Naval Postgraduate School Thesis
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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA – PEOPLE’S ARMY (FARC-EP): MARXIST-LENINIST INSURGENCY OR CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE? by Paul E. Saskiewicz December 2005 Thesis Advisor: Jeanne Giraldo Co-Advisor: Douglas Porch Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED December 2005 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC- 5. FUNDING NUMBERS EP): Marxist-Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Enterprise? 6. AUTHOR(S) Saskiewicz, Paul E. 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8.PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis argues that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia- People’s Army (FARC-EP), Latin America’s oldest and most powerful guerrilla organization, has not abandoned its ideological beliefs and devolved into a criminal enterprise as a result of its immersion in the drug trade and participation in other illicit activities. Rather, the movement remains an ideologically committed, guerrilla insurgency whose strategic objectives include the defeat of the Colombian military, the toppling of the central government, and the establishment of a regime founded on Marxist-Leninist and “Bolivarian” principles. While recognizing the important role that resources earned from criminal activities have played in strengthening the FARC-EP’s challenge to the government, this thesis argues that the guerrilla organization’s involvement in the drug trade serves exclusively as a means to an end. However, numerous factors including recent changes in leadership, the recruitment of non-ideologically motivated and poorly educated fighters, and the increased operations tempo have led to the weakening of the ideological commitment of the base. Consequently, many of the FARC-EP’s newer recruits are poorly educated in the political goals of the insurgency. This, combined with the weakening of the organization’s leadership could result in the devolution of the FARC-EP into several criminal enterprises. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC, FARC-EP, 15. NUMBER OF Colombia, President Uribe, Government of Colombia, Insurgency, Drug Trade, Coca, PAGES Heroin, Poppy, Marxist-Leninist, Guerrilla Organization, PCCC, Bolivarian Movement For 147 A New Colombia, Bolivarian Campaign For A New Colombia, Strategic Plan, Peace Talks, 16. PRICE CODE Despeje, Demilitarized Zone, Libertad Uno, Plan Patriota, Jacobo Arenas, President Gaviria, President Samper, Patriotic Union, La Unión Patriótica. 17. SECURITY 18.SECURITY 19.SECURITY 20. LIMITATION CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA – PEOPLE’S ARMY (FARC-EP): MARXIST-LENINIST INSURGENCY OR CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE? Paul E. Saskiewicz Captain, United States Air Force B.A., Saint Joseph’s University, 1999 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2005 Author: Paul E. Saskiewicz Approved by: Jeanne Giraldo Thesis Advisor Douglas Porch Co-Advisor Douglas Porch Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT This thesis argues that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia- People’s Army (FARC-EP), Latin America’s oldest and most powerful guerrilla organization, has not abandoned its ideological beliefs and devolved into a criminal enterprise as a result of its immersion in the drug trade and participation in other illicit activities. Rather, the movement remains an ideologically committed, guerrilla insurgency whose strategic objectives include the defeat of the Colombian military, the toppling of the central government, and the establishment of a regime founded on Marxist-Leninist and “Bolivarian” principles. While recognizing the important role that resources earned from criminal activities have played in strengthening the FARC-EP’s challenge to the government, this thesis argues that the guerrilla organization’s involvement in the drug trade serves exclusively as a means to an end. However, numerous factors including recent changes in leadership, the recruitment of non-ideologically motivated and poorly educated fighters, and the increased operations tempo have led to the weakening of the ideological commitment of the base. Consequently, many of the FARC-EP’s newer recruits are poorly educated in the political goals of the insurgency. This, combined with the weakening of the organization’s leadership could result in the devolution of the FARC-EP into several criminal enterprises. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 II. A BLUEPRINT FOR WAR: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FARC-EP’S “STRATEGIC PLAN” (1982-1989) ...........................................................................9 A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................9 B. IDEOLOGY....................................................................................................11 C. POLITICAL-MILITARY.............................................................................16 1. Belisario Betancur and the Peace Process (1982-1986) ..................22 2. The End of the Peace Process and the Road to War (1986- 1989) ....................................................................................................25 3. The 1989 FARC-EP Plenum .............................................................28 D. RESOURCES .................................................................................................31 E. ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.............................................................33 1. FARC-EP Education, Institutions and Training Facilities............34 2. FARC-EP Control of Financial Resources......................................35 F. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS........................................................................39 III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE “BOLIVARIAN CAMPAIGN FOR A NEW COLOMBIA” (1990-1998) .............................................................................41 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................41 B. POLITICAL-MILITARY.............................................................................43 1. Operation Wasp: The First FARC-EP Offensive (1990-1991) ......46 2. The Peace Talks of 1991-1992...........................................................49 3. The Eighth Guerrilla Conference: Maneuver Warfare and the Push into the South ............................................................................50 4. Major Victories against the Samper Administration (1994- 1998) ....................................................................................................53 C. ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.............................................................58 D. RESOURCES .................................................................................................63 E. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS........................................................................67 IV. FROM STRATEGIC ADVANCE TO STRATEGIC WITHDRAWAL (1998- 2005) ............................................................................................................................69 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................69 B. POLITICAL-MILITARY.............................................................................71 1. FARC-EP Motivations for the Creation of a Demilitarized Zone.....................................................................................................73 2. The FARC-EP – Pastrana Pact and the Creation of the Despeje..76 3. FARC-EP Participation in the Peace Process (1998-2002) ............78 4. FARC-EP Use of