rapidity .

’ wa s General Whitlock s column , which coneen tra ti n a ba l ur : g at J p , consisted of

Cavalry Brigade : Colonel Lawrence :

1 2th Lancers .

6th and 7th Madras Cavalry .

1 35 Artillery Brigad e Colonel Miller .

Two troops Horse Artillery .

Two light Field Batteries .

Three Companies Foot Artillery . First Infantry Brigade : Colonel Carpenter : r 3 d Madras Europeans . 1 t s and 5th Madras Native Infantry . Second Infantry Brl g a de Colonel M cD uff 4 3rd Regiment . 1 9th Regiment . f 5 th A wing o the 0 Madras Native Infantry . There was already a small force at J a ba lpur

33rd Madras Native Infantry . of 4th 6th a nd Part and Madras Cavalry ,

Some details , in all men . It was the 6th February before Whitlock e reached Jabalpur . His force wa s then cone n tr d 2md a te except the Brigade . On the 1 7th he advan ced very cautiously keeping his whole body united , thus the rebels were only cleared away from his actual line of 5th a march . On the March the column re ched

1 7 . V Sagar , where it halted till the th ery cautiously and slowly advancing through Bandal khand , he now marched in the direction of Banda . By spreading false information the Nawab of Ba nda prepared a very skilful ambush near on 1 8th Kabrai . Whitlock fell into the trap the s r and his troops were surpri ed , the men howeve recovered in an insta nt a nd the enemy fled . The f pursuit was ine fective . On the 1 9th the advanced guard found the enemy on the plain south of Banda , covered by an

1 36

CHAPTER XII .

r l Final Ope a t ons.

The Lessons of the War .

The fall of Lucknow had not completely broken e o e s the reb l p w r in Oudh , and further operation were necessary . For the moment it was to R ohilkha n d considered best move against , where the insurgents under Khan Bahadur Khan were collected at Bareilly . Meanwhile Kunwar Singh had again become

- active in Behar and had re occupied Azamgarh . He was defeated by a small column mainly composed of a wing of the 1 3th Re giment under L u a rd Lord Mark Kerr . To pacify Behar , g was despatched with a strong column . A strong 2nd n of force , Dragoo Guards , eight Regiments

Infantry , four batteries , and a siege train , were left to protect Lucknow . To attack Bareilly four columns was directed to o n converge on that point , Walp le , Pen y and

Jones moving from Lucknow , Seaton from e Fat hgarh .

’ But for an unfortunate repulse to Walpole s ‘ column at the fort of R uya hfl where the gallant e Adrian Hope was killed , the op rations were all

. 5th successful The battle of Bareilly , on the e May , was chiefly remarkable for a most det r

* a Not marked on m p.

1 38 b mined charge by a ody of Ghazi swordsmen . to u The weather was too hot press the purs it , and during the night 5th to 6th May Khan Bahadur

Khan was able to slip away . The rebels joined their friends in Oudh .

’ c After the fall of Kalpi , Sir Hugh Rose s for e e had expect d some rest , but the rebels had a piece of good fortune which forced Sir Hugh to prompt Ta ntia fl action . Topi and the Rani of Jhansi , y ing towards Gwalior , were met by Maharajah ’ i n hi a Sindhia with his forces . S d s troops deserted ; thus the rebe ls be came possessed of the treasure and munitions of war in Gwalior .

se Ta nti a Sir Hugh Ro pursued Topi , caught him up and beat him at Morar close to Gwalior , n i where the Rani of Jhansi was killed . T a t a Topi

fled to Oudh . Behar was pacified after tedious operations by L u a rd g . To destroy the rebels in Oudh many small mov1 n columns were formed which , g swiftly , surrounded the rebel bands and constantly depleted their numbers . The operations were of the most trying character , far more so than the great operations of the war , and were carried out with great c suc ess , and great endurance on the part of the ri fl me n troops . Mounted e were employed for the

first time , and proved of the utmost service . The driving and sweeping Operations bear a certain similarity to those of the latter stages of the Boer

. e war The reb l leaders , who displayed great agility i n a s r esc ping their pursuer , were finally captu ed ,

1 39 or o w m o killed , driven int the s a ps which b und

Nepal . It wa s not till November 1 859 that the last body of s rebels surrendered in Oudh , and the la t

flickering embe rs of revolt were crushed out .

e B fore this , however , the great company which had won India for the Empire had been dissolved , and the "ueen of England proclaimed Empress of u i India . From that time the co ntry , w sely and has e c justly governed , enjoyed p a e within her borders .

