CORPS DEFENSIVE OP".RATI GNS ALONG the GARIGUANO, GARI, and HAPIDO RIVERS, 17-31 January 191&
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MS # R-?6 cO° "A 7 \ XI7 PAlTZEF; CORPS DEFENSIVE OP".RATI GNS ALONG THE GARIGUANO, GARI, AND HAPIDO RIVERS, 17-31 January 191& A Study Undertaken in Support of the Volume Salerno to Cassino UBRARY^^. by USACGSCFT l£AV£fWORlHf*WI' Philip A. Growl (OCMHt In Progress) Foreign Studies Branch Office of the Chief of Military History Washington, D«C« Kovoisber 1955 70 pages - . I MS # t-73 OT PAHZBR CORPS DEFE-BSIYE OPESATIOSS ALOIfG THE afilOLXABQ, GARX, AID R4PIIX) RIVSSS, lj - J1 JAIIUAST X9W** fable of Contents ' • Paga X..• Introduction*'• Historical Background 4*•*»•*».**.. 1 # II* Geraan Defensive Positions', Shs Bsrnhgrd &nd Custav Lines. Li. XXI* Organisation, 'Overall Strength end Chain of CoswtBd of SeraaR Forces in Italy...»+*«*•»*•••+ 8 IT. Hhs Situation at tha Eve of Allied Attack Against Gastsv' Line* #•#*•*•* * f * * •% # • « •* *'• » * # ***•»»#• * * * •* *#»#»***•*** '# • 16 At Serosa Order of Battle and Beplcrjssant of Troops, . 1? January 19MU *••*******•**«»#«•*# * v * *• * * * »• i * .* « • * • * *' 16 Esiimte of Allied Capabilities and Intentions*#**..*> 19 C* Beployasat ©f 8ema Reserves, 17 January 19H+- ' 25 4' Y. The- Attack by British 10 Corps against the Sarigli&ao Sirer see-tor# 17 - 25 January -19^*• • * * • * # » • *• • * * • #**»## • • 27 A. Crossing the Qsurigli&no, 17-18 January...•,*..«**«»*, 27 B. Gersoan Coimterjafflaroree*..**...»»»...***«».*.**•*.»*.. 32 C. Continuation, of 10 Corps attack and Sarsan Countsratt&ck..,.35 P. Ssrsis® Losses.• »»*»«»•.*•»•»»«»•»*»»»*»-«»»»»•*«*«»*»* 1*0 VI» XI (IS) Corps Attack against Sari and t&pido Pavers, • 20-21}. January.• 1*1 ¥11. Effect of . Allied landing at Ansio on Fighting along (hastef* Till. Combat Action on lor them Wing XI¥ Panzer Corps, 51 Overlays and hssm'ms Overlay Er. Is Gemsa Defense Lines in Italy,3& Orerlay 8r« 2s %XT Banger Corps, Baployiaant of foraes aad intelligence Estteate.15®. Overlay Hr# • % 9ii-th Birision Sector* 17 Jan !&«*.••••>*.: 26a • Overlay Hr» ut fema Units couth of liri Hirer, 21 January jSo. v ' Overlay Br» 3' 15th Panzer Orenadier Piris ion gee tor 20-C-5*"Jannary lv^4** *••.»••*•» »«%•«». «. * Ilia Overlay Sr. 6t 2X7 Panzer Corps-deploynant of -units, 51a Table of Contents (Cont'd) i^-ge Annex Nr. 1; Garisan Order of Battle 17 January 1944-.......... 62 Annex Nr. 2 j German Order of Battle 21 Jaira&ry 1944.«-»....... 63 Annex Kr. 3s' Strength. Report, Armor and Weapons of Gerssn Bivisiens. 64-70 [Notes OVERLAYS ABE INCLUDED ONLY IN. HISTORIAN*S AND AUTHOR'S COPY] m # a-78 *u I* Introduction; W Four aaonths had el&peed since the Allies had seca-ed their ' bsaehhead at Salerno arid started their advance north on the Italian mainland isrhsu, on 15 Jsauary ISMi* Allied troops reached the approaches to .the' G-ust&v lias. The Gus tav Lias represented th© "finallias of defease south of Sosa® at -rhioh the G-erci&n High, Cemasaad was determined to hold the Allies at bay. =? The- seeisioa to defend Southern Italy &nd to hold. Beam hairnet been iB&&® by Hitler until the fall of lyh3 sad found its formal ex pression in the aapointsasai of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring as CoEsaaader is Chief Suedwest on 6 loveaber 19^3** tfntil- then Hitler * Order, OberkosBaaado der Wehr&aoht. Wshrmohtf-ashrtsagsstab, Opsrationsahteiltaig (referred to hereafter as QKlfA'FSt/Op), Kr> 00&125/it5» 6 Sot b% ia Grmdsaetsliche Bef'ehle OKn/pB SITBDlg'S?,, - I9h2 - I9i4 ICRS H, Gr. C 75133/12]i for & translation of this order see Office of Kaval Intelligence* Fuehrer Directives sad Other Top-Lave1 Directives of the German Armed Forces^ 19lj2 *>. 19^5 (Referred to hereafter as CM I, Fuehrer Directives)« p. 103# The &m»n term B<%>grbefehlshaber Suedsrest." isrhich aay asari either the Coarsander in Chief Suedsrest or his headquarters, has been readered as "OB SUBIMEST1* -when it refers to the headquarters, end as "Cossander ia Chief Sue devest" when it refers to the person, fh© saxaa applies to other theater designations, e*g. OB SITED but CoroasiTtdor in Chief Sued. MS # R-78 had vacillated betp?sen Field Marshal Ersfia Hossel and Xesselring as his choicc for Ccsasanaer in Chief of the Italian Theater. Before - Koveisbsr 19h3 HOSBSI had. coissanded Army Group B la Horthern Italy •shilo Kessalring, as CoEEBander in Chief Sued,• directed operations Before the Italian Theater was united under OS SSHEwSST, the Gosa&nd in Southern Italy was designated OB SUSS. in Southern Italy. Both Kes&elring &ad -Btmrnl, independently of * each otter, received instructions from end reported directly to OBI, She two generals held rather divergent views on the Strategy to be followed in the defense of Italys Rosso©! considered it unwise to sake a stand in Southern Italy because of the resulting disadvantages of exposing Gerjaan forces to flanking