Woodrow Wilson Wouldn'tyield
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Treaty of Versailles I
Treaty of Versailles I. Wilson’s Vision forWorld Peace A. Fourteen Points to End All Wars 1. Wilson’s first goal was to eliminate the causes of wars by calling for an end to secret agreements and alliances, protecting freedom of the seas, and reducing armaments. 2. Wilson’s second goal was to ensure the right to self-determination so ethnic groups and nationalities could live under governments of their own choosing. 3. The last of the fourteen points called for setting up a League of Nations to ensure world peace. B. Wilson’s Unusual Decisions 1. Wilson broke with tradition by traveling out of the United States while president to lead the U.S. delegation to the peace conference in Paris. 2. Wilson weakened his position when he asked Americans to support Democrats in the 1918 midterm elections, but then the Republicans won a majority in Congress. 3. Wilson made matters worse by choosing all Democrats and only one Republican to serve as the other delegates to the peace conference. II. Ideals Versus Self-Interest at Versailles A. Peace Without Victory Gives Way to War Guilt and Reparations 1. Wilson’s vision for a peaceful world was different from the vision of other Big Four leaders. 2. France’s Georges Clemenceau was most concerned about French security. 3. David Lloyd George wanted Germany to accept full responsibility for the war through a warguilt clause and reparations. 4. Wilson tried to restrain from punishing Germany but ultimately agreed to gain support for the League of Nations. B. Self-Determination Survives, but Only in Europe 1. -
Panama Treaty 9 77
Collection: Office of the Chief of Staff Files Series: Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files Folder: Panama Canal Treaty 9/77 Container: 36 Folder Citation: Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files, Panama Canal Treaty 9/77, Container 36 NATIONAL ARCHIVES ANO RECORDSSe'RVIC'E ~~7'",,!:.;, WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIALLlBR~~IESj FORM OF CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE DATE RESTRICTION DOCUMENT caDle American Imbassy Panama to Secretary of State '/27/77 memo Panama Canal treaty negotiations (S PP.) ca. '/27 A memo aicE Inderfurth to IJ '1'/77 A memo Elmer T. Irooks to ZI '1'/77 A ..,b thomson to 3C ..... ~~ I} ~tI~o '/2'/7~ ...... - ----"------,----,---,-,-,---,- ----'-1---'"--''' FILE LOCATION Chief of Staff (Jordan)/lox , of • (org.)/Panama Canal Treaty~Sept. 1'77 RESTRICTION CODES (A) Closed by Executive Order 12065 governing access to national security information. I B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document. IC) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION GSA FORM 7122 (REV. 1-81) MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINCTO!': MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN 1-1.9. DATE: AUGUST 30, 1977 SUBJECT: PANAMA CANAL ENDORSEMENTS 1. The AFL-CIO Executive Council officially adopted :::::',:-·· :.... ·;;h~i: -: a strong statement in favor of the new Panama .~'",. , .:.; Canal Treaties today. Mr. Meany, in a press con ference afterwards, said that the resolution "means full support, using whatever influence we have on Fi· Members of Congress - it certainly means lobbying." In addition, we have a commitment from John Williams, ...... President of the Panama Canal Pilots Association, and from Al Walsh of the Canal Zone AFL-CIO, to testify q~11 ~llli, at Senate hearings that the employee provisions / -~ ... -
Nfhs EVIL Mil© with a HOLT MAME” the Leagme ©F Hatlens
"The evil thing with a holy name"; The League of Nations as an issue in the presidential election of 1920 Item Type text; Thesis-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Murray, Edward Parham, 1929- Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 03/10/2021 19:14:02 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/319154 NfHS EVIL mil© WITH A HOLT MAME” The Leagme ©f Hatlens asan Issme im the Ppesitential Eleetiom ©f 192© by Edward 3?0 Murray AS submitted to the faculty ©f the Department ©f Hlst©ry partial fulfillment ©f the requirements for the degree MASTER OE ARTS' in the ©radtaate CollegeUniversity ©f Arizona This thesis has been submitted in partial fml#- fillment ef requirements f@r an advanced degree at the University ©f Arizona and is deposited in the Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Libraryo Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission^ provided that accurate acknowledgment of source (La made* Requests for permission for extended quotation from or repr©= duetion ©f this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the dean of the Graduate Gollege when in their judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship* In all other instances> howevers per= mission must be obtained from the author= TABLE OF GONTESTS C o 6 o O O O O O O O o O 6 o o THE GENESIS #F M IDEA ,AE) AH 1SSEE „ . -
The Debate Over League of Nations
