In Hongkou: the Japanese Community in Shanghai, 1895-1932
"Little Japan" in Hongkou:
The Japanese Community in Shanghai, 1895-1932
MO Yajun
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of The Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Philosophy
in
History
© The Chinese University of Hong Kong
July, 2004
The Chinese University of Hong Kong holds the copyright of this thesis. Any person(s) intends to use a part or whole of the materials in the thesis in a proposed publication must seek copyright release from the Dean of the Graduate School. IL/統系馆書圓\A ICo 9 m 15 )j|
university J碧j VfisilBRARY system/^ Acknowledgements
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Leung
Yuen-Sang, for his support and guidance throughout the two years of my master
studies. Without his guidance and help this work could never be possible. I would also
like to thank Professor Yip Hon-Ming, who has provided advice, encouragement, and
support to me throughout the course of this study.
I must also express my gratitude to the following scholars for their generous
assistance in collecting data and in other capacities: Professor So Kee-Long and Dr
Siu Kam-Wah at the History Department of the Chinese University of Hong Kong; Dr
Lee Pui-Tak at the Centre of Asian Studies of the University of Hong Kong; Professor
Hamashita Takeshi and Dr Furumatsu Takashi of Kyoto University, Japan; Professor
Shiba Yoshinobu ofToyo Bunko, Japan; Mr. Chen Zu'en at the Shanghai Academy of
Social Sciences, China.
Finally, I wish to record my special thanks to my dearest parents, who love and believe in me in everything I have attempted to do, and especially in this endeavor.
With their deep love, I would never lose my confidence in experiencing any challenge in my life, and I would never feel lonely anytime, anywhere.
i • Abstract
This thesis examines and investigates the Japanese community in Shanghai from
their emergence and formation in the city in the late nineteenth century to their
development through the early Republic era, focusing particularly on the Japanese
concentration in Hongkou district in the early twentieth century.
In light of a thorough examination on the historical-geographical background of
the city of Shanghai, the first part of this thesis reveals the uniqueness of the urban space and the hybrid culture of modem Shanghai and the special characteristics of the
Hongkou district. This part not only introduces the milieu within which the Japanese community initiated and developed, but also shows the complexity of the foreign presence in the city.
The second part of the thesis is a discussion on the formation, structure and actions of the Japanese community in Shanghai. Without an exclusive Japanese concession, the Japanese community in Shanghai developed by joining the foreign enclaves in the city - the International Settlement in Shanghai. However, they had established their own “sphere of influence，，in Hongkou district through their consulate and other Japanese communal organizations, and fostered their own lifestyle in Hongkou.
By focusing on the relationship between the Japanese community and other foreign or Chinese communities in Shanghai, the last part of this thesis relates the
Sino-Japanese tension to Japanese communal lives in Shanghai. Inside the authority of the International Settlement, they had less voice than their western counterparts.
Meanwhile, the anti-Japanese sentiment in China and organized actions against Japan in Shanghai irritated the Japanese community, who reached its exploding point in
1932. The Japanese military actions in the January of 1932 may partly result from the appeals of Japanese community who wanted to protect their “home，，in Hongkou.
ii 論文摘要
本文嘗試以社會史的視角入手’探討十九世紀末到二十世紀初上海曰橋社會
的形成及其發展過程0全文共分三個部分，七個章節。首章介紹近代上海的城市
空間的發展過程及其複雜的社會文化背景。第二章考察虹口的歷史地理背景，外
國人和中國人社區的發展’討論了虹口在上海城市空間中所處的特殊地位，及其
對上海曰橋社會的影響°第三章分析在上海，尤其是虹口，日橋社會的形成。第
四章則將重點放在其內部行政管理體制。第五章’討論日橋社會內部的社會階層
的分化的同時，並且嘗試重塑了日僑社會在虹口日常生活的大槪面貌。第六章和
第七章則著重探討了日橋與上海其他西人或中國人社會之間的摩擦、衝突和妥
協。
在有關近代上海的社會史硏究中’日僑在上海的歷史相對少人問津。近人對
中曰關係史當中的政治史、外交史的關注往往掩蓋了其在社會史層面上的複雜
性。本文通過報紙、檔案、回憶錄和其他資料，嘗試重塑其社會構成以及日本人
在上海獨特的生活面貌：一九一〇年代之後，上海日橋在人口上遠遠超過其他在
上海的外國人，但在上海他們並沒有自己獨立的“日租界”。他們通過在上海的
曰本領事館和其他內部組織的來維持日本人社會的運作和發展，並漸漸“獨立”
於公共租界而在上海形成自己獨特的社區。在二十世紀初，日橋社區的發展幾乎
將虹口地區變成了他們的的勢力範圍。虹口從最初曰本人自發的聚居區域，到最
後成爲一個幾乎半官方的“日租界”。而一九二〇年代末，隨著中國民族主義情
緒的日益高漲，上海日本人社會與中國人及其他外國人社會之間的摩擦也日益激
烈。
iii Table of Contents
Introduction 1
Part I: Remapping Shanghai, Remapping Hongkou 4
Chapter I. Reconfiguration of the urban space in modem Shanghai 4
1.1 ‘‘Tri-cities” in Shanghai: urban space in transformation 4
1.2 A divided city, a hybrid society 8
Chapter II. How special was Hongkou district in Shanghai? 10
2.1 Where was "Hongkou"? 10
2.2 American Settlement: “the Cinderella among the settlements" 12
2.2.1 From waterways to waterfronts 14
2.2.2 Bridges and roads 16
2.3 New frontiers for new comers 19
Part II: Structuring of the Japanese Community in Hongkou District 21
Chapter III. The latecomers to Shanghai 21
3.1 Why not an exclusive Japanese Concession? 21
3.2 Population growth after 1895 25
3.3 Choose Shanghai, choose Hongkou 30
3.3.1 "Why go to Shanghai?” 30
3.3.2 "Why choose Hongkou?" 33
Chapter IV, The administration structure and the power system 37
4.1 Japanese Consulate in Shanghai 37
4.2 'JRA': a ‘self-governing，body run by the elites 42
4.3 Public services and communal duties 50
iv 4.3.1 The JRA-run schools and their school system in Shanghai 51
4.3.2 Japanese company in SVC 55
4.3.3 Public health service
4.3.4 Other services 57
Chapter V. 'Little Japan，，a self-contained community 59
5.1 'Kaishaha，vs. 'Dochakuha， 59
5.2 A society formed by small traders 64
5.3 Make Hongkou a Japan town 68
5.3.1 'Japanese streets' & ‘Little Tokyo' 68
5.3.2 Japanese lives in Hongkou 71
5.3.3 'Nagasaki ken-Shanghai shi， 74
Part III: Compromises and Conflicts 76
Chapter VI. Conflicts with compromises 76
6.1 Japanese community and the Shanghai Municipal Council 76
6.1.1 Representatives in Council 77
6.1.2 Japanese participation in the SMP and other services in the SMC 78
6.1.3 Japanese wanted more voice in the SMC 81
6.2 The anti-Japanese boycotts and Japanese community 82
6.2.1 The boycott as an economic tool 83
6.2.2 The hostilities and the Japanese reaction 86
6.3 Conflicts with compromises 89
Chapter VII. Shanghai 1932: An era ended 92
Conclusion 99
Notes 102
V Appendices
Appendices A Glossaries
Appendices B Bibliography 151
List of Tables
Table
1. "Hongkou" in different Gazetteers of Shanghai County 11
2. The Japanese Population in Shanghai, 1889-1909 27
3. The Development of Japanese Population in Shanghai, 1912-1931 28
4. Japanese Firms in Shanghai, in First Decade of Meiji Era 32
5. The Geographical Origins of the Japanese Merchants in Shanghai, 1894 34
6. The Proportion of Japanese in Shanghai (1889-1892) 38
7. The Members of JRA Administrative Committee in 1915 and 1922 48
8. The Enrollment of Japanese Primary Schools in Shanghai (1911-1932) 52
9. The Japanese Schools run by the JRA 55
10. The Proportions of Japanese Population in Different Professions in the Early
1910s 60
11. The Different Status of "Kaishaha" and “Dochakuha’， 62
12. The Election Result of the Residents' Council of the JRA (1925, 1929) 63
13. The New Registered Japanese Commercial Firms in Shanghai (1918-1932) 65
14. The Japanese population resided in Outer Hongkou Area 70
15. Japanese Small Businesses Opened inside the "Japanese Streets Area" (1924)....72
List of Figures
Figure
1. Shanghai Japanese Clubs (1903-1908) 44
2. The Structure of Japanese Residents' Association 47
vi vii Introduction
The Japanese empire in modem China, which initiated from the end of nineteenth century, can be distinguished two forms: the formal and informal ones, demonstrating two different kinds of Japanese experience and roles in China] While in its formal colonies, the Japanese had enjoyed the overall control of the local society and was able to promote their colonial policies in a planned way, it was impossible for other Japanese societies to establish such authorities in many Chinese treaty ports, where also held a large number of Japanese migrants in some insulated Japanese communities.
Among all the Japanese communities in different Chinese treaty ports, the
Japanese community in Shanghai might be the most unusual one, not only because the
Japanese failed to establish their exclusive concession in this city but also because of the complexity of the foreign presence in this “queen of the treaty ports in China，，.
Current scholarship in the history of Shanghai centers upon the multiplicity of the city, among which there is a growing body of writings on the complexity of the "foreign presence" in Shanghai.^ However, little attention has been given to the Japanese community.
The modem relationship between Japan and Shanghai can be traced back to
1862，when the Senzaimaru (千歲九)，the first Japanese vessel of the modem era, arrived in Shanghai. Ten years later, by the time that modem Japan first opened diplomatic and trade relations with China in 1871, the Japanese Consulate was first established in Shanghai on the north bank of the Suzhou Creek (蘇州河).And during the early twentieth century, the Japanese community in Shanghai became the largest foreign community in the city.
This study focuses on the Japanese community in Shanghai: their emergence and development in the city from the late nineteenth century in general, and their concentration in Hongkou (虹口）in the early twentieth century in particular. This
1 study investigates how these “latecomers，’ established their own kingdom in the
foreign enclave; how deep their self-governing institutions influenced the daily life of
the ordinary Japanese in Hongkou district; and how these administrative agents and
other organizations had given these Shanghai Japanese a sense of identity and
cohesiveness in the city even without a formal Japanese concession. It also gave rise to a vision of the ordinary Japanese life in the "margin space” between the Chinese and non-Chinese communities, how they earned their livings, fostered a unique lifestyle and cultivated the social responsibility towards their community in Shanghai.
Three scholars — Mark R. Peattie, Christian Henriot, and Joshua A. Fogel — have contributed to our understanding of the Japanese experience in Chinese treaty ports. Peattie carefully researches the general living conditions of the Japanese in
Chinese treaty ports and points out some large-size Japanese communities in China and their demand for strong action constrained Japanese foreign policy.^ Henriot has paid special attention to the importance of the Japanese community in Shanghai by presenting its history through detailed statistics and careful surveys from the 1870s through the 1940s.4 Fogel's study of the Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai
(JRA) focuses on the evolution of the communal organization of the Japanese community in Shanghai.^ Besides Peattie, Henriot and Fogel, some Japanese and
Chinese scholars, such as Takatsuna Hirofumi, Chen Zu'en and Ma Changlin have also written on various aspects of the Japanese community in Shanghai.^
However, much of the existing scholarship in English on Japan's presence in
Shanghai stresses the uniform pattern of Japanese experience in Chinese treaty ports, especially on the development of communal organizations and military activities.
Little has been done on the social life of the Japanese, and the image of the Japanese community in Shanghai remains one-dimensional in these studies. On the other side, the studies by Chinese scholars focus a lot on Japan's expansionism and militarism, and tend to connect Japanese experience in Shanghai with Japan's increasing political, economic, and military encroachments in China from the 1890s to the 1940s7 Even though there are grounds for adopting such an approach, yet in the case of Shanghai, especially before the 1930s, too rigidly conforming to a model of expansionism would
2 rob the field of much vitality.
This study attempts to present some new insights on the social history of
Japanese community in early twentieth-century Shanghai by focusing on Hongkou
district where the Japanese in Shanghai concentrated. By remapping Hongkou, the
study hopes to provide information related to the historic-geographic environment, the
population structures and the complicated foreign existence of the area, how these
affected the growth and development of the Japanese community in Shanghai, and
how Hongkou district had been turned into the "little Japan" in Shanghai.8
Such a study would also reveal the internal dynamics of social history of modem
Shanghai by explicating the patterns of interaction between the Japanese community and those Chinese or non-Chinese communities in the city.
This study begins by introducing the milieu within which the Japanese community emerged and developed. Part One - "Remapping Shanghai, Remapping
Hongkou" - presents such fundamental information as the historic-geographic environment of Hongkou district, the original foreign population there before
Japanese presence, and the early urban development at the turn of the twentieth century. Following this part is an analysis of the major factors behind the structuring of Japanese community. This section also investigates the Japanese population formation in the area, the policies the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai held towards their citizens, the communal duties of the JRA, the daily lives of the ordinary
Japanese in Hongkou, and the social classification among them. Part three probes further into the relationship between the SMC (Shanghai Municipal Council) and
Japanese community, and the conflicts happened between the Japanese and Chinese communities.
3 PART ONE:
REMAPPING SHANGHAI, REMAPPING HONGKOU
THIS PART is intended to be a background study of the Japanese community in
Shanghai during the turn of the twentieth century, including the urban development of
modem Shanghai, the situations of the newly-arisen areas, as well as both of the
domestic and foreign presence in different parts of the city. It has three principal
objectives: First, it aims at offering an analysis of the historical-geographical
background within which the foreign society in general and the Japanese community
in particular initiated and developed. Secondly, we may acquire a preliminary yet
necessary knowledge of the urban space of modem Shanghai which may enable us to
better understand the uniqueness of the Japanese society and its role in the
transformation of the city at the turn of the twentieth century. Finally, it attempts to make a careful study of the special characteristics of Hongkou district where the
Japanese established their "sphere of influence” from the end of nineteenth century.
CHAPTER ONE
RECONFIGURATION OF THE URBAN SPACE IN MODERN
SHANGHAI
"Tri-cities �in Shanghai: urban space in transformation
Shanghai is a unique case in the history of western powers' expansion in the
East. The foreign settlements established after the conclusion of the Opium Wars
(1839-42) combined with the original "Chinese City" (or ‘‘Native City", xiancheng
4 §系城）formed a special kind of power structure in this Chinese metropolis. Modem
Shanghai, according to its separated realms and the different styles in governance,
could be divided into three parts: the Chinese City, the International Settlement, and
the French Concession.
The "Chinese City", or the “Native City", as its name indicates, was an area
ruled by the Chinese. Surrounded by the city walls erected during the Ming Dynasty,
this area used to be the center of Shanghai (or Shanghai xian 上、海環系)，especially
from the political, social and cultural perspectives.^ The surrounding regions outside
the walled area had remained mulberry and cotton farms before 1840s. The market
towns connected by the waterways and streams flourished during the long period of
time when Shanghai functioned as a modest domestic trading mart and low-level
administrative center in the Yangzi River delta.
After the signing of the Treaty of Nanjing, the foreigners, who came to Shanghai
from the "open sea”，carved out their living space and established their 'cities' all
around the walled area." Between 1845 and 1849，three main treaty powers, Britain,
France and United States separately established their settlements in the north part of
Shanghai out of the city walls according to the Land Regulations.^^ The delimitation of a British settlement was first detailed in the Land Regulation of 1845: a tract of land to the north of the walled city along the Huangpu River (黃浦江)’ which was a total of 180 acres, had been set aside for British use]) M. Montigny, the first French
Consul in Shanghai, entered into an agreement with Daotai (道台）Lin Gui (麟桂）in
1849. The French acquired a separated area of over 200 acres of land north of the
Chinese City and south of the British Settlement where they established a French
Concession. Meanwhile, the Americans founded their informal “settlement” on the north of Suzhou Creek (which was also called Wusong River 吳、般江).In 1863，the
Americans amalgamated their own tract of land with the British Settlement and finally established the International Settlement.
5 However, the original "design" of the absolute division between the Chinese and
non-Chinese societies evaporated in the face of almost a million refugees driven into
the settlements due to the depredations of several rebellions: the localized "Small
Sword Society’，(Xiaodaohui 小刀會）revolt in 1853 and the Taiping rebellion from
1850 to 1864. The huge influx of Chinese spurred the formation of the Shanghai
Municipal Council (SMC) in the former Anglo-American settlements in 1854，which
later became the SMC of the united International Settlement. Meanwhile, a
separatist tendency in foreign Shanghai was developed, and the prospect of the
consolidation of all foreign controlled areas in Shanghai under one municipal
administration could no longer be persisted. Fearing their national interests to be
impaired by predominant British and American powers, the French formed their own
municipal council, conseil municipal, in 1862.'^
These two municipal governments were fundamentally different with each other: the SMC of International Settlement was composed of elected representatives of the qualified foreign land renters and ratepayers, and it was constitutionally responsible only to its electorate rather than the direct consular or diplomatic authority,'^ while its counterpart in the French Concession, was subject to the approval or veto of the
French consul"
Since many Chinese realized the foreign settlements was able to offer not only refuge but also economic opportunities for them, more and more Chinese began to establish their businesses outside the walled city in the post-Taiping era. When the relationship between the two sides of the city walls was getting closer, the city walls served no longer as the defense for the local Chinese society but rather the barrier prevented the development of transportation and communication. Finally, the walls were officially torn down in January 1912，after the collapse of the Qing dynasty, even though the calling for demolition of the walls, which were proposed by local elites and commercial leaders, can be traced back as early as to the end of the
1Q ^^ nineteenth century. The ring roads, had soon replaced the original walls and moats.
19 Since this area located to the south of foreign settlements, it was called the
6 "Southern City，，{nanshi 南市）as well. This area together with Pudong 甫東）and
Zhabei (閘北)，another native district developed outside the walled area and the
foreign settlements when large amount of refugees entered Shanghai during the 1850s
and 1860s, formed the Chinese administered areas {huajie 華界）in Shanghai.
The Chinese City, together with other Chinese administered areas, was governed
in a traditional way, while the International Settlement became an "independent
republic" ruled by their own “citizens” - the land renters and ratepayers - who lived
there. If these two parts of Shanghai can be seen as the two “poles’，in the power
structures of this city, the administration of French Concession can be viewed as a
kind of middle-state. The division and combination of the "tri-cities" became the
foundation of the development of modem Shanghai and influenced the transformation
of its urban space.
From the 1860s onwards, Shanghai began to evolve into a major metropolitan city in China and even in East Asia. Along with the growth of the population and the trade and industrial expansion, demands for more living and working space in the city emerged after the 1880s. Proposals were made to transform this pre-modem county into a comprehensive and systematic modem city. Thus various plans, which related to different fields from sanitation, public health to education, were presented and put into practice. Remarkable innovations and drastic improvements were conducted for the transportation, delivery system, infrastructure, residences, shopping and commercial spaces, social and cultural activities. The riverside of Huangpu was bunded; the metalled, cleaned, and lighted roads were built; shipped goods from numerous godowns and jetties were traded at the stock exchange; piped pure water was provided in different parts of the city; westernized hospitals and schools were constructed; public gardens were established; and some unplanned melange of
Chinese housing and Western housing were developed in the same time. Such municipal innovations had transformed the urban space of Shanghai and provided a center "stage" for peoples who from different countries all over the world.
7 A divided city, a hybrid society
Opened forcibly to foreign trade and residence, Shanghai had its urban space
developed separately in three different scopes, of which the boundaries were changed
for several times. In addition to their territories, their administrative authorities, the
judicial systems, and the order of the societies varied from each other, though they
were somehow interdependent with each other. Moreover, even inside the
self-governing foreign settlements, different districts had their own unique
"landscape" according to the various characters of their inhabitants. Some historians
of Shanghai just argue that Shanghai was “a mosaic city" based on its cultural
geography.20
The International Settlement, for example, can be further divided into several
parts. The "central area", where the former British Settlement had been located, was
the center of modem Shanghai from the capitalistic and commercial perspectives. The
"west area", an large scale of territory gained in 1898 when the International
Settlement was further expanded on the west side of the city, together with the "east
area", an area called Yangshupu (楊樹浦)which was part of the former American
settlement, became two emerging areas of light industry. And the "north area", or the
"Hongkou district’，which centered around North Sichuan Road (Bei Sichuan lu 匕四
JIf路)，was an area slightly deviated from the center of the International Settlement
and prospered in its own sophisticated way. Since this area is the main "stage" of this
paper, it will be further discussed in details in the following chapters.
The other two entities in the city, the French Concession and the Chinese City,
also enjoyed their own special characteristics. While the latter was viewed as a
traditional and increasingly anachronistic area in the city, the French Concession, a
charming place with a pleasant mix of wide tree-lined streets and interesting European style masons and gardens, earned a reputation as a haven for vice and drugs. The
8 lawlessness in this area attracted not only the gangsters but also Chinese Communist
Party and leftist writers and intellectuals.
However, even though the residential divisions were complex and conflicting in
modem Shanghai, the distinctive cultures of different peoples overlapped with each
other had also constructed a society with a hybrid culture. For instance, various
languages from different language families, together with different Chinese dialects,
were being used in modem Shanghai, where they might be interwoven and exchanged
with each other in the process of communication. Sometimes, people might have to
use two or three languages in their daily lives. And it was quite common that the
names of the avenues and streets in the foreign settlements were written in two or
three languages. The so-called “pidgin English", a bastardized China Coast potpourri
of mangled English, Chinese, Portuguese and Indian words, became a useful language
tool not only for business but also for daily communications. As to the juridical
system, different courts, including the "mixed court，，in the settlements, which was
formed to settle legal disputes between Chinese and foreigners, the intendant's
Yamen for the Chinese people, and other consulate courts for the foreigners,
co-existed in the same place in the views of different groups of people. At least six
countries had their own postal service in Shanghai, which served both the people from
their own countries and the Chinese people in the foreign settlements. Even though
most people shared the standard Occidental calendar system in Shanghai, other
disparate systems of "time" were still pursued due to the divergent religions and
customs. Various festivals and anniversaries (such as the Chinese New Year,
Christmas, Japanese Emperor's birthday, the anniversary of the accession of the Great
Qing Emperors, and etc.) were celebrated in this city.
These multiple cultural levels of modem Shanghai approach acknowledges that this "divided" city emphasized the differences between various groups of people, yet at the same time their civic lives and activities were conducted, though within these distinct frames, for the balance of each other. This also influenced the formation of the
Japanese community who entered Shanghai from late nineteenth century.
9 CHAPTER TWO
HOW SPECIAL WAS HONGKOU DISTRICT IN SHANGHAI?
Where was "Hongkou"?
In today's Shanghai map, Hongkou district (虹 口區）is located in the north-east
of the city, bordering Yangpu district (楊浦區）on the east, Zhabei district (鬧北區）on
the west, Pudong new area G甫東新區)and Huangpu district (黃浦區）across the
Huangpu River and Suzhou Creek to the south, and the Baoshan district (寶山區）on
the north.22 However, when people talk about “Hongkou，’，they refer to a narrower
area around Wusong Road (吳液路)，Raining Road (海寧路）and North Sichuan Road
(四川北路).Before 1947，the name “Hongkou，，(or "Hongkew" in the historical
materials) referred to an area without specific boundary, and even after 1947，when
Hongkou had become an administrative division in Shanghai, the border of this
division had changed for several times. Thus, the simple question raised in this
chapter needs more clarifications: where "Hongkou" refers to in this paper should be
limited in the first place.
In different Shanghai gazetteers, the word "Hongkou" can be found in several
places, which referred, respectively, to "Hongkou Creek" {hongkou gang 虫工 口港）
and "Hongkou Market，，{hongkou shi 虫工 口市)：the former one was a creek which
empties itself into the Huangpu River,^^ while the latter one referred to the market town "five lis (里）north-east to the county’，.� I*n the reign of Jiaqing (嘉慶)，Qing dynasty, this stream had been called “Shahong” (、?少洪)，which lied on "the east side to
Yangshupu'\ and "connected with Wusong (River) and Huangpu (River)".^^ It is common, in Chinese language, that the juncture of the streams is called the “kou”
10 (mouth) of the river, thus the place where the stream empties itself into the Huangpu
River was also known as “Hongkou” (洪口），which later became "Hongkou"(虹口）
during the Tongzhi (同治）reign (1861-1875).^^ (See Table 1)
Table 1
"Hongkou" in different Gazetteers of Shanghai County
� “ .”” • Year(s) of the Different Editions ” 丄. Section� Contents compilation
Wfln/z Reign (Ming) 1586-1588 ^^印 "S/w/ion又〃（沙洪） (Shanghai county) Kangxi Reign (Qing) Qianlong Reign I / �� 1750 Map (Qmg) P "Hongkou"(虹口） Qianlong Reisn 11 仍* (Shanghai county)
(Qing) "Beichuanhong"(北 川洪)， Map (waterways) "Zhongchuanhong" Jiaqing Reign (Qing) 1812-1814 (中/1 丨洪),"Hongkou" (洪口） 2 4 "River — B;anches" '(沙洪） "Beichuanhong"(北 川洪)， Map (waterways) "Zhongchuanhong" (中川洪),"Hongkou" Tongzhi reign (Qing) 1866-1870 (虹口）
^^ket towns;:‘(虫f口— ^ 4 4 "River Branches" � (沙洪） Ma (Laozha area) "'^^ngkou ganf^l A continuation of 口港） , ,� � 1913-1918 the gazetteer (Qing) 4.3 "River "Hongkou (虹 Branches" —__P^)
Minguo (Republic) 1925-1935 2. "Waterways" g抓g"(虹 ___J P^
11 14.1 "The American development of the Settlement in foreign settlements" I Hongkou district L i (虹口美租界） Source: TZSHXZ, SXXZ, MGSHZ, Wang Xiaojian (Shanghai, 1993); Zheng Zu'an (Shanghai, 1999); Xue Liyong (Shanghai, 1994).
From all these records, we may outline a sequence of the changing meaning of
the name “Hongkou，，in different periods of times. “Hongkou，’ was a name referred to
the river mouth of a creek, called “Shahong”, where it empties itself into the Huangpu
River. Later this creek was also known as “Hongkougang” (Hongkou creek) in the
Gazetteers, and divided into different sections according to the different positions,
which named respectively, “beichuanhong” (北川洪)，“zhongchuanhong” (中川洪）
and “hongkou” (虹口），from north to south. "Hongkou" was also the name for a
market, which appeared near the south section of the Hongkou creek during the
Daoguang (道光）reign (1821-1850). Thus, the areas around the south section of the
Hongkou creek and the market were firstly regarded as “Hongkou”. Before the
opening of Shanghai as a treaty port, Hongkou district consisted mainly of farmland
and fishing villages, with the exception of the market towns of Jiangwan (、江灣)，
Hong(虹）and Hongkou(虹口). ^^ Qiujiang (虫L江，or Jiujiang,舊江 “the old river",
which is the old river route of the Suzhou Creek) marked the boundary of the district,
south of which was Shanghai County and north of which was Baoshan County (寶山
縣).This should be the only possible boundary for Hongkou district before the foreigners came. However, "Hongkou" had still remained an area with uncertain limitations until the day when some Americans, most of whom were missionaries, passed over the Suzhou Creek and established their “informal” American settlement on the opposite shore to the British one.
12 American Settlement: "the Cinderella among the settlements"
Seeking cheaper accommodation, the American Episcopal Church Mission,
under Bishop William J. Boone, came in 1848 to the Hongkou district, across the
Suzhou Creek. They purchased land for residences and established their church and a
hospital which stood close by the northern bank of the Huangpu River. The tower of
the church was a landmark for many years to the captains of ships coming up the river
from Wusong to Shanghai, for it was the only "high point" in that area for a long time.
At the time, the north bank of Suzhou creek was low and swampy with only a small
population. This section of land, lying North of Suzhou Creek and including the
district around, was called as “Hongkew” or ‘‘Hongque” by these foreigners.
The founding of the American Settlement seemed to be a natural, not a political
growth, caused by an expansion or overflow from the old British Settlement. Some
historians argued that ‘‘the American Settlement was not created, but 'just growed'" in
Shanghai.28 However, even though the Shanghai Daotai acquiesced when Bishop
Boone established an American community in Hongkou (and there had been an
official American consulate flying the Stars and Stripes at Hongkou since 1854), the
boundaries of the American Settlement had not been clarified until 1863 when the
American Settlement merged itself with the British Settlement. Thus, it is difficult to
give an exact or definite account of the formation of its original area. In 1863，the
boundary of American settlement was settled after several negotiations between
Shanghai Daotai and the American consul, George R Seward. In that regulation, the
name “Hongkou” had been officially equated with the American Settlement for the
first time,29 even though the settlement included a large tract of land of Yangshupu.
This kind of equation may result from the fact that this settlement had been initiated in the Hongkou district since the time of Bishop Boone. Furthermore, Hongkou was the center of the American Settlement, and on its right opposite bank of the Huangpu
River, laid the "Bund", which was the central part of the foreign society in Shanghai.
Nevertheless, this settlement was much under-developed and was justly called
13 as “the Cinderella among the settlements", since there was only some small taxable
resources to provide for the maintenance of order.^^ And the urban infrastructure
construction in this area had swiftly developed after the amalgamation in 1863. The
land in Hongkou was surveyed, the gambles and brothels in this district were
registered, and new municipal infrastructure was developed in this part of the city.
From waterways to waterfronts
As discussed before, Hongkou district was an area combined with several
waterways, including Hongkou Creek, Qiu Creek inside the district, and Suzhou
Creek, Huangpu River marked as boundaries. Even though both of Hongkou Creek
and the Qiu Creek were two main waterways in the district connecting the surrounding market towns during the pre-modem time and have kept in use even until resent time, their status as the main water routes of the local trading system declined during the modem time. Suzhou Creek, which was called Wusong River by the
Chinese, linking Shanghai with Suzhou (蘇州）and other Jiangnan (江南）market towns, used to be the most important river for shipping in Jiangnan area, yet in modem time, its transport status had been replaced by the Huangpu River, which became the “artery” of modem Shanghai because of the huge profits carried by increased maritime trade. Even the high-ranking officials of Qing government realized its significance for the city:
"Huangpu River, which comes from Huating (華亭）and surrounds the (Shanghai)
county from south, east and north, converges with the Wusong River, and then
entered the sea in Baoshan. The width of (Huangpu River) is from one to three lis
(里)，and depth is from five to six zhangs (丈）.There is no hill outside to hinder
(the river mouth), and no reef and shoal inside to block (the river route). All the
huge ships from Denglai,(登萊，Yantai 煙臺 in present day). Canton and Fukien,
can hoist the sails and run at fast speed. Both of the (foreign) steamships and the
14 (Chinese) junks can easily run through (the Huangpu River).�3i
Some historians argue that this was an important change in nineteenth century
Shanghai, which “took place on the waterfront instead of the waterways".^^ However,
as to the shift from the waterways to waterfronts, most people would like to focus a
lot on the remarkable story of “the Bund", yet little was written on the opposite shore
of the Huangpu River, where the Suzhou Creek empties itself into the river at
Hongkou.
