Constitutional Impasse in Gilgit-Baltistan (Jammu and Kashmir): the Fallout

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Constitutional Impasse in Gilgit-Baltistan (Jammu and Kashmir): The Fallout

Senge H. Sering

To cite this article: Senge H. Sering (2010) Constitutional Impasse in Gilgit-Baltistan (Jammu and Kashmir): The Fallout, , 34:3, 354-358, DOI: 10.1080/09700161003658998 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161003658998

Published online: 11 May 2010.

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RSAN0970-01611754-0054Strategic AnalysisAnalysis, Vol. 34, No. 3, March 2010: pp. 0–0 COMMENTARY Constitutional Impasse in Gilgit-Baltistan (Jammu and Kashmir): The Fallout StrategicSenge H. AnalysisSering Senge H. Sering

he legal status of Gilgit-Baltistan, which is part of Jammu and Kashmir that is Tunder Pakistani occupation, has remained undefined in successive Pakistani con- stitutions. Pakistan governs the region with ad hoc presidential ordinances, resulting in transitory political arrangements. It was Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto who first introduced the so-called Northern Areas Governance Order of 1994, after shelving the draconian and inhumane Frontier Crimes Regulation, with which Pakistan ruled the region like a colony. With some amendments, the same ordinance was later renamed the Legal Framework Order by President Musharraf in 2007 and more recently as the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order by the Zardari regime. The term ‘self-governance’ in the current ordinance is coined as a strategic move to defuse pressure of rights organisations. The order establishes the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly and the Gilgit-Baltistan Council. It also creates the post of chief minister; and a governor, who will represent the president of Pakistan and function as the de facto rulers of Gilgit-Baltistan. Despite demands, Pakistan refused a parliamentary system and a president and prime minister to the locals. It refused Gilgit-Baltistan representation in the Pakistani parliament, the Council of Common Interests, the National Hydro-electric Board, the Indus River System Authority, the National Judicial Council and the National Finance Commission. The natives are refused access to Pakistani apex courts and also remain deprived of their own high and supreme courts, a penal code and reinstatement of State Subject Rule.1 Instead of the chief minister, the order rests all administrative, political and judicial authority with the governor, which makes him the supreme authority and portrays the assembly as a toothless tiger. At best, the order legitimises Pakistan’s occupation and claims political rights for the locals without changing the power equation. The governor will appoint, transfer and fire heads of apex departments, including the public service commission, election commission, boundary commission, auditor general, commissioner of excise, taxation and revenue, chief judges of appellate and chief courts, regional cabinet members and advisors, the inspector general of police, chief secretary, departmental secretaries and regional commissioners. Further, he is also authorised to approve the budget, to dissolve the cabinet and assembly, and to impose emergency. The governor resides in Islamabad, rather than staying in Gilgit-Baltistan, and this deprives locals of access to his services. He is also the vice chairman and voting member of the council, and has veto right over the laws passed by both the assembly and the council. The

Senge H. Sering comes from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and is an International Visiting Fellow with IDSA.

