Studies in Military and Strategic History

General Editor: Michael Dockrill, Professor of Diplomatic History, King’s College, Published titles include: Nigel John Ashton EISENHOWER, MACMILLAN AND THE PROBLEM OF NASSER Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955–59 Christopher M. Bell THE ROYAL NAVY, SEAPOWER AND STRATEGY BETWEEN THE WARS Peter Bell CHAMBERLAIN, GERMANY AND JAPAN, 1933–34 G. H. Bennett BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE CURZON PERIOD, 1919–24 David A. Charters THE AND JEWISH INSURGENCY IN PALESTINE, 1945–47 David Clayton IMPERIALISM REVISITED Political and Economic Relations between Britain and China, 1950–54 Michael J. Cohen and Martin Kolinsky (editors) BRITAIN AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE 1930s: Security Problems, 1935–39 Paul Cornish BRITISH MILITARY PLANNING FOR THE DEFENCE OF GERMANY, 1945–50 Michael Dockrill BRITISH ESTABLISHMENT PERSPECTIVES ON FRANCE, 1936–40 Robert Frazier ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH GREECE The Coming of the Cold War, 1942–47 John P. S. Gearson HAROLD MACMILLAN AND THE BERLIN WALL CRISIS, 1958–62 John Gooch ARMY, STATE AND SOCIETY IN ITALY, 1870–1915 G. A. H. Gordon BRITISH SEA POWER AND PROCUREMENT BETWEEN THE WARS A Reappraisal of Rearmament Raffi Gregorian THE BRITISH ARMY, THE GURKHAS AND COLD WAR STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST, 1947–1954 Stephen Hartley THE IRISH QUESTION AS A PROBLEM IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1914–18 Brian Holden Reid J. F. C. FULLER: Military Thinker Stewart Lone JAPAN’S FIRST MODERN WAR Army and Society in the Conflict with China, 1894–95 Thomas R. Mockaitis BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY, 1919–60 T. R. Moreman THE ARMY IN INDIA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRONTIER WARFARE, 1849–1947 Kendrick Oliver KENNEDY, MACMILLAN AND THE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN DEBATE, 1961–63 Elspeth Y. O’Riordan BRITAIN AND THE RUHR CRISIS G. D. Sheffield LEADERSHIP IN THE TRENCHES –Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British Army in the Era of the First World War Adrian Smith MICK MANNOCK, FIGHTER PILOT Myth, Life and Politics Martin Thomas THE FRENCH NORTH AFRICAN CRISIS Colonial Breakdown and Anglo-French Relations, 1945–62 Simon Trew BRITAIN, MIHAILOVIC AND THE CHETNIKS, 1941–42 Steven Weiss ALLIES IN CONFLICT Anglo-American Strategic Negotiations, 1938–44

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Raffi Gregorian Senior Adviser US Department of State Washington USA © Raffi Gregorian 2002 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2002 978-0-333-80148-2 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his rights to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2002 by PALGRAVE Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE is the new global academic imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC Scholarly and Reference Division and Palgrave Publishers Ltd (formerly Macmillan Press Ltd). ISBN 978-1-349-42114-5 ISBN 978-0-230-28716-7 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9780230287167 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gregorian, Raffi, 1964– The British Army, the Gurkhas and Cold War strategy in the Far East, 1947–1954 / Raffi Gregorian. p. cm. – (Studies in military and strategic history) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-349-42114-5 (cloth) 1. Great Britain. Army – History – 20th century. 2. Great Britain – Military policy. 3. Gurkha soldiers. 4. Cold War. 5. East Asia – Strategic aspects. I. Title. II. Series. UA649 .G683 2001 355’.033041’095–dc21 2001036345 10987654321 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 Contents

List of Tables ix List of Figures x Acknowledgements xi Preface xiii Glossary of Abbreviations xvi

