USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal #509
USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER
CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Issue No. 509, 19 June 2006
Articles & Other Documents:
US Warns On Readiness Of North Korean Missile U.S. Sanctions Cost North Korea Millions U.S., Russia Reach Deal On Securing Soviet WMD Iran Seeks Aid In Asia In Resisting The West Iran's President Hints At Hope For Defusing Crisis Ahmadinejad Says Proposal By The West Is 'Step Forward' North Korea May Test Long-Range Missile North Korea Moves To Take Missile Through A Test Run At The Heart Of The United Front On Iran, Vagueness Iran To Seek Changes In Incentives Package On Crucial Terms Spy Who Turned Tide With Libya Is Brought Back To U.S. Feared Cyanide Attack On New York Subway Target Teheran North Koreans Said to Be Near a Missile Test The Untold Story of al-Qaeda's Plot to Attack the Subways Cyanide Plot Prompts Spy Support
Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal to Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved
London Financial Times June 16, 2006 US Warns On Readiness Of North Korean Missile By Demetri Sevastopulo in Washington and Anna Fifield in Seoul North Korean preparations for a possible long-range missile test have advanced to where Pyongyang could launch a Taepodong-2 missile on “very short notice,” a Bush administration official told the Financial Times on Thursday. The US has been monitoring activity at a launch site in North Korea for weeks following indications that Pyongyang was preparing to test an intercontinental ballistic missile for the first time. A senior Bush administration official last week said the US was not yet “on the edge of our seat”. But another official on Thursday said more recent intelligence suggested Pyongyang was now much closer to being ready to conduct a test. “They appear to be moving closer to the ability to actually conduct a launch on very short notice,” said the administration official. In 1998, Pyongyang stunned the US and Japan by firing an intermediate range Taepodong-1 missile over Japan into the Pacific Ocean. While US intelligence now shows that test preparations are very advanced, Washington does not know whether Kim Jong-il, the North Korean leader, will go ahead with a test. Taking the threat of a possible test very seriously, the Pentagon has positioned military assets to deal with any launch. Washington believes increasingly strident and frequent North Korean protests over US spy plane reconnaissance flights may signal its intention to test the Taepodong-2. US and South Korean officials have also urged North Korea to abandon any test. “We are currently trying to get all of the parties in the six-party talks process to send a strong message to North Korea to discourage them from launching,” said a senior US official. The Taepodong-2 is an untested two-, or three-, stage “integrated” missile. The three-stage version consists of a solid-fuel booster rocket strapped atop a Scud missile, which is in turn attached to a short-range Nodong missile. North Korea appears close to the position where it only needs to fuel the missile. Once it does, it would significantly increase the likelihood of a test since the move is dangerous and difficult to reverse. Vice-admiral Lowell Jacoby, then head of the Defence Intelligence Agency, last year told Congress that a three- stage version of the Taepodong-2 had the “theoretical capability [to] reach most of the continental US”. But some experts doubt whether the missile has the range to hit the US and whether it can carry a significant payload. The US believes North Korea is trying to develop the technology to put a nuclear warhead on an ICBM that could reach the US, but has not yet succeeded. South Korea is “bracing” for a possible missile launch, Ban Ki-moon, South Korea’s foreign minister, said on Thursday. “We are very concerned that international opinion turns increasingly negative towards North Korea, especially the six party talks [which] are still in a deadlock,” Mr Ban said. “North Korea should stop its plan, if [there is] any, to fire a missile and come back to the negotiating table.” Tensions over the missile test preparations come as delegates from the two Koreas are meeting in the Southern city of Kwangju to celebrate the sixth anniversary of a historic summit between Kim Jong-il and Kim Dae-jung, then president of South Korea. Inter-Korean relations have warmed significantly since the summit, but there has been no follow-up meeting, as pledged at the time. Kim Dae-jung is preparing to return to Pyongyang at the end of this month, a visit that the current South Korean government hopes will pave the way for a second summit. “We are in a state of truce, not having resolved the issue of war and peace. The threat of war is constantly around us,” said Ahn Kyong-ho, the chief Northern delegate. “As we look to the future of the nation, we must think big and implement it.” Earlier this week, Stephen Hadley, the White House national security adviser, said it would be a “bad idea” for North Korea to conduct a test, and urged Pyongyang to return to the six-party talks which have been stalled since last September. North Korea has refused to return to the talks because of US financial sanctions that are crippling its economy. Another US administration official said: “Our concerns about North Korea’s missile programme are pretty well known. North Korea should abide by the long-range missile test moratorium it has observed since 1999.” http://news.ft.com/cms/s/190275d6-fcd3-11da-9599-0000779e2340.html
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Washington Times June 16, 2006 Pg. 3 U.S. Sanctions Cost North Korea Millions By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times U.S. economic "defensive measures" aimed at curbing illegal activities by North Korea have cost the Pyongyang regime millions of dollars in lost cash over the past several months through banking restrictions and other actions, U.S. officials estimate. One sign that the economic measures are hurting the communist regime in North Korea is Pyongyang's continued refusal to rejoin six-nation talks on its nuclear program until the United States lifts what it regards as sanctions, said Bush administration officials involved in Asia matters. "We think the defensive measures are hurting them," said one official who spoke on the condition of anonymity. North Korean officials have told Chinese officials that they will not come back to the six-party talks until the United States lifts economic restrictions imposed on the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia, something the Bush administration is refusing to do, saying the measures are not nuclear-related, but simply efforts to protect the U.S. financial system and to pressure Pyongyang into halting activities such as counterfeiting U.S. currency. The Bush administration official pointed out that U.S. financial actions against North Korea were never part of the agenda of talks aimed at halting covert North Korean nuclear programs. Those talks also include representatives of China, South Korea, Japan and Russia. Officials said there are intelligence reports that North Korea is continuing work on its nuclear programs, including plutonium-fueled efforts and a uranium-enrichment program that remains couched in mystery. The impoverished communist-ruled state has earned hard cash through counterfeiting U.S. currency, specifically a high-quality forged $100 bill. Its other activities include selling illegal drugs, such as heroin and cocaine. The latest U.S. action was a May 8 ban that blocked any U.S.-based company from flying the North Korean flag on its merchant ships. The ban was imposed after the government learned that North Korea was selling its flag to companies at two to three times the usual international price as a way to raise cash. The Clinton administration permitted the flaggings in 2000. Weeks after the Bush-era ban went into effect, U.S. intelligence agencies detected launch-preparation activities at a North Korean missile facility that indicate the regime may be preparing to conduct a missile test. Officials said the North Koreans are unpredictable and could be engaging in brinksmanship, but they do not expect Pyongyang to break its self-imposed moratorium on missile tests. The most effective restrictions were Treasury Department penalties imposed on Banco Delta Asia in September. The bank was sanctioned as a "primary money-laundering concern" for its 20-year role in helping the North Korean government. The bank was involved in major North Korean foreign purchases including precious metals used in manufacturing and was the main outlet for more than $45 million in North Korean-made counterfeit $100 bills since 1989, the officials said. The Treasury Department said a North Korean government front company used Banco Delta Asia for more than a decade to carry out illegal activities, including smuggling counterfeit-brand tobacco products. The company also took part in international drug trafficking on behalf of North Korean government agents. Officials said the penalties against Banco Delta Asia, which have been supported by China's government, have had a ripple effect among international financial institutions that now are taking steps to avoid working with North Korean government agents and front companies linked in the past to illegal activities. http://www.washtimes.com/national/20060615-105145-9374r.htm
