CORPS DEFENSIVE OP".RATI GNS ALONG the GARIGUANO, GARI, and HAPIDO RIVERS, 17-31 January 191&

MS # R-?6

cO° "A 7 \

XI7 PAlTZEF; CORPS DEFENSIVE OP".RATI GNS ALONG THE GARIGUANO, GARI, AND HAPIDO RIVERS, 17-31 January 191&

A Study Undertaken in Support of the Volume Salerno to Cassino UBRARY^^. by USACGSCFT l£AV£fWORlHf*WI' Philip A. Growl (OCMHt In Progress)

Foreign Studies Branch Office of the Chief of Military History Washington, D«C« Kovoisber 1955 70 pages

- . I MS # t-73

OT PAHZBR CORPS DEFE-BSIYE OPESATIOSS ALOIfG THE afilOLXABQ, GARX, AID R4PIIX) RIVSSS, lj - J1 JAIIUAST X9W** fable of Contents ' • Paga

X..• Introduction*'• Historical Background 4*•*»•*».**.. 1 # II* Geraan Defensive Positions', Shs Bsrnhgrd &nd Custav Lines. Li. XXI* Organisation, 'Overall Strength end Chain of CoswtBd of SeraaR Forces in Italy...»+*«*•»*•••+ 8

IT. Hhs Situation at tha Eve of Allied Attack Against Gastsv' Line* #•#*•*•* * f * * •% # • « •* *'• » * # ***•»»#• * * * •* *#»#»***•*** '# • 16

At Serosa Order of Battle and Beplcrjssant of Troops, . . 1? January 19MU *••*******•**«»#«•*# * v * *• * * * »• i * .* « • * • * *' 16

Esiimte of Allied Capabilities and Intentions*#**..*> 19

C* Beployasat ©f 8ema Reserves, 17 January 19H+- ' 25

4' Y. The- Attack by British 10 Corps against the Sarigli&ao Sirer see-tor# 17 - 25 January -19^*• • * * • * # » • *• • * * • #**»## • • 27 A. Crossing the Qsurigli&no, 17-18 January...•,*..«**«»*, 27 B. Gersoan Coimterjafflaroree*..**...»»»...***«».*.**•*.»*.. 32

C. Continuation, of 10 Corps attack and Sarsan Countsratt&ck..,.35

P. Ssrsis® Losses.• »»*»«»•.*•»•»»«»•»*»»»*»-«»»»»•*«*«»*»* 1*0

VI» XI (IS) Corps Attack against Sari and t&pido Pavers, • 20-21}. January.• 1*1

¥11. Effect of . Allied landing at Ansio on Fighting along (hastef*

Till. Combat Action on lor them Wing XI¥ Panzer Corps, 51

Overlays and hssm'ms

Overlay Er. Is Gemsa Defense Lines in Italy,3& Orerlay 8r« 2s %XT Banger Corps, Baployiaant of foraes aad intelligence Estteate.15®. Overlay Hr# • % 9ii-th Birision Sector* 17 Jan !&«*.••••>*.: 26a • Overlay Hr» ut fema Units couth of liri Hirer, 21 January jSo. v ' Overlay Br» 3' 15th Panzer Orenadier Piris ion gee tor 20-C-5*"Jannary lv^4** *••.»••*•» »«%•«». «. * Ilia Overlay Sr. 6t 2X7 Panzer Corps-deploynant of -units, 51a Table of Contents (Cont'd) i^-ge

Annex Nr. 1; Garisan Order of Battle 17 January 1944-...... 62 Annex Nr. 2 j German Order of Battle 21 Jaira&ry 1944.«-»...... 63 Annex Kr. 3s' Strength. Report, Armor and Weapons of Gerssn Bivisiens. 64-70

[Notes OVERLAYS ABE INCLUDED ONLY IN. HISTORIAN*S AND AUTHOR'S COPY] m # a-78 *u

I* Introduction; W Four aaonths had el&peed since the Allies had seca-ed their

' bsaehhead at Salerno arid started their advance north on the Italian

mainland isrhsu, on 15 Jsauary ISMi* Allied troops reached the

approaches to .the' G-ust&v lias. The Gus tav Lias represented th©

"finallias of defease south of Sosa® at -rhioh the G-erci&n High,

Cemasaad was determined to hold the Allies at bay.

=? The- seeisioa to defend Southern Italy &nd to hold. Beam hairnet

been iB&&® by Hitler until the fall of lyh3 sad found its formal ex

pression in the aapointsasai of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring as

CoEsaaader is Chief Suedwest on 6 loveaber 19^3** tfntil- then Hitler

* Order, OberkosBaaado der Wehr&aoht. Wshrmohtf-ashrtsagsstab,

Opsrationsahteiltaig (referred to hereafter as QKlfA'FSt/Op), Kr>

00&125/it5» 6 Sot b% ia Grmdsaetsliche Bef'ehle OKn/pB SITBDlg'S?,,

- I9h2 - I9i4 ICRS H, Gr. C 75133/12]i for & translation of this

order see Office of Kaval Intelligence* Fuehrer Directives sad

Other Top-Lave1 Directives of the German Armed Forces^ 19lj2 *>. 19^5

(Referred to hereafter as CM I, Fuehrer Directives)« p. 103# The

&m»n term B<%>grbefehlshaber Suedsrest." isrhich aay asari either the

Coarsander in Chief Suedsrest or his headquarters, has been readered

as "OB SUBIMEST1* -when it refers to the headquarters, end as

"Cossander ia Chief Sue devest" when it refers to the person, fh©

saxaa applies to other theater designations, e*g. OB SITED but

CoroasiTtdor in Chief Sued. MS # R-78

had vacillated betp?sen Field Marshal Ersfia Hossel and Xesselring as his choicc for Ccsasanaer in Chief of the Italian Theater. Before -

Koveisbsr 19h3 HOSBSI had. coissanded Army Group B la Horthern Italy

•shilo Kessalring, as CoEEBander in Chief Sued,• directed operations

Before the Italian Theater was united under OS SSHEwSST, the

Gosa&nd in Southern Italy was designated OB SUSS.

in Southern Italy. Both Kes&elring &ad -Btmrnl, independently of

* each otter, received instructions from end reported directly to OBI,

She two generals held rather divergent views on the Strategy to be followed in the defense of Italys Rosso©! considered it unwise to sake a stand in Southern Italy because of the resulting disadvantages of exposing Gerjaan forces to flanking attacks from the sea, -tying

doss Gerssan reserves, and extended lines of coEmsxications. Eoransel

had-also advocated giving on Southern Italy even before Allied lasd<»

lags on the mainland, because of his distrust of the Italians. His

appointment as Coasaandar in Chief of the Italian Theater had seeded

like a foregone conclusion until October 19h3* Hitler began to

waver, however, after the landings at Salerno as Kesselriag demon

strated the fe&sability of defending Southern Italy. Trug to his

reputation as an eternal optiaist, lesseiring had aiaiadaed

danger of Italy*e defection and later, after-German forces had

successfully coped with Italy1 s withdrawal frm the 7/ar -without

giving up their firm grip on the country, he remained convinced

-2. K r MS # E-78

that a line south of Hoase could be successfully defended* A mors

southern Una ©f defease, Kesaelring and his supporters argued, had

the advantage of keeping Allied boabera farther away from Serssany

propsr, of reducing the likalyhood of an invasion of the Balkans,

of shorter defense lines and better terrain for a defense in, 'depth#

and, finally# of holding on to Ecsae the possession of which was con

sidered,of greatest psychological isport. :Sesselrings8 appoinfeaat

as Cosssander in Chief Suedwest, effee tire as of 21 Soyember 19h3*

ended the arguzaent in his favor, while Rorsrasl vr&s reassigned to & different theater,* • . . *

* For details of the background preceding Sesselriag,s appoint

ment see MS # 1-3, Kasselringts ApaoiBtasnt as Cosgasader in Chief

Southwest ( Luoian Heichler ). «a£ rVrr^SFr ^ , s-tsmmzz-

In September and October l$-k% vrhils Hitler held in abey&noe ME

decision to whoEE/. to giTa. orerall conaand, Sesselring. was givaa en

opportunity to demonstrate in practice 'what he. :preadBd in theory* Be

r:&s indeed able to slow down the Allied advance to and beyond the

Voltarao Hiver#. thereby gaining T&luabl© tiias for preparing asore per-

isanent positions south of Sosss» The final line beyond Tshloh the

Allies wsre not' to be permitted to advance# as specified by Hitler in his order appointing Kssselring Cczsmander in Chief Suadwest, wis

to run approxiss&tely from Qaeta on the I^rrhenian Sea to Ortona on

the Adriatic Sea, the shortest lins across the Italian Peninsula.

-3- 1 * ; V MS # a-78

II. German Defease Positions; Ths Bernhard and Gustav Line

The first Gernan defensive positions along the Tolturno^ and

the soc&lled Barbara Line bofeeeri ths Yclturno and th© Garigllano a Hirers* were o£y ^japorary nature intended to delay, but not to stop

xths Allied advance, The defensive line that «as to mark the end of

withdrawals was ths called the Berahard Line by the C-eriaans and the

' Winter Line by the Allies. She position followed the loser

v C-arigliano River, turned northeastsmrd toward Mign&no and San

Pietro Infine, blocking the eatranes to the l&gaaao Gap — the ?

natural approach to Cassino and the Liri Pdver valley. Farther to

th® north it utilised the upper reaches of the Volturno Hirer,

erossed the Male11a Magaif, turned east toward the Sangro Kivar and

ran north of and parallel to S&agrc, reaching the Adriatic Sea Just

i northeast of Foesaoesia.

The- Allied drive reached the Bernhard Line in the southern

(American Fifth Ansy) sector in Hovesiber and penetrated it in

Deeesber and the first half of January# Anticipating the necessity

of further withdrawals* Kesselring had given orders for new posi

tions to be reeonnoitered to be used as a switch position to the

southern and central sector of the Bernhard Line. Construction

work on this line which caias to be called the Gustav Line, started

on 11 Boveia&er 19h3* and its name ms applied to ths whole defensive

* felg., AmQeoberkoamando 10 (referred to hereafter as Tenth

Army) to OB SUED, 15 «ov h% in AOS 10, Iatf iiriegstsgebuoh Sr» III MS # H-78

Anlagen, II. - 1S.XI. 19^3 I CSS AOS.10, h2Q92A'U

mteori^ including those sections which %?ers part of the original

Bsrah&rd Line«

The Gustav Lins, following the oourse of the Bsrnhard Line,

started on the coast southwest of Minturao, curved ground'- the south ern slopes of the hills just south of Minturne, froxa'there it extend

ed to the Garigliano River just east of that town,. It then followed

the - river beyond the point where the Bernhard Line branched off, toward

Eign&no, continuing along the west bank of the G&rigliano, Gsri* end

Sapido rivers, through the town of G&ssino* through the Abrussi

national Park, to & point just south of Alfed-eoa, where it ones more

joined the Bsrshard Line,*

• Is the northern sector# bordering on the Adriatic Sea, the

Bemhard Line had been abandoned by the Ge-raaas soaatsfaat. earlier*

By January the front line ran about halfsray betsaeen the abandoned

Bernhardt Line and a newly prepared position called the Foro Line•

The Poro Line reached the Adriatic a few kiloaeters southeast of

Pesoara. Tenth Arsy Situation !aap (It 100 000), 17 Ijl** in

AOIf 10, Ia» Kriegsta.p;ebuoh Sr. XT, /a la gen 17- - 23 I» 19'ih (cited

hereafter as Tenth Army, K73 XT, Aalagen 17. - 2?« I« 19lilt) [CRS

AGK 10, I42092/233.

-5" MS f E-78

Behind the Gustar Line yet another defensive position ms

under eea$ traction. Sanrdng southwest frcsa Cassiao toward

Terrecina., it passed south of Piedimoate, just east of Acquiao

• asd Postsconr©* terssiuatijag aorth of Foadi. the lins,,intsadefi

to serve as a switch position to the Gustav L4rts»: -was called, at

first, ths Fuehrer Slegel end later ths yon Sanger Riege 1 after

ths CoazsandiRg General SIT Pa&ssr Corps*»

tenth. Arsar Situation w&p (is 100 000), 17 <&a kkf in *

AOE 10, la. Iriegst&gebuoh 'Kr» X¥, Anlagen 17- * 23«I» 19lii (citad hereafter as Tenth krmr, KT3 IV, Aalagsn 17« -» 23. X, f CBS

|A OK 10. Ij209£/233»

" - position was kaosra to the Allies as ths EAdolf Hitler

Line'V fh© fena&a tern "Riegol" is probably best translated as

"i^itsh position,K .