In the first chapte r some of the main causes of discontent among the princes and people of India were mentioned . Those particular causes have now m m e practically vanished , yet it ust be ad itt d that British rule is not altogether beloved by our c It is i to subje t peoples . child sh cry out against

of e . the ingratitude these p oples True , we have taken to them peace and plenty , the population has r as out e inc e ed of all measure , justic is done e of so a s without resp ct persons , and , far the British Indian Civil Servants are able to prevent or it , the poor man is safe from the persecution Y extortion of the rich or powerful . et against all this must be set the fact that the British are an alien ra ce . It is painfully true that a nation prefers to be badly governed by its own pe ople

. e than well governed by aliens At first , aft r a e of p riod anarchy , no doubt the blessings of peace a n d prospe rity appear cheap a t the price of t liberty ; but , af er a few years , the price paid

to s e . begins eem exc ssive When , as in the case of a of s s a a India , a cl ss men ari e , s well educ ted

1 40

" “ di cul requires the most t and de licate handling . a Extreme boldness and udacity will go far , and i t is evident from the Mutiny that a small and is as highly mobile force capable of paralysing , s s it were , the movement of in urgents .

In India should a great a nd widespread re bel e s lion br ak out , it would be in the highe t degree s s improbable , that the various bodies of in urgent in the diff erent districts would be willing to one b e combine under the command of leader , he

Mahomme dan or Hindu .

Even were this not the case , it is not to be expected that the rebels would throw up any a great leader , capable of initiating and c rrying through combined operations ; still more unlikely is it that many of the less powerful leaders would work wholly together for a common ca use . Insurgent leaders generally fight each man for his own hand . No doubt groups of insurgents combine at times for certain specific and immediately attainable objects , which being attained the combination soon breaks down . Lastly the insurgents from the necessities of the s s of of case , do not pos e s control the machinery r Gove nment , and have difficulty in creating the administrative departments which alone ma ke an army mobile .

We may therefore generally expect to find , even in a general and widespread rebellion , the rebel force s separated in various more or less distinct bodies , practically confined each to of its own locality , and incapable continu ou s movement beyond that locality . To prevent

1 42 the insurrection spreading it will be best to attack each of these separate forces at n ce s to o ce . Where the ne s ary force take the f o of of ensive is not on the sp t , a show activity must be made while the reinforcements are n arriving . Lastly before the final move agai st any particular body of rebels is made , every possible precaution consistent with rapidity must be taken , to ensure the movement being carried se i right through without pau . There s nothing that so demoralizes irregu lars as restless energy ; when the irregulars are Asiatics continued m s f ovement is till more e ficacious .

The circumstances of the case will almost necessitate an advance into the theatre of war from several directions . This arrangement is often dangerous in regular warfare , but in deal ings with rebe l forces such as might be met with in India the objections are to a great extent invalid . To obtain the full value from the s interior lines situation , an army mu t be highly mobile and efficient .

As e be se h we have s en , this will not the ca wit e s such an enemy . It s ems that in thi particular ’ class of war Colonel C a llwell s doctrine that strategy favours the enemy d oes not quite hold A out ms . t good , and in fact he points this hi elf the same time the a mplification of his doctrine that the object of the regulars must be to fight not to manoeuvre is abundantly true .

In dealings with Asiatics it h a s invariably be en found that the general population favours the stronger party . If there fore the regulars are

1 43 able to inflict decisive defeats on the rebels , and a at the s me time appear from various directions , the impression of superiority will be enhanced . An enemy such as will be met with in such a war even if willing and a nxious to concentrate under one leader will almost certa inly be drawn to disperse his forces by the advance of the regulars from several directions . Sir Hugh Rose ’s campaign in Central India affords very convincing proof of the truth of the se assertions. The enemy never combined to oppose him ; though it is true such an attempt wa s ad Ta nti a m e by Topi , but the attempt was m to ade o late . His advance in two columns found opposition equally divi ded in front of each . His bold and swift operations paralyse d his opponents and caused them to abandon strong positions such as the line of the Betwa almost without fighting . H is victories were a lways rele ntlessly followed up . He did not move until prepared to carry his projected movement through to a conclusion .

e to t is With r gard tac ics , it apparent that the a utmost boldness is necessary . A b yonet charge is s the olution of almost every tactical problem . To enable an infantry inferior in numbers to push a bayonet charge home against the invariably superior numbers of the enemy the guns must F r support the attack with the utmost boldness . o u this purpose , not only must field g ns push to s in clo e range, but horse and field artil lery must be employed in flanking movements . For the attack of houses heavy artillery is

