The Failure of Police Reform in Pakistan: What Police Order 2002 Reveals About the Challenges Confronting Democratic Consolidation
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The Failure of Police Reform in Pakistan: What Police Order 2002 reveals about the challenges confronting democratic consolidation Author Siddiqi, Huma Published 2020-07-02 Thesis Type Thesis (PhD Doctorate) School School of Govt & Int Relations DOI https://doi.org/10.25904/1912/875 Copyright Statement The author owns the copyright in this thesis, unless stated otherwise. Downloaded from http://hdl.handle.net/10072/395528 Griffith Research Online https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au Griffith Business School Submitted in fulfilment of the requirement of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Huma Shazia Siddiqi January 2020 1 The Failure of Police Reform in Pakistan: What Police Order 2002 reveals about the challenges confronting democratic consolidation Huma Shazia Siddiqi MPhil (Government and Public Policy) Centre for Government and International Relations Griffith Business School, Nathan Campus. Griffith University The thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 2020 2 Synopsis This thesis studies a 2002 attempt to fundamentally reform the Pakistan Police Service (PSP) through the promulgation of Police Order 2002. This reform was aimed at converting the PSP from an instrument of coercive government to a force responsive to and protective of the citizenry. It constituted, as its introduction explicitly stated, a significant move toward democratic consolidation in Pakistan. PO 2002 was introduced nationwide on 14 August 2002 with wide support from Pakistani elites and under the direction of the autocratic but reform-oriented government of General Pervez Musharraf. Yet PO 2002 failed. It was amended in 2004 and annulled in 2010. Understanding why it failed is important for understanding the challenges confronting democratising developing states, like Pakistan. Existing accounts attribute PO 2002 failure either to ‘loss of political will’ or to ‘bureaucratic politics’. The present research inclined toward the latter explanation until evidence gathered in the field pointed in quite another direction. The thesis employed a combination of process-tracing of the history of PO 2002 and the analytical framework of advocacy coalition developed by Sabatier and Jenkins- Smith. The use of Advocacy Coalition framework (ACF) directed research toward the most important factors before the actors involved. Semi-structured interviews with these revealed their beliefs and various aims regarding the initiation, progress and fate of PO 2002. ACF also alerted the research to the impact on the policy domain of external perturbations, internal shocks and changes in socio-political conditions. Interviews with key personnel of the Musharraf regime and relevant political and civil parties revealed considerable unanimity of opinion: the demand for police reform originated in the 1990s when simultaneous strategies of democratic transition and neoliberal transformation conflicted, aggravating chaos and distributional conflicts in multi-ethnic urban centres of Pakistan. Governments used police in an attempt to control the situation but brutal, highly politicised policing failed, prompting widespread acceptance of the need for police reform. ACF analysis found that the policy design phase of the resulting PO 2002 was monopolised by a material coalition of PSP that identified the problem as control of police by central executive power. It recommended transfer of control to local communities. Absent an epistemic community capable of analysing this proposal’s merits, and in an atmosphere of general public distrust of elected politicians, it was 3 approved by a military government pursuing community empowerment and by liberal elites who saw it as the pathway to democratic policing. But research revealed a contradiction in PO 2002’s stated objectives – first, to improve police performance and, second, to make police autonomous. Increased autonomy worked against performance by serving the motives of PSP officers more interested in removing bottlenecks from their careers than in effective policing. Moreover, the transfer of control to divided, often mutually hostile communities, in the times of market liberalisation merely fragmented politicisation and led to intercommunal violence. Exacerbating the situation was the fact that, even before PO 2002 was implemented, the aftermath of 9/11 caused unprecedented anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. Given popular perceptions of the US as anti-Islam, President Musharraf’s assistance to George W. Bush in his ‘war on terror’ cost him public support. Meanwhile, thanks to PO 2002, his government could not employ police to fight terrorists hiding in local communities. Belated recognition of the need to align police with the policies of the central executive led to the 2004 amendment of PO 2002. Control of provincial heads of police