Daring an insection toar to XIV panzer Corps the Cossandiag

Oeasral charastsrised construction work on the Gustav

Line as "good® for ths sections north of Cassia© and south of Satit t Aagelo; bstwesn Santimgelo and Cassiao, however, he fait that the

line "needed isiproTesents»" * Construction work on the von eoager

* Memo, Tsnth Arriy, 7 Jan Ldu Fahrtenbeaerkiin^en des Hsrrn Oberbafehlshabors aalaesslioh seiner Fahrt am 7*1. 19ulu in Tenth \ / Array. KTB 17, Anlagen. 17. - 23. I. 19hh.

-6- MS # H-78

Rlegel had nade little progress by the beginning of January sinse f isproverasnt of the Gustair Lino was considered more urgent and reeeived priority.

By 15 January l-thli the German main line of resist&nse ra the

Gustav Line, even though achr&nse cu::posts, and corah-it patrols still operated east of the S&rigli&no, Gari, and Rapid© Papers« IS # R—78

III. Qr,genigatlont Ovgrall Strength, and ChsliE of Coaragnd of German

Forces in Italy

The Italian Theater -was placed under unified coasiand on 21 Novesber 1943, as noted above, and designated OB Sji&Uir&aT' ana Army Group C.&

The designation Army Group S which appears in the' Krie gstagebuch CO/^FSt, I» IX - 31.HI. 194-3. entry fear 6 Nov 43, is in errorj for the correct •designation, Araiy Group C. see entry for 21 K o

Actually cne headquarter under Kssselriag, the adaitonal designation, of Army Group C Barely implied that Qberkosa-sando des Heeres (here after referred to as OKK) was required to furnish the necessary cozsplenient,and logistical support, a regular army group Gossand was authorised, Throughout the first quarter of 1944. OB SEEDIEST ^as located on "cnte Soratte, north of Rase. As ConEsander in Chief Suedwest, Kesselring had direct corn-sand over.all units of the Army cm Italian soil and of those forces of the SS and Luftwaffe directly engaged in ground eor&hat. All" other forces of the SS, laftwaffe, and German Navy regained directly under the jurisdiction of the Reichsfuehrer SS(1»e » Elaaleg) « OberkoHsnando der l&ftwaffe (hereafter referred to as OKL), and the Oberkosmando der Marine (hereafter referred to as 0K2d) respectively. In all natters pertaining to combat an the mainland, Commander in Chief Suedwest could give binding orders to any unit. Moreover, on 19 January 1944,

-3- MS $1-78

Hitler clarified the situation further by authorising Iesselr2iig to assuae unrestricted coxaaana ovar all units of the SS, Luftwaffe, and

Navy suitable for ground combat "in case the situation should require such Ecti®.The juriddictianal can-flicts fshich were bound to arise

«• Order, OOT/WFSt/Op, Nr. 0073. 19 Jan. 44, in Heeresgruppe C, la.

"verschledenest Januar — Jmi 1944 /CES H.Gr.C. 75138^S7,

with the SS in. particular had little or no effect on fighting en the front, but they were important in the sphere of occupation policy and antipartisan warfare. The sission of OB SPESWSST was defined by OKW on 6 November 1943 to include{

1, Defense of Central Italy aimg the line Gaeta - Qrtona. 2. Defense of the coastline agaiast possible invasion attempts with particular esiphasis on the Genoa area arid the coast alcng the Tyrrhenian Sea in general.

,..3# Pacification of partisan infested areas.

' r4«- Preparation. of plans for an offensive in Apulia if and -?shen Allied moves to mount an attack agaiast the Balkans frost Southern Italy should become apparent.**

* Order, Onf/fFSt/Op. Nr. 006123/43. 6 Mov 43, in Grundsaetzllche Befehle OKW/OB SUEDWEST,- 1942 - 1944 /CRS H.Gr.C. 75138/^. .

-9- MS # R-7S

By January 1944 the mission of OB StiisDWSST had not changes substantially!* except that a s?«jor Allied venture in the oalkans ms no longer consider ed iaaittsnt. the idea of waging an offensive on the Adriatic front sector against British Eighth Anay was not dropped, however, until after

15i® Allied landings at Ansio had taken place.-

* As late as 21 Deoaiaber 191+3* the coraaariding general Tenth Army iBferase! Kesselring that hs thought &n opportune moment had arrived to launch an offensive against the vre&kensd British Eighth Army sector, eonourriag in this with the commanding gemral of IXVv'I Panzer Corps which was faeing Eighth irsrv*. Meiac, Tenth Arisy, la to OB SGE1MES% fir,

3l/k5t 21 Bsc 1+3, in Tenth Arzrf KTB III, Anlarten, Chefsachea fCRS, AOK lOj 1+2092/lS].

To aooo&plisli its laission OB gUgpgfESf controlled tsso armies,

?otgtteeni& irsar and Tenth Arr?/. Fourteenth Ar^r territory covered ep of Borthera Italy to tha sross-eoiintry higl»my from Orbe-tello to Porto

Civitanova and included the island of Elba# Tenth Arsy area reached south, frca tho border with Fourteenth. Arsr/ to the front lines.

Attached to Fourteenth Ate*? in the beginning of January wore

LI Mcnaitaia Corps, LXXXVZI g'orps and a provisional e ossiand design®,tod

Corps Witthoeft after the naas of the ooEssnding general# Fourteenth

Amy, at that tima, comprised three infantry divisions, 65th, 35^ th and 162nd (Turk) Divisions * tv?o divisions in process of organization,

-10- MS # a-78

* Jhe l62nd (Turk) Division was composed primarily of members

of Turkic nationality groups from the C&ueasian region of Soviet

Russia,

the 278tli end 562nd Division; one repl&oesent division, the 188th

Reserve Mountain Division, attached to Fourteenth An?/, but under

control of GKH; another division, the l6thSS Panssr Grenadier

Division was in process of organisation out of the former Sturm-

brigade Reichsfuehrer SS aM under SS control* Thus a total of

seven divisions •wsre located in Northern Italy of -which only three

were anywhere near full strength asd ready for coxabat. The total

^Vsrpf legunesstaerke "* of FourtoaRth. Arrry on 15 January 19144-

* Q&?/%FSt, Iriegstagebucht Ausarbeitung; "Die Entericklung im

Suadwesten, 1,1. 5l« 121, 19liua ia OKg/feSt, Kriegstagebuoh.»

Ausarbeitung "Pie Enfcricklurtg im Suedwesten" and *Die Kaeapfe una

den Brueekenkopf Isttuno» 22, I. - 51* III« 19ljli-»w (Hereafter cited

as WFSt, Ausarbeitung Suod-yresten and WBSt, Ausarbeitung Hettuno)»

[ OCMH Files]. The German BsSljod of accounting for the strength

of units at that time, distinguished between "7erpflegrun.^sst&grka"

(nsaber of ma to be fed), gIst St&erke" (number of sen appearing

on laorning report - hereafter referred to as assigned strength),

"Gefschtsstaerke" {nmaber of men available for regular duty - here

after referred to as effective strength), *Grabenstaerken (number of

-11- > MS # E-78

lasa available for combat duly excluding staff of regimental a»3

higher headquarters, msdical personnel, drivers, rasss personnel,

etc.-hereafter referred to as effective infantry combat strength),

aridj, finally, "Soli Staerksw ( number of men authorised by table

of organization)» Of these the Yerpflsgungestaer ke \ms the least

representative of actual strength - excluding, of course, the Soli

Staerks - since it ma kept as high as possible and included

auxiliary ansy personnel.

135, OCX) men. With this force Fourteenth Amy, in cooperation -filth

ths SS, ms to guard against Allied iErasioa attempts and maintain

security in Northern Italy, particularly in the partisan infested

northeastern seotor bordering on Yugoslavia.

In the south Tenth Army w&s charged -prith conducting defensive

operations against Allied ground forces aM with protesting the

right flank of ths arsagr, from ths main line of resistance to

Terracina, against tactical landing operations to the rear of Tenth

Amy. Tenth Anay headquarters throughout the winter and spring

19i?-3/y+ "tf&s located at Mars a d'Albe north of Avezsano. fhe Army,

commanded by

gennant Soheej (hereafter referred to as General Ton Tietinghoff),

in ths beginning of January comprised two Passer Corps: XI7 Panzer

Corps, consaanded by General der Panzertruppen FSridolin von Sanger

unci Etterlin (hereafter referred to as General von Sengor), with.

-12- MS # E-73

three infantry divisions, tsro Panser Grenadier divisions, and one zaountain division? and IZXtt Panzer Corns, cossanded by General der

Baazertroppen Tr&ugott Berr, with three divisions - one Psazor diri-» sion, ona parachut© division, and one infantry division.* In addi-

* A. fouriii division, the Srd F&nssr Grenadier Division^ sas first attached to U-Xvl ftiaaer Corps but diverted to UY F'aaggr Corps in the

Mddle of Jantsary.

'' p

tion, Tenth Aiw comprised the reinforced 305th Infantry Division,

temporarily ©levated to m provisional corps oossnssd and designated ~

Corps fiauck after the a&ae of the division cfaaaandsiv' ffhe Ber&am

Goer Ins: Panzer Division,. ..reconstituted after its virtual annihilation ,F <*"' in lortli Africa, ms Tenth, Arm reserve* -The ^esigaefi streagta of

Tenth Arrgy rs of 1 January l^iA- was 167# 000;officers, nonaoar-issiomd

officers, and -msa and the effective strength was 88, i£?l«*

* Strength JUsport, Tenth Irxsy, la/id Br, 117/tilu 10 Jaa kb, la

Tenth Aray. £15 17. Anlagen •&»!» > 10.1»19&t fOHS, AQg 10, h2Q92/21l,

fenth i^w Ternflet^mRsstagrks for 15 January l^bh is given as 272,000 jasnj WFSt, Ausarfcoltung Suedwesten* p, liu For explanation of 'German teras relating to strength reports, see above p. 11.

In addition to the law© armies QB SUBDSSSf comprised I Parachute Corps* with the 90th and 29th Panser Grenadier Divisions attached,

-15-' MS # R-78

in the ROEJ® area. The tr/o divisions were deployed in central Italy along the coast from fferraciaa to Grbetsllo. A threefold purpose was the riby ssrvsd; l) the tsro divisions had a chance for rest and rohabi1itaticn, badly needed along long periods of active fighting in the front linesj 2) their presence in Central Italy along tha coast guarded against Allied landings there; and 3) they served as central mobile r#sarve for QB SRTEPffSSf. Also located in eentr&I

Italy was the lyfch Paras Irate Division still is process of organisation and under -control of DEL end attached to XI Air carps with headquarters at Perugia.

Is all, tsrsntyone divisions :w#r» at the disposal of* 03 -gteuii'gST,

/including four in process of organisation and one replaeesnent division and eleven either ia>tths front lines, tactical reserve, or in transit r "ft*# near ~Jv* *9'r, Af> M "JiTxie. dty>s/0nT /n -fcrfcerr. /, to a front sector^ / Jhsring an inspection tour* of the Chief ISlSt* General** ' y oberst Alfred Jodl, on I4. and 5 January 19144-* fesselring outlined his recjuireasnts as 19-20 divisions: eight to nine divisions in the front lines, two Eiotorissd divisions as taotioal reserve, two 2x10 torisect or araored divisions in the HOE® area, and seven divisions in Horthern

Italy of which ism could V© in process of organisation. * After the

* ¥?St, Ausarbeitufe?: Sitedvrestszu pp* 9"*1G»

contemplated mthdra®&l of two divisions from Italy, lesselring would have had the number of divisions he thought necessary, but five instead of tr/o were in process of organization snd three of these

~lli~ MS # S-78

were »ot directly under OB r1IED??BS?« Aotu&lly the ruza&er of divisions ia Italy •was not decreased, but increased because of the Allied land ing at Aasio (s©s below)*

Sons idea of the strength of 0-eraan forces in Italy my bs gained from two sets of ..figures available for this period* Q& 15 J&msry the Terpflegruttffsstaarbs of OB SoEMBSf ms 680, 000 ssn, * while in' " :

• WFSt, Aus&rbeitimg SiKsdyreetan, p. Ilu .