1 44

b m such warfare . It is pro able that had Windha had 5 00 horsemen at Cawnpore he would have defeated Ta nti a Topi instead of suffering a f e reverse . The e fect that even a retirem nt has ’ on the enemy s moral has be en already touched

. t b e a on If a victory canno followed up , retire b ment often ecomes inevitable , the following up of success can only be performed by cavalry . The courage of the opponents must not be c a t s pla ed too low a value , but at the ame time be the it must admitted , that in Mutiny the a rti cu courage of the rebels in the open field , p la rl of c y that their avalry , was conspicuous by its absence . Mr . Sherer who accompanied Have lock from Allahabad to Cawnpore particularly “ notices the laughable way in which rebel cavalry e declin d to come to close quarters. Though this was common in the Mutiny on many occasions , it must be remembered that it was not always so . Perhaps it will never happe n again that British rule in India will be subjecte d to such an ordeal as in those terrible summer months of 1 858 . If it should come it is to be hoped that it will be met with the prompt and resolute action that the History of the Indian Mutiny teaches us to be e ess ntial , and that among soldiers and civilians alike will be found many such men as the

Laurences , Nicholson , Durand , Bartle Frere , a Neill , Havelock , and a thous nd others , for if there is one lesson above all that we may learn from the Mutiny it is the inestimable value of the personal element in India .

1 46 E D 1 A P P N IX . Distributio n of T roops i n In dia a t o utbre a k D m n r n n a c a e n ot h w . w e M uti y . et h e ts s o They n M v e ry n ume ro us i a dra s .

B ritis h . I n ti n u ed . AP P E N D X 1 . ( co )

i h B rit s .

89 M e n

Ban da Etaw ah

1 48

on ti n u d APPE N D I X I . ( c e )

L a h r i v i s i o e D o n .

B i i h . r t s N a ti v e .

P e sh a w a r Di v i si on .

M a d ra s C e n t re Di v i si on .

1 a n d a S t . T M t . homas w i ng Arcot N ellore B a nga lor S eri n gapatam M ad ukarai M a n gal ur

1 5 0 n ti n ued . APP E N D I X 1 . (co )

n B h . S t a ti o . ritis

M asu l ipatam R usse lkon da h Vi z ia nagram B e rham p ur C uttuck Vi z agapatam Dha v a le shv a ra m

Tri ch in opol i Palayam kottai "uilo n Ja cka ta lla K a n n an u r Calic ut M a liya pura m Bellari K adapa K ar n ul

1 5 1 n AP P E N D IX I. ( co ti n u e d)

S a on . t ti B ritis h . N a ti v e

mb a Bo y b out h e rn D i v i si o n .

1 52

1 n i n APPE N D I X] . ( co t u ed)

— m n N . B It c a a th . ust be spe i lly oted th t e B ritish Ho rse B a tte ries a n d the C ompa n ie s w hic h

r F a n d S B a r c n a u fo med ield iege tte ies , o sisted bo t

a of B r a of n a v r In v r h lf itish , h lf ti e t oops . e y ma n y ca ses the n a tive gun n e r s a n d drive r s dese rted a n d join ed the mutin ee r s th u s in c re a sin g

r n r f ra n r r m n thei umbe s o t i ed a tille y e .

This list a cc o un ts f or the w hole of the E uropea n F o rc e a n d f or

Th irty -e ight Re gim e n ts of Cav alry On e h un dre d a nd s e ve nty -eight Regime n ts of I nfantry

of the Na tiv e Army .

The re w e re fo ur na tiv e In fa n try C o rps e m

i n S n a r H n k n a n d n da a n ployed i g po e , o g o g the A m

a n r e ha d b n ba n d r out Isl ds , th e ee dis ed befo e the

brea k of revolt a nd five mo re w e re n ew ly ra ised

o n r n r or w r c a r i n d a c m n s the f o tie s e e s tte ed et h e t ,

ma kin g up th e tota l of 1 90 N a tiv e In fa n t ry m R egi ents .

W r a r a v a r on e R m n ha d ith eg d to the C l y , egi e t

n d a n e r u r a of re bee isb ded b fo e the o tb e k volt , it is n ot quite clea r how the rema in ing th ree of the f tota l o 42 w e re dist ributed .

1 5 4

AP P E N DIX III.