The Debate in the United States over the League of Nations — http://edsitement.neh.gov/view_lesson_plan.asp?id=475 The Debate Over the League of Nations Student Name ___________________________________________________ Date ________________ Viewpoint Represented by: Positions Strong Internationalists President Woodrow Wilson Newton Baker James M. Cox William McAdoo Limited Internationalists William H. Taft Former President William H. Taft objected to putting the U.S. in a position in which it could be forced into a war against its will. Nevertheless, he was in favor of the League of Nations because he believed the chance of such a war occurring quite unlikely. The League’s power to enforce a universal boycott against a country should prevent such a necessity. A world movement immune to a boycott would oblige the League’s members to unite in military action. As the only sensible course of action, that would be a war in which the U.S. would willingly participate. It could not be compelled to fight. Mild Reservationists Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock Strong Reservationists Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Senator (and presidential candidate) Warren G. Harding Irreconcilables Senator William Borah Permission is granted to educators to reproduce this worksheet for classroom use The Debate in the United States over the League of Nations — http://edsitement.neh.gov/view_lesson_plan.asp?id=475 Hypothetical Position Statements on the League of Nations Student Name ___________________________________________________ Date ________________ The following statements may be used in the assessment activity for the lesson The Debate in the United States over the League of Nations. Most are paraphrases of statements by participants. -
Minutes of the Senate Democratic Conference
MINUTES OF THE SENATE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE 1903±1964 MINUTES OF THE SENATE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE Fifty-eighth Congress through Eighty-eighth Congress 1903±1964 Edited by Donald A. Ritchie U.S. Senate Historical Office Prepared under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate U.S. Government Printing Office Washington 105th Congress S. Doc. 105±20 U.S. Government Printing Office Washington: 1998 Cover illustration: The Senate Caucus Room, where the Democratic Conference often met early in the twentieth century. Senate Historical Office. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Senate Democratic Conference (U.S.) Minutes of the Senate Democratic Conference : Fifty-eighth Congress through Eighty-eighth Congress, 1903±1964 / edited by Donald A. Ritchie ; prepared under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. United States. Congress. SenateÐHistoryÐ20th centuryÐSources. 2. Democratic Party (U.S.)ÐHistoryÐ20th centuryÐSources. I. Ritchie, Donald A., 1945± . II. United States. Congress. Senate. Office of the Secretary. III. Title. JK1161.S445 1999 328.73'07657Ðdc21 98±42670 CIP iv CONTENTS Foreword ...................................................................................... xiii Preface .......................................................................................... xv Introduction ................................................................................. xvii 58th Congress (1903±1905) March 16, 1903 .................................................................... -
The League That Wasn't
stephen wertheim The League That Wasn’t: American Designs for a Legalist-Sanctionist League of Nations and the Intellectual Origins of International Organization, 1914–1920* In 1919 “isolationism” was a word not yet in circulation, much less a disposition seen as the principal antagonist of a new Wilsonian “internationalism.” One could be forgiven for assuming otherwise. So many narratives of the political fight over the League of Nations portray President Woodrow Wilson as the embodiment of a monolithic U.S. internationalism that represented the only meaningful alternative to traditional isolationism. Such books, produced even today but first written surrounding World War II—when “isolationism” entered common usage and “internationalism” came to connote nonisolationism—tell the defeat of the Versailles Treaty as a two-sided morality tale. Wilson’s retro- spective sympathizers tar League opponents for hewing to naïve nonentangle- ment, hidebound nationalism, or greedy partisanship. Realist critics, meanwhile, offer no less simple a schematization, seeing their naysaying selves in Wilson’s contemporaneous foes.1 The twilight of the Cold War illuminated some creative intellectual positions among League opponents. Ralph Stone showed that senators irreconcilable to Wilson’s Treaty of Versailles championed international engagement nonethe- *My thanks to Benjamin Coates, Matthew Connelly, John Milton Cooper, Robert David Johnson, Ernest May, Mark Mazower, Adam McKeown, Thomas Meaney, Stefano Recchia, Simon Stevens, and the anonymous reviewers -
Was Hiram Johnson a True Isolationist During World War I and the League of Nations Debate?