Sovembsr 19^.3 the assigned strength ms 296,000.'* The latter figte*e

* Report, OJgi/Qp^nis&tloasEijtteiltgsg, fey l/sliTS/liS. 9 I>eo li5* irt OKs/OrganisationgE-bteiluagu MSB An.l6P.exx 1. XIJ « - 15is-5»

£ CBS* Ha/210-' 3 ... .

mnild still have bees approxteately correct is the; first, half of ;

January siaes no ssijor changes occurred ia the order ofbattla at that tirss, and since replacements covered or

-15- MS # R-78

17. The Situation at the Eve of Allied Attack against Gustav Line

Am Geraan Order of Battle and Deployment of Troops, 1? January I9U4

Tenth Array order of battle and deployment of units on 17 January 19144-

reflected the course cf battle during the last few weeks, The sain attacks of the Allied forces had been against ths southern wing of tenth Ansy (XIY

leaser Corps sector) end were ssade In tha direction of Cassino and the Iiri Valley. Soreover, it -Eras expsoted that the earns sector vrauldoontinue to be subjected to Allied attacks with the objective of readiang Rome as soon &® possible. The northern wing of Tenth Ars?r frog, the Adriatic to the Made 11a ; ;

Massif, ;; and facing British Bighth Arsy, -eras held by L2XYI Panser Corps -with 1st Parachute Division, 26th Panser Slvislen* and 35Uth Infantry .

Division in Use. Adjoining UCSV1 Panzer Corps to a point-©est of Castel San Ylacesso ms Corps Hauck (3Q5th Division). The mountainous regions of this sector were virtually impassable during the winter aonths and therefore weakly occupied by both sides. fhe area south of Corps Hauak. facing Fifth (US) Artsy, ^ras defended by XIY Paneer Corps with the divi

sions deployed as follows (See also overl-aySr. 2}t In the north, from the iferazei Sational f&rk to a point southwest of San Elia, the line

t?as held by 5th Mountain Division and one regissnt of the 3rd Panzer

Grenadier Division* the remainder of the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division was en route frtsa I3CXVI Panger Corps and the fioss area.* Below San Elia

* 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division had been en route to IXW1 Panzer Corps

from I Parachute Corps to replace 90th Panser grenadier Division -gfaieh in

-16- MS #S -78 '

turn ms transferred to the Eosifi area a ferv? days earlierj hcnsrever, be cause of ths critical situation that developed north of Cassino hotvrsen

XO and Uh. January* 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division n^s diverted to XIV

Panzer Corps to las deployed in -ths ssess sector as 5th. Mountain Division.

Tenth Arsy, la. £13 17. 1. - 51.1. I9l4u 15 «Jaa

to ths Ecasss — Baples railroad line the Igixth Division^ also known by its honorary title Koch und Deutsohissister and composed exclusively of ilustrlans, ^as deployed along the banks of the Sapido River* north south of Cassino. Also la this sector m ona regissat of the Tlst

Divisioai ufhile the bulk of ths latter division was still' in transit frca northern Italy. * Adjoining ijitth Division. 15th Fanser grenadier Division

* It had been planned that 71st Division would replace blith which, in turn, would relieve 15th Paaser Grenadier Pivisioa so that the - latter eould be utilized as a reserve division. Tenth Arzgy. ET3 IV, 1. - 51.

I. l^bijy 12 Jan ItL.

hold tise sector north astd south of the confluence of the Liri and G&rigli&no

Rivers to £ point eastsoutheast of riant* Andrea, The southerrusost sector of XIV Paris or Corps was as signed to' 9-Uth Pivlslsion vrhioh was also r©e pons I** ble for guarding Mis coast as far north as Terracim. The Horsgxtgi Soaring

Panser Division, frith the balk of its troops and equipnssnt, was also deployed in XI7 Panzer Corps sector to be used, as t&etio&l reserve. The division was slated to be transferred to OB WEST In the latter part of January and

-1?- 128, # a-78

15th P&aser Grenadier Division wag to take its place aa a reserve

division.* However, Aaeric&n Fifth. Aray offensive which ' started 17

* Order, OB SPEBSmST, Hr«5lilA3. 30 Doc 1*5, in Tenth Amy. STB

III, Anlasren, Chsfsachea [ CHS, AQg 10. l»2Q92/i3l«

^aausry I9i»4 the l&adiag at Aasio interfered with these plans

and Bensana Soaring Panser Division regained ia the the&tsr for sevEr&l

7HQT& mmtfiM* V:.»

Thus, on 17 January 19I4I4., the day the Allied assault on the Qua "bay

Lias bsg&n, American Fifth Arsgr m faced by four divisions, plus one

regiasjsst ©aeh of tsro more divisions in line^ and one Paiiser division la

reserve* The manpower of XT? Panzer Coros St that tias was approxliae.te-

ly li-5*000 Esan aseigj»d- strength and 27,000 men effective strength.*

* "Without the 71st sad 5rd P&nger Grenadier Division^ bat including

the Herasaca Goering Panzer Division. XI7 Panzer Corps assigned • strength ms I4X), 000 saeru Excluding the 71st Pivie ion, but including one rsgiaezrb

of the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division and the Herza&m Goering Banger Divi

sion the effective strength WSJS 2% UOG sssru Strength Seport, Tenth Arsy.

13 Jan lib* in' Tenth toy. KTB I?. Anlagsn, 11. - l6. I, 19lih f CHS. AOS 10.

-10- MS # a-78

B« Estimate'of Allied Capabilities and Intentions

At.least as early as 1 Hoveaber 19b3 03 SUEDWESf (at that tizsa OB SPED) realised that the city of Home vras a prizasry objective of the

Allied driTej thereforej it me expected that Strang attacks would be laade against the s outhem seetor cf the front held by XIT'Paaser Corps and that terrain 2aost suited for armored vehicles would mark immediate

Allied goals. At the sasse time, tactical landings were anticipated to the Immediate rear of Tenth Army and in ths area of Roias and north thereof* * Ths successful Allied attempt to force the l&gn&ao Sap la

* Order#, OB SUSP, llr» h£>&Ai5» Befehl fuer die Kesroffughrtaag, 1 HOT l±% la Tenth te ICTB III, Anlagen. Chef sac hen [CHS, A OK 10, h2092/Wl*

order to reach Cassias and the approaches to ths Liri Vailsy during

December and tha first half of January tended to confirm this ©stla&te of Allied intentions. After Fifth (US) Arn^r had reached ths Gust&v

Line, on 15 January X9lsk* along the whole front of XI¥ Faster Corps, it vms expected that attaeks in this general area wuld "be resumed shortly# although the specific direction of the anticipated assault remised a isatter of speculation. She attack of British 10 Corps oa the night of 17-18 January I9I4U to establish a bridgehead across the Garigliauo River caught the Gsrsans# if not by c cap lets surprise, at least somewhat off balance, the deploy* sent of Senaan units and reserves on If January 19^4- was still under the

-19, * r MS # R-78

impact of the concentrated Allied attacks northeast and southeast of

Casslno between 5 15 January*, The daily situation report of Tentii

Atbw.for instanoe, anticipated that strong pressure against 5th Mountain

Division north of Gassino would be re suae d 17 January, v/ithout mentioning

•fee possibility of other Allied thrusts further south,* She Germans were ...oV qvra.

* Dally sitrep, Tenth Arrry» la. l6 Jan I4J4, in Tenth irsor KTB IV, Anlagen 11. - l6. X» i9iii f CBS, AOS 10. 0=2/22 1

not usw&re, horevsr, that a build-up of Allied for 000 ms taking place

opposite the northern wing 9ltth Division and the southern wing 15th Banger Grenadier Division below the confluence of ths Oarigliano and

Liri Rivers, On 17 January Kesselrinj; warned of a possible attack in

that sec top without, however, giving the impr&sslon that it appeared

isalns nt. In the same vein. General von Yistinghoff expressed Ms un

certainty at 2150 hours - the very time British 10 Corps started its

drive across the Garigii&no - whether the Allies opposite 9lith Division

were regrouping or whether they wars reinforcing that sector. In any

case he too pointed out that no 21a jor action was to bo expected there

in the iissediate future beoauses "at present we are having moonless

sights which he [the enesy} has bsen avoiding so far*B#

* Telephone conversation# Keeselring - General von Yietinghoff, 17

Jan hh* In Tenth Arm KfB IT. Anlaeon 17. -21. I. 19iilt [CHS, AOK 10. 1^2092/233.

I -20- MS :# K-78

German intelligence officers and other staff officers of Tenth

Array tod 03 SUBDIffiSf on 17 January vtere unable to supply their cosaandsre with accurate information concerning the strength and deployment of

Allied forces. It was recognised that the offensive operations against

XI¥ ?anser Corps *er« about to be restanad any day, but the direction of the attack as wall as the divisions which would execute it were not as certained. It-was thought that ijasriean Fif tk .teay had eosapleted, or ms still in procee ® of, recouping,

A Geraan G—2 situation map of JIT Panger Corps, dated II4. January, ' ^ placed British 10 Corps, II (US) Corps, and a French Ccr^s whose identi- ty ms aeye t uncenfirmed opposite XIV Pansar Corps (See also overlay

Nr. 2). 10 Corps, with the 56th and lp£h Divisions, was believed to extend frcsa the Garigliaao estuary to Cedro Hill, three silos south, of

Csrvaro. Behind 10 Corps ths 2nd (US) Arinored Division (sic ) was indicat

ed as being is reserve.* II (£fS) Corps, -sri-th the 1st Armored, 3Utk» &nd

* It is not known why ths Germans ease to believe that 2nd Amored

Division was located near the front lilies. A German high-level intelli

gence report, dated 11 January 19kh, Eientionsd that the division had

been ccesiitted in Sicily where it suffered heavy casualties. It •s&S

suspected o5 being in. Southern Italy since the middle of Hovens-ber.

During the first days of January it vsas believed deployed behind the

1st Arisored Divislos and since 9 January it was reported in action.

The informtion «as, however, considered unconfirmed, Ifat, Verbindxaigs-

Offl&ler Ausland/lc. Hsrkunft der in Sueditalien ainf-asetzten und isa rueck-

waertlgea Gebiet erk3.nr.ten Ver'oaonde, Faehrerhauptquartier, 11 Jan I3I1, in

OSS. Itallen-Schreeiz [CHS, OS?/?33.

«"31» MS # R-78

elements of the $6th division la line adjoined 10 Corps to the north and extended to a point about 2 l/2 kilometers north of Csmro. The

C2nd Airborne Division vras thought to be II Corps reserve. Korth of

II Corps to the Fifth Ara§r boundary, pl&oed 2 l/2 kilcaaetess north of

Casts I San Vineeazo, a French Corps v/i th the Jrd Algsriaa and 2nd

»loroccan KLvision, constituted the right wing of Fifth iirsy. *

* Enemy situation sap, XI? Pg Corps, Xc, Hr» Tlydilu lii Jsa hXh ia

XI7 ?z Corps. Iq« Anlagehaft 1, I. - I. ig-lii. fCRS, XIY ?a Corps.