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USA Today June 16, 2006 Pg. 4 U.S., Russia Reach Deal On Securing Soviet WMD Post-Cold War program nearly derailed by dispute By Peter Eisler, USA Today WASHINGTON — U.S. and Russian officials have agreed on terms for a seven-year extension of programs that provide U.S. money and expertise to secure and destroy Soviet-era caches of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The agreement resolves legal disputes that threatened to derail the programs, which send hundreds of millions of dollars a year to Russia for “cooperative threat reduction” efforts. It will be signed by week's end, according to Frederick Jones, a spokesman for President Bush's National Security Council. “The agreement ensures that critical cooperation with Russia continues to combat the proliferation threat posed by large quantities of Soviet legacy weapons of mass destruction and missile(s),” Jones says. The cooperation programs, initiated in 1992, comprise a broad range of initiatives meant to reduce the risk that old Soviet weapons of mass destruction will fall into the hands of rogue states or terrorists. Projects include constructing facilities to lock down nuclear material and warheads; strengthening security at labs storing dangerous biological pathogens; developing special facilities to destroy chemical weapons; and dismantling long-range missiles and bombers. Bush has hailed the programs as an important part of the administration's efforts to keep terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction. But the programs' future has been in flux since 2004 due to a U.S.-Russian dispute over liability protections for U.S. companies, workers and government personnel working at Russian weapons sites. The original agreement governing the projects gave U.S. workers blanket protection from liability for damages in case of an on-site accident. That might include, for example, the accidental release of nerve gas at a chemical weapons disposal facility. But Russia was reluctant to continue that arrangement based on concerns that it would indemnify U.S. workers even for intentional acts of sabotage. The new pact essentially retains the same blanket protections for U.S. workers involved in projects already underway. For new projects, the countries will develop liability protections that are not as sweeping as the current agreement. William Hoehn, a non-proliferation expert at the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, said the new agreement would ensure that old Soviet weapons stocks are properly secured and disposed of. http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-06-15-soviet-wmd_x.htm
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Washington Post June 16, 2006 Pg. 14 Iran Seeks Aid In Asia In Resisting The West Shanghai Group Urged to 'Block Threats' By Edward Cody, Washington Post Foreign Service SHANGHAI, June 15 -- Overshadowing a regional summit, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad suggested Thursday that China, Russia and neighboring Central Asian nations should help Iran resist growing pressure from the United States and Europe to limit its nuclear development program. The appeal, in a speech to leaders of the six-nation Shanghai Cooperation Organization, seemed aimed in particular at China and Russia. The two nations, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, have been reluctant to endorse the threat of U.N. sanctions and other steps being pushed by the Bush administration to persuade Iran to stop enriching uranium and submit its nuclear program to international controls. Ahmadinejad's remarks were also framed to portray the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a bloc opposed to the threats that have accompanied the U.S. and European campaign against Tehran's nuclear program. In addition to China and Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan make up the group, which was founded five years ago under Chinese leadership to foster regional security and economic cooperation. "We want this organization to develop into a powerful body, influential in regional and international politics, economics and trade, and also serve to block threats and unlawful strong-arm interference from various countries," Ahmadinejad declared. The five permanent Security Council members -- the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China -- along with Germany recently proposed a new package of incentives designed to persuade Iran to halt uranium enrichment and begin negotiations on its nuclear ambitions. Although Russia and China signed on, they have signaled reluctance to approve sanctions or other punitive action that Washington has warned could follow unless Iran buys into the proposals. Iran has insisted that its program is aimed exclusively at producing energy and that it is within its rights to develop nuclear technology like other nations. But U.S. and European officials have suggested that the ultimate goal is nuclear weapons. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao, urged Iran to accept the incentives package. In keeping with the Chinese position, he said diplomacy, not force or threats of sanctions, was the way to deal with the standoff. Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing met with his Iranian counterpart to foster a favorable reply from Tehran, Liu said. But he added, "They still need a little time." Presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia and Hu Jintao of China did not respond publicly to Ahmadinejad's appeal, but Putin told reporters that Iran was favorably disposed to the U.S.-European offer. Appearing uncomfortable with the focus on the nuclear standoff, Liu suggested that reporters here were paying too much attention to Iran and not enough to festivities marking the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's fifth anniversary. Iran was invited as an observer nation, along with leaders from Pakistan, Mongolia and India. President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan was also on hand, at the invitation of China, because joint action against drug smuggling was high on the agenda. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld suggested recently that Ahmadinejad should not have been allowed to attend because one of the organization's main goals is to fight terrorism -- and according to the Bush administration, Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism. Rumsfeld's comments also highlighted a more general U.S. uneasiness over the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a group with growing influence revolving around Chinese and Russian leadership and excluding the United States. In a communique, the participating heads of state said they intended to work out a mechanism "to adopt measures in response to developments that threaten regional peace, stability and security." While vague, the agreement suggested more formal military cooperation among Russia, China and their Central Asian partners. Hu also proposed that the body's six members begin negotiations toward a friendship and security treaty. Recognizing U.S. concerns, Hu and other leaders emphasized in speeches that the organization was not aimed against any other countries. But the background music of independence from U.S. influence seemed clearly audible as the six nations celebrated their cooperation. President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, for instance, complained that "foreign forces stationed in the region" had failed to dampen drug smuggling from Afghanistan and had sought to "rope in" Central Asian nations to advance their own interests. Uzbekistan, along with Kyrgyzstan, accepted U.S. military forces on its soil to support the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. But Uzbekistan has since expelled the U.S. military from its base in the country, and Karimov's relations with Washington have soured. At a summit last year, Shanghai Cooperation Organization leaders called on the United States to set a deadline for the withdrawal of military installations from all member states. Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, said his country was keen to upgrade its status in the organization from observer to full member. Musharraf portrayed Pakistan as an "energy corridor" for the movement of Persian Gulf oil into the giant Chinese economy, reflecting the organization's strong appeal to the nations surrounding China that are eager to share in its growing prosperity. China has helped finance a port at Gwadar, in southwestern Pakistan, and planning is underway for a road link between Gwadar and western China. Similarly, China has given low-interest loans for several projects in the Central Asian nations belonging to the organization. Ahmadinejad suggested that Iran, with its large oil reserves, was also eager to play a part. He called for a regional energy conference to be held in Tehran, an idea that Liu said appealed to China. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/15/AR2006061500954.html
