Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 2004 Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution Daniel C. Richman Columbia Law School,
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[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons Recommended Citation Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, VOL. 105, P. 583, 2005 (2004). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1336 This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution Daniel C. Richman* & William J. Stuntz** In 1931, Al Capone was the leading mobster in Chicago. He had violated the Volstead Act on a massive scale, bribed a large fraction of Chicago officialdom, and murdered rivals in those enterprises. Because he was America’s first celebrity criminal, all this was clear not only to Chicagoans but to much of the nation. But his crimes were not easily proved in court. So federal prosecutors charged Capone not with running illegal breweries or selling whiskey or even slaughtering rival mobsters, but with failure to pay his income taxes. Capone was incredulous. When he heard about the tax charge, he reportedly said: “But the government can’t collect legal taxes from illegal money!” Actually, it could.