5&200/33- . P

The existence of a separate French Gorpscoasiand was act yet definite ly established* Moreover, VI (US) Corps, until recently opposite XIY Blazer

Corps, ms no longer located together with the 14.5th and 3^d Divisions slid the 6th Armored Division (the latter appease with a question mark on the «nes§r situation mp), -

A Tenth Aray enemy situation map, dated 18 January I9lii% but presumab ly reflecting information available 17 January, shows the sens divisions ia the same order, except that the 2nd Arstored ms placed behind the 1st

Arxaored Division and that the 6th Armored no longer apr>eared.*

• Sassy situation mp, Tenth Army, Io, 16 Jan idh Tenth Array KTB IY«

•gnlegen^ Taetlgksitsbarioht, lo mit Anlagen, 1« ~ 31. I* 19lnk [C:- S, h2Q92/5lU

The G-2 situation sap# however, did not reflect the anxieties and doubts of the Geraaa cexmaanding officers* The truth of th© satter v-s.s

-22- MS # R-78

that the location of eny of the American divisions was uncertain, the sost. iaforsed guess being that II (US) Corps was deploying its forces is a narratr eaotor tjetweea Caepluo &ad Saat* Angelo. Moreover, irtiile the British sector was quits large, concentration, of troops was noticed and the daily situation report of Tenth Army for If J&auary, stands

RIhe forward movement of the emvg1 against the northern irf.ag 9hth

Division and against the right [southern] wing 15th Panzer Grenadier Pivisioa as well as further eaengr relnforcemaatsreported on th@ saat bank of the Gari River opposite 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, leave opea the possibility of & new ooaeeatratioa of eaesy foroa»n*

fcDaily sitrep, Tenth Army, Xa« IT Jaa hlu in Tenth Anw fffB, Aal&gen

The intelligence pic ture oa 17 Jaauary as it appeared to Serisaa seEsjsaads revealed several changes frees earlier estimates, Si© sector held by the French divisions had bsocsas wider and covered aa area of about 30 tea straight liae dieteaoe. The Axasricaa II Corps sector had shrunk to about 5 km, from SartAngelo to Cassinc., and there was even

SOB© speculation that the Arasricaa divisions HAD been withdrawn alto gether, but this possibility was irmiedietely discounted, The 10 Corps sector had also beeojae somewhat wider, but the deployment of forces there and the aotsd Allied troop aovemeata smde the Gemaas uncertain as to Allied intentions. The only thiag that seemed reasonably certaia was .that aa attack -was IsBtziaent. ead that it v/ould not bo forthconiag

-23- MS # R-78

from, the ITenoh sector because troops there -were spread too thinly for at. c oncer tod effort at any one point. To clear the picture, the intelligence officer, Tenth Arzsy flooded the area south of Via

Casilim (highway Br, 6) 'szita agents,3* ?ihatevQr results this effort

* Telephone conversation, Tenth Artw CofS - OS SUEEfSST CcfS. la bours 17 Jan Lilu in Tenth Arm ZTB 17, Anlaeen 17. I. - 21, I, I9II1. produced casia too late to wcrn of the iREoinent assault of 10 Corps,

la" contrast to the tmcerta3.nty that prevailed with, rsgard to Allied in teat ions in Fifth (US) ATE^T sector, there was 'general agreement eiaong

Geraaa staffa that Allied attacks in the Eighth (British) iirsy sector on the Adriatic side nere sot preliminary to -acre serious efforts on the northern front. It was noted that, despite heavy artillery fire, attacks were limited to battalion strength and -feat the ijth (Indian) Division had relieved a Hew £saland Division. Apparently it-was felt that the Indians were no great threat, since they had no ccsabat experience,*

• ' • fele phone conversation Koeselring —• von Tietinghoff, 0915 hour#,

17 «Jaa khs and Tenth Aray, CofS - LXXV'i Panser Corps CofS, l£>55 hoars

-2b- MS # S-78

C. Deployment of. Persian He serves, 17 January 19kli

Befor© tiie Allied attaek* reserves In XIV Panzer Corps seotor were primarily loeatsd north of and near C&ssino where they had besn deployed to meet the Allied thrust against 5thMountain and LLth Divisions during the first half of January, (oyerlay Mr, 2). 3?& Panzer Grenadier Division had boen ordered south from ths Adri&tie sector on 15 January to rein force 5th Mountain Division ana 8th Passer Grenadier Seginent eas already in line and had freed 85th Bagj-aant (5th Mountain. Division) and 2nd P Battalion XOUth Panzer Grenadier Saglaant (detached fr«» 15th linger

Grenadlor Division) for reserve status. "The rest of the 3rd Pejnser

Grenadier Division was still with LETvT Panser Gorps or en route, . Two fch acre smaller units, 1st Battalion 115/Penser Grenadier Regiaentj, GHQ

troops and 95th Mobile Battalion (5th Mountain Division), constituted reserves in 5th Mountain Division sector.

IMth Division on VJ Jenusry ms in process of being relieved by

7lst Division* fho 211th. Eegiaent of the latter had been in line sinoe

16 January, while ths remainder of the' division was expected to relieve

the entire Mith Elvis ion within the near future. Ths Mith in turn ms

to relieve the 15th P&nssr Grenadier Division to bsoceae Tenth Arm?

EG serve. Reserves in this sector cons is tad of 13Uth Regiment,Mjth.

Sooon Battalion,, (ijlith Division) and 2lt2nd Assault C-un Battalion.(SHQ

troops)•

Behind ths 15th Panzer Grenadier Division vras one battalion IQUth

Panser Grenadier Iteglaent and one battalion Horxaann Goerlng Panzer Begiasnta

**25** MS # R-78

9iUth Division could only call upon the 9ltth He placement Battalion., sad the othar battalion Hcrsann O-oering Panzer Regiatent which ims dispersed along the ooast from Miutumo to a point west of Fonaia. Farther to the rear isere the ts?o battalions of Panzer Grenadier Regiment Corwin.

ISaga&an Goer lag; Panser Division* * In ell the Germans had thirteen

* Situation sap* Tenth Array, IT January lS'i-w-j in Tenth-'Array KTB IT,

Anlagen* lagekarten, 17* - 23* I« 19bh» Panser Grenadier Heriramt Corwin consisted of the 1st Bn^Sad Panser Grenadier Seglaaentr and the 2nd

Battalion of the 1st Banger Grenadier Herjaant, Ssrsann Qosrln- Panser

Division. battalions in reeorve north of the liri.Elver and only tro battalions

In reserve- south'of the Liri, fs?o store battalions were in reserve be tire en

Cepra.no end Arpino far behind the front lines.

»2S* MS f S-?8

T. The Attack "by British 10 Corns against the Garig11a no River Sector, 17 ~ £3 Jan A. Crossing the C-arisrliaao, 17 - 13 January

Ths assault *.geiast the Ge«aaa positions west of the G&rigliaso

Elver ooourec durtjjg the night 17-18 January X9hh* Starting about 2100 hours 17 January unusually strong artillery fir© pounded the en tire sector 9ii-th Division bothfroia land and sea..*? ' Before aldnight

* Ths fire £r

Allied tomes had landed between adTanee positions and the Eiais lias of resistance (Guetev lias) near Mo-oat d*Argsnto, south, of Minturno, At ths saiae tins, the lav?sr Garigliano was crossed by Allied troops at several points.

The attack caught ths .OeraaBs in their weakest sector and largely unprepared. Only three German battalions sssre In lias at the seetor under attack; Grsr battalion of the 276th Seglaehty and the 9^-i-th Fuesiller

Battalion* were deployed fro®. a point east of Mount Rotonc-e to a point

-27' MS # R-?8

* The Skth Division had three regiments of two battalions each (267th, 27iith. and 27oth) plus one Fussiller Battalion which saight be called a non-motorized reconnaissance battalion, but which, in effect, was a seventh infantry battalion. east of Minturno, jast southeast of the village of fufo. 0n3 battalion

27iith. Regiment was deployed in and ia front of the sain line of resist* anee and long the coast to & point Just west of Mount Scauri. The 1st

Battalion, 27l*th BegjaBtttl UL J11 (ainus tm> companies), one company of the " " " ? Berssaaa Goering Panzer RenlsHmt. and the replacereent battalion of 9lith

Division ware the only reserves ismsdiately available. The replacement battalion v?ae deployed further to tha rear but could be moved up at short notice. g$7th Regiment, 9lxth Division guarded the coast all ths

•®ay to ferraeina. Artillery, too, me less concentrated than further to the nc'th. Two battalions of the 19lxth Artillery Regisient and teo batteries arsy artillery -were located south of Coreno and bstsTesn Ssnta

Maria Infants and Casts lienorato «* a total of 10 batteries,* xhs area

* See appendix for strength report of Gsrzsan divisions. ts&s heavily lained, 2^, 000 sines had been la Ida in 9ltth Division sector.

Kasselring, however, remarked on 18 January that their effeotr; seams to have been ail*

After heavy fighting between night and morning the following picture ©merged in tha forenoon 18 Januarys Allied forces had landed south of Minturno and reached the Via Appia (highway Hr. 7) ^here they

.28- MS # R-73

•were reported digging in. Advance units 274th Resistant temporarily were able- to hold a line from Mount d* Argent© to the ?ia hppia. bridge across the %riglIarxo, Rear' Kinturoo 100 Allied prisoners .tf«re takenj the village of Tufo, east of Minturno, was lost and recaptured, only, to be lost agsin in the afternoon. Allied troops succeeded in forcing their i?ay up the-

Ausante Valley for about cne mile. Other troops advaaeed to the village of &•§.io, east of Gastelforte and beyond the road function south of

Castelforte. Sim&taseoasly straag pressure *&s exerted in the direotim of -Kinturn©• In '%b»; late afternoon an unsuccessful counterattack-*to re- P capture the heists at the southeast sntr^r to the Ausente .Valley w staged with the 94-th Renlaoeaant Battalion, quickly brought up. frosa the rear and supported by earns tanks of a company of the. Hergann Cogging 'Panzer Reglagat.

Sj nightfall IS January, Allied forces had succeeded in establishing & coasiderable bridgehead, across the Oariglianoj the Gestav line had been penetrated south and east of CasteIforte a^d at the .entrance - to the Ausente fallsy .northeast of ttinturao, M&jor breakthroughs were, haseverf averted and the battle was still in .balance.* British units fjartiepating in .the

" * Daily sitrep, Tenth Army. IB Jan 44, in Tenth Army KTB 17. Anlagen

1? - ?I*T,44; and KTB, XTV Sanger Corps. 1,1 - 30.11. 1944, 18 Jan 44. offensive were recognised as the 5th and 56-th Division j the for»er had not been identified previously.

fas smoem of the German eonEsanding officers reflected the serious ness of the situation. Early in the morning both the Conssanding Generals

Tenth Army and XIV Panser Corps expressed their uncertainty concerning the

—2y— MS § R-78

nature of the attack# The possibility that it was a diversionary maneuver, designed to pull dcm-n reserves from the point where the sain attack •was to be staged -was not discounted. Kesselring, however, was convinced by 0900 hours that a ma 5or attack was under way and that a second would soon begin by XI (US) Corps north of Sarit Axabrogio along the Gari and Eapido rivers south of Cassino as part of a coordinated effort to penetrate the Liri Valley, During the course of the day, American troops were positively identi fied for the first time opposite 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, north of the liri Siver. At 0940 hours Kesselring, usually optimistic, eclaimed "I convinced that we are notr faced with the greatest crisis yet encountered £in the Italian caapaim7." he lamented the fact that he and General von Vietinghoff had failed to act decisively 24 hours earlier by shifting reserves south, and cosmented mournfully "all our reserves are located on the wrcng side the northern part of XIV Panzer Ccgps7.w His greatest fear was that the expected attack by II (US) Corps would coae before forces could be shifted to meet it.* A breakthrough into the liri Valley would sake the

*~Telephme conversation, Kesselring - von Vietinghoff, 0920 and 094-0 hours 18 Jan 44, in Tenth Arm KTB IV, An la gen 17. - 21,1* 1944. entire Gustav line untenable while the von Senger Riegel was not yet adequately built-up. Aside froa his om determination to avoid any with drawal, pressure was put cei Kesselring from above. Oi 19 January Hitler signed an order in which he insisted that the present line be held under all circumstances. He also indicated his displeasure with recent develop-

-30- ' MS # R-78

ments by densanding that coananders who had'shown themselves unsulted far their position be employed In the nest lower coaaancU*

•» IFSt, Ausarbeituag Suedwesten« p. 11

-31- MS # R—78

B. German Countermeasures

In order to cope with'the situation Kesselring, General vcxi Vietinghoff, and General von Senger took imediate-steps to reinforce the front of 94th Division and 15th Panzer Grenadier Division by realigning reserves and by increasing firing power. Is some time would have to elapse before additional forces could arrive in the critical area, Kesselring ordered every able-bodied man, regardless of his norsal duties, to be utilised in the frmt lines if necessary,* Panzer Grenadier Regiment Corwin and 44-th

* Teletype, OB SUEDWEST. la to Tenth Arsy. 18 Jan 44, 0925 hours, in Tenth Army KTB IV. An la Ren. 17. - 21, I, 1944.