attacks from the sea, -tying doss Gerssan reserves, and extended lines of coEmsxications. Eoransel had-also advocated giving on Southern Italy even before Allied lasd<» lags on the mainland, because of his distrust of the Italians. His appointment as Coasaandar in Chief of the Italian Theater had seeded like a foregone conclusion until October 19h3* Hitler began to waver, however, after the landings at Salerno as Kesselriag demon strated the fe&sability of defending Southern Italy. Trug to his reputation as an eternal optiaist, lesseiring had aiaiadaed danger of Italy*e defection and later, after-German forces had successfully coped with Italy1 s withdrawal frm the 7/ar -without giving up their firm grip on the country, he remained convinced -2. K r MS # E-78 that a line south of Hoase could be successfully defended* A mors southern Una ©f defease, Kesaelring and his supporters argued, had the advantage of keeping Allied boabera farther away from Serssany propsr, of reducing the likalyhood of an invasion of the Balkans, of shorter defense lines and better terrain for a defense in, 'depth# and, finally# of holding on to Ecsae the possession of which was con sidered,of greatest psychological isport. :Sesselrings8 appoinfeaat as Cosssander in Chief Suedwest, effee tire as of 21 Soyember 19h3* ended the arguzaent in his favor, while Rorsrasl vr&s reassigned to & different theater,* • . * * For details of the background preceding Sesselriag,s appoint ment see MS # 1-3, Kasselringts ApaoiBtasnt as Cosgasader in Chief Southwest ( Luoian Heichler ). «a£ rVrr^SFr ^ , s-tsmmzz- In September and October l$-k% vrhils Hitler held in abey&noe ME decision to whoEE/. to giTa. orerall conaand, Sesselring. was givaa en opportunity to demonstrate in practice 'what he. :preadBd in theory* Be r:&s indeed able to slow down the Allied advance to and beyond the Voltarao Hiver#. thereby gaining T&luabl© tiias for preparing asore per- isanent positions south of Sosss» The final line beyond Tshloh the Allies wsre not' to be permitted to advance# as specified by Hitler in his order appointing Kssselring Cczsmander in Chief Suadwest, wis to run approxiss&tely from Qaeta on the I^rrhenian Sea to Ortona on the Adriatic Sea, the shortest lins across the Italian Peninsula. -3- 1 * ; V MS # a-78 II. German Defease Positions; Ths Bernhard and Gustav Line The first Gernan defensive positions along the Tolturno^ and the soc&lled Barbara Line bofeeeri ths Yclturno and th© Garigllano a Hirers* were o£y ^japorary nature intended to delay, but not to stop xths Allied advance, The defensive line that «as to mark the end of withdrawals was ths called the Berahard Line by the C-eriaans and the ' Winter Line by the Allies. She position followed the loser v C-arigliano River, turned northeastsmrd toward Mign&no and San Pietro Infine, blocking the eatranes to the l&gaaao Gap — the ? natural approach to Cassino and the Liri Pdver valley. Farther to th® north it utilised the upper reaches of the Volturno Hirer, erossed the Male11a Magaif, turned east toward the Sangro Kivar and ran north of and parallel to S&agrc, reaching the Adriatic Sea Just i northeast of Foesaoesia. The- Allied drive reached the Bernhard Line in the southern (American Fifth Ansy) sector in Hovesiber and penetrated it in Deeesber and the first half of January# Anticipating the necessity of further withdrawals* Kesselring had given orders for new posi tions to be reeonnoitered to be used as a switch position to the southern and central sector of the Bernhard Line. Construction work on this line which caias to be called the Gustav Line, started on 11 Boveia&er 19h3* and its name ms applied to ths whole defensive * felg., AmQeoberkoamando 10 (referred to hereafter as Tenth Army) to OB SUED, 15 «ov h% in AOS 10, Iatf iiriegstsgebuoh Sr» III MS # H-78 Anlagen, II. - 1S.XI. 19^3 I CSS AOS.10, h2Q92A'U mteori^ including those sections which %?ers part of the original Bsrah&rd Line« The Gustav Lins, following the oourse of the Bsrnhard Line, started on the coast southwest of Minturao, curved ground'- the south ern slopes of the hills just south of Minturne, froxa'there it extend ed to the Garigliano River just east of that town,. It then followed the - river beyond the point where the Bernhard Line branched off, toward Eign&no, continuing along the west bank of the G&rigliano, Gsri* end Sapido rivers, through the town of G&ssino* through the Abrussi national Park, to & point just south of Alfed-eoa, where it ones more joined the Bsrshard Line,* • Is the northern sector# bordering on the Adriatic Sea, the Bemhard Line had been abandoned by the Ge-raaas soaatsfaat. earlier* By January the front line ran about halfsray betsaeen the abandoned Bernhardt Line and a newly prepared position called the Foro Line• The Poro Line reached the Adriatic a few kiloaeters southeast of Pesoara. Tenth Arsy Situation !aap (It 100 000), 17 Ijl** in AOIf 10, Ia» Kriegsta.p;ebuoh Sr.