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The Brain Drain from Iran to the United States Author(S): Akbar E The Brain Drain from Iran to the United States Author(s): Akbar E. Torbat Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring, 2002), pp. 272-295 Published by: Middle East Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329755 Accessed: 08/05/2009 18:39 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mei. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Middle East Institute is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Middle East Journal. http://www.jstor.org The BrainDrain from Iran to the UnitedStates AkbarE. Torbat In this article, the underlyingforces and the extentof brain drainfrom Iran to the UnitedStates are studied.The brain drain is measuredby the migrationrates of Iraniannationals to the US with tertiaryeducation, including physicians and professors.The universities'admission policies and inclusionof Islamicsubject mattersin the academiccurricula are reviewedto evaluatethe qualityof higher education.In addition,the possibility of reversingthe braindrain and its impact on the economyare discussed. INTRODUCTION iEmigration of the highly educatedelite from the developingcountries to the developedcountries is an importantissue that deserves attention.The Middle East with its vast oil resourcesneeds educatedprofessionals to enhanceeconomic develop- mentand modernize the region.Iran, one of the oldest countriesin the region,has lost a good portionof its educatedprofessionals in the past few decades.The extentof the "braindrain" from Iran is a major concern. It is a vital matterin the US-Iranian relationsdue to the fact thateducated elite arethe mediumfor transferringtechnology and know how. This articlebrings to the fore the issue of the braindrain from Iran thathas not been examinedrecently. Educatedand skilled workers are the scarcestresources of any developingcoun- try. They comprisethe core workforcefor sustainableeconomic developmentpro- grams. Their trainingis time-consumingand expensive. The departureof a large numberof highly educatedelite from Iranhas definitelycaused a disastroussocial loss to the country. In Iran, the governmentsubsidizes students'higher education expenses by means of no-interestloans, little or no tuition,free accommodationin dormitories,various financial aids, grants,and scholarshipsfor studyingabroad. Even if educationand trainingin Iranwere privatelyfinanced, still therewould have been AkbarTorbat is a memberof the facultyin the Departmentof Economicsat CaliforniaState University, Fullerton. MIDDLEEAST JOURNAL * VOLUME56, NO. 2, SPRING2002 IRANIANBRAIN DRAIN * 273 significantnational loss causedby the braindrain, due to the fact thateducation is a public good, and it has positive externalbenefits to the society.Educated people not only increasetheir own productivitybut also contributeto the society's well being and knowledge;examples are the physiciansand educators.The developedcountries andespecially the US have greatlybenefited from the pool of the highlyeducated and experiencedIranian immigrants. These countriesare getting a "free ride"from the educationand expertise of the Iranianelite. Most of the Iranianimmigrants in the US areworking in fields such as education,engineering, medicine, and other professional services.Their work has importantexternal social benefitsfor the host countriesthat are missed in Iran. Carringtonand Detragiachehave done a comparativestudy of braindrain from developing countries to the United States and the other membercountries of the Organizationfor Economic Cooperationand Development.' They show that brain drainfrom Iranto the US, measuredby migrationrates of the individualswith ter- tiary education,is the highest in Asia. After Iran,sizable braindrains to the US are from Korea,the Philippines,and Taiwan,while the brain drainfrom other Middle Easterncountries is low. The subjectof internationalmigration of manpowerfrom the Middle East has been underscrutiny since the 1960s. George B. Baldwin has studiedthis problemfor the case of Iran. He examinedwhether the high-levelbrain drainwas an obstacle to Iran'seconomic development.2He found thatbrain drain from Iranwas not a seriousproblem at the time and some foreigneducated Iranians could be repatriatedhome by the effortsof publicinstitutions. Askari