When the foreigners arrived, “the Bund" was originally a towing path with a
wide foreshore, covered or uncovered according to the state of the tide and its wide
open space was secured, not from any aesthetic sense, but because of the necessity of
leaving a path for the trackers. From time immemorial, trackers had used the tow path
along the shore of the Huangpu River and the Chinese authorities in the first Land
Regulations issued by them reserved this right. A space of 30 English feet was to be
reserved between buildings erected on the foreshore and the edge of the river.
Foreigners, therefore, when putting up their buildings on river lots, drove in piles to
that distance in front of each lot, and filled it in. This regulation had been observed,
and this section of waterfront became the symbol of the foreign societies in Shanghai
not because of the wharves or piers, but rather because of the well-established
merchant buildings along the riverbank.
Meanwhile most steamship wharves and piers were constructed on the Hongkou
waterfronts instead of the opposite bank of the Huangpu River. Many waterfront
properties in Hongkou, from wharves, piers to machine shops and company buildings,
were established, first, by some American-owned steamship navigation companies.
Later, navigation companies from other countries, including Britain, Germany and even China, entered the rivalry of this section of the waterfront.^^
Besides these western powers, Japan also wanted to share the profits of the overseas shipping and trading in Shanghai, even though they were late comers to this
Chinese largest treaty port. The steamship line between Yokohama and Shanghai, which was started by Mitsubishi in 1875 and taken over by its successor, the Nihon
15 Yasen Kaisha (曰本郵船會社，N.Y.K., Japan Mail Steamship Co.), in 1885, was
Japan's first overseas shipping line. After that, other Japanese shipping companies,
including the Osaka Shosen Kaisha (大阪商船會社，O.S.K.，Osaka Commercial
Shipping Company) and Nisshin Kisen (日清汽船，Japan-China Steamship
Company), had developed their China business from the end of twentieth century.；々
These companies, like their western competitors, constructed wharves along the
Huangpu River, and most of them were located in Hongkou, Yangshupu and Pudong.
Thus, to some extent, the arrival of the American shipping companies, together
with some other companies from different countries, changed the main image of
Hongkou. When the Hongkou waterfront developed rapidly after 1860s, the north part
of Hongkou, with its adjacent waterfront also called as "Outer Hongkou"
{waihongkou 夕虫工口)，had become the center of the district at the end of nineteenth
century.
Bridges and Roads
The municipal construction in Hongkou district had remained underdeveloped
before the amalgamation of the British and American Settlements in 1863. However,
bridges were erected on the Huangpu River and Suzhou Creek even before the urban
development in Hongkou speeded up at the turn of twentieth century in order to
connect the British and the American Settlement. At first, the only way of crossing the
Suzhou Creek was by ferry, and of course it was inconvenient, especially in the
inclement weather.^^ The need of a bridge was apparent, and in the first instance it
was supplied by a man named Wills who organized the “Soochow (Suzhou) Creek
Bridge Company". A bridge known as "Wills Bridge", a wooden structure, was
erected in 1856 at a cost of $12,000. The company made a great profit from the tolls collected from those using the bridge. ^^ In one of the contemporary notes (biji,筆言己） the story of the bridge was recorded:
16 "The currents (of Suzhou Creek) are rushing and the creek is wide. There used to
be some ferry boats run on the river, which would be closed in the evenings.
Hence, there were no transportation connected the south and north side of the
creek at nights. After the city was opened to the foreign trade and commerce, the
westerners made a wooden bridge on it, which is of 180 paces in length. There is
a tenon in the centre which is circled by a shackle. (This forms a drawbridge in
the centre that) could open for the passage of the boats/'^^
Some years later, a free bridge, known as the Garden Bridge, was erected by the
Municipal Council. From then on, more bridges were erected on the Suzhou Creek and this wooden bridge was replaced by a metal-structured bridge in 1906.
Besides these bridges across the Suzhou Creek, three main bridges had been erected by the Municipal Council on Hongkou Creek in the The bridges were called, from south to north, as "Outer Hong Bridge’，{waihongqiao,外虫工橋)’
"Middle Hong Bridge" {zhonghongqiao 中虹橋）and “Inner Hong Bridge"
{lihongqiao 裏虹橋).By these three bridges, the Hongkou district had been divided into three parts, which were called, respectively, as "Outer Hongkou" {waihongkou
外虹口 )，"Middle Hongkou” {zhonghongkou 中虹口 )，and "Inner Hongkou"
{lihongkou 裏虫工口）. When new bridge was built on the Fearon Road (which now called 九育I路 Jiulong Road) across the Hongkou Creek in the late 1880s, it was named “New Hong Bridge，，{xinhongqiao 新虫工橋).And the area developed on the both sides of this new bridge was naturally called as "New Hongkou" {xinhongkou 新
虫工口）. The connection of the different parts of Hongkou district was strengthened by these bridges. ^^
As to the roads (maloo ,馬路）built by the SMC of the International Settlement,
17 we can trace the following evolution: First, the land renter made his own road and
handed it over to the Municipal Council to keep up; second, the land owner bought
the land for the road and the Council made it up; and thirdly, the Council bought the
land and made the road. For Hongkou district, there were only two well-built roads in
this district, Wusong Road and Broadway Road when the American Settlement
merged itself with the British in 1863. Both of the two roads were built by the
individual land renters. Gradually the roads system underwent an extension, an
extension from the central part of the former British Settlement to the west part, from
the south bank of Suzhou Creek to the north bank. However, the development of
district's business concentrated in the area near the Hongkou Bund before twentieth
century. Except from some signs of lives in the markets around the Broadway Road,
the district was still mixed up by hamlets and wastelands during the late nineteenth
century. When Hongkou became part of the International Settlement, its municipal
construction was incorporated into the plan of the SMC. The minute of Shanghai
Municipal Council shows that “the roads in Hongkew (Hongkou) were reported to be
in bad state" in 1864，but ‘‘new lines of roads were being marked out." Hence, new
paths and roads were opened up or under construction, and the Bund (the Hongkou
Bund) prospered shortly after the amalgamation.'^'
At the turn of twentieth century, accompanied with the expansion of the
International Settlement, Hongkou district was "enlarged" and extended to the areas
north to the Boundary Road by the construction of North Sichuan Road and Dixwell
Road. These so-called “external roads areas" or "extra-settlement roads areas" used to
be under the control of Baoshan County, and then became the
"semi-foreign-settlement" (banzujie 半租界)in Shanghai. By building roads,
International Settlement, whose boundaries had been settled since 1899, nevertheless
tried to extend westward and northward. It controlled the distribution of water and
electricity in these sectors, ensured law and order, and in return, collected taxes from inhabitants. The area of International Settlement was thus doubled by this de facto annexation. 42 Thus, the subdivisions in Hongkou district were shaped by the
18 construction of the road network. This enlarged Hongkou district connected
Yangshupu on the east, and Zhabei on the west, located on the heart place of a
non-westem foreigners' society, the Japanese society. These "extra-settlement roads’，
together with the former discussed roads which occupied the central part of the
Hongkou district, formed the main stage for the Japanese community, who let
Hongkou become a "Little Tokyo" in the early twentieth century Shanghai.
New frontiers for new comers
Shanghai's migrants hailed predominantly from the Canton region in the period
immediately following the Opium War, and Hongkou district was one of the centers
for the Cantonese. The so-called “Guangdong bang"(廣東幫）or “Yuebang"(粤幫）
in Shanghai, who had close relationship with the Shanghai Daotai of the pre-Taiping
era，Wu Jianzhang (吳健章力，lived mainly in three parts of the city. A group of
these Cantonese which "comprised mainly lower-class workers, vagabonds, and the
unemployed，’44 chose to live in Hongkou district. We have no record of the exact
number of Cantonese living in Hongkou, however, it is recorded that, at the beginning
of 1865，after the great exodus of refugees returning to their homes, there were still
20,000 Chinese living in Hongkou district."^^ The regions on the both sides of Qiu
River, where was the boundary area between Shanghai County and Baoshan County,
had became a "vacuum area" and had higher crime rate than any other areas in the
city. 46 There were skirmishers, gangsters, vagabonds, together with the foreign
adventurers, American sailors, and remnant soldiers from “Ever-Victorious Army"'^^
living among the district's local residents.48 But there were only six policemen for the
control of the large population. Besides the problem of the lack of the police force, the
effectiveness of the police control in the wealthy English settlement had also "flooded
Hongkou with disorderly characters"/^ Hongkou, to some extend, was the haven for these new comers, no matter from other parts of China or from foreign countries.
Among all the “sins” in the district, the most impressive story was the rapid growth of
19 prostitution in Hongkou. As described by Gail Hershatter:
"North Sichuan Road, in the Hongkou district north of the International
Settlement, became a center for Cantonese, Japanese, Korean, and (after the
October Revolution) White Russian brothels, side by side with the dance halls,
movie houses, teahouses, restaurants, bathhouses, beauty shops, and massage
parlors where many casual prostitutes worked.
At the time, a small but growing Japanese community, constituted by small
businessmen, settled mostly in the yet-undeveloped Hongkou district?】 During the
early Meiji years (1868-1912), the Japanese women in Shanghai 'Vorked largely in
the flesh trade".^^ Some of them served as the concubines to foreigners, while others
“doubled as maidservants, teahouse waitresses, and small-restaurant owners". ^^
Among all these "services", Japanese teahouse, which was known as “Dongyang
Chashe” (東洋茶市土)，was one of the most attractive places for the local Chinese, not
only because of the exotic charm of the Japanese females, but also the low price in
these teahouses. ^^ However, in early 1880s，many Japanese prostitutes were repatriated by the Japanese consul-general in Shanghai because the Japanese government thought they had damaged the "international reputation’，of Japan.^^
Hongkou district held nearly a quarter of Japanese population in Shanghai during the early twentieth century, and most of which were the small traders, freelancers and some other people from lower classes. Even though the Hongkou district lay apart from other non-Chinese spheres in Shanghai, it still was part of the
International Settlement and the Japanese had had to deal constantly with the western existence than some other Japanese settlements in Shanghai, like those living in
Yangshupu and Zhabei.
20 PART TWO
STRUCTURING OF THE JAPANESE COMMUNITY
IN HONGKOU DISTRICT
THE TREATY OF Shimonoseki marks a clear shift of Sino-Japanese relation in
modem times and in the development of the Japanese community in Shanghai. The
following part examines the formation, structure, and action of the Japanese residents
in the city in the post-war era. This part is divided into three broad sections: the first
section scrutinizes the development of the Japanese community in Shanghai after the
Treaty of Shimonoseki. The second section focuses on the organizations inside the
Japanese community in the city, based on which the Japanese community formed and
administrated. And the last section portrays the groupings of their community in
Shanghai and the image of their daily lives in Hongkou district where the majority of
the Japanese were concentrated.
CHAPTER THREE
THE LATECOMERS TO SHANGHAI
Why not an exclusive Japanese Concession?
To end the first Sino-Japanese War, the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on
April 17, 1895，after the difficult negotiations between Ito Hirobumi (伊藤博文）and
Li Hongzhang (李鴻章).Harsh terms were imposed on China, which provided for the end of Chinese suzerainty over Korea, giving Korea independence, and for the cession to Japan of Taiwan, the Pescadores islands {Penghu Qundao 膨湖群島)，Port Arthur
21 {Lushun 方©瞑)and the Liaodong (遼東)peninsula. Japan also imposed a large
indemnity and forced China to open five new treaty ports. Japan officially gained
most-favored-nation status, which made the same privileges of extraterritoriality in
Chinese treaty ports (not only the five new treaty ports opened under the Article Six
of the Shimonoseki Treaty, but also all those treaty ports opened by the West)
available to this Chinese "small, hitherto insignificant, neighbor”.
An extra “Treaty of Commerce and Navigation" was signed on July 21, 1896 to
regulate the Japanese trade in China, in which some concrete applications in the
establishment of the Japanese concessions in Chinese treaty ports were clarified. The
treaty acknowledged that Japan would enjoy the consular jurisdiction in China, agreed
the setting-up of Japanese consulates in the opened treaty ports. All the Japanese
citizens who chose to live in these cities would enjoy the freedom of traveling,
engaging in trade and commerce, and setting up factories in these Chinese treaty-port
cities. Moreover, in these cities, the Japanese people could rent lands to build houses,
establish schools, hospitals or churches, as well as locate their cemeteries.^^ Later in
the same year, another special clause, which was called as "Gongli Wenping"(公立文
憑）in Chinese, was signed by the Chinese and Japanese government in order to
permit Japan to set up Japanese concessions in Shanghai, Tianjin (天津)，Xiamen (廈
門）and Hankou (漢口).58 At the time, Shanghai, of course, was one of the earliest
and most important treaty ports in China, where the Japanese society had already
initiated and developed for more than twenty years. The Japanese concessions were
immediately established in the latter three cities from 1898 to 1899. In Shanghai, however, it remained an “informal，，settlement and failed to become a concession.
This was "something of an anomaly", as Mark R. Peattie argued, "while the city was the earliest and most important focus for the interplay of Japanese power, capital, and settlement in China, these elements did not operate within an exclusive Japanese concession”.59 Why the Japanese did not establish their exclusive concession in
Shanghai after all these treaties and agreements were signed with the Chinese
22 government? Why did the Japanese fail to do the same thing that they had already
accomplished in most of the Chinese treaty ports? Why did they finally decide to join
the foreign enclaves in the city instead of establishing their own "territory"?
In fact, the main dispute was the location of the Japanese concession in
Shanghai. Since 1896，the Japanese Consul in Shanghai had negotiated this problem
with Shanghai Daotai for several times, but they did not reach any agreement. Lii
Haihuan (呂海寰)，the Shanghai Daotai, suggested, after careful investigation, that
Yangshupu district, which laid on the east side of Hongkou along the Huangpu River,
might be a suitable spot for Japanese Concession. Yangshupu, thanks to its particular
geographical position, was a developing industrial area with great potential for
shipping and business. But Lii，s suggestion was rejected by the Japanese,
During the time, both foreign authorities in Shanghai, the International
Settlement and the French Concession, were seeking for the opportunity of the further
expansion of their realms. Yangshupu district was obviously the further ambition and
goal of the SMC of International Settlement.^^ Even though before 1899 there was no
sign of compromise from Chinese govemment,^^ most of the industrial and trading
firms in Yangshupu district had been already controlled by western merchants.
Japanese diplomats must have realized that if they accepted Yangshupu as their sphere
in the city, this would result in conflicts between the Japanese and those western
Shanghailanders, and their relationship with Britain might be impaired. It is not
groundless to suspect that the motive of Shanghai Daotai was to arouse the frictions
between these two members of foreign powers in Shanghai, from which the Chinese
government might get some benefit.^^ Even Liu Kunyi (蕃p申一)，the Minister of
Nanyang {Nanyang dachen,南洋大臣)，admitted that they might not be able to prevent such foreign expansion in Shanghai.64
In 1898, Wusong (吳肌 a small port located at the mouth of the Yangzi River which is about thirty kilometers northeast of Shanghai, was opened for business by
Qing government. The Japanese Plenipotentiary in China, Yano Fumi (矢野文雄)，
23 soon proposed to establish a Japanese Concession in Wusong instead of in Shanghai,
since the location of the Japanese Concession in Shanghai had not been settled.
However, neither Liu Kunyi nor Cai Jun (蔡鈴)，the Shanghai Daotai, could accept
this proposal, because there was no foreign concession or settlement in Wusong and
they believed that if Japan started to set up their concession there, other foreign
powers would do the same thing and this would bring malpractice for those
self-opening ports.^^ Chinese government was quite unyielding and insisted that all
the foreign settlements could not be expanded towards Baoshan County, within which
Wusong was located/^
When the western powers finally succeeded in the land expansion, Yangshupu
district was finally included into the International Settlement on May 8, 1899. After
that, Japan had not pressed for a Japanese Concession in Shanghai any more, even
when it became an important member of the commercial and trading competition in
Shanghai.
Mark R. Peattie has asserted that Japan finally decided not to press its claims to
an excluded concession in Shanghai because:
"The Japanese recognized that it would be more advantageous to operate within
the boundaries of the already flourishing International Settlement than to
attempt to secure some area outside it, which would inevitably be less
conveniently located—much less developed
Besides this plausible explanation, there might be some other reasons why Japan finally gave up the idea: First, as a newcomer and latecomer to Shanghai, their position was ambiguous at the time. It was difficult for Japan to suggest any spots in
Shanghai, where were not under the control of foreign power or beyond their sphere of influence. While the central part of the city had already been carved up by the westerners, even in those outskirts, such as Yangshupu and Pudong, there also existed many west-owned shipping yards, factories, as well as the navigation companies
24 which occupied the areas along the Huangpu River. Second, based on the land
regulations, Japanese people, like any nationals of other full-fledged treaty powers,
could buy or rent land freely in the boundaries of International Settlement (and even
outside) and they had also enjoyed the same privileges which those western people
had out of the most-favored-nation status they gained after the Shimonoseki Treaty.
Lastly, most of their civilians in Shanghai had already concentrated in a small area,
Hongkou district, where situated on the north bank of the Huangpu. Based on a name
list recorded in 1894，we find that nearly sixty percent of the Japanese who stayed in
Shanghai during the Sino-Japanese conflict had been living in Hongkou.^^ Because a
large group of people of the Japanese community in Shanghai had been engaged in
the foreign part of the city, especially in Hongkou district, it was impossible and
unwise to demand them to leave their base and move to any other parts, especially
those underdeveloped areas, in the city.
Population growth after 1895
There had been a long pre-modem history of ties between Shanghai and Japan, going back to as early as the fifteenth century. Besides some unpleasant “contacts” with those Japanese pirates during the Ming dynasty, the commercial relations had developed under some kind of monopoly policy for a long time.^^ The first Japanese vessel of modem era, the Senzaimaru, visited Shanghai in 1862 during the late
Shogunate period in order to look for possible future commercial ties with this
China's busiest treaty port.However, during the bakumatsu (幕末）period
(1860-1868)，Shanghai had provided Japanese with its special "western" experience, rather than the commercial opportunities/'
During the early Meiji years (1868-1894)，the population of the Japanese in
Shanghai grew slowly. According to the statistics of SMC, there were only seven
Japanese who had settled in the former English and “Hongkou，，settlement in 1870’ while there were another twenty-two Japanese sailors. Even in some other materials
25 recorded by the contemporary Japanese diplomats and other visitors, the Japanese
population in Shanghai had not surpassed sixty in the early 1870s7^ During the
1868-1880 period, especially after 1871，there was a slow yet stable increase with
yearly increases of five or six persons. However, the gender imbalance between the
ratios of male and female was severe: women constituted roughly two-thirds of the
local Japanese (nearly sixty to seventy percent of them served as the concubines to
foreigners or casual prostitutes, see Chapter Two), while only one-third of the
Japanese population were men, most of whom were engaged in the small businesses.
Only a small proportion served as the staffs in Japanese Kaisha or worked for the
consulate services. Before the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-95)，the Japanese
population reached 639，with men first time outnumbering women (337 men, 302
women, see Table However, such growth tendency had been interrupted by the
outbreak of the war in 1894.74
On the eve of the conflict of 1894-95，the great majority of Japanese
withdrew.75 As Uchiyama Kiyoshi (内山清）recorded in his Dai Shanhai (Greater
Shanghai,大上海)：
"At the time (of the first Sino-Japanese war), nearly all of the one thousand
resident Japanese withdrew (from Shanghai). When those who remained
celebrated that year's Tencho Setsu (天長節，the festival honoring the birthday of
Japanese Emperor) on the second floor of the Konbu Kaisha (昆布會社)，which
located on the Yangkingpang, only some thirty people came. At that time, the
hostility (towards Japanese) among the Chinese was not like it is today (1915):
besides only one or two persecutions and conflicts, the daily life (in Shanghai)
were still quite peaceful. Those who lived in the foreign settlements could still
communicate with each other.
Those who remained in Shanghai chose to "live in the foreign settlements", because those areas were an internationally guaranteed neutral zone in Shanghai.
26 Nevertheless, the local official, Shanghai Daotai，with the help of the American
Consulate, issued “passports，，to those so-called "law-abiding Japanese in China"
{Anfen yu hua Riren’ 安分寓華曰人).Such information as names, addresses,
professions, the original hometowns in Japan, and even the appearance was recorded
carefully, but this could only be the revenge for the similar actions earlier conducted
by the Japanese government towards the Chinese civilians in Japan/? However, those
Japanese who held such “passport" still could not enter the "Chinese City" or the
outskirts of the Shanghai County.^^
After the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Japanese gained the position
as a member of the club of treaty powers in China, which provided them with more
commercial opportunities than ever before. Thus, the resident Japanese population
increased rapidly and continuously from the beginning of the twentieth century, when
they began to be deeply involved in the Chinese economy. (See Table 2)
Table 2
The Japanese Population in Shanghai, 1889-1909
Year Male Female Total Year Male Female Total
1889 337 302 639 1900 737 435 1,172
1890 414 320 734 1901 935 538 1,473
1891 435 316 751 1902 1,207 684 1,891
1892 519 377 896 1903 1,427 789 2,216
1893 477 389 866 1904 1,961 1,077 3,038
1895 386 230 606 1905 2,739 1,592 4,331
1896 488 285 773 1906 3,753 2,045 5,798
1897 492 331 823 1907 3,912 2,300 6,212
1898 593 339 932 1908 4,441 2,828 7,269
1899 698 390 1,088 1909 4,971 3,085 8,029
Sources: Nihon teikoku tokei nenkan, (The statistic yearbook of Japanese empire,
27 Hereafter NTTN, Tokyo, 1890-1910), Vol. 9-29.
Table 2 gives a crude picture of the evolution of the Japanese population in Shanghai during the late Meiji era. It shows that, during the 1904-1906 period, there was a real leap forward, with yearly increases close to twenty-five percent. We have no concrete explanation for such "leap forward"; however, the Japanese ultimate victory in Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), which provided Japan with boosted self-confidence and the basis for further expansion in China, might work as a possible incentive to would-be emigrants from Japan.^^ During the following three years from 1907 to 1909， the yearly increase was also higher than ten percent, although throughout the Taisho era (1912-1926) the speed of such increase slowed down. (See Table 3)
Table 3
The Development of Japanese Population in Shanghai, 1912-1931
Source: Nihon teikoku tokei nenkan. Vol. 32-46; Christian Henriot, "'Little Japan' in Shanghai: an insulated community, 1875-1945", New Frontiers: Imperialism 's New Communities in East Asia, 1842-1953 (Manchester, 2000), p. 148，Table 9.1.
In the early Taisho era, the Japanese population in Shanghai surpassed ten thousand for the first time and became the largest component of the foreign population. By the mid-1910s they outnumbered the British by one and a half to one. In 1920 they
28 overshadowed all the foreign communities taken together.8。Even though the scale of the Japanese community kept increasing during the decade after World War I，there were relative falling-offs in some certain years, such as 1915 and 1920. It is difficult to trace the reason that caused such falling-offs, since we lack documentation about the movement of Japanese population in Shanghai and in most Chinese treaty ports. During 1927-1931，the population of Japanese community fluctuated. It shifted back and forth, sometimes with a sharp increase in a single year and then a little draw-back in the following. The population increased sharply in 1927 (increased twenty-five percent in a year), then the figure fell off in 1930-1931 period, as indicated by Table
As Mark R. Peattie argued, Japanese immigration into China was "insignificant" in the early years of Meiji, even though after the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1871 "the Japanese resident population expanded along with Sino-Japanese trade". ^^ The real watershed was the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Boxer Protocal signed after the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, which "set off a small spurt of Japanese immigration into China". Other Japanese significant triumphs in early twentieth century also caused the growth of the Japanese population in China，The growth of Japanese population in Shanghai was very similar to the situation of the whole country, since Shanghai was the commercial center and the largest treaty port at the time.
In the early twentieth century, besides Manchuria, Shanghai had become the largest center of Japanese economic activities and attracted the largest amount of Japanese investment in China.岔斗 As part of the expansion, the Japanese community in this city developed along with the establishment of their web of trading, shipping, banking, industry, and retail interests. Also, by the 1920s, the population growth of the Japanese community in Shanghai had been influenced by the amounting anti-Japanese agitation from adjacent and hostile Chinese populations. From the statistics, we can see the decrease of the population resulted from the Chinese pressure and successive waves of Chinese nationalism.
29 Choose Shanghai, Choose Hongkou
''Why go to Shanghai?"
Going to Shanghai meant different things to different Japanese people. From those
recorded motivations, we learn a lot about why Shanghai attracted those Japanese
reformers, travelers, and even some famous novelists,^^ such as Tanizaki Jun'ichiro (谷
崎、潤一郎)，Akutagawa Ryunosuke (芥川龍之介)，who went to Shanghai just for
adventure.86 Another Japanese reformer, Miyazaki Toten (宮崎、滔天)，dreamt of going
to the mainland China, and he even shed tears of joy when he arrived in Shanghai in
1891.87 Meanwhile，those diplomatic officers and other branch managers of the main
Japanese enterprises were simply sent by their official superior and the boss. However,
why other ordinary Japanese folks went to Shanghai is a question very difficult to
answer.
Unlike those people who had sojourned in the city or just had a short visit, most of poorer people lived longer in the city. However, conceptually, going to Shanghai was no great move. After China, and later Russia, was defeated by Japan, China was regarded as a backward Asian country by the Japanese people. Uchiyama Kanzo (内山完造)， who is famous for his long-term friendship with Lu Xun (魯迅)’ had similar thought when he was introduced to work as a salesman for a Japanese pharmacy in Shanghai.
Uchiyama was one of the typical Japanese from the grass-root level who earned his living by a low wage as a postman in Kyoto before he went to Shanghai. The biographer described why he finally accepted such an offer to work in Shanghai:
"After Kanzo had heard (this suggestion), he could not help surprising (at it). He
had once thought that all the people in the society were better than him, and he had
always felt himself incompetent than others. So (he thought) it would be impossible
for him to make any accomplishment if he did not go to those backward societies.
Thus, he had once thought of going to China."88
30 Because of the lack of other materials, we cannot simply equal Uchiyama's motivation and thinking to those relatively poorer Japanese immigrants to Shanghai. But this cannot be an individual case. Throughout the early twentieth century, the economic situation of the grass-root Japanese had not been improved, if not deteriorated. For example, the number of Japanese peasant proprietors steadily decreased so that by 1910 it has been estimated that 45 per cent of all arable land in Japan was being fanned by tenants. Standards of living remained low, and the life of the Japanese peasant was a 89 hard one. Thus, to some extent, these Japanese grass-root people left Japan for Shanghai had some similar motivation as Uchiyama's, that is, to avoid feared or experienced frustrations at home. Thus, in the wider materialistic sense, most Japanese came to help themselves, that is, to earn a living. From the late Shogunate to the early Meiji period, there was only a little group of Japanese traders started their small businesses in Shanghai, most of who came from Nagasaki (長崎)，a western prefecture in Kyushu (九少卜 1) lies only 800 kilometers away
from Shanghai. In 1868, the first Japanese firm in Shanghai, "Tashiro House"(田代屋)， was opened on Suzhou Road in the British Settlement as a porcelain import-export company. Later on, other stores dealing with art objects, printings, and lady cosmetics (such stores were especially welcome by those Japanese women, most of who served as maid in those western families in Shanghai), were opened successively around it. After the Meiji Restoration, when there were more Japanese traders and Meiji diplomatists came to Shanghai, the “Tashiro House" began to run an inn next door concurrently, which became a center for Japanese in Shanghai. Not only the travelers and traders came here to communicate with other expatriates and listen to the news from their homeland, but even the high ranking officers of the Japanese diplomatic corps chose to rest in "Tashiro House" when they were sent to negotiate with the Shanghai Daotai in September, 1870.^^ Thus, some historians just regard such period as "Tashiro
House period”（田代屋時代).9i (See Table 4)
31 Table 4
Japanese Firms in Shanghai, in First Decade of Meiji Era
Newly opened Japanese Firms in Shanghai
Meiji Year 1 (1868) Tashiro House (Porcelain, Inn)
Araki House (Sundries, Cosmetics); Meiji Year 4 (1871) Kiwata House (Steamship wholesaler. Porcelain, Cosmetics)
Meiji Year 5 (1872) Kiyo Company (Cosmetics, Inn)
Meiji Year 6 (1873) Kaitsuu Company (Sea goods)
Meiji Year 8 (1875) ^Mitsubishi (Shipping firm)
Kougyou Company (Sea goods); Meiji Year 9 (1876) Alima Company (Porcelain, Cosmetics)
*Mitsui (Coal business);
Meiji Year 10 (1877) Eisho Company (Porcelain, Cosmetics);
Ryugen Company (Porcelain, Sundries)
* Firms still existed in 1914.+
Source: Shina Boueki Annai (Guidance for trade in China, 1914)，cited in Yonezawa
Hideo, "Shanhai hojin hatten shi，，，p.l 19.
Why these Nagasaki merchants pioneered in the development of Japanese
communities in Shanghai? While some historians argue that it may simply because of
the close distance between the two places, the early interactions between Shanghai
and Nagasaki during the bakumatsu period had also influenced their later choice.
As the only open window to the outside world before Japan was reopened to the
foreign countries, Nagasaki had served as the only gateway for the introduction of goods and information from overseas. Meanwhile, after it was opened forcibly to foreign trade and residence, Shanghai had quickly developed into a kind of hub, not
+ Mitsui together with NYK (Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Japanese Mail Steamship Company), the successor of Mitsubishi, were two of Japan's big-three service enterprises in China. See William D. Wray, "Big-Three Service Enterprises".
32 only linking the domestic economy with international markets, but also serving as a center of the information network in the region. Thus while the economic ties between the two places were intensified, other cultural relations were developed in the mean time. For example, even before the shipping routes linking two cities was started in 1859 by a British navigation company, large amounts of the Chinese translations of Western books had already been transferred from Shanghai to Nagasaki through western missionaries.^^ Some famous samurais, who had voyaged to Shanghai during the late Shogunate period, regarded the image of modem Shanghai as a "westernized modem world", which also deeply influenced some Nagasaki merchants. Hence, these Japanese adventurers played a key, and sometimes decisive, role in the early contacts. When they finally chose Shanghai as the new frontiers for trading and for living, they were both businessmen and promoters of Japanese interactions with this city. However, the era monopolized by Nagasaki merchants were soon ended after the first decade of Meiji years.