Was Hiram Johnson a True Isolationist During World War I and the League of Nations Debate? Michael K Whitcomb On June 2, 1919, Hiram Johnson rose to his feet in the Senate chamber to deliver a blistering attack against America’s membership in the League of Nations: This League means that American boys shall police the world; that all the tottering nations of the earth shall be upheld by our blood and our bone .. It means that I must abandon the lessons of my youth, which until this moment have been the creed of my manhood, of American ideals, American principles, and American patriotism. .. The issue is America. And I am an American.’ This speech went beyond itemizing specific flaws of the League to articulate a brooding suspicion of foreign governments, a fierce embrace of American patriotism, and contempt for his nemesis, President Woodrow Wilson. After his speech, Johnson embarked on a national speaking tour to denounce the League of Nations. In most cities he drew larger crowds than Wilson did at the same venue just a few days before. By seizing on the League of Nations as the central issue for his presidential bid for the 1920 election, Johnson painted himself as the antithesis of everything Wilson stood for, and in doing so he cemented his place in history as an isolationist. Johnson’s comparatively parochial background prior to 1917 as a western governor, dedicated to domestic Progressive reforms with negligible exposure to international relations, only reinforced his propensity for isolationist leanings. He also displayed staunchly isolationist behavior later in his career when he opposed America’s participation in the World Court (1935), the modification of the Neutrality Act (1939), the Lend-Lease Bill (1941), and membership in the United Nations (1945). -
Treaty of Versailles / Ratification Battle
"Cite the major provisions of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) and compare it to Wilson’s original plan for ‘peace without victory’ following World War I. Assess the battle waged between Wilson and Congress over ratification of the Treaty of Versailles." ⇒ Consequences of World War I: An Overview • Wilson’s idealistic plan of "peace without victory" -- known as the Fourteen Points -- was not welcome at the peace conference by those wishing to punish Germany and gain post-war advantages. Wilson compromised on most points in order to guarantee the formation of the League of Nations . ⇒ Highlights of Wilson’s Fourteen Points *Self-Determination -each nationality or ethnic group would have a say in how it was governed or ruled. *Freedom of Seas -nations would travel the seas unobstructed in peacetime and during war. *Open Diplomacy -secret treaties would no longer be allowed. *Reduction of Armaments -to prevent future "arms races". *League of Nations -"a general association of nations…for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." The Versailles Treaty • To defend his Fourteen Points, Wilson personally participated in the peace conference . • Other heads of state at Versailles made it clear that they wanted revenge against Germany and compensation in the form of reparations and territory. They did not share Wilson’s idea of peace without victory. David Lloyd George (Britain), Georges Clemenceau (France), and Vittorio Orlando (Italy) met with Wilson almost daily as the "Big Four" . • After months of argument, the president reluctantly agreed to compromise on most of his Fourteen Points. -
Copyright By- David Henry Jennings
Copyright by- David Henry Jennings 1959 PRESIDENT WILSON'S TOUR IN SEPTEMBER, 1919: A STUDY OF FORCES OPERATING DURING THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS FIGHT DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University t By DAVID HENRY JENNINGS, B. A ., A. M. ****** The Ohio State University 1958 Approved by A dviser Department of History PREFACE In view of the many articles and books occasioned by the recent Wilson Centennial and the current in te re st in American foreign policy, it is, indeed, surprising to note that no full length study of Wilson's transcontinental tour of September, 1919 exists. Present publication on the western trip is confined to individual chapters of longer works and b rief general essays.^ A communication from Arthur S. Link indicates that this topic w ill not receive extended coverage in his future volumes on Woodrow Wilson. The status of research indicates the need for a more complete account of the "Swing Around the Circle" than has hitherto been presented. It is hoped that this dissertation meets this need. The other major contribution of this thesis lies in the field of evaluation. The analysis of Wilson's "New Order" attempts to make a significant clarifi cation and synthesis in a relatively neglected area. The study, also, endeavors to identify the forces at work and appraise their effect on the League of Nations debate in September, 1919. Because present day opinion inclines toward the view that the transcontinental tour was a mistake, extended examination is undertaken to see why Wilson should have gone on the trip and why the tour failed. -