1 Introduction 1 Sources 6 Approach 9

2 ‘Future Defence Policy’: the Far East as Strategic Backwater, 1945–48 11 Introduction 11 Global strategy 18 From SEAC to FARELF: military strategy in the Far East, 1945–48 24

3 National Service, the Gurkhas and the Reorganization of the British Army, 1946–48 32 Development of the postwar British Army 33 Filling the manpower gap: the origins of the British Army Gurkhas 36 GHQ FARELF, local forces, and the ‘Gurkha Project’ 42 Development of the Gurkha division 44 Teething pains: the Gurkhas arrive in Malaya 46 The Brigade of Gurkhas 48 Conclusion 49 4 FARELF and the Malayan Emergency, 1948–50 51 The Communist threat 52 FARELF and the British response 54 ‘Ferret Force’ 58

v vi Contents

Despatch of the ‘fire brigade’ 59 Training 61 The Gurkha Division 62 Local defense forces 63 A new C-in-C shakes things up 65 A fillip to the MCP: Communist victory in China 67 Renewed call for reinforcements 68 Conclusion 74

5 ‘To the Last Round’: the Defense of Hong Kong, 1948–50 77 The 1946 Hong Kong defense policy 78 Rethinking Hong Kong defense policy 80 A Communist threat on the horizon 82 Colonial Office jitters 83 The garrison’s role and the reinforcement dilemma 84 Assessing the strategic implications 87 HMS Amethyst and a brigade group for Hong Kong 90 Contemplating war with China 91 Scoping the effects of suppositional reinforcements 93 The decision to defend 95 Thinking in the long term 98 Military preparations in Hong Kong 99 Thinking about Hong Kong in a global war 101 Hong Kong and British recognition of the People’s Republic 102 Robbing Peter to pay Paul 105 Conclusion 107

6 Adapting to Reality: the Far East and Cold War Strategy, 1950–54 109 The strategic impact of a Communist China: the view from Whitehall 110 The view from Singapore 113 Singapore’s call for coordinated containment 114 The Colombo conference 116 ANZAM 117 Updating Far East strategy and policy 118 The Far East and the ‘global strategy and defence policy’ of 1950 119 Contents vii

‘In light of the present situation’: updating DO(50)45 122 The strategic reappraisal of 1952 125 The ‘Radical Review’ 128 Conclusion 133

7 Between the American Scylla and Chinese Charybdis: Hong Kong, 1950–54 135 Hong Kong, FARELF and the Korean commitment 136 Land forces for Korea 138 Reassessing the threat 142 Strategic deception and a new policy for Hong Kong 143 The United States, Hong Kong, and the war in Korea 147 Mixed signals 148 Getting Hong Kong on the allied agenda 151 ‘Indefensible’ 152 The US and Hong Kong: from deception to commitment? 155 Five Power planning for Hong Kong 159 Reduction of the garrison 161 Conclusion 163

8 Manpower, the Strategic Reserve and the Malayan Emergency, 1950–54 165 Malaya at the start of the Korean War 166 Malaya, colonial troops, and the new strategic reserve 167 A Federation Army 169 India, Nepal and the British Army Gurkhas 172 The Communist campaign against the British Gurkhas 175 The end of the Gurkhas? 176 Conclusion 178 9 Siam and the Commonwealth Defense of Malaya 180 Siam in relation to the defense of Malaya 181 The ‘Songkhla position’ 182 Planning begins under changing strategic assumptions 185 Plan IRONY 187 Revised force requirements 188 A change in Allied strategy and new thinking about reinforcements 189 viii Contents

The role of deception 190 Plan RINGLET 191 Ministerial briefing 192 Reassessing the initiating triggers 193 The improving situation in Siam 194 Plan WARRIOR 196 A Commonwealth role in the defense of Malaya 198 Conclusion 200