and Cummings also have studiedthe braindrain from Iran and severalother Middle Eastern countries to the UnitedStates.3 They pointout that,given the need for high-levelmanpower in these countries,it is essentialto adoptpolicies to reversethe braindrain. They suggest economic incentivepolicies for encouragingexpatiates to return. Bozorgmehrand Sabaghhave investigatedthe profile of Iraniansto the United States.4 Theirstudy reveals thatIranians are one of the high statusimmigrant groups, whose educational achievementsare significantlyhigher than those of other immigrants.Also Maboud Ansarihas conducteda good sociologicalstudy of the Iranianimmigrants in the US5 His researchindicates that the Iraniansare one of the most educatedforeign-born groupsin the US who have achievedrapid success. 1. William Carrington,and EnricaDetraiache, Finance and Development,Volume 36, No. 2, June 1999, pp. 46-49. The tiny countryof Fiji thathas a higherrate than Iran was ignoreddue to its very small size. 2. GeorgeB. Baldwin,"Four Studies On the IranianBrain Drain," in TheInternational Migration of High-LevelManpower: Its Impacton the DevelopmentProcess, The Committeeon the International Migrationof Talent,(New York:Praeger Publishers, 1970.) pp. 374-396. 3. HosseinAskari, and John Thomas Cummings, The MiddleEast and the UnitedStates: A Problem of "BrainDrain," International Journal of MiddleEast Studies,Vol. 8, 1977, pp. 65-90. 4. MehdiBozorgmehr and Georges Sabagh, High StatusImmigrants: A Statisticalprofile of Iranians in the United States, IranianStudies Volume XXI, No. 3-4, 1988, pp. 5-36. 5. Ansari Maboud, The Making of the Iranian Communityin America, (New York, NY: Pardis Press, 1992.) 274 * MIDDLEEAST JOURNAL This articleexamines the problemof braindrain from post-revolutionaryIran. It containsan analysisof the problem,its underlyingcauses, its impacton the Iranian economy,and a discussionof the possibilityto reverseit. The migrationof Iranian physicians and professorsto the United States are specifically studied in orderto understandthe magnitudeof braindrain in these two groupsof highly-educatedpro- fessionals,which have very high cost of training. THE POLITCALIMPETUS OF THE BRAINDRAIN Economic-relatedfactors are normallythe main drivingforce for migrationof individualsfrom developingcountries to the developednations. In the case of Iran, politicalfactors are found to be the main push force. Economic,social, and profes- sional factorsare the secondarycontributing forces. 6 The following is a brief look at the politicalevents thathave contributedto the massive braindrain from Iran. In March 1975, Shah MohammadReza Pahlavidissolved all existing political partiesin Iranand establisheda single partycalled the IranianPeople's Resurgence Party (Hezb-eRastakhiz-e Mellat-e Iran). He asked all Iranians,including govern- ment and universityemployees, to become membersof this party.7Only the armed forcespersonnel were excludedfrom membership.8 The Shah,in a speech,said those who did not want to join the partybecause of rejectionof its principlesshould leave the country.9As a result,a numberof politicalactivists and academicswho could not toleratethe Shah'srepression gradually started to leave the country.The IranianRevo- lutionbrought down the Shah'sregime in February1979. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had been exiled by the Shah,for his oppositionsto the Shah'sreform programs since 1964,10 returnedfrom exile on February1, 1979. He headed a newly estab- lished provisionalgovernment on February11, 1979.11 Immediatelyafter, most of the top officials in the Shah'sgovernment were arrestedand triedby the Revolution- ary Courtand were executed.A numberof educatedelite who had self-exiledthem- selves returnedhome to participatein the transferof power. In a matterof a few months,Muslim fundamentalists led by Khomeiniwere able to turnthe revolutionin theirfavor and establishedthe IslamicRepublic. 6. For analysis of braindrain due to economic causes see Paul Krugman,and JagdishBhagawati, "TheDecision to Migrate,"The Brain Drain and Taxation:Theory and EmpiricalAnalysis, edited by JagdishBhagwati, (New York:North-Holland Publishing, 1975,) pp. 31-51. 7. Nikki R. Keddie,Roots of Revolution:An InterpretiveHistory of ModernIran, (YaleUniversity: 1981,)
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