Reconnaissance Battalico were ordered to proceed immediately tc 94th Ditisim where they arrived in time to participate in the action on 19 January. All detached elements 15th Panser Grenadier Bivisim (me battalion each 104th and 129th Panzer Grenadier Regiment) vrere to move back to their division. 134th Regiment. 44th Division was ordered south to become close reserve of 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. Artillery end projector units were to be relocated to strengthen the area between Cassino and Valleaaio. Fresh reserves were to be made available as addltmal unite of 71st Division and 3rd. Panzer Grenadier, Sivisicn arrived in XIV Panzer Corps area. In addition to the shifts within XTV Panzer Corps, two Army artillery bat tali ms and the artillery regiment 90th Panger Grenadier Division (which had regained in the Adriatic sector after the division moved to Rome) were MS § E-78

ordered south-- from LXIVT Fanner Corps sector. The Corps also was to set in motien all elements and the artillery of 3rd Panser Grenadier Division. anee (including 103rd Panser Reaoaaalas/Battalicn and divisional artillery) aad elements Hermann Goering Panser Division (including the Panzer Reconnaissance

j•

# Tele grass, OB 5UEDWSST to Tenth Army. Nr. 521/44. 1540 hours, 18 Jan 44, in Tenth Artsy KTB I?* An la gen 17. - 21* I, 1944.

The ssost important decision of the day was rsade by rCesselring "when he v further strengthened the front south of the Liri and made forces available for a contemplated counterattack to regain the iaain line of resistance near

Mlfttwao and Castelforte. Thm only nnits available for suck a task had to cazs frcE. the Ease area Into which 29th raid ?0th Panser Grenadier Division had -recently bean aowd. In the early afternoon 18 Jaauary thsss too divi sions -were ordered to proceed to an assent ly area frees where they could be dispatched to the southern front XIv" ranger Corps as soon as possible. At the saias time, Cosjaaadiiag General I Parachute Corps. General der Flieger

Alfred Schles2a,was ordered to proceeded to XIV Panzer Corns to prepare hiia- self for the task of assusing eonnand south of the Liri River, independent ly of XI? Panzer Corps.*

* felogrsas, OB SUSDWSST to Tenth Arary. Hr. 521Alu 15ij.O hcrure, 18 Jan J4I4* in Tenth Army, gT3 IV, AnUzen 17. - 21. 1. IQJJ..

The Ecaas area and the coast north and south of Heme was thereby practically denuded of troops, and any Allied landing attempt -souId pos©

5> MS # R-78

a grave threat to Rome and the rear of Tenth Amy. Eesselring and his Chief of Staff, Generalleutnant Siegfried Westphal, ware con vinced that there v/as no immediate danger of Allied landings*.

* TfPSt, Ausarbsitung; Suecharesten, p. 7 » Telephone conversation,

OB SUBT3T7SST CofS ~ Tenth Aray CofS. 15 Jan 14, in Tenth Army ZTB IV.

Anlagen 12, - 16. I«

sMle -©...breakthrough into the Liri Valley trould -pose a more urgent

threat to Roto (foxir days later the Allies established their beachhead at Ansio-Hettuno).

The considerable re&ligniaent of German strength indicated clearly

Kesselring's certainty that the xaajor Allied effort would be mde south. of Cassino and also that T3CHTI Panzer Corps would not be exposed to a ujs^or attack. MS # R-78

C. Continuation of the Attack Aralnst 9k-th. Division

Heavy fighting in 9Uth Division sac tor cosrtdnuod en 19 January*

The situation remained tensej both BasseIring ana General von

Yistinghoi'L, however, expressed relief that the previous day had passed without irreparable dasage to the G-eraan §j©sition» 9lj-th

Division^was, however, nearing exhaustion and estimated!;that It could hold out LfB hours at best before being overrun. The xssn were enoenraged to hold out by the kaosrledge that strong reinforoejaents

•were on the way (£9th and 90th Panzer Grenadier PiTislon) to ^strengthen the line,

Ihe plan for a continuation of the battle called for holding the line frcea a point west of Mount Scaur 1 to Minturno - Coll© Cesaoole

(hill lo6) *» Castelforte - Mount Pur gator io, until 29th Panzer grenadier PiTislon could begin a countercffensive. This defensive line was called the Sehler Siege1, and constituted a partially build-up swi"bah position to the Gust&v Line**

• Telephone conversation, Kssselring - General von Yietinghoff,

0C£5 hours 19 «Jan I|ii, in fenth Angy KTB IT, Anlagen 17 — 21, X« l9oiu

By 19 January the only reinforoeaents received by 9ltth Division

•srere the Panser Grenadier Regiment Corgi'n» Hrfch Reeotmalseanoe

Battalion, and one battalion 267th Regiment, the last had been relieved from, its sector along the coast by some engineers of Hsrxaann Gooring

Panser Division. Minturno was lost in the forenoon, but 27lith Regiiaent

-55- prevented fur fas r suvanties beyond 35inturso; ~en.iu.so was o&ptured by

British. Forces and recaptured "by Paneer Gren&dier SagiiBent Cerwirit iji'th Reconnaissance aud elenents of the %nssr Sagls-ent Herasmn goer lag <• Fighting raged in the outskirts of CastsIfart© stad a pens- tretion west of CasteIfarte could not be sealed off immediately. An attempt to cross the Sarigliaao in the northern sector of 9lvth Division, eastnortheast of Mount Ornito f?s.s repulsed by 1st •Battalion. 276th

Beglsgnt.

By nightfall the situation remained .dangerous but on the-"whole the lino had he Id end plans wars 2222.de for 29th Passer Grenadier Ci-yj— si on to asanas the effensire the fo-1losing say trith the sission of restoring the main line of resistance in the sector Colle Saivatito «•

Suio (the saall village eastsoutheast of Gagtelf orte )* For this pur- psss g9tn P&nser Grenadier Division assuzaad oossrt&nd orer the sector frees Colle Saivatito, sou •fewest of Caste If or te# to the boundary with

15th Passer Grenadier Division, Artillery support was to bs furnished by the artillery of 9Uth Division and one battalion of the Hermann

Goer jag Artillery Regiment x?hioh had been shifted to this area.*

* Panser Corps KTB 1. X. - 30* YX« 19iiLw 19

Fighting on 20 January continued north and northsresi; of Minturno irhere British forces were stopped Just short of Santa Maria Infants by 1st Battalion, 115th Panser Gr^neAi^r Rffgiaent (GRQ, troops} -Erhose strength barely exceeded a e cap any, The unit s&s the only one supplied MS # 8.-78

9lj.th Division after .additional reserves had been requested. .At

1130 ho tire- 29 th Panser Grenadier Division began its counterattack

with 15th Passer Oren&dler Rr- riraent regaining; the north and southeast

slopes of Cclie 'is.lr2.titc and 71st Pernor Grenadier Reglasnt fighting

for Mount C-astiello, The British countered with a renewed at task of

•pbsir . asm -ss& the battle northwest and southeast of Castelfort© raged

uadeeisivelyv

la the evening £0 January'' the additional ccEriitssnt of 90th

Passer Grenadier Division was authorised by 03 SffSPffBSf to broaden

the counterattack to - the Hiatumo sector and thei&y relieve the

rsressure against 29 th Panzer Srenaj&Lar Division*» 90th Psnser Grenadier

* XIV Pfenzeri Corps,. CT3 1.1,19lii. - 30. YZ. 19Uu 20 Jan Hi*

D5£ision in reality consisted ef a reinforced rcalias at, oailed; Saapf grupge

5aada» and ^as not considered a first class im.itj Kesselring, at first,

had van ted to keep it in reserve in case Allied pressure bee-ass stronger

north of the Liri River. Qm r.orc battalion of the Benaann Gogring

Artillery Regiment w to support Kaisnf frrunge Baade. On 21 January

1 Parachute Corps, aoasanded by General Sc-hlsss* assuaed oc®snsad over

9h%h Division^ gyth fi»& 9Qtfe PsSser Grenadier Dlvis ions to assrsr-e

unified direction of ths attempt to regain the lost positions near

Minturno and Castelforte.

After considerable delay ©aused by shortage of fusl# Allied air

raids, and inefficiency Zastpftertipr^ Baade (90th P&nEer Grenadior Dirts ion)

-57- MS #.B-78

commenced its attack in the Kinturno area at loOO hours 21 January,

Attacks end counterattacks sueeedsd each other with neither- aide gaining significant ground.

The situation bacasa tsnse in the morning 22 January 19UU An the Allied landing at Insio became known, • The Gernans •. 8topped their . counterattack and resumed the defensive to release forces fear imediate transfer to the beachhead, C-ensral von Senger requested permission to withdraw to the von Sender Riegel but Xesselrin." insisted on standing firm, ' * % Parachute Corps relinquished its oogamana to take charge of dsTensive operations &% Anzio, Panzer Grenadier R&gimeat Corwin and

Bsrzaann Goering finger Division artillery 'wore pulled out, while

29th and 90th Panzer grenadier Division remained, Kesselring feared that a withdrawal of S9th Panzer Grenadier Division would create too great a gap in the front Etna open the wsy for an Allied breakthrough* although both von Yietinghoff and von Sanger suggested such a aaove.

With their forces thus weakened the (remans -were unable to resume the offensive; but 10 Corps, too* appeared incapable of sustaining its drive at the old pace, although fighting reaained sufficiently intense to prevent Begimnt Corwln frcaa being released until 2ii January, After

23 Janu&rv the front lines itest of the lossrsr G&rigliano becaxas stabilis ed oaee sore,

Castelforte regained in Gens&a hands while Minturno ma held by

10 Corps, a bridgehead across the losrer Garigliano had been forjuad, but the British ware not able to exploit their advances. Just south of the

-38- MS #E-78

Ilrl Hirer ?rd Bet-hell on, l£9t*n Pang-ay Orenodier Regiment, 1*5th

Bangor.,Grenadier Division, bad successfully repulsed all British efforts to cross the Garigll&no opposite San -Aabrogio. The Gerrtaa lias was bent but not broken., *

* This account is based, unless otharwlee noted,: or XIV Panzer

Corps. KTB YX. 1. - I. 1914. - 30. VI. 19Uu 17 - 23 January isl and Tenth Arny STB IV, 1. - 51. I. 19lik 1? - 23 January

~39~ MS # H-76

D, Gerran Lor res

During all of January 19144- 9l:th Division suffered 1,l>Uo casualties

(«ead4 vrcunded, ads slag, and sick) including 4J4.I ceaclj the vast majority

of tbsss jnuct hare been incurred during the period of hs&vy fighting

18-21; January. 29th P&neer Grenadier Division suffered 1153 casual ties, including l6l deed^ and 90th Panzer Grenadier Division 707 la- eluding 82 dead while engaged on the southern wing'of Tenth A»ay» *

* Casualty Report, Tenth Amy. XXa/XIb, 1-51 Jas JJis la Tgnth

Army KTH IV, Aalas-en Ta e ti g;ke it s be ric ht e IXa/lIb [ a.o.] 1. - 51. I. l9ldi tCH5 AOK 10, 242092/32}.

Total casual ties Tenth Army for January v?sre 12, 95^* of these 1,800 were killed# For the three decades in January the figures are broken

dosm as folfossns {numbers in parenthesis denote dead )i

1-10 January 2,937 (251}.) 10 - 21 January 3t95k (5^5) 21- 51 January 6,011 (851)

The figures for each ton-day period ars not believed to be too reliable* It is probable that during periods of-heavy fighting casualty reports were not received in time.for the tabulation and the figures -were included in the aesrfc period.