10 Limited Liability and the Defense of Southeast Asia, 1950–54 203 The importance of French Indochina to British Southeast Asia 204 American aid for Indochina 205 Thinking about collective security 206 Tripartite talks 209 The effects of a possible French withdrawal in 1952 212 Five Power Staff Agency (FPSA) 214 Dien Bien Phu and the American call for ‘united action’ 215 The US request for British intervention 218 The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty 221 Conclusion 222

11 Conclusion 225 Strategic sufficiency 230 Epilogue 234

Notes 237 Select Bibliography 308 Index 323 List of Tables

1.1 Declining power’s beliefs about interacting with adversaries 4 3.1 Strength of the armed forces, 1945–48 34 6.1 Expansion of the British Army, 1950–52 123 7.1 The radical review and the Hong Kong garrison 162 8.1 Number and source of infantry battalions in Malaya, 1948–54 172 11.1 Actual and planned deployments of British divisions in 1948 229 11.2 Actual and planned deployments of British divisions in 1955 229

ix List of Figures

1.1 London–Singapore Central Defence Organization 8 2.1 Distribution of the British Army as at 31 December 1946 13 3.1 FARELF order of battle in Malaya and Singapore, June 1948 47 11.1 Strength of principal overseas commands, 1948–54 232 11.2 Strength of home and overseas commands, 1948–54 233

x Acknowledgements

A work of this magnitude could not have been completed without assistance from a variety of advisers, friends, colleagues, and officials. Dr David Charters suggested the idea of focusing on the theater com- mand level, while Professor Eliot Cohen supported me morally, acade- mically, and, with the generous assistance of the Bradley Foundation, financially as well. I owe special thanks to the following people: Dr John Mackinlay for his assistance in arranging interviews and access to private material; Dr Timothy Moreman for encouragement and support as both a friend and colleague; - Julian Thompson, CB, OBE, for his help in arranging personal interviews and access to important papers; Brigadier Maurice Tugwell for his invaluable aid in putting me in touch with a number of Far East Land Forces (FARELF) staff officers; Major- General Timothy Toyne Sewell, for his help with the Staff College; Professor Thomas Mockaitis for his feedback, suggestions, and encour- agement; Dr Michael Dockrill for advice and personal references; Dr Cathy Swan for her accommodation of my 1991–92 study schedule; and Sanders Marble, who helped me conduct some last-minute ‘remote’ research at the PRO. Thanks also to my colleagues Steve Rader, USA (Ret’d) and Bill Rosenau, both of whom provided needed criticism and insight, and Bill for his recommendation about Charles Kupchan’s The Vulnerability of Empire. A number of people gave graciously of their time and privacy, espe- cially: Lady Keightley and her son, Major-General Richard Keightley, CB; Charles Loewen; Colonel Templer; and General Sir Walter Walker, KCB, CBE, DSO. Library and archive staffs provided invaluable help, and always with a pleasant disposition. Although too numerous to mention by name, they work for the Public Records Office, the India Office Library and Records, the National Army Museum, the Imperial War Museum, Royal United Services Institute, the Gurkha Museum, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, the National Archives and Records Administration, and, of course, the SAIS library, without whose forbearance I would not have been able to finish the work. Crown copy- right material from the Public Record Office is reproduced by kind per- mission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. My thanks

xi xii Acknowledgements to the Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London, for permission to use papers from the collection. The most important backing came from my parents and my wife. To my parents I owe the great privilege of a first-rate education. But it is to my wife, Bernadette, to whom the greatest debt is owed. At one point she had three jobs to ensure the continuation of my studies, and gave of her time and emotional energy more than I can ever repay, all dur- ing a period of painfully personal travail. I can only hope that she will think it was worthwhile. Preface