"Why Choose Hongkou？〃
After the signing of the first Sino-Japanese Treaty in 1871，the first Japanese
Consulate in China opened in Shanghai in 1872. Japanese trading in Shanghai developed quickly in the 1870s-1880s: Mitsubishi had opened both mail service and a steamship line to Japan in 1875. Two years later, Kishida Ginko (岸田吟香）had established his notorious Rakuzendo (樂善堂)~ half patent-medicine shop, half army intelligence center - while Mitsui had begun a coal business in Shanghai. Over the next decade, a range of small business dealing in sundries, foodstuffs, art objects, printing, services (inns and restaurants in particular), dry goods, and antiques had established themselves in the port.94
However, during this period, the Japanese businesses in Shanghai were no longer monopolized by the Nagasaki merchants, other businessmen from Tokyo (東京)，Osaka
(大阪)，Hokkaido (北海道)，joined the Shanghai market and took part in the Japanese community in the late nineteenth century. As to those Osaka merchants, for example, even though their presence in Shanghai was much later than their Nagasaki competitors,
33 they started to dominate in the sundries business and Japanese goods business in
Shanghai from the From a name list of the so-called “law-abiding Japanese in
China” {Anfen yu hua Riren,安分寓華日人)，which was recorded by the Shanghai
Daotai during the first Sino-Japanese War, we may see such diversity in the geographical origins of the Japanese merchants at the end of twentieth century. (See Table 5)
Table 5
The Geographical Origins of the Japanese Merchants in Shanghai, 1894
Geographical Origin Business run in Shanghai Location
Hokkaido (北t^M) Kelp Company
Japanese Goods Store F證h Concession
Sundries Store
Osaka (大阪府） Sundries Store
Instrument Company American Settlement
Ginning Workshop
Niigata (新鶴縣） Photo Studio
Hiroshima (廣島縣） Sundries Store
TT , , /祐raflA Coal and Plank Shop British Settlement Fukuoka (福岡縣） Coal Business
Flower Workshop
Kagawa (衝 11縣） Flower Workshop
Ginning Machine Shop American Settlement
Shop for Shoes
Tokyo (東京府） Haircut Shop
Haircut Shop Nagasaki (長崎縣） Hawksbill Shop Inn
Japanese Clothes Store
34 Sundries Store & Dye house
Sundries Store & Dye house
Chiba (千葉縣） Haircut Shop
Kumamoto (熊本縣） Shop for Shoes
Ginning Machine Shop Kyoto (京都府） .....——
Business Company French Concession
Source: The name list of the "law-abiding Japanese in China，，{Anfen yu hua ri ren, “安
分寓華日人”)，see QJZRHGXSL, Juan 6, pp.3802-23
According to this name list of 184 Japanese people (110 men, 71 women, 3
children), Nagasaki indeed ranked first as a source of the Japanese immigrants in the
city, which provided nearly one-third of their community (61 out of 184). However,
nearly half of these Nagasaki people (29 out of 61) were maids of the foreign families in
Shanghai. The second large source was people from Osaka (37 out of 184)，most of who
served as the shop owners or the employees in the Japanese stores and firms. While
other 20 prefectures of Japan have also appeared in this list, we may find three dominant
areas (always formed by two adjacent prefectures) of these various geographical origins:
"Nagasaki-Kumamoto" area (長崎-熊本）in Kyushu; "Osaka-Hyogo" area (大阪-兵庫）
in Kansai (閧西)，and "Tokyo-Kanagawa" area (東京-神奈川）in Kanto (閧東(严
which forms an arrow from the western part to the eastern part of Japan.
Besides the information of the geographical origins of Japanese people in the city, such name list also shows the fact that the Japanese community had started their moving to Hongkou district from late nineteenth century. While Table 5 shows that three-fifths of Japanese businesses in Shanghai were located in the American Settlement, namely in the Hongkou district, nearly two-thirds of Japanese population lived in the same area.
Why the Japanese people chose to gather in Hongkou? I argue that the activity of
Japanese diplomatic branch, shipping firms and religious enterprise had important implications for the formation of Japanese community in Shanghai: In 1873，the
Japanese Consulate, which was considered the representation of Japanese government in Shanghai, had moved from British Settlement to a building in Hongkou district,^^
35 which located on the Huangpu waterfront. The Consul had served as the governor of the Japanese community, while some communal services and organizations, such as postal services and the “Japanese club", had been first developed by the Consulate. Moreover, the wharf of Mitsubishi (later became the "Japan Mail Steamship Co.’，）was just located on the Hongkou waterfront, blocks away from Japanese Consulate，^ where became the first stop for most of the new Japanese migrants to the city. Thirdly, a Japanese Buddhist temple, the Higashi Honganji Temple (東本願寺)，established by Oguri Sukocho (小栗
棲香頂) in 1876, were also located near to the Japanese Consulate on the comer of
Wuchang Road (武昌路）and Zhapu Road (乍浦路).It had not only served as a religious center for the Japanese community, but also performed as an educational enterprise and had provided most of the communal services in the early period of Japanese community in the city.卯
Thus, from the end of 1870s, when these political, commercial, and religious centers for the Japanese society had been simultaneously established in Hongkou district, the main part of their community inevitably developed in a concentric-circle model through the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, until some other forces finally broke this kind of balanced structure. Hongkou district, where had been called "the Cinderella among the settlements", developed into a Japanese kingdom and became "Little Japan” in Shanghai. What kind of role had the Japanese Consulate played in the development of the Japanese community in Shanghai? How did they change Hongkou into a "Japan town"? What was the relationship like between the consulate and those ordinary Japanese migrants? How did Japan's big enterprises influence and shape the formation of the Japanese community in Shanghai? ... All these questions will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.
36 CHAPTER FOUR
THE ADMINISTRATION STRUCTURE AND THE POWER SYSTEM
Japanese Consulate in Shanghai
In spite of the fact that the roles and responsibilities of consuls have evolved over
time in history, their most fundamental function, which has never been lost, is always
two-fold: to further their national interest and to take care of their fellow expatriates on
the foreign soil. However, during the century of the treaty port system, the job of the
foreign consul in China was unique comparing with that of consuls in other places. H. B.
Morse's description is worth quoting in illustration of such ways developed with the
unequal treaty system in China:
"Commissioned to other countries, a consul is no more than the commercial agent of
his government; but, in a country which has granted the privileges of
extraterritoriality, he is charged with such important diplomatic and judicial powers
as to remove him into a different class. In China these powers have, in the main,
been exercised in a dignified way by most of the consuls of most of the greater, and
many of the minor, powers, and the consuls of all nations have had an importance
such as is not known elsewhere.〃咖
The turbulence and fragmentation of Chinese politics had influenced and even helped form such roles of the individual consuls in China.'®' A famous British diplomat summarized that the function of the foreign consul in Chinese treaty ports "was not merely commercial, but political, judicial, one might even say universal", and his duty was “to protect the interest and exterritorial rights of their countrymen; to see that the treaties were carried out; and in case of an infraction of treaty rights to obtain redress as best they could”，
As to the Japanese experience in Shanghai, Christian Henriot argues that "of all
37 the foreign communities in Shanghai, and probably in China, the Japanese were beyond any doubt the most organized and regulated," and he insists that this must have to do
with "the strong involvement of the state in the control of its subjects，，.⑴〗it is obvious that this kind of control would not be possible without its diplomatic branch and representative in the city, namely the Japanese Consulate and Consul in Shanghai.
The Japanese Consul or Consul-General in Shanghai served likewise as the judge, chief investigator, chief of the consular police and head of the Japanese resident community. However, the role he played and the way he performed varied from time to time according to the different period of Japanese presence in the city, and the different status of Japan in East Asia. Thus, his relation with Japanese resident community in Shanghai also changed over time.
Since Japan was a latecomer to Shanghai and had not joined the club of the treaty port powers before 1895，the role of Japanese Consul in Shanghai was more complicated than those of western powers before the signing of the Shiminoseki Treaty. During that period of time, Shanghai was one of the earliest destinations to Japanese expatriates to China and attracted nearly ninety percent of these immigrants (See Table 6), so the Shanghai Consul hardly had any model to follow when he served as the head of his countrymen, and we may regard his performance in Shanghai was the pilot run of the Japanese authorities in China.
Table 6 The Proportion of Japanese in Shanghai (1889-1892) 1889 1890 1891 1892 Shanghai 639 734 751 896 China 757 864 867 1016 Proportion 84% 85% 87% 88%
Source: Nihon teikoku tdkei nenkan, Vol.9-12.
As a consul in a "virgin land", the primary role of the Shanghai Consul was the organizer of the Japanese commercial activities in Shanghai. Without any exterritorial privileges, it was not easy for the Japanese firms to open the Chinese market. The only
38 aid was from the government at home and the diplomatic branches overseas. Japanese government played a major role in supporting his national enterprises financially, but it was the consul who helped big Japanese firms establish their branches in Shanghai. As the chief investigator, he investigated and furthered the Chinese trading information to the traders in the city and other firms at home. The consul also needed to coordinate the relationship between their national companies and the foreign competitors. The first
Japanese consul in Shanghai，for example, Shinagawa Tadamichi (品川忠道）organized
the first Japanese commercial association overseas, "Shanghai Trade Union" (Shanhai
Shodokai,上海商同会)，in 1880s. Such association united the Shanghai branches of
three main Japanese firms, Kogyo Firm (廣業洋行)，Mitsubishi Kaisha (三菱会社）and
Mitsui Bussan (Mitsui Trading Company,三井物產)，which helped these “Direct Sale
Firms" (Chokuyu Shosha,直輸商；社）and shipping company connected their local
system with the overseas trading network, and furthered their businesses along the
Yangtze River. ！。* However, since the Japanese investment scale in Shanghai was rather small during the meanwhile the consul had to try his best to protect his people and regulate their behavior in Shanghai. Among the early resident Japanese in China and Korea, there were a large group of uneducated people who made their living by small trading, doing skilled labors, and other humble professions. In order to prevent acts of misconduct and regulate the indecent behaviors, which may harm Japanese national honor, the consul had to issue orders to punish those undesirable nationals. Thus, in 1880s, Gaimusho issued a series
of rules called "Disciplinary Rules for Japanese Residents in China and Korea"(清国及
朝鮮国在留曰本人取締規則)，by which the local consuls regulated the Japanese
residential affairs.'®^
In Shanghai "Disciplinary Rules of Shanghai Japanese Residents in China"(清国
上海居留民曰本人取締規則）was promulgated on September, 24, 1883. Among these
strict rules, while some rules with regard to the movement and trading activities of Japanese residents were rather complicated (such as, "all those who wanted to run restaurants and inns in Shanghai must follow the established practices that they must
39 apply and get the permission from the consulate before they started their business"; "those who wanted to run stores in the city needed to report to the consulate three days prior，，; “those who had just arrived in Shanghai must report his arrival in 48 hours, if he failed to do so, he would have to explain the reasons"; "the personal information one needed to report on his arrival included one's geographical origin, identity, address in Shanghai, name, age, date of arrival, and etc. other movements, such as departure, traveling, moving, should be reported to the consulate one day prior，，； "one could not travel outside Shanghai without a passport"; and etc.), other rules concerning the daily behaviors of Japanese residents were even more inflexible (such as, "one must not go out hatless’，； "women were not allowed to have short hair or wear men's clothing"; "Japanese residents must not earn their living as beggars or dress up like beggars"; "one must not tattoo body, no matter on one's own body or on others"; and etc.). All those who offended against these rules would be detained for up to ten days or would be fined of five sen to one yuan ninety-five sen，In the early twentieth century, a new rule,
"Regulations of Shanghai Japanese Residents"(上海在留民規貝Ij)，was put into effect
with some certain regulations revised, however, the substantive provisions remained similar to the former
However, before the first Sino-Japanese war, the Japanese brothels, singsong houses, and teahouses located in Hongkou district and in the former British Settlement became one of the thorniest problems the Japanese Consul in Shanghai faced. He regarded all these places and those Japanese females inside these places as offences against decency, which harmed the Japanese national honor and impaired the image of Japanese community in the city. Thus, in compliance with the request from the Shanghai Consul, some policemen were dispatched by the Japanese government in 1884. While their purpose was to help maintain the public security of the Japanese community in Shanghai, the main target was to manage these Japanese brothels and teahouses. Some main organizers were arrested, teahouses and other places were closed, these Japanese females were repatriated and most of whom were banished to Singapore and Hong Kong. 109
Even though the consul had also served as the protector of their countrymen when he negotiated with the Qing officers，】^o he was rather the real "governor-general" of the
40 Japanese community, at least inside their central realms in Hongkou district. Thus, some historians just regard that the consul in Chinese treaty ports acted just as "an elected mayor might do in any town."''‘
Why the local consul had so close relation with their resident people? Why he tried to control his nationals' daily lives outside their country where the administrative system was effective in the foreign society? Why the rules formulated by their government were so strict and comprehensive that paid attention to nearly every detail of Japanese residents' daily lives?
Besides the reason that the Japanese overseas communities consisted largely of people from grassroots level, some other factors of Japanese situation in East Asia and the realities in Shanghai foreign societies had also influenced Gaimusho's policy and determined the consul's early performance in China, and especially in Shanghai.
First, Japanese international status during the early years of their modernization period decided that their nationals in Shanghai were only "the second-class citizen" inside the foreign society. Like China, Japan also "faced the same challenge from the West in the nineteenth century", though their ‘“opening，was less traumatic than China's". The Meiji Modernization brought radical changes to their society, while the national unification and modernization (or, we can say, "westernization") was promoted by most Meiji leaders. However, the unequal treaties had not been relaxed until the end of nineteenth century, and their strong national self-respect had not been strengthened even before 1905，when they succeeded in the Russo-Japanese war. Thus before that, the scale and development of Japanese community had been kept in a modest way in Shanghai and even in other Chinese treaty ports. Their relatively small population, their low status in the foreign clan in the city, their status without the exterritorial privileges (may also combine with the fact that they were non-European nationals who have similar appearance with the Chinese, especially in the Westerner's eyes) decided that they were not really regarded, by the westerners and even the Chinese, as one member of the foreign society in the foreign settlements. Hence, at the time, they had no representative in the SMC and no other self-rule organizations, the Japanese community had to completely rely on their home officials in order to survive in Shanghai.
Secondly, even though Shanghai was a city in a declining empire, it was also the
41 center of the western presence in East Asia，and for most Japanese, Shanghai, especially
“the central district" of the International Settlement, was the symbol of western life style, namely the life style of the civilized world. (See Chapter One) The consul, even his
foreign ministry, regarded that it was his duty to keep all their humble nationals behave
decently. However, the triple intervention happened after the Shimonoseki Treaty had
changed such respect into resentment.�
Lastly, unlike other foreign governments who tried to keep their influence in the
lowest level, the Japanese government, on its way to imperialism, had the tendency of
tightening up their control of their foreign societies. Other foreign consuls in Shanghai
could not interfere directly with the administrative of the International Settlement,
where lived most Japanese in Shanghai, Also unlike other foreign consuls in Shanghai
who had to contact their ambassador or highest envoy in China, the Japanese Consul
was in the constant and direct communication with his foreign minister, which enable
him forward the Gaimusho's policy directly to their nationals. Thus, the consul in
Shanghai also possessed greater authority to negotiate with the Daotai，"* when the
authority had finally legalized after the signing of Shimonoseki. Under such a system,
the Japanese community in Shanghai, gathered around their consulate, had established
an invisible boundary even inside the International Settlement.
Since more formal concession areas were clarified in an agreement of 1896, the
Gaimusho began to present formal guidelines for managing Japan's concession areas
both in Korea and China to the Japanese Diet, which became legislation in 1906. These
ordinances emphasized the authority of the Japanese consulates over the oversea
communities and also earmarked funds to aid in operation schools and hospitals. And
during this period, the residents' association was established to replace part of the roles
the consul had played before - to administrate the Japanese community, even though the board and the chairmanship were always appointed by the consul, n 5
'JRA': a 'self-governing' body runs by the elites
While the "Regulations of Japanese Residents，，was created in order to regulate the daily behavior and control the movement of the offshore Japanese nationals, the
42 "Residents' Association Law，’ (Kyoryu Mindan Ho,居留民團法）was enacted in
responding to the demand of building up the corporate body in Japanese concession areas in Asia.
After the Shimonoseki Treaty, the Japanese presence in East Asia grew rapidly, thus，how to operate those expanding communities and how to maintain the operation expense became a serious problem for the Japanese concession areas both in China and in Korea. Under such circumstances, some consulates in Korea and their local Japanese residents held residents' meetings and proposed some resolutions to promote the
self-rule in the concession areas?丨6 In responding to the need to unify and protect their nationals abroad, the Japanese government, through the Gaimusho, enacted the "Residents' Association Law" on March 7，1905, and the Gaimusho followed with a supplementary directive on August 1 of that year.
According to the "Residents' Association Law", the Japanese residents could establish the self-rule “Residents’ Association" in Chinese and Korean concession areas (no matter in the excluded Japanese Concessions or the International Concession areas) to administrate the community by themselves. However, this kind of self-administration must be supervised by the local consuls and under the direction of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. 117
In some respects, it is not groundless to argue that the Japanese self-rule of concession areas in China was “a by-product of Japan's tightening grip on Korea"/^^ however in Shanghai, the demand to establish a united and self-administrative organization for local Japanese community had existed for a long time, especially among the elite class. It is difficult to trace the origins of the early organizations of Japanese community in Shanghai, but even as early as the 1880s，there existed some kind of such organizations inside the Japanese Consulate, of which most members came from the main Japanese enterprises, and of course from the elite class.'^^ At the time, the yelling for the self-rule and a more united Japanese community had appeared among 1 OA the Japanese people, the Japanese club also raised a similar motto in their first meeting held in the Japanese Consulate.⑵ After the founding of "Shanghai Club" (established by the Britons), the “Customs Club” and the "Germany Club", it became the third similar organization established by the foreign resident civilians in the city. 122
43 However, due to a lack of fiinds (because of the lack of members), the club activities had been turned into parties of their member, and such organization had disappeared before the end of nineteenth century. During the last several years in the nineteenth century, several other Japanese clubs, even included a sport club, had been organized, however, no one survived long enough.
Such a trend, interrupted by the first Sino-Japanese War, revived when the "new era，，came. In the early twentieth century, several new Japanese associations was founded by different groups of people: some Tokyo Imperial University (Tokyo Teikoku daigaku 東京帝國大學）graduates founded “Red Gate Club" (Akamon Kurabu 赤門
俱樂部)，which located on Zhapu Road (乍浦路)；while another organization called
Mizunoto Association (癸卯會）was established on Nanxun Road (南簿路).丨 2〗These two clubs merged into one united "Japanese Club" in 1904 and a larger residents' club, the famous "Shanghai Japanese Club", came into being when the three main Japanese clubs united into one in 1908. (See Figure 1)
Figure 1 Shanghai Japanese Clubs (1903-1908)
Red Gate Club Mizunoto Association 赤門俱樂部* 癸卯會 (1903) (1903) ~~ . I ~~ Japanese Club Japanese Business Club Koyukai 曰本人俱樂部 日本實業俱樂部 滬友會 (1904) (1906) (?) ‘ ~ I ~~ 1 Shanghai Japanese Club 上海日本人俱樂部 (1908)
Source: "The origin of Japanese Club", in Yonezawa Hideo, Shanhai Shiwa, p. 199.
44 Since all of the Japanese clubs and organizations were established by certain groups of people, especially the big Japanese tradesmen and elites, their functions and operation areas were limited. Even though they had gained their funds from the membership dues, and edifice was erected for meeting, gathering and recreation, it was impossible for them to function as a full-time and professional manager to their community. But they had become the fundamental central members among the Japanese civilians in the city, based on whom the "Japanese Residents' Association" (JRA) was established.
On December 17, 1905, a Japanese Association (Nihonjin Kyokai,日本人協會) was founded at a joint meeting held by the Japanese Club and the Japanese Business Club in the Japanese Consulate. Several days later Consul-General Nagataki Hisakichi
(71<清•久吉）appointed a thirty-member board and named Ito Yonejiro (伊東米治良its first chairman. This association took over the management of an elementary school from the Shanghai branch of the Higashi Honganji Temple, which had seen to its operation since it was initially set up in 1890. The Japanese Cemetery, located on land purchased by the consulate in 1873 and long run by the Higashi Honganji, and the
Japanese Volunteer Corps were also placed into hands of the Japanese Association」24 Further expansion of the Japanese community during the post-Russo-Japanese War period demanded a more powerful self-rule organization who could serve as a kind of public institution with social and political significance. However, this Japanese association could not meet such goals. Thus, the suggestion for "a more powerful Japanese corporation" had been proposed. The former Japanese Association was soon replaced by the "Japanese Residents' Association" on September 1st, 1907. The new organization would govern all the Japanese citizens in the International Settlement, French Concession, and two kilometers beyond the foreign concession barriers. In the following years, the main concern of the JRA was how to levy taxes from the local Japanese in order to maintain their communal work. These taxes can be distinguished into two main parts: income tax and business tax. While the income tax payers were those who earn their livings by salaries and other stable incomes, the business tax payers were those enterprisers and traders who ran their own businesses. Other various service fees had also collected from the different trades. ^^^ Even though
45 they managed to regulate taxes on the local community and the tax income was of a quite respectable sum which enabled them develop their communal duties, we cannot regard it as a real self-rule administrative organization for the Japanese community (like SMC for the International Settlement), since this body was really controlled by the Consul, but not by the Japanese civilians themselves. It was the Consul in Shanghai
who formed a Residents' Council (Kyoryu min kai,居留民會）in 1908 in compliance
with a consular order, and the members of which were also determined by him. However, in 1925, a detailed regulation of Shanghai Japanese Residents' Association was issued by the Shanghai Consul, in which many aspects including the election of the Residents' Council, the structuring of the Association, the taxation system, and etc. were finally clarified. ^^^ From this document, we may leam more about how the JRA ran and how they administrated the Japanese community. And from then on, JRA had been steadily turned into a more self-dependent administrative entity. This regulation prescribed that all the male Japanese civilians and corporation owners in Shanghai who had paid taxes for more than six months were entitled to vote for the councilmen in the JRA. The voter registration would be held from each year's
December 31 St to the last day of January of the following year. Person's name, address, profession would be recorded when he registered as a voter, while the corporation owners would be required to provide the information such as the name of his corporation, its location in the city, what kind of taxes and how much he had paid, and when he paid tax for the first time. The size of the Residents' council had finally been fixed at 60 by the Gaimush5, which was responding to the growing size of the Japanese community in Shanghai. All the councilmen would need to receive at least one seventh of the votes, while the Chairman and the Vice-chairman should receive more than half of the votes. An administrative committee, consisted of seven administrative members and three reserve members, was formed in order to maintain the daily operation of the JRA. The treasurer under this committee must report the ending balances of the accounts in every three months to the Consul. And the annual report would be proposed to the "Japanese Residents' Meeting", while the Chairman of the Residents' Council would also send an inspector to review the treasurer's work. Even though, at this time, the
46 members of Residents' Council were elected by the Japanese tax-payers and were no longer decided by the Consul, it was still the Consul's right to perform as the superintendent of the whole JRA. (See Figure 2)
Figure 2 The Structure of Japanese Residents' Association
广 > Japanese Consul < ’
； Japanese Residents' Association ！
I, I I I __=1 I ： Japanese Residents' Meeting The Administrative Committee ； ； y ！ I •� . j I ； ： [ •、. ；• ； 、. ” ！ i The Residents' Council �� | ； '� . Chairman : • \ ： ； T Vice-Chairman ！ Chairman ^ ^ Treasurer 并 > Vice-Chairman Administrative Members Reserve Members Councilor
As the self-governing body of the Japanese Community, JRA was mainly run by the elite class. No matter the imelected management group or the elected Residents'
Council, the manage class of JRA were always dominated by those managers from significant Japanese firms in the city and the Shanghai branch of the government-sponsored Japanese enterprises, while a little group of intellectuals, doctors, lawyers had also joined them. Take, for instance, the members of the JRA
Administrative Committee in 1915 and 1922 (See Table VII): The branch managers of six major Japanese enterprises in China (N.Y.K., Bank of Taiwan, Yokohama Specie
Bank, Manchuria Railway, Mitsubishi, and Mitsui) were included in both of the two years' name lists. Other familiar names, such as "Okura"(大倉)，"Sumitomo"(住友)，
“T5a Kogyo"(東亞興業)，were also included in this table. Based on this information,
47 we may regard that JRA mainly consisted of the leaders or the owners of major
Japanese banks, navigation companies, commercial firms, big local stores and Japanese cotton mills. In 1915, among the twenty members of the Administrative Committee, there were seven members came from different professional services (five doctors, one journalist, and one lawyer), while the proportion of these professionals dropped from thirty-five percent in 1915 to ten percent in 1922. And more cotton mill owners and local commercial firms' runners replaced their places in JRA.
Table 7 The Members of JRA Administrative Committee in 1915 and 1922
1915 Post Name Profession Name Profession , T 1 •• Branch Manager Chairman Ishii /tvtvt^� Suzuki Journalist (IM. Y.JN..) Vice-chairman Hata Manager Branch Manager (DaishinYoho) (N.Y.K.) Treasurer Ezaki Branch Manager ^ori Branch Manager (Bank of Taiwan) (Toa Kogyo) ^ -..丄 Branch Manager Admtmstrative � . Branch Manager ,,, Godamu (Yokohama Specie Sakura Members 己占打让） (Manchuria Railway)
. Branch Manager Branch Manager Shiboi …1 o,，.� Morimoto ^ (Takada Shokai) (Shanghai Exchange) Branch Manager Kibata (Nisshin Kisen Tanobe Manager Kaisha) (Nikka Cotton Mill)
Branch Manager H如da (Mitsubishi) Nohiu Manager (Mitsui) _ , H Branch Manager Branch Manager _ Shin Shudo (Yokohama Specie (Furukau Yoho) ‘ Bank) Manager ^ ,…，… , Branch Manager •no (Shanghai Cotton Yamaguchi MU) (N.Y.K.)———
Manager Suzuki Journalist Fukushimu (Gosho) ^ _ Branch Manager Sasaki Doctor Yanogida (Bank of Taiwan)
48 Shinozaki Doctor Mutsushimu Branch Manager (Sumitomo Bank) Manager Nakano Doctor Kawamura (Naigai Wata Cotton Mill)
Yoshimusu Doctor Yamaguchi Shop owner (Yamaguchi Store) Suzuki Doctor Yoshizumi Doctor
KounoManager”^；：；；^ Sh^:-- (OkuraYoho) (Saisedo) Hatabu Manager (Mitsui) Ominami Manager (Shitai Yoho) Reserve Baba Branch Manager Musuo Shop Owner Members (Nisshin Yoho) (Musuo Yoho) Branch Manager Murai (Manchuria Ishizaki Owner Railway) (八脇 ha) Murakami Lawyer Yokota Manager (Nihon Keran) Source: Uchiyama Kiyoshi, Greater Shanghai, p. 200; Chen Zu'en, "Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan" ("Japanese in Shanghai" no. 24, in Shanghai Walker, Shanghai, December, 2002).
Thus, for the Japanese community, these branch managers and the people who ran their own business in Shanghai not only dominated their economic, financial lives, but also decided their communal affairs. I am not going to argue that it was the Japanese community's tendency towards “elitism，，- nearly all of the main foreign communities in Shanghai were led by a small body of their own nationals which consisted of their local diplomats, big trading company owners, and expert persons, yet, the elite of the
Japanese community in Shanghai had their own special characteristics.
First, most of these main Japanese companies had deep relations with their government, which were called as “national policy enterprises" (Kokusaku Kigyo,國
策企業)• Japanese government gave these enterprises inclining policies, based on which they had gained huge amount of profits in Shanghai and even in other Chinese treaty port cities. Thus we can rarely hear their voices differed from what the consul said.
In fact, they, like the consul, represented the Japanese government rather than their
49 whole community; they just assisted the consul and Gaimusho promote their policies, maintain the communal services in Shanghai rather than administrate their community by themselves. On the other hand, even though these elites were more open-minded, better-educated, and had more direct contact with both of the westerners and Chinese than the large amount of their ordinary folks in the city, they kept their community developing in an extremely extrinsic way. Even though the institution of JRA was
slightly different from the system of their basic municipal system (市町丰寸 Shichoson)
at home, the rules set up for the Japanese tax payers, the educational system run for the Japanese schools in Shanghai and even the uniform of Shanghai Japanese Volunteers were the same as in their own country. They had designed a life style that resembles Japanese lives at home?
While “the role of the consul as the headquarters of the community is highlighted，’，130 we still cannot ignore the role the JRA and the Japanese from elite class in Shanghai played in their community: They help establish the administrative system of their local community; They dedicated to uniting and maintaining an exclusive Japanese entity in the city; And most remarkably, they maintained most of the public services and communal duties of Japanese community by the sources from the tax revenues they collected, the government funding, and financial supports from big Japanese firms.
Public services and communal duties
The municipal council of International Settlement had provided basic public services, such as the policing institution (consisted of the major foreign powers and the Chinese people), schools with different levels, hospitals, cemeteries and etc., to the foreign people lived inside. However, since the European-American people had dominated the SMC, the services they provided failed to meet the need of the Japanese community. Besides, Japanese themselves, who did not deeply engaged in the municipal affairs in the SMC, concentrated in their own "kingdom", especially before the 1920s. Before 1907, it was the consul together with other organizations, such as Higashi
50 Honganji Temple, the Japanese Association, administrated the public services for the relatively small Japanese community in Shanghai. After the JRA was established, most of these public services and communal duties were transferred to their hands. Since the JRA had more stable resources than those religious enterprises and other nongovernmental organizations, the public services and communal duties of Japanese community developed continuously under their long-term efforts. Among all the services the JRA provided, the most important projects included education, policing and public safety, public health, welfare, charity, crematoria services and cemeteries. Here, I would only introduce part of the services they had provided.
The JRA-run schools and their school system in Shanghai
When Japan opened herself to the world in 1868，one of the government's high priorities was catching up with Western standards in science and education. The Japanese education system was reformed mainly according to the German and French model which experts regarded as most suitable and advantageous. Japan's modem school system was developed in the same period. In 1872 the school systems for the elementary, secondary, and higher level schooling were established according to the idea of equal opportunity for education. Among all those reforms, the most important thing was the introduction of the compulsory education.
As for the Japanese schools in Shanghai, they were developed in three different periods: "Honganji period’，，"Japanese Association period", and the "JRA period".