Complete list o f R ein fo rceme n ts a nd R e lie f S

ll r d . se n t to In dia . N ot a w e e employe

S e ve n Re gim e n ts of Ca v alry (tw o se nt i n re l ie f)

2 n n u d 3 rd n G u d . d Dragoo G ar s . Dragoo ar s

l st 7 th

7 th H ussars 8 th L ight Dragoo n s 1 7 th L igh t Dragoo n s

T hir ty -n in e Re gim e n ts of I n fa n try (fo ur i n re l i e f)

F rom E ngla n d 7 th 1 9th 2oth 34th 3 8 th 42 nd 44th 5 4th 5 6 th 3 rd/60th 7 9 th 6 6 th

2 n h 2 n R r . 1 8 th 7 d 8 8 th 9 7 t d/ . B . 3 d/R B

5 1 st 98 th 94th 6 8 th 6 9th 7 l st

9 2n d — F rom C hi n a E " p e ditio n ary F orce z 23 rd 8 2 n d 9otb — Prom M a uriti us z Wi ng 4th

C e ylo n : m Wi ng 37 t h — Cap e C olony z l 3 th 8 9 th 95 th 2n d/60th

8 0th S l st

Po ur T roops Royal H ors e Artill e ry S e ve n F ie ld Batte ri e s Royal Artill e ry S e ve n te e n Com pa n ie s Royal Arti ll e ry

F i ve n i E Com pa e s R .

1 5 6 occurred to the railway tra c , and the work of Chamberlain ’s (afterwards Nicholson ’s) movable column would have been far more spee dily a ccom s pli shed . It is however probable that the marche of this column through the length and breadth f of the Punj ab had a very good political e fect , by showing the British arms throughout the country ; this eff ect would have been lost had the column t moved from place to place by rail . However hat e c may be , its work would have b en ac omplished with much greater rapidity and it would have been free much earlier to move to the assistance of the Delhi force . The losses by battle and sick ness , reduced the original Delhi force by many hundreds of men during the months that elapsed before the arrival of the movable column , and of the siege train , these losses would have been obvia ted by the earlier arrival of the Punj ab reinforcements at Delhi , and it is reasonable to conclude that Delhi would therefore have fallen in

July and not in September .

Turning to the other side of the theatre of war , in view of the fact that Behar was at first passive , and that the 1 st Madras Europeans and 84th m a e Regi ent could , had railways existed , h ve b en 25th at Benares and Allahabad by the May , we may I think fairly assume that Cawnpore would d ld have been relieved . A elay wou however have then occurred , before Havelock would have received the reinforcements from the Persian e Exp ditionary Force , and the China Expedition ary Force . It cannot therefore be fairly assumed e that Lucknow could have been reli ved , by ’ Havelock s first attempt .

1 58 In considering the advantages for Havelock ’s advance of railway communications as far as

Allahabad , one must not loose sight of the fact that Havelock’s losses were principally from sick ness ; much of this would have been avoided by a better system of transport to the front , his force b hi s would therefore have een larger , and first attempt to enter Lucknow might have succeeded .

On the Bombay side , in the same way , Durand at Mau could have been more quickly reinforced . To the rebels it does not appear th at railways would have been of much service . It is probable from previous experience that one of the first acts of the rebels would have been to destroy all the railways within their zone of occu e patiou . It is in the highest degr e unlikely that they would have tried to employ them , to move their troops from one side of the theatre of war to another , with a view to utilizing their , strategi cally , satisfactory position , holding as they did “ ” the interior lines With regard to the great numbers employed on the lines of communication it does not seem that railways would have econ o mi z ed on this point . The line from Calcutta would have had to have been guarded by as many men as were actually employed in the Mutiny in safeguarding the road . On the whole however we may say that railways would have very greatly facilitated the task of the

British . The prompt relief of Cawnpore and the saving of valuable lives lost there , and daily lost b y sickness , would have enabled the British to localize the disturbances far more readily . It is

1 59 quite possible that th e Behar mutinies would never have taken place had it bee n possible to deal more h promptly with t e Cawnpore rebels. In the latte r stages of the war and in the guer illa operations railways would not have helped the British very largely except that they would have greatly reduce d the amount of transport it

was necessary to collect . To sum up we may say that the existence of a railway system in India in 1 857 such as now exists f would have been wholly in avour of the British , to o have enabled them l calize the disturbances , s to relieve Cawnpore , to capture Delhi much ooner , and by hastening the operations to avoid the

terrible wastage by sickness.

1 00

U N IVE R SIT Y O F C AL IF O R N IA L I BR AR Y

L os An geles

T h b ok D U E on th e l a d a a m d l w is o is st te st pe b e o .

' -U art s LD

F or m L 9—S e r i e s 4 9 3 9