was acquired by the state via the intermediary home secretary, while control of ancillary police agencies was left with local actors and communities. But problems once again re-emerged when the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) came to power after Musharraf’s resignation in 2008. Strong evidence against the lower ranks of police force victimising the accused of blasphemy came forward, creating a scandalous national crisis. PPP government and state institutions were blamed for neglecting their responsibility and not protecting the rights of the accused. Further inquiry identified both the internal and external structures of PO 2002 as problem parameters. The additional internal structures introduced by PO 2002 had introduced procedural delays which significantly increased the risks for the blasphemy accused. These procedural delays further increased the probability of exploitation of police force by the local political actors, business groups and the extremist factions in some communities. Lower level police constables inspired by the extremist ideology or overtaken by their own sentiments even killed the accused of blasphemy, especially in Punjab. One, such incident also led to the murder of the governor of Punjab in 2010. The strong evidence before the PPP government left little choice but to repeal PO 2002 in 2011, and revert back to PO 1861, but it was not without incremental changes. PO 2002 failed because of its own internal weaknesses. Removing central executive control created serious security issues and singular focus of the PSP material coalitions 4 on removing career bottle neck in their careers introduced procedural delays between reporting of the crime and initiation of its investigation. This delay increased the risk of victimisation of already vulnerable blasphemy accused. Devolving policing responsibility to local communities may seem democratic, but in a multi-ethnic country it is a recipe for conflict. The study concludes by exploring models aimed at reconciling control of police with democratic imperatives but argues that the lack of political trust in the executive, which began with Pakistan’s transformation to a neoliberal regime, remains the biggest challenge for democratic consolidation in Pakistan and perhaps in other developing countries. 5 Statement of Originality This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself. Huma S Siddiqi 6 Disclosure The research was undertaken under the human ethical clearance GU REF NO: 2018/630. 7 List of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction 18 1.1 Statement of Problem and Research Question 20 1.2 Research Procedure and Summary of Results 27 1.3 Thesis Structure 34 PART I Chapter 2: Literature Review 37 2.1 Police and Democratic Consolidation. 37 2.2 Transitional Democracies of the 1990s and the 40 Causes of Police Reform Failures. 2.3 Issue of Political Control, Democratic Policing 45 & Community Policing in some Western Democracies. 2.4 Police Reforms in Fragile Democracy of Pakistan 53 2.5 Theories of Democratic Consolidation Failure in Pakistan. 60 Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Methodology 67 8 3.1 Theoretical Framework 67 3.1.1 Advocacy Coalition Framework- ACF 71 3.2 Methodology 79 3.2.1 Process Tracing within Case Study. 80 3.3 Methods and Diversity of Evidence. 87 PART II Chapter 4: History and Politics of Pakistan Police 95 before PO 2002 4.1 History of Pakistan Police post-1947. 96 4.1.1 Pakistan Police Services post 1971. 99 4.2 Impact of Ishaq Khan, Bureaucracy-Police Nexus 109 on Pakistan Democratic Transition. 4.3 Law & Order Crisis Generating a Demand for 113 Police Reforms. 4.4 Politics of the PSP in the Overall Ambivalent Scheme 117 4.4.1 ‘Secret’ Apportionment Formula and distrust 118 of PAS. 4.4.2 PSP involvement in Murtaza Bhutto’s Murder. 120 4.4.3 Anti-Terrorism Law, and PSP Accountability. 127 9 4.5 The 1999 Coup d’état and End of the Pure Neoliberal Regimes. 132 PART III Chapter 5: Policy Design Phase 136 5.1 Start of Military Regime and Agenda Setting. 138 5.1.1 NRB: Think Tank or Policy Broker? 140 5.2 Mapping the Policy Coalitions 144 5.2.1 PO 2002 Policy Coalition A 146 5.2.2 PO 2002 Policy Coalition B 150 5.3 PO 2002 Policy Sub-Systems 155 5.3.1 Sub System A − Nascent but Non-Trivial 156 5.3.2 Sub-System B − Mature but Vulnerable 161 5.4 Cross-Coalition Exchange 163 5.5 Time Constraint and the Final Rush 165 5.6 Salient Features of PO 2002 167 Chapter 6: Policy Implementation to Policy Change 171 6.1 PO 2002 Implementation and Internal Scandals. 172 10 6.2 External Event and Change in National Mood. 179 6.3 Introduction of New Weak Political Actors in 185 the Policy Domain 6.4 Dynamic of Policy Change and New Coalitions 192 Topology of Belief. 6.5 New Coalitions and Topology of Belief 196 6.6 Evidence of Learning 199 6.7 Salient Features of Amendment Order of 2004 201 Chapter 7: Policy Annulment 205 7.1 Brief background of the Blasphemy Law in Pakistan 207 7.2 National Blasphemy Scandal and Role of 212 Local Police Force.