The first Japanese school in Shanghai was run by the Higashi Honganji Temple� which located in the Hongkou district. A study group called "Shinai Sha"(親愛舍）was first established as early as 1876 for those Japanese females who had married foreigners and migrated to Shanghai. Later it had been turned into some kind of a private primary school which taught spelling, reading, and arithmetic. When more local Japanese children were attracted to this school, it was renamed Kaido Elementary School (開導
学校）by the consul in 1888. Despite of its small scale (the sUadent number was less than twenty before the first Sino-Japanese War), this school followed the Japanese
51 government orders of primary schools, and English language was taught to those students of higher grades in order to match the criterion in Tokyo. Except for some slight differences, this school was operated in the same way as those primary schools in Japan. For example, the textbooks adopted in this school were same as those in Nagasaki. Even though this Japanese school in Shanghai had been initiated and supported by a Buddhist Temple, the Japanese Consul soon took over its management and handed it to Japanese Association one year after its establishment in 1905. An educational committee was founded to control the budget and administrate other affairs related to this school. Two years later, when the Japanese Association had been replaced by the JRA, this school was officially renamed "Shanghai JRA Japanese Higher Primary
School"(上海居留民団立日本尋常高等小學校）and the Japanese Ministry of
Education soon accredited it.⑴
The school had moved out of the Higashi Honganji Temple to new site on North Sichuan Road because of the enrollment expansion. However due to lack of classroom space, the school had to rent the former school house ofToa Dobun Shoin (東亞同文書
院)to establish a branch to contain more students in 1910s. A new branch was built on
Pingliang Road (平涼路）in 1923，which separated from the original "Higher Primary
School" and renamed "East District Shanghai JRA Japanese Higher Primary School" in 1926. Two more “higher primary schools", the Middle District and West District Higher
Primary Schools, were established to enroll more Japanese teenagers in Shanghai] (See Table VIII)
Table 8
The Enrollment of Japanese Primary Schools in Shanghai (1911-1932)
Higher Higher Higher Higher Primary School Primary School Primary School Primary School (East District) (West District) (Middle District) 1911 329 1912 401
1913 478 191 4 ^
52 1915 657
1916 666 1917 708 1918 816 1919 1001 1920 978 1921 1105 1922 1257 1923 1403 133 1924 1357 177 1925 1402 180 1926 1463 133 1927 1175 239 119 1928 1458 329 257 1929 836 366 311 751 1930 961 428 329 821 1931 1036 478 398 896 193 2 ^ 238 96 597
Source: Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan, Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan Ritsu Gakkd Ichiran, p. 21.
These Japanese higher primary schools actually were a combination of elementary school and middle school, which recruited students from six years old to fourteen years old. The first six-year was equal to the elementary period, while the two years after was the higher standard period. When students entered the latter period, they would be able to leam English, Chinese, painting or other commercial curriculum. When the student graduated from these primary schools, they could choose to go back to Japan for higher education or enter one of the middle or higher specialized schools in Shanghai. These schools, including a high school for girls and two other business schools only for boys, were also erected by the JRA in the late 1920s. Besides those basic courses, the curriculum in girls' high school also included moral training, home economics,
53 needlework, handcraft, and etc., while other two business schools taught more professional skills, such as business writing, abacus arithmetic, and etc., which all related to business and finance. Also, a private kindergarten which was first established by a Japanese trader was finally attached to the Higher Primary School in
1910, and later moved to the "Japanese Girls' High School，，（日本高等女學校）due to the lack of space，(See Table IX)
All these educational institutions run by the JRA were maintained by the taxes revenues and other financial supports from Japanese companies and banks. Based on certain rules of Japanese Ministry of Education, the teachers and other staffs in these schools had got quite good salaries. Thus, many good teachers from Japan were recruited and the educational quality of these Japanese schools was guaranteed. As overseas Japanese schools accredited by the Ministry of Education, these schools followed a set of rules in order to keep themselves the same quality as those schools at home. Since compulsory education to all children from the age of six to fourteen years were maintained in modem Japan, it was the responsibility of the JRA in Shanghai to provide sufficient educational facilities for their children and ensure that all the school-aged children were admitted to the primary schools.
Through the school education, the communal structures maintained by the JRA reinforced values acquired in Japan. The values such as imperialism, militarism were associated with their public school education, and emphasized in their textbooks. The Japanese school system in Shanghai developed exclusively. The teaching language was one of the major reasons that why their children failed to enter the Municipal Schools in Shanghai. But the idea of maintain a strictly same educational system as it at home promoted the establishment of the JRA primary schools in the city. Even though they had once applied for the "Grant-in-Aid" from the SMC of the International Settlement, the SMC refused to provide any grant because their policy was "precluded from contributing to the maintenance of purely national schools."'^^
54 ^ ^9 n ^ w p e 咖s •!••^ § •^ 伍 J 脳 A. S I Kindergarte 1 ^^IMmmM^^^Mm^^^tmm^lmtmn m Hig ^h mm ^primar BiiH Primar -HHHiiii y Gy l —— ml! .1 ^ i^i^i^i^i-^iii 3 7654321M^^n^987654 ————————I — Showa I rtra gi ^― s ————————School — I West Taish6 ^ Primary
mra
I Meiji I Kindergarten
East
Branch
rtra
2 School 1 1 M g ^ ^ ^ 肌 ^ ^ ^ Trading Japanese Primar Q^ y businesJapanesJapaness e e School Schoo l sghe Schoor l 細 School ^ School School a 0 Higher b s J ^ ^ §， ^ § 施 ^ ^ .w -I r^ 肿 Highe 8 r ⑶ 仪 ^ ^ y 肪 c 5 s ^ n ^ 冗 - ^ s c ^ s I ^ w 如 J 5 «
------
^
------
n^
6 American，British and French trade delegations residing in Shanghai.丨彳。The resultant international defense organization acted as municipal militia for the international community in Shanghai, and eventually had representation from twenty nationalities, including a Russian contingent. The corps mobilized a number of times, usually in response to riots but sometimes to augment the regular foreign garrisons or expeditionary forces, such as during the Tai Ping Rebellion, 1860-1862, and the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. The Japanese disbanded the corps during their occupation of the city.
There were twenty-three units in the Shanghai Volunteer Corps: the Light Horse, American Troop, Shanghai Field Battery, Shanghai Light Battery, Shanghai Field Company, Armored Car Company, 'A' Company, 'B' Company, American Company, Portuguese Company, Japanese Company, Chinese Company, Shanghai Scottish, Jewish Company, Philippine Company, American Machine Gun Company, American Reservists' Company, Transport Company, Inter-communication Company, Interpreter Company, Air Defense Company, Public School Cadet Company, and the Russian Regiment. Most of the Russian Regiment was comprised of paid men. All other units were voluntary.
As for the Japanese branch in the SVC, it was founded by the frightened Japanese residents in the city during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900.⑷ According to the structuring of the SVC, 120 Japanese were selected from the Japanese community and established this Giyutai (義勇隊）on June 28, 1900. A month later, it joined the SVC in the
International Settlement. The Japanese company was rather small in comparison to the British branches, which was of 45 members and three officials in 1915.】42 With the creation of the JRA, the management of the Japanese Volunteers fell to it in 1907.''^^ Not only providing the operation expenses, the JRA also administrated their daily training, which was one hundred percent Japanese style of military training. They also changed their British styled uniforms to the Japanese style, and attached the insignia of Japanese imperial army to their caps]**
Even though the commissions of the Japanese company was authorized by the SMC based on the Commandant's recommendations and their goals was to maintain the security neutrality of the International Settlement, the Japanese Consul and the JRA had always regarded this military force the safeguard of their own community.
56 Public health service
Even though little was recorded about the public health and hygiene services of the Japanese community, there was a certain amount of annual budget from the JRA was set aside for the health service, especially for an Infectious Disease Hospital (Hibyoin
避病院）run by the International Settlement.⑷ Before 1934，there were no JRA-mn hospitals in Shanghai, but there were certain amount of Japanese doctors who practiced medicine in Shanghai and served for the JRA administrative committee in the early twentieth century, because doctors were respected in the Japanese community.
Besides, the JRA also financially support those Japanese doctors and nurses who worked in the International Settlement hospitals」47
The first Japanese doctor was invited by the first Japanese consul Shinagawa to serve the Japanese residents in the hospital run by Higashi Honganji Temple?48 From
1906 to 1914 period, there were 1001 Japanese residents died in Shanghai, most of them were killed by infectious diseases such as meningitis, tuberculosis, typhoid, cholera, etc.
There were 22 Japanese-run clinics in Shanghai in 1915, while the scale of these
Japanese clinics was not very big: usually consist of only one doctor with a pharmacist or an assistant and a nurse.According to the statistics of 1924, there were 44
Japanese-run clinics in Shanghai, included pediatrics, dentistry and ophthalmology clinics.i5°
Other services
The Japanese Cemetery in Shanghai, which located on land purchased by the consulate in 1873，had long been run by the Higashi Honganji Temple before 1905, while the crematoria service was also provided. The daily affairs, such as clearing, administration, managing the burial rites, had been long held by the Japanese religious enterprises in Shanghai and gained financial supports from the Japanese companies in the city. Later in 1907，it was handed to the JRA and maintained by the tax revenues collected from the Japanese community. ^^^
57 Besides all these routine services, in the year of 1927, the JRA organized special committees to settle the Japanese refugees who entered Shanghai during the Northern Expedition of the Chinese Nationalists' revolution. A Buddhist Temple and the Japanese school in Hongkou were provided for the Japanese residence as special accommodation. Most of these refugees left Shanghai to Japan by the arrangement of this committee. Aiding the work of the committee and consular authorities were Japanese steamship companies in Shanghai and railways in Japan: The N.Y.K. had granted a 20% reduction in fares of their tickets to Japan for these refugees and a railway in Japan had reduced its fares to half for the same purpose. ^^^
From all these services provided by the JRA, we may clarify the roles the JRA played in the Japanese residential society. Rather than a "self-rule" authority, it served more like an administrative agency in charge of the Japanese communal affairs in the city. The SMC did not know their existence until late 1920s, though most of the Japanese councilors in SMC were serving in the JRA in the same time] 54 But, we cannot deny that it was the JRA who helped the Japanese Consul establish the order and administrate the expanding communal services inside the Japanese community. Since most of the Japanese residents in the city were not eligible for voting in the International Settlement, finally they gained their 'Velfare" from their own organization.
58 CHAPTER FIVE
TITTLE TAPAN'. A SELF-CONTAINED COMMTJISTTTY
'Kaishaha' vs. 'Dochakuha'
In contrast to the Euro-American communities in Shanghai, the Japanese community remained comparatively poor, though more and more Japanese investments in China were located in Shanghai in the early twentieth century. While those big company owners, branch managers together with their diplomatic officials dominated the administrative affairs of the Japanese community in Shanghai, the majority of their community still consisted of poorer Japanese small traders, who had come to possess their sole social and economic stake in Shanghai. However, under the guidance of the consul and the semi-governmental JRA, the Japanese civilians in Shanghai seemed to have been organized as an exclusive and monolithic society.
In fact, the apparently monolithic Japanese community had been subtly stratified into different groups, who had different objectives and concerns for their lives in Shanghai. According to their different roles in the Japanese community, the dominant group of elite Japanese who were closely tied to the consulate, major corporations, banks and textile factories, together with some of big firms' high rank
employees, were dubbed the "Kaishaha"(會社派）or "Company Faction"; While a large
number of ordinary Japanese folks, who were largely gathered in Hongkou district in
Shanghai, were called "Dochakuha" (土著派）or ‘‘Native Faction". It is difficult to estimate that how many proportions these two groups respectively accounted for, even though some historians argue that the "Company Faction" accounted for “no more than 5 percent of the Japanese in Shanghai". According to the statistics recorded by the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai, during the early twentieth century nearly 70 percent of Japanese populations in Shanghai Area (included some other cities near Shanghai) were engaged in trading, navigation, and other businesses (See Table 10):
59 Table 10
The Proportions of Japanese Population in Different Professions in the Early
1910s
1911 1912 1913 1915 1916
Agriculture 0.08% 0.25% 0.16% 0.7% 0.63%
Industry 19% 19.9% 20.2% 19% 18.4%
Officers & Freelancers 7.5% 10.9% 10.5% 9.8% 7.6%
Unemployment 3.5% 4.1% 2.2% 2.1% 2.1%
Source: Nihon teikoku tokei nenkan. Vol. 31-37. (The figures recorded in Vol. 34 [1914] are exactly same as those statistics in Vol. 33[1913])
Even though we cannot simply equal all of these 70% of Japanese populations to the
"Native Faction", these figures show that the Japanese society in Shanghai were mainly made up by the businessmen who had been distinguished into two separated groups.
And the majority of the ‘"Native Faction" was involved in the trade between Japan and
Shanghai. Most of their businesses were not large-scale ones, sometimes really small: the small sundry goods stores opened in the front parts of their living houses, the fish stalls in the Hongkou market, the small trading firms engaged in buying and selling whatever could make profit in the Japan and Shanghai market. Besides, all kinds of service establishments aiming at the local Japanese customers, such as traditional
Japanese restaurants, inns and hotels, barber shops, repair workshops, and etc., were also founded by these people. Such Japanese small businesses in the city seldom employed any Chinese or other nationals, and sometimes it was run simply by their owners, mostly by a family]57 Even if they hired some employees, the payment was rather low. It was recorded that a Japanese employee of a shop in Hongkou district was only C$50 or C$60 per month, while the monthly stipend of a member of the Shanghai
60 Municipal Police was Most of them lived in those renovated Chinese houses in the Hongkou district. They were too poor to be eligible for voting for the SMC of the International Settlement, and they seldom had any direct contact with the westerners in the city, because most of them could not communicate in English. However, it was even hard for them to influence the communal affairs inside the Japanese society, since the JRA were dominated by those "Kaishaha", though it was them who were the settlers inside the Japanese community in Shanghai.'^^
The "Company Faction" included the traders, bankers, manufacturers and those who had been running, representing or working for mining, shipping or railway interests. A part of them were employed by the largest Japanese banks which all located on the Bund: Yokohama Specie Bank, Bank of Korea, Bank of Taiwan, Bank of Mitsubishi, Bank of Mitsui, Bank of Sumitomo; while others might have been hired by some of the most important Japanese companies: such as Nisshin Kisen Kaisha, N.Y.K., Mitsui
Bussan, Nihon Menka (曰本綿花），and etc. Mostly lived in the former British
settlement, they had got better living standard than those of the "Native Faction". Even though it is argued that their standard of living was generally lower than that of the British people,some high rank Japanese "Kaishaha" still had lived really "luxury" in Shanghai: some of them lived in the beautiful mansions in the former British Settlement, while they might possess another villa inside the French Concession; like those Britons
in Shanghai, they hired Chinese "Amah"(阿女黾）as servants, or sometimes just
employed the Japanese maids. They had direct contact with those western businessmen
and even joined the British dominated Shanghai Club.'^' This group of people was regarded more open-minded than those "Native Faction", because they had more experience of the west, and had direct business contact with both the Chinese and the westerners. They were better-educated than those “Native Faction" and their business in
Shanghai seemed to be more stable.But they were more dispersed than the Japanese from the "Native Faction” and much more likely to move from treaty port to treaty port, or even leave China to other countries from time to time. Unlike those small traders, as the sojourning businessmen in the city, they did not intend to settle in Shanghai for the rest of their lives. They might have enjoyed the life here for several years, yet they might be transferred to some equally prestigious position in Paris or London or New
61 York.丨63 (See Table 11)
Table 11
The Different Status of "Kaishaha" and "Dochakuha"
Kaishaha Dochakuha
Branch Managers Small Traders
Business Owners Inn Keepers
Employees in big Japanese Small Service Business Professions Enterprises Owners
Servicemen in SMC Professionals & Freelancers
etc. etc. Hongkou District Former British Settlement Gathering Districts Zhabei District French Concession Yangshupu District Good: dose to the living Poor: same as the living standard of the average Living Standard standard of the Chinese Euro-Americans in populace in Shanghai Shanghai Settlements
Direct contacts in Hardly had any contact Relations with Chinese & commercial and municipal with the westerners and Westerners in Shanghai affairs Chinese folks
Dominated the JRA, and Only a handful of them Status in Japanese controlled nearly all their joined the JRA and had less Community
communal affairs influence in the community
Identity in Shanghai Sojourners Settlers
The gap between these two groups of people caused dissatisfaction of the "Native
Faction，’. They did not satisfy with the stratification within the Japanese community. For example, the Japanese candidates for councilors of the SMC were always selected from the "Company Faction”，for the official language of the SMC was English and the councilors had to communicate in this language」64 In order to avoid serious friction
62 within the community and placate the interest of Dochakuha people, the consul
frequently nominated and appointed a Dochakuha man as the Chairman of the JRA
board. At the time of 1922，for example, Suzuki Shigetaka (鈐木重孝)，a journalist,
served in this position. Another more famous figure in this position, Kawabata Teiji (、河
端貞次)’ who was killed by a Korean terrorist bomb in April 1932 at a ceremony
honoring Emperor Hirohito's Birthday, was a doctor who had been living in Hongkou district for nearly twenty years.Both of them were by no means Dochakuha professionals.
During the late 1920s, the competition of the two groups of Japanese people became
more intense, because within the "Company Faction" emerged other sub-groupings
shaped by the relative strength of the textile companies who formed "Boshokuha"(紡織
派）or the “Textile Faction’，. i66 According to the results of the first and third time major elections of the sixty councilors of the JRA, regardless of the question that whether we consider the "Company Faction" as a single entity or divided groups, the "Native
Faction" had gained more seats inside the Residents' Council of the JRA in 1929 than in
1925: (See Table 12)
Table 12 The Election Result of the Residents' Council of the JRA (1925, 1929)
Kaishaha Dochakuha Boshokuha Neutrality
First Election 40 13 7 (1925)
Third Election 10 21 22 7 (1929) Source: Shanhai Shupd (Shanghai weekly), March 18，1929, “Special issue of the Residents' Council，，.
As Joshua A. Fogel argues, this group Japanese expatriates, who had formed an economically weak group inside the Japanese community, was "more dependent on
63 local political and economic vagaries".'^^ And it was them, but not the Kaishaha, who represented the image of the Japanese civilians' lives in Shanghai. However, because of the lack of sources, this group of people does not seem to have left an explicitly visible legacy’ though they should be the leading roles in the stories of the Japanese community in Shanghai.
A society formed by small traders
Unlike those sojourning Japanese businessmen who were often had no choice but simply got their marching orders to leave Japan towards Shanghai, the large amount of small Japanese traders, other middle-class professionals and poorer people had decided to move to Shanghai all by themselves. Besides all those Japanese females who had lived depended on the westerners or the Chinese people, most of the Japanese forerunners in the early Meiji era were the poor people who could only had "their stomach stuffed in Japan’’.】68 Some of them were attracted by the myth of making a quick fortune in China, while other successful businessmen, like Kishita Ginko, pioneered the Shanghai market for Japan. From the late Shogunate period, the trading
connections between Shanghai and Nagasaki, Shanghai and Hakodate (函館）had
already existed. Early Japanese merchants from Kyushu usually ran the business of sundry goods, while the trading between Shanghai and Hokkaido were dominated by
the marine products, especially the “Konbu’’（昆布)，or the tangle and kelp.'^^ Even
though in the very beginning, such trading network was mainly developed by Chinese overseas, most of them were Cantonese and Fukienese, together with some western merchants; it was the Japanese small traders in Shanghai who made the city a collection and distributing center for the Japanese goods in China and even in East Asia.'^® When the navigation routes between Shanghai and Japan were greatly developed after the first Sino-Japanese War, the trading network was improved in the meantime. According to the statistics, in 1882 there were only twelve Japanese firms in China, 31 in 1891, and 42 in 1893. However, the number of the companies jumped to 114 in 1898. Most of these Japanese enterprises centered in Shanghai where attracted most Japanese in China. But at the time the overall Japanese investment was only one million yen,
64 which indicates that the scale of these firms were not very big. Most of these firms
engaged in the import-export trading of cotton, silk, and coal. From the
Russo-Japanese War to the First World War period, most main Japanese companies,
together with a large number of small Japanese commercial firms had entered Shanghai
market. However, even though there were hundreds of Japanese firms opened in the city,
they still lost by comparison with those western enterprises.'^^
Unlike those large Japanese companies who engaged in comprehensive range of
businesses from trading, commerce to manufacturing, these small or medium-sized
Japanese firms usually concentrated in the import-export businesses of consumer
products. Also unlike some other Japanese firms in Shanghai, such as Toyo Menka (東
洋綿花)，Nihon Menka (日本綿花)，Toyo Shiga (東洋煙草)，and Dai Nihon Eigyo
K5shi (大日本塩業公司)，who were the specialized dealers of some certain goods,
most of the small Japanese traders, were dumping a series of Japanese goods, from
textile goods and daily necessities to hardware, clocks and watches, in order to make the
largest possible profits.
From the rapid increase of the Japanese textile goods export to China in the early twentieth century, we may see how fast the Japanese commercial firms developed in
China. In 1907, the import of Japanese textile goods cost only 628 thousand yen; however, it jumped to 6081 thousand yen in 1914，which had increased nearly ten-fold.
And meanwhile in Shanghai, the percentage of such increase was as high as 69%.'^^
The number of the Japanese commercial firms in Shanghai kept increasing through the
1920s to 1930s. (See Tablel3)
Table 13
The New Registered Japanese Commercial Firms in Shanghai (1918-1932)
(A> The (B) Commercial Firms* (C) Import-Export Firms** Number of ^ Proportion Proportion � w Number Number Enterprises (_ (C/B)
1918 43 39 90.7% 31 79.5%
65 ‘ —^―——— ^ 37 19 51.4% 9 47.4% • 60 41 68.3% 14 34.1% 2923 66 54 81.8% 43 79.6% 2922 83 55 66.3% 34 61.8% 1923 15 5 33.3% 4 80.0% 2924 21 11 52.4% 7 63.6%
扭5 19 14 73.7% 4 28.6%
1926 13 9 61.5% 3 37.5%
1927 18 7 77.8% 5 35.7%
1928 12 4 75.0% 6 66.7%
1929 9 7 77.8% 1 14.3%
1930 10 4 40.0% 4 100%
1931 14 7 50.0% 3 42.9%
1932 7 6 85.7% 1 16.7% * Include all the commercial firms which had also run other businesses, but exclude
those manufacturing enterprises which also engaged in commercial businesses, and the service businesses, such as inns, hotels, and barber shops.
** Include all kinds of the commercial firms which operated import-export trading
concurrently. See Du Xuncheng, Riben zaijiu Zhongguo de touzi, p. 380.
The figures listed above were somehow lower than the real number in history simply because there were so many industrial enterprises which also took part in the commercial activities were excluded from the statistics. However, it still helps outline the image of the Japanese commercial expansion in Shanghai. By what means did these Japanese trading firms survive the tough competition in Shanghai? First, the price of the Japanese goods was lower than that of Euro-American goods. Take the white twills for instance, the price for the British-American twills were 9 taels per roll, while the Japanese ones only cost 6.5 taels]?* The relatively lower prices of the Japanese goods were welcome by the large grass-root level inside this cosmopolitan city, though most of the Japanese consumer products were of poorer
66 external appearance if competed on quality. Secondly, compare to those western countries, Japan lies in a closer distance to Shanghai, thus, the sea-freight was cheaper. Based on such an advantage, the Japanese traders could have their goods shipped faster to Shanghai and guaranteed the replenishment of goods could be accomplished with safety and efficiency. Also this helped them keep the price of their goods lower than that of other western countries. Thirdly, the management patterns of Japanese trading firms were applied more successfully. They changed tactics when the demand of the market shifted and utilized various strategies in order to promote their sales. Besides, both of the Japanese government and other Japanese commercial organizations (no matter established in Japan or in Shanghai) had emphasized a lot on the information collecting, in which included a large amount of the commercial information.'^^ This helped them take better control of their businesses and survive in the competitions. Lastly, their close relationship with the certain Chinese trading firms in Shanghai made it possible to sail the Japanese products directly to the Shanghai market. The merchants from Osaka, for example, had established special close ties with those so-called "Toyo So"(“東洋莊"， specialty stores for Japanese goods) in Shanghai. Such Chinese firms developed quickly because of the favorable patterns provided by their Japanese suppliers. Also，through the commercial network in East Asia, which was established by the Japanese import-export merchants in China and Korea together with the overseas Chinese businessmen in Japan (most of who settled in Osaka and Nagasaki), the Japanese traders had maintained and furthered their businesses from Shanghai towards other Chinese treaty ports and Korean cities.丨 76
In addition to these Japanese trading firms who survived in the regional commercial market, there were certain groups of Japanese small traders, middle class professionals and other small businessmen who engaged in special service industries. Most of them lived upon their own community in Shanghai. It was them who supplied their offshore nationals the daily necessities from homeland and provided them with other services they needed during their daily lives. Other middle-class professionals, such as doctors, teachers, lawyers, journalists and freelancers performed as specialists for their communal lives, and often took active roles in the civic and political associations. It will not exaggerate too much if someone argues that these various
67 peoples combined together and formed the core of the Japanese community. Thus, besides the limited relations established with their commercial partners, the Japanese civilians seldom had any further contacts with Chinese populations in the city. Christian Henriot argues that such a Japanese society formed by these peoples was so self-contained that it was unnecessary for most of these Japanese civilians to contact
with other nationals in their daily lives in Shanghai. 口？ Their routinized daily-lives had been secured not only by the administrative system maintained by their Consul and the JRA, but also by their special "kingdom" erected in the Hongkou district.
Make Hongkou a Japan town
Even as late as the early 1930s, the proportion of the Japanese population in Shanghai was still very small in comparison to nearly 300 million Chinese populations, though at the time the Japanese nationals had outnumbered 25 thousand and was the largest foreign community. Like other foreigners in Shanghai, it was impossible for the Japanese to live exclusively from their Chinese neighbors even inside the Hongkou district where the so-called "Japanese Concession" located.However, we cannot deny that it was the Hongkou district where contained a large proportion of Japanese populations in Shanghai, which mostly consisted of the Japanese small traders, the ordinary employees of the Japanese firms, the inn-keepers, store-owners, restaurant runners, middle-class professionals together with the poorer unemployed persons. And it was the Hongkou district in which the so-called "Japanese Streets" and "Little Japan" appeared. Even today, many Shanghai people still have the impression that had been a Japanese concession in Hongkou district during the modem times, just like the British, American and French concession areas in the city」79 How did this district develop into a Japanese kingdom? What were the Japanese lives like inside this district and in Shanghai?
"Japanese Streets'' & "Little Tokyo"
When the students graduated from Toa Dobun Shoin!肌 recalled their lives in
68 Shanghai, one of the most impressive things was the joyful weekends spent in Hongkou district, where the Japanese restaurants, cinemas, teahouses gathered in several main streets:
"In the Hongkou district, the Japanese stores were crowded on Wusong Road,
Zhapu Road, Boone Road, and Haining Road: the Sukiyaki Restaurants called
Yasuda (安田),Matsuba (松葉);the noodle house called Mitake (三竹);the Japanese
cinema Tonwakan (東和館)；Zenzai shop called Tamai (田每）...Gathering in the
Sukiyaki Restaurant cost one dollar, while the meal at Mitake cost fifty cents....
Before the Shanghai Incident, there were many small shops similar to the teahouses
(in Japan) where you could have a drink like coffee."
For these students, Hongkou was so "charming" a place where featured familiar
Japanese restaurants, teahouses, and cinemas, while a wealth of recreational choices could be found there. Despite the long distance between their Shoin and Hongkou, these
students would still like to indulge in Hongkou until the last minute when they had to go 1 back to school before 11 pm.
As we discussed in Chapter Two, Hongkou was a hinterland crisscrossed by waterways, bridges, and streets. Even though Japanese had not evacuated the large amount of the Chinese and monopolized these main streets in Hongkou before the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), it is believed that the so-called "Japanese streets" had already existed in Hongkou even as early as
After the first Sino-Japanese War, Broadway Road had become the center of
Japanese small businesses. In 1904，many Japanese sundry stores appeared on this street which left an impression that a prosperous "Japanese street" emerged, and these
Japanese businesses developed steadily] 84 According to the investigation conducted by the Japanese consulate in 1915, several streets around the Broadway Road in the "outer
Hongkou area，’ attracted more Japanese residents than any other places, where contained more than 16% Japanese population in Shanghai: (See Table 14)
69 Table 14
The Japanese population resided in Outer Hongkou Area
Boone Road WusongRoad Kunshan Road Nanxun Road Japanese 851 515 295 235 Residents
Source: Yonezawa Hideo, Shanhai Shiwa, p. 207.
In the 1920s, several crossed roads, around which erected the buildings of the Japanese consulate, Higashi Honganji, Japanese club, and etc., were also filled up with Japanese residents.
Take the Wusong Road for instance: This road used to be one of the two main streets in Hongkou district which was built in 1856. When the first group of Japanese entered Hongkou during the early Meiji era, the region around this road was still farms, except for the already-existed Boone Road and Broadway Road. However, during the 1920s，the areas around were crowded with the Japanese residents and other facilities related to their community. According to consulate's statistics in 1927，there were 1997 Japanese families lived around Wusong Road, which contained nearly thirty percent of their populations in Shanghai. This area had been called as "Japanese Streets，，since so many Japanese stores were opened here. As the main street in Hongkou area, some famous long-standing Japanese shops, such as Tsuchibashigo (土橋号)’ Matsumoto
Honten (松本本店)，Iwasaki Gofuku Shop (岩崎吳服店)，Nihondo Book Store (曰本堂
書店)，even had started their businesses during the late Meiji era�8 5According to the
"Shanhai Hojin Eigyobetsu"(“上海邦人營業別”，"The Directory of Japanese
Businesses in Shanghai”）in the 1924 year's Shanhai Arniai’ (上海案内，The Shanghai
Guidebook), there were 146 Japanese enterprises located on Wusong Road, while most of them were Japanese small stores relating to all kinds of businesses from groceries, drugs, fish, meat, dry goods, bakeries and candy, to antiques, hardware, upholstery, furniture, book stores, clothing, gifts, jewelry, leather goods, shoes and toys. Another important road in Hongkou district was North Sichuan Road (or North Szechuan Road)
70 which extended the Japanese presence to the so-called "external roads area". From the same "Directory", we may find that North Sichuan Road not only became crowded with
Japanese shops twenty years after this road had been built, but also attracted even more
Japanese industrial and commercial entities than the Wusong Road/86
Besides these two main north-south roads situated “north of the creek’，，some other parallel streets (such as Zhapu Road, Miller Road, Nanxun Road and Fearon
Road), together with some adjacent vertical west-east roads (such as the Range Road,
Haining Road, Boone Road, Hambury Road, Wuchang Road, Tiantong Road, Seward
Road and Broadway Road) constructed a special Japanese residential zone in Shanghai. 187
When more Japanese nationals moved to Shanghai after the establishment of the new navigation route in 1923, the Japanese community expanded. Consequently, their residential area, though still concentrated in the “outer Hongkou", furthered towards the middle or even inner Hongkou, and towards the east bank of Hongkou creek or even entered Yangshupu district. Thus, when more Japanese resided in different parts of
Hongkou, Dixwell Road, and Wuchang Road were regarded the "Japanese Streets" by the local Shanghai people, while Japanese residential nationals themselves called the
Broadway Road "Little Tokyo".'^^
Japanese lives in Hongkou
It is difficult to reconstruct the image of Japanese daily lives in Shanghai because of the lack of sources. Even though Japanese community was spread throughout
Shanghai, they rarely became attracted people's attention unless "the imperial army fought in the city or when an anti-Japanese boycott campaign choked everyday life".
