Constitutional Impasse in Gilgit-Baltistan (Jammu and Kashmir): the Fallout
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ISSN: 0970-0161 (Print) 1754-0054 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsan20 Constitutional Impasse in Gilgit-Baltistan (Jammu and Kashmir): The Fallout Senge H. Sering To cite this article: Senge H. Sering (2010) Constitutional Impasse in Gilgit-Baltistan (Jammu and Kashmir): The Fallout, , 34:3, 354-358, DOI: 10.1080/09700161003658998 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161003658998 Published online: 11 May 2010. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 244 View related articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rsan20 Strategic Analysis Vol. 34, No. 3, May 2010, 354–358 RSAN0970-01611754-0054Strategic AnalysisAnalysis, Vol. 34, No. 3, March 2010: pp. 0–0 COMMENTARY Constitutional Impasse in Gilgit-Baltistan (Jammu and Kashmir): The Fallout StrategicSenge H. AnalysisSering Senge H. Sering he legal status of Gilgit-Baltistan, which is part of Jammu and Kashmir that is Tunder Pakistani occupation, has remained undefined in successive Pakistani con- stitutions. Pakistan governs the region with ad hoc presidential ordinances, resulting in transitory political arrangements. It was Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto who first introduced the so-called Northern Areas Governance Order of 1994, after shelving the draconian and inhumane Frontier Crimes Regulation, with which Pakistan ruled the region like a colony. With some amendments, the same ordinance was later renamed the Legal Framework Order by President Musharraf in 2007 and more recently as the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order by the Zardari regime. The term ‘self-governance’ in the current ordinance is coined as a strategic move to defuse pressure of rights organisations. The order establishes the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly and the Gilgit-Baltistan Council. It also creates the post of chief minister; and a governor, who will represent the president of Pakistan and function as the de facto rulers of Gilgit-Baltistan. Despite demands, Pakistan refused a parliamentary system and a president and prime minister to the locals. It refused Gilgit-Baltistan representation in the Pakistani parliament, the Council of Common Interests, the National Hydro-electric Board, the Indus River System Authority, the National Judicial Council and the National Finance Commission. The natives are refused access to Pakistani apex courts and also remain deprived of their own high and supreme courts, a penal code and reinstatement of State Subject Rule.1 Instead of the chief minister, the order rests all administrative, political and judicial authority with the governor, which makes him the supreme authority and portrays the assembly as a toothless tiger. At best, the order legitimises Pakistan’s occupation and claims political rights for the locals without changing the power equation. The governor will appoint, transfer and fire heads of apex departments, including the public service commission, election commission, boundary commission, auditor general, commissioner of excise, taxation and revenue, chief judges of appellate and chief courts, regional cabinet members and advisors, the inspector general of police, chief secretary, departmental secretaries and regional commissioners. Further, he is also authorised to approve the budget, to dissolve the cabinet and assembly, and to impose emergency. The governor resides in Islamabad, rather than staying in Gilgit-Baltistan, and this deprives locals of access to his services. He is also the vice chairman and voting member of the council, and has veto right over the laws passed by both the assembly and the council. The Senge H. Sering comes from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and is an International Visiting Fellow with IDSA. ISSN 0970-0161 print/ISSN 1754-0054 online © 2010 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses DOI: 10.1080/09700161003658998 http://www.informaworld.com Strategic Analysis 355 council, with an in-built majority status for Pakistani federal ministers, can veto laws passed by the locally elected legislature. More significantly, it is not the assembly but the council that decides on natural resources, including minerals, forests, electricity, water reserves, industries, tourism, school curricula, religious affairs, cinematography, and so forth. Similar in-built majority is provided to the federal bureaucrats serving in Gilgit- Baltistan, which creates hegemony over the local administration. The order has no mention of the leader of the opposition, which will create a disarrayed and friendly opposition with no check and balance over the government’s excesses. Called an eyewash by the locals, international rights