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New York Times June 17, 2006 Iran's President Hints At Hope For Defusing Crisis By Howard W. French SHANGHAI, June 16 — Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, said Friday that his country was seriously considering an international proposal to resolve the dispute over its uranium enrichment program. Mr. Ahmadinejad's vague but conciliatory remarks, made here at the end of an Asian summit meeting, came with veiled taunts of the United States and statements of solidarity with China and Russia, the leading powers in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the regional group that convened the gathering. "My colleagues are carefully considering the package of proposals of the six countries, and in due time they will give them a response," Mr. Ahmadinejad said. At another point in a news conference, he said, "Generally we regard the offering of this package as a step forward," adding that his country "supports constructive talks on the basis of equality." The proposal was put forth this month by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany, and offers Iran incentives to freeze its nuclear activities. Mr. Ahmadinejad's visit here has put the spotlight on the diplomatic importance of China and Russia, Security Council members that have resisted sanctions as a means of resolving the crisis. Although the details of their talks were not disclosed, the leaders of China and Russia are thought to have urged Iran to embrace the six-party proposal. Both China, as the host, and Russia, a co-founder of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, have appeared eager for a successful meeting here that would increase the prestige of the five-year-old body. This may help explain the restrained, even studied language of Mr. Ahmadinejad, whose country is a candidate for membership but whose oratory can be inflammatory. Although his repeated references to the United States were unmistakable, he never named his designated nemesis. "Some countries create problems for other countries and make the impression that these are problems for the entire international community," Mr. Ahmadinejad said. "Actually they are making problems for themselves." In Washington, the State Department spokesman, Sean McCormack, sought to play down Mr. Ahmadinejad's statement. "I'm not going to try to comment on the various rhetoric coming out of Tehran or elsewhere concerning Iran's thoughts on the proposal in public," he said. "As I said before, we're going to wait for the formal response." In his remarks Friday, Mr. Ahmadinejad repeated his denials that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, referring regularly to the "Islamic Republic of Iran's peaceful nuclear program." Mr. Ahmadinejad, who has often questioned the reality of the Holocaust, said again that the history should be "investigated by impartial and independent experts," and added that the Palestinians should not be made victims because of events in European history. He concluded his remarks on this subject, however, by saying, "There are no differences between Jews, Christians and Muslims." Asked if he were concerned about the possibility of an Israeli attack on his country's uranium enrichment plants, similar to Israel's aerial attack on the Osirak nuclear plant near Baghdad in 1981, Mr. Ahmadinejad brushed the question off with a quick "No." Moments later, he added that Iran had the means to defend itself, but offered no details. Iran's status as an observer and candidate for membership poses delicate questions for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which has six members: China, Russia and four former Soviet republics, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. China is in the midst of a carefully measured bid to increase its diplomatic clout without alarming the United States or others, from Europe to India. At times, Mr. Ahmadinejad's language flirted with formulations that Beijing has studiously avoided, which would cast the group as a rival or counterweight to the West and to alliances like NATO. Mr. Ahmadinejad said pointedly that if all the observer states became members, the organization would represent more than half of the world's population, and he urged the group to "ward off the threats of domineering powers to use their force against and interfere in the affairs of other states." He added, "I believe we should remove the word sanctions from the political literature of the world." China, too, has consistently opposed sanctions as a tool of international relations, and helped engineer a joint declaration at the end of the talks here. The declaration said, "Differences in cultural traditions, political and social systems, values and models of development formed in the course of history should not be taken as pretexts to interfere in other countries' internal affairs." But if the membership swells without addressing the problem of nuclear proliferation, it could face problems on two fronts. On the one hand, the credibility of an approach that renounces sanctions and the use of force will be severely weakened, along with China's diplomatic prestige. On the other, if the Shanghai Cooperation Organization emerges as a group whose highest principle is the right of states to do what they wish without outside interference, China and Russia could both eventually face the nightmare of a nuclear-armed Central Asia. "One example of our being a responsible stakeholder is speaking to Iran and asking Iran to respect I.A.E.A. commitments, to make sure that it meets its obligations," said Shen Dingli, a specialist in international relations at Fudan University in Shanghai. He referred to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Beyond that, while Mr. Ahmadinejad repeatedly stressed Iran's diplomatic closeness with China and Russia, calling China's leader, Hu Jintao, "my very good friend," he also repeatedly invoked the importance of religion, or what he called "spirituality." China and Russia have had problems with Muslim minorities and would be loath to see the spread of militant Islam in the region. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/17/world/asia/17china.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
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Washington Post June 17, 2006 Pg. 12 Ahmadinejad Says Proposal By The West Is 'Step Forward' But Iranian Leader Stays Noncommittal on Details By Edward Cody, Washington Post Foreign Service SHANGHAI, June 16 -- Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Friday that an international proposal designed to restart negotiations on Iran's nuclear program constitutes "a step forward" and that his government will respond "in due time." Ahmadinejad, who met with reporters after attending a summit conference of the six-nation Shanghai Cooperation Organization, seemed to go out of his way to emphasize a willingness to give the proposal serious consideration even though it calls on Iran to halt uranium enrichment before new talks can proceed. But he refused to be pinned down on when Iran might respond and whether it could ever accept shutting down the enrichment program. "Generally speaking, we regard this package as a step forward, and we will give a response in due time based on the interests of the people of the Islamic Republic of Iran," he said. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme Iranian leader, used a considerably harsher tone in remarks published in Tehran on Thursday. According to the official Iranian press, he said Iran will never give up its nuclear program and will not pay attention to the threat of U.N. Security Council sanctions. Ahmadinejad, cast here in a diplomatic role, said his meetings with Presidents Vladimir Putin of Russia and Hu Jintao of China showed that the three countries' views are "close, even identical" on many issues, including opposition to what he described as efforts by some countries to impose their will on Iran through unacceptable pressure. Russia and China, both veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council, have shown reluctance to join the United States and European allies in threatening Iran with sanctions if it refuses the package of proposals for resuming nuclear talks. But Ahmadinejad declined to say whether he sought or received assurances during his talks here that Russia and China will continue to oppose Security Council sanctions. "On the nuclear issue, we have continuous consultations and cooperation with China and Russia," he said. "All of us are seeking a peaceful solution to this issue. And all of us are trying to prevent the Inquisition-like tendencies of certain powers." China and Russia, along with Germany, last week joined the three other permanent Security Council members -- the United States, Britain and France -- in offering a package of incentives for resuming the suspended nuclear negotiations. The Bush administration, in a change of policy, promised to join the negotiations provided that Iran first stops enriching uranium and maintains the halt during talks. U.S. officials have expressed fear that the Iranian program is designed to produce nuclear weapons, which Washington regards as unacceptable in the hands of Iran's militant Islamic government. Iran has consistently denied that intention, however, saying its goal is to produce nuclear energy. "We are not seeking to develop nuclear weapons," Ahmadinejad reiterated Friday. The government of Hu Jintao has publicly urged Iran to accept the new proposals. Hu pressed the point with Ahmadinejad in a meeting earlier, according to the New China News Agency. But the government has displayed patience -- and urged other nations to do the same -- as Tehran ponders its response. It has also repeatedly cautioned that diplomacy is preferable to threats of sanctions or other punitive steps. Ahmadinejad sought to portray the dissension over Iran's nuclear program as the result of a desire by some countries to impose their will on others, a reference to the United States and its European partners. That is the "root cause" of the crisis, he said, adding, "Any relationship based on unilateralism and humiliation is unjust and unsustainable." The Shanghai Cooperation Organization -- comprising Russia, China, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan -- is refreshingly free of U.S. influence, he suggested, and could help Iran weather this crisis. Iran, which is currently an observer, has applied for full membership in the security and economic grouping, which was founded five years ago under Chinese leadership. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/16/AR2006061600532.html