I initially chose to study British military strategy in the Far East from 1947 to 1954 as a means to understand the military context in which Commonwealth forces conducted military operations against Indonesia during the ‘Confrontation’ of 1962–66. My research revealed that the preceding period was far more complex and informative than I had previously understood. I was particularly struck by two things, the first being the apparent disjunction among the ways, ends, and means of British strategy and defense policy. The second was the evi- dent success the British achieved in meeting their strategic objectives in the Far East. Standard interpretations of these seemingly contradic- tory phenomena simply discount strategic success and claim that Britain overextended itself in terms of its reduced power after World War II. Postwar Britain was undoubtedly in relative decline but this had been the case since the beginning of the twentieth century. Many scholars have attributed its relatively poor postwar economic perfor- mance to supposedly excessive defense spending and ‘strategic overex- tension’. Yet as I contend in this book, such criticism is misplaced and misses the fact that British military strategy was entirely successful and did not constitute overextension, itself a subjective phrase usually definable only by the presence of military defeat. In retrospect, some economic and defense policies may have been inadvisable and the active duty Army was indeed stretched thin by numerous contingency operations. But such mistakes as may have been made should not obscure the fact that by a judicious application of military deployments and diplomacy, Britain played a major role in the Cold War that was entirely in keeping with what Michael Howard has called ‘traditional British strategy’. Contrary to Liddell Hart’s polemic rendering of the ‘British way in warfare’ as being chiefly an indirect maritime strategy combined with subsidies to continental allies, Howard states that a ‘commitment of support to a Continental ally in the nearest available theatre, on the largest scale that contempo- rary resources could afford … was absolutely central’ to traditional strategy.1 This book is about how Britain, following its traditional strategy, and focusing on the defense of its strategic core, achieved its objectives even

xiii xiv Preface in the face of major challenges in the Far East, its strategic periphery. It focuses on military strategy, and delves into air and naval strategy only as is necessary to elucidate the main subject. My reason for this is simple: the British Army bore the brunt of the Cold War burden and it is only by studying its planned and actual deployments that one gets a proper understanding of what the British government valued enough to place ‘boots on the ground’. To those readers not overly familiar with the British military estab- lishment, a review of a few conventions about the basic organization of Army forces might be helpful. Unlike in the United States Army, a British infantry regiment is more an administrative unit than a combat one. In most, but not every, instance in this period, it consisted of only one battalion, whereas before 1939 it usually consisted of two ‘paired’ battalions, one of which served abroad, the other at home. This was known as the ‘Cardwell system’, after the Secretary of War that devel- oped it in the 1870s. Cavalry, tank, and artillery regiments, on the other hand, always consisted of a single, battalion-sized formation. In terms of combat formations, infantry brigades normally consisted of three infantry battalions, while a brigade ‘group’ usually denoted an infantry brigade reinforced with field artillery, engineers, various sup- port troops, and possibly even an armored squadron. Infantry divisions usually consisted of three brigades, backed by an artillery brigade, an armored regiment, and divisional support troops, including anti-aircraft and anti-tank units. Regiments’ names were usually abbreviated and the respective battalion placed in front; hence the 1st Battalion of the Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders is rendered as 1 A&SH. All four of the British Gurkha regiments were referred to as ‘rifle’ regiments, so the 2nd Gurkha Rifles is abbreviated as 2 GR. Since each of the Gurkha regiments actually had two battalions, the battalion number precedes the regimental number, so the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Gurkha Rifles is rendered as 1/2 GR. With respect to nomenclature, readers should be aware that during this period the British usually referred to the Soviet Union and Soviets as Russia and Russians, and Thailand and Thais as Siam and Siamese. References to the Soviet Union are found in this text, but for the sake of consistency and clarity, I have chosen to use only Siam and Siamese in referring to Thailand. Also for the sake of clarity, I have decided not to include the classification levels of the documents cited in the notes. In almost every instance these documents were ‘Top Secret’, and the reader can assume as much. Similarly, because the vast majority of the cited documents came from the Public Records Office (PRO), the reader Preface xv can assume that a document comes from the PRO unless it specifically refers to another repository such as Imperial War Museum (IWM), India Office Library and Records (IOLR), National Army Museum (NAM), Gurkha Museum (GM), Liddell-Hart Archives (LHA) or National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Glossary of Abbreviations

