CH 24 Guilty Pleas
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GUILTY PLEAS ............................................................................................. 1 §24-1 Generally ...................................................................................................... 1 §24-2 Waiver of Counsel .................................................................................... 11 §24-3 Plea Bargaining ........................................................................................ 12 §24-4 Unfulfilled Promises ................................................................................ 27 §24-5 Voluntary Pleas ........................................................................................ 35 §24-6 Admonishments ........................................................................................ 42 §24-6(a) Generally ......................................................................................... 42 §24-6(b) Nature of Charge ........................................................................... 52 §24-6(c) Rights to Plead Not Guilty, Go to Trial, and Confront Witnesses .................................................................................................... 53 §24-6(d) Possible Sentence .......................................................................... 53 §24-6(e) Right to Appeal .............................................................................. 67 §24-7 Factual Basis ............................................................................................. 70 §24-8 Motion to Vacate Plea or Reconsider Sentence; Appeal ................. 72 §24-8(a) Generally ......................................................................................... 72 §24-8(b) Procedure on Motion .................................................................... 89 §24-8(b)(1) Generally .............................................................................. 89 §24-8(b)(2) Rule 604(d) Certificates ..................................................... 94 §24-9 Guilty Plea as Waiver of Errors .......................................................... 106 §24-10 Stipulated Bench Trial .................................................................... 111 §24-11 Juvenile Proceedings ....................................................................... 114 i GUILTY PLEAS §24-1 Generally United States Supreme Court U.S. v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586 (2002) The Federal Constitution does not require that before pleading guilty, a criminal defendant must receive "impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses" or information supporting affirmative defenses. Thus, the constitution does not prohibit use of a "fast track" plea bargaining process which requires the defendant to waive the right to receive such information. The court stressed that the right to receive exculpatory or impeachment information concerns the fairness of the defendant's trial, not the voluntariness of a guilty plea. In addition, the "fast track" plea bargaining process used here required the State to provide any evidence of actual innocence. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) Pleading guilty does not require a "higher" standard of competency than that used to determine fitness to stand trial. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) A defendant may plead guilty while proclaiming his innocence, if he intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of guilt. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) A guilty plea record must show a waiver of the rights against compulsory self-incrimination, to trial by jury and to confront one's accusers. A waiver of these rights cannot be presumed from a silent record. U.S. v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) A defendant does not have a constitutional right to have his guilty plea accepted by a court. Illinois Supreme Court People v. Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162 As part of a negotiated guilty plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated unlawful use of weapons and in exchange the State nol-prossed the eight remaining counts. Years later defendant filed a 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment (735 ILCS 5/2-1401) seeking to vacate his conviction since it was void under Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116. The State conceded that Aguilar voided defendant’s conviction and filed a motion to reinstate some of the charges it had nol-prossed. The circuit court vacated defendant’s conviction and allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea, but denied the State’s motion to reinstate the charges. The Supreme Court, with one justice dissenting, held that the statute of limitations barred the State from reinstating the nol-prossed charges. When a circuit court vacates a judgment and allows a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, the case returns to its status before the judgment was made. And generally the State may in this situation ask the court to reinstate nol-prossed charges. But here the statute of limitations constituted an absolute bar against reinstating the charges since the three-year limitations period had already run. 1 720 ILCS 5/3-5. Although a statute of limitations period may be tolled, the court found no authority for the State’s argument that it is tolled when a defendant successfully vacates his conviction after the period of limitations has expired on charges that were dismissed as part of a plea agreement. The court specifically rejected the State’s argument that the “prosecution” against defendant was still pending and had not expired because defendant’s case never had a final disposition on appeal. The court refused to read into the statute “exceptions, limitations, or conditions” that were not plainly spelled out. The State was barred from reinstating the nol-prossed charges. People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817 Jurisdiction stems from the Illinois Constitution, which assigns original jurisdiction to the circuit court in all “justiciable matters” except where the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction. The court rejected the argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea on a count on which a nolle prosequi order had been entered on the State’s motion and which had not been refiled or reinstated. To nolle prosequi a charge means simply that the State indicates an unwillingness to prosecute. Once the charge is nol prossed, the proceedings are terminated with respect to that particular charge, but the defendant is not acquitted. If a nolle prosequi is entered before jeopardy attaches, the State may reprosecute the defendant subject to other relevant statutory or constitutional defenses and so long as there is no harassment, bad faith, or fundamental unfairness. Because jeopardy had not yet attached, the State’s termination of the criminal prosecution by a nolle prosequi gave the State the right to either file a new charge or ask to vacate the dismissal and reinstate the original charge. The failure to do either did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction, however, because an aggravated criminal sexual abuse indictment is a “justiciable matter” involving an offense created by the Criminal Code. Thus, even if the indictment was legally defective due to the nolle prosequi, the trial court had jurisdiction over the cause and could accept the guilty plea. In dissent, Justices Freeman and Burke found that unless the State took steps to reinstate the nol prossed charge, there was no “justiciable matter” on which a guilty plea could have been entered. People v. Absher, 242 Ill.2d 77, 950 N.E.2d 659 (2011) Generally, contract law principles apply to negotiated guilty pleas. Thus, neither party can unilaterally abrogate its obligations under the plea agreement. By entering a fully negotiated plea and accepting an intensive probation sentence which required him to submit to searches by the probation department and agree that any evidence discovered in such searches was admissible at trial, defendant waived any Fourth Amendment issues concerning such evidence. The court acknowledged, however, that the waiver would not extend to searches that had no possible law enforcement objective or which so far exceeded any legitimate objective as to justify an inference that the officers’ purpose was mere harassment. The court also stressed that it expressed no opinion concerning the validity of a similar condition where the defendant enters an open plea or is involuntarily placed on probation. People v. Urdiales, 225 Ill.2d 354, 871 N.E.2d 669 (2007) Defendant offered to plead guilty but mentally ill, but the State objected. The parties agreed to allow the trial judge to hear evidence before determining whether to accept the plea. The Supreme Court found that the preponderance of the evidence standard applied at the evidentiary hearing. The court also 2 found the trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the plea of guilty but mentally ill. People v. Hall, 217 Ill.2d 324, 841 N.E.2d 913 (2005) A defendant challenging a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel must show that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable and that defendant was prejudiced. Where defense counsel repeatedly stated that lack of knowledge of a child's presence inside a stolen vehicle was not a defense to aggravated kidnapping, and that advice was clearly erroneous, there was a substantial showing that counsel's