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New York Times June 17, 2006 North Korea May Test Long-Range Missile By Helene Cooper and Michael R. Gordon WASHINGTON, June 16 — North Korea appears to have stepped up preparations to test an intercontinental ballistic missile, perhaps as early as this weekend, American officials said Friday. The move, if carried out, would put the North's military efforts back into the spotlight and could demonstrate that it has a missile with the range to reach the United States. In a sign of how seriously the United States is treating the prospect of a test, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice telephoned her Chinese counterpart on Tuesday and asked Beijing to use its influence to stop the test, a senior Bush administration official said. President Bush made a similar appeal two weeks ago in a telephone call to China's president, Hu Jintao, the official said. "Together, our diplomacy and that of our allies has made clear to North Korea that a missile launch would be a provocative act that is not in their interests and will further isolate them from the world," Sean McCormack, the State Department spokesman, said Friday. A test of the long-range missile by North Korea would be the first since 1998, when it fired a three-stage Taepodong 1 missile over Japan, demonstrating an ability that caught American intelligence officials by surprise. That led Congress to step up its push for deployment of antimissile defenses. North Korea declared a moratorium on its long-range missile launchings in 1999. The current concern focuses on indications first detected five weeks ago that North Korea is preparing to test a multiple-stage Taepodong 2 missile, administration officials said. Some Bush administration officials at first suspected that the moves were a grab for attention while Washington's focus was primarily on Iran and a way to press the United States to agree to direct talks. "They've done prep work that is consistent with a missile launch," one senior administration official said. "What we don't know is whether they really intend to go through with this, or whether they are just saying, 'I will not be ignored.' " But in recent days, administration officials said, they have seen more worrying signs that North Korea is accelerating its preparations. The officials would not be more specific about the information, and most would discuss the matter only after being promised anonymity, saying the sensitive diplomatic and intelligence concerns meant they could not speak for the record. American knowledge about the Taepodong 2 is limited. The system has never been flight-tested. American intelligence has steadily increased the estimates of its range. In 2001, a National Intelligence Estimate forecast that a three-stage version of the Taepodong 2 missile could reach all of North America with a sizable payload. A test of the missile could set off a political chain reaction on both sides of the Pacific. The Bush administration might step up financing for missile defense efforts. Japan might also increase such efforts, and hard-liners there might even push to reconsider the nation's nuclear weapons options. Both moves would alienate China. Just two weeks ago — a day after the United States offered to hold direct talks with Iran over its nuclear program — North Korea invited Christopher R. Hill, an assistant secretary of state and chief negotiator on the North's nuclear weapons program, for direct talks in Pyongyang, the capital. That offer was immediately rebuffed by the White House, which insisted that the North return to the long-deadlocked six-nation talks instead. The other nations involved in the talks are China, South Korea, Japan and Russia. The Taepodong 2 is believed to have three stages. The first is thought to be a cluster of No Dong missiles, according to Gary Samore, a former senior staff member of the National Security Council. The second stage is believed to be a No Dong missile. The third stage might be a solid-fueled system. If the North Koreans were simply trying to draw attention from Iran, it is curious that they began making preparations for the test more than a month ago, because that would pre-date when the Bush administration changed course on Iran, offering to join European talks with Tehran over Iran's nuclear program. North Korea agreed last September in the six-nation talks to abandon its nuclear program in return for energy assistance and security guarantees. But the agreement left unclear the sequence of events, and disputes arose immediately over whether disarmament or the award of benefits would come first. Then, a few months later, North Korea boycotted the talks after the United States cracked down on financial institutions, including a bank in Macau, that dealt with the government in Pyongyang, and with North Korean companies suspected of counterfeiting American dollars and laundering money. If North Korea goes ahead with a launching, the already floundering six-nation talks could go into the deep freeze. Critics say the Bush administration is in a tight spot of its own making, with no options beyond pressing China to press North Korea not to test. "I think the administration was dismissive too soon regarding this North Korea invitation for Chris Hill to go to Pyongyang," said Robert J. Einhorn, assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation under President Clinton. One result, he said, is that the administration cannot now offer Mr. Hill as an inducement not to test, because the North Koreans might view that as a reward for threatening to launch the missile. The Taepodong 2 is believed to have a substantially longer range than the first version, tested on Aug. 31, 1998. Pyongyang tried to place a small satellite in orbit by launching a three-stage Taepodong 1. Although the third stage — the part where the missile was supposed to boost the satellite into orbit — failed, the test showed that North Korea was technically capable of launching missiles with multiple stages, Mr. Samore said. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/17/washington/17korea.html
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Los Angeles Times June 18, 2006 North Korea Moves To Take Missile Through A Test Run Experts say it probably would carry a satellite, not a warhead. Japan warns against accident. By Barbara Demick, Times Staff Writer SEOUL — North Korea appeared poised to test-launch today what intelligence experts contend is a new multi-stage ballistic missile that probably could not reach North America but could threaten U.S. interests in Asia. Satellite surveillance showed North Korea moving what appeared to be fuel canisters to the launch site on its remote east coast late last week in preparation. The Japanese daily Sankei Shimbun reported that North Koreans had been instructed to raise the national flag and watch television in anticipation of a "message to the people." From the length and diameter, the missile appears to be larger and more sophisticated than the one North Korea test- fired in 1998. With a range estimated at about 2,400 miles, it would be capable of reaching Guam, but not the U.S. mainland. Experts said the missile would probably carry a satellite, rather than a warhead, which would enable North Korea to say it was a civilian endeavor and not a military move. Weapons analysts are calling the new missile either the Taepodong X or the Taepodong 2. It probably could not carry a nuclear payload, experts said, although it could be fitted with a chemical or biological warhead. Over the weekend, the United States, Japan and South Korea called for North Korea to cancel the test and instead return to six-nation talks aimed at dismantling its nuclear program. "The North Koreans think it is good timing. They want to make trouble and shake up the status quo," a South Korean official said Saturday. The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that the North Koreans might have been motivated by the negotiations underway over Iran's nuclear program to seek to turn the spotlight on themselves. Another South Korean official said that the communist regime in Pyongyang intended to do the test before the start of the rainy season at the end of the month. The Taepodong 1 missile launched in 1998 flew over Japan. The following year, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il signed a testing moratorium, which he renewed during a summit in 2002 with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso warned today that a miscalculation could result in the missile landing on Japanese territory. "If it is dropped on Japan, it will complicate the story. It will be regarded as an attack," he said on Japanese television. Japanese officials said they had no knowledge of developments within the Kim regime that would account for the possible test. But Tokyo said it had improved its electronic surveillance over the Korean peninsula in recent years. It has two spy satellites in orbit and its maritime defense force has four destroyers fitted with the U.S.