ISSN 0970-0161 print/ISSN 1754-0054 online © 2010 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses DOI: 10.1080/09700161003658998 http://www.informaworld.com Strategic Analysis 355 council, with an in-built majority status for Pakistani federal ministers, can veto laws passed by the locally elected legislature. More significantly, it is not the assembly but the council that decides on natural resources, including minerals, forests, electricity, water reserves, industries, tourism, school curricula, religious affairs, cinematography, and so forth. Similar in-built majority is provided to the federal bureaucrats serving in Gilgit- Baltistan, which creates hegemony over the local administration. The order has no mention of the leader of the opposition, which will create a disarrayed and friendly opposition with no check and balance over the government’s excesses. Called an eyewash by the locals, international rights organisations have also rejected governor’s rule as a sinister design of Pakistan to complicate the constitutional impasse and eventually annex this region. As a reaction filled with angst, prominent local politicians—including pro-Pakistani voices like that of Miss Malika Baltistani—demand absolute independence for Gilgit-Baltistan. Allama Mirza Yusuf Hussain, a prominent religious figure from Baltistan, calls the order dishonest and insincere, and appeals to the locals to reject Pakistani political parties and incept a regional party to unify the masses to overcome political and economic issues. While the order is claimed as strategic in winning hearts and minds, it rather strengthens the long arms of Islamabad in Gilgit-Baltistan. Further, it fails to pacify rising separatism among the aggrieved people and provides fewer or no benefits to the poverty-stricken and largely illiterate masses.2 The timing of the order is significant when the country is grappling with rising separatism and simmering Talibanisation. While minorities clamour for political autonomy in other parts of the country, strategically located Gilgit-Baltistan topped the priority list of Islamabad to receive ‘empowerment and self-governance’. The order allows Pakistan to reap benefits from Gilgit-Baltistan’s strategic location, in a time when China, her all-weather ally, is investing billions of dollars in the region. With no legal right to administer Gilgit-Baltistan, the order conveniently enables Pakistan to exploit natural resources and fill coffers in Islamabad, as both countries tend to maximise revenues in the shortest possible time, even if that comes at the cost of environmental, demographic and cultural degradation. It will not be excessive to assume that the order addresses the needs of the Chinese more than it does of the locals, and provides better security cover for their rapidly growing interests. China considers the Karakoram Highway (KKH), the historic silk route that passes through Gilgit- Baltistan into East Turkestan, as the easiest and shortest transport route to access oil, gas and mineral supplies from all over the world, especially the Middle East and Africa. Further, the Karakoram corridor allows weapons trade between both countries without hindrance. Given its significance, China is converting KKH into a four-lane highway, with three times more capacity to accommodate heavy-laden vehicles under extreme weather conditions. As per plans, a railroad will run parallel to the KKH con- necting Kazakhstan via Kyrgyzstan, China and Gilgit-Baltistan to the port cities of Karachi and Gwadar in Pakistan. This will enhance China’s connectivity with energy- laden countries in the Persian Gulf. Further, Pakistan’s ports are far nearer to some of China’s industrial zones than the eastern Chinese ports and place China in proximity to the Suez Canal like never before. Gilgit-Baltistan’s importance as a trade, water, gas and oil corridor has increased after Pakistan signed the free trade agreement with China in 2007 and established dry ports at Sost (Gilgit) and Tashkorgan (East Turkestan). Beijing’s profile in Gilgit-Baltistan has risen swiftly in the last few years. Pakistan expects China to invest approximately US$10 billion in power generation, infrastructure, telecommunication and mineral extraction. Bunji and Diamer dams are expected to cost around US$19.6 billion and to generate 12,000 MW of electricity. With 125 ongoing 356 Senge H. Sering projects and 10,000 Chinese working in Pakistan, both countries have identified another 55 initiatives and signed 42 memoranda of understandings (Mo.Us) in less than a year. The Sino–Pak friendship, flourishing through the corridor of Gilgit-Baltistan, allows China to emerge as an Asian economic and military power, and enables Pakistan to explore ways and means for her survival in the next century. Likewise, Gilgit-Baltistan is vital for China’s military as an alternative route to the Middle East, Africa and Europe, in case the Malacca Straits become inaccessible. At the same time, it limits to India the strategic space in Central Asia, Middle East and the Indian Ocean. For India, the presence of Chinese workers on Pakistani soil presents a constant threat as many of these workers belong to the infrastructure and building division of People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA) and are capable of assisting Pakistani armed forces in times of need. For locals, Chinese interventions under the protective umbrella of the presidential order will hasten demographic change and resource depletion on a very large scale, and will encourage foreigners to settle in Gilgit-Baltistan. Prominent constitutional experts of Pakistan, including Abid Hassan Minto, who supports a provisional parliamentary setup for Gilgit-Baltistan on the line of AJK,3 call Pakistan’s rule illegal and one that refutes fundamental human rights. Minto objects to Pakistan’s mega projects in Gilgit- Baltistan, which continue without the consent of locals and without granting royalty and water usage compensation. The definition of the ‘citizen of Gilgit-Baltistan’ in the order itself poses grave threats to the locals and allows foreigners to acquire local citizenship if they possess assets and local identity cards. This may benefit hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis living in the region since 1947, and allow them to strengthen stakes in local jobs, resources, social services and revenues, and thereby reduce opportunities for the margin- alised locals. The order restricts local laws, which fail to comply with the Pakistani laws. Further, it requires the locals to ensure security, integrity, solidarity and strategic interests of Pakistan. In the same manner, the order prescribes an oath format for local officials, which requires them to declare loyalty to Pakistan. Since the order as well as the constitution of Pakistan does not consider Gilgit-Baltistan as part of the country, the locals challenge such restrictions as an attack on local autonomy; defying the true spirit of delegating authority to the institutions and hindering democracy and freedom of speech and expression. In the current context of political engagement, the above- mentioned conditions are designed to bar involvement of the nationalists and separatists in the political decision-making process, and safeguard the interests of foreigners involved in resource exploitation. The absolute authority and veto power vested in the governor is likely to force the people to take the matters to the streets, causing dis- harmony among ethnic and religious factions and political impasse. Yet another example of how this order will enhance social divide and allow Pakistan to weaken locals is embedded in the right of the council to veto laws that contradict the Quran and Sunnah. It is no secret that both Shias and Sunnis have failed to agree on a single definition of Sunnah. Under the circumstances, laws pertaining to religion will become a dividing factor and a cause of sectarian clashes and polarisation. This will also restrict the Shias to learn their religion in government schools. On their part, the Sunni immigrant minority also fears for their long-term survival and socio-economic interests in the region, which became their home only three decades ago. As social friction and polarisation over who controls what will intensify, it will lead to further sectarian killings, longer-termed religious and ethnic feuds, and destruction of the regional socio-economic fabric. This can be assessed from the results of recently held assembly elections on November 12, 2009, in which the majority of the voters of Strategic Analysis 357

