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An Exploration of the EU's Counterterrorism Measures And An Exploration of the EU’s Counterterrorism Measures: Can the EU Learn from its Member States? A Case Study Examining Italy By Lana Perić A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario © 2018 Lana Perić Perić 2017 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................... 2 List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ 4 List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................... 5 Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... 7 Chapter I: Introduction ................................................................................................................ 8 A. Introduction to the Research Issue and the Research Question .................................................... 8 B. Research Outline .............................................................................................................................. 16 c. Scope of the Project .......................................................................................................................... 17 (i) Time Period: .................................................................................................................................. 18 (ii). Geographic Scope: Applying Italy as a Case Study .................................................................... 19 D. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 20 Chapter II: Methodology ........................................................................................................... 23 A. Theoretical Frameworks ................................................................................................................. 23 Policy Harmonization ......................................................................................................................... 24 Deterrence Theory and Reintegrative Shaming Theory: Crossing International Relations with Criminology ....................................................................................................................................... 25 B. Methodology: Single Case Study .................................................................................................... 28 C. Methodology: Policy Analysis ......................................................................................................... 30 D. Application of Quantitative Data ................................................................................................... 35 Chapter III: Literature Review ................................................................................................. 36 A. The Emergence of Terrorist Groups .............................................................................................. 38 Motivations ........................................................................................................................................ 39 Objectives ........................................................................................................................................... 43 Organizational and Bureaucratic Characteristics ............................................................................... 45 B. “How Terrorist Groups End” ......................................................................................................... 47 C. Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Policies and Strategies ............................ 50 Chapter IV: The EU and Counterterrorism ............................................................................ 55 A. Issue ................................................................................................................................................... 55 B. Background on Terrorism and Jihadist Extremism in Western Europe/the EU....................... 57 First Wave: Anarchist Terrorism ........................................................................................................ 59 Second and Third Waves: Anti-Colonialist and New Left Terrorism ................................................ 61 Fourth Wave: Religious Wave and the Spread of Jihadist Extremists in Europe .............................. 64 C. Europeanization: A Single European Intelligence Agency .......................................................... 74 Internal security: Partial Intelligence Sharing within the EU? ........................................................... 76 Background on Intelligence Cooperation in the EU........................................................................... 77 Europeanization of Intelligence in the Future .................................................................................... 80 D. Policy Analysis: Findings and Discussion ...................................................................................... 83 EU Counterterrorism Strategy (2005) ................................................................................................ 83 General Trends Derived from the Policy Analysis of the EU’s Counterterrorism Measures Introduced Between 2001 and 2016 ................................................................................................... 91 E. Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................... 103 Perić 2017 3 Chapter V: Italy’s Counterterrorism Measures .................................................................... 105 A. Issue ................................................................................................................................................. 105 B. Background on Terrorism and Jihadist Extremism in Italy ..................................................... 105 The Years of Lead: Political terrorism in Italy from 1969-1989 ...................................................... 106 Italy’s Complicated Relationship with its Muslim Community ....................................................... 110 Jihadist Extremists in Italy ............................................................................................................... 113 C. General Overview of Qualitative Analysis of Italy’s Counterterrorism Measures (2001-2016) .............................................................................................................................................................. 117 General trends and an overview of the policy analysis .................................................................... 119 D. Findings and Discussion ................................................................................................................ 127 Options for Those Convicted of Terrorism Offences – Deportation or Collaboration .................... 127 Merging Anti-Mafia Measures with Anti-Terrorism: Preventative and Deterrent Measures .......... 134 Holistic Deterrent Approaches: Collaboration, Reintegration, and Prison Reforms ........................ 138 E. Conclusions ..................................................................................................................................... 144 Chapter VI: Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 148 Limitations .......................................................................................................................................... 153 Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 158 Annex A: List of Measures Examined .................................................................................... 175 EU Measures ....................................................................................................................................... 175 Italian Measures ................................................................................................................................. 188 Annex B: Pillars of the EU Counterterrorism Strategy 2005 ............................................... 198 Annex C: Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA On Combatting Terrorism ......... 199 Perić 2017 4 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 4.1 Total Attacks in the EU between 1970 and 2000 72 Figure 4.2 Total Attacks in the EU between 2001 and 2015 73 Figure 4.3 EU Counterterrorism Competencies 75 Figure 4.4 Pillars of the EU Counterterrorism Strategy (2005) 84 Figure 4.5 Number of Counterterrorism Measures Passed by EU Institutions between 92 2001 and 2016 Figure 4.6 Total Number of Terrorist Attacks in the EU between 2001 and 2015 92 Figure 4.7 Total Number of Successful Terrorist Attacks in the EU between 2001 and 93 2015 Figure 4.8 Evaluated Counterterrorism Measures Categorized Under the EU 96 Counterterrorism Strategy’s Pillars Figure 4.9 Themes of the EU’s Counterterrorism Measures 102 Figure 5.1 Counterterrorism Strategy Pillars applicable to Italian counterterrorism 119 measures Figure 5.2 Application of the EU definition
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