Representative Northwest Senators and the League of Nations
University of Montana ScholarWorks at University of Montana Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers Graduate School 1952 Representative Northwest senators and the League of Nations Philip Williams The University of Montana Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Williams, Philip, "Representative Northwest senators and the League of Nations" (1952). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 8649. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8649 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ÜEPBESEKTATIVfî NORTHWEST SENATORS AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS by PHILIP WILLIAMS, JR. B.A., University of Delaware, 1948 Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY 1952 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: EP39450 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMT D<#s«rt*tion Pubft*h»rvg UMI EP39450 Published by ProQuest LLC (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. -
Henry Cabot Lodge, the Treaty of Versailles, and Integrity
Breaking the Heart of the World: Henry Cabot Lodge, the Treaty of Versailles, and Integrity Handout A: Narrative BACKGROUND World War I was fought from 1914-1918 and claimed the lives of nearly 9.5 million combatants. The United States entered the war in April 1917, when Congress voted to declare war based upon President Woodrow Wilson’s war message arguing for American intervention to “make the world safe for democracy.” An armistice ending the war was signed in November 1918, and the war concluded on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of that month. The Allied Powers of Great Britain, France, and Italy sought a punitive peace against Germany and blamed that nation for starting the war. President Wilson, on the other hand, argued in his “Fourteen Points” for a lenient peace settlement that would prevent Germany from seeking revenge and prevent another war. At the core of his proposal was a League of Nations that would help prevent war through deliberation. After months of negotiation, the final Treaty of Versailles, which included provisions for establishing the League of Nations, was released for review and approval by each country’s government. The treaty included the controversial Article X, which required League member nations to go to war whenever another League member was attacked. Some of the U.S. senators who would be asked to vote on ratification of the treaty were “irreconcilables” who completely opposed to the treaty while others, like Henry Cabot Lodge, were “reservationists” who would consider voting for the treaty assuming some changes were made, including the removal of Article X. -
Introduction
Introduction VI. AMERICA ON THE WORLD STAGE resident Woodrow Wilson and Senator Henry Cabot PLodge, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, ar- ticulated two very diferent visions of how to make permanent America’s ascendancy on the world stage and how to use America’s new power to create a lasting global peace. The two men disagreed ideologically and, to make matters worse, they also hated one another personally. The Republican Lodge was angry at Wilson, a Democrat, for not having included any prominent Republicans in the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference that produced the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Furthermore, under the Constitution, the president has the authority to negotiate treaties, but the Senate must approve them by a two-thirds majority. Lodge did not believe that he or his fellow senators had any obligation to approve the Treaty of Versailles simply because the president wanted them to do so. Nor did opponents of the League of Nations believe that the Constitution permitted them to cede the criti- cal congressional power to declare war to an international or- ganization. The two men shared a vision of America as an exceptional and indispensable part of the world order, but they clashed over how America might best exercise its power and authority in the postwar world. Wilson’s Senate opponents during the treaty debate were divided into groups that became known as the Irreconcilables and the Reservationists. The Irreconcilables were opposed to ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, which they saw as fatally flawed, under any circumstances, while the Reservationists were willing to consider a modified version of the treaty if it protected American rights, such as the ability to dominate af- fairs in Latin America, a right enshrined, they argued, in the Monroe Doctrine.