-made AEGIS detection systems, at least one of which is permanently based in the Sea of Japan. "Our intelligence collection has improved over the last several years and nothing will come out of the blue like it did in 1998," said Tomohiko Taniguchi, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry. Both U.S. and Japanese officials said Tokyo would be eager to prove that it was able to swiftly detect and track any missile launched by North Korea. Japan has no capability of shooting down a missile, though it has signed on to participate in the Pentagon's antimissile defense program. The U.S. cruiser Shiloh, armed with Standard Missile 3 interceptors designed to shoot down intermediate-range missiles, is expected to be stationed in Japanese waters beginning in August. But Tokyo has little economic leverage over North Korea, leaving Aso with not much of a threat other than asking for a United Nations Security Council debate if Pyongyang does fire a missile. Most of Japan's actions appeared to be aimed at voters at home, where there is simmering anger over the kidnappings of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and '80s by North Korean security services. On Friday, the Japanese government passed a law requiring economic sanctions against Pyongyang if no progress is made on resolving questions about the fate of citizens still believed to be missing. The U.S. ambassador to Japan, J. Thomas Schieffer, said: "There is no good that can come from launching a North Korean missile. It will only isolate the North Koreans further from the rest of the international community." Still, experts say there are compelling reasons that the North Korean regime would like to launch a missile. The North Koreans have been testing engines for a new missile since at least 2002. A successful test would bolster Kim's assertions domestically that he is developing advanced technology for his people. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., a leading U.S. expert on North Korea's military, said the technologies for putting a satellite in orbit and firing a multi-stage missile were so similar that it might be difficult to immediately determine North Korea's real intention. "For a ballistic missile, you have to get into space to get the range…. The technology for guidance, for multi- staging, is the same," he said. A satellite launch in itself would be a significant advance in North Koreans' military capabilities, he said, and "would give them great prestige." In 1998, North Korea said its missile test was actually a satellite launch, causing much confusion. Now, Western intelligence officials believe there was a small satellite on the third stage of the multi-stage missile, but that it failed to launch. Despite the country's impoverishment, North Korean scientists have been working steadily since 1998 to improve their missile capabilities. For weeks now, satellite imagery has detected preparation for a missile test at Musudan-ri, a remote military site in North Hamgyong province on the east coast. Times staff writer Bruce Wallace in Tokyo contributed to this report. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-norkor18jun18,1,4285451.story
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New York Times June 18, 2006 At The Heart Of The United Front On Iran, Vagueness On Crucial Terms By Elaine Sciolino and William J. Broad PARIS, June 17 — The success or failure of the international initiative to curb Iran's nuclear program hinges largely on an ostensibly clear-cut request: before talks can begin, Tehran must freeze all activities related to the enrichment of uranium. But while that demand seems surgically precise, what it actually means is unclear. It has become the subject of anxious diplomacy around the world — a sort of prenegotiation negotiation — centered on finding a definition that the Iranians and the six countries behind the initiative can accept. The results will determine if the talks move ahead or fail before they formally start. Iran has long insisted that it will never give up its "right" to enrich uranium. At the other end of the spectrum, the Bush administration and some nuclear experts have maintained that Iran should not be allowed to spin a single centrifuge — the machines that in large clusters can enrich, or concentrate, uranium into a form that can fuel nuclear reactors or atom bombs. But in interviews and statements, officials from several countries have begun to show signs of optimism and flexibility, suggesting that players on both sides are struggling to create momentum for talks by finding common ground and avoiding a clash over the issue. The question is whether some low level of enrichment activity, couched as "research," will be deemed permissible and whether the objections to such a move will yield to compromise. "The definition of enrichment is very important," a senior Iranian official said. "The words in the package are not holy words. This will be a political decision. Each side will have to meet the other halfway." A formal offer, presented to Iran on June 6, would open talks on an array of incentives and benefits. First, though, Tehran would have to freeze all its enrichment-related activities and commit to keeping them halted during the negotiations. Diplomats involved in the talks said that Iran's six potential negotiating partners — the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany — left the definition of suspension vague to maintain unity on their side and to lure the Iranians back to the negotiating table. "There is no real master plan on what will be suspended," said one European official. Like others interviewed for this article, the official spoke on the condition of anonymity under normal rules of diplomacy. By contrast, an accord reached in late 2004 with Iran to freeze its nuclear program "had a long paragraph on the scope of suspension," the official said. "This agreement has a few words." It was after the collapse of that accord that the Iranians restarted their nuclear program. Russia is trying to serve as mediator and seems to be taking a less rigid view than the Americans and the Europeans to get the talks started, officials said. On Thursday, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, after meeting Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in Shanghai, said Iran responded positively to the proposals and was ready to talk. But Iranian officials have already rejected preconditions for negotiations, and Mr. Putin did not say under what circumstances Iran would be willing to talk. Then on Friday, Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov of Russia was more explicit, suggesting that Iran had its own preconditions for talks and perhaps its own definition of suspension. "Iran will soon declare the terms for such negotiations," he was quoted as saying by Interfax. To underscore the point, he repeated it, saying "Iran is preparing its response, including on terms." So, too, Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has floated the idea of a deal in which Iran would halt its industrial enrichment but retain some level of face-saving, low-level work, usually referred to as research. "The big ticket item is this suspension of the research within Iran," Dr. ElBaradei said recently. "We should be able to find a solution to that." Despite its longstanding objections to Iranian enrichment, the Bush administration recently relented and agreed to leave open in the offer the possibility that Tehran could one day enrich uranium if it proved beyond a reasonable doubt that its program was peaceful. That show of flexibility, diplomats said, might presage a compromise on what Washington would now define as suspension. The enrichment program starts at Isfahan, where raw uranium is converted into a form that easily becomes a gas. At Natanz, that gas is fed into rows of centrifuges. Iran is now learning how to do such enrichment on an industrial scale and is expected to master the step in the next few years. While Tehran says its work is solely for peaceful nuclear power, Washington and its allies see the program as a cover for the development of nuclear arms. Defined narrowly, Iran's suspension of enrichment might consist of nothing more complex than stopping the injection of uranium gas into its centrifuges, while leaving the machines running. (This is standard practice, as slowing the spinning rotors is a risky procedure that can cause them to wobble and crash, destroying the centrifuges.) Defined broadly, suspension could include halting the spinning machines at Natanz, ending the production of centrifuges and their parts at factories across Iran, stopping the testing of such machines, stopping the import of centrifuge materials and ending the conversion of uranium at Isfahan. Diplomats said the six nations had agreed to let Iran continue to convert uranium. The question now is where to draw the line on enrichment. European, Iranian and I.A.E.A. officials have said that the technicalities in the incentives package about the enrichment suspension are less important than whether both sides make the political decisions necessary to move forward. Independent arms experts agree. "Ideally it would have been much better to have an airtight definition of what suspension means," said Mark Fitzpatrick, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. "But it would be much harder to persuade Iran back into the process of suspension." The text of the package has yet to be made public officially. Excerpts from the document have been published by Agence France-Presse, and an official read a copy of the full document to The New York Times. Some officials involved in drafting the proposal, including the French foreign minister, Philippe Douste-Blazy, have said privately that even uranium conversion and small-scale enrichment should not be allowed, European officials said. Beyond the question of stopping all enrichment, some officials and arms experts object even to letting Iran import, build and install centrifuges and parts, which would let it move toward its stated goal of completing 3,000 centrifuges by the year's end. Privately, some Iranian officials say that at a minimum, Iran would want to continue to run the 164 centrifuge machines already operating at its Natanz site, although not necessarily to produce enriched uranium with them. They say Iran would also want to convert uranium at Isfahan and to continue making centrifuges. Geoffrey E. Forden, a nuclear expert at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said that, even if everyone agreed on a definition of suspension, gaps still remained on such crucial issues as how long it might last. Iran, he said, might want five months, Europe two years and the United States forever. "At least they're thinking about each other's proposals," he said. "That's better than rejecting them out of hand." Elaine Sciolino reported from Paris for this article, and William J. Broad from New York. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/18/world/middleeast/18iran.html
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Los Angeles Times June 18, 2006 Iran To Seek Changes In Incentives Package By Associated Press TEHRAN — Iran's foreign minister said Saturday the government probably would suggest amendments to a Western package of incentives meant to persuade the Islamic Republic to give up its uranium enrichment program. Manouchehr Mottaki would not give any timing for Iran's response. The Tehran regime previously has said that some parts of the package were acceptable but others should be changed, and that the central issue of uranium enrichment needed clarification. "It is a step forward," he said. "In the end, we will present our proposals. It's a two-way street," Mottaki said at a joint news conference with Iraqi politician Abdelaziz Hakim, who heads that country's largest Shiite political party, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Mottaki's remarks echoed comments made Friday by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. "Generally speaking, we're regarding this offer as a step forward, and I have instructed my colleagues to carefully consider it," Ahmadinejad said after meeting Chinese President Hu Jintao in Shanghai. Iran denies accusations by the U.S. and others that it is seeking to develop nuclear weapons, saying its program is solely for the generation of electricity. European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana presented the package of perks and possible penalties, drawn up by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany, to Tehran on June 6. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iran18jun18,1,5093743.story
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London Sunday Telegraph June 18, 2006 Spy Who Turned Tide With Libya Is Brought Back To Target Teheran By Toby Harnden, in Washington The American spy who persuaded Libya to renounce its weapons of mass destruction is to return to the Central Intelligence Agency, where he will direct an aggressive drive to recruit informants inside Iran to aid possible negotiations over Teheran's nuclear capability. Stephen Kappes, a former United States Marines officer who resigned from the CIA after a clash with its then director, Porter Goss, has been brought back from self-imposed exile in London by George W Bush. Iran will be top of his agenda. "He's a remarkable guy, a talented leader and among the finest officers of his generation," said Gary Berntsen, the CIA's key commander during the invasion of Afghanistan, who has worked for Mr Kappes in the Middle East. "He knows the target [Iran] intimately." The return to CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia, of Mr Kappes, 54, has boosted flagging morale at the spy agency. A former CIA station chief in Moscow, he led successful efforts to penetrate the network of A Q Khan, the rogue Pakistani scientist, who supplied Iran and Libya with nuclear know-how. He will be deputy to Gen Michael Hayden, who took over from Mr Goss and characterised his predecessor's tenure as "amateur hour". Mr Kappes is the first career undercover operative to ascend to this level for more than 30 years. The CIA's first priority is to gather intelligence from inside Iran about the theocratic regime's nuclear capabilities and intentions, and the locations of its secret weapons sites. Such information would be crucial in the event of direct talks - or in launching military strikes if negotiations collapsed. Mr Kappes is a Farsi and Russian speaker who, while stationed in Frankfurt in the late 1980s, was in charge of collecting information about Ayatollah Khomeini's regime and debriefing Iranian exiles. Mr Kappes is understood to have told friends months ago that he favoured direct engagement with Iran, even suggesting that there might be a case for restoring diplomatic relations with the country and reopening the American embassy in Teheran, closed since the 1979 hostage crisis. Earlier this month, the Bush administration made an about-face by proposing direct talks on the nuclear issue if Teheran suspended uranium enrichment. Mr Kappes would be a likely candidate to lead any such negotiations. Robert Baer, a former CIA agent handler in the Middle East, said: "The CIA has a terrible track record in Iran. In the late 1980s, they lost all their human resources [informants] after the Iranians got into the mail." More than 30 CIA informants were arrested when the Iranians intercepted and deciphered CIA communications in 1989. In October 2003, Mr Kappes led a 15-strong American and British team that went into Libya to test an overture by President Muammar Gaddafi, suggesting that he might be willing to give up his weapons of mass destruction. The information gathered by Mr Kappes helped to persuade the Libyans that the West had clear evidence of the military intent of their nuclear programme. Mr Baer, author of Blow The House Down, a novel about 9/11, said that a similar outcome would be difficult to achieve with Teheran while America had poor intelligence-gathering capability in Iran. "We have to open up a negotiating channel to Iran, if nothing else to figure out what they're thinking." But Mr Berntsen said he believed that negotiations were unlikely to succeed and military action against Iranian nuclear sites would have to be taken. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/06/18/wiran118.xml
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New York Times June 18, 2006 U.S. Feared Cyanide Attack On New York Subway By Al Baker and William K. Rashbaum United States authorities in 2003 were concerned that Al Qaeda operatives had made plans to carry out a chemical attack on the New York City subway system, according to two former counterterrorism officials. But American intelligence authorities concluded that the plot ultimately had been abandoned, the officials said. Plans for the attack, which some officials came to believe was called off by a senior member of Al Qaeda, called for using an improvised device to release cyanide into subway cars or other public spaces, said the officials, who would not be named because of the sensitive nature of the information. The details of the suspected plot were first reported yesterday on Time magazine's Web site, which said the information was contained in a new book by the author Ron Suskind. The magazine is publishing excerpts of the book, "The One Percent Doctrine," in this week's issue. "We were aware of the plot and took the appropriate precautions," Paul J. Browne, the New York Police Department's chief spokesman, said yesterday when asked about the report. He declined to comment further. That the sprawling, underground subway system is a possible target for terrorists has long been a concern for law enforcement. After the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the subways received increased police patrols, particularly at the entrances to each of the 16 underwater tunnels. Moves by the Police Department to secure and monitor a system that carries nearly 5 million people a day along 656 miles of tracks reflected the increased jitters about a possible attack. In February 2003, the counterterrorism arm of the department issued orders for officers to look out for anyone using improvised weapons, like light bulbs laden with chemicals, that could be released in the subways. Officers were ordered to be vigilant and prepared for the release of such substances in densely populated areas. That same month, city hospitals were wrestling with the issue of how to treat anyone exposed to cyanide. Hospitals were seeking to increase their stocks of medical antidotes to cyanide and other toxic substances, preparing for any potential mass triage. It is unclear whether those efforts, in February 2003, were linked to knowledge of the alleged plot by Al Qaeda operatives to attack the city's subways. The account by Mr. Suskind, according to Time, said that American intelligence agents had developed a relationship with an informant from within Pakistan who was connected to Al Qaeda and that the man had told them in March 2003 of the aborted hydrogen cyanide attack on the subways. According to