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Right-Wing Populist Parties and the Mellowing Down of Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe Under the Influence of Europeanization

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Right-Wing Populist Parties and the Mellowing Down of Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe Under the Influence of Europeanization Sociology and Anthropology 5(2): 117-123, 2017 http://www.hrpub.org DOI: 10.13189/sa.2017.050201 Right-wing Populist Parties and the Mellowing Down of Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe under the Influence of Europeanization Philip Dandolovi Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of Bath, England Copyright©2017 by authors, all rights reserved. Authors agree that this article remains permanently open access under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License Abstract This paper examines two cases in which the and 2000s in the case of two Central & Eastern European European Union (mainly through its normative influences) member states of the EU that have successfully escaped from reduces the playing space for nationalist parties or is a factor the shadow of Euroscepticism and are currently in their declining electoral fortunes, which nonetheless does characterized by a pro-European consensus at the political not result in a marked transformation of the parties’ level. In the aftermath of the collapse of totalitarianism in ideologies in a staunchly anti-EU fashion. The Ataka party in 1989, the strong influence of pro-EU voices notwithstanding, Bulgaria and the HZDS in Slovakia both exemplify the [2] the firm anchoring of Bulgaria and Slovakia into the EU principle of charismatic leadership and are regarded as family of nations was far from guaranteed. However, a strongly focused on nationalism, while also exhibiting combination of factors such as the skillful maneuvering of populist and anti-establishment leanings. Ataka reached the local politicians, the EU’s instrumental and normative height of its popular support between the mid and late 2000s leverage, a serious commitment displayed by civil society and is currently represented in the National Parliament of actors towards achieving membership as well as a somewhat Bulgaria. On the other hand, the HZDS was a significant surprising ability of formerly staunchly Eurosceptic parties factor in Slovak politics between the Velvet Divorce and the to reform and adapt, eventually brought the EU question out late 1990s, but is no longer active, as it was dissolved in of the sphere of conflict politics. January 2014. The conclusion reached by comparing the fortunes of these factions is that encouraging the imposition of a direct or indirect “cordon sanitaire” by the mainstream 2 . Ataka parties on anti-establishment ones under the direction of the EU could actually have a beneficial effect in terms of altering The Bulgarian nationalist-populist Ataka party was the party’s orientation and moving its opposition to the EU established in April 2005 as a result of the merger of the within the “soft Euroscepticism” spectrum. National Movement for Saving the Fatherland (NMSF), the Bulgarian National-Patriotic Party (BNPP), and the Union of Keywords Euroscepticism, Europeanization, Patriotic Forces (UPF).[3] The main public relations anchor Nationalism, Populism, Eastern Europe, Slovakia, Bulgaria of Ataka at the time was SKAT television (which had come to life in 1992 and was notable for its nationalist orientations).[4, p.14] SKAT is currently no longer affiliated with Ataka and has thrown its weight behind its own nationalist party – the National Front for the Salvation of 1 . Introduction Bulgaria (NFSB), which is (as of 2016) chaired by Valeri The various manifestations of Euroscepticism and the Simeonov. [5] strategies through which the EU manages to “insert itself” In addition, a weekly newspaper under the name of Nova into the context of domestic political competition continue to Zora (New Dawn) closely linked with Ataka at the time of its be a topic of salience from the standpoint of both founding.[6, p.30] The rise of the formation caught many policy-makers and regular citizens. In a time period that has analysts by surprise, as support for Ataka skyrocketed in the seen a flurry of networking and electoral successes on the days immediately preceding the elections, which was part of political parties with an explicitly anti-EU profile contrary to the expectations of pre-election polls.[7] The (mainly in Western Europe), [1] this study sets the clock results of its first showing at the 2005 Bulgarian national back and looks at the Eurosceptic undercurrents in the 1990s elections were regarded as an accomplishment (for the 118 Right-wing Populist Parties and the Mellowing Down of Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe under the Influence of Europeanization standards of a fringe and newly emerged actor), because it the Freedom Party’s inclusion in the new Austrian gained 21 seats in the Bulgarian National Assembly government) was deemed to have left some serious scars on (collecting 8% of the votes). In this way it firmly established the EU, especially with regard to the Europeans’ perception a presence in the Bulgarian Parliament by becoming the of its legitimacy. Two of the principal critiques that were fourth-largest party, bettering the results of all three of its raised against the EU sanctions were tied to the dubious legal center-right political rivals. [6, p.27] basis for the EU conduct (implying that the EU had been In the 2005-2007 periods (before the attainment of the EU guilty of unwarranted interference into the domestic order of membership by Bulgaria in 2007) Ataka’s appearance was a state), and the potential backfire effect in terms of generally greeted with consternation and derision by the empowerment of radical rightist actors within Austria and mainstream actors. A clear containment policy was exercised other European states.