Madhyamaka in Abhidharma Śāstras 353
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Madhyamaka in Abhidharma Śāstras 353 Chapter 11 Madhyamaka in Abhidharma Śāstras: The Case of Harivarman’s *Tattvasiddhi Goran Kardaš 1 Introduction There are only a few very brief references to the Madhyamaka philosophi cal standpoint in the preserved Abhidharma śāstras. In the ninth chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh), Vasubandhu accuses those Buddhists who propound the existence of pudgala (Vātsīputrīyas) and those who con tend that nothing exists (sarvanāstitāgrāhaka) of introducing heresy into the Buddhadharma. These doctrines are wrong and do not lead to libera tion (mokṣābhāvadoṣa) (Pradhan, 1975: 472, lines 13–14). In his commentary (Vyākhyā) on the AKBh (Wogihara, 1932–1936: 710, 31f.), Yaśomitra explicitly identifies those who contend that nothing exists with the Madhyamaka school. Vaibhāṣika master Saṃghabhadra, speaking in his *Nyāyānusāra about those Buddhists who are not worthy of being called members of Sarvāstivāda, men tions those who “under the empire of distorted mirror hold that all dharmas are devoid of own nature and that even present existence of dharmas is illu sory and wrong” (de La Vallée Poussin, 1937: 89). Another Vaibhāṣika śāstra, the Abhidharmadīpa (kārikā 299 and vṛtti), criticizes those propounders of empti ness (śūnyatāvādinaḥ) who contend that nothing exists (sarvaṃ nāsti) in any of the three time periods, calling them “upholders of destruction” (vaināśika) and “propounders of the emptiness of the connection (between cause and effect)” (ayogaśūnyatāvādins).1 This situation is slightly different in the case of the *Tattvasiddhi2 (hence forth: TS) of Harivarman (third to fourth century CE), who, according to Shōryū 1 In my translation of ayogaśūnyatāvādin, I have followed Jaini’s understanding (cf. Jaini, 1977: 123) of this compound, not to be found in any other Buddhist text. Jaini understands ayoga as absence (“disconnection”) of causal interrelatedness. Therefore, following his understanding, the translation could be either as I have done, or alternatively, as “propounders of the doctrine that emptiness is (implies or means) absence (“disconnection”)” of any actual causation or conditioning activities or so. 2 In the present chapter, I will utilize N. Aiyaswami Sastri’s Sanskrit (re)translation of the text (“Satyasiddhi” in his reconstruction) from the classical Chinese, and I will also follow his pagination. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004318823_013 354 Kardaš Katsura, was a member of the Bahuśrutīya school.3 If so, this Śāstra is the only surviving representative of Mahāsāṃghika Abhidharma literature. The Śāstra also discloses a strong Sautrāntika affiliation on many doctrinal issues. The TS was translated into Chinese in the early fifth century, and had a huge influence on Chinese Mādhyamikas at some point, as it was wrongly understood as a proper Mādhyamika work. Nevertheless, although composed as a typical Abhidharma śāstra centered around the four noble truths, some of its key philo sophical views have an undeniable Madhyamaka tinge. The relevant portion of the Śāstra I will focus on in this chapter, is situated in the fourth chapter called “Nirodhasatya,” sections 142–151. I will focus on three issues: 1. What could be the main source for Harivarman’s presentation of an apparently Mādhyamika position? 2. What is the nature of his criticism of the Mādhyamika position, bearing in mind his overall philosophical standpoint? 3. What is the general Mādhyamika answer to the kind of criticism Harivarman exposes in his treatise? 2 The Main Source for Harivarman’s Presentation of an Apparently Mādhyamika Position Our part of the text begins with the enumeration of the four wrong doctrines that presumably concern the existential status of objects of everyday experi ence, namely the doctrine of unity or identity (ekatva), of diversity or difference (nānātva), of unspeakability (anirvacanīyatva) and of nonexistence (abhāva)4 (142). According to the first doctrine, parts of, e.g. a pot (color, smell etc.) are identical to the pot itself; according to the second, they are different from it; according to the third, it cannot be said whether they are identical to or differ ent from the pot; according to the fourth, the pot does not exist (at all). 3 Cf. his argumentation on this point as well as on the TS’s doctrinal affiliations and disagree ments with other traditional Buddhist schools in Katsura, 1974: 29–49. 4 Katsura, 1974: 181, is of the opinion that Harivarman here presents four arguments concerning “the relationship between concepts and dharmas”; Priestley, 1970: 31, thinks so also (concepts and real phenomena). This would hold for the first three positions (the relationship between parts and the whole), but not for the fourth position (“the pot does not exist”). I think that Harivarman here more generally provides four possible explanations of the existential status of everyday objects..