Mr. Suskind's account, the informant said that while cell members had arrived in the city in 2002, from North Africa, and had researched the locations they had planned to attack, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the top aide to Osama bin Laden, called it off. But American intelligence officials were confused as to why, the account said. One official who was briefed at the time that the authorities learned of the threat said some in the intelligence community had been skeptical of the supposed plot, particularly of the idea that the plot had been called off by Mr. al-Zawahiri. The plot was said to involve the use of a relatively crude device for releasing the chemical gases. "This is a simple cyanide thing, two chemicals mixed together, and it releases cyanide gas," he said. "They'd be lucky if they killed everybody on one car — you can do that with a 9-millimeter pistol." He added, "None of it has been confirmed in three years, who these guys were, whether they in fact had a weapon, or whether they were able to put together a weapon, whether that weapon has been defined and what it would cause or whether they were even in New York." One former official said he believed the basic information about the scheme had been declassified two years ago for distribution to state and local officials. There were no formal announcements of increased concerns about the city's subway system in March 2003. Mr. Browne would not offer any specifics about when the New York Police Department was informed of the abandoned plot. Security measures were increased in the subways as a result of the threat, said one of the former officials. Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly has often ticked off the times that subway systems have become the focus of terrorists, emphasizing that an attack could still happen and that plans are constantly being developed to deal with it or prevent it. The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which killed 12 people and injured 5,500 in 1995 with a sarin gas attack on subway trains in Tokyo, also attempted an attack using hydrogen cyanide. Two plastic bags containing the chemical components were found by a cleaning woman near a ventilation grate in a men's restroom in the subway. No gas was produced, but Japanese experts later said the quantity of chemical in the bags could, in theory, have produced enough gas to kill 10,000 people. In Washington, press officers for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Counterterrorism Center all declined to comment. Scott Shane reported from Washington for this article. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/18/nyregion/18plot.html
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New York Times June 19, 2006 North Koreans Said to Be Near a Missile Test By Helene Cooper and Michael R. Gordon WASHINGTON, June 18 — North Korea appears to have completed fueling a long-range ballistic missile, American officials said Sunday, a move that greatly increases the probability that it will go ahead with its first important test launching in eight years. A senior American official said that intelligence from satellite photographs suggested that booster rockets had been loaded onto a launching pad, and liquid-fuel tanks fitted to a missile at a site on North Korea's remote east coast. While there have been steady reports in recent days about preparations for a test, fueling is regarded as a critical step as well as a probable bellwether of North Korea's intentions. Siphoning the liquid fuel out of a missile is a complex undertaking. "Yes, looks like all systems are 'go' and fueling appears to be done," said the official who discussed the matter only after being promised anonymity because he was addressing delicate diplomatic and intelligence issues. A second senior official, who declined to speak on the record for similar reasons, also indicated that the United States believed the missile had been fueled. A launching would be a milestone in the North's missile capacity and effectively scrap a moratorium on such tests declared by the North Koreans after their last test in 1998. Moreover, a launching would have enormous importance for American security because it would be North Korea's first flight test of a new long-range missile that might eventually have the capacity to strike the United States. A launching could also ignite a political chain reaction in Japan, the United States and China, which have been trying to re-engage North Korea in stalled talks about its nuclear weapons program. The Bush administration might step up financing for missile defense; Japan might increase its missile defense efforts as well, while militant Japanese politicians might push to reconsider the nation's nuclear weapons options. Such moves would most likely alienate China. The reported fueling of the missile has set off a flurry of diplomatic activity, as officials from the United States, Japan and China worked furiously to try to forestall a launching. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke to her Japanese and Chinese counterparts this weekend, urging the Chinese, in particular, to try to press North Korea. Officials at the State Department recently telephoned North Korean diplomats at that country's permanent mission to the United Nations in New York, warning them directly against going ahead with a launching. Such direct contact is highly unusual, since American officials limit their direct talks with their North Korean counterparts. But "we needed to make sure there was no misunderstanding," a senior American official said. American intelligence officials say they believe that the system is a Taepodong 2 missile and that a three-stage version could strike all of the United States. One administration official said the missile at the launching pad was a two-stage version. While North Korea claims to have developed nuclear weapons, it has never allowed outsiders to see them. American experts believe that North Korea has enough plutonium for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons and has produced a small but growing nuclear arsenal. It is not known if the North Koreans can build a nuclear warhead small enough to fit on a missile, but experts say it seems plausible that they could do so. "Assuming the missile is a Taepodong 2 and assuming the missile test is successful, North Korea would demonstrate that they have made important progress toward the ability to hit targets in the continental United States with a missile large enough to carry a nuclear weapon," said Gary Samore, a former senior aide on the National Security Council and a vice president of the MacArthur Foundation. It remained unclear late on Sunday how long North Korea might wait before launching a fueled missile, what the diplomatic prospects were for averting a launching, or what the missile's intended landing spot or projected range might be. In Japan, Foreign Minister Taro Aso warned that a miscalculation could result in the missile landing on Japanese territory. "If it is dropped on Japan, it will complicate the story," he told Japanese TV on Sunday. "It will be regarded as an attack." Mr. Aso later toned down his language, saying, "We will not right away view it as a military act," but adding that Japan would seek an immediate meeting of the Security Council if the missile were launched. In its last test of a long-range missile, in 1998, North Korea fired a Taepodong 1 missile over Japan — a launching that the Clinton administration had warned against to no avail. American intelligence was surprised to learn when the missile was launched that it had three stages, although the solid-fueled third stage exploded in flight. That led Congress to step up its push for deployment of antimissile defenses. In 1999, North Korea agreed to a moratorium on long-range missile testing, and has not fired one since. But five weeks ago American officials received satellite images that showed North Korea preparing to test a multiple-stage Taepodong 2 missile. Some Bush administration officials suspected that the moves were a grab for attention while Washington's focus was primarily on Iran's nuclear intentions, and a way to press the United States to agree to direct talks. But since then, diplomats have become increasingly concerned that North Korea indeed planned to conduct a launching. "Why they are doing this, you will have to ask them," one senior Bush administration official said Sunday. "It is not in anyone's interest; certainly not theirs. For our part, we will not be derailed by their temper tantrums, nor have any of our own." Referring to the deadlocked six-party talks about North Korea's nuclear program, the official said: "We'll continue to be guided by our policy of protecting our people and of working closely, very closely with our partners in the six parties. It is important in times like this not to give any mixed signals and to be firm and clear. We support the six- party process as the best means to solve what should be clear to all is a multilateral problem." American knowledge about the Taepodong 2 is limited. In 2001, a National Intelligence Estimate forecast that a three-stage version of it could reach North America with a sizable payload. The first stage of the Taepodong 2 is thought to consist of a cluster of Nodong missiles, which are single-stage, shorter-range rockets; the second stage is believed to be a Nodong missile. A third stage would probably be a solid-fueled system. There was no mention of a missile in a report from North Korea's official media on a national meeting on