While they became the largest component of the foreigners' society in Shanghai, as foreigners and non-Euro-American, they were doubly excluded by the Chinese and those Western Shanghailanders. How did they fit in the new "home" when they arrived in their new environment?
For most of the Dochakuha Japanese it was their first taste of life outside Japan, though they enjoyed advantages such as the relatively short distance between Japan and
71 Shanghai, the familiar Kanbun (literary Chinese) which they could read. From the limited materials we gain the impression that most ordinary Japanese were living inside their own insulate community, where they lived, worked, ate and played. For example, they could find whatever they need for their daily lives, since most of the Japanese small businesses related to their daily lives were opened within the area of the so-called
"Japanese streets”. (See Table 15)
Table 15
Japanese Small Businesses Opened inside the "Japanese Streets Area"
(1924)
Inside the Outside the "Japanese Streets The proportion "Japanese Streets Area" A/(A+B) Area" (B) ^ Footwear Stores 8 1 89%
Meat Stores 6 0 100%
Sake and Beer Stores 13 1 93%
Clock Stores 9 2 82%
Restaurants
(including shops 50 16 76% provided food and
drink)
Inns & Lodging Houses 26 8 76%
Clothing Stores
(including both 45 7 87% Japanese and western
style)
Candy Stores 22 6 79%
Book Stores 5 0 100%
Antique Shops 21 1 95% Food Stores 30 2 ^ Source: "Shanhai Hojin Eigyobetsu", in Shanhai annai (Shanghai, 1924)，pp. 1-39.
72 In the Hongkou market, housewives could buy fish, vegetables and fruits from Japan,‘卯 while other consumer products could be found inside their residential areas. Besides, they could send their children to Japanese schools run by the JRA, see the Japanese doctors when they were ill, and have meals in the Japanese style restaurants. During the leisure time, the Hongkou Park was the best choice for the Japanese lived nearby. Some
Japanese golfers even frequented this park to play the golf during the weekends.
They had little contact with both Chinese and Westerner since it was not necessary, though most of them had Chinese neighbors and even neighbors of other nationals.
Some of them managed to find their place and establish themselves by joining their own neighborhood organizations, the Japanese clubs, and other organizations inside their community, while the majority would attend the activities held by the Japanese consulate and the Japanese religious entities (no matter the Buddhist temple or the
Japanese Jinsha). Most Japanese people celebrated the festivals and important dates of their own country, through which a sense of community had been maintained and strengthened.
However, most Japanese in Shanghai lived a modest life and kept a low profile, even though anti-Japanese activity occurred continually in the city. A Chinese scholar recalled the his impression of the Japanese people lived in a typical lilong (里弄）or lane located on the Dixwell road in Hongkou:
"In this lane, there were Chinese who migrated to Shanghai from other places in
China, while Japanese, Indian, Jew, Italian and Filipino people had also resided in
the same place. There were no conflict between Chinese and foreign residents.
Even though the national sentiments and anti-Japanese feelings of Chinese people
were aroused during the Japanese aggression to China, we had not revenged those
Japanese residents who lived peacefully with us. People lived here showed no bad
intentions towards those gently polite Japanese females, and their industry and
thrift children. From the balcony of my living place, I could see the young
Japanese female embracing their baby sitting on the tatami, and bowing deeply to
their husbands when they back home from work...—
73 Except for some individual cases, like Uchiyama Kanzo, the small traders from Japanese community seldom tried to be involved in the Chinese society, though the Chinese merchants supplied them with some usual services. They did not show their attitudes towards Chinese people unless the anti-Japanese boycotts deeply affected their daily lives.Also, unlike those Japanese people from Kaishaha, they did not have direct contact with those foreigners from those major powers. Thus, to some extend, they lived in a community established by a kind of imagination that they had just lived inside a community at home but rather abroad.
"Nagasaki Ken- Shanhai Shi"
From the 1920s, Japanese began informally referring to Shanghai as "Nagasaki ken, Shanhai shi"(長崎!^-上海市，Nagasaki prefecture, Shanghai City).】94 There are several cursory remarks in Japanese indicates the close relation between the two places, such as "one can address a letter as 'Nagasaki ken, Shanhai shi' for posting"; "while the first-time meeting was at a dinner in Nagasaki, the second may be at a horse race in Shanghai." How did such relation establish during the second decade of twentieth century? How did such a feeling of linkage emerge among these “Shanghai Japanese"? What kind of meaning does this symptom indicate?
New navigation route between Shanghai and Nagasaki shorten the distance between the two cities and started a new era for the Japanese community in Shanghai.
Before this twenty-seven-hour fast navigation route was established in 1923, it would take you seven days to navigate form Tokyo to Shanghai, or five to six days from Kobe
(字申戶).After years of discussion, waiting and preparation, two clippers, "Nagasaki
Maru，，（長崎九）and "Shanhai Maru"(上海九)，started this new route on February 11，
1923:195 While the “Nagasaki Mam” sailed further to Kobe, the "Shanhai Maru" also connected Osaka. Consequently, the travel between China and Japan became more convenient, which also greatly influenced the daily lives of Japanese community in Shanghai.
For this extremely self-contained community, the new route strengthened their
74 tendency ofkeepping everything in the same way as it at home. Most Japanese residents
in Shanghai had maintained their lives in Japanese style. One of the prominent
evidences is what they ate in Shanghai. During the 1920s, fish and vegetables arrived
from Nagasaki on a daily basis and were sold in the "Hongkou triangle market"(虹口
三角市場).Various Japanese stores, such as fish stores, vegetable stores, dry goods stores, Japanese cake stores, lined up several streets which all displayed Japanese foods. People seek security in the familiar food from home, possibly even what you never particularly enjoyed, may become a focus, maybe an obsession. "It was as if a comer of the Nagasaki market had moved,，，noted one Shanghai Japanese from Nagasaki. People discovered that "Japanese residents in Shanghai lived there oblivious to the fact that they were in foreign country."'^^ Most early arrivals in Shanghai were single (most were young and leaving home for the first time), even those married seldom accompanied by their family. Dozens of inns and lodging houses provided them with accommodation, while small traders and their employees might just sleep in their workplace overnight. However, when new route was opened between Japan and Shanghai, more and more Japanese came in family. Most of these people rented houses in Hongkou district and commuted to work everyday. 197 The family lives provided Japanese residents a feeling of home. The surrounded Japanese enterprises, such as the post offices, temples, public schools, even the cemeteries, formed a whole atmosphere that all the Japanese in the city were integrated with each other. The maintenance of the Japanese customs, rituals, and even the festival celebration and some special ceremonies helped them tie themselves to their home. As Joshua A. Fogel argued, "the most remarkable quality of the entire Japanese enterprise in Shanghai was how extrinsic it was to the city itself and how much life was fashioned to resemble home.’"^ When the Japanese community of Shanghai became a distinct ethnic enclave and the communal tensions between Chinese and Japanese turned into increasingly bitter conflicts, the Japanese in Shanghai nonetheless came to represent an economic entity which worth dying to protect.
75 PART THREE
COMPROMISES AND CONFLICTS
THIS PART examines 1) the relationship between the Japanese community and the
authority of the International Settlement, and 2) the Sino-Japanese tension in Shanghai
through the early twentieth century. Inside the Settlement, Japanese had enjoyed lower
status and got less voice than their western counterparts. The representatives of the
Japanese community had struggled to improve their situation inside though received
little respect from the west. Meanwhile, anti-Japanese sentiment in China and organized
actions against Japan, especially the anti-Japanese boycotts, ebbed and flew through the
period of 1915-1931, which deeply influenced the relationship between the Japanese
and Chinese communities in the city. The growing Sino-Japanese tension in the city
reached its exploding point in 1932 when Japanese military force suddenly attacked the
Zhapei section of Shanghai.
CHAPTER SIX
CONFLICTS WITH COMPROMISES
Japanese Community and the Shanghai Municipal Council
The SMC of the International Settlement, as we discussed before, was responsible only to its ratepayers who had turned it into "an autonomous body" in Shanghai. Even though it had been dominated by the British power in the city, it was "mostly left to its own devices by the British government and its diplomatic and consular representatives，，. 199 Every foreign community, in principle, was able to take part in its administration, such as having representatives in the Council, joining the Volunteer Corps and the Municipal Police, if they were the land renters and rate payers. Personnel who had joined the Council's services, such as the engineers, accountants, teachers, health workers and policemen, were also coming from different countries, most of whom became the
76 members of the foreign communities in Shanghai. However, for Japanese community, they had less voice than those major western powers in the management of the International Settlement before the 1930s when their advances in China put pressures on the western, mostly British, powers in Shanghai.
Representatives in Council
The SMC's early communication with Japanese power in the International Settlement was maintained by their occasional correspondences with Japanese Consul in the city. And besides a few issues related to the court procedures, there were no serious disputes between Japanese and the SMC even without any Japanese representative in the SMC before the end of 1915.
The first Japanese councilor, Ishii Akira (石井徹)，entered the SMC after another western member's early resignation. Ishii, the branch manager of N.Y.K. in Shanghai, was a Japanese Kanshaha who had also served as the Chairman of the JRA in the Japanese community and had close relation with the Japanese Consul. He was the candidate for the former years' SMC election but failed to win the post, thus, some western councilors questioned this appointment though some other members had pointed out that “such appointment would undoubtedly gratify the Japanese Government and community and facilitate matters relating to the Settlement which involve reference to the Diplomatic When the make-up of the Council was revised, a steady national quota (5 British, 5 Chinese, 2 US, and 2 Japanese) had been long maintained since the 1920s and had not been challenged by the Japanese power before the mid-1930s when the JRA "breached the convention that only two Japanese candidates would stand for election to the SMC”.201 As we discussed before, most of Japanese councilors came from the Kaishaha, because of their better language ability and prominent status within the Japanese community. Even though this does not mean that they did not pay attention to the ordinary communal lives of their community, yet from the archives of the SMC, we may find that in this administrative body of foreign communities they actually served as the liaison officers between their Consulate and the authorities of the International
77 Settlement rather than the representatives of the Japanese community in Shanghai. However, when the Japanese community prospered in the north bank of the Suzhou Creek during the First World War period, the Japanese community became more involved in the daily affairs in the International Settlement, and the Japanese nationals, mostly those from elite class, wanted to participate more in the center of the municipal council and took part in the making of the decisions which affected their own communities in Shanghai.
Japanese participation in the SMP and other services in the SMC
The SMP (Shanghai Municipal Police) force was founded in 1854, and policed the International Settlement in Shanghai until 1943. Originally composed of Britons, by the time of its incorporation into the puppet police force of the Shanghai municipality it consisted of Britons, British Indians, White Russian refugees. Central European Jewish refugees, Japanese and of course Chinese, who made up the bulk of the force throughout the twentieth century. The Japanese Branch of the SMP was formed in 1916 when 30 men were recruited from the Tokyo Metropolitan force and there were about 260 Japanese men in the force by 1938.^°^ During the turn of the 1920s, when the tension between Chinese and Japanese communities rose, one of the disputes focused on the Japanese presence in Shanghai was the Japanese consistent demands for an exclusive policing force in the Hongkou district, since most of Japanese community's interest concentrated there.
As early as 1918，after the so-called "Hongkew Disturbances" or "Hongkew Riots，，(during which two Japanese, one SMP constable and the other a shopkeeper, were killed, while the Japanese residents attacked and fought Chinese SMP constables)，203 the Japanese community held a meeting at the Japanese club and resolved several demands. Among all the demands they proposed, two were related to the Japanese branch of the SMP: they insisted that "the number of Japanese police should be increased, that the Chinese police should be disarmed in the Settlement" and “an additional Japanese police carried with it a recommendation that the unit had its own station directly in charge of the Japanese Inspector，’.204 However, the SMC largely
78 held the Japanese community for blame, and noted, worryingly, that the Japanese consular authorities appeared to have little control over their community and rejected their demand.^®^ And despite the fact that the Japanese branch of the SMP was finally brought up to 50 in 1920,^°^ the SMC rejected Japanese demand for greater Japanese executive control in the force.
While the national tension between Japan and China became more violent along with the triumph of the nationalist revolution in China, the Japanese community in Shanghai proposed similar demands to the SMC in the late 1920s. However, such demands were again rejected by the SMP and SMC though a Japanese Assistant Commissioner of the police force was appointed.^®^ In the January of 1928，while the Japanese members in the SMC proposed that "the policing of the Dixwell and Pootoo
Road (Putuo Road,普陀路）districts should be exclusively undertaken by the Japanese
Branch", the Commissioner of the SMP refused their demand by insisting that "a number of Chinese police should be retained in these districts." In another circumstance, Japanese demand of "the placing of a Japanese officer in charge of a district，，was opposed because of “the difficulty of finding properly qualified men," while the SMP intimated that they had "a concurrence in desirability of having Japanese officers in responsible positions in certain areas where there are large Japanese interests.”209 And in the end of the same year, additional police were hired from Japan when the SMP were taking steps to recruit 34 more Japanese constables for the Japanese Branch.2i°
In the late 1920s it was reasonable to for the SMC to avoid arousing further conflicts between Japanese and Chinese communities by rejecting Japanese demands for their exclusive policing forces in Hongkou, but for Japanese community this was by no mean a disappointment. Even though the Japanese members finally accepted such excuses as the difficulties in the recruitment procedure, they argued that such difficulty was caused by the relatively low pay of the Japanese Branch, which was not "commensurate with the responsibility attaching to it (the post), or sufficient to attract the services of property educated and capable man，？"
Here, the payment of the Japanese personnel in the SMC was another main dispute between the Japanese community and the authority of the International Settlement for a
79 long time. Japanese personnel, in addition to the Japanese police in the SMP, served in different positions in the services of the SMC. However, before the late 1920s, most of these positions were low rank and need no special skills, such as the park keepers, meter inspectors, nurses, and etc. The pay to these people was comparatively low than those western personnel, most of whom served in higher positions. While the JRA had subsidized their nationals worked under the SMC,^'^ the Japanese community complained such "discrimination" and demanded for the same standard of pay as other foreign municipal employees in the SMC service. In 1928，for example, when the
Japanese councilor, Mr. Fukushima (福島)expressed the appreciation of the Japanese
community for the SMC，s decision that the two Japanese employees, like other employees in the Electricity Department, would be paid at the rate of taels, he argued that the Council ought give up the system of differed pay for Asiatic employees and other distinctions in the terms of service and follow the practice of the Chinese Maritime Customs and the Post Office，in which the Japanese employees were accorded the same treatment as other foreign employees. Another instance was in 1931 when both of a Chinese and Japanese were nominated respectively for a Chinese and a Japanese Assistant Secretary in the press office of the SMC,^'"^ the question whether the
• 215 Japanese Press officer should receive a Class ‘A，or a Class ‘L，letter of Appointment and whether they should receive equivalent rates of pay had arisen. The Japanese member of Council insisted that Japanese nationals enjoyed "in the same position as other foreign municipal employees", thus should receive the Class ‘A’ letter of appointment and received a higher pay than his Chinese colleague, owing to the fact that they are not permanently domiciled in Shanghai." However, the Council insisted the same rate of pay for Japanese and Chinese press officials in order to avoid the "a feeling of dissatisfaction on the part of the Chinese press nominee."^'^ Even though we cannot simply argue that it was the SMC's long-persisted "policy" to isolate the Japanese from the decision making group in the SMC or exclude them from their British-American intelligence unit, for those Japanese officers who had worked in the SMC services, they still had gained a strong feeling that they had got little respect from their western colleagues and received unfair differentiation rates of pay.^'^
80 While most of the "Dochakuha" Japanese resented the predominant status of the British, similar dissatisfaction was also held by the elite class Japanese and even their diplomatic officers in Shanghai.^^^
Japanese wanted more voice in the SMC
As we have just discussed, during the 1920s, Japanese community had got little
dominance in the administration of the International Settlement since the British
dominated the important positions of the SMC. However, during the late 1920s,
Japanese community began to urge more Japanese voice in the SMC because they were
"dissatisfied with certain aspects of the Municipal administration of the Settlement."^
In the November of 1927，a series of Japanese petitions were received by the SMC.
This time the local Japanese residents demanded not only the increase of the Japanese
Branch of the Police Force, but also the engagement of Japanese nationals in other
Departments of the Council's service, the translation of the Council's official documents
into the Japanese language, and etc. The Chairman of the SMC met the representations
who had made to him by prominent local Japanese subjects. They transmitted the strong
feeling of the Japanese community that the Council "should meet them in the matter of
the petitions put forward", if it "desires to ensure the co-operation of the Japanese
community in the interests of the good government of the Settlement." The reasons put
forward by the Japanese community for compliance with their request included: 1) the
Japanese population was almost three times as large as that of any other foreign
nationality in the International Settlement; and 2) approximately two fifths of the
General Municipal Rate was paid by Japanese residents; 3) there were a large present and potential business interests of the Japanese in Shanghai. These arguments sounded so unyielding that the Chairman had admitted that “it was necessary to recognize that the time had arrived when the Japanese Community should be given greater opportunity for employment in the Municipal Service” and promised that their proposals would be
"given the most sympathetic consideration，，，though meanwhile he maintained "it would be not equitable to dismiss present members of the staff in order to create vacancies.，，22°
Two weeks later, proposals had been put forward that 89 Japanese employees
81 would be engaged by the various departments in the SMC during 1928: out of these 89
positions 73 were posts which have definitely created in order that they might be filled
by Japanese subjects. The Chairman also expressed the hope that as suitable vacancies
occurred in the various Departments of the Service due consideration would be given to
qualifications of Japanese residents to fill such posts.^^'
After this "triumph" the Japanese community had one more Japanese Assistant
Commissioner of Police in 1928，and an Assistant Secretary in Press office. According
to the recording of Gaimusho, at the end of 1930，there were 216 Japanese personnel
working in the SMC, while this number increased to 240 before the Shanghai Incident 222 in 1932. Even though a more violent electoral struggle occurred repeatedly in 1936，
1938 and 1939，the Japanese had gained more voices in the SMC in the early 1930s than
ever before, and tried to change their once marginalized status among the western
communities in Shanghai.
The anti-Japanese boycotts and Japanese community
During the period of 1915-1931, the boycott — a mode of passive resistance to
which Chinese people had gained recourse as a means of opposing action when they
considered unjust on the part of their own authorities - had in various instances been
employed against the trade of one or another foreign nation as a weapon by which to
enforce form their redress for what they deemed to be grievances?^ Even though there
were boycotts against trade of various "imperialists", such as the anti-American boycott
in 1905-1906，the anti-British boycott in 1925-1926, and etc., the anti-Japanese boycotts happened more frequently than any boycotts against foreign powers in China.
Moreover, because of the concentration in Shanghai of Japanese and Japanese interests, it had always been the center of such resistant campaigns, especially in the large scale of anti-Japanese boycotts took place in 1915, 1919-1920, 1925-1926，1927-1929, and 1931.
Nevertheless, even the anti-Japanese boycotts varied by the year. The frictions between the Japanese and Chinese communities caused and heightened by the anti-Japanese boycotts were also changing from time to time.
82 The boycott as an economic tool
In 1915 when the landing of Japanese troops in Shandong caused Sino-Japanese difficulties, an anti-Japanese boycott was produced by the so-called "Twenty-one Demands.” With the establishment of the “Society to Propagate the Use of National
Goods"(勸用國貨會）and the initiation of the "National Salvation Fund Movement"
(救國儲金運動)，the 1915 boycott took on quite largely the form of a movement to
"buy Chinese goods.，，^^^ As to the economic effectiveness of boycott in 1915, Charles F. Remer argued that:
"The boycott of 1915 was the first which revealed the power of this weapon in the hands of the Chinese. The decline in Japanese trade was great for the brief period of severest boycotting. This decline was not confined to a single part of China as had been the case during earlier boycotts ... The stimulus to domestic industry from boycotting had added a new feature but otherwise this boycott was not different, except in extent, from those of an earlier day."^^^
However, the Japanese import-export businesses suffered a lot during this boycott. The
Japanese coal had been steadily replaced by the coal form Kailuan (開灤）and were
nearly driven out of the Shanghai market.^^^ The market price of the cotton products from Japan declined gradually when the calling for the total resisting of Japanese products rose in Shanghai and Tianjin.^^^ Not only these Japanese import-export trades, the large Japanese navigation companies^ the sundry goods shops and cotton mills run by Japanese had also been deeply affected by this boycott. ^^^ Under such circumstances, most Japanese firms in Shanghai had no business at all: Uchiyama Kanzo, for example, who was working as salesmen for a Japanese drugstore in the city, had nothing to do all the days but kept discussing the current developments of the ，11 anti-Japanese boycotts with his Japanese colleagues.
In 1919，a more general anti-Japanese boycott erupted with student's leadership among merchants and the lower middle class. This time the immediate cause was the
83 receipt of the news in China that the Peace Conference in Paris announced their
intention of awarding Japan the former German leasehold of Shandong province. As the
only weapon available to Chinese to fight their "selfish and aggressive neighbor", they,
again，"resorted to wit a boycott of everything belonging to Japan.^^^ As summarized
by Remer, boycott of this time was better-organized: the students, the consumers, the
Chamber of Commerce had been tightly unified, when the boycott had also associated
with a general popular movement happened in early June. 233 Compared with the
boycott of 1915，this time the boycott was undertaken in a more systematic way: Rules
of boycott was first clarified by the promotersStudents form all over the country
gathered in Shanghai and served as enthusiastic propagandists; merchants together with
different guilds were adopting action for boycott against Japanese trading interests. It
was recorded that in the end of May there were an increasing number of Chinese people
queuing outside the Japanese banks for exchanging their paper for silver dollars, since
the boycotters yelled for “not to accept or honor any Japanese bank-notes." Meanwhile,
special funds were created for “the purpose of paying the Chinese servants of Japanese
who were expected to leave their employment”.23^ The Japanese community, on the one
hand, vaunted “the preparedness of the Japanese banks and other firms to stand against
even a prolonged boycott” and pointed out "the futility of such movements in former
times，，;236 on the other hand, their trade was badly hit by this deep-rooted movement
which waged intermittently from May of 1919 through 1920 and 1921.^^^ Some
Japanese traders erased the trade mark ‘made in Japan' since most Chinese merchants
refused to deal in Japanese goods. The cotton importation from Japan decreased;
even the Japanese shipping firms were affected by the boycott due to the Chinese
refusal to transport cargoes on Japanese ships.^^^
When a wave of national sentiment rose in Shanghai during the 1920s in reaction
to the foreign powers in the city, anti-foreign boycotts happened more often than earlier
decades. A Chinese Mass meeting was held in the June of 1927, when some strict
anti-Japanese resolutions were adopted.In the mid-1920s, the Chinese importation of
Japanese cotton decreased sharply. During the April of 1927，definite signs of panic had begun to spread through the Shanghai Japanese Community owing to the closing of two local Japanese banks, following a steady drain upon resources of each, when depositors began withdrawing their deposits.】"" However, affected by the mood on the third
84 anniversary of the May Thirtieth Movement, the most economically effective
anti-Japanese boycott erupted in 1928，as a protest against the “Jinan Incident" (or
“Tsinan Incident，，)，and lasted through 1929. This time, the Japanese traders suffered
even heavier financial loss than in those former boycotts.242 Even though the boycott of
Japanese goods was still the only weapon, it became more rigorous this time.^^^ In 1928’
a centralized Anti-Japanese Association was organized who checked the transactions in
Japanese goods.^'^ A National Anti-Japanese Conference held in Shanghai on July
21-27, which adopted a series of resolutions and certain rules of procedure which were
to serve as the basis for all of the anti-Japanese organizations in China.245 According to
these rules, some common Japanese consume products in Shanghai market, such as
cotton yam, clocks, sugar, tumblers, umbrellas, and shirts, could be seized in Chinese
ruled areas which caused many Japanese goods kept in storage in Shanghai after being
shipped from Japan.^^^ The seized Japanese goods would be held until the importing
merchants paid a specified fine to the national salvation fund. For example, it was
reported that during the early part of November C $200,000 worth of salt fish and other
goods imported from Japan was seized at Nantao and were returned to the importers
upon the payment of a fine of C $35,000,247 it was estimated that the loss in trade with
China by Japanese merchants in Shanghai was as high as y. 32,000,000.^'^^
An anti-Japanese boycott revived after the Wanbaoshan Incident (萬寶山事件）
in July 1931，which was intensified after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident on
September 18，1931. An anti-Japanese association, the Anti-Japanese and Protect
Overseas Association (反日援橋委員會)，was organized by the Shanghai Kuomintang when they held a meeting at the Shanghai Chinese General Chamber of Commerce.
They declared a boycott of Japanese goods and the permanent severance of economic relations with Japan, and called for a nation-wide boycott of Japanese goods.249 This time the movement was insisted unanimously in all circles. It was reported that it was practically impossible to sell or buy Japanese products in Shanghai.^^® The pickets of the Anti-Japanese and Protect Overseas Association had seized the Japanese goods at the checkpoints in the city, which became the main method during this time's boycotting.251 Nearly all the Japanese commodities, such as cotton yam, soap, glass bottles, and matches, were confiscated by them. According to the recording of Japanese
85 foreign ministry, up to the end of 1931，more than C $127,000,000 worth of Japanese goods had been seized by the Chinese. ^^^ The situation of small-scale Japanese business in the city was especially bleak because of the severity of the boycott. All in all, the anti-Japanese boycotts in Shanghai became radical between 1915 and 1931. The economic effectiveness of the boycotts deeply affected the Japanese community in the city and those Japanese businessmen at home. Besides the great loss in economy, the agitation and hostility had also emerged between the Japanese and Chinese community in the city, which affected the daily lives of the Japanese society in Shanghai.
The hostilities and the Japanese reaction
While the main panic of the Japanese community was due to the economic depression caused by the boycotts, the unfavorable experience in their routine lives also provoked their resentment. Whenever an anti-Japanese boycott erupted in the city, similar hostilities towards the Japanese presence would appear, such as the distribution of anti-Japanese handbills, the organizations of anti-Japanese rallies, and the occurrence of strikes as political protests in those Japanese owned businesses.^^"^
In response to fears arisen during the boycott, six neighborhood associations (町内
會，Chonaikai) were first organized for local self-defense and mutual aid. Based on these associations the League of Japanese Neighborhood Associations of Shanghai (上
海曰本人町内會聯合會，Shanhai Nihonjin Chonaikai Rengokai) was formed in 1917.
The neighborhood associations had risen to forty by the mid-1920s. When the boycotts and other anti-Japanese actions erupted, these neighborhood associations were called into action to provide Japanese with current information, deliver the mail, distribute food, protect fellow nationals (especially schoolchildren). Instead of being led by the JRA leaders, such neighborhood associations were organized by the Native Clique, though they were affiliated with the JRA.^^^ Meanwhile, the vigilance committees (自
警團，Jikeidan), and the Shanghai Branch of the Imperial Military Reservists'
86 Association (帝國在鄕軍人會，Teikoku zaigo gunjin kai) were organized in order to
protect local Japanese interests. Most of such organizations (except the Imperial Military Reservists' Association, which was organized by a group of local JRA members with military experience) represented the majority of the Japanese community in the city, who had confronted the Chinese nose-to-nose.^^^
However, before 1927 when the city (the Chinese ruled areas) was handed over to the Kuomintang government, the conflicts between Japanese and Chinese people seemed to be relatively mild. Both the authorities of the foreign settlement and the local Chinese government called for the calm of the boycotters and Japanese community. The Japanese consul and the Chinese official kept in close touch while the disturbances occurred in the city. The police force, no matter belonged to the foreign settlements or to the Chinese government, tried their best to preserve the order. Most Japanese nationals had kept calm for the sake of the reputation of their community. In 1915, for example, besides the news that some "over-enthusiastic citizens" who had gathered in front of the Japanese firms and tried to persuade the Chinese not to buy Japanese products, caused several lawsuits between Japanese merchants and these Chinese,^^^ no really serious violence towards Japanese community could be found in the recordings of the contemporary local newspapers. One of the most unrestrained affairs was a piece of news reporting that the windows of some Japanese firms were broken by angered Chinese, while others threw eggs towards the Japanese shops in Hongkou district, which caused these Japanese businesses closed up and stopped businesses for several
258 days. Meanwhile, in responding to the abusive languages used by Chinese, Japanese posters containing an expression of scorn had also irritated the Chinese people.〕^。 During the boycott of 1919, as described by the SMP report, few of those energetic students gave trouble on the streets except distributing handbills. “No cases of intimidation or of incitement by them to disorder came directly under police notice within Settlement limits” said the report. The Chinese patriotic students had also clarified that they had no grudge or hatred against Japanese people, and no violent act would or could occur in their movement.^^® The Chinese newspapers reported that the foreign owned shops in the Hongkou district kept running during the general strike of the local merchants, when the SMP arranged more patrols than usual in the district;^^'
87 while the North China Herald said that “in Hongkew，，，"there was little of importance to report." However, rumors spread in the city during both boycotts of 1915 and 1919.
While gossips that Japanese navy was going to sending their marine force in order to
protect their nationals were heard in 1915,^^^ in the June of 1919 the rumor of the poisoning of wells and food by Japanese had led to many assaults on some innocent Japanese people严
During the mid-1920, violence between the Chinese working class and Japanese cotton mill owners had increased, while some deaths and injuries of Japanese nationals during the combats were reported by the press. The Japanese primary schools closed during the climax of the upheavals following the May Thirtieth Incident, when a small group of the Japanese naval landing party landed. Violence towards ordinary Japanese civilians happened in Hongkou and Yangshupu district caused the sending of Japanese branch of the SVC.265
Nevertheless, situations became even tougher during the late 1920s when the Northern Expedition rode the wave of anti-imperialist fervor. From 1927, especially after the Jinan incident in 1928，Japan had been singled out by the anti-foreign propaganda. Such a trend met its climax in 1931 when new waves of anti-Japanese agitation irritated the Japanese community who nearly reached exploding point. Chinese people in the city had been "burning in public of all Japanese goods seized by the Association，，，and insisted that "the penalty of death should be imposed upon any one responsible for the enforcement of the boycott, who is found guilty of receiving bribes. ”266
Although their consul protested the boycotts and other anti-Japanese movements towards the Japanese civilians in the city, such protest may not replied by the national government. The Japanese argued that “no civilized country will permit its people to enforce at their own discretion regulations for the punishment of offenders for the purpose of carrying on an anti-Japanese boycott."267 In fact, the Japanese community in Shanghai became the scapegoat for their military expansionists, and this may show why the Japanese community in Shanghai felt extremely humiliated and became more and more irritated and worried about their situation in the city.
88 Conflicts with Compromises
Although the ordinary Japanese civilians in Shanghai had little chance to enjoy a
deep relationship with residential communities during the early twentieth century, the
Japanese community who mainly lived inside Hongkou district of the International
Settlement still faced with the question that how to get along with their neighbors,
especially during some period with growing tension between different peoples. Such tensions may be aroused by the economic factors, or different status inside the treaty-port system，but in modem Shanghai, especially after the 1920s, the nationalist sentiment had become the moving force of the interaction of the Sino-foreign communities, especially between the Japanese and Chinese communities.