[11, pp.25-26] During the towards Ataka by the other parties in the Bulgarian National pre-accession period the Euro parties did not confine Assembly. For instance, all the other relevant parties themselves to the mere “coaching” of their Bulgarian distanced themselves from any cooperation with Ataka after partners. In early 2006 a number of MEPs sent out a the nationalists became part of the BNA sessions.[8] In proclamation, which condemned Ataka and emphasized the March 2006 Ataka’s populist antecedent National need to protect Bulgaria against neo-totalitarianism. [6, p.33] Movement for Stability and Progress (NDSV) criticized the Dutch MEP Els de Groen, who used to be a member of the destructive tone of Siderov and its “ghastly chauvinism”, delegation to the EU-Bulgaria Joint Parliamentary which “set in apart” from other political blocs in Bulgaria.[8] Committee, was possibly the most vociferous in its Ataka’s proposals were generally coolly received by the condemnation of Ataka, branding it as an “offspring of the other parties; to take one example, the amendments to the secret services”. [12, p.618] 1998 Law on Bulgarian Citizenship that were suggested by In addition, there was arguably a natural willingness on the party in 2006 and envisioned the removal of the right to the part of mainstream Bulgarian parties (tied to domestic dual citizenship for non-ethnic Bulgarians were considerations) to oblige and follow the advice of EU actors. overwhelmingly rejected.[9, p.245] This trend of isolating One implied impetus for the shunning of Ataka could be Siderov’s party continued in the later months of 2006 - linked to the trepidations (especially manifested by the during the Bulgarian presidential elections held in October parties in government) that by questioning some of the and November 2006 Siderov was the lone wolf and could not unwritten rules of the Bulgarian ethnic model, Ataka could count on the support of the established parties.[6, p.33] The sow the seeds of discord between Bulgaria and the EU by NGOs and human rights groups were no more inclined to encouraging enhanced scrutiny of the former’s minority treat Ataka with kid gloves. For instance, the president of the rights record. Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (BHC) Krasimir Kanev Since the fall of communism Bulgaria has displayed pride turned the tables on Ataka and placed the ball in its own in being a peaceful country, in which ethnic issues hardly court by characterizing it as an anti-constitutional. This was enter the realm of security politics. The emergence of Ataka due to what he dubbed as racist rhetoric against the and its anti-minority rhetoric was viewed as a threat to the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), allegedly attempts of the other parties to keep the matter of inter-ethnic having creeped in during Ataka’s questioning of the relations in Bulgaria confined to the backstage. [13, p.808] constitutionality of the Turkish minority party. Kanev even As early as November 2006 sociologist Teodor Dechev depicted the party’s pronouncements as transcending the (drawing in part on some of political analyst Ivan Krastev’s radicalism exhibited by Jörg Haider and Jean-Marie Le ideas) identified three possible scenarios for the future Pen.[7] development of Ataka.[14] The first one envisioned a There have also been strong indications that Europarties disintegration of Ataka due to blows delivered by other played a significant role in persuading their mainstream nationalistic parties as well as the hostility of the media Bulgarian national party counterparts not to allow Ataka to towards the party. Alternatively, it also foresaw the cling to any illusions that it could be in a position to govern possibility of Ataka self-sabotaging as a result of internal country. It has been gauged that the delicate pressure (but squabbling over the structure of the party and the accusations also accompanied by hints that Bulgaria’s EU membership of nepotism, which were frequently leveled at Siderov when could be compromised) from the European People’s Party it came to high-level appointments.[15] The second scenario (EPP), Party of the European Socialists (PES), and others predicted that Ataka would convert the negative energy from helped shape the attitudes of Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the ill-disposed media and the other parties’ accusatory NDSV, and the moderate right-wing parties in Bulgarian discourses into the garnering of increased sympathy from politics towards Ataka.
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