—i^0— KS -f R-78

VI# XI (US) Corps Attack against Gari and Sapido River, 20->2lt Jan

Wh.il-3 10 Corps .attack

ing cf the 'Sapido and Sari iliircrs north and south of" flantAagelc by II

(US) Corps troops -was almost relegated to a sMeshcsr- The aotion

caused German oojEmanders no great concern and was capably dealt with

by ths units and artillery deployed in that saetor*

' *• • • • • . Ths crossing cf ths Gari and R&pido River© -was attested along

a five mile stretch between the confluence cf the Garl aiad li^i River &

and a sesII creak, called J?icpstto? to the north. The segment fell

within the area of 15th Paaaer Grenadier Division and uas held fcjr

IQtrhh "anaer Grenadier Segiiagnt with three battalions (frca north to

souths 1st Battalion, 129th Pg,ager Srenadler Itegtraea-fci 3rd Battalion«

IQitth. Pans er Grenadier Re.gixaent, and 115th Panssr Reconnaissance

Battalion)* An attack against 15th Passer Grenadier Dirision north

of the Liri had been anticipated as soon as 10 Corps had started its

drive. Therefore, strong reserves had been ads available which ware

not diverted to assist 9Uth Division in its struggle. The entire

15th Panzer Grenadier Division sector was held by five battalions

in line deployed north and south of the Liri; in addition, two

battalions lOijth Pfenger Grenadier Regiment, IjLtth" Rep-.isient, Ijj^th

Division, and an assault gun battalion were in close reserve behind

the main line of resistance* The sector was further strengthened by

«4j.l—

v MS # B-78

a comentration of fore power and by two rockst projector (Werfer)

regiiasats xaassed behind 15th Passer Grenadier and Liirfch Division* *

v The following units of artillery and projectors were deployed beteeas. Cassino and the border between 15th ?a.nsor Grenadier and 9-Uth

Division; teo battalions 53rd (g.ot) Artillery Regiment. Ig$h ?saser

grenadier Divisions one battalion I9lith Artillery Reginaent. 9kth

Blvlsioa , ons battalion 171st Artillery Rerlaent [71st Division!11

557th Heavy Artillery Battalion (K£ Artillery, 17cm guns and 21csa sorters )j

998th Mortar Battalion (EQ Artillery); fco battalions 5oth FroWt&r

f Werfer] Reelrasnt (SO Artillery h ons battalion 71st Projector Rarisr^wfe

(HQ Artillery}* Overlay, XIV Panzer Corps. Artillery Positions 21 Jen ZjZt,

12 xrr Faaser Corps, STB 71. Aalaaetu Xagekarten Id/la, I.I. - 55.TI.1QMi [ CESj XIV Pz Corps 5BI99/&1

The nuahsr and location of American Divisions t,-es still uncertain on

19 and 20 January. II (US) Corps sector «as believed to extend fron the

eonflusnee of th® Liri and Gari Rivers to Caseino. XIY Panzer Corps

situation &ap for 20 January indicates that II Corps sector had 22+th end

1st Armored Division in line, but lists as possible alternatives 2nd

Armored, Jrd, ^th, and 45th Division.#

•' "• # Daily situation overlay, XIV Tanaer Corps. la, 20 January 1914*, in

' ' . . MV Panzer Uorps, tcm vjl, .ani&gen, la uigeicarten i" CHS XIV Panzer Corps 53199/51.1

«»iL{2«" MS # H-7Q

First iadioetica of activity eloag the R&pido Rive? cans at noon

20 January •when 15th Panzer Grenadier Division resorted that 1st Battalion. 129th Punaer Grenadier Hegiaaat had repulsed -teres attempts fey Asaer loan troops ia platoon strength to advance near Saxxt* Angelo. la the aoraiag 21 January attempts "to fore© the G&ri and Hapido Riv&rs north and south of Sant* A$gelo -ware repulsed. Reporting on the ee-tiea soutii of S&nt* Aagelo* 15th Pfemcr Sremdier Division related that Allied troops had tried to cross the Gari and to build bridges about 1 l/2 Exiles north of ths Liri. Allied tanks, used as artillery* supported ths effort. P Third Battalion loUth Panzer Grsaadler Rsgiassnt prevented Allied troops frcsa gaining a foothold, aided by concentrated fir® of. two-starter batteries, te?o projector battelioas, sad tsro artillery battalions. A similar venture just north of Seat* Angelo proved equally unsuccessful. Hare sam Allied troops gained & hold on ths "©est bank of the Hapido* but a oou'ntera.ttaok b?/ 1st Battalion, 129th Panser Oreaadisr Rggisacat, rein forced by two cotspaniee l^ith Ragriisent^ forced the fesrieans back efter leaving 120 prisoners in Osrxaaa hands. A rensw&d effort to oross th§ river south of Saat* Asgelo detected ia the afternoon and failed to develop bacause GarE&n artillery dispersed &»cl destroyed the assembled forces asd supporting tasks. Levees of 'tesrioaa troops* 550a* recognised as belonging to ^th Division, rroro characterized as hoavy throughout the day, while Oena&s losses in the sssm sootor t?ar© negligible.*

• Daily sitaatioa report^ XT? leaser Corps. 21 Jan is XIV Panzer Corps. KTB VI. Anlagen, faktlscha Heldungen, 1&. - 25. X. IQlili fCRS XT? Ps Corps 58199^3.

-4a3- . MS # H-7Q

During the night 21-22 January General von Vietinghoff issued an ordsr that further attempts to cross th® Sari or "Rapid© Hirers were to be countered with concentrated artillery and infantry fire without sparing sjsaunition, in order to'prevent Allied troops from gaining ground and possibly finding a weak spot in the Geriaan defenses. He characterised American efforts during 21 January as "reconnaissance in force!'* The German estimt© of Allied intentions for the next day

* Order, Tenth An%rt la, &*. lG2h/Llk* 22 Jen 14k in Tenth Arrav, KTB Anton. 17. - 21. I. iqL. ^^ indicated that further attacks with stronger forces were to be expected.*

* Daily sitrep, Tenth Arzny, la, Ir. 1023/ljlu 22 Jan Uht la Tenth Array 138 Aalagen, 17. - 21. I, I9tti.

Qa 22 January, while German ©ossnands war* occupied with the unexpected

Allied landing at Artsio, Aissrioan forces continued their efforts north and south of S&nt* Ingelo •sd.th even more disastrous results. In the sector of 119bh ranger Reconnaissance Battalion and 3rd Battalion, It&th

Panaer Grenadier Regiment, south of Saat* Angclo, Germans c ousted 2I4.O dead on tte west bank. More than 500 prisdas** -srare tsfcsn in local counterattacks against Ajserio&n troops •who had effected a crossing to the -srest bank of the G&ri ©nd Hapido.

There are no indications that even local Geraan reserves were e©omitted by 15th Panzefi Grenadier Division on 22 January. Sensed attacks in ths sans area on 23 January "rare again thsfarted. During ths day units were

-hh- MS # R-78

shifted to Anzio, thereby reducing reserves of 15th Panaer Grenadier

Division. The sane battalions regained in line^ but l?Uth Rer.issnt assussd command over the sector of loUth Panzer Grenadier Regiaeat while the latter, without 3rd Battalion, was transferred to Ausio,

At the saas time* two battalions 53rd Artillery llagissnt also Eoved to Ansio (for further detail's of units shifted to the beachhead see be Ice?, p. i+S). there is no indication that combat actions during 22 afid

23 January interfered with these aoves*

Allied troops continued to exert pressure in the saos sector* on 2i+ and 25 January without breaching German defenses. At the end 25 January,

15th Panser Grenadier Division reported that during the last few days oa its northern wing it had counted ij.30 dead on the west bank of the river end had taken 770 prisoners. For the sass period the division lost 6>k dead and 179 wun&edv* After 25 January all efforts to force a crossing

* Daily sitrep, Tenth Artw» 25 Jan Idh in Tenth Amy j£T3 Anlagen.

22. > 26. I. I9iili« south of Cassino oe&sed.

-h5~ MS # R-73

¥11. Effect of Allied Landing et Anaio on Fighting along Pus tar Lias

Early in th» soraing 22 January 19liU Alli«d troops, reoogsie©d ths

s&m day as belonging to 71 (US) Corps, landed along the shallow beaches

€>f Ansio and Hettuno. The aetion case as a ooaplote sarprisa *• n»t' only

the precise arsa but the iussdasms of lending itself had rssaained ua~

susjjseted «atil the very acsaeafct; that Allied troops debarked £r«a. their

invasion crafts,* Just a fat? days before, on 18 January, Sssseiring had

pf/fche Y&q£lkg gb/^n^io/seer bolapr,

reinforce the sagging southern front of fa nidi Array* leaving only sdnor

elements of 29th Panser Grenadier Division to gu&rd the coast.

Although surprised by tha landing at this time, pre per at ions and

plans to Eiast suoh im eaargeaoy had been mde well inad*raaee Isy OKW far

all theaters, including ths Italian Theater, ami by OB SgBDWSST specifically

for ths Italian Theater. These plans included transfer of one B&nzer

Division frog Tenth Array, bat assicsed that two divisions -arould be iasaediately

available nsar Rone. Additional forces wars to be sad© available by Qg VIES?, •and OS StIBDOST, from northern Italy and frosa Gsraany. Without any advenes •snuraittg of the landing;, ths arrival of troops fron Northern Italy and froa

other theaters at the landing site would cojaa too late to preveai: the dewlopnssnt of a serious threat to fioiae and the rear of Tenth Amy. It MS # E-76

bseasB mcessajy, therefore, to treabsn Tenth Art.Tr and the defensive strength of XI? Passer Corps and L3U.V1 Panssr Cores* The necessity for this sas clearly recognised by femrals von Yietinghoff and Ton .

Sanger- tsho feared that-their Ant^r and Corps• would be confronted'*rith an isjporisible situation If Allied units should succeed in cutting Tital sugply and scsraunicatioa routes to thsir rear*- Both g«xxsrats» for- that reason, advocated an isissdi&t© withdrawal to the von Sanger Elegel* It

«as hoped thereby two divisions ccxild be made amilabls tot- the beachhead frost* Ton Sanger in particularadvocated stash a step as ha «s ^oavineecl

retrograde movement to -a foroad tdthdrewal under eneay pressure** By

*• XXV Panzer Corps, ffT5 1, I* - 30. ^1. 19Hu 22 Jan and telephone

eosversatios Kegselriag von Tietiaghoff, 16^5- kours 22 Jan lji% la Tenth -away

KTB IT, -Aalagea 22. - 27. S. 19iiu

Gustav -Line was to be held and' that no withdresgals were authorised* Only

two concessions were sade to the fast that Tenth Arm' had beccesa very ssuoh weaicert 1) Offensive action la the forzasr see tor of 1 Parachute Sorts m

line it pressure by superior engsjy forces should Bake this mate necessary.*

* Si trap, Tenth; £rsgf* 22 Jiaa -Itf^ in Tenth Amy KTB IV* "i&al&gen 22* -27*

I* 19liU; Order, 03 SuHPlSST. Sr* 677AL 22 Jan % in Tenth Arecr. KTB 17*

Aolagea 22* - 27* 1* l9Uu € MS # S-78

Daring 22 ead £3 JfesMary the -fellcs&sg reorg&slsation of fcs*e@a were ordered •within Tenth /aw to raaks units syllabi# for transfer to the beachhead: 1) I Parachute Corps* under Gsasral Scalane relinquished ecsamud crmr 9iith Division^ 29 th arsd 90th I^aser Qreaadier Pivisi ens ? thsss diTlsioas reverted ~fao XIV P&nssr Cartas* 2) 1-is.nser Grenadier Ptrtslon which had bsrea sade- iSarajr Group ressire ms tr&asferrad to Antic (except Qth Panser Greajadier Begissent •*#hialv'.ressiaed witfe 5th Honniais Division)* * 3) Samm Goerlag Panser Pirisiout Tenth Arsy reserrs, ma transferred • to:ATHiid^ • Spsoifioaily the following 'el@s@nts were pulled out of" lias#

a. ?aaagr Grgn&dlar'; Iteglgamt Corwia b. Bra Battalion Bsraaftg Soeplus; Artillery Eeglasnt c. £ra Battalion Sarsatm goer lag Arrnored Artillery rcogtegat ft« Hermann. Oooring Parser Res etmai s S aase Battalion (this unit had just errlTsd Bt XIY Panzer Corps sector frm 1XX71 Panser Corps and ms not eoias&tt©d la line*) • k) lolith Part&er Grenadier Rs&jaasat (without $rd Sattalloa3» 15th Banger Grenadier Division. was transferred to Anzic. 5) foli©t?iag .Artillery units wer® sieved .to Ansio by XI7 Panser

" Corr>s ' a. l&Oth Heavy Artillery Battalion ' '-i^lst Heavy .Artillery Battalias. q, 7&tth Heavy Artillery Battalion cL 5S5th Tank Destroyer Battalloa MS # B-78

-* 55rd Artillery Sediment (1st and 2nd Battalion) 55ft-.

6) 26th Panser Division unti1 nov? TS3C7T Passer "pros •gas pulled out

of Has and transferred to Aressano as Array Group Esseirre. (25th

Reconnaissance Battalion was en route to XI? Panger Corps and diverted).

7) Other units to bs transferred by UvXV'I Panzer Corps eosprlaod one

mohiw gut* battalion* one battalion 1st Parachute Diylsion and 590th Tank Destroyer Battalion*

8) -71st Division. units enrouts to XIV Panser Corps t?ors dirertad

to Ansle* The fast that Tenth Anny me thus v/eakenod had relatively little

effect on the fighting along the Gustav Line. As sisntionsd above, it b*?~

came necessary tohalt offensive operations ia the southern sector and there

by abandon the attempt to recapture Minturao ana the fonasr min. line of

resistarrae. 10 Corps offensive had, however, lost its punch and the lias

in that area-remained- stable witfe' Cast®Iforis remitting in Gsnaas. and

ifinturao is Allied hemds. In the center of XI? Panzer Corps,. 15th Pan&er .

