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Nfhs EVIL Mil© with a HOLT MAME” the Leagme ©F Hatlens "The evil thing with a holy name"; The League of Nations as an issue in the presidential election of 1920 Item Type text; Thesis-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Murray, Edward Parham, 1929- Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 03/10/2021 19:14:02 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/319154 NfHS EVIL mil© WITH A HOLT MAME” The Leagme ©f Hatlens asan Issme im the Ppesitential Eleetiom ©f 192© by Edward 3?0 Murray AS submitted to the faculty ©f the Department ©f Hlst©ry partial fulfillment ©f the requirements for the degree MASTER OE ARTS' in the ©radtaate CollegeUniversity ©f Arizona This thesis has been submitted in partial fml#- fillment ef requirements f@r an advanced degree at the University ©f Arizona and is deposited in the Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Libraryo Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission^ provided that accurate acknowledgment of source (La made* Requests for permission for extended quotation from or repr©= duetion ©f this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the dean of the Graduate Gollege when in their judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship* In all other instances> howevers per= mission must be obtained from the author= TABLE OF GONTESTS C o 6 o O O O O O O O o O 6 o o THE GENESIS #F M IDEA ,AE) AH 1SSEE „ . , . 3 Bise ef the League Idea *» »•*..« 3 The Growth of ©gp©sitlorn to the League Idea a O ooooo o o o o o -o O 0 O o 12 Belay and Deadlock « . ., » * 34 IIo PEOPLE, POLITICIANS, AMD PLATEOEMS „ . 0 „ 0 46 III. »A BAES1B WITH A 8 T M S G E DEVI OF" . = . 93 IT. SLOSH FIEDS All THE AOTOGEAT . = 111 V. ATALAEOHE AIB AFTERMATH ..... 152 00 0 0 0 0 0 000 O O O O 6 o APPSHBieiS o o o o o 0 0 o o o 0 0 0 e o 0 0 6 d 0 0 o 0 0 d o 0 0 0 0 o © o 182 ill INTRODUCTION R©Iitleal parties themselves in the United States sprang from a .division ©f ©pinion among the leaders ©f the newly-fermed government of the United States of America0 This differenee of opinion was itself torn of different phil­ osophies of governmentg its nature and its relationship to the people of the nation0 These philosophies found speeifie instances of conflict both in the realms of domestic and of foreign affairs* Thuss #hen in time popular appeal became the basis for gaining political office, these specific in­ stances of conflict became the "issues® upon which elections were fought out * In every election there are numerous issues, but some one or two usually seem to stand out as paramount» Often the issues of a campaign form real and basic divisions of policy and belief„ Just as frequently they are mere slogans and phrases, empty of real meaning, which serve to create an ap­ parent difference* Campaign issues in national polities range from the local domestic field to international relations* In the pres­ idential campaign of 1920, a casual foreign observer might easily have concluded that the whole campaign was being fought over whether or not the United States was to enter the league of Nations* He might also have thought this rather odd, since the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, 2 had been ©me ©f the ehlef arehiteets ©f the le&gmeo True, Wile on was net running again* These eonelusi©as $, however-, would have revealed a pameity of knowledge about a complex situation and, indeed, little comprehension of the American political system* That the League of Mations was an issue in the 1920 earn- paign is undeniable, but it was far from being the only one* This paper will attempt to assess just how important the League was as an issue in this presidential election* To do this, the growth of the League idea and the opposition to it will be traced as well as the process of the League's trans­ formation from an idea to a political issue* With this as a background, the pre-convention picture will be developed by noting the attitude of people in general and of would-be candidates in particular * The stands of the parties will be noted in a discussion of the two conventions* In the discus­ sion of the campaign proper, particular attention will be paid to the emphasis given the League issue by the candidates and speakers for the two parties * The views of contemporaries will be utilized in evaluating the results of the campaign* In this fashion, the writer will attempt to place the League of Nations issue in its proper place and perspective in re­ gard to the presidential election of 1920o m u s i s m m idea ahd m issue