Sunday, according to news service reports from the region. At the meeting, officials talked about increasing the North's "military deterrent" — a phrase used by the country to refer to its nuclear program. North Korea contends it needs the program for a defense against a possible American attack; the United States says it has no intention of invading. American analysts say that if a missile launching occurs it is possible that North Korea will describe it as part of a peaceful program to put satellites in orbit. North Korea is a secretive Stalinist state, and figuring out the motives of its leader, Kim Jong Il, has stymied diplomats for years. "It may well be that Kim Jong Il is getting a lot of pressure from his generals to verify the design" of the Taepodong 2 missile, said Robert J. Einhorn, a former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation under President Bill Clinton. But, he added, "Whenever the North Koreans act up, one has to assume in part at least that they are trying to get the world's attention." Just two weeks ago — a day after the United States offered to hold direct talks with Iran over its nuclear program — North Korea invited Christopher R. Hill, an assistant secretary of state and chief negotiator on the North's nuclear weapons program, for direct talks in Pyongyang. That offer was rebuffed by the White House, which insisted that the North return to the long-deadlocked six-nation talks. The other nations involved in the talks are China, South Korea, Japan and Russia. North Korea has boycotted the talks in recent months after the United States cracked down on financial institutions that dealt with the government in Pyongyang, and with North Korean companies suspected of counterfeiting American dollars and laundering money. If North Korea goes ahead with a launching, the already floundering talks would go into the deep freeze. David E. Sanger contributed reporting for this article. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/19/world/asia/19korea.html
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Time Magazine Monday, Jun 19, 2006 The Untold Story of al-Qaeda's Plot to Attack the Subways In an EXCLUSIVE BOOK EXCERPT, author Ron Suskind reveals how officials learned about a cell that came within weeks of striking in New York City with poison gas By RON SUSKIND Two months had passed since 9/11, and at the highest levels of government, officials were worrying about a second wave of attacks. CIA Director George Tenet was briefing Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice in the White House Situation Room on the agency's latest concern: intelligence reports suggesting that Osama bin Laden and his No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had met with a radical Pakistani nuclear scientist around a campfire in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Absorbing the possibility that al-Qaeda was trying to acquire a nuclear weapon, Cheney remarked that America had to deal with a new type of threat--what he called a "low- probability, high-impact event"--and the U.S. had to do it "in a way we haven't yet defined," writes author Ron Suskind in his new book, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11. And then Cheney defined it: "If there's a 1% chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al-Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response. It's not about our analysis ... It's about our response." Suskind writes, "So, now spoken, it stood: a standard of action that would frame events and responses from the Administration for years to come." In the following excerpt, Suskind describes the government's reaction to information about a different WMD threat: hydrogen cyanide gas. As in the rest of the book, he illuminates the constant interplay and occasional tension between the "invisibles," the men and women in the intelligence and uniformed services actually fighting the war on terrorism, and the "notables," high-level officials who "tell us that everything will be fine, or that we should be very afraid, or both." Suskind, who won the Pulitzer Prize as a reporter at the Wall Street Journal, wrote the 2004 best seller The Price of Loyalty, an inside look at the Bush Administration. In The One Percent Doctrine, Suskind finds that the notables and the invisibles have at least one thing in common: a "profound sense of urgency." TIME's exclusive excerpt: In late May 2002, the NAtional Security Agency had a gift for the CIA, and NSA Director Mike Hayden was on the phone to deliver it. They had as precious a dispatch as any since 9/11. It was a communication from a designee of Osama bin Laden. The al-Qaeda chief had not used a cell phone or satellite phone since 1998. He was very careful. A ring of deputies, below the level of an Ayman al-Zawahiri or Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, carried messages for him. The United States had determined who some of them were. They made calls, or sent e-mails, on bin Laden's behalf. One such communication was passed to a mysterious character in Saudi Arabia who--on the intercepted signals intelligence--went by several aliases, the most compelling of which, translated from Arabic, meant "Swift Sword." Two things were clear. Bin Laden seemed to be alive and well and providing guidance from some location in the tribal regions along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border; and Swift Sword was al-Qaeda's representative on the Arabian Peninsula. His hand seemed to be in several places at once in the kingdom, guiding several cells of angry opponents of the regime. The instructions from the top of al-Qaeda: Turn your operational focus toward the overthrow of the Saudi government. . . (To read entire article, please click link below.) http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1205478,00.html
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Washington Times June 19, 2006 Pg. 4 Cyanide Plot Prompts Spy Support By Shaun Waterman, United Press International The chairman of the Senate intelligence panel said that reports of a planned cyanide-gas attack on the New York subway system showed the need for continued warrantless surveillance of terrorism suspects. Officials declined yesterday to comment in detail on the story, which appeared on the Time magazine Web site this weekend. Sen. Pat Roberts, Kansas Republican and chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, told CNN only that "the intelligence committee is briefed on these kinds of threats. I would simply say that we've had a briefing." But Mr. Roberts said the report showed the need for the administration's program of warrantless surveillance of electronic communications from terrorism suspects into and out of the United States. The National Security Agency program, revealed by leaks to the New York Times last year, was authorized by President Bush. "It points up, once again, the value of the terrorist surveillance program, the NSA program that's been in the news so much," Mr. Roberts told CNN's "Late Edition" program. "We are able to detect and deter and stop such attacks." In book excerpts published this weekend, author Ron Suskind reported that U.S. intelligence had in 2003 discovered a design for a small and easily constructed makeshift device to produce deadly cyanide gas and separately discovered that there had been a plot to use a series of such devices in a coordinated attack on the New York City subway system. Mr. Suskind, who estimates that such an attack would have killed as many people as the September 11 suicide hijackings, reported that by the time it was discovered by U.S. intelligence, the plot -- hatched by jihadists in Saudi Arabia -- had been called off by al Qaeda's No. 2 leader, Ayman al-Zawahri for unknown reasons. Mr. Suskind wrote that the United States learned of the plot from a human source, an agent "from within Pakistan who was tied tightly into al Qaeda management." It is the first time that the existence of U.S. human intelligence sources with direct access to the al Qaeda leadership has been reported. White House press secretary Tony Snow declined to comment on the report yesterday, telling CBS News only that "in the war on terror, there have been a number of victories. But I don't want to confirm or deny this particular story." But reached yesterday by United Press International, two U.S. officials who requested anonymity to speak about the still-classified episode, confirmed the main elements of the story. "There was concern about such a threat from such a device," said a U.S. counterterrorism official. Another U.S. official confirmed that there had been a plot to use such a weapon in the New York subway. "There was a real plot to use this," said the official. The official also confirmed that the plot had been "switched off" by al-Zawahri. "We still don't know why that is," the official said, adding that analysts had posited two theories. The first was that al-Zawahri was concerned the plot would not be successful enough to top the September 11 attacks, by killing more people or causing more panic -- a goal that is widely thought to be a big strategic factor in al Qaeda's operational planning. The second was that the plot might be too successful -- and bring redoubled efforts to capture the remnants of the al Qaeda leadership hunkered down on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, effectively eliminating their ability to guide the global movement they inspired. http://www.washtimes.com/national/20060619-011335-1448r.htm
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