No matter inside the management institution of the International Settlement or within the surroundings of Sino-foreign societies the presence of conflicts could not be avoided. While there were disputes inside the SMC between Japanese representatives and other western and Chinese councilors, the conflicts occurred more often between the Japanese and Chinese communities because of the tension aroused by the anti-Japanese movements kept rising and falling through the end of 1910s to the early
1930s.
Since the Japanese community had less qualified electorate to vote in election of councilors and sit at meeting of ratepayers, they had fewer representatives and enjoyed less voice inside the SMC. Thus, Japanese representatives had been compromised to the authority of the western dominance though they felt extremely disappointed in some certain cases. For example, in 1928，the SMC refused the permission of a lantern procession in this city on November 11，when the Japanese was going to celebrate the coronation of Japanese emperor. While the SMC thought such a procession would be
"an act of discrimination against the Chinese," this decision had caused great disappointment to Japanese.^^^
As to the Sino-Japanese relations in the city, before the mid-1920s, the anti-Japanese tensions hardly made serious conflicts between Japanese and Chinese communities, since they kept quiet and calm under the economic attacks. During the anti-Japanese movement of 1919，for example, the Japanese community hoped that "the
89 agitation if unresisted will die a natural death."^^^ The Japanese consuls in the city tried
their best to pacify their community, while they also demanded the local Chinese
government and the authorities of the foreign settlements to protect the Japanese
citizens in the city and suppress the radical activities towards them. Nevertheless,
atmosphere between the Japanese and Chinese communities deteriorated in the
mid-1920s, though, as analyzed by Hammi Goto-Shibata, both the Japanese diplomats
and their elite class in Shanghai were very optimistic of the anti-Japanese boycott.^^^
The Japanese consuls and other elites often inclined to solve the problem through
diplomatic methods. Before the end of 1920s, diplomatic methods, namely the governmental negotiations, were still effective: Chinese government would suppress the
Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts while Japanese put pressures on them. But this does not mean that the Japanese did not need to make concessions when the Sino-Japanese tension rose. To end the anti-Japanese strikes in 1925, an agreement was made with the
Chinese when the Japanese promised to increase the wages and improve the living condition of the Chinese workers.
However, situation changed when the nationalist began to struggle for the independence from foreign domination. When the focus of Chinese Nationalists' anti-imperial propaganda shifted from Britain in 1927 to Japan in 1928, anti-Japanese boycotts and other movements were applied not only as an economic weapon but also as a part of the so-called "Revolutionary Diplomacy". Such a shift could be felt even as early as 1927 when the North Expedition had driven a large amount of Japanese refugees to Shanghai. Some of the Japanese refugees, as reported by the North China
Herald, had enjoyed such a feeling of the hostility of the Chinese nationalists:
"The attitude of the Chinese towards Japanese, they say is becoming more and more
aggressive and hostile and, if this feeling is not checked in good time, it will be
detrimental to the interests of Japanese residents of China, such interests having
been built by Japanese merchants as a result of some 60 years hand toil."^'^
The interests of Japanese businesses had been regarded as the most important aspect of the Japanese presence in China. However, most of such interests were protected by the
90 extraterritorialities in the treaty ports system. Thus, when an anti-imperialist revolutionary party (Kuomintang) was going to overthrow the foreign privilege in China, the Japanese community gained the feeling that they could no longer make any compromises since the Nationalist regime had touched their bottom line.^^^
Such a feeling could only be intensified after 1928 through the early 1930s when the economic situation became worse. The optimism of Japanese consulate officials and elite class could no longer influence their compatriots. The Japanese press accused such “riots，，towards Japanese were caused by the chicanery Chinese, whose nationalist propaganda invented a story in Jinan which aroused anti-Japanese sentiment, and argued that it was the traditional Chinese chicanery.274 The calling for a stronger stand against the Chinese nationalist movement appeared not only in the ordinary Japanese but also in the elite dass?^
Most of the ordinary Japanese had come to think that their government in home country did not understand the real situation of the anti-Japanese boycott in China since the diplomats was too optimistic to make sufficient efforts to put an end to the boycotts. Thus, the Japanese merchants, no matter the small dealers or the cotton mill owners, just "became very keen on the idea of relying on naval power", and like Harumi Goto-Shibata argued, “the more irritated the Japanese businessmen in Shanghai became over time, the keener they also became regarding this idea."^^^
Thus, when the compromises could no longer guarantee the suppress of the anti-Japanese movement and the revive of the Japanese businesses in the city, the Japanese community just pleaded for an alternative for a diplomatic response to the growing nationalist sentiments among the Chinese, which turned out to be a passive or aggressive response, the military force.
91 CHAPTER SEVEN
SHANGHAI 1932: AN ERA ENDED
In the end of 1931，the Japanese society in Shanghai was faced with the question
that how to put the Chinese anti-Japanese movements to an end, not a contemporary
pause but an ultimate ending. However this time, the diplomats were no longer trusted
by the Japanese merchants and other small dealers in the city，since they seemed to be
unconcerned and unhelpful. They inclined to call on the Japanese military force to provide protection.
As pointed out by Donald A. Jordan:
"The story of the response of Japanese businesses at Shanghai requires an
examination of civilian industrial associations and overseas organization for
Japanese nationals in China — seinendan* youth groups, reservist units, and
Japanese Residents' Associations (JRA) - all of which had links with the Japanese
army/'278
Even though the armed conflict happened in early 1932 was not merely caused by the depression of Japanese community and the activities of their organizations, most of such
Japanese overseas organizations and their behaviors in Shanghai were still closely related with the conflict happened in the early 1932.
When the news of Manchurian Incident spread south, Shanghai became the last base of many Japanese in less well-protected cities of China,^^^ because the Japanese had never quite removed their military forces from the Hongkou district of the
International Settlement and guaranteed the relative security of Shanghai. However, in
1931，an unprecedented level of anxiety grew and spread within the Japanese community when various anti-Japanese organizations were formed in the city and their activities became radical towards the ordinary Japanese. As described by Christian
Henriot, Shanghai's Japanese community deeply affected by the boycott not because of
• Japananese Young Men's Association (青年団,Seinendan)
92 the violence but because of the humiliation they gained. The Chinese not only refused to do business with them but also refused to supply them with the usual services (water, food，coal, etc.) which made their lives difficult. According to the records of Japanese foreign ministry, from the September 19 to the December 31，1931，there were 581 Japanese students and 623 other Japanese nationals had been "attacked" by the Chinese in the city. Some of the “attacks’，as throwing stones and glasses towards them, compelling them to get off the buses and tramcars, spitting in their face, and etc., "hurt" the Japanese nationals psychologically rather than physically.^^^
The anti-Japanese actions hit the Japanese community, especially the Dochakuha Japanese in the city. The representatives of these smaller Japanese merchants and factory owners, who were in extreme difficulties owing to depression and the boycott, called upon the Japanese Consul in the early January of 1932 "to explain the hardships which are facing these people’，. Although the Consul promised to give financial assistance, these small businessmen seemed to need more safety guarantee.^^^
Several Residents' Assemblies (居留民大會，Kyoryumin Taikai) were held
following the Manchurian Incident, during each assembly four to six thousands Japanese civilians from fifteen Chinese cities were gathered. During these gatherings the calling on the Japanese government and military “to provide aid against Chinese efforts to destroy them” appeared more often than ever before. Even though the Kaishaha seemed to have more moderate tone, they were also very insisted that, like the situation in Manchuria, Shanghai should be protected by their military force in the same way. 283 Shigemitsu Mamoru (重光莫)，the contemporary Japanese plenipotentiary in
China, recalled that he was very surprised and worried about such changes in the attitude of the Japanese community in Shanghai - not only the ordinary Japanese folks, even branch managers of big Japanese firms, whose thoughts had always been calm and mature, held the similar unyielding idea of pleading for the help from military force. ^84
When the demands proposed by the Japanese Consul remained rejected by the Nationalist government in Shanghai, the Japanese military force began to take action towards Shanghai. While the landing force and the warships of Japanese navy started to gather in Shanghai, when more Japanese Renins (浪人）came to Shanghai from other
Chinese cities in separate lots, more and more tense confrontation between Japanese and
93 Chinese residents were reported by the local press. Besides the activities as tearing down the anti-Japanese caricature posters and Chinese flags from shop windows, some violence were conducted towards both of the Chinese civilians and Chinese constables of the SMP. The increased presence of Japanese marines in Shanghai and the highly visible Japanese gunboats steaming on the Huangpu River were also reported by the local press, while the disorders caused by Renins, no matter in Hongkou district or in the sector of Chinese Zhabei adjacent to International Settlement, happened more often.
Meanwhile the Japanese community began to "speak loudly" towards the Chinese by showing the possibilities of the outrage of their power in Chinese largest city even in front of the western presence.
The municipal authority of International Settlement began to worry that such tensions between Chinese and Japanese would damage the neutral position of the International Settlement. When the third Japanese Residents' Assembly was held on December 6，1931，the SMP had imposed a contemporary curfew around the meeting place until the Japanese gathering dispersed in order to prevent unnecessary chaos and ，Q A skirmishes. A special meeting was held on November 30，1931 by the SMC, during
which the Chairman of the SMC stated that they would prevented any hostile military
activities inside the International Settlement, while others insisted that the SMC would
preserve the lives and property of all residents of the Settlement, irrespective of the
nationality of such residents.^^^
However, result of growth of Japanese power and desire for colonies like other
great powers plus the increasing dominance of military in Japanese decision-making. In
Shanghai, an armed conflict was expected by the Japanese community in the late 1931;
the only problem was when the expected would occur.
Although Joshua A. Fogel points out that at the time inside the Japanese
community in Shanghai the class tension was heightened between the Kaishaha and the
Dochakuha Japanese,^^^ we may find that the Japanese society, when faced with the
outside pressure, became even more united because of the communal antagonism
between Japanese and Chinese in Shanghai. The continuing agitation aroused by the
Japanese Residents' Assemblies organized by the JRA had also influenced specific
Japanese economic lobbies that had also put pressures on both of the Japanese
Consulate and the Nationalist government in Shanghai. This time, the Japanese Consul,
94 Murai (村井）was faced with a situation difficult to cope with: On the one hand, the
Chinese nationalist government seemed to be unyielding and did not reply to the
Japanese demands proposed by him; On the other hand, the Japanese civilians, no
matter the small dealers or large merchants became more radical and acted under their
own way to plead for the help from military force instead of the diplomatic negotiation
to end the anti-Japanese movements in the city.^^^
When one of the assault towards the Japanese monks aroused serious disturbances in
Shanghai,290 the national spirit of Japanese community was inflamed. Even though the
International Settlement banned Japanese residents, who were in a violate mood, from
processing to the funeral, twenty-third thousand of irate Japanese nationals attended the
temple funeral in Hongkou district of the International Settlement and then the cremation
at a Japanese cemetery in Zhabei.^^' After the Sanyou Towel Mill (三友實業丨社）was
burnt by the Japanese Renins, the Japanese marine commandant threatened to march his
marines through the Settlement and shut down a nationalist newspaper, Minguo Ribao (民
國日幸艮)，who had accused that local Japanese marines colluded in the burning of the
Sanyou Mill.^^^ As recorded by the North China Herald, Sino-Japanese tensions flared following these incidents in Shanghai. Disturbances between Japanese and Chinese could not be avoided:
"In the afternoon about 1000 Japanese met in their club in Boone Road where fiery
and excited speeches were made, expressing indignation over the attacks on the
Japanese priests. A resolution was passed calling upon their Government to dispatch
additional warships and military units to Shanghai for the complete suppression of
all anti-Japanese movements by 'acting within self-protective limits' as the
anti-Japanese agitations had reached their zenith. About half those present they
marched to their consulate-General to present Mr. K. Murai ... On the way,
Hongkew police officers turned out to act as an escort and in Woosung Road the
crowd was swelled considerably. In Range Road, a Japanese made a sudden dive at a
CP.C. but a Japanese constable managed tactfully to restrain him. The crowd turned
from Range Road into North Szechuan Road when a riot commenced. One report
95 stated that it was started by a brick being thrown through a window but the
Japanese report was to the effect that a missile was hurled from an upper storey at
the crowd. At any rate, several bricks were thrown and shop window smashed. The
police did their best to check the crowd and the Reserve Unit was called out."293
When Japanese rubbed shoulders with Chinese on so many levels, the war, broke
out in the predawn hours of January 28，1932. The Japanese forces suddenly attacked
the Zhapei section of Shanghai, advancing from Hongkou district of the International
Settlement. It was officially stated that the Japanese forces, which was of 40,000 men
strong and subsequently increased to about 60,000, had been sent to Shanghai, solely to
protect her nationals that at no time numbered over 20,000 men, women and children.
Widespread fighting, which included aerial bombardment of densely populated areas, devastated Zhabei and surrounding districts. Thousands of refugees poured into the
International Settlement. During the thirty-three-day disaster, 6080 Chinese dead, 2000 wounded, and 10,400 missing; 814,084 persons suffered direct losses, and 80 percent of urban workers lost their jobs; 50 percent of all factories in Zhabei were destroyed largely from aerial bombardment, and 1.2 million Chinese were made refugees.^^"^
During the wartime, some of the Japanese nationals who remained in the city had also attended to assist their armies under the leadership of some Japanese organizations.
The JRA, for example, whose role during wartime was very complicated, took several responsibilities which included the liaison with government and police agencies, making the Japanese position known to the press, providing a temporary postal service, turning some of the dormitories at JRA-mn schools over to military use, mobilizing teachers at those same schools to work in field hospitals, collecting funds to support the various agencies during the crisis, purchasing food and fuel and acquiring vehicles from
Nagasaki and Dalian, providing houses and provisions for refugees, distributing free food, and interpreting for military personnel, and etc.^^^ Besides the fact that most of the Japanese women and children had withdraw before the war, we have no further information related to the Japanese community remained during the disaster. However, from the recordings of SMC and contemporary newspapers, we learn that several groups of Japanese civilians in the city served as irregular force in Hongkou district, most of who got little control from their authority, or we may argue, the Japanese army
96 just did not want to control their activities inside Hongkou district, since they regarded
this area as their own concession.^^^ Even though Hongkou remained a status as only
part of the International Settlement before 1943，it had been turned into a Japanese
dominant “concession” after, or even during the war in 1932.
As to the cause of this war, some historians argues that it was caused by the
diplomatic failure of both Japan and Chinaf? while some other scholar believes that
the Shanghai Incident "derived partly from planned provocation by Kanto army agents
trying to distract attention from continuing troop movements in Manchuria". 二卯 However, the large Japanese economic stake in the Shanghai market certainly helps to
explain the willingness of local Japanese towards the military "protection" in Shanghai.
The words of a contemporary Japanese travel writer Muramatsu Shofu.(村松梢風）may help us better understand their such feelings:
"The Japanese have no intention whatsoever of throwing away fifty years of work
that have gone into the building of 'Shanghai-Japan.' Then Yangtze trade runs
annually to five or six hundred million yen and often more than seven. As
Manchuria is Japan's lifeline, the Yangtze trade is Japan's line of nourishment, and
it will under no circumstances dispense with this. There is no reason to relinquish
such great interests of Shanghai. We cannot let them die before our very eyes. This
is our responsibility both as a state and as a government/'^^^
After the cease-fire, when the Japanese naval landing party was stationed in the barracks in Shanghai's ‘little Japan，，the Japanese community in Shanghai was given a fillip by their military presence in this Chinese largest treaty Meanwhile, the
Japanese community in Shanghai entered a new era.
Before 1932 the Japanese community had been mainly developed based on the center of Consular offices in the city, when this large overseas community in Shanghai was organized through the Japanese Consulate into JRA. They were part of the overseas
Japanese communities in China, and participant of the foreign society in Shanghai. They shared the extraterritorialities with other foreign communities inside the settlement areas.
Their merchants, investors, and other small dealers, like merchants of other foreign
97 nationals, enjoyed the same status in the city and had run their businesses under the treaty ports system. The principles of the so-called informal empires maintained carefully by all these participant powers. However, when Japanese peaceful and economic diplomacy ended and the Chinese nationalist revolution succeeded in the end of 1920s, the environment for the Japanese community (and even other foreign communities) in Shanghai shifted. The war broke out in 1932 marks that such a system was faced with serious challenge: On the one hand, the Chinese nationalists threatened to withdraw the privileges settled by the treaty port system; on the other hand, the Japanese community seemed to be more military and aggressive in its resistance to the Chinese anti-foreign movements and searched for the new way to head out when they were unable to solve their difficulties under the treaty port system. Their answer was violence.
As Mark R. Peattie pointed out, the end of the conflict left the Japanese in a stronger position, not only military but also politically. The growing dominance of Japanese military force in Hongkou part of Settlement made the concession life changed a lot. For Japanese community, they had dominated Hongkou district that "the Council exercised almost no control."^®' The Japanese military presence in Hongkou district became another power center of the Japanese community, which had been turned to be more and more combative after 1932. Hongkou district had finally been turned into a Japanese dominated kingdom when more Chinese were gradually dispatched out of their places in the 1930s. Moreover, the western powers in the city had to be faced with a stronger and aggressive Japanese power since 1932. For modem Shanghai, 1932 was also a watershed. Even though, after 1932, the original treaty port system and the special administrative system inside the International Settlement and the French Concession remained until 1943 when they were taken over by the Japanese military force, Japanese hostility hardly made concession life pleasant to most westerners, especially in the end of 1930s. The position of the foreign enclaves in Shanghai changed, when the characteristics of Japanese community altered in 1932.
98 Conclusion
By the broke out of Shanghai Incident in 1932, the development of the Japanese community in Shanghai had come to another turning point after the signing of the Shimonoseki Treaty.
Before 1932, Japanese community participated in the foreign society in Shanghai based on the extraterritorialities of the treaty ports system. They seemed to be well-established under such a system that the Japanese merchants had put large economic stake in the Shanghai market. Like other main western powers in the city, Japanese main interests in Shanghai were of economically importance rather than political intentions. However, without the Japanese presence in the city, Shanghai would not be able to establish its international importance, especially in East Asia. Moreover, Shanghai could not maintain its unique Chinese cosmopolitanism without their influence. ^^^ Japanese community had its own uniqueness among the foreign communities in Shanghai.
First, the Japanese established an insulated and self-contained community in Hongkou district even without an exclusive Japanese Concession. Even though it became the largest foreign community in the city after the 1910s, there was not an exclusive Japanese Concession in the city. The community initiated and developed by joining the foreign enclaves in the city - the International Settlement in Shanghai, though Hongkou district in the International Settlement, where was nicknamed "Little Japan", became an area contained most of the Japanese populations and facilities. With the large Japanese Consulate, located on the waterfront of the conjunction of the Suzhou Creek and Huangpu River, and other communal facilities set up around, the Japanese shops, apartments, prosperous cotton mills crowded in the streets of Hongkou and districts around, while the Japanese wharves, warehouses strung out along the waterfront of Huangpu. Meanwhile the branches of large Japanese enterprises - banks, navigation corporations and large trading companies - loomed above the nearby Bund downtown. Like other citizens in the city, the Japanese community, treated in this thesis, seemed to have been well adjusted to live in this bifurcated world of China's largest treaty port. Although they had little personal contact with Westerners and Chinese in the
99 city, they were self-contained by their own enterprises, most of which located in Hongkou district.
Secondly, the Japanese community in Shanghai had a closer relation with their government at home than any other foreign communities in the International Settlement. Such a large overseas community in Shanghai was organized through the Japanese Consulate into Japanese Residents' Association (JRA), both of which had close contact with Gaimusho or some other governmental or military power at their homeland. Even though they had representatives in the Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) and admitted that they were part of the foreign society inside the International Settlement, they had enjoyed their own administrative structure created by the Japanese Consulate in the city and their government at home. The JRA, a self-rule entity of the Japanese community, with representatives from the various economic circles and neighborhood street unions, collected taxes from their nationals in order to maintain their communal duties and the management expense. However, inside the Japanese community the stratification seemed to be severer than other foreign communities in Shanghai, especially during the period of great Sino-Japanese tension. British community had similar stratification as the “company，’ and "native" factions inside the Japanese community,yet, inside the British community, we cannot see the similar heightened class tensions inside the
Japanese community. Thirdly, the national tensions seemed to be more combative and vengeful between Japanese community and communities of other nationals in Shanghai, especially with the Chinese communities. Even though they had less contact with western civilians in Shanghai, they were not satisfied with their positions inside the International Settlement. They tried to improve their situation inside the SMC by economic expansion in the city, while they still felt they get little protection from this authority. On the other hand, during the late 1920s to the early 1930s, things were changing even more broadly in Shanghai for the Japanese, whose position was evolving in the face of the triumph of Chinese nationalism. Even though some historians argued that their trading houses, which had concentrated on import-export trades or on servicing that trade (insurance, shipping) were vulnerable under the anti-Japanese boycotts, especially during the boycotts happened during the late 1920s through early 1930s严 the psychological effects of the boycotts were not insignificant in this period of time. The target of the
100 Chinese nationalists was the privileges they gained, but the Japanese felt that the Chinese threat was also towards their property and even their lives. Since ultimately they did not want to give up such privileges, based on which they established their community in the city, they began to rely on the Japanese military to protect them and their economic interests in the city.
In Asia, Shanghai became the center of a network of cities linked together by ship routes for purposes of marketing, transportation, and tourism. While the imprint of British colonialism is clearly discernible, this chain of cities nevertheless formed an international political, economic and cultural space in which not only Britain and France but also Japan played a significant role. However, during the interwar period, when an "enterprising cosmopolitan urban society blossomed",Shanghai had also become the focal point of contact between Japanese and Chinese civilians.
When Japanese aggression had been regarded as the new wave of imperialism by the Chinese, Japanese community was singled out as the target of the Chinese nationalist sentiment in Shanghai. Nationalism, as argued by Lucian Pye, is also "shaped by interactions with other nations as both friend and foe."^®^ Thus, Japanese aggression had also aroused nationalistic passions among Chinese citizens in Shanghai, while the Kuomintang had related such self-consciousness with the national self-esteem. When a high patriotic pitch was aroused after September 18 1931, the Japanese community in Shanghai, a community had close link to their homeland, demanded the help and protection from Japan. Even though most main western powers in Shanghai, especially the Shanghai British, had also disrespected the limits of the concessions, it was Japanese who, for the first time, started a war close to the center of foreign Shanghai, disregarding the neutralism of the foreign society.
It is not groundless (maybe not completely true) to argue that the Japanese community in Shanghai was just doing everything to protect their ‘home，，simply because they believed that it was them who recreated their home abroad in the Hongkou district of Shanghai, they had to protect their own "territory" no matter by what means.
101 Notes:
1 While the Marxist analysis in Communist China termed the political and economic domination of Chinese society through treaty privileges “banzhimin" (semi-colonial), others have described this as 'informal empire' or treaty port imperialism. See Jurgen Osterhammel, "Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth Century China: Toward a Framework of Analysis," in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jurgen Osterhammel, eds.，Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities (London, 1986), pp. 290-314; As to the discussion of the concept of 'informal empire', see Peter Duss, "Introduction: Japan's Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937: An Overview", in Peter Duss, Raymond H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton, 1989), pp. xi-xxix. 2 Nicholas R. Clifford focuses on the 'Westerners' Shanghai’ and provides in-depth look at the community in its own right in his Spoilt children of empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the Chinese revolution of the 1920s (Hanover, 1991). On the various aspects of Western municipal authority in Shanghai, see Kerrie L. MacPherson, A Wilderness of Marshes: the Origins of Public Health in Shanghai. 1843-1893 (Lanham, Md., 2002); Frederic Wakeman, Jr., Policing Shanghai, 1927-1937 (Berkeley, 1995)，and etc. 3 Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937", in Peter Duss, Raymond H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton, 1989), pp. 167-209. 4 Christian Henriot, "'Little Japan' in Shanghai: an insulated community, 1875-1945", in Robert Bickers and Christian Henriot eds., New Frontiers: Imperialism 's New Communities in East Asia, 1842-1953 (Manchester, New York, 2000), pp. 146-69. 5 Joshua A. Fogel, "'Shanghai-Japan': The Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai", in Journal of Asian Studies (Ann Arbor, MI) 59, no.4 (Nov 2000)，pp. 927-950. Besides this work, Fogel compares the two Japanese communities in Shanghai and Harbin. See Joshua A. Fogel, "Integrating into Chinese Society: A Comparison of the Japanese Communities of Shanghai and Harbin", in Sharon A. Minichiello, ed., Japan 's Competing Modernities (Honolulu, 1998)，pp.45-69. 6 Takatsuna Hirofumi, "Seiyojin no Shanhai, Nihonjin no Shanhai" (Westerner's Shanghai, Japanese Shanghai), in Takahashi Kosuke, Furumaya Tadao, eds., Shanhai shi, kyodai toshi no keisei to hitobito no itonami (The History of Shanhai: The Formation of an Immense City and its People's Occupations. Tokyo, 1995), pp. 105-131. Chen Zu'en, "Zaoqi Shanghai Riben juliumin de wenhua huodong" (The early cultural activities of Shanghai Japanese residents), in Dang'an yu Shixue {Archives and History, Shanghai), No. 2 (2001), pp.34-39; Takatsuna Hirofumi and Chen Zu'en, "Shanghai Ribenren juliumin guanxi nianbiao (Mingzhi bian)" (A Chronology of the Japanese Residents in Shanghai, Meiji period), in Shilin {The Forest of History’ Shanghai), 1995, No. 1’ pp.93-99; Ma Changlin and Cao Linhua, "Shanghai Riben juliu mintuan gaishu" (A General Presentation of the Shanghai Japanese Residents' Association), in Dang'an yu Shixue {Archives and
102 History, Shanghai), No. 3 (1990)，pp. 51-55; Other articles in Chinese on this field includes: Xu Jie, "Hongkou Ribenren juzhuqu shulun" (A Presentation on the Japanese Quarter in Hongkou), in Shanghai yanjiu luncong (Collected Essays of research on Shanghai, Shanghai, 1998), No. 10， pp.278-298; Qiao Shuming, "Jinru Shanghai zujie de Ribenren" (Japanese who entered the Shanghai Concession), in Shanghai yanjiu luncong (Collected Essays of research on Shanghai, 1991), No. 3’ pp.43-52. 7 See Wang Yunsheng ed.，Liu shi nian lai Zhongguo yu Riben (China and Japan in the last sixty years, Beijing, 1979). 8 As to the nickname of Hongkou in the history of Shanghai, there were different sayings. The famous ones were "Japanese Concession", "Japanese Streets", "Little Tokyo", and etc. However, the latter two had referred to certain roads and areas in Hongkou district as regarded to some historical recordings, while the so-called "Japanese Concession" was just a misunderstanding of the historical reality. Thus, in this thesis, I borrow the term "little Japan" from Christian Henriot (See note 4). This term simply points out the special status of Japanese presence in Hongkou, and shows the real image of its changing into a Japan town in the early twentieth century Shanghai. 9 At the center of the Chinese city existed the Chenghuang temple (Chenghuangmiao 城陸廟)’ where the city god, Chenghuang (城隍)，was worshiped. The government offices {yamen 衙門)， including the intendant's (daoshu 道署)and the magistrate's (xianya 縣衙)，were located inside it. In addition to the official yamens, there were other kinds of public bodies of social and political significance, such as the traditional educational institutions {shuyiian 書院）and the charitable halls as well. See Leung Yuen-sang, The Shanghai Taotai, Linkage Man in a Changing Society, 1843-90 (Honolulu, 1990), pp. 130-43. 10 See Mark Elvin, "Market town and waterways: the county of Shanghai from 1480 to 1910，” in Mark Elvin, Another History: Essays on China from a European Perspective (Broadway, Australia, 1996)，pp. 101-39. ”Before the boundaries to the foreign settlements were assigned, all the foreign merchants and missionaries had rented houses within the city walls. Even though at that time the population of foreigners was extremely small and there seemed to be no big problem arising when these "barbarians" entered city, the Daotai still inclined to the idea of a foreign settlement which separated from the Native City. See Leung Yuen-sang, The Shanghai Daotai: Linkage Man in a Changing Society. 1843-90, p 48. George Lanning and Samuel Couling, The History of Shanghai (Taipei, 1973), pp.275-77. 12 Since there was no agreement about the site of a foreign settlement in the treaty of Nanjing, nor the national policy of the Qing government for the local officers in Shanghai to follow, the matter had to be arranged between the contemporary Shanghai Daotai, Gong Mujiu (宮慕久)and the first British consul, Captain George Balfour, both of whom signed the Land Regulations of 1845. The regulations had been revised in 1854，1869 and 1898. See Leung Yuen-sang, The Shanghai Daotai:
103 Linkage Man in a Changing Society, 1843-90, pp. 46-49. The boundaries of original British Settlement were north from the place where later became the Peking Road (北京路)，south fromYangkingpan g (洋徑浜)，east by the harbor along Huangpu River, and the west side not determined. The British demanded further extension of their boundary later, and acquired a large piece of territory on the west in 1848. See George Lanning and Samuel Couling, The History of Shanghai, p.277. M Its precursor was the Committee of Roads and Jetties (道^^頭委員會）which was also elected by the foreign Land Renters in British Settlement. They also established Shanghai Municipal Police Force (SMP,上海工部局警務処)，and Shanghai Volunteer Corps (SVC,上海商團）in order to protect the foreign settlements from the wars and disorder. See Robert Bickers, Britain in China: Community Culture and Colonialism, 1900-1949 (Manchester; New York, 1999)，p 124. Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (London, New York [etc.], 1910-18)，Vol. 2, pp. 119-20. 16 According to the Land Regulations, persons qualified to vote in the election of councilors and at meetings of ratepayers were foreigners who (a) owned land of not less than 500 taels in value and paid an annual assessment of not less than 10 taels; or who were (b) householders paying on an assessed rental of not less than 500 taels per annum. See Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31 (Basingstoke, Hampshire, 1995), p. 6; Robert Bickers, Britain in China: Community Culture and Colonialism, 1900-1949, pp. 124-137. 17 Charles B. Maybon et Jean Fredet, Histoire de la Concession Frangaise de Changhai (New York, 1975),pp.251-257. Zheng Zu'an, Bainian Shanghai cheng (A hundred years of Shanghai city, Shanghai, 1999)，pp. 6-8. 19 Philip Y.S. Leung, The Walls and Waters, A Comparative Study of City Culture in Modern China - Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong (Shanghai; Hong Kong, 2002), p. 13. 20 See Liu Jianhui, Gan Huijie trans., Mo du Shanghai: Riben zhi shi ren de "jin dai" ti yan (Shanghai, the devil city: the Japanese intellectual's "modem" experience) (Shanghai, 2003), p. 7. 21 Thomas B. Stephens, Order and Discipline in China: the Shanghai Mixed Court, 1911-27 (Seattle, 1992)，p. 44. 22 Wang Minghui, Yao Zongqiang (eds.)，Hongkou qu zhi (Gazetteer of Hongkou district, Shanghai, 1999)，p.2. 23 Yao Wennan (ed.)，Shanghai xian xu zhi (Continuation of the Shanghai county gazetteer; Taipei, 1970), p. 298. 24 Yu Yue (ed.), Tongzhi Shanghai xian zhi (Gazetteer of Shanghai county of the Tongzhi reign; Taipei, 1975)，p. 134. 25 Li Linsong (ed.), Jiaqing Shanghai xianzhi (Gazetteer of Shanghai county of the Jiaqing reign), c.f. Zheng Zu'an, Bainian Shanghai cheng, p. 33
104 26 These two Chinese characters “洪” and “虹” are of a precise homonym in pronunciation, thus, it is not strange why the name changed from “洪口” to “虹口，，after mid-nineteenth century. Some historians of Shanghai argued that this may also relate to a bridge called "Hong bridge"(虹橋） which was built on the Hongkou creek. See Zheng Zu'an, Bainian Shanghai cheng, p. 34. 27 The combination of the market and the waterway was a typical model in pre-modem Shanghai. The waterways had been the commercial arteries which linked the market towns nearby. See See Mark Elvin, "Market town and waterways: the county of Shanghai from 1480 to 1910". 28 Rosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, Vol. 1，p. 349. 29 The words "Hongkew or The American Settlement at Shanghai" was engraved on the boundary tablets of the American Settlement Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, Vol. III，p. 122. 31 These descriptions were written in the Memorial to emperor by Zeng Guofan (曾國藩）and Ding
Richang (丁日昌）.See Yao Wennan (ed.)，Shanghaixian xuzhi (Continuation of the Shanghai county gazetteer), p. 119. 32 Leung Yuen-sang, The Walls and Waters: A Comparative Study of City Culture in Modem China — Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong, p. 25. 丁he famous companies included “Shanghai Steam Navigation" (American), "China Coast Steam Navigation" (British), "China Navigation" (British) and "China Merchants' Steam Navigation" (Chinese). As to the activities of British and American steamship companies, see Kwang-Ching Liu, Anglo-American Steamship Rivalry in China (Cambridge, 1962). As to other main events, see Zhang Yan (ed.), Shanghai gang zhi (Gazetteer of Shanghai harbor; Shanghai, 2001). 34 See William D. Wray, "Big-Three Service Enterprises", in Peter Dims, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (eds.), The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (Princeton, 1989), pp.31-64. As to the development of Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K., see William D_ Wray, Mitsubishi and The N.Y.K., 1870-1914, Business Strategy in the Japanese Shipping Industry (Cambridge, 1984). 35 George Lanning and Samuel Couling, The History of Shanghai, p. 448. The company also claimed it had received a charter from the Daotai giving it a right to this monopoly for 25 years. The public, however, protested, and denied the authority of the Daotai to grant any such charter. When the company attempted the erection of a new iron bridge in 1871, two poles gave way and the part of the bridge that had been completed sank into the river. 37 Mao Xianglin, Moyulu (The vecordings by the remained ink, Shanghai, 1985)，Juan Eight, "Big Bridge", p. 122. 38 See The Minutes of Shanghai Municipal Council (hereafter TMOSMC, Shanghai, 2001), April 30， 1864. 39 These three bridges were located, respectively, on Broadway Road (Darning Road), Seward Road (Changzhi Road), and Hanburry Road (Hanyang Road). See Xue Liyong, Shanghaitan diming zhanggu (Shanghai place-name anecdotes, Shanghai, 1994)，pp 274-75.