Grenadier Division ms able to repulse Allied attsspts to cross the Eapido, Carl, and CSarigliano Sivers without eoassitting: strong reserves* ?ho with drawal of one regiment and several artillery battalions did not Materially

affect the division*^ a.bili'ty to .defend its s-actorj nor is there any indica tion that attempts to force the Gari and Eapido Rivers slewed down the trans-:

for of these units to the beachhead. f^s withdrawal of troops and artillery was felt sere 'seriously in the northern sector of £17 Pa&ser Corps which bore the brunt of the fighting

after 25 January lylilj., This action will be the eubjsct of the following MS # E-7S

pages.*

* Tabulation of units transferred to the beachhead is based on th®

folio??!Jag souroest XIV P&nger Corps, KTB, 71, i«X. » 30»^*19UU: 22 and

2J January 19ijUj Orders, Tenth Arssy^ fir, 290AL. and lg?6/Liu 22 Jan JULL^ la

Tenth irgy KTB 17, Anlagon 22. - go, I. 19Uu Order* OB SgBDSEST. 3r. 677/)

23 January 19^4® in Tenth. lr?sy STB 17. Aalaeren, 22« I» «» 2d. I» I9ltlu

;

50- MS #.B-78

Coaabat Action oa th

Fighting in. the northsm ssotcr of XIV Panzer Coras befceraexi 17 end

23 January 19ijii dlfr'not coispsre in intensity to the battle fought along tb© Garigliano, Gari, and lower Hapido • Hiver. After 25 tJaausry# however, ths eaphasie shifted fros. the south to the north# Searing failed to crack ths Gust&r lias and to pen&trat© the Liri Valley south of Cassino, Allied forces attempted to envelop O&ssiao frc® the north and gain entrance into t3as liri Valley oror tbs mountainous region from Cassino to Bslaoate.

•.the attack was sade fcy the French and II (US) Corps against a sector held by Mi-th Division and 5th Mountain Mvisioa, . (See overlay Br. 6)

The lit® ms rather strongly held, but ths desa^s of the beachhead for troops lad' depleted ths reserve strength of XIV Panaer Gorss^and Tenth irnar bad no reserve division at its. disposal to reliefs say of the battle worn divisions la line* Sis front ras held in hhth Blvlslea sea tor by

(south to north.) 211 Regiiaaat, detached 71st PiTlolom 152nd acq 131st aagtesnt, Ishth Division', 191st P^islssnt, dstaohed ?lst Djrisios with, only on© tiattalion in line# 5th Hcuatala Pinsloa had' in line 100th Mfntnfcs^n

Begimest, 5th Mountain PiTlsioai 5th Panzer grenadier' HegSaeat^ /detached

3rd P&nzer Grenadier Division; and Alp ins Battalion. 85th Iksua^ain

Rsgirisnt. 5th Mountain Division; 2nd Battalion. 191st ^giaeati &»2 85th

Bee amaiasasce Battalion,: 5th Mountain Division* o^natituted the reserve

* 85th Itsoonnais saaoo Battalion, at this tite% ma being reorganized out of 95th Mobile Battalion* strength north of Oassino.

-51- MS 4 R*73

Sins® 20 Jarmory Zreaah Ccrps had smde strong efforts to capture -Mount Croc©, as. important anchor of tho Gust&v line just eoutawfcft of Biagpfio* On 23 January Preroh- forees suoosedsd in -capturing a secondary height of Mount Croce, but were he24 la ohack fey the stubborn resistance of the greatly deoimated 3rd Battalion, 8th, Itegiiasnt whigh, during the course of th© battle for Mount Groce, had suffered 73% casualties, and 2nd Battalion* 85th Esgiasnt thrown in to help contain the Prone h., C-ersan counterattacks with; looal reserves stopped the advanoe "but failed to regain %h© lost .ground. At OQOO hours, 25 January 19blh Mtth Division between Cassino and Mount Cifalo: ease under a concentrated attaek by ,.fes-risa.n. and

Freneh Forces* The assault «as belie-rsd carried out by 5**d Algerian Division and el ©seats of Jlith (as) Division vith the objective of capturing Mount Abate and the town of Tarells, thereby cracking the Cassiao defenses from the north and gaining entrance into the Liri Galley* ,.. Between GFassino and the small tomx of Cairo the German lines held firm, but a psnstration was mde along ths Ssaeo MTer In tha direction of Belmont®, fe stop the advanss and seal off the penetration j'Jith Division oossattted the only aval lab Is rescrrs unit. 2nd Battalion. 191st Regiment and sons hastily gathered engineer and artillery troops.*

l"J' " "" * 'The two battalions 85th Reriaent were not arailablo since they |$ad been cossittsd previously in the fighting at and mar Mount Croc®.

-52- MS # a-78

Between Cairo and Cassiao the defense^ aided "by the water-logged

Tenth Amy and XI? Panzer Corps realised that the northern

.Corps sector had bsooas ths sain object of the Allied attack. IjUfch

aagiiaentj Isls-th Division was returned to its division frosa 15th Passer io Grsnadier Division soctor/Tialca additional reserves available in the

Bslmcate - Sara lie sector# A renewed attack against 15th Panzer

Srgsadjgrr Division was thought unlikely oocauso of the defeat"suffer*-

a few days .earlier* 2he Belaonte ceo tor ms further strengthened "by

adding ons battsry of the ^Ist Kocket -Projector Eegiiaant and one

ocEspany 2h2nd Assault £aa Battalion.

On 26 January'' ths Preach succeeded in widening the penetration

toward Mount Belvedere* German counterattacks failed to galasatsaentuEi

because of heavy artillery fire and French attacks in the eaiae area.

IQord Panzer Seoormaissanse Battalion, 3rd Pa&eer Grenadier Division, tf which had remained on the southern wlng/XIT Panser Corps after the

remainder of the Division had been shifted to Ansio, was set in notion

to ijijth Division. January 2J saw heavier Sermn counterattacks with

I'&.th Regiment, 1st and grd Battalion to cut off Allied forces by seal

ing off the entrance to the Belsonte Yalley, These attacks gained soisss

ground but fell short of their objective. aesselring, on this day,

visited ths front lines and came to the oonolusioa that Allied forces

-53- MS # H-78

were not strong enough to force a breakthrough. He warned, however,

that mountain fighting could always lead to unexpected results* During

the day eleiasnts 103rd Passer Reconnaissance Battalion and 85th .

Reconnaissance Battalion •cere comitted la ths sector where the break

through h&d occurred. The artillery colander ET Panzer Corps was ins true ted to see to it that by 29 January the fcliasring pieces eould fire in ths ftelmoate — fetalis arsai Three Mortar batteries, seven raeditaa fie Id howitzer and eight light field hessitser batteries, and

fero roeksfc jjrojeotof batteries. . . . ' f

The key to the Gsriaan defease f&s Mount Abate which changed hands several tiaas. E hasty attempt mss&de to construct a ssitch position

across Mount Abate by all available engineer troops, scae of wham had

to be pullsd out of ths front lines. Blount Abate dominated the Belraerrte

ths vt&y for further advances. As a. consequence, loss of Mount Abate would have seant that the entire Gustav Line f/ould have to be abandoned

to prevent flanking attacks fro® the north. Through radio interoepts

Geinaaa intelligence believed that, on 28 January, ths Allies vrere pre«t

paring to throw an entire new reginant into the pocket and to strengthen

their artillery firing power which mi already exacting a heavy toll.

General von Sanger anticipated a crisis on 29 January or, at the latest,

30 January* In an attempt to alleviate the situation it t?as decided to

•weaken the southern tdng XIY Panzer Corps even further, despite renewed

pressure by 10 Corps. 2nd Battalion, 36lst Segisvsnt, 90th Panser

Sremdier Division was shifted north and two aore battalions of 90th MS # E-78

Panzer Grenadier Division., on® each of 36lg.fr-'and 200th Panzer

Italy#* On.s more battalion 200th Parser Grenadier Esrfgsnt %~&s

• The 90th Panger Grenadier Division,; at tSais tliae, held a sector of ths frost on the southern wing XI7 Panzer Gorpe, Its units,

he®wer# t?srs couple tsly dispersed. On $0th Jamary only 1st Battalion,

3&1 st Ite^laent remained is the southern sector* 2nd Battalion, gSlsfr

Panzer Grenadler Segiment was XIY Panzer Corps reserve In thet north and th© 3rd Battalion, 5olst Panzer Grenadier Re gissnt together trith

the 1st Battalion, 200th Se&inent constituted Kasspf gruppe Behr en route from Central Italy. 2nd Battalion, 200th Panser Grenadier

Rggiisent res with I Parachute Corps at the beachhead and dispatohod

fro X1Y Pax^er Corps on 23 or 29 Jasuary* shifted north on 3Q January.

The greatest vrorry of XI? Panser Corps me the Allied artillery

against tshioh there appeared to be so protection* Even local reserves,

deployed close behind the lines were suffering casualties through

artillery fire* larger units to replace tho depleted units of liUth

Division and 5th Mountain Division, were not available and a "withdrawal

beyond the rango of Allied artillery firs would have been tantamount

fro giving up the entire Gustav Line.

On 29 January Allied attacks in the Beijnonts pocket lost la

intensity - instead. Aooricaa forces were advaKsiag toward Cairo and

the sector just north of C&sslao. It bsesjas very doubtful that the

-55- MS f S-78

line Mount Castsllone » Mount Abate could be held* farther haggling of units took place in a desperate effort to strengthen the line.

Two battalions IjLth Division vridch had been holding a front sector south .of Cassino ware pulled out ts&thout being replaced. and /xaadte* available as reserves north of Saaslno and the northern "sring 5th Mountain PlTlslon u~as also weakened by pulling cut 1st Battalion,

6th leaser Grenadier Eeglma&t* By Jlst January there >?ere eleven Scenpasies of engineer troops is the front lines, because of the ssevere casualties suffered-by regular uziits. f er On 1 Pebn.ia.rj the staff and gqsEan3/90th P&nser grenadier

Division took over a front sector of Mifh Division iao lading the

•team of Cassino, while LLth Dirtsion sector was jaa&e narrower.

The addition of 90th Passer Grenadier Division* at first, meant no great relief, since several days, at least, would elapse before the units of the division which were far fron full strength.-would be able to occupy positions in line.

On 29 January rens-sred tanb- supported Allied attempts to advauoe toward Cairo •srere again r epulsed by 1st Battalion,, Iggrad Re-gteent and 2nd Battalion-151st Regiment. In the early norning hours 30 January an assault supported, according to Gsnsan estia&tss, tgr

I4Q Sherman tanks was somewhat more suooessful una resulted in the capture of the hills south of Cairo. By evening the town itself had fallen after 0erssan anti-tank defenses were knocked out of . action. liUth Division incurred heavy losses during the battle for Cairo and appealed desperately to XI? Parser Corps for fresh troops, * lest further Allied attacks were to result in an

-5S- m f R-73

* Geraan .casualty reports for the period 22-31 January r©» veal that y.;th Djyisioa suffered 6lS casualties, including 128 killed,

5th tt& Division* oaring the saiae period. Incurred 586 casualties including 85 killed. These figures do not indicate such heavy casualties for the two divisions as their daijy reports tmuld suggest.