ABC America–Britain–Canada global war planning program ACFE Air Command, Far East (later renamed FEAF) ADM Admiral; Admiralty Papers (PRO) ALFSEA Allied Land Forces, South East Asia ANZAM Australian–New Zealand–Malayan Command Area ANZUK Australian–New Zealand–UK force ANZUS Australia–New Zealand–United States Security Treaty AVM Air Vice Marshal AWM Australian War Memorial BAOR British Army of the Rhine BCOF British Commonwealth Occupation Force (Japan) BDCC(FE) British Defence Coordination Committee (Far East) Bde Brigade BFHK British Forces Hong Kong Bn Battalion BO British Officer BPF British Pacific Fleet BSMB British Services Mission Burma C-in-C Commander-in-Chief CAB Cabinet, records of (PRO) CAS Chief of the Air Staff CCP Chinese Communist Party CGS Chief of the General Staff CIC(FE) Commanders-in-Chief Committee (Far East) CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff CNS Chief of the Naval Staff (First Sea Lord) CO Colonial Office COS Chiefs of Staff COSC Chiefs of Staff Committee COSSEA Chiefs of Staff to South East Asia (classified cable) CRO Commonwealth Relations Office CSO Chief Staff Officer DC Cabinet Defence Committee DEFE Defence (PRO) DMI Director of Military Intelligence DMO Director of Military Operations DMT Director of Military Training DSD Director of Staff Duties FARELF Far East Land Forces FEAF Far East Air Forces FEDSEC Far East Defence Secretariat FO Foreign Office FOM Federation of Malaya

xvi Glossary of Abbreviations xvii

FPSA Five Power Staff Agency FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States (Serial publication) FTC FARELF Training Center GHQ General Headquarters GM Gurkha Museum GOC General Officer Commanding GR Gurkha Rifles GSO General Staff Officer HC High Commissioner HKLF Hong Kong Land Forces HKVDF Hong Kong Volunteer Defense Force HMG His/Her Majesty’s Government HMS His/Her Majesty’s Ship HRH His Royal Highness Inf Infantry IOLR India Office Library and Records IWM Imperial War Museum JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff (US) JIC(FE) Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) JPS(FE) Joint Planning Staff (Far East) KAR King’s African Rifles KMT Kuomintang KOYLI King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry LEP Locally Enlisted personnel LHA Liddell-Hart Archives MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group (US) MCP Malayan Communist Party MDAP Mutual Defense Assistance Program (US) MELF Middle East Land Forces MGBG Major-General, Brigade of Gurkhas MoD Ministry of Defence MRLA Malayan Races’ Liberation Army MSS Malayan Security Service NAM National Army Museum NARA National Archives and Records Administration (US) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCO Non-Commissioned Officer NNC Nepalese National Congress NSC National Security Council OR Other Rank (enlisted man) ORS Operational Research Section PHPS Post Hostilities Planning Staff PLA Peoples’ Liberation Army PM Prime Minister PRO Public Records Office RA RAAF Royal Australian Air Force RAF Royal Air Force RAR Royal Australian Regiment xviii Glossary of Abbreviations

Regt Regiment RG Record Group RM Royal Marines RN Royal Navy RNZAF Royal New Zealand Air Force RTR Royal Tank Regiment SAS Special Air Service SCOSC Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee SEAC South East Asia Command SEACDT South East Asia Collective Defense Treaty SEACOS South East Asia to Chiefs of Staff (classified cable) SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization SIS Secret Intelligence Service SOE Special Operations Executive SSC Secretary of State for the Colonies SSCR Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations SSFA Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs SSW Secretary of State for War TA Territorial Army (reserves) UK USAF United States Air Force USSW Under-Secretary of State for War VCIGS Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff WO War Office