105 4�TMOSMC，Januar 21y , 27, 1864. See North-China Herald (Hereafter NCH), January 16出，1864. 42 The sovereignty of these areas was still unresolved in 1937, even though an agreement was put in sight in 1934. See Hu Xianghan, Shanghai Xiao Zhi (Little gazetteer of Shanghai, Shanghai, 1989), P.6. Christian Henriot, Noel Castelino (trans.), Shanghai 1927-1937: Municipal Power, Locality, and Modernization (Berkeley, 1993)，p. 136 n.l5. See Elizabeth J. Perry, Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor (Stanford, 1993)，p. 19. ^ See Leung Yuen-sang, "Regional rivalry in mid-nineteenth century Shanghai: Cantonese vs. Ningpo men，’’ in Ch 'ing -shih wen-t'i (Calif., 1982)，December 1982 (Vol IV，No. 8), pp. 29-50. And see Biyna Goodman, Native Place, City, and Nation, Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937 (Berkeley, 1995), p. 17. See NCH, April 1865. Xue Liyong, Shanghaitan diming zhanggu, p. 271. 47 "Ever-Victorious Army", also known as "troops with foreign rifles，，(洋槍隊)，was a local army supported by the foreigners who had helped the Qing government save the Shanghai city during the "Taiping rebellion". Zhu Peng, Shanghai shi yange dili (The historical geography of Shanghai, Shanghai, 1989)，p. 280 49 Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, Vol. III’ p. 122. 50 Gail Hershatter, Dangerous Pleasures: Prostitution and Modernity in Twentieth-century Shanghai (Berkeley, 1997)，p. 37 Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937", pl83. 52 Joshua A. Fogel, "'Shanghai-Japan': The Japanese Residents'Association of Shanghai", p.928 “Gail Hershatter, Dangerous pleasures: prostitution and modernity in twentieth-century Shanghai, p. 52. Huang Xiexun, Songnan mengying lu (The record of Shanghai, Shanghai, 192-?) Juan Ti (yi), "Dongyang Chashe". 55 See Xue Liyong, Shanghai jinii shi, p.220. 56 Marius B. Jansen, Japan and China: jrom War to Peace. 1894-1972 (Chicago, 1975)，pp.25-26. 57 Institute of Modem History, Academia Sinica (ed.), Qing ji Zhong Ri Han guan xi shi liao (The historical source of the relations among China, Japan and Korea in Qing dynasty, hereafter QJZRHGXSL, Taipei, 1972), Juan 8，pp. 4879-85. QJZRHGXSL, Juan 8, pp. 4933-35. 59 Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937”，p. 181
60 Xiong Yuezhi, "Riben mouqiu zai Shanghai sheli Rizujie de dang'an" ("The archives related to Japanese efforts to establish their concession in Shanghai"), in Dang'an yu shixue (Archives and history, Shanghai, March, 2001), pp. 75-78.
106 61 Xu Gongsu and Qiu Jinzhang, Shanghai gong gong zujie zhidu, (The system of Shanghai International Settlement, in Shanghai gong gong zu jie shi gao. Manuscript of history of Shanghai International Settlement, Shanghai, 1980)，p.70. 62 Ibid., pp.69-75. 63 Xiong Yuezhi, "Riben mouqiu zai Shanghai sheli Rizujie de dang'an". ^ See "Zongli geguo shiwu yamen qingdang", (The archives of Zongli Yamen) attached to the article of Xiong. 65 "Zongli geguo shiwu yamen qingdang" 66 Xu Gongsu and Qiu Jinzhang, Shanghai gong gong zujie zhidu’ pp.72-76. 67 Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937", p.l83. 68 This piece of archive was a statistics record, conducted by Shanghai Daotai, of the Japanese businessmen who stayed in Shanghai during the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). Based on which the Shanghai Daotai issued "visa" to these so-called "law-abiding Japanese in China" {Anfen yu hua ri ren, “安分寓華日人”).See QJZRHGXSL, Juan 6，pp. 3802-23. 69 Liu Jianhui, Mo du Shanghai: Riben zhi shi ren de "jin dai" ti yan, pp. 32-33. Feng Tianyu, "Qiansuiwan “ Shanghai xing: Riben ren 1862 nian de Zhongguo guan cha, (The Senzaimaru's Voyage to Shanghai: Japanese's view of China in 1862, Beijing, 2001), pp. 235-239. 70 On the voyage of Senzaimaru, see Joshua A. Fogel, "The voyage of the Senzaimaru to Shanghai: early Sino-Japanese contacts in the modem era’’，in Joshua A. Fogel, The Cultural Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations (Armonk, 1994)，pp.79-94; Joshua A. Fogel, "First contacts: the travelers aboard the 'Senzaimaru' and other early accounts", in Joshua A. Fogel, The Literature of Travel in the Japanese Rediscovery of China. 1862-1945 (Stanford, 1996)，pp.43-65; Feng Tianyu, "Qiansuiwan “ Shanghai xing: Riben ren 1862 nian de Zhongguo guan cha; Wang Xiaoqiu, "Mu mo Riben ren zen yang kan Zhongguo: 1862 nian qianzuiwan Shanghai zhi xing yanjiu" ("Japanese View of China in the Bakumatsu Period: A Study of the Voyage of the Senzaimaru to Shanghai in 1862") in Riben Xue (The Japanology, Beijing, January, 1989) pp.140-56. 71 Liu Jianhui, Mo du Shanghai: Riben zhi shi ren de "Jin dai" ti yan, pp. 12-22. 72 Yonezawa Hideo, Shanhai shiwa (History of Shanghai, Tokyo, 1942), pp. 93-94. 73 Takatsuna Hiroftimi, "Seiyojin no Shanhai, Nihonjin no Shanhai", pp. 119-20. 74 The Japanese population approached 1000 in 1894, on the eve of the firstSino-Japanes e War. See Yonezawa Hideo, Shanhai shiwa, p.ll5. Shanghai Kyoryumindan ed., Shanhai Kyoryumindan sanjugonen kinenshi (A commemorative record of thirty-five years of the Shanghai Japanese Residents' Association, Shanghai, 1942), p.75. 76 Uchiyama Kiyoshi, Yamada Shusaku, Hayashi Tazaburo, Dai Shanhai (Greater Shanghai, Shanghai, 1915)，p. 60. 77 QJZRHGXSL, Juan 6, pp. 3800-3801. 78 Ibid., p.3802
107 79 Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937", p. 170. Zou Yiren, Jiu Shanghai renkou bianqian deyanjiu (Shanghai, 1980)，p.145. 81 Even though, with so little materials, I cannot argue that the Japanese population fluctuation in Shanghai through 1910s to 1920s was caused by some certain events, especially those anti-Japanese movements, it would not be very precarious a reasoning that there might have some relations. First, we see some similar shifts in the mid-1930s，some of which were caused by the acute tension between Chinese and Japanese. See Christian Henriot, '"Little Japan' in Shanghai: an insulated community, 1875-1945”，p. 147. Second, the large range of anti-Japanese boycotts happened, "coincidently", in those years when the anti-Japanese campaign caused by the "twenty-one demands" in 1915, and the May Fourth Movement started in 1919. Lastly, unlike those western countries, the distance between Shanghai and Japan was relatively close, which made it more convenient for the Japanese nationals to move back during the "difficult years" of the Japanese community. However, we may need more materials, contemporary statistics and surveys, to support this argument. 82 Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937", p. 169. “Ibid., pp. 169-170. 84 Liu Xuezhao, "Lue lun Shanghai zai jindai Zhong Ri guanxishi zohng de diwei" (A brief account of Shanghai's position in modem Sino-Japanese relations) in Shanghai yanjiu luncong (Collected essays of research into Shanghai, Shanghai, 1991)，Vol. 7 (1991), pp. 86-99. See Joshua A. Fogel, The Literature of Travel in the Japanese Rediscovery of China, 1862-1945. Liu jian... 86 Liu Jianhui, Mo du Shanghai: Riben zhi shi ren de "jin dai" tiyan, pp. 93-97. ”Miyazaki Toten, Sanjitsannen noyume (My Thirty-Three Years' Dream, Tokyo, 1967)，p. 41. 88 Ozawa Masamoto, Zhao Baozhi and Wu Delie trans., Neishan Wanzao Zhuan (The biography of Uchiyama Kanzo, Tianjin, 1983)，p. 27. 89 Hugh Cortazzi, The Japanese Achievement (London, New York, 1990), p. 223. 90 Gaimusho ed.’ Nihon gaiko bmsho (Japanese diplomatic documents, Tokyo, 1955-63)，Vol. 3，pp. 207-208. 91 Yonezawa Hideo, Shanhai shiwa, pp. 92. 92 Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937", p. 171. Liu Jianhui, Mo du Shanghai: Riben zhi shi ren de "jin dai" tiyan, pp. 23-35. Yonezawa Hideo, Shanhai shiwa, pp. 122-124. 95 Ibid., p. 186. 96 These six prefectures ranked first to sixth as the source of Japanese population in the city: Nagasaki (61), Osaka (37), Kumamoto (13)，Kanagawa (12)，Hyogo (11)，and Tokyo (10). Before the official diplomatic relations with China was established in 1871，Japanese government set up an organization, called "Kaidensha"(開店社)，in British Settlement, where three Japanese
108 officers were assigned to regulate commercial activities and manage the Japanese residents in Shanghai. 98 Xue Liyong, Shanghai tan diming zhanggu, p.376. 99 Takatsuna Hiroftimi and Chen Zu'en eds., Riben qiao min zai Shanghai, 1870-1945 (The overseas Japanese in Shanghai, Shanghai: 2000)，p. 87’ map. H. B. Morse, The International Relations, Vol. 1，p. 303. 1 � Barbara J. Brooks, Japan 's Imperial Diplomacy, Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895-1938 (Honolulu, 2000)，p. 82. …2 Stanley Lane-Poole, The Life of Sir Harry Parkes, in Collected Works of Frederick Victor Dickins, Vol. 4 (Bristol, Tokyo, 1999), p.69. 103 Christian Henriot’ “，Little Japan' in Shanghai: an insulated community, 1875-1945", p. 157. See Kobun roku, "Zai Shinkoku Shanhai shodokai he shokyo hokoku no tame me hoshukin kabu" (Vol. 101，June, 1885)，Digital Archives retrieved from "National Archives of Japan” (Hereafter NAJ), Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR), URL: http://www.iacar.go.ip/media/d2/a0355600/kou55600/1190/index.divu： and Matsui Kiyoshi, Kindai Nihon Bdekishi (The history of trade in modem Japan, Tokyo, 1959-)，Vol. 2，p. 148. It is recorded that there was only one-million-dollar Japanese investment in Shanghai in 1902, while the British investment was 260 million dollars. However before 1900，the Japanese investment in Shanghai had been even smaller. See Zhang Xiaomei, Riben dui hu tou zi (Japanese investment in Shanghai, Shanghai, 1937), pp. 1-2. …6 See Kobun roku, "Meiji juroku nen daikyugo fukoku shinkoku kyu chosen zairyu Nihonjin torishimari kisoku daiichijo kaisen" (Vol. 11, July-September, 1885)，retrieved from NAJ, URL: httD://www.iacar.go.ip/media/d2/a0353700/kou53900/0028/index.divu. 107 Cao Linhua and Ma Changlin, "Shanghai Riben juliumintuan gaishu". 108 Shimatzu Chojiro ed., Shanhai Annai (The Shanghai Guidebook. Hereafter SA, Shanghai, 1924), pp.2-12. 109 See Kobun Roku, "Shinkoku Shanhai Zaikin Junsa Zoyin kyu Hiyo Shishutsu no Ken" (Vol. 12’ October-November, 1885)， retrieved from NAJ, URL: httD://www.iacar.go.ip/media/d2/a0353901/kou53901/0365/index.divu; and see Chen Zu'en, "Toyo Chakan" ("The Japanese teahouses", in his column "Shanhai ni yi ta Nihonjin" [Japanese in Shanghai], in Shanghai Walker, Shanghai, March 2001), retrieved from URL: httD://www.shwalker.com/iapanese/database/timei/iapanese03.htm. "0 For example, the Shanghai consul had also negotiated with Qing government for exchanging some of their nationals who had committed light crimes in Shanghai. See Daish5 Ruiten, "Shanhai Ryoji ri Zairyumin Keizai wa Shokuzai Osamushoku ni Ikue Shobun Sum o Moto su" (Vol. 2， 1871-1877), retrieved from NAJ, URL: http://www.iacar.go.iD/nieclia/d2/a01 Q34Q0/dai03600/0944/index.divu 1" Barbara J. Brooks, Japan's Imperial Diplomacy. Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China,
109 1895-1938, p. 100. Marius B. Jansen, Japan and China, from War to Peace, 1894-1972, pp.54-55. Ibid. p. 72. Barbara J. Brooks, Japan's Imperial Diplomacy, Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895-1938，p.lOl. 115 Kimura Kenji, "Zaigai kyoryumin no shakai katsudo," (The Social Activities of Japanese Residents Abroad) in Oe Shinobu et al.，eds., Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi vol.5: Bdchd sum teikoku no jinryu (Modem Japanese Colonies, Vol. 5: The Flow of People under an Expanding Empire, Tokyo, 1993), pp. 38-39. 116 Ibid., p.37. GoshomeiGenbon, "Horitsu Dai Yonjuichi Go, Koryu Mindan Ho" (1885)，retrieved from NAJ, URL: http://www.iacar.go.ip/media/d3/al401900/gos02000/0259/index.divu Barbara Brooks, Japan's Imperial Diplomacy, Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895-1938, p. 237 n.73. "19 Yonezawa Hideo, Shanhai Shiwa’ p. 196. Shanhai Shinpo, January 2,1891. 121 Ibid. Jan 1891. 122 Ibid. Feb, 27^ 1891. Yonezawa Hideo, Shanhai Shiwa, p. 199. 124 Zai Gaikoku Shukai ni Seki sum Zassan, "Shanhai Nihonjin Kyokai ni Seki sum Ken Hokoku", retrieved from NAJ, URL: httD://www.jacar.go.jp/media/d5/b 10042/1 -0305/00000216/index.divu: and see Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan, Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan Sanjugo shunen Kinenshi (Commemorative chronicle on the 35仇 anniversary of the Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai, Shanghai, 1942), pp. 107-12，933-34; Cao Linhua and Ma Changlin, "Shanghai Riben juliumintuan gaishu", p.52; Joshua A. Fogel, "'Shanghai-Japan': The Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai", p. 929. 125 Cao Linhua and Ma Changlin, "Shanghai Riben juliumintuan gaishu", p.53. 126 Kyoryu Mindan Hd Shikdkisoku Sankosho, "Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan Shiko Saisoku" (January 1925)，retrieve from NAJ,
URL: http://www.iacar.go.ii3/media/d2/bt0003/t-0014/00000035/index.divu. 127 The two who had received the highest number of votes would become the Chairman and Vice-chairman of the Residents' Council. If the numbers of the votes to these two persons were the same, the elder one would be the Chairman. If they were of the same age, the Chairman would be decided by lot drawing. Ibid., "Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan Shiko Saisoku". 128 As to Japanese large companies in modem China, see William D. Wray, Mitsubishi and the N.Y.K.. 1870-1914: Business Strategy in the Japanese Shipping Industry; Du Xuncheng, Riben zai jiu Zhongguo de touzi (Japanese investment in Modem China, Shanghai, 1986); As to the Japanese investment in Shanghai, see Zhang Xiaomei, Riben dui hu tou zi (Japanese investment in Shanghai,
110 Shanghai, 1937). 129 Joshua A. Fogel, "'Shanghai-Japan': The Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai", p. 930. Barbara J. Brooks, Japan's Imperial Diplomacy, Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895-1938, p.102. � Higashi Honganji Temple in Shanghai, which was founded by Ogurisu Kocho (小栗栖香頂）in 1874，was an outpost of the "eastern headquarters" of the Pure Land Buddhist sect. See Shibata Mikio, "Shanhai Nihonjin Kyoryumen to Bukyo" (The Japanese residents in Shanghai and Buddhism), in Nihon Shanhaishi Kenkyukai ed., Shanhai: Zyimu Sum Netto Waku (Shanghai: the multilayer of network, Tokyo, 2000)，pp.403-404 132 Shibata Mikio, "Shanhai Nihonjin Kyoryumen to Bukyo", p. 404-406. Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan, Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan Ritsu Gakkd Ichiran (The Japanese schools run by the Shanghai Japanese Residents' Association, Shanghai, 1936), pp. 1-2. Wu Jianxi, "Riben juliu mintuan he Shanghai Riqiao zidi xuexiao" (The Japanese Residents' Association and the Japanese schools in Shanghai), in Shilin {Historic review, Shanghai, no. 4，1994)，pp. 51-59. Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan, Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan Ritsu Gakkd Ichiran, pp. 2-3. Wu Jianxi, "Riben juliu mintuan he Shanghai Riqiao zidi xuexiao", p. 52. Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan, Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan Ritsu Gakkd Ichiran, pp. 3-5. Wu Jianxi, "Riben juliu mintuan he Shanghai Riqiao zidi xuexiao，，，pp. 53-54. 136 Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan, Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan Ritsu Gakkd Ichiran, p. 1’ 3. Uchiyama Kiyoshi, Yamada Shusaku, Hayashi Tazaburo, Dai Shanhai’ p. 290. 137 Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan, Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan Ritsu Gakkd Ichiran, p. 30-39. Wu Jianxi, "Riben juliu mintuan he Shanghai Riqiao zidi xuexiao", p.59. 139 See The Minutes of Shanghai Municipal Council, Oct, 28,1925. 140 NCH, July 2; September 2; and November 11，1854. � Uchiyama Kiyoshi, Yamada Shusaku, Hayashi Tazaburo, Dai Shanhai, p. 621. 142 Ibid., p.622. � Joshua A. Fogel, "'Shanghai-Japan': The Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai", p. 930. 1 料 Cao Linhua and Ma Changlin, "Shanghai Riben juliumintuan gaishu", p.54. Uchiyama Kiyoshi, Yamada Shusaku, Hayashi Tazaburo, Dai Shanhai, p. 99，204. 146 Cao Linhua and Ma Changlin, "Shanghai Riben juliumintuan gaishu”，p.54. 147 Uchiyama Kiyoshi, Yamada Shusaku, Hayashi Tazaburo, Dai Shanhai, p. 99; TMOSMC, March 18，1931. Shibata Mikio, "Shanhai Nihonjin Kyoryumen to Bukyo", p. 406-407. 149 Uchiyama Kiyoshi, Yamada Shusaku, Hayashi Tazaburo, Dai Shanhai, p. 118-121. 150，"Shanhai Hojin Eigyobetsu"(“上海邦人營業別’，，"The Directory of Japanese Businesses in
Shanghai"), in Shimatzu ed., Shanhai annai (The Shanghai Guidebook, Shanghai, 1924), pp. 1-2. Shibata Mikio, "Shanhai Nihonjin Kyoryumen to Bukyo", p. 406-407.
Ill 152 Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan, Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan Ritsu Gakkd Ichiran, p. 107-12. NCH, April 23. 1927. 154 In 1927, when a petition was summit to the SMC by the JRA, Funatsu, the Japanese member in the SMC introduced that "the Association from whom the petition has been received is a responsible organization, its opinion being representative of the Japanese community." TMOSMC, November 16， 1927. Takatsuna Hirofumi, "Seiyojin no Shanhai, Nihonjin no Shanhai", pp. 123-25. 156 Ibid., p. 124; Joshua A. Fogel, “，Shanghai-Japan，： The Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai", p.932. 157 See Chen Enfu ed., Shanghai Xiaofei Shichang Fazhan Shilue (A brief history of the development of Shanghai consumer market, Shanghai, 1996)，p.70. 158 North China Herald, April 10，1926. 159 See Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31, pp.7-8. Joshua A. Fogel, "'Shanghai-Japan': The Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai", p. 933, 160 Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31, p.7. 161 Takatsuna Hirofumi, "Seiyojin no Shanhai, Nihonjin no Shanhai", pp. 124. 162 Ishii Itaro, Gaikdkan no isshd (The life as a diplomat, Tokyo, 1986)，pp. 228, 235. Takatsuna Hirofumi, "Seiyojin no Shanhai, Nihonjin no Shanhai", pp. 124; Joshua A. Fogel, "'Shanghai-Japan': The Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai", pp.932-933. Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai. 1925-31, p.7. Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan, Kawabata Teiji Shi Den (The biography of Kawabata Teiji, Shanghai, 1933),pp.9-14. 166 Shanhai Shupd (Shanghai weekly), March 18，1929，"Special issue of the Residents' Council". 167 Joshua A. Fogel, "'Shanghai-Japan': The Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai", p.933. 168 Takatsuna Hirofumi, "Seiyojin no Shanhai, Nihonjin no Shanhai", p. 120. 169 Yonezawa Hideo, Shanhai Shiwa, p.85-90. 170 Ibid.，p.80-84. 171 Toa Kenkyjo daiichi chosa iinkai hen, Nihon no taishi toshi, Daiichi Chdsa linked hdkokusho (Japanese investment in China: the report of the first investigation committee, Tokyo, 1974), p. 377. Du Xuncheng, Riben zaijiu Zhongguo de touzi, p. 371. 172 Toa Kenkyjo daiichi chosa iinkai hen, Nihon no taishi toshi, Daiichi Chdsa Iinkai hdkokusho, P.379. 173 Takamura Naosuke, Nihon shi hon shugi shiron (The Historical essays on the Japanese Capitalism, Kyoto, 1980), p. 113. 174 Chen Enfii ed., Shanghai Xiaofei Shichang Fazhan Shilue, p.72. 口5 TsQsho Sangyosho ed” Shoko sesaku shi (The history of commercial and industrial policies, Tokyo, 1961-1985), vol. 4，pp. 30-1. 176 Chen Enfii ed., Shanghai Xiaofei Shichang Fazhan Shilue, p.72-3.
112 � ”Christian Henriot, '"Little Japan' in Shanghai: an insulated community, 1875-1945”，pp. 146-7. 178 Lucian W. Pye argues that "the myth of the treaty ports as purely foreign settlements as late as the 1920s and 1930s was inspired by political propaganda". See Lucian W. Pye, "How China's Nationalism was Shanghaied", in Jonathan Unger ed, Chinese nationalism (Armonk, 1996)，p.96. 179 Xue Liyong, Shanghai di ming zhanggu, p. 375. 哪 Toa Dobun Shoin was established by Toa Dobun Kai which advocated the idea of Great Asia and of friendship among countries in Asia. It was firstestablishe d in Nanking in 1900 and a year later moved to Shanghai. 181 Koyukai ed.，Toa Dobun Shoin daikaku shi (The history of Toa Dobun Shoin, Tokyo, 1982), p. 552. 182 Ibid. pp. 552-3. 183 Yonezawa Hideo, Shanhai Shiwa’ pp. 207-8. 184 Takatsuna Hiroftimi, "Seiyojin no Shanhai, Nihonjin no Shanhai", p. 121. Uchiyama Kanzo, Chugoku Yonjunen (Forty years in China, Tokyo, 1949), pp. 146-54. 186 "Shanhai Hojin Eigyobetsu"(“上海邦人營業別”，"The Directory of Japanese Businesses in
Shanghai"), in Shimatzu ed., Shanhai annai (The Shanghai Guidebook, Shanghai, 1924), pp. 1-39. 187 Uchiyama Kiyoshi, Yamada Shusaku, Hayashi Tazaburo kyocho, Dai Shanhai, p. 130. 188 Xue Liyong, Shanghai di ming zhang gu, p. 377.
189 Christian Henriot, "'Little Japan' in Shanghai: an insulated community, 1875-1945’’’ pp. 146-7. 190 Uchiyama Kiyoshi, Yamada Shusaku, Hayashi Tazaburo kyocho, Dai Shanhai, p. 299. See, TMOSMC, June 17,1931. 192 Ding Jingtang (oral narrator), Zhu Shoufen (intepretor), “Bashi huiyi" (Memoirs in Eighty, in Shilin, Shanghai, 2001, Vol. 1), p. 33. 193 Christian Henriot, Shanghai, 1927-1937. Municipal Power. Locality, and Modernization, p.68. Matsui Kiyoshi, Kindai Nihon bdekishi，p.311, 320. 195 Long time discussion had been conducted by different groups of people and the main dispute was whether Nagasaki or Mojiko (門司）would be a better starting point of this new navigation route. See Fukuoka Nichinichi Shimbun, October 14-18，1919; Osaka Asahi Shimbun, Januaryl4, 1920, retrieved from Shinbun Kishi Bunko {Newspaper Article in digital version, hereafter SKB), Kobe University, URL: httD://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.iD/sinbun/search.htnil. 196 Takatsuna Hiroftimi, "Seiyojin no Shanhai, Nihonjin no Shanhai", p. 125. 197 Ibid. p. 120. 刚 Joshua A. Fogel, "Integrating into Chinese Society: A Comparison of the Japanese Community of Shanghai and Harbin", p.49. 199 Robert Bickers, Empire Made me: an Englishman Adrift in Shanghai (Allen Lane, 2004), p.53. 200 TMOSMC, July 28，1915; August 4，1915; September 8，1915; October 27，1915; November 3’
113 1915. 201 Robert Bickers, Britain in China, p. 156. 202 Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan, Shanhai jihenshi (The history of Shanghai incident, Shanghai, 1933)， p.503. Robert Bickers, Empire Made me: an Englishman Adrift in Shanghai, p.308. 203 See NCH, July 27, 1918. Ibid., July 27, 1918. 205 SMC, Annual Report 1918，58a-89a; Annual Report 1919，93a-95a. 206 NCH, August 14,1920. 207 TMOSMC, February 1，1928. 208 Ibid., January 11, 1928. Ibid., October 17, 1928. NCH, December, 22,1928. 211 TMOSMC, October 17,1928. For example, the JRA financially supported the Japanese nurses who worked in the International services. Ibid., March 18, 1931. 213 Ibid., September 12, 1928. 214 NCH, September 22,1931. 215 Letter ‘A’ referred to the foreign municipal employees, while the Letter 'L' referred to the local municipal employees. 216 TMOSMC, November 25,1931. 217 See Robert Bickers, Empire Made Me: An Englishman Adrift in Shanghai, p.308. 218 Hanimi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31, pp.7-8. 219 TMOSMC, November 16, 1927. 220 Ibid., November 16，1927. 221 Ibid., November 30，1927. 222 Ajiakyoku Chosho, Chukaminkoku yohei honhonin jinmeiroku (furoku) Shanhai kydddsokai kohukyokuyohei honhonin jinmeiroku, (Ajiakyoku Chosho, Daisan ShQ no roku, 1931) Retrieved from httD://www.iacar.go.ip/media/d2/bt0002/t-QQll/00000263/index.divu Ajiakyoku Chosho, Chukaminkoku yohei honhdnin jinmeiroku (furoku) Shanhai kydddsokai kdbukyoku ydhei honhdnin jinmeiroku, (Ajiakyoku Chosho, Daisan Sokan no Shichi, 1932) Retrieved from httD://vmw.iacar.go.ip/media/d2/bt0002/t-0011/00000365/index.divu 223 As to the study of Chinese boycotts in modem time, see Charles Frederick Remer, A Study of Chinese Boycotts (Taipei, 1966); Kikuchi Takaharu, CMgoku minzoku undd no kihon kozo: taigai boikotto no kenkyu (The basic structure of Chinese nationalist movement: a study of anti-foreign boycotts, Tokyo, 1966); Donald A. Jordan, Chinese Boycotts versus Japanese Bombs: the Failure of China's "Revolutionary Diplomacy," 1931-32 (Ann Arbor, 1991); Guanhua Wang, In Search of Justice: the 1905-1906 Chinese Anti-American Boycott (Cambridge, 2001). 224 According to Remer，s study, up to 1931, Japan had become the target of the Chinese boycotts in
114 1908, 1909，1915，1919-1921, 1923，1925，1927，1928-1929, 1931. See Charles Frederick Remer, A Study of Chinese Boycotts. NCH, February 20; March 27,1915. 226 Charles Frederick Remer, A Study of Chinese Boycotts, pp. 53-54. 227 Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, April 13，1915. Retrieved from SKB. 228 Yokohama Bdeki Shinbo, June 8’ 1915. Retrieved fromSKB. . 229 Osaka Asahi Shinbun, March 29，1915. Retrieved from SKB. 230 Yokohama Bdeki Shinbd, June 8，1915; Jiji Shinbo, June 27-28，1915. Retrieved from SKB. Ozawa Masamoto, Neishan Wanzao Zhuan，p. 60. 232 Ibid.，May 17，1919. Charles Frederick Remer, A Study of Chinese Boycotts, pp.55-63.