Gilgit-Baltistan voted along sectarian lines. The fear of losing their political leverage has forced the conservative Sunnis to seek support from their allies, the Taliban and Al-Qaida groups, which use sectarian rift as an opportunity to enhance their influence. As a result of heightened religious feuds, urban centres like Gilgit and Skardu have become militarised ghettos. Owing to Taliban influences, women were barred from voting during the recent election. The Taliban also attack traffic on KKH and disrupt trade, which harms the local economy. These are dangerous developments, which cannot be reversed if local people are weak and divided; and the legislature is crippled and wilfully kept emaciated. Extremism may also spill over into neighbouring Tajikistan, East Turkestan and India. This will confirm Chinese apprehensions of Taliban and Uyghur separatists forming a nexus to promote separatism, terrorism and extremism in East Turkestan. Currently, Gilgit-Baltistan’s economy largely depends on China and such developments will create regional tensions, exit of Chinese workers and investment, and economic downfall of both Pakistan and Gilgit-Baltistan. One way to tackle rising extremism is to promote the indigenous secular cultural assets of Gilgit-Baltistan as a potential bulwark. However, Pakistan—which believes that promotion of indigenous cultures will advance ethnic nationalism and possibly rupture her geographic seam—may not adhere to such policies. In fact, successive regimes have tackled the nationalists heavy-handedly to curb pan-ethnic sentiments. In some cases, government agencies covertly provoke sectarianism to suppress secular nationalism. During the current assembly elections, authorities intimidated, abducted and tortured hundreds of nationalists. Their electioneering in Gilgit-Baltistan was banned, and in one incident a bomb was hurled at the residence of a nationalist election candidate. Security forces tortured and killed Zubair, a nationalist worker, on November 23, 2009, when he was protesting against election rigging. The ranks among the nationalists will swell further if the governor authorises the foreigners to compete with the locals in resource exploitation. In the elections, the ruling party in Islamabad (Pakistan People’s Party-PPP) managed to win a two-thirds majority amidst accusations of rigging and ballet stuffing. However, a legislature with no freedom to use the two-thirds majority will only promote Pakistan’s interests like a rubber stamp and allow gradual annexation of Gilgit-Baltistan. On the inauguration of an international investment conference for Gilgit-Baltistan, Governor Kaira affirmed that ‘PPP-led government was taking solid steps to strengthen the federation and reform the system of the country’.4 The remarks of the newly appointed chief minister of Gilgit-Baltistan, Syed Mehdi Shah, echoes a similar message when he claims that Gilgit-Baltistan is the fifth province of Pakistan and is not connected with Jammu and Kashmir.5 Recently, he toured Punjab and Sindh to encourage Pakistani investors to initiate projects in Gilgit-Baltistan. Such short-term and quick-fix solutions for economic development of Gilgit-Baltistan might help in developing the region but without benefitting the locals, who are the real owners of the resources. The task that the resourceful leaders like Z.A. Bhutto, General Zia-ul Haq and General Pervez Musharraf failed to accomplish will now be carried out smoothly and swiftly through the local legislature. To some extent, an engineered two-thirds majority has been made possible to allow the powerless assembly to pass a resolution declaring the region as an integral part of Pakistan. This will follow with an approval from the council and governor, and ending with the president of Pakistan signing it into a binding document. There will be some hue and cry among the Kashmiris if something like that happens, but again the Gilgit-Baltistan legislative assembly and council will be used to resolve the issue in favour of Pakistan. Creation of two separate assemblies and councils within 358 Senge H. Sering

Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) is part of the grand scheme of divide and rule, which will engulf both regions of PoK, complicating the political tussle over the nature of the Kashmir dispute with differing claims on how to end it. It is befooling to assume that Pakistan will allow Kashmiris to take over an area, which is so vital for the survival of the country given its location and resources. As Pakistan claims Gilgit- Baltistan as its own, her policy shift on Kashmir may force India to retaliate to protect its strategic interests. While the regime in Islamabad may fail to sell the idea of per- manent division of Jammu and Kashmir to its public, the presidential order does take the nation in that direction but without much fanfare. The order has forced the Kashmiri leaders to realise that Pakistan is encroaching on their territory and nibbling away bits of it in the same way it annexed Shinaki- Kohistan in 1955 and Chitral in 1971. Now, they demand Pakistani withdrawal from PoK and reunification of the entire state. The order has internationalised Gilgit- Baltistan and placed the region back on the political map of Jammu and Kashmir. The presidential order is the first baby step taken by Pakistan in 63 years, and it may take some time before Shias and Sunnis will reconcile to the idea of co-existence and using the legislative assembly for the benefit of both communities. In addition, the unity among the natives of Gilgit-Baltistan will help them seek genuine political freedom and control over their resources. Against this, Pakistan’s excessive dependence on China for economic growth complicates the Kashmir issue and makes India wary of China’s intentions in the region. This may prolong the impasse on Kashmir, as also resource thievery and political oppression in Gilgit-Baltistan. Pakistan’s behaviour towards the people of Gilgit-Baltistan is reflective of its exploitative and oppressive nature rather than that of a benign benefactor. The past policies and attitudes need to change, so presidential orders and legislative assemblies become meaningful and help diffuse trust deficit among Pakistanis and locals, and unify them in their endeavours to halt the advancing Taliban.

Notes 1. State Subject Rule protects demographic characteristics of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1974, Pakistan abrogated State Subject Rule in Gilgit-Baltistan, which paved the way for Pakistanis to claim stake in local immovable assets and natural resources. Today major businesses in Gilgit and Skardo are owned by Pakistanis. This not only impacts resource sharing and competition over jobs and services, it also alters local linguistic and cultural heritage and damages religious harmony. Shia-Sunni feuds have been simmering since then and have consumed thousands of lives and damage to property worth billions of rupees. 2. The per capita, per annum income of Gilgit-Baltistan is less than US$268, which is one-quarter of Pakistan’s national average per capita income (Aga Khan Rural Support Program socio- economic surveys, Socioeconomic Survey of Northern Areas and Chitral 2005). 3. The term used for the Pakistan-occupied Muzaffarabad–Mirpur region. 4. ‘PPP-led Govt Reforming System, Strengthening Federation, says Kaira’, Associated Press of Pakistan, January 4, 2010, at http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content& task=view&id=93177&Itemid=2. 5. ‘Mehdi Shah’s Delinking GB from Kashmir Annoys India’, Pamir Times, January 2, 2010, at http://pamirtimes.net/2010/01/02/mehdi-shahs-delinking-gb-from-kashmir-annoys-india/.