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PHI 1700: Global Ethics Sessions 19 & 20 April 20th & 22nd, 2020 Normative Ethics: Virtue Ethics Today we start investigating normative ethics, which involves Ø formulating practical rules/principles for how we should behave in order to be a good person. – (normative = concerning how things ideally should/ought to be, in contrast with descriptive = concerning how things actually are) » We have already come across some theories in class that present views about how we should behave: • contractarianism: doing the right thing means fulfilling your obligations to other people by keeping the promises/agreements you’ve made with them, • including obeying the laws in your community • care ethics: doing the right thing generally results from viewing others as deserving of care & concern Ø In this unit we’ll focus on three additional leading theories about how we ought to behave: virtue ethics, consequentialism (esp. utilitarianism), & deontology. 2 What do we mean by a “good person”? Ø A normative ethical theory is about what we should do / being a “good person” in the sense of doing the right thing for others to affect their lives in a positive way, and making the world a better place for everyone to live in. – In contrast, a normative prudential theory describes what we should do / being a “good person” in the sense of doing what it takes to satisfy one’s desires & achieve personal goals. Sometimes being a good person ethically aligns with or contributes to being a good person prudentially: – i.e., doing something to help other people could also make you happier, or help you work towards one of your goals. …but other times, being a good person ethically can be in tension/conflict with what seems to be prudent for you (beneficial for achieving your personal goals). – Doing the right thing might be inconvenient or unpleasant sometimes, » or it might require you to give up some things you’d like to do or to have. 3 One of the major debates in normative ethics is generalism vs. particularism: Ø Generalist normative ethical theories propose that there are general rules, principles, or formulas that define what it means to be an ethically good person / do the right thing. That is, in all situations, one can do the right thing by acting in accordance with a moral rule, principle, or formula. » Utilitarianism & deontology are each generalist theories. Ø Particularist normative ethical theories contend that being a good person / doing the right thing can’t be boiled down to rules, principles, or formulas. Particularists typically argue that doing the right thing is about using one’s own judgment to determine the right action for each specific situation. » Virtue ethics, the topic of this week’s sessions, is a particularist theory. 4 The first normative ethical theory we will consider: Ø virtue ethics = doing the right thing results from developing good moral character, which involves cultivating moral virtues Aristotle (384-322 BCE), a particularist, believed that being a good person is much more complicated than just following rules: » it’s a matter of developing skills which enable us to make the right choice for each situation we confront, • since “the right thing to do” depends upon the situation. » He suggests that the best way to become a good person, we should follow the example set by moral exemplars – people who do the right thing & can serve as role models. He characterizes moral exemplars as people who have cultivated Ø virtues = states of excellence in one’s character, developed through repeated practice, which allow a person to make good choices & do the right thing at the right time – So, we call his theory “virtue ethics” to highlight its emphasis on developing good character & becoming a virtuous person, which will in turn lead to good behavior. 5 The Good Place, Season 1 Episode 3 6 Aristotle indicates right off the bat that he holds a particularist view of normative ethics: • He states that we should only expect to be able to develop rough guidelines – not rigid laws – about how we ought to behave. “…noble & just [i.e., right] actions . exhibit much variety & fluctuation…" – The right thing to do in situation A might be completely different from the right thing to do in situation B, • and that makes it hard to pin down anything all these right actions have in common that makes them "right”. – So, “doing the right thing” could not be expressed in terms of strict rules that apply in all situations. » We must be content, then, in speaking of [ethics] . to indicate the truth roughly & in outline, . speaking about things which are only for the most part true . it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits.” (Nicomachean Ethics I.3) 7 Think about a person who you look up to, who always seems to know how to do the right thing in every situation. • According to Aristotle, this person you’re thinking about – someone you regard as a moral exemplar – is likely someone you would define as having good character. – He believes that “good character” is synonymous with being virtuous or having virtues: virtues = states of excellence in one’s character, developed through repeated practice, which allow a person to make good choices & do the right thing at the right time He suggests that you can think of each virtue as a type of learned skill: an ability you gain that allows you to do well when put to the test, – like being a good team player when you have to work with others – or having good time management when you’re on a deadline. » moral virtues: character traits that lead us to do the right thing ethically; skills that lead to good ethical choices (e.g., being fair, considerate, generous, etc.) 8 – According to Aristotle, “good character” is synonymous with being virtuous or having virtues: virtues = states of excellence in one’s character, developed through repeated practice, which allow a person to make good choices & do the right thing at the right time » moral virtues: character traits that lead us to do the right thing ethically; skills that lead to good ethical choices (e.g., being fair, considerate, generous, etc.) Aristotle asserts that nobody is born morally virtuous: Ø instead, we become morally virtuous through our actions. As with any other skill, practice makes perfect: • you have to do the right thing over & over until it becomes “second nature”. So, just as “men become builders by building & lyre-players by playing the lyre; • so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.” (NE II.1) 9 Aristotle suggests that every interaction with other people is a chance to develop our virtue, and Ø the choices we make determine our character: – “…by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other [humans] we become just or unjust, – and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and by being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly. – The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger; • some men become temperate & good-tempered, others self-indulgent & irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances.” (II.1) Having good intentions is important, – but Aristotle believes that actions, (rather than your intentions) are the true mark of your character. 10 » moral virtues: character traits that lead us to do the right thing ethically; skills that lead to good ethical choices (e.g., being fair, considerate, generous, etc.) ØEach moral virtue represents the midpoint (“golden mean”) between two extremes: an excess (too much) & a deficiency (too little). He draws this conclusion by noting that most things that are good for us are best in moderation: • E.g., “drink or food which is above or below a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is proportionate [to our needs] produces & increases & preserves it.” • Too much or too little food/drink/sleep/studying/partying is bad: but an intermediate amount is good for you. Aristotle reasons: “So too is it, then, in the case of temperance & courage & the other virtues… • temperance & courage, then, are destroyed by excess and [deficiency], and preserved by the mean [i.e., moderation].” 11 Each moral virtue represents the midpoint (“golden mean”) between two extremes: an excess (too much) & a deficiency (too little). Ø E.g., courage is the midpoint between fearing everything & fearing nothing: – “…the man who flies from and fears everything & does not stand his ground against anything becomes a coward, – & the man who fears nothing at all but goes to meet every danger becomes rash, » …[but] by being habituated to despise things that are fearful & to stand our ground against them we become brave” Ø Temperance is the midpoint between enjoying too much pleasure & not enjoying enough pleasure. – “…the man who indulges in every pleasure & abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, – while the man who shuns every pleasure…becomes in a way insensible [unable to enjoy anything]... » …[but] by abstaining from [most, but not all] pleasures we become temperate” (NE II.2) 12 Each moral virtue represents the midpoint (“golden mean”) between two extremes: an excess (too much) & a deficiency (too little). • Everything in the middle column (”BALANCE”) is a moral virtue (a good character trait, generally resulting in right actions), • …while the Excesses & Deficiencies (side columns) are the corresponding vices (bad character traits, generally resulting in wrong actions). ØDo you agree with this list? 13 However, Aristotle adds that to be truly virtuous, it isn’t quite enough to behave in accordance with each virtue: Ø you also have to enjoy it (& not enjoy doing wrong).
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