organisations have also rejected governor’s rule as a sinister design of Pakistan to complicate the constitutional impasse and eventually annex this region. As a reaction filled with angst, prominent local politicians—including pro-Pakistani voices like that of Miss Malika Baltistani—demand absolute independence for Gilgit-Baltistan. Allama Mirza Yusuf Hussain, a prominent religious figure from Baltistan, calls the order dishonest and insincere, and appeals to the locals to reject Pakistani political parties and incept a regional party to unify the masses to overcome political and economic issues. While the order is claimed as strategic in winning hearts and minds, it rather strengthens the long arms of Islamabad in Gilgit-Baltistan. Further, it fails to pacify rising separatism among the aggrieved people and provides fewer or no benefits to the poverty-stricken and largely illiterate masses.2 The timing of the order is significant when the country is grappling with rising sepa- ratism and simmering Talibanisation. While minorities clamour for political autonomy in other parts of the country, strategically located Gilgit-Baltistan topped the priority list of Islamabad to receive ‘empowerment and self-governance’. The order allows Pakistan to reap benefits from Gilgit-Baltistan’s strategic location, in a time when China, her all-weather ally, is investing billions of dollars in the region. With no legal right to administer Gilgit-Baltistan, the order conveniently enables Pakistan to exploit natural resources and fill coffers in Islamabad, as both countries tend to maximise revenues in the shortest possible time, even if that comes at the cost of environmental, demographic and cultural degradation. It will not be excessive to assume that the order addresses the needs of the Chinese more than it does of the locals, and provides better security cover for their rapidly growing interests. China considers the Karakoram Highway (KKH), the historic silk route that passes through Gilgit- Baltistan into East Turkestan, as the easiest and shortest transport route to access oil, gas and mineral supplies from all over the world, especially the Middle East and Africa. Further, the Karakoram corridor allows weapons trade between both countries without hindrance. Given its significance, China is converting KKH into a four-lane highway, with three times more capacity to accommodate heavy-laden vehicles under extreme weather conditions. As per plans, a railroad will run parallel to the KKH con- necting Kazakhstan via Kyrgyzstan, China and Gilgit-Baltistan to the port cities of Karachi and Gwadar in Pakistan. This will enhance China’s connectivity with energy- laden countries in the Persian Gulf. Further, Pakistan’s ports are far nearer to some of China’s industrial zones than the eastern Chinese ports and place China in proximity to the Suez Canal like never before. Gilgit-Baltistan’s importance as a trade, water, gas and oil corridor has increased after Pakistan signed the free trade agreement with China in 2007 and established dry ports at Sost (Gilgit) and Tashkorgan (East Turkestan). Beijing’s profile in Gilgit-Baltistan has risen swiftly in the last few years. Pakistan expects China to invest approximately US$10 billion in power generation, infrastructure, telecommunication and mineral extraction. Bunji and Diamer dams are expected to cost around US$19.6 billion and to generate 12,000 MW of electricity. With 125 ongoing 356 Senge H. Sering projects and 10,000 Chinese working in Pakistan, both countries have identified another 55 initiatives and signed 42 memoranda of understandings (Mo.Us) in less than a year. The Sino–Pak friendship, flourishing through the corridor of Gilgit-Baltistan, allows China to emerge as an Asian economic and military power, and enables Pakistan to explore ways and means for her survival in the next century. Likewise, Gilgit-Baltistan is vital for China’s military as an alternative route to the Middle East, Africa and Europe, in case the Malacca Straits become inaccessible. At the same time, it limits to India the stra- tegic space in Central Asia, Middle East and the Indian Ocean. For India, the presence of Chinese workers on Pakistani soil presents a constant threat as many of these workers belong to the infrastructure and building division of People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA) and are capable of assisting Pakistani armed forces in times of need. For locals, Chinese interventions under the protective umbrella of the presidential order will hasten demographic change and resource depletion on a very large scale, and will encourage foreigners to settle in Gilgit-Baltistan. Prominent constitutional experts of Pakistan, including Abid Hassan Minto, who supports a provisional parliamentary setup for Gilgit-Baltistan on the line of AJK,3 call Pakistan’s