The Else ©f the League Idea Frem the beginning ©f hi story there have been dreams and plans ©f aniens, federations, kingdoms and the like to estab­ lish peace thromghont the worlds The rise ©f national states, however, seemed to preclude the possibility of any sash federation, for these states were extremely jealeas of their sovereignty and distrnstfnl of their neighbors» For many centuries men had to be content to merely dream of a "parliament of man, and the federation of the world'*; By the opening of the twentieth.century there had been many treaties of arbitration signed, in addition to the ad­ vancement of other plans to promote world peace, and the Hague Gomrt was perhaps the elimination of this idea of vol­ untary arbitration of disputes „ In the mind of many American leaders, as in the minds of leaders of other nations, there was a gradual development of thought concerning the next step in the effort of nations to make peace more enduring 0 la 1909 Philander C 0 Knox, Secretary of State, took note of the tendency of improved methods of communication to knit the world togethero To Khox it seemed that the sweep of events would of necessity bring some sort of limitation upon our tra­ ditional idea of national sovereignty which allowed nations 1 tamllmitet freedom ©f aetien at all times« .Tkeedere Boesevelt*s active mind was net ene t© leave completely t© others this concept of world mien. He had mmch to do with the growing use of arbitration treaties, bmt by 191© he had moved still farther in his themghts. In that year he spoke before the Hebei Prize ©emmittee at.Ohristlana, Herway where he had gone to acknowledge their recognition of his efforts in behalf of world peace<, In his speech Boose- velt suggested still farther development of the arbitration principle, the Hague ©omrt, and the idea of world disarma­ ment . Then he went another step forward and said: Finally, it would be a master stroke if those great powers honestly bent on peace would form a league of Peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, but to prevent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others0 The supreme difficulty in connection with developing the peace work of the Hague arises from the lack of any executive power, of any police power to enforce the decrees of the court 0 a 02 Roosevelt realized that world peace could not be en­ forced or insured by a court alone, any more than a state can govern the relations of its citizens by judicial decrees alone. He voiced no fear of a wsuper-statew but, indeed, took note that not only must there be some type of an executive but one with force behind it to give weight to its decisions. ^Bemna Frank Fleming, The Hhited States and The league of nations a 1918-1920 (Hew York, lend on: G . P . Putnam ® s Sons , 1^32 ppo /[>—5» ^Fleming, pp. 4=5» 5 With the ©mtbreak ©f World War I, it heease elear that the Hague Tribunal was inadequate as am insuramee ©f peaee 0 There were sany suggestions as t© an effective substitute but Hoeseveltj, writing in 1915$, observed that The ©me permanent move f©r ©btaining peaee whieh has yet been sm^ested with any reaSenable ehanee ©f ob­ taining its ©bjeet is by an agreement among the great powers in whieh eaeh should pledge itself not only to abide by the deeisions of the eommon tribunal but to baek with foree the decision of the eommon tribunal0 The great civilized nations of the world whieh do possess forest actual or immediately potential* should eembine by solemn agreement in a great world league for the peaee of righteousness = 3 In this same period many other Americans were thinking about the formation of some sort of international organiza­ tion to preserve peaee* ©nee the war whieh had broken out was ended6 Woodrow Wilson, whose name was beginning to become almost synonymous with that of the League * was beginning to ? -7----- - probe the fringes of the idea of world organization= In the fall of 1914 Wilson had observed to his brother-in-law, Br0 Stoekten Axson* that after the war the nations must of necessity link themselves into some great association whereby all would guarantee the integrity of one another in such a manner as to bring punishment automatically upon any one na­ tion which violated the agreement6 At this period too* Wil­ son was expressing the idea that Latin American nations should be brought into a multilateral interpretation of the ^Fleming, The Whited States and The League of Hations* M©nr©@ ©©©trineo During the period of American neutrality he proposed to the Latin Ameriean repuhlies a treaty whieh.
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