Hc-ssrerer, both divisions probably lost aost of their men during the

short period of intense fighting. Casualty Report, Tenth £rsy« IIB,

1 — 31 «feusuery 19&&* in Tenth Ansy, KTB I¥, Anlagsn, fasti gkietitsberiohte

Ila/lXb [and others]

irreparable bre&eh in the Gersaan lines. Tot, on 31 January 19iiU* ths Jhasriean troops were usable to enlarge their Cairo salient*

By-the end of the month, however, th© situation remained dangerous for the Gsrsmns everywhere north ©f Casslno* although according to fesselriag and general iron Yietiaghoff far froa critical. Mount Abate

•w&s 'still held by a battalion consisting of ssen after it m lest

wad recaptured lay the Geroans ea 51 "January, and "fee Agericaa advance west of Cairo was temporarily cheeked but ths Genaan line appeared

near the breaking point Judging from the frantic rsports of hlith

Division, fo alleviate ths situation and to preside soiae relief fes?

rslievs the Ccsssaanding General and staff of 90th Panser Grenadier -

Division of responsibility of its southern front sector and assign $e dir/s/e^

it a sector of the Cassino front effective 1 February 19hh* tha plan me to reunite the scattered units of th© division in the nets* -57- MS # H-78 ssoter as soon aa possible. To xa&ke additional reserree available, tear Tenth irxsy, fisnsral' Toa Vietiaghoff withdrew on© regiment of 1st P&r&chute Division from the northern "srlng and designated it Tenth Army reserve,*

• Otter organization; shaages whioh, took pl&c© in tfes beginning of; February did net directly influence the fighting la X1T Paxtser Coras saetor, By 1 February Coras' llausk ( 305th PiTitloa) « disbanded and ... ths-division Teattaohed to th® northers ©orps* SSisaeats 309th Division fcased Ccabat Group. Bode plao&d mad@r LI Mountain Corns .whi@l% as of

X. February had roplaoed 13X71 Pa&ger on the northers wiBg tenth Amy, DOTfl P&asorCorps' assuzaed eejssasd o¥«r a- sector at the beach* hsad oa 2 Ibbrmry, "Tenth Aaay« %&» K3B- IV* 1 - :>1« I» 191J-U sM igB ?«. 1« - 29. XX. 19^ I-aad 2 fob kU« MS # H-78

CcBslusloa

By the end of January 19hU the Allied assault against the Gustav Lane had been in progress for fero weeke, During the eourss of these two weeks scsas dents had been raade in the lino, but major oreak throughs wsre averted by skillful shifting of troops find reserves. lh©n tha Allied offensive opened as If January 19i|l|# 10 Corps succeeded is establishing a beachhead across the Garigli&no and penetrating the -

Guatav Ida®# Kaee«lring,8 decision to strengthen the southern vriag XT? Panzer Corps by shifting 29th Finger Grenadier Division gad strong elements 90th Panzer Grenadier Division to XI? linger Corps sss.de suffi- oient troops available to stop the British advance on 20 January Vjhh, A §enaas oouatera ttac k against 10 Corps oaae to & halt, however, after the Allied invasion at Ansio necessitated a withdrawal of artillery and troops from Tenth Array to the new front, The fact that g9th. and 90th Panser Grenadier Division- were sot on hand to counter ths Allied beachhead, enabled tha Irterican and British forces to l&nd Virtually unopposed. It is highly speculative to olaSst that fesselring's deci sion to weaken fee Horse defeases Bade the Allied landing & sucoeeg. It would undoubtedly have teen iaor© difficult for the invader to so©ur© e, besohhs&df yet, the attempt -.srould probably have succeeded nevertheless. On the other hand, failure to reinforce the hard-pressed southern wing XTV Banger Corps sight wall have resulted in a British breakthrough toward Ausonia and beyond, thereby lacking tha entire Guotav Line untenable.

-52- MS # R-7S

The Allied attack against the center of -XXV Panzer Corps across the Sari and lower Rapido River proved & costly failure to the Mmric&a division involved» The sector had been reinforced with artillery sad reserves just prior to the attack, because an assault Is that sector ted bsau anticipated. 15th Panaer Grenadier Division ms thus able to repulse all efforts at crossing the river, inflicting heavycasualties on the Americans while stiff ©ring only light casualties themselves.

Cassino after 2{? January during Ereaoh - Corps and American efforts to envelop Cassia© from the north. Allied l&ndiags at Ansio had left tenth Array without major reserves and only through desperate juggling of units and weakening sectors not isszaediately threatened were Tenth

Arssy and XT?.Panzer Corps able to compensate for the heavy losses which, according to General von Sanger, amounted to the equivalent of one battalion per day. • fhe French succeeded in breaching the Oustav line in tbs direction of Terelle and Belaonte, but the Gerza&ns desperately held on to the important height of Mount Abate -which, during the course of the fighting changed hands several times, but ms in Gerisen hands by evening 31 January* After initially repulsing American efforts to penetrate the Sustav

January* Cairo fell and Mount CasteHone, another important height through which secondary Gsrmn defenses were built-up hurriedly, ms threatened. In order to prevent a breakthrough in the north, Gensral voa Vietinghoff found it necessary to weaken the southern wing XIV ranger Corps yhere renewed 10 Corps pressure resulted in the loss of sane ground, but no breakthrough ooeured. -60- MS # B-78

By the and at January ths Gustav line remained in danger

especially in ths sector north of Cassino but, despite los&l advances am penstratioas, the Allies had not yet succeeded in penetrating the

liri Valley where acre favorable terrain would have opened the wey for

as afiT&aoe ©a Rosae. Ths- battle had bG©o33§ a battle of attrition. lils-th aad 5th Mountain Bj-gj SIGH were BADLY LA »S4 OF r#et &A3 rehabilitation, while 90th P&qgsr Grenadier Division ms scattered

and hatt been recalled into action on 19 January before completing

T its contenplated period of rest arid rehabilitation* During the fight-

lag ia January Tenth Aray incurred a total of 13,0D0 casualties-* :

-61 date

division Cor'os Army Army fjroup

?&ur5o;?nth

Jrcgr XSife m. SB. <3? . E tes . *£&***<* r^W. V&SU**. 4MW "Vii '-W. fctev*. Corps Slfctiasel^ ,.t» gresees < C C^r&ilssgr Ssgs (hsfch is process

i f& Ctr XTf BE. Ssssass C Bs Uzv* Else I 51& st& j 71st E&& (*>) T«ixi& fed f& Grills®, ^ragr i (®)

ffc BiT*; F,2EE

'SOOX & j3rd ft; fir, ilsarg^m ~ i ffe Wi.w»-1:

IK &sp X Jfepa.

S 'a* fcstsksd tO (B ova; >S Sr Siv as 5 a proesss 39C e^i^slsatica

b« Cfess Ply fa i&ss," SS" Is tmsett gnm

€>• 3-d fig Or ordered to ZTf Ps Cortss IYqel SBEST.P* g^g

date;:

Pivision Corps A"ny Arav SroiiT)

iMh BS Pe fir* B3^s

21? (feoth in. process 0C£23£ES2

£$3$ -preoess i&m m m Gr rsticas OsbssssesS,

¥z Sr a ••: OT £s Jri Be Hit*' {•} 5t2s. Mia. Bsrsssa 6oar3 at, E3^B Ps dv («) 3rd Be -Qr#lEfces

m SlV-

tsftriiare. .saocrii-jsfc

Ik* I «Isaasats 71st Ef still fa trsaslt frte ffearfeggagk W I S-cypg ©TOP so&th&rn fteatfe 4X &&• gH& Pz Gr «a& 93ffo gg -gr (-) attached to t&sn gouthsra ic?i£§» ofxs-b ro%^ MS # a-78

Maex Kr,

9sti.th Infantry Plvleioa

E-cuirssent:

&. Thirty Field Howitzers W "jf®?© 120sa guns e* .'fIfteea 75; m guns eL Sixteen issdium anti-tank guns e, Elevea self-propelled aati-fcsjak guns

Order of Battls an4 Strength of Units:

iih Fussilisr Ba n * w Vin • 9M& B«pl«oena&i £fc" * ff 520-

I9i|.tit Artillery Bsgfc** t

» All figures, ualees otherwise aoted* are oorreot; fer 13 3

-&4- MS # S-78

15th Pariser Grenadier Division (aata)

AselgnM Strength*.*.E* 51*5 (20 January)* is uroa^tal. *##«»*»..*» # * «.•*.*».**«***

Bouaaa-snt;

Field Howitssr.s &ad 100 ses guns «»»*»•«' 37 ^5 am Assault Huns 21 itali&n Assault guns 21 ^.0<*XX££H x&a^3 #• *• . # * .• • »..*... • •. . . 22 Medivca Aatl-taak guas**.,...... 57 Tnrae isoh aatl-t&nk gun... * 5 light anti-aireraft guns,».*...... Four-barrelled anti-aircraft s?aa.....,» 8

Order of Battle aM Strength of Units

lOUth. Es 2r fiegt'• , g^gaagth^ 2* 129th Ps Gr Segt Aciii.-rmd ft -try*a T) Vj • 850

.* Ail figures apply to 20 January I9I4I4. MS # S-78

l&fo. Pivigioa *

Assigned Strength...... 7* 7&1 Ef feetire Strength...... &J1

Anaor aad Weapons* light PieM Mosritser®,...... J5 Medivsa Field Bos'itsers. 100 ^2.21S » * » 4- *«»«:« 4 + « •* « '•*-**•*«*<«•».** # 5 2251 As&ll'UX'C ^l22lS.e • 3

jt03 JiS$$U3.XiS £pil3;S-.» * » * * * * * * <• « *• * * • X£^ .Medium Anti-ta.nk gu&su• • ***.**«*« • J& S€.ir-propellM anti-tank guns*****.**** 1J

Order of Battle and Strength of Units;' Effective Strength J£ 4-«•*,.*« JL *?XSE T *****»«»«* * -*.* • 1* >10 Ks|^t#»# •**»*••##*% . Xj 150 • ••«»*•*+»«** X* 0*70 14+th Eeconnaissance Biu* 520 Ssplao-ssent; Bxw ••••''. 230

*- As of 20 Jarvuar y X944

•66« i m # E-78

5th Mountain Slvislcaa ^

£LIl*sn^~cn»3^7**® Effective Strength...... Ij,. 8^0

Arsor and Taeapoaa- t

X*L|^it H.0^!L*•*% + #12 Kedim Field Bowlt£ers«.6: 75 Em.

Ss-0i2 S.tssi ». * * • * •> • »•... * x!j 20 xsa anti-airoraf't guns*.»,.2o

Order of Battle end Strength of Units; Effective Strength

Sfjth Hegt...... l, lOOtn it® nt* • . • . . •...».. 1^ 77^

95th. Mobilo 730 .Engineer 8a...... 610 Beplae@iaest Ba»»««.,»,»• 130

* As of £Q January 1944

-67- t MS # a-73

3rd Panggy Grenadier PlTigion*

Armor GUd Weapons?

llo figures i.v&ll&ble

Order of Battle gad Stro:urth of Oaltsi Eifeotlw Strength. Sr &3gt(ni^)»*»*»« 2» 070 29tfa Pz Qe Esgt.*,..»».,» 2, 1O0

lOjfefti Ps Hecoa Bxw,«•*»*•» 720 ~ *2 ? &£!,*

.« Figures applicable &e of 1? January 19'ii

-58- MS # E-78

Bsnsanrt Goarin-; Pang-sr "ivlslon -x-

Assigasd Strength.,.,...... 190 Sffeetl'TO

Araor as4 "Sfeapoast J'oId ii0Erxt£©r s,, , 12 Mediua field hosatsers...... 15 Salf-propsIIod ssdfasi fisld hcvd-tsers*...... 6 100 srs' guns...... 11 75 ssi gua trn tank ahassis*. .» 1 20 sa gaa on task chassis**,*....,,. 8

• 75 ssa assault goas«, ...... 2U 105 ss. assault hcwi tears*,,, *»*.*•«* 3 Msditss tsalis, , 27 X&^lit t&alcs*, *.... ,*. • * * * .»•*,« 32 Mediua asti-tank guas, # « »•* * * :• * » » • » 2b- '•Se If -prop© lied aati-taafc guns,...*, 5

Oder of Battle Strength of Units; Effective Strength Psaser Grenadier Regijssat Oor^ia [composed of 1st ba 2ad Panzer Grenadier Eegiceat and 2nd ba 1st Paassr Grsnadic? Hegiirgsnt] *-*»•» *- *• • »• • •*' • * *• » •# **» Xj, 330. P&aser Seeonnaiss&noe Battalion,,* 660 Passer Engineer Battalioa* »«.»•»»« 790

« As of 20 January 1944-

-69- *- • MS # K-ya %

90th 'Passer Grenadier Division { Ssspf gruppe -Baade )

**» Effective- Strength. 1st Bn 3&st Ps .Gi1, .itegt*,**...... «• p30 } Sid Bn jSi st llegt, • * * » *# * « • *#*<#.* » « * * 280 ) , " ) Ksapf grupps Ba&de ^2 3st 200th Sr. Hcgis«'».4#«• *»« •• #• 2S0 } •

figures applio&ole as of 21 January IQli'j- — other figures available

•70-