NCH, May 17，1919. 235 Ibid., May 17, 24,1919. 236 Ibid., May 24, 1919. 237 Ibid., August 9,1919. Yomiuri Shinbun, August 12,1919. Retrieved from SKB. 238 Ibid., May 24，31, 1919; SB, June 6，1919. 239 Hochi Shinbun, July 31’ 1919. Retrieved from SKB. See William D. Wray, "Japan's Big-Three Service Enterprises in China, 1896-1936”，p. 52. 240 -pj^g resolutions were strict and even more specific than any boycott resolutions created before. They demanded that “1) Chinese people be persuaded never again to use Japanese goods and that Chinese merchants be asked never again import or sell such goods; 2) the Chinese Maritime Customs be requested not to accept or pass Japanese goods 3) Chinese workers in Japanese employ, in factories, mills, shops. Steamers, houses, etc. be persuaded to call a general strike 4) Chinese stock exchanges be requested to sever economic relations with Japanese factories, etc. 5) Chinese people be requested not to use or circulate Japanese banknotes, travel in Japanese steamers, or deposit money in Japanese banks; 6) Chinese compradors working for Japanese steamers, firms, shops, etc. be requested to leave their position immediately 7) Chinese newspapers be requested not to accept Japanese advertisements or advertise Japanese business, 8) no raw goods be exported to Japan 9) Chinese people should be notified that they must have nothing to do with Japan, either diplomatically or economically." And etc. These resolutions became main heading for the later boycotts during which they were strictly practiced, though some of these rules had not been persisted. See NCH, June 18’ 1927. 241 NCH’ April 23’ 1927. 242 Charles Frederick Remer, A Study of Chinese Boycotts, pp. 147-49. 243 Ibid., pp. 128-29. Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 7925-5/, pp. 94-95. 2灿 Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31, pp. 83-5. 245 Charles Frederick Remer, A Study of Chinese Boycotts, p. 138. 246 NCH, August 4，1928. Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31，p. 96.
115 247 NCH，November 3，1928. 248 NCH, August 18,1928. 249 Several principles were proposed to regulate the movement: 1) the immediate cancellation of all orders for Japanese goods; 2) no shipment of Japanese goods; 3) the refusal to deliver Japanese goods; and 4) the immediate registration of all Japanese goods on hand. See NCH, 14,21 July, 1931; Shanhai Nichi Nichi Shinbun (hereafter, SNNS), July 18’ 1931. Charles Frederick Remer, A Study of Chinese Boycotts, p. 157. 250 SB, October 1, 1931. 251 NCH, July 21, 1931; SNNS, July 25, 1931. 252 Manshujiben: Hainichi haika kankei, "Shanhai ni okeru hainichi undo 3" (Manshujihen: Hainichi haika kankei, Dai Jusan maki). Retrieved from: http://www.iacar.gQ.iD/media/d3/ba0014a/a-0124/00000421/index, djvu SNNS, July 25, 27, 29, 30, 31,1931. 254 As to the strikes happened in modem Shanghai, see Elizabeth J. Perry, Shanghai on Strike: The
Politics of Chinese Labor. 255 Joshua A. Fogel, "'Shanghai-Japan': The Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai," p. 932. 256 Ibid, p.933. 257 NCH, March 27’ 29, April 3, 1915.
258 ji^id，March 29,1915. Uchiyama Kiyoshi; Yamada Shusaku; Hayashi Tazaburo, Dai Shanhai, pp.
80-82. 259 NCH, March 29, 1915. 260 Ibid., July 26,1919. 261 SB, June 6, 1919. 262 NCH, Junel9, 1919. 263 Ibid., March 28, 1915. 2M Ibid., June 12，17,1919; NCH, July 26,1919. 265 Osaka Asahi Shinbun, June 3-6,1925. Retrieved fromSKB . 266 NCH, July 21,1931. 267 Ibid., July 21. 1928. 268 See TMSMC, October 17，1928; NCH, October 27，1928. 269 NCH. May 31, 1919. 270 For example, one of their officials in Shanghai, Kato Hiyoshi, just anticipated the boycott of 1928 would not last too long by summarizing the similarities of all the former anti-Japanese movements. He argued that the boycotts usually took one month from the declaration of an anti-foreign boycott until the occurrence of the actual boycott, and the boycott itself usually lasted for two or three months. Thus, the anti-Japanese boycott in 1928 should be over in August or September. Furthermore, before and after the boycott, transactions usually increased dramatically, compensating for losses during the inactive period, since most of the Japanese goods were
116 necessities of life, which were difficult to do without. Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31, pp. 85-6. 271 Ibid., p. 27. 272 NCH, April 23, 1927. 273 As to the anti-imperialism characteristic of Kuomintang, see Parks M. Coble, Jr., The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist Government, 1927-1937 (Cambridge, 1980), p. 4. 274 Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, May 15-27，1928. Retrieved from SKB. 275 Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31, pp. 86-7. 276 As to their roles as magistrates, some Consuls witnessed firsthand the results of anti-Japanese movements in Shanghai and other Chinese treaty ports. They had consistently sought to placate the irate local Japanese community in order to reduce growing tensions. However, their role as pacifier of aroused national feelings met the difficulty of satisfying Japanese and Chinese sides of any dispute, which also left consuls vulnerable to domestic charges that they did not adequately protect Japanese national in China. See Barbara J. Brooks, Japan 's Imperial Diplomacy. Consuls. Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895-1938, p.83, p.90. 277 Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31,^.^1. 278 Donald A. Jordan, Chinese Boycotts versus Japanese Bombs, p. 4. 279 See SB, October 13’ 1931，January 21’ 27，28，29,1932. 280 Christian Henriot, Shanghai 1927-1937: Municipal Power, Locality, and Modernization, p. 68. 281 Manshajiben: Hainichi haika kankei, "Shanhai ni okeru hainichi undo 3" (Dai Jusai maki).
Retrieved from: http://www.iacar.go-}p/media/d3/baOO 14a/a-0124/00000421 /index.djvu 282 NCH,Januarys, 1932.
283 Joshua A. Fogel, “’Shanghai-Japan’： The Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai", pp.
934-5. 284 shigemitsu Mamoru, Shigemitsu Mamoru Gaikd Kaisdroku (The memoir of Shigemitsu Mamoru's diplomatic career, Tokyo, 1953), pp. 111-2. 285 See NCH, August 18，25’ 1931; SB, October 18’ 21，22,23,1931. 286 SB，December 7’ 1931. 287 TMOSMC, November 30, 1931. 288 Joshua A. Fogel, "'Shanghai-Japan': The Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai," p. 935. 289 Donald A. Jordan, Chinese Boycotts versus Japanese Bombs, pp. 280-81. SB, January 24,1931.
290 NCH, January 19, 1932. 291 Donald A. Jordan, Chinese Boycotts versus Japanese Bombs, p. 303. 292 Donald A. Jordan, China's Trial by Fire: the Shanghai War of 1932 (Ann Arbor, 2001)，p.l3. 293 NCH, January 26, 1932. 294 As to the process of the war in 1932，see Wong Chi-yuen and T'ang Leang-Li, eds.. The Japanese
117 Invasion and China's Defence: A Symposium (Shanghai, 1932); Donald A. Jordan, China's Trial by Fire: the Shanghai War of1932. 295 Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan, Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan Sanjugo shunen Kinenshi, pp.552-57. 296 As to the situation of Hongkou and other part of the International Settlement during the wartime, see TMOSMC, special meetings, January 28，February 1-7，1932. And Wong Chi-yuen and T'ang Leang-Li, eds., The Japanese Invasion and China's Defence: A Symposium. 297 Ibid., pp. 331-41. 298 Barbara J. Brooks, Japan's Imperial Diplomacy, Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895-1938, p. 148. 299 Muramatsu Shofti, Mato (Demon Capital), cited fromJoshu a A. Fogel, "'Shanghai-Japan': The Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai," p. 931. 300 Robert Bickers, Britain in China: Community Culture and Colonialism, 1900-1949’ p. 154. 训 Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937，" p.208. 302 See Leo Ou-fan Lee, Shanghai modern: the flowering of a new urban culture in China, 1930-1945 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999)，pp. 307-23. 303 Robert Bickers, Britain in China: Community Culture and Colonialism, 1900-1949, p. 70. Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937，’，pp. 203-9. 305 Marie-Claire Bergere, "'The Other China': Shanghai from 1919 to 1949”，in Christopher Howe ed., Shanghai, Revolution and Development in an Asian Metropolis (Cambridge; New York, 1981), p. 13. 306 Lucian W. Pye, "How China's Nationalism was Shanghaied", p. 110.
118 Glossary
Akamon kurabu 赤門俱樂部 Haining Road 海寧路
Akutagawa Ryunosuke 芥川龍之介 Hankou 漢口
Bakumatsu 幕末 Hibymn 避病院
Banzujie 半租界 Higashi Honganji Temple 東本願寺
Baoshan district 寳山區 Hongkou 虹口，洪口
Beichuanhong 北川洪 Hongkou gang 虹口港
Bei Sichuan lu 北四川路 Hongkou shi 虹口市
Biji 筆記 Huajie 華界
Boshokuha 妨織派 Huangpu district 黃浦區
Chenghuangmiao 城隍廟 Huangpu River 黃浦江
Chokuyu shosha 直輸商社 Huating 華亭
Chonaikai 町内會 IshiiAkira 石井徹
Dai Nihon engyo Company 大日本塩 Hirobumi 伊籐博文
業公司 ItoYonejiro 伊東米治郎
Dai Shanhai 大上海 Iwasaki Gofuku Shop 岩崎吳服店
Daoguang 道光 Jiangwan 江灣
Daoshu 道署 Jiaqing 嘉慶 Daotai道台 Jikeidan自警圑
Denglai 登萊 Jiujiang 舊江
DingRichang 丁日昌 Kaid5 School 開導學校
Dochakuha 土著派 Kaishaha 會社派
Dongyang Chashe 東洋茶社 Kawabata Teiji 河端貞次
Tonwakan 東和館 KishidaGink5 岸田吟香
Fukushima 福島 KonbuKaisha 昆布會社
Giyutai 義勇隊 KokusakuKigyS 國策企業
Gongli Wenping 公立文憑 K郎yS Firm 廣業洋行
Gong Mujiu 宮慕久 Kyorya mindan hS 居留民團法
Guangdong bang 廣東S Kyoryu min kai 居留民會
119 li 裏 Nihon Menka 日本綿花
Lihongkou 裏虹口 Nihon YUsen Kaisha 日本郵船會社
Lihongqiao 裏虹橋 Nisshin Kisen 日清汽船
Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 Oguri Sukocho 小栗棲香頂
Liaodong Bandao 遼東半島 Peking Road 北京路
Lin Gui 麟桂 Penghu Qundao 激湖群島
Lushun 旅順 Pudong 浦東
Lu Xun 魯迅 Qiujiang 叫江
Maloo 馬路 Rakuzendo 樂善堂
Matsumoto Honten 松本本店 R5nins 浪人
Matsuba 松葉 Senzaimaru 千歲九
Mitake 三竹 Seinendan 青年団
Mitsubishi Kaisha 三菱會社 Shahong 沙洪
Mitsui Bussan 三井物產 Shanghaixian 上海縣
Miyazaki Toten 宮崎滔天 Shanhai Annai 上海案內
Murai 村井 Shanhai Hojin Eigyobetsu 上海邦人
Nagasaki ken, Shanhai shi 營業別
長丨椅県-上海市 Shanhai Nihonjin Chonaikai Rengoka
Nagataki Hisakichi 永灘久吉 上海日本人町內會聯合會
Nanshi 南市 Shanhai Shodokai上海商同會
Nihonjin Kyokai 日本人協會 Shigemitsu Mamoru 重光葵
Nihondo Book Store 曰本堂書店 Shinagawa Tadamichi 品JI 丨忠道
120 Shichoson 市町村 Wusong Road 吳淞路
Shinai sha 親愛舍 Wusong River 吳淞江
Shuyuan 書院 Xiamen 廈門
Suzhou Creek 蘇州河 Xiancheng 縣城
Suzuki Shigetaka 鈴木重孝 Xianya 縣衙
Tamai 田每 Xinhongkou 新虹口
Tanizaki Jun'ichiro 穀崎潤一郎 Xinhongqiao 新虹橋
Tashiro House 田代屋 Yamen 衙門
Teikoku Zaigo gunjin kai 帝國在鄕軍 Yangkingpang 洋涇浜
人會 Yangpu district 楊浦區
Tencho Setsu 天長節 Yangshupu 楊樹浦
Tianjin 天津 Yano Fumi 矢野文雄
ToaDobun Shoin 東亞同文書院 Yantai 煙臺
Tokyo Teikoku Daigaku 東京帝國大學 Yasuda 安田
Toyo Menka 東洋綿花 Yuebang粵幫
Toyo Shiga 東洋煙草 ZengGuofan 曾國藩
Toyo So 東洋莊 Zhabei 鬧北
Tsuchibashig5 土橋號 Zhongchuanhong 中川洪
UchiyamaKanzo 內山完造 Zhonghongkou 中虹口
Uchiyama Kiyoshi 內山清 Zhonghongqiao 中虹橋
Waihongkou 外虹口
Waihongqiao 外虹橋
121 Bibliography
PRIMARY SOURCES
NAJ, Digital Archives from “National Archives of Japan”, Japan Center for Asian
Historical Records (JACAR), URL: http://www.iacar.go.jp/
NCH, North-China Herald
Nihon gaiko bunsho (Japanese diplomatic documents). Ed. Gaimusho. Tokyo: Do
Sho.
Nihon teikoku tdkei nenkan (The statistic yearbook of Japanese empire).Vol.8-52.
Tokyo: Tokyo Ripurinto Shuppansha
QJZRHGXSL, 1972. Qing ji Zhong Ri Han guan xi shi liao (The historical source of the relations among China, Japan and Korea in Qing dynasty), ed. Institute of Modem
History, Academia Sinica. Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo.
Shinbun Kishi Bunko {Newspaper Article in digital version, hereafter SKB), Kobe
University, URL: http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.ip/smbun/search.html.
Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan Ritsu Gakkd Ichiran (The Japanese schools run by the
Shanghai Japanese Residents' Association). 1936. ed. Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan.
Shanghai.
Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan Sanjugo shunen Kinenshi (Commemorative chronicle on the
35th anniversary of the Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai). 1942. ed.
Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan. Shanghai.
Shanhai Shinpo
Shanhai Shupd
SMC, Annual Report
TMOSMC, 2001. The Minutes of Shanghai Municipal Council Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe.
122 WORKS IN WESTERN LANGUAGES
Bergere, Marie-Claire. 1981. “'The Other China': Shanghai from 1919 to 1949." In,
Shanghai, Revolution and Development in an Asian Metropolis, ed. Christopher Howe,
1-34. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bickers, Robert. 1999. Britain in China: Community Culture and Colonialism,
1900-1949. Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press.
.2004. Empire Made me: an Englishman Adrift in Shanghai. Allen Lane:
Penguin Books.
Brooks, Barbara J. 2000. Japan s Imperial Diplomacy, Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China’ 1895-1938. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Clifford, Nicholas R. 1991. Spoilt children of empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the
Chinese revolution of the 1920s. Hanover: University Press of New England.
Coble, Parks M. Jr. 1980. The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist Government,
1927-1937. Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University.
Cortazzi, Hugh. 1990. The Japanese Achievement. London: Sidgwick and Jackson;
New York: St. Martin's Press.
Duss, Peter. 1989. "Introduction: Japan's Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937: An
Overview." In The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937, eds. Peter Duss,
Raymond H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, xi-xxix. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Elvin，Mark. 1996. "Market town and waterways: the county of Shanghai from 1480 to 1910." In Another History: Essays on China from a European Perspective, ed.
Mark Elvin, 101-39. Broadway, Australia: Wild Peony.
Fogel, Joshua A. 1994. "The voyage of the Senzaimaru to Shanghai: early
Sino-Japanese contacts in the modem era，，. In The Cultural Dimension of
Sino-Japanese Relations, ed. Joshua A. Fogel, 79-94. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
. 1996. “First contacts: the travelers aboard the 'Senzaimaru' and other early accounts”. In The Literature of Travel in the Japanese Rediscovery of China,
123 1862-1945, ed. Joshua A. Fogel, 43-65. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
.1998. "Integrating into Chinese Society: A Comparison of the Japanese
Communities of Shanghai and Harbin.’，In Japan 's Competing Modernities: Issues in
Culture and Democracy, 1900-1930’ ed. Sharon A. Minichiello, 45-69. Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press.
• 2000. '"Shanghai-Japan': The Japanese Residents' Association of Shanghai."
Journal of Asian Studies 59, 4: 927-950.
Goodman, Bryna. 1995. Native Place, City, and Nation, Regional Networks and
Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Hanimi, Goto-Shibata. 1995. Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925-31. Basingstoke,
Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd.
Henriot, Christian. 1993. Shanghai 1927-1937: Municipal Power, Locality, and
Modernization, Trans. Noel Castelino. Berkeley: University of California Press.
.2000. “’Little Japan' in Shanghai: an insulated community, 1875-1945”，In
New Frontiers: Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, 1842-1953’ eds. Robert
Bickers and Christian Henriot, 146-69. Manchester, New York: Manchester
University Press.
Hershatter, Gail. 1997. Dangerous Pleasures: Prostitution and Modernity in
Twentieth-century Shanghai. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Jansen, Marius B. 1975. Japan and China: from War to Peace, 1894-1972. Chicago:
Rand McNally College Pub. Co.
Jordan, Donald A. 1991. Chinese Boycotts versus Japanese Bombs: the Failure of
China's "Revolutionary Diplomacy," 1931-32. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press. .2001. China s Trial by Fire: the Shanghai War of1932. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Lane-Poole, Stanley. 1999. The Life of Sir Harry Parkes, In Collected Works of
Frederick Victor Dickins, Frederick Victor, Vol. 4. Bristol; Tokyo: Edition Synapse.
Lanning, George; and Couling, Samuel. 1973. The History of Shanghai. Taipei:
Ch'engWenPub. Co.
124 Lee, Leo Ou-fan. 1999. Shanghai Modern: the Flowering of a New Urban Culture in
China, 1930-1945. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.
Leung, Yuen-sang. 1982. “Regional rivalry in mid-nineteenth century Shanghai:
Cantonese vs. Ningpo men.，，Ch，ing -shih wen-t'I Vol. IV，8: 29-50.
. 1990. The Shanghai Taotai, Linkage Man in a Changing Society, 1843-90.
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 2002. The Walls and Waters, A Comparative Study of City Culture in Modern
China 一 Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong. Shanghai: Shanghai-Hong Kong
Development Institute; Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies.
Liu, Kwang-Ching. 1962. Anglo-American Steamship Rivalry in China. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
MacPherson, Kerrie L. 2002. A Wilderness of Marshes: the Origins of Public Health in Shanghai, 1843-1893. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books.
Maybon, Charles B. et Fredet, Jean. 1975. Histoire de la Concession Frangaise de
ChanghaL New York: AMS Press.
Morse, Hosea Ballou. 1910-18. The International Relations of the Chinese Empire.
London, New York [etc.]： Longmans, Green, and co.
Osterhammel, Jurgen. 1986. "Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth
Century China: Toward a Framework of Analysis.，’ In Imperialism and After:
Continuities and Discontinuities, eds. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jurgen
Osterhammel, 290-314. London: Allen & Unwin.
Peattie，Mark R. 1989. “Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895-1937." In
The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937，eds. Peter Duss, Raymond H.
Myers and Mark R. Peattie, 167-209. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Perry, Elizabeth J. 1993. Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Pye, Lucian W. 1996. "How China's Nationalism was Shanghaied". In Chinese nationalism, ed. Jonathan Unger, 86-112. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
Remer, Charles F. 1933. A Study of Chinese Boycotts. Taipei: Cheng-Wen Pub. Co.
Stephens, Thomas B. 1992. Order and Discipline in China: the Shanghai Mixed
125 Court, 1911-27. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Guanhua Wang. 2001. In Search of Justice: the 1905-1906 Chinese Anti-American
Boycott. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center.
Wray, William D. 1984. Mitsubishi and The N.Y.K., 1870-1914, Business Strategy in the Japanese Shipping Industry. Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard
University.
.1989. "Japan's Big-Three Service Enterprises in China, 1896-1936." In The
Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937, eds. Peter Duss, Raymond H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, 31-64. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
WORKS IN CHINESE
Chen Enfu. 1996. Shanghai Xiaofei Shichang Fazhan Shiliie (A brief history of the development of Shanghai consumer market), ed. Shanghai: Shanghai caijing daxue chubanshe.
Chen Zu，en; Takatsuna Hiroftimi. 1995. "Shanghai Ribenren juliumin guanxi nianbiao (Mingzhi bian)，，(A Chronology of the Japanese Residents in Shanghai, Meiji period). In Shilin {The Forest of History, Shanghai), No. 1: 93-99.
. 2001. "Zaoqi Shanghai Riben juliumin de wenhua huodong" (The early cultural activities of Shanghai Japanese residents). In Dang'an yu Shixue {Archives and History，Shanghai), No. 2: 34-39.
Ding Jingtang; Zhu Shoufen. 2001. "Bashi huiyi，，(Memoirs in Eighty) in Shilin’ Vol.
1:30-43.
Du Xuncheng. 1986. Riben zaijiu Zhongguo de touzi (Japanese investment in Modem
China). Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue yuan chubanshe.
Feng Tianyu. 2001. ''QiansuiwarL' Shanghai xing: Riben ren 1862 nian de Zhongguo guan cha, (The Senzaimaru's Voyage to Shanghai: Japanese's view of China in 1862).
Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan. Huang Xiexun. 192-?, Songnan mengying lu (The record of Shanghai). Shanghai:
126 Jinbu shuju.
Liu Jianhui. 2003. Mo du Shanghai: Riben zhi shi ren de "jin dai" ti yan (Shanghai,
the devil city: the Japanese intellectual's “modem，，experience), Trans. Gan Huijie.
Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe.
Liu Xuezhao. 1991. "Liie lun Shanghai zai jindai Zhong Ri guanxishi zohng de
diwei，’ (A brief account of Shanghai's position in modem Sino-Japanese relations). In
Shanghai yanjiu luncong (Collected essays of research into Shanghai) Vol. 7: 86-99.
Ma Changlin and Cao Linhua. 1990. "Shanghai Riben juliu mintuan gaishu” (A
General Presentation of the Shanghai Japanese Residents' Association). In Dang an yu Shixue (Archives and History), No. 3: 51-55.
Mao Xianglin. 1985, Mo yu lu (The recordings by the remained ink). Shanghai:
Shanghai guji chubanshe.
Ozawa Masamoto. 1983. Neishan Wanzao Zhuan (The biography of Uchiyama
Kanzo), Trans. Zhao Baozhi; Wu Delie. Tianjin: Baihua wenyi chubanshe.
Qiao Shuming. 1991. "Jinru Shanghai zujie de Ribenren” (Japanese who entered the
Shanghai Concession). In Shanghai yanjiu luncong (Collected Essays of research on Shanghai), No. 3: 43-52. Takatsuna Hirofumi; Chen Zu'en; eds. 2000. Riben qiao min zai Shanghai, 1870-1945
(The overseas Japanese in Shanghai). Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe.
Wang Minghui and Yao Zongqiang, eds. 1999. Hongkou qu zhi (Gazetteer of
Hongkou district). Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue yuan chubanshe. Wang Xiaoqiu. 1989. "Mu mo Riben ren zen yang kan Zhongguo: 1862 nian
qianzuiwan Shanghai zhi xing yanjiu，，(Japanese View of China in the Bakumatsu
Period: A Study of the Voyage of the Senzaimaru to Shanghai in 1862). In Riben Xue
(The Japanology) January: pp. 140-56. ‘ Wang Yunsheng, ed. 1979. Liu shi nian lai Zhongguo yu Riben (China and Japan in
the last sixty years). Beijing: Sanlian shudian.
Wong Chi-yuen; T'ang Leang-Li, eds. 1932. The Japanese Invasion and China's
Defence: A Symposium. Shanghai: Publicity Department of the 19th Route Army.
Wu Jianxi. 1994. "Riben juliu mintuan he Shanghai Riqiao zidi xuexiao" (The
127 Japanese Residents' Association and the Japanese schools in Shanghai). In Shilin
{Historic review) No. 4: pp. 51 -59.
Xiong Yuezhi. 2001. "Riben mouqiu zai Shanghai sheli Rizujie de dang'an" (The archives related to Japanese efforts to establish their concession in Shanghai). In
Dang'an yu shixue (Archives and history). No. 2: 75-78.
Xu Gongsu; Qiu Jinzhang. 1980. Shanghai gong gong zujie zhidu, (The system of
Shanghai International Settlement). In Shanghai gong gong zujie shi gao (Manuscript of history of Shanghai International Settlement), ed. Ruan Ducheng. Shanghai:
Shanghai shudian. Xu Jie. 1998. "Hongkou Ribenren juzhuqu shulun" (A Presentation on the Japanese
Quarter in Hongkou). In Shanghai yanjiu luncong (Collected Essays of research on
Shanghai), No. 10: 278-298.
Xue Liyong. 1994. Shanghai tan diming zhanggu (Shanghai place-name anecdotes).
Shanghai: Tongji daxue chubanshe.
Yao Wennan, ed. 1970. Shanghai xian xu zhi (Continuation of the Shanghai county gazetteer). Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe.
Yu Yue, ed. 1975. Tongzhi Shanghai xian zhi (Gazetteer of Shanghai county of the
Tongzhi reign) Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe.
Zhang Xiaomei. 1937. Riben dui hu tou zi (Japanese investment in Shanghai).
Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan. Zhang Yan, ed. 2001. Shanghai gang zhi (Gazetteer of Shanghai harbor) Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue chubanshe. Zheng Zu'an. 1999. Bainian Shanghai cheng (A hundred years of Shanghai city). Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe.
Zhu Peng. 1989. Shanghai shi yange dili (The historical geography of Shanghai).
Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe.
Zou Yiren. 1980. Jiu Shanghai renkou bianqian de yanjiu (A study of changes in the evolution of the population of old Shanghai). Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe.
128 WORKS IN TAPANESE
Chen Zu'en. January 2000- . Column "Shanhai ni yi ta Nihonjin，，(Japanese in
Shanghai). In Shanghai Walker (Shanghai), January 2000 - June 2004.
Ishii Itaro. 1986. Gaikokan no issho (The life as a diplomat). Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha.
Kikuchi Takaharu. 1966. Chugoku mimoku undo no kihon kozo: taigai boikotto no kenkyu (The basic structure of Chinese nationalist movement: a study of anti-foreign boycotts, Tokyo, 1966). Tokyo: Daian. Kimura Kenji. 1993. “Zaigai kyoryumin no shakai katsudo," (The Social Activities of
Japanese Residents Abroad). In Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi Vol5: Bocho suru teikoku nojinryu (Modem Japanese Colonies, Vol. 5: The Flow of People under an
Expanding Empire), eds. Oe Shinobu et al. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten.
Koyukai. 1982. Toa Dobm Shoin daikaku shi (The history of Toa Dobun Shoin).
Tokyo: Koyukai.
Matsui Kiyoshi. 1959-. Kindai Nihon Bdekishi (The history of trade in modem Japan).
Tokyo: Yuhikaku.
Miyazaki Toten. 1967. Sanjusannen noyume (My Thirty-Three Years' Dream). Tokyo:
Heibonsha.
Shanhai Kyoryu Mindan. 1933. Kawabata Teiji Shi Den (The biography of Kawabata
Teiji). Shanghai.
. 1933. Shanhai jihenshi (The history of Shanghai incident). Shanghai.
Shibata Mikio. 2000. "Shanhai Nihonjin Kyoryumen to Bukyo" (The Japanese residents in Shanghai and Buddhism). In Shanhai: Zyunu Suru Netto Waku (Shanghai: the multilayer of network), ed. Nihon Shanhaishi Kenkyukai. Tokyo: Kyuko Shoin.
Shigemitsu Mamoru. 1953. Shigemitsu Mamoru Gaikd Kaisdroku (The memoir of
Shigemitsu Mamoru's diplomatic career). Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha.
Shimatzu Chojiro ed. 1924. Shanhai annai (The Shanghai Guidebook). Shanghai: Kinpu Sha. Takamura Naosuke. 1980. Nihon shi hon shugi shiron (The Historical essays on the
129 Japanese Capitalism). Kyoto: Mineruva Shobo.
Takatsuna Hirofumi. 1995. "Seiyojin no Shanhai, Nihonjin no Shanhai" (Westerner's
Shanghai, Japanese Shanghai), In Shanhai shi, kyodai toshi no keisei to hitobito no itonami (The History of Shanhai: The Formation of an Immense City and its People's
Occupations), eds. Takahashi Kosuke and Furumaya Tadao, 105-131. Tokyo: Toho
Shoten. Toa Kenkyjo daiichi chosa iinkai hen. 1974. Nihon no taishi toshi, Daiichi Chdsa
Iinkai hdkokusho (Japanese investment in China: the report of the first investigation committee). Tokyo: Genshobo.
Tsusho Sangyosho ed. 1961-1985. Shoko sesaku shi (The history of commercial and industrial policies). Tokyo: Tsusho Sangyosho.
Uchiyama Kanzo. 1949. Chugoku Yonjmen (Forty years in China). Tokyo: Haneda
Shoten.
Uchiyama Kiyoshi; Yamada Shusaku; Hayashi Tazaburo. 1915. Dai Shanhai (Greater
Shanghai). Shanghai: Dai Shanhaisha. Yonezawa Hideo. 1942. Shanhai Shiwa (History of Shanghai). Tokyo: Unebi Shobo.
130 